T3 B7 Dialogue W Commissioners Fdr- Notes Re 11-13-03 Team 3 Meeting W Kojm And Hamilton 097

To:

Team 3

From:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Some Quick Notes on Last Week's Meeting with Lee Hamilton Date:

November 19,2003

Team 3 reps—Allan, Hawley, Hurley—met with Lee Hamilton at the Woodrow Wilson Center on Thursday, November 13. Chris Kojm and one of Lee's assistants also attended. The following are Lee's comments: •

CT is a vast field. How did our government organize itself to deal with it.

•

Is the government currently optimally structured to fight terrorism?

•

How do you bring all the separate governmental strands together in the best way?

•

What is the balance between the military response and the non-military response? Is that balance right?

•

Explain al Qaeda. What do we understand about it? (Note: We pointed out that Team 1 is working on this.)

•

Who are we fighting? Who is the enemy? We owe it to the American people to tell them.

•

There are consequences to policy choices. What were he consequences? For example, we put U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990. Good reasons to do it. But those choices had consequences which led to 9/11. These choices put in motion counter forces; it is difficult to see at the time choices are made what they will lead to, set in train.

•

No matter how good the message is on public diplomacy, there are still consequences and policy trade-offs.

•

The law of unintended consequences.

•

We need to identify the choices that were made.

•

CT is now a central focus of American foreign policy. What does this mean? Are we so focused on it that we are neglecting other things? Too heavily focused to the exclusion of other priorities?

•

The problem of terrorism: Where does terrorism fit into the national security interests of the U.S?

•

Roots of terrorism: What are they? What are the right instruments to combat bring to bear?

•

What is at the heart of the terrorism problem? Causes are varied. American public hasn't thought this through. We, the Commission, must do that work for them, then explain it clearly.

•

Lee described how during a recent speech he said "we need to attack the roots of terrorism." Someone in the audience, an expert on terrorism, responded that that was preposterous. What we need to do, he said, is kill terrorists.

•

Caused Lee to ask question: "What are the roots of terrorism? And what can we do about them?"

•

He related a politician's trick: People ask politicians to resolve impossible problems. Pol knows they are impossible, often requester does as well. Pol listens, gives the impression that he is on the requester's side, expresses sympathy. Maybe, we need to do more of this hi Islamic world? We can't solve poverty, misery, illiteracy, anger at autocratic governments. But maybe we can portray ourselves better as the champion of the downtrodden.

•

Lee: 40 years ago we cut a deal with the House of Saud. We wanted cheap gasoline, in return we would overlook corruption of Saudi regime. Bargain with the devil. Do we have shared values? Shared interests? No.

•

Lee expressed interest in Pres. Bush's recent speech about our goals in the Middle East. Bush said all the right things. Test will be what Bush does, or will we continue with the same policy, for example, with respect to Saudi Arabia?

•

Re Pakistan: Musharraf is our ally as long as he does things we want. But do we share values?

•

MH point: We may have adopted a strategy that was short on offense. Did al Qaeda see an attack on the U.S. homeland as a "soft target?"

• Lee's practical advice on interviewing Principals: —Develop coherent line of questioning; —Ask most important questions first, as time will go by quickly and interviews will likely be cut short. --Expect they will try to filibuster, to drag out replies to questions to reduce the number of questions asked.

> Lee on policy recommendations: -What was right about U.S. policy pre-9/11? -What was wrong about it? -Why did we do wrong what we did wrong? -Have we corrected it? -What has been done since 9/11? -What has our government learned? -Write it straight and draw lessons

Meeting of Team 3: Mike Hurley, Len Hawley, and Scott Allan with Vice-Chairman Hamilton and Chris Kojm November 13, 2003 Notes Taken by Ben Rhodes Interviews: Mike Hurley said the Team has conducted at least 50 interviews, most with mid-level people to "clear out brush" before interviewing high-level deputies and principals. The Team also interviewed about 70 people on foreign travel. Lee asked how the Washington Times got this story. Mike Hurley said someone they interviewed in Pakistan probably leaked. Agencies: Scott Allan is working on State - how diplomacy was used towards key countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan in the run-up to 9/11. He is also working on DoJ/FBI to assess their policy options. Bonnie Jenkins is working on DoD and their policy options - what was the environment and planning for military strikes? Alexis Albion is working on CIA, along with Dan Byman. Warren Bass is working on the NSC. Task and Report: Lee asked how the Team defines its task. Mike Hurley said they aim to produce the most comprehensive and complete monograph possible on U.S. counterterrorism (CT). The monograph would detail the period from 1998 through 9/20/01, and then assess the policy side of the war on terror with an eye towards recommendations. Lee asked what the product would look like. Mike Hurley said the Team is putting together a timeline, and will turn that into a narrative chronology off of which they will build the monograph. It will probably be highly classified. Policy Critique: Lee asked how critical the Team will be. Mike Hurley said they will be objective and offer factual details, but themes will emerge implicating policy failures. DoD was not doing much pre-9/11 on offensive response and proactive strategy. State's efforts toward the Taliban - sanctions and pressure on Islamabad - were not working, and frustration was building within the Department. Did this diplomatic approach stand a chance? The answer is probably no. Parts of the CIA understood the threat. But a small group carried a heavy load; other elements of national power were needed. Len Hawley said they would also look at homeland security. Mike Hurley said root questions are: what did policymakers know, and what did they do to act on what they knew? Help from Commission: Lee asked what the Commission could do to help. Mike Hurley said they need their notes back from the White House. Warren Bass is taking detailed notes that he needs to prepare for interviews and drafting. The White House thinks the notes are too detailed and is holding on to them. Dan Marcus is working on the problem. Lee said to let him know if anything further needs to be done. Lee asked if the Team needs any subpoenas. Mike Hurley said no, but there are some problems getting policy documents f-om DoD. Lee said that he and Phil Zelikow brought this up with Secretary Rumsfeld, and he was supportive. Mike Hurley said DoD had been forward-leaning on briefings - the Team is waiting for documents, and is pleased that DoD

has identified 96 boxes in its archives. If Rumsfeld maintains a forward-leaning attitude the Team should get what they need. Specific Issues: Lee then turned to specific policy issues. He stressed that he spoke for himself and not all Commissioners: Organization: Lee asked if our government is structured to fight terrorism. How do we bring all of these different strands together? He is interested in balance between military and non-military response. Bush once said the non-military parts of the war on terror were most important, but it seems the pendulum has swung towards a military response. Lee feels the non-military aspects are just as important and need to be emphasized. For instance, running down bank accounts is hard to sustain, but absolutely critical. Al Qaeda: Lee asked which team is working on understanding al Qaeda. Chris said that it is Team 1 's responsibility, but Scott Allan added that there was natural overlap to policy analysis. Lee said he is concerned about how little we understand al Qaeda and terrorism. For instance, in Iraq we don't even know who we're fighting. We also don't understand the attraction of al Qaeda as an ideological movement. Len Hawley said al Qaeda is not just a group - it is a Jihadist movement with tremendous popularity in parts of the Muslim world. It is not just UBL and his guys. Lee said we have chosen to personalize the war against al Qaeda, which works for political purposes at home. But the Commission must instruct the American people about the nature of al Qaeda. Consequences of Policies: Lee said that he is concerned about the consequences of our policies. He remembers no debate about putting troops in Saudi Arabia. That may have been a good policy, but it triggered UBL. When we support Israel, that has consequences; when we back Musharraf, that has consequences. There are limits to public diplomacy and "getting the message straight" when some of our policies - no matter how justified — are unpopular. Len Hawley said the Team seeks to identify policy trade-offs on different issues. What would be the unintended consequences of certain actions? Lee raised Bush's plan to democratize the Middle East. What about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? If Bush does not follow-up on his rhetoric, there could be a serious hypocrisy backlash. Mike Hurley said thii issue applies to CT choices as well as foreign policy. After the embassy bombings we decided to harden our facilities abroad. The consequence of this was pushing terrorists to softer targets. Recent attacks in Bali demonstrate this, though such attacks may undercut popular support for terrorists. Counter-Terrorism versus other issues: Lee said the Team should look at CT versus other issues. President Bush sees everything through the prism of terror. Lee thinks we're weighted too heavily in this direction. The Team needs to put terrorism in perspective. Where does it fu in our foreign policy agenda? Len Hawley agreed that the perfect CT policy might not be the most desirable because it shuts out other concerns. Root Causes: Lee is concealed about root causes of terrorism, though he knows some think it irrelevant. Scott Allan said Ambassador Chamberlain raised this issue. She does not have much faith in public diplomacy - we need to spend our money building schools

and roads so that people see tangible gains. Mike Hurley said the task is too big. Saudi Arabia has something like 80% illiteracy. How do you combat that? Lee recounted a politician's trick. When someone asks for the impossible, you don't say no - you let them know you're on their side and are sympathetic to their concerns. That alleviates some of their distress. It's the same in foreign policy. Countless people around the world have absolutely no future. As a Nation, we need to convey that we're on their side. Len Hawley said al Qaeda preys on young men with no future by giving them an option. Lee said he thinks terrorism is a young man's game. We need to convey to 15-30 year old Muslim men that there is another option. State-Sponsors: Lei raised state sponsors. The Team needs to assess whether this is the heart of the problem. He thinks it is more varied and many groups act independently. Scott Allan said our policy has evolved over twenty years. We came to realize that isolated groups in the Philippines could be more dangerous than groups sponsored by Libya or Syria. Len Hawley raised the State Department's list of sponsors. It is a meaningless document that serves domestic political concerns. Lee said he does not think the list helps the war on terror. Saudi Arabia: Lee raised the issue of Saudi Arabia. We have had a deal with them for decades - oil for v.s, security for the Hcuse of Saud. It worked, but the relationship is shallow, based on stared interests and not shared values. The Team should look at whether we should continue that policy. Wt have to balance our interests. Some people want to pull the rug out from under the Saudis, out tnen what would we do about oil? Senior Level Interviews: Chris said there has been a good response for interviews at the Assistant Secretary and Secretary levels. The remaining questions are Rice and Hadley, and the Vice-Presidents and Presidents. Lee said that before Cabinet level interviews he wants to know about the line of questioning. He stressed that time will be limited, and you need to lead with important questions and ask for the right to submit written questions. Secretaries will squeeze on time and filibuster. Chris said the Commission staff would sit down with their timeline and work off of it in preparing for interviews. Assigning Blame Mike Hurley returned to criticism. He thinks it is inevitable that analytical trends will emerge, but Lee has cautioned against assigning blame. Lee said he is reluctant to blame one person or agency. But you have to write it straight. At the end of the narrative you shift gears to lessons. What did we do right? What did we do wrong? Why did we do this? It is possible someone messed up, but more probable that there were systemic problems. Tlien you have to move on to what we've done since 9/11. What have we done correctly; What have we done wrong? This leads to recommendations. Families: Scott A iuri asked about ikmihes. The Team has not interacted much with them. Lee said there is a wide-range of views among the families. Many want to hang somebody and will no; be satisfied wiai the Commission's report. He understands they are deeply frustrated at lack of transparency in the government. But it is hard to pin responsibility in the USG. Chris pointed out thai some of the families want to pursue tangents. Lee said the Commission should do its absolute best to address their concerns, but he expects that some of them will not be satisfied.

Team 3 Meeting with Lee Hamilton Thursday, November 13, 2003 -Will ask us what our major policy issue is. —Where are we in documents and interviews? Status updates —Where are we in narrative? Rolling monograph? Due Dates? —Time line? Organized timetable? Specific Issues: —Where are we headed? —Sequencing? —Will there be a face-to-face process with Commissioners so there aren't 10 critics? —How will all of this work?