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Los Angeles Times June 20, 2004 Sunday Copyright 2004 The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles Times All Rights Reserved Los Angeles Times June 20, 2004 Sunday Home Edition SECTION: MAIN NEWS; Foreign Desk; Part A; Pg. 1 LENGTH: 1900 words HEADLINE: The World; 2 Allies Aided Bin Laden, Say Panel Members; Saudi Arabia and Pakistan let terrorists flourish before 9/11, apparently in return for protection from attacks by Al Qaeda. BYLINE: Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writer DATELINE: WASHINGTON BODY: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for the Sept. 11 attacks by cutting deals with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden that allowed his Al Qaeda terrorist network to flourish, according to several senior members of the Sept. 11 commission and U.S. counter-terrorism officials. The financial aid to the Taliban and other assistance by two of the most important allies of the United States in its war on terrorism date at least to 1996, and appear to have shielded them from Al Qaeda attacks within their own borders until long after the 2001 strikes, those commission members and officials said in interviews. "That does appear to have been the arrangement," said one senior member of the commission staff involved in investigating those relationships. The officials said that by not cracking down on Bin Laden, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia significantly undermined efforts to combat terrorism worldwide, giving the Saudi exile the haven he needed to train tens of thousands of soldiers. They believe that the governments' funding of his Taliban protectors enabled Bin Laden to withstand international pressure and expand his operation into a global network that could carry out the Sept. 11 attacks. Saudi Arabia provided funds and equipment to the Taliban and probably directly to Bin Laden, and didn't interfere with Al Qaeda's efforts to raise money, recruit and train operatives, and establish cells throughout the kingdom, commission and U.S. officials said. Pakistan provided even more direct assistance, its military and intelligence agencies often coordinating efforts with the Taliban antTATQIecia they said. ~

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http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=8aOa7adl52el577406d92558aelf52b8&docn... 6/25/2004

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

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Distr . GENERAL

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S/RES/1054 (1996) 26 April 1996

RESOLUTION 1054 (1996) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3660th meeting, on 26 April 1996

The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996, Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1996 (S/1996/179) submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1044 (1996) and the conclusions contained therein, Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought to justice, Taking note that the statements of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II) considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only at the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole, Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements, Taking note of the continued effort of the OAU Secretary-General to ensure Sudan's compliance with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU, Taking note also, with regret, that the Government of Sudan has not responded adequately to the efforts of the OAU, Deeply alarmed that the Government of Sudan has failed to comply with the requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996),

96-10786 (E)

260496

Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan /

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This item is available on the Benador Associates website, at kttp://www. benadorassociates.coo]/article/43

intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan by Mansoor Ijaz and Timothy Carney Washington Post June 30, 2002 In early 1996, CIA director John Deutch convinced Secretary of-St3le Warren Clinslophel to pull U.S. diplomats out of Sudan out of fear for their safety. His anxiety was based on intelligence that implicated the Sudanese government. Although the embassy wasn't formally shut down, it was vacated, and relations with Khartoum became severely strained. Soon afterward, the CIA figured out that its analysis was wrong. A key source had either embellished or wholly fabricated information, and in early 1996 the agency scrapped more than 100 of its reports on Sudan. Did the State Department then send its diplomats back? No. The bad intelligence had taken on a life of its own. A sense of mistrust lingered. Moreover, the embassyhad become a political and diplomatic football for policymakers and activists who wanted to isolate Khartoum until it halted its bloodyj:ivil war with the largely Christian south. To this 9ay, the embassy is mostly unstaffed. This episode is worth recounting now. Whether hunting terrorists in Afghanistan, judging the integrity of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, mediating a dispute between India and Pakistan, or Contemplating the virtue of an attack on Iraq, the Bush administration has given great weight to the ontent of U.S. (and sometimes foreign) intelligence reports. As the United States wages war on terrorism and Congress re- organizes and bolsters U.S. intelligence agencies, the influence of intelligence on foreign and military policy will only grow. But American policymakers have to be intelligent about using intelligence. The story of U.S. policy in Sudan shows how bad intelligence - or good intelligence badly used -- can damage U.S. interests. In Sudan, it confused us about political Islam, hurt our ability to intervene in the 47-year-old Sudanese civil war, and in 1996 undermined our best chance ever to capture Osama bin Laden and strangle his organization, before he was expelled from Sudan and found his way to Afghanistan. We write from experience. One of us, Carney, a retired career diplomat, was the last U.S. ambassador to Khartoum. The other, Ijaz, an American hedge-fund manager, played an informal role by carrying messages between Khartoum and Washington after the embassy was emptied. Perhaps the most important intelligence failure in Sudan wasn't about protecting the safety of U.S. diplomats but about understanding the political environment throughout the Muslim world. This is one aspect of Sudan's cautionary tale: the danger of losing sight of politics while focusing on terror. During the 1990s, some committed Muslims around the worldtried to forge a political movement to bridge the gap between the modern world and medieval scripture. But instead of engaging this movement, the United States lumped Islamic political groups together and viewed them all as dangerous. It clung to relationships with authoritarian regimes that felt threatened by Islamic groups nd thus let well-organizedradicals dominate the Muslim world's reformist movement. Khartoum was an important center of Islamic political activity. Sudan's National Islamic Front, led by the fiery, Sorbonne-educated Hassan Turabi, seized power in a 1989 coup. Turabi held annual conferences that attracted thousands of Muslim radicals to Khartoum to craft their vision for an http://www.benadorassociates.com/pf.php?id=43

8/27/03

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

Distr. GENERAL S/RES/1070 (1996)* 16 August 1996

RESOLUTION 1070 (1996) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3690th meeting, on 16 August 1996

The Security Council. Recalling its resolutions 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996 and 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 July 1996 (S/1996/541 and Add.l, 2 and 3), Taking note of the letters of 31 May 1996 (S/1996/402), 24 June 1996 (S/1996/464) and 2 July 1996 (S/1996/513) from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, Taking note also of the letter of 10 July 1996 (S/1996/538) from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought to justice, Taking note that the statements of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of 11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II) considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only at the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole, Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,

Reissued for technical reasons.

96-21420 (E)

/.

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

Distr . GENERAL S/RES/1044 (1996) 31 January 1996

RESOLUTION 1044 (1996) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3627th meeting, on 31 January 1996

The Security Council, Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of international terrorism in all its forms which endanger or take innocent lives, have a deleterious effect on international relations and jeopardize the security of States, Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (S/23500) when the Council met at the level of Heads of State and Government in which the members of the Council expressed their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts, Recalling also the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973, Stressing the imperative need to strengthen international cooperation between States in order to make and adopt practical and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all forms of terrorism that affect the international community as a whole, Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved, is an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security, Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought to justice,

96-02172 (E)

sudan

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(SFC,4/15/96,A-8) 1973 Mar 2, Arab commandos, "Black September" terrorists, led by Abu Jihad executed 3 hostages in ^•Chartoum, Sudan, after Pres. Nixon refused their demands. US ambassador Cleo A. Noel, deputy George Curtis Moore and Belgian charge d'affaires Guy Bid. The operation was later reported to have been organized by Yasser Arafat. (WSJ, 1/10/02, p.A12)(SC, 3/2/02) 1976 The deadly Ebola virus was 1st identified in western Sudan and the nearby region of Congo. (SFC, 1/8/02, p.A6) 1978 Chevron Corp. sank oil wells north of Bentiu. (SFC, 6/13/01, p.D3) 1983 Civil War began again in the Sudan when the People's Liberation Army renewed the battle for greater autonomy from the Muslim north. The discovery of oil in the middle of the country and the imposition of sharia by the government reignited violence. (SFC, 5/29/96, p.A8)(SFC, 1/31/98, p.A9)(SSFC, 3/25/01, p.C8) 1983-1998 The civil war killed some 1.5 million people over this period. (SFC, 11/3/98, p.A10) 1984 Chevron Corp. pulled out of Sudan after rebels killed 3 employees. (SFC, 6/13/01, p.D3) 1984 War rekindled in the Sudan. A government official stated that: "The southerners were being used by the rxist Ethiopians and by Col. Qaddafi of Libya to cause trouble for Sudan." Pres. Nimeiri set an edict to make Islamic law the code of the land. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army was led by a former Sudanese army colonel and Ph.D. in economics from Iowa St. Univ. named John Garang. (NG, May 1985, R. Caputo, p.609) 1985 Apr 4, A coup in Sudan ousted pro US President Gaafar Nimeiry and replaced him with Gen. Dahab. (HN, 4/4/99)(WSJ, 12/8/99, p.A19) 1985 Christian Col. John Garang and Muslim leader Sadiq el-Mahdi helped to restore democracy, but soon grew at odds. (WSJ, 3/4/97, p.Al4) 1985 The people of the Nuba Mountains allied themselves with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) after government backed Arab militias attacked their villages. (SSFC, 1/7/01, p.Dl) 1986 May 15, Francis Bok was kidnapped when Arabs from a government-armed militia swept into his village shooting the men and cutting off their heads with swords. (WSJ, 5/23/02, p.Al) 1988-1989 The war induced famine killed some 250,000 people. (SFC, 11/3/98, p.AlO) 989 Jun 30, The elected coalition government was overthrown. The Umma Party and the Democratic Union party established bases in Cairo and Eritrea and later allied with rebel groups that included the Southern People's Liberation Party. (SFC, 12/29/98, p.A6) http://timelines.ws/countries/SUDAN.HTML

9/4/03

BBC NEWS I Middle East I Timeline: Sudan

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1881 - Revolt against the Turco-Egyptian administration. 1956 - Sudan becomes independent. 1958 - General Abbud leads military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year 1962 - Civil war begins in the south, lead by the Anya Nya movement. 1964 - The "October Revolution" overthrows Abbud and a national government is established 1969 - Ja'far Numayri leads the "May Revolution" military coup.

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1971 - Sudanese Communist Party leaders executed after short-lived coup Khartoum skyline against Numayri

South gets autonomy 1972 - Under the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government and the Anya Nya the south becomes a selfgoverning region. 1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu in southern Sudan. 1983 - Civil war breaks out again in the south involving government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), lead by John Garang.

Islamic law imposed Rebel John Garang

1983 - President Numayri declares the introduction of shari'ah (Islamic law).

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/827425.stm

5/28/03

Sudan (History) - Crossroads linking Black southern Africa, Mediterranean areas, souther... Page 1 of 2

Ar^jsie German Consulting

HI Sudan - History Historically, sparsely-populated Sudan has served as the crossroads linking Black southern Africa with the Mediterranean areas and the southern Sahara with the Red Sea. In about 2000 B.C., Egypt colonized Nubia (now northeastern Sudan), from which it took slaves and soldiers, gold, ivory, and precious stones. Nubia controlled Egypt briefly around 750 B.C., and continued to dominate the middle Nile until A.D. 350, when it was colonized by the Ethiopia-based empire of Aksum. Ethiopia and Nubia accepted Christianity in the 6th century and remained Christian until colonized by Moslems in the 15th century. The Sudan (as the country was known before 1975) was ruled as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 1899 until achieving independence as a parliamentary republic on 1 January 1956. After a military coup in November 1958, a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was established and ruled until October 1964, when it was overthrown in a civilian revolution. Subsequent governments failed to improve the economic situation or to deal with the problem of the insurgent southern provinces, and in May 1969 power was seized by a group of officers, led by Col Gaafar Mohammed Numeri, who assumed the rank of major-general. All existing political institutions and organizations were abolished, and the "Democratic Republic of the Sudan" was proclaimed, with supreme authority in the bands of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). In October 1971 a referendum confirmed Gen. Numeri's nomination as President. A new Government was formed, the RCC was dissolved, and the Sudanese Socialist Union was recognized as the only political party. An early problem facing the Numeri Government concerned the disputed status of the three southern provinces (Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile), whose inhabitants are racially and culturally distinct from most of the country's population. Rebellion against rule from the north had first broken out in 1955, and fighting continued until March 1972, when an agreement to give the three provinces a degree of autonomy was concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between members of the Sudan Government and representatives of the South Sudan Liberation Movement. A High Executive Council (HEC) for the Southern Region was established in April 1972, and Sudan's permanent Constitution was endorsed in April 1973. Elections to the Regional People's Assembly for southern Sudan took place in November 1973, followed by elections to the National People's Assembly in April 1974. Following an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1976, Sudan severed diplomatic relations with Libya and established a mutual defence pact with Egypt. Diplomatic links between Sudan and Libya were restored in 1978, but relations became strained in 1981, during Libya's occupation of Chad, and President Numeri frequently accused Libya of supporting plots against him. In 1990, after Lt-Gen. al-Bashir had visited Col Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, in Tripoli, Sudan and

http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/sudanhis.htm

5/28/03

Prendsrgast: Us Intent Is Not To Demonize Islam, But Terrorism

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PRENDERGAST: US INTENT IS NOT TO DEMONIZE ISLAM, BUT TERRORISM Runs Pirn \ Official speaks at Institute of Peace Sudan parley) By Emile S. Siman USIA Staff Writer September 18, 1997

Washington — "The United States' intent is not to demonize Islam, Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism," said a National Security Council official September 17, but "terrorism, regional destabilization and human rights abuses." John Prendergast, who is director of African Affairs at the National Security Council, spoke about the implications of the situation in the Sudan to U.S. foreign policy on the second day of a two-day conference on "Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan," which was sponsored by the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace. The NSC official outlined initiatives taken by the United States government on three levels to counter the Khartoum regime in Sudan, which is controlled by the National Islamic Front. On the international level, Prendergast noted that the U.S. government, in focusing on "eradicating terrorism," placed Sudan on the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism, which includes four other Mideast states — Iran, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Moreover, "we are trying to expel Sudan from the IMF, on purely economic grounds," mainly because it is not adhering to economic reforms. We have "intensified pressure to contain" the NIF-dominated government in Khartoum, which he labeled an "odious regime." On the regional level, the NSC official declared, the United States "tries to focus on supporting neighboring states in the Horn of Africa" which are threatened by Sudan. He noted that through what he called the "FrontLine States Initiative," both Uganda and Ethiopia have received non-lethal weapons to defend themselves and Washington closely coordinates with the governments of the region. The U.S. also supports the IGAD (Inter Governmental Authority on Development) Declaration which calls for peace talks to settle the civil war in Sudan. Another initiative is the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative which involves a "forum on policy" on how to

http://www.usembassy-israel.org.i1/publish/peace/archives/l 997/me0918a.htm

5/28/03

Raid on Afghanistan, Sudan: Aug. 20, 1998: Clinton's Washington Speech

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TARGET: TERRORISTS Statement by President Clinton The President spoke from the White House on his decision to strike 'terrorist-related facilities'

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Good afternoon. Today I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security. I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why it was necessary. Our target was terror. Our mission was clear -- to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today. The groups associated with him come from diverse places, but share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against. A few months ago, and again this week, bin Laden publicly vowed to wage a terrorist war against America, saying -- and I quote -- "We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They are all targets." Their mission is murder. And their history is bloody. In recent years, they killed American, Belgian and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the president of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt. The most recent terrorist events are fresh in our memory. Two weeks ago, 12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives. And another 5,000 were wounded when our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed. There is convincing information from our intelligence community that the bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings. Based on this information, we have high confidence that these bombings were planned, financed and carried out by the organization bin Laden leads. America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we've used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached out around the world and

http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/asbombing/clintonwash.html

5/28/03

War on Terrorism

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Background Information A collection of explanatory stories printed in the Arizona Daily Star.

In war on terrorism, Sudan struck a blow by fleecing bin Laden By ROBERT BLOCK The Wall Street Journal KHARTOUM, Sudan — With American bombs dropping on Afghanistan, Ibrahim al Rufai Abu el Hassan is pleased to announce that Khartoum Tannery Co. is under new management. "The previous owner is long gone," he says with a wry smile. Curiously, Dr. Hassan, a chemical engineer, says he doesn't know who that owner was, except that he was a Saudi businessman who had to leave Sudan abruptly. The man he is referring to, in all but name, is Osama bin Laden, who took up residence here in 1991 and ran the tannery as part of a business empire that Washington says funded his terrorist network. In 1996, Sudan, under United States pressure, expelled the then-relatively-little-known Mr. bin Laden. Five years later, many in Sudan are loath to talk about their dealings with a man whose name many in the West have come to regard as a synonym for evil. In 1998, the United States launched a missile attack on a Sudanese Pharmaceuticals factory on the stillunproven theory that Mr. bin Laden was using his investments here to make chemical weapons. Now, the Taliban are in retreat and Washington is promising to expand its war against terrorism beyond Afghanistan. But there may be yet another reason for Sudan's reluctance to discuss Mr. bin Laden: Its government ripped him off for millions of dollars. In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the

http://www.azstarnet.com/attack/indepth/wsi-sudanbinladen.html

• Muslims speak in many voices Plus: Origins, growth of Islam • Who are the Afghans? A look at ethnic groups • How the Taliban rose to power • The roots of Islamic extremism • Combat in Afghanistan's caves • Afghanistan on the world stage • Jihad in Afghanistan

5/28/03

Order Code IB98043

Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web

Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy

Updated April 23, 2003

Ted Dagne Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service »> The Library of Congress

462

NOTES

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accessed atvvww.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/ transcripts/sudanmernotext_100301.html. 19. Since September 11, one much-repeated allegation has been that the Clinton administration missed a key opportunity in the mid-1990s to improve relations with Sudan and learn more about the terrorists, including bin Laden, who had been sheltered there. Had the United States done that, critics contend, it could have prevented the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The chief proponents of this argument are Mansoor Ijaz, a New York-based investment banker, and Timothy Carney, the former U.S. ambassador to Sudan. Carney has sharply criticized the Clinton administration for what he says are critical mistakes in its policy toward Sudan. In the 1990s, Ijaz made sizable contributions to the Democratic Party and met once with National Security Adviser Sandy Berger at the request of White House political personnel. Berger heard out Ijaz's argument that the United States should engage more with the Sudanese. Despite repeated requests, Berger declined to meet Ijaz again. (The White House had been harshly criticized for meetings between officials and businessman Roger Tamraz, who wanted assistance in getting a pipeline built to carry Caspian basin oil, and Ijaz presented a comparable case since he has investments and ties to firms in the energy sector, some of which may have been interested in oil development in Sudan.) Ijaz, a Pakistani-American who has advertised his close ties with governments in South Asia and his ability to make progress on the Kashmir conflict, was viewed by other NSC officials as an unreliable freelancer, someone who was pursuing his own interests and fancied himself a grand strategist. Jointly and separately (and Ijaz much more frequently), Carney and Ijaz have made their case in the Los Angeles Times, Vanity Fair, and The Washington Post and through numerous television appearances. They adduce several pieces of evidence to support it. Ijaz, in particular, often cites correspondence from Sudanese leaders professing a desire to cooperate on counterterrorism that he personally delivered to U.S. officials. They refer to an offer to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, as they wrote in The Washington Post on June 30,2002. (See Timothy Carney and Mansoor Ijaz, "Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan," Washington Post, 30 June 2002, B4.) And they claim that Ijaz was shown sensitive intelligence on terrorists tracked through Khartoum by the Sudanese intelligence chief. They argue that the administration was blinded by its preconceptions aj' \n and refused to engage with the Khartoum regime. rhe notion that the United States missed a great chance is belied by the facts. There was no break in diplomatic relations even though the U.S. em-

bassy in Khartoum was closed. U.S. and Sudanese officials met numerous times, including, as Carney and Ijaz note, in Virginia in early 1996. The Sudanese were not shunted off to low-level officials but met with Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering. They had ample opportunity to provide genuine intelligence cooperation, and they did not do so. The U.S. government declined Ijaz's services because there was nothing he could achieve that America's diplomats could not. In fact, Ijaz's involvement could add nothing to relations except provide Khartoum with an opportunity to manipulate him. And that is exactly what has happened, whether he is wittingly complicit or not. An example is Ijaz's claim to have seen sensitive intelligence: How could Ijaz possibly know what constitutes sensitive intelligence? What expertise does he have in terrorism? How could he know anything about the value of the paper in front of him beyond what the Sudanese told him? What kind of perspective did he have on years of Sudanese dissembling about its support for terror and its dealings with the United States? A further example of the thinness of this story is the claim that Khartoum offered to hand bin Laden over. Setting aside the issue of whether the United States could take custody of bin Laden, against whom it had no indictment at the time, no senior government official from the Clinton administration is aware of any such offer, nor has any record of one surfaced. It is hard to find anyone who has made this claim other than Mansoor Ijaz. In fact, in an interview on May 2,2002, in Washington with one of the authors, Timothy Carney said that he "was not aware of any option to send [bin Laden] to us." One has to wonder what suddenly convinced him that there was such an option. At the heart of the argument that Washington botched its dealings with the Sudanese government is the implicit contention that in 1996 and after, the Khartoum leadership was well-meaning but misunderstood. Again, this is belied by the facts. Sudan continued to harbor and support terrorists long after bin Laden left. As the embassy-bombing trial transcripts show, Khartoum kept close watch over the terrorists within its borders, knew them well, and cooperated closely with them, not with the United States. Senior bin Laden operatives continued to visit Khartoum, undoubtedly with the acquiescence of the regime, months after the bombing of the East Africa embassies in 1998. The Sudanese knew precisely what they needed to do to improve relations with the United States. They refused because they shared many of the goals and ideology of the terrorists and, at a minimum, wanted to keep their involvement with these groups safe from scruti'-- Sudan never provided any serious cooperation with the United States /use to do so would have revealed its complicity in numerous acts of terror.

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Thu, 26 Jun 2003 15:32:55 -0400 Warren Bass <[email protected]># "" <[email protected]>4P Fwd: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for Democracy & Unity in Sudan" Summary by Hesham Sallam ,,

fyi, for your sudan obsession...

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>From: "Middle East Institute" <[email protected]> >Reply-To: <[email protected]> >To: [email protected] >Subject: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for >Democracy & Unity in Sudan" Summary by Hesham Sallam >Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 14:50:25 -0400 > >Middle East Institute >POLICY BRIEF > >The Prospects for Democracy & Unity in Sudan >Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil 'MEI Scholar-in-Residence ^* > >Summary: > >June 25, 2003 (Washington, DC) - The Sudan peace process has recently made >signifleant progress and an end to a long devastating war seems to be near. >Yet the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, if pursued and implemented to its >tenor, would not result in the restoration of democracy, human rights and >the rule of law to the people of the Sudan. > > >Brief: > >Attributing the unprecedented progress in peace talks between the >government >of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) to the >active >U.S. involvement and the increasing concern of friendly countries, Dr. >Khalil points out that despite broad agreement between the two parties, >details of wealth and power sharing, the structure of the interim >government >and the substance of the interim constitution are yet to be worked out. > >The government's agreement to the SPLA's demand for self-determination >rules >out the possibility of Southern unilateral secession, which would not augur ll for relations between two neighbors who share vital natural resources. -Moreover, according to international law, people of Southern Sudan are not >entitled to external-self determination, which may lead to secession. This >right to self-determination is only legally recognized in international law >within the colonial context. To that extent Machakos should be regarded as

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6/26/03

Background Notes Archive - Africa

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U.S. Department of State Background Notes: Sudan, June 1995 Bureau of African Affairs

and released by the Bureau of African Affairs, ^rfice of East African Affairs June 1995 Official Name: Republic of the Sudan PROFILE Geography Area: 2.5 million sq. km. (967,500 sq. mi.); almost one-third size of continental U.S. Cities: Capital-Khartoum. Other cities-Port Sudan, Kassala, Kosti, Juba (capital of southern region). No current accurate population statistics available. Terrain: Generally flat with mountains in east and west. Climate: Desert in north to tropical in south. People Nationality: Noun and adjective--Sudanese (sing, and pi.). Population (1994 est.): 28 million; 25 percent urban. Annual growth rate (1993 est.): 3 percent. Ethnic groups: Arab-African, black African. Religions: Islam (official), indigenous beliefs (southern Sudan), Christianity. Languages: Arabic (official), English, tribal languages, ^lucation: Years compulsory—9. Attendance-50 percent. Literacy-27 ^ jrcent. Health: Infant mortality rate—099/1,000. Life expectancy—52 yrs . Work force (6 million, 1982): Agriculture--78 percent. Industry and commerce--10 percent. Government--6 percent. Government Type: Military dictatorship. Independence: January 1, 1956. Constitution: 1985 provisional constitution amended, now suspended. Branches: Executive authority is shared by the 12-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the cabinet. The chairman of the RCC is concurrently chief of state (president) and prime minister. Judicial-Supreme Court, attorney general, civil, shari'a (Islamic), special revolutionary courts, and tribal courts; investigative commissions. Administrative subdivisions: 5 northern regions, 3 southern regions; each region, 2 or more provinces. Political parties: All political parties banned following June 30, 1989, military coup. Central government budget (1990 est.): $1.5 billion. Defense (1990 est.): 30 percent of GNP. Flag: Horizontal red, white, and black stripes with green triangle on staff side.

GDP (1988 e s t . ) : $9 billion. GDP annual growth rate (1994 e s t . ) : - 6 . 0 percent.

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/sudan9506.html

r

7/8/03

CHAPTER 4

The Koran and the Kalashnikov: Bin Ladens Years in Sudan

"They began issuing statements amongst themselves in the Sudan, calling the Americans infidels. . . . But, ladies and gentlemen, it was not just words. You will hear that bin Laden and his group began taking actions to prepare to do battle with his enemies, particularly the United States."

c

—Opening statement of federal prosecutor in the Manhattan trial of four bin Laden associates, Februarys, 2001

iome upstairs, I have something to show you," said a Middle ' Eastern dissident I was visiting in London in 1997. In his study he pulled out a videotape and popped it into his VCR. The footage, shot through the windows of a slowly moving car, showed some of the tens of thousands of Americans living in Saudi Arabia.1 The camera panned to a sign announcing a housing complex for employees of Aramco, the oil company. Then the cameraman drove into the complex and zoomed in on an American woman pushing her child on a swing. In the next sequence, the cameraman overtook a U.S. army truck driven by a female soldier, who glanced nervously at the camera when she realized she was being videotaped. The tape was poorly shot, but fascinating in a voyeuristic way It had no narration, but its message was plain: "Look at these infidels trespassing on our holy land."

76

Opposition to the longtime presence of Americans on the Arabian peninsula intensified dramatically after August 7, K, ni Bthe day the first U.S. troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. The dying edict of the Prophet Muhammad had been "Let there be no two religions in Arabia"; now "infidels" of both sexes were trespassing on the holy land of the Arabian Peninsula.2 For bin Laden, this was as transforming an event as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan had been a decade earlier. It is no coincidence that exactly eight years later, on August 7, 1998, his men blew up two U.S. embassies in Africa, the bombs going off almost simultaneously in two different countries—no mean feat of coordination. Of course, bin Laden had been denouncing Americans well before he was forced to put up with them in the flesh. On his return from the Afghan war in 1989, he was quickly in demand as a speaker in mosques and homes, and one of his principal themes was a call for a boycott of American goods because of that countiy s support for Isirael.3 Hundreds of thousands of recordings of his speeches circulated in the Saudi kingdom.4 Ironically, bin Laden was in sympathy with the reason for the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia: the war against Saddam Hussein. He had embarrassed the Saudi regime much earlier by warning of the Iraqi leaders intentions.5 "A year before Hussein entered Kuwait," bin Laden recalled, "I said many times in my speeches at the mosques, warning that Saddam will enter the Gulf. No one believed me. I distributed many tapes in Saudi Arabia. It was after it happened that they started believing me and believed my analysis of the situation."6 After Hussein's forces did invade the small, oil-rich state on August 1, 1990, and threaten the security of Saudi Arabia, bin Laden immediately volunteered his services and those of his holy warriors. The Saudi army and his own men would be enough to defend the Kingdom, he reasoned; after all, hadn't his own troops been instrumental in driving the Russians from Afghanistan? The Saudis did not take this offer seriously. Despite the tens of billions of dollars they had spent on their own army, they turned instead for help to the U.S. government and then-President Bush, who" had made his fortune in the oil trade and so understood exactly what was at stake in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (whatever rhetoric was employed on

The Koran and the Kalashnikov: Bin Laden's Years in Sudan /

77

9-11 COMMISSION DAILY PRESS CLIPS for September 23, 2003 ***HEADLINES*** 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Clinton NSC attacks Miniter (WT) Miniter responds (WT) Moroccan Calls 9-11 Conviction 'Unjust' (AP) Pakistan Detains 17 in Sweep At Islamic Schools in Karachi (AP) Musharraf Criticizes Terror War (WP) Probe of 2 Groups That Train Muslim Chaplains Sought (WP) Fifth Column II (WT) Antiterrorism creed (BG) Don't deny government useful anti-terror tools (USA Today) Patriot Act overreaches (USA Today) Patriot Act Used In 16-Year-Old Deportation Case (WP)

"*FULL TEXT*** 1. Clinton NSC attacks Miniter By Roger Cressey and Gayle Smith Washington Times As counterterrorism and foreign policy professionals and veterans of the NSC staff in the years proceeding September 11, we have heard our share of misstatements and conspiracy theories about terrorism. But nothing quite compares to Richard Miniter's book "Losing Bin Laden," which includes a number of erroneous allegations about the Clinton administration's counterterrorism record, many of which were then published in this newspaper. Let us address a few: First, Mr. Miniter recycles old, false Sudanese claims that the Clinton White House declined access to Sudan's intelligence files on al Qaeda and that an unnamed CIA official declined an offer from Sudan in 1996 to turn Osama bin Laden over to the United States. No one should believe these allegations by Mr. Miniter's source, Fateh Erwa — a Sudanese intelligence officer known for his penchant to deceive — that there was an offer to hand bin Laden over to the United States. Certainly, no offer was ever conveyed to any senior official in Washington. Had the Sudanese been serious about offering bin Laden to the United States, they could have communicated such an offer to any number of senior Clinton administration officials. It did not happen. Mr. Miniter also claims that Sudan repeatedly tried to provide voluminous intelligence files on bin Laden to the CIA, the FBI, and senior Clinton administration officials and would be "repeatedly rebuffed through both formal and informal channels." Absurd. In fact, it was precisely the other way around. On multiple occasions, and in venues ranging from Addis Ababa to Virginia, Washington, New York and Khartoum, the United States aggressively pressed the Sudanese to prove their alleged commitment to cooperating on terrorism, by severing their close ties with known terrorists, arresting specific individuals and providing specific intelligence information to us. Yet, despite PRESS CLIPS FOR SEPTEMBER 23, 2003

1

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The Washington Post, September 24, 1997 —**.

Copyright 1997 The Washington Post The Washington Post

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September 24, 1997, Wednesday, Final Edition SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A27 LENGTH: 400 words HEADLINE: U.S. Diplomats Return to Sudan BYLINE: Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post Staff Writer BODY: The United States is sending diplomats back to Sudan, 19 months after pulling all American employees out of the U.S. Embassy there for security reasons, the State Department announced yesterday. The move does not reflect an improvement in relations with the vast African country, officials but instead signals the start of an upgraded diplomatic campaign to increase pressure on the militant Islamic regime. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright ordered the return of eight mid-level diplomats to the Khartoum embassy as "part of an intensified diplomatic effort to change the behavior of the Sudanese government," a State Department official said. "We want to ratchet up the pressure on ~" Sudan to respond to the demands of the international community on terrorism, human rights and the civil war [in southern Sudan.] This shouldn't be misinterpreted by anybody, especially the Sudanese." Sudan is on the State Department's list of countries that sponsor international terrorism. Washington has long viewed the Khartoum government as an ally of Iran in promoting regional unrest, encouraging terrorism and opposing peace between Israel and the Arabs. In Washington's view, Khartoum is the source of trouble across east and Central Africa, most notably along its southern frontier where non-Muslim neighboring countries are supporting a long-running insurrection against the Islamic regime. In February 1996, the State Department announced it was withdrawing all U.S. personnel from Khartoum because the Sudanese government could not guarantee their security. Diplomatic relations were not formally severed, however, and the embassy has remained open, staffed by Sudanese employees. Ambassador Timothy M. Carney has been living in Nairobi, Kenya, and flying into Khartoum monthly to conduct official business. Carney will remain in Nairobi, but the security situation in Khartoum has improved sufficiently to allow the posting there of the eight mid-level diplomats, a State Department official said. At the same time, he said, Washington is planning to increase the amount of its "non-lethal" aid to Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea, states backing the rebels in southern Sudan. The governments in all three countries are in high favor with the Clinton administration, which regards them as relatively progressive and as useful in the effort to curb Sudanese influence. — LOAD-DATE: September 24, 1997

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10/7/03

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SUDAN

This is the html version of the file http://www.ustreas,goy/oM^ G o o g l e automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.googie.com/search? g=cache:JjcGJJrdtQSJrwww.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/tllsudan.pdf+OFAC+Sudan&hl=en&ie=UTFGoogle is not affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content.

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SUDAN U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control

What You Need To Know About U.S. Sanctions An overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations — Title 31 Part 538 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations • INTRODUCTION - On November 3,1997, afterfindingthat the policies and actions of the Government of Sudan, including continued support for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neigh boring governments, and the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign

No U.S. bank, including its foreign branches, may finance, or arrange offshore financing for, third-country trade transactions where Sudan is known to be the ultimate destination of, or the Government of Sudan is the purchaser of, the goods. Arranging transactions which ultimately benefit Sudan (for example, brokering third-country sales to Sudan) constitutes an

http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cache:JjCGJJrdtQ8J:www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/tllsudan.pdf+OFAC+Sudan...

10/24/03

TCS: Tech Central Station - Where Free Markets Meet Technology

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TECH CENTRAL STATION

Signs of the Times By Ken Adelman

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Published 01/10/2002

Two important Times stories - one in the New York Times, the other in the London Sunday Times - tell us a lot about the news media and help set the record straight about the Clinton administration's failed efforts to combat terrorists. The first story contains a rebuke of Fox News broadcasters for patriotism. The second shows how President Clinton passed up three chances to nab Osama bin Laden before his massive terrorist attacks against us. First up, Fox. You'd think that in our post-9/11 world, wearing a flag pin signifies nothing worse than national unity in our fight against terrorism. But essayist Caryn James thinks otherwise. In her December 30, 2001 New York Times essay on "The Year in Television," Ms. James pointed out that right after September 11th came "a round of flag-waving and flag-wearing patriotism, in which even some network correspondents wore flag pins." Before long, however, all the networks but one realized the grave error of this move. "That was rightly seen as crossing a line into politics," James lectures, "and was banned by every network and cable channel except Fox News." Then came her punch-line - "so much for its ludicrous claim to political balance." Granted, I'm biased towards Fox News, not only for giving me the opportunity to write a weekly column on their website, but also for frequent appearances on the air. But even if Ms. James wrote that about another network, I'd consider her claim rather "ludicrous." Why would wearing an American flag pin sacrifice "political balance"? Is that more Republican than Democratic? Surely the Democrats wouldn't admit that. Is it pro-American as opposed to pro-Taliban? Surely so, but Ms. James can't mean that by "political balance." American patriotism, symbolized by a flag pin, doesn't compromise "political balance," but instead proclaims a determination to preserve our values of freedom and tolerance. Clinton's Failure "U.S. Missed Three Chances to Seize Bin Laden" headlined England's most prestigious and best-selling newspaper, the Sunday Times, on January 6th in the first of a three-part series. The much-discussed piece began: "President Bill Clinton turned down at least three offers involving foreign governments to help to seize Osama Bin Laden after he was identified as a terrorist who was threatening America, according to sources in Washington and the Middle East." The first offer came in the summer of 1996 when Sudanese officials were willing to hand over the terrorist, then living in their country. They had done something similar when giving Carlos "The Jackal" to French authorities two years earlier. Yet in our case, unlike the hardheaded French, the Clinton White House let pass the Sudanese offer. The very next month bin Laden struck, when "a 5,000lb truck bomb ripped apart the front of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The explosion killed 19 American servicemen. Bin Laden was immediately suspected." The other two offers came in the summer of 2000. The Clinton team handled neither seriously. Within 14 months, bin Laden struck again, this time more spectacularly with the

http://www2.techcentralstation.com/1051/printer.jsp?CID=1051-011002B

11/3/2003

DradgeReportArchives.com 2003

Drudge's Special Reports

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Important: If the link is XXXXX DRUDGE REPORT XXXXX FRI NOV 30 2001 10:30:08 ET XXXXX *"\Q: SUDAN TRIED TO GIVE CLINTON ADMIN FILES ON BIN LADEN NEW YORK —VANITY FAIR HAS OBTAINED LETTERS and memorandums that document approaches made by Sudanese intelligence officials and other emissaries to members of the Clinton administration to share information about many of the 22 terrorists on the government's most-wanted list, including: Osama bin Laden. VANITY FAIR is set to unleash the story in January 2002 editions, publishing sources tell the DRUDGE REPORT.

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MORE THE MUKHABARAT, A SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, spent the early to mid1990s amassing copious amounts of information on bin Laden and his cohorts at a time when they were relatively unknown and their activities limited, author David Rose reports. From the fall of 1996 until weeks before the September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the Mukhabarat made repeated efforts to share its files on terrorists with the U.S. On more than one occasion senior F.B.I, officials wanted to accept the offers, but were apparently overruled by the State Department. FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT and her assistant secretary for Africa, Susan Rice, declined to comment for this story. ^^WORDING TO TIM CARNEY, THE LAST U.S. AMBASSADOR to Sudan, whose posting-ended in 1997, "The fact is, they were opening the doors, and we weren't taking them up on it. The U.S. failed to reeiproeatf^ ?u.flnTi'9 — willingness to engage us on some~~s~erious questions of terrorism. We can

http://www.drudgereportarchives.eom/data/2001/l 1/30/20011130_154810_matt91h.htm

7/8/03

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NewsMax.com: Inside Cover Story

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U.S. Ambassador to Sudan Confirms Clinton Snubbed Bin Laden Deal Protect Your Loved Ones! You could save up to 60%! Click Here

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Former Ambassador to the Sudan Tim Carney confirmed Tuesday night that the Clinton administration refused an offer from the Sudanese government to hand over terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s directly contradicting former Clinton administration officials who have attacked the story as baseless. "In fact, what was offered [by the Sudanese] was to expel bin Laden to Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis, because he was such a hot potato, simply refused to handle him," Carney told Fox News Channel's Alan Colmes.

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"Then, as I understand it, there was an offer to send him to us," Carney recalled. The Clinton administration rebuffed the overture because, Carney said, "we did not have an indictment [against bin Laden] at the time." Carney's account corroborates the claims of Pakistani-American freelance diplomat Mansour Ijaz, who has maintained for months that the

http://www.newsmax.com/showinsidecover.shtml?a=2002/7/2/221350

6/30/03

The Brookings Institution

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Susan E. Rice Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Governance Studies The Stephen and Barbara Friedman Endowed Fellow Expertise War on terrorism, foreign assistance, failed states, post-conflict reconstruction, development issues, humanitarian intervention, international peacekeeping and conflict resolution, national security policymaking, UN affairs and multilateral diplomacy, African affairs Current Projects Transnational security threats and the security implications of globalization; Corporate social responsibility investing Education Ph.D. (1990), M.Phil. (1988), Oxford University; B.A., Stanford University, 1986 Background Current Positions: Independent speaker, management and policy consultant Previous Positions: Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1997-2001); Special Assistant to the President ana senior Director for African Affairs, the National Security Council, the White House (1995-1997); Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping, National Security Council (1993-1995); Management Consultant, McKinsey and Company (1991-1993)

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6/5/03

Page 1 of4

Scott Allan From:

The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]

Sent: Sunday, March 28, 2004 7:14 AM Subject: IJAZ on the Clinton Intelligence Record in NRO (4) LONDON

Sunday, March 28, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues, In light of the past week's events surrounding the book, the controversy it generated on intelligence Commission's hearings on the subject, I thought it see once again an article I wrote about a year ago were discussed at length.

release of Richard Clarke's new failures and the 9-11 might be of interest for you to in which the very same topics

Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz NRO Contributor April 28, 2003, 8:45 a.m.

The Clinton Intel Record Deeper failures revealed. By Mansoor Ijaz The unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to Saddam Hussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration's case that dismantling Iraq's Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism's dynamic duo. But closing that case may reopen a Pandora's box for ex-Clinton administration officials who still believe their policy prescriptions protected U.S. national interests against the growing threat of terrorism during the past decade. The London Telegraph^ weekend revelations raise deeply disturbing questions about the extent and magnitude to which President Clinton, his national-security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, and senior terrorism and State Department officials — including Assistant Secretary of State for East Africa, Susan Rice — politicized intelligence data, relied on and even circulated fabricated evidence in making critical national-security decisions, and presided over a string of intelligence failures during the months leading up to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

4/2/2004

Page 1 of4

Scott Allan From:

The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]

Sent:

Wednesday, March 24, 2004 9:34 AM

Subject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Inquiry in NRO (4) LONDON

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues, I've offered some areas of inquiry the 9-11 Commissioners might want to consider for the witnesses appearing today in front of the Committee. These seven areas of questioning appeared in an op-ed for National Review Online yesterday. Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz HRO Contributor '"

, ..

March 23, 2004, 8:55 a.m.

A Dick Clarke Top Seven Questions for commissioners. Richard Clarke, the former White House counterterrorism czar in four successive administrations, testifies in front of the 9/11 CommissiononWednesday. But what should have been a serious inquiry into how a loosely knit gang of Islamic fanatics could rise to become one of history's most lethal and effective global terrorist organizations now promises to become a political spectacle. At the height of the presidential campaign season, Clarke has made irresponsible and untrue allegations that the Bush White House was indifferent to the threat posed by al Qaeda in the months leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Whether his charges are the result of a momentary lapse in judgment in an otherwise distinguished civil-service career, or the hallmark of personal ego and greed in trying to sell a book while settling scores with a Bush White House that demoted him, the 9/11 commissioners cannot be deterred in their task to find out the truth about what happened on his watch to America's counterterrorism efforts. The 9/11 commissioners have a thankless job of asking tough questions that nobody wants to ask. There will be a broad set of questions asked Tuesday and Wednesday of the various witnesses who appear. But when Clarke goes under oath, there will be a need to get down to specifics because the devil of

4/2/2004

Page 1 of3

Scott Allan From:

The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]

Sent:

Tuesday, March 23, 2004 11:35 AM

Subject: IJAZ on Richard Clarke in The Washington Times (4) NEW YORK

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues, Mr. Ijaz asked that I send his op-ed piece on the recent controversy generated by Richard Clarke's new book and hopes you will find it of interest. He asked that I send his best regards to each of you. Sincerely, M. Wassil

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

washingtontimes.com

POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE

TO WHAT END?

by Mansoor Ijaz Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism czar for Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, testifies tomorrow before the commission investigating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. He is well-qualified to do so because few individuals over the last decade, inside or outside government, better understood the Islamic extremism threat in all its dimensions. But rather than deliver a factual recounting and analysis of the intelligence failures and politically charged antiterrorism policies that plagued his years as coordinator for counterterrorism operations, he has chosen to characterize the Bush White House as indifferent to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network prior to the September 11 attacks without consideration for the failures on his watch during the Clinton years. This is inaccurate and adds nothing to our understanding of how distant terrorists could plan and carry out such daring and effective attacks. Mr. Clarke's premise that Bush national security officials neither understood nor cared to know anything about al Qaeda is simply untrue. I know because on multiple occasions from June

4/2/2004

Scott Allan The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]] Monday, March 22, 2004 1:48 PM Gov (NSC) Hadley, Stephen J. Gov (NSC) Lineberry, Laura; Gov (NSC) McCormack, Sean IJAZ manuscript on RICHARD CLARKE Importance: LONDON

High

Monday, March 22, 2004

Dear Steve, I thought you should have an advance copy of this piece on Richard Clarke's statements which will appear in a prominent Washington newspaper tomorrow morning. This storm too shall pass... All best, Mansoor

LONDON Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism czar for Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, testifies today before the commission investigating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. He is well-qualified to do so because few individuals over the last decade, inside or outside government, better understood the Islamic extremism threat in all its dimensions. But rather than deliver a factual recounting and analysis of the intelligence ^—failures and politically charged antiterrorism policies that plagued his years as oordinator for counterterrorism operations, he has chosen to characterize the Bush White House as indifferent to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network prior to the September 11 attacks without consideration for the failures on his watch during the Clinton years. This is inaccurate and adds nothing to our understanding of how distant terrorists could plan and carry out such daring and effective attacks. Mr. Clarke's premise that Bush national security officials neither understood nor cared to know anything about al Qaeda is simply untrue. I know because on multiple occasions from June until late August 2001, I personally briefed Stephen J. Hadley, deputy national security adviser to President Bush, and members of his South Asia, Near East and East Africa staff at the National Security Council on precisely what had gone wrong during the Clinton years to unearth the extent of the dangers posed by al Qaeda. Some of the briefings were in the presence of former members of the Clinton administration's national security team to ensure complete transparency. Far from being disinterested, the Bush White House was eager to avoid making the same mistakes of the previous administration and wanted creative new inputs for how to combat al Qaeda's growing threat. Mr. Clarke's role figured in two key areas of the debriefings Sudan's offer to share terrorism data on al Qaeda and bin Laden in 1997, and a serious effort by senior members of the Abu Dhabi royal family to gain bin Laden's extradition from Afghanistan in early 2000. * Fall 1997: Sudan's offer is accepted by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, then rejected by Mr. Clarke and Clinton National Security Adviser Samuel "Sandy" Berger. Sudan's president, Omar Hasan El Bashir, made an unconditional offer of counterterrorism assistance to the vice chairman of the September 11 Commission, then Rep. Lee Hamilton, Indiana Democrat, through my hands on April 19, 1997. Five months later on Sept. 28, 1997, after an exhaustive interagency review at the entrenched bureaucracy level of the U.S. government, Mrs. Albright announced the U.S. would send a high-level diplomatic team back to Khartoum to pressure its Islamic government to stop harboring Arab terrorists and to review Sudan data on terrorist groups operating from there. ^^ As the re-engagement policy took shape, Susan E. Rice, incoming assistant secretary E state for East Africa, went to Mr. Clarke, made her anti-Sudan case and asked him to jointly approach Mr. Berger about the wisdom of Mrs. Albright's decision. Together, they recommended its reversal. The decision was overturned on Oct. 1, 1997. Without Mr. Clarke's consent, Mr. Berger is unlikely to have gone along with such an early confrontation with the first woman to hold the highest post at Foggy Bottom.

Renaissance Connection

Page 1 of 10

www.rcnetwork.ne BY DAVID ROSE

© VANITY FAIR Repinted from Vanity Fair (New York) January 2002, No. 497, pp.50-56

An updated picture of Osama bin Laden with fellow terrorists Ayman al-Zawahiri left, and Muhammad Atef.

>

THE OSAMA FILES BY DAVID ROSE In a squat, red-brick building next to Khartoum's presidential palace, the agents who serve the Mukhabarat, Sudan's intelligence division, keep their secrets in pale manila files. "Those guys know what they're doing," says a retired longtime C.I.A. Africa specialist. "They tend to be thorough. Their stuff is pretty reliable." And sometimes very important. Sudan's Mukhabarat spent the early to mid-1990s amassing copious intelligence on Osama bin Laden and his leading cohorts at the heart of the al-Qaeda terrorist network-when they were still little known, and their activities were relatively limited. Some of the files at Mukhabarat headquarters identify individuals who played central roles in the suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998; others chart the backgrounds and movements of alQaeda operatives who are said to be linked directly to the atrocities of September 11.

In the wake of those attacks, President Bush and the F.B.I, issued a list of the world's 22 most wanted terrorists. Sudan has kept files on many of them for years. From the autumn of 1996 until just weeks before the 2001 attacks, the Sudanese government made numerous efforts to share this information with the United States all of which were rebuffed. On several occasions, senior agents at the F.B.I, wished to accept these offers, but were apparently overruled by President Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, and hi assistant secretary fc«^Ajrjc^,_Sjj§gn_R[ce, both of whom would not comment for this story afte repeated requests for interviews. Vanity Fair has obtained letters and secret memorandums th document these approaches. They were made directly to the State Department and the F.B.I., and also via a series of well-connected U.S. citizens who tried to warn America that the Sudanese offers were serious and significant. By definition, September 11 was an intelligence failure. As the C.I.A. man puts It, We didn't kn it was going to happen." Some of the reasons for that failure were structural, systemic: the shortage of Arabic-speaking agents, the inability of C.I.A. officers to go underground in Afghanistan. This one was more specific. CE Had U.S. agencies examined the AF Mukhabarat files when tl

http://www.rcnetwork.net/include/_tellafriend.php?iscript=yes&preview=760&criteria=id,bo...

5/28/03

Page 1 of4

Scott Allan From:

The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]

Sent:

Thursday, April 15, 2004 8:58 AM

Subject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Hearings in NRO (4) LONDON

Thursday, April 15, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues, Please find below some thoughts on the 9-11 Commission's hearings over the past month, and a key area of inquiry I believe the commissioners have not yet looked at. Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz NRO Contributor April 15. 2004, 8:32 a.m.

Politicized Intelligence The 9-11 Commission's Achilles Heel. By Mansoor Ijaz The independent 9/11 Commission investigating the intelligence failures that preceded the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States has not done enough to shed light in its hearings during the past month on the most critical problems facing America's system of predicting and protecting against external threats. The commission's blue-ribbon panel seems unable — perhaps even unwilling — to ask tough questions about how good intelligence was politicized, how bad intelligence was used to make worse policy, and how policymakers' egos and personal career agendas interfered with the development of prudent national-security strategies to deal with the growing threat of militant Islam's terrorist front. Analyzing these areas can reveal more about how the 9/11 attacks became possible than any assessment of which committee or working group met when, and who did or did not attend, or how high a "wall" was built to make sure the American judicial system functioned properly. The Clinton administration's stormy relations with Sudan illustrate the gaping holes in the commission's important work with distressing clarity.

5/7/2004

SURVIVORS'RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL I alert doc!207

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Khartoum and terrorism: the view from inside the NSC New Diversionary Scheme to shift blame on US gov. and legitimize Sudan gov. Gayle Smith was special assistant to the president for African affairs at the National Security Council under President Clinton. Los Angeles Times

How to Address the Massacres Perpetrated in Algeria's Civil Conflict - May 12, 2003

"Terrorism? Sudan Gave Us No Help" By GAYLE SMITH December 7 2001

Trafficking in Persons: Latin America and the Caribbean -May 12, 2003

SRI Press Release: Survivors' Rights International Praises the First Indictments of the Special Court for Sierra Leone

One of the mistakes all too frequently made by the outside world is to assume that because the regime in Sudan is bad it is incapable of fooling the good guys. The regime, however, has been anything but ineffective. Quite the contrary, it is frequently brilliant, always clever and too often successfully manipulative. Its most successful ploy has been to turn on its head the adage "actions speak louder than words."

-Mar. 11,2003

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Open letter to Kofi Annan and to African and western heads of state and government: We demand the deployment of an international police force throughout Ivory Coast to protect

"We stand for peace," the government says. According to Khartoum, the government wants nothing more than to end the civil war that has killed more than 2 million civilians and turned southern Sudan into a permanent, destitute relief center. What Sudanese officials fail to mention is that they overthrew an elected government in 1989 just hours before it was to sign a peace agreement. "We are not terrorists," they say. What they fail to mention is that they invited Osama bin Laden not only to live in Sudan but to establish a financial architecture there. What they fail to mention is that they created terrorist training camps and deployed soldiers against their neighbors and Western targets. What they fail to mention is that they harbored terrorists involved in an assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the bombing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and a thwarted plot to bomb the United Nations.

the whole civilian population.

Burundi Press Release -Nov. 21, 2002

The Great Lakes Region of Central Africa

Sri Lanka: Post-Conflict Alert

Regroupment Efforts in Burundi

The only definitive step Khartoum ever took against terrorism—asking Bin Laden to leave the country in 1996—came about not out of a desire to thwart Bin Laden's intentions but because Sudan wanted tu uvolU fmtliu 1 sanctions. • . The Sudanese government appears to still hope that words speak louder than actions. Now the story is that the Sudanese government had massive intelligence files on the Al Qaeda network that it wanted to give to the U.S. over the four years beginning in 1996 and that the State Department refused to take them, thus denying the U.S. important information. This is as inaccurate as it is illogical. The facts are these: On countless occasions, the Sudanese government—eager to

http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/alerts/alert_docl207.mv

5/28/03

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Scott Allan From:

The Crescent Partnerships [[email protected]]

Sent:

Thursday, April 15, 2004 8:58 AM

Subject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Hearings in NRO (4) LONDON

Thursday, April 15, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues, Please find below some thoughts on the 9-11 Commission's hearings over the past month, and a key area of inquiry I believe the commissioners have not yet looked at. Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz NRQ Contributor

April 15. 2004, 8:32 a.m.

Politicized Intelligence

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The 9-11 Commission's Achilles Heel. By Mansoor Ijaz The independent 9/11 Commission investigating the intelligence failures that preceded the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States has not done enough to shed light in its hearings during the past month on the most critical problems facing America's system of predicting and protecting against external threats. The commission's blue-ribbon panel seems unable — perhaps even unwilling — to ask tough questions about how good intelligence was politicized, how bad intelligence was used to make worse policy, and how policymakers' egos and personal career agendas interfered with the development of prudent national-security strategies to deal with the growing threat of militant Islam's terrorist front. Analyzing these areas can reveal more about how the 9/1 1 attacks became possible than any assessment of which committee or working group met when, and who did or did not attend, or how high a "wall" was built to make sure the American judicial system functioned properly. The Clinton administration's stormy relations with Sudan illustrate the gaping holes in the commission's important work with distressing clarity.

4/15/2004