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FYI, from today's clips. Mostly a Team 1 issue, methinks, but it's partially in Scott's ballpark, too. I'm sure the good folks at the National Security Archive would be thrilled to show us what they've got, if it's not already on the web. Bonus points for the Byman quote, too. Warren

10. Memo Shows Iraq, Iran Tried To Contact Bin Laden

By Eli J. Lake

United Press

International

The Taliban claimed in a 1997 meeting with U.S. officials that it had blocked attempts by both Iraq and Iran to contact Osama bin Laden, according to a previously confidential State Department memo made public yesterday.

The memo says that the assistant secretary of state, Karl Inderfurth, was told on Dec. 7, 1997, by the Taliban's acting minister of mines and industry, Armad Jan, that his government "had stopped allowing [bin Laden] to give public interviews and had frustrated Iranian and Iraqi efforts to contact him. "

Contacted yesterday, Mr. Inderfurth said he did not believe the Taliban claim was credible at the time, and that he had no recollection of Taliban officials mentioning Iraqi or Iranian attempts to meet bin Laden in the following 19 meetings he would attend with the de facto Afghan regime for the next four years .

"I never saw any evidence in anything I was doing where there were any Iraqi connections," said Mr. Inderfurth, who was the Clinton administration's senior State Department official for South Asia.

Iraqis were not to my knowledge, players in the Afghan conflict. Almost every other country in the region was . "

The memo, however, discloses a previously unreported link, or at least an Iraqi http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?index=1415

9/15/03

CNN.com - Peter Tomsen: Stabilizing post-Taliban Afghanistan - December 12, 2001

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Ambassador Peter Tomsen served in the first Bush Administration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992. In that role, he met with many of the Afghan tribal leaders and commanders who remain active today. In June 2001, he met with former Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood, who was assassinated by the Taliban just before U.S. attacks were launched. Tomsen also met with the exiled king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, in Rome in July and September, 2001. Tomsen is currently professor of American foreign policy and Eurasia at the University of Nebraska-Omaha's Center for Afghan Studies.

IVERY CNN: Thank you for joining us today, Peter Tomsen, and welcome PETER TOMSEN: Hi, good morning. I look forward to this chat in the CNN chat room! CNN: While the Taliban have been forced to surrender, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, as well as other major leaders in the Taliban remain at large. What needs to be done to achieve the surrender of these men? TOMSEN: First of all, there needs to be continuing intensive military pressure, until they are apprehended, both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. It's important that they be captured or eliminated. They were ultimately behind the horrific attacks on the United States on September 11. Also, they are responsible for the enormous amount of death and destruction inside Afghanistan over the last five years. They must be captured and dealt with. I believe they will be captured or eliminated.

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10/7/03

Foreign Affairs - A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: The Taliban's Days Are Numbered ... Page 1 of 5

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A CHANCE FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN

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By Peter Tomsen

NEWSSTAND FINDER PERMISSIONS ADVERTISING INTERNATIONAL EDITIONS SITE MAP CONTACT US About tls» COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Taliban movement, depicted by Ahmed Rashid ("The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," NovemberffiDecember 1999), has passed its high-water mark. It is now disintegrating, echoing the rapid rise and fall of similar religious movements in Afghan history. With the Taliban's demise, Afghanistan faces a new challenge: who will fill their place?

OF RELATED INTEREST a Topics: Asia Social and Cultural Issues n The Taliban: Exporting Extremism By Ahmed Rashid Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999

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Myth of the Holy Cow D. N. Jha. New York: Verso, 2002.

D A Princely Impostor? The Strange and Universal History of the Kumar of Bhawal Partrta Chatterjee. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

As Rashid notes, the Taliban emerged in the mid-iggos, when their radical leader Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Muhammad Omar succeeded in melding Making of Modern India religious fervor with the tribal patriotism of Nicholas B. Dirks. Princeton: Afghanistan's largest group, the Pushtuns. Princeton University Press, 2001. Omar and the other militant mullahs from India Briefing; Quickening the Pace rural southern Afghanistan in the Taliban of Change Edited by Alyssa Ayres and Philip K. leadership were assisted by the powerful Oldenburg. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency 2002. (ISI), the extremist Pakistani religious party Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and radical Arab Muslims, including members of Osama bin Ladin's terrorist network. Together, these forces unleashed a powerful coalition that sallied northward from the Pushtun belt that borders Pakistan, ultimately gaining control of 90 percent of the country. The Taliban were initially welcomed by an Afghan population tired of war and disgusted by Kabul's inept, corrupt mujahideen government, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. THINGS FALL APART

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faresponsel8/peter-tomsen/a-chance-for-peace-in-afg... 10/7/03

STATEMENT ON

UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN: CURRENT ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTION

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS For a hearing on June 19, 2003

By PETER TOMSEN Former United States Special Envoy and Ambassador on Afghanistan, 1989 -1992 Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia, 1995 -1998

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Peter Tomsen Restoration of democracy in Pakistan and reduction of tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations will be high on President Clinton's agenda during his meeting later this month with Pakistan's military ruler, Pervez Musharraf. But Pakistan's destructive policies on Afghanistan should be emphasized as well. Senior administration officials recently announced American support for yet another Pakistan initiative to resolve the Afghan conflict. Mr. Musharraf has also sought Iranian and United Nations cooperation for the initiative. Unfortunately, these efforts are foredoomed. Giving another U.S. green light to Pakistan to mediate the Afghan conflict will only further postpone the day when the United States must adopt a more effective policy to deal with the international Islamist extremist network centered in war-torn Afghanistan, but also well entrenched in Pakistan. The network includes the Taleban; the Pakistan government's military intelligence arm, the Interservices Intelligence Bureau (ISI); a number of Pakistani religious parties and their ' paramilitary forces engaged with ISI support in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban; Osama bin Ladin's terrorist web; and a growing medley of militant extremist groups operating in North

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* SUNDAY, MAY 23, 1999 / PAGE B3

PETER TOMSEN

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jr continues to tear Afghanistan. The Pakstani-supported radical laliban recently refused to attend a United Nations sponsored reconciliation meeting. There seems no end to the 18-year humanitarian agony of the Afghan people. Osama bin Laden and other international terrorists still enjoy sanctuary there. Afghanistan is now the world's No. 1 producer of heroin. Moreover, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan blocks the development of a natural Eurasian trade corridor north to south, east to west, connecting South, East and Central Asia with the West. The great majority of Afghans are weary of the continuing conflict. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras and the more Westernized Kabuli population yearn for peace. The widespread Afghan hope that the Taleban would deliver that peace contributed to the quick-fire Taleban military victories two years ago, and the downfall of the discredited, illegitimate, and selfappointed Rabbani government in 1996. Peace and a political settlement, however, will not be realized in Afghanistan unless Pakistan terminates its covert support to Islamist radicals like the Taleban today and the ruthless Gulbudin Hekmatyar before the Taleban's ascendancy. Since the Soviet pullout in 1989, the single largest obstacle to a successful settlement process has been the Pakistani military intelligence agency, the ISI (Interservices Intelligence Agency). The United States, through the CIA, funneled more thaii $1 billion of weapons, equipment and cold cash to the ISI following the Soviet invasion, including during three years after the Soviet pullout. The ISI unilaterally conveyed the great bulk of this aid to the Afghan Muslim extremists, who concurrently were receiving large sums from radical Islamist sources in the Persian Gulf region. Pakistan's military dictator Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and his ISI sought to displace the communist regime in Kabul with Mr. Hekmatyar. This fit nicely into Gen. Zia's Islamization policy and cooperatir •
Beyond Marx and mullahs al leaders, Islamists rather than the majority Afghan moderates, also would pre-empt revival of the "Pushtunistan" issue aimed at uniting Pashtun tribal groups on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The military training camps for Muslim militants were created by the ISI in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Bin Laden has played a major role in this operation since 1983. It was not surprising that Pakistani, Kashmiri and Arab extremists — not Afghans — comprised the great majority of those killed in the 1989 U.S. cruise missile attack on the ISI-Ben Ladin training facility near the Pakistan border. During the 1980s and 1990s, the CIA, the State Department, more moderate Afghans, who did most of the fighting against the Soviets, and even Pakistan's Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were cut out of decision-making on ISI distribution of U.S. supplied arms and finances within the Mujahideen, ISI Gen. Mohammed Yousaf, in his book "Silent Soldier," documents how the ISI monopolized control of all arms distribution among the Mujahideen. Gen. Yousaf confirms that more than 70 percent of combined U.S. and Saudi covert funds went to the extremists, primarily Mr. Hekmatyar. Several ISI attempts over 16 years to install its favorite, Mr. Hekmatyar, in Kabul failed. Mr. Hekmatyar's group, drawing on logistics lines to nearby Pakistan, conducted a horrendous bombardment of Kabul during 1992-1995 after rival Ahmed Shah Masood seized the city from the communist regime. Ancient buildings, lovely gardens and neighborhoods that survived intact during the Soviet occupation were reduced to rubble. Tens of thousands of civilians died in the savage bombardment. When Mr. Hekmatyar failed, the ISI switched its support to the Taleban, supplying weapons, cash and direction as the Taleban army rolled north. Lacking the management and logistics capabilities to run coordinated military operations or to administer towns and cities, Taleban ranks have been

"Afghanistan picks Osama bin Laden In the first round ... Iraq gets Abu Nldal and three Russian nuclear scientists."

swelled by thousands of Pakistani military, intelligence, and religious operatives to perform those tasks. Intensely anti-Shi'ite Pakistani and Arab religious elements within the Taleban led to the massacre of Shi'ite civilians in Mazar-I-Sharif and the Hazarajat. Pakistan as the "front line state" during the Soviet-Afghan War deserves considerable credit for assisting Afghanistan out of a nineyear nightmare. In doing so, however, its sponsorship of the Mujahideen Islamist extremists sowed the seeds for the second nightmare — Sunni Muslim terrorism and dictatorship. The Taleban's foreign-imposed image is dissipating the initial Afghan enthusiasm that greeted its rise to power. Afghan regional, tribal and sectarian cleavages are eroding Taleban unity in tangible and intangible ways. In the months ahead, challenges to the Taleban and their Pakistani supporters will inevitably grow, including in the southern and eastern Pashtun tribal belt near Pakistan. Pakistan would be foolish to try to shore up the doomed Taleban movement through even further infusion of i' irsonnel and resources, or k A>lish a formal alliance or confederation link with the Taleban regime. Islamabad

should instead recall the fate of previous Soviet and imperial British interventions in Afghanistan. The situation today is further complicated by the breakdown in central political authority in Pakistan. The ISI has become a "state within a state." Neither the Pakistani military nor political leadership control its Islamist activities in Afghanistan and also Kashmir. The past 10 years have witnessed a pattern of constructive statements on an Afghan settlement by Pakistan's presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers. In each case, ISI and its radical Muslim Pakistani and Arab partners on the ground derailed the reach for peace. The United States does not have vital interests in Afghanistan. The stability of the broader region around Afghanistan, including the Persian Gulf, does, however, impinge on U.S. vital interests. We therefore remain a major diplomatic player in encouraging an Afghan political settlement. Our positions carry considerable weight among the Afghan and external parties involved in Afghanistan, including Pakistan. Resolution of the Afghan issue would facilitate Indo-Pakistani normalization. It would help to avoid a nuclear confrontation between them and lessen tensions in Central

Asia between Pakistan and Iran, Russia and the Central Asian Republics, and between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's political leadership since Gen. Zia has dodged its responsibility to reclaim control of Afghan policy from ISI. The United States should insist that it do so, appealing to Pakistan's own selfinterest. Interlocked warfare, terrorism and narcotics production in Afghanistan is disastrous for Afghans. It is also disastrous for Pakistan. Intense Shi'ite-Sunni violence has alreadyflowedacross the Afghan-Pakistani border to torment Pakistani cities and towns. Drugs from Afghanistan have penetrated Pakistan's youth and spawned crime. Islamabad, through its misguided Afghan policies, has literally thrown away natural markets for itself in Eurasia, from Central Asia to the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Pakistan could be the foundation for a network of east-west, northsouth pipelines and roads transiting Afghanistan to the energy rich new republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus — if peace is restored to the Afghan land bridge. Tb get there, Islamabad needs to dispel the well-founded suspicion of most Afghans, plus Afghanistan's other neighbors, and the international community, that ISI's and therefore Pakistan's support for Islamist extremism in Afghanistan remains the root cause of the continuing Afghan tragedy. It should join the United States, Russia, Iran, China and the new Central Asian Republics in letting the United Nations-assisted Afghan peace process unfold without ISI's disruptions aimed at maintaining an Islamist government in Kabul and making Afghanistan a training ground for Muslim terrorism elsewhere in the world. Peace and stability will return to Afghanistan only when Afghans are able to choose their leadership in a process seen by them as credible and not imposed from the outside — from Moscow on behalf of doctrinaire Marxists, or from Islamabad on behalf of radical Mullahs. Peter Tbmsen, special envoy to the Afghan resistance with the title of ambassador, 1989-1992, is •' ~ofessor of international studl Jl programs at the Uiiiversi., of Nebraska at Omaha.

.com - Ex-envoys tell of Taliban meetings - November 8,2001

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Ex-envoys tell of Taliban meetings By CNN Chief International Correspondent Christiane Amanpour

LONDON, England (CNN) —On the streets and in corridors of power in the Muslim world, in the salons of Europe, people keep asking: Why has the United States never tried to talk to the Taliban about Osama Bin Laden? Where's the evidence against him? Why has the United States never presented it to the Taliban? The answer is ~ they did. In their first television interview, the two U.S. point men on talks with the Taliban told CNN a story that is largely unknown: about their many meetings, about sharing evidence, and about ultimately failing to reach a "meeting of the minds" with the Taliban. For nearly three years, they met for talks with the Taliban in Islamabad, Pakistan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Kabul, s~^ Afghanistan and Bonn, Germany — as well as in New York and Washington. Former Clinton administration official Karl Inderfurth led many of the meetings. "I personally think I had about 20 meetings with Taliban officials at a very senior leyfl, including Mullah Mullah Jalil. Mullah Muiahed and the Taliban representative in New York," Inderfurth says. "We spent many, many hours patiently discussing our concerns with the Taliban." There were dozens of telephone conversations with the Taliban, including the foreign minister and even once with the Taliban's reclusive leader, Mullah Omar. "The fact is that we wanted to establish a direct line of communication to the Taliban," Inderfurth says. "Mullah Omar got on the line and had a discussion briefly about this." These contacts got under way in earnest only after the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 that killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. Armed with evidence against Osama bin Laden that eventually was presented in a New York court, the Clinton administration's ambassador for counter-terrorism, MichaeLSheefean, says he briefed the Taliban in detail in more than a dozen meetings. "We presented that information after those indictments were concluded in early 1999," Sheehan says. "The linkages back to al Qaeda and Bin Laden's organization were very strong in the case of the East Africa bombings. The groups, the cells that conducted that operation, had clear ties to known Bin Laden lieutenants. There were links were well established in communications, faxes and other means that I think build a very strong case and I think was well understood by any objective persons who reviewed it," Sheehan says. Adds Inderfurth: "In February 1999, Mike Sheehan and I travelled to Islamabad to tell the Taliban a very important http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&expire=-l&urlID=8023231«&fb=...

10/22/03

CNN.com - U.S. repeatedly asked Taliban to expel bin Laden - Jan. 30,2004

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U.S. repeatedly asked Taliban to expel bin Laden Declassified cable details years of negotiations From Henry Schuster CNN (CNN) -The U.S. government asked the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to expel or hand over Osama bin Laden more than two dozen times between September 1996 and summer 2001, according to a recently declassified State Department cable.

Three of those attempts were made after the Bush administration came into office in late January 2001. Despite the various efforts, "these talks have been fruitless," the cable said. The cable was written in July 2001 and was obtained recently by the National Security Archive at George Washington University through the Freedom of Information Act. The National Security Archive posted the document to its Web site Friday. Sajit Gandhi, research associate at the NSA, said there are indications that the Taliban were approached more than 30 times during the time period. The Taliban religious militia ruled much of Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until a coalition of U.S. and allied forces drove them from power in November 2001. The Taliban had given haven to al Qaeda before the attacks of September 11 2001. Remnants of the group remain active, and bin Laden is still at large. The State Department held its first meeting with a Taliban official September 18,1996, when the political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, asked that bin Laden be made "unwelcome" in Afghanistan. According to the document, the U.S. official was told by the Afghani deputy foreign affairs adviser that "the Taliban do not support terrorism and would not provide refuge to bin Laden."

http://cnn.usnews.printtMs.clickability.conVpt/cpt?action=cpt&title=CNN.com+-+U.S.+re...

1/30/2004

UNCLASSIFIED

.-••*•:

*

SECRET NODIS

DECL: 7/16/n .

RELEASED IN FULL

U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden

DECAPTIONED Since the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, the United States has consistently discussed with them peace, humanitarian assistance, drugs and human rights. However, we have made clear that Usama bin Laden (UBL) and terrorism is the preeminent issue between the U.S. and the Taliban. • These concerns over bin Ladin preceded the 1998 bombings. • For instance, Secretary Christopher wrote to the Taliban Foreign Minister in 1996 that. "we wish to work with you to expel all terrorists and those who support terrorism..." In our talks we have stressed that UBL has murdered Americans and continues to plan attacks against Americans and others and that we cannot ignore this threat. • Have also emphasized that the international community f shares this concern. In 1999 and in 2000, the UN Security Council passed resolutions demanding that UBL be expelled to a country where he can be brought to justice. • Have told the Taliban that the terrorist problem is not confined to bin Laden and that the Taliban must take steps to shut down all terrorist activities. • Have told them that the resolution of the bin Laden issue and steps to close the terrorist apparatus would enable us to discuss other issues in an improved atmosphere. • Conversely, have stressed that if this terrorism issue is not addressed, there can be no improvement in relations. These talks have been fruitless. The Taliban usually said that they want a solution but cannot comply with UNSCRs. Often the Taliban asked the U.S. to suggest a solution. • In October 1999, the Taliban suggested several "solutions" including a UBL trial by a panel of Islamic scholars or monitoring of UBL Afghanistan by QIC or UN. • Taliban consistently maintained that UBL's activities are restricted, despite all evidence to the contrary.

SECRET NODIS Classified by: Christina B. Rocca, A/S for South Asia UNITED STATESDEPARTMEHSfiaftSETAIZ.©. 12958; 1.5
36/04

THE 12:58 FAX 202 619 6237

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Text of Pakistan! president's 12 January address to the nation. bbcsap0020020113dyld0012x 5532 Words 13 January 2002 11:20 GMT BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political English (c) 2002 The British Broadcasting Corporation [date of publication]. All Rights Reserved. No material may be reproduced except with the express permission of The British Broadcasting . Corporation. President Musharraf has said that the time has come for Pakistan to decide whether it was to be a theocratic state or an Islamic welfare state. In a televised address to the nation, the president stated that any organization which Instigates violence will be "dealt with sternly" and announced ban on the two militant groups blamed by India for the 13 December parliament attack. However, he said that Pakistan would never abandon its "principled stand on Kashmir" and called for India to hold talks to resolve the dispute, with international organizations monitoring the situation. Gen Musharraf also outlined his vision of a society free from "militancy, extremism, violence and fundamentalism" and described new controls over religious schools. The following is the full text of President Musharraf's address to the nation, broadcast by Pakistan TV on 12 January 2002; unable to determine if live or recorded; subheadings added editorially My Pakistani brothers and sisters. You may remember, since I came to power, I launched a campaign against extremism, violence and terrorism in the society, and for the projection of Islam in the right perspective. I would like to quote what I had said in my first speech on 17 October 99: "Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred; universal brotherhood not enmity; peace and not violence. I have great respect for the religious scholars and expect them to come forward and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and brining a bad name to our faith." Disappointment with "some religious extremist parties" After this, I took a number of steps in this regard. First of all, in the year 2000, I began to interact with Taleban, and advised them [to practice] tolerance and balance and also told them that the terrorists who were involved in terrorist acts in Pakistan were hiding in Afghanistan should be handed over. Unfortunately, we were not successful on any account. For this reason, in the beginning of 2001, I think In January, I sealed Pak-Afghan border and directed that no student of any religious school would cross over to Afghanistan without valid documents. After this, I sent a number of delegations to Mola Omar. I continuously urged them to practice tolerance and balance. After that, on 15 February 2001, we passed Weapons Ordinance, through which we launched deweaponization campaign in Pakistan. On 5 June, I addressed the religious scholars at the Seerat conference [a conference in memory of Prophet Muhammad] and talked to them in very harsh terms about religious extremism.

file://C:\WINNT\Profiles\safi\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\OLK19\Musharraf.htm

1/6/04

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

OPINION 000

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2001

DIPLOMACY

Face to Face With the Taliban

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By KARL F. INDERFURTH ASHINGTONAfter the terrorist attacks on the Worl<$Trade Center an8 the Pentagon, President Bush said. ,we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. The Taliban of Afghanistan should not have been surprised by this statement. They were similarly warned by the U.S. government more than two years ago. The meeting took place Feb. 3, 1999, at the U.S. ambassador's residence in Islamabad. As the assistant secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, I was instructed to deliver a message about Osama bin Laden and terrorism to a high-ranking official of the Taliban movement. I was accompanied by the State Department's coordinator for counter-terrorism, Michael Sheehan. Mullah Abdul Jalil, a close associate of the Taliban's supreme leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and a possible liaison with Bin Laden, traveled to Pakistan to meet with us. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania nearly six months earlier had made it horrifyingly clear that Afghanistan-based "terrorism was a direct threat to the United States. We were outraged that after all the support the United States had given the Afghan resistance during its struggle against the Soviet Union, the terrorists tied to the bombings, including Bin Laden, were trained and based in Afghani-

The U.S. government had repeatedly demanded that the Taliban stop giving safe haven to terrorists. It had also appealed to nations, like Pakistan, that have influence in Kabul. But the situation did not change. . . . The message I delivered at the February meeting went further than any previous one issued by the U.S. > government. Arriving late in the evening from Kandahar, Afghanistan, Mullah Jalil was accompanied by the Taliban's representative in Islamabad. Along with Sheehan, I stressed that the Taliban needed to expel Bin Laden to a location where he could be brought to justice. I emphasized that it was vitally important for the Taliban to act, because the American government believed that Bin Laden was still plotting acts of terrorism against the U.S.—and that we would hold the Taliban responsible for his actions. The message could not have been clearer. Speaking softly through his interpreter, and frequently stroking his beard, Mullah Jalil responded. He began with a prayer, then proceeded to argue that the Taliban's actions conformed to their interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law. He said Bin Laden was an honored guest of the Taliban for the role he had played in the jihad, or holy war, during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. Mullah Jalil acknowledged that Bin Laden was increasingly a burden on Afghanistan, but the Afghani tradition of hospitality did not permit them to force Bin Laden to leave. Mullah Jalil assured us, however, that Bin Laden was under the Taliban's control and that he could not possibly be operating a worldwide terrorist network as we had suggested. Finally, he demanded that we show him the evidence against Bin Laden and that then the Taliban would act according to Islamic law. Sheehan did, citing chapter and verse from the indictment of Bin Laden for his role in the East Africa embassy bombings.

Later efforts were made to provide the Taliban with more information about the U.S. case against Bin Laden, but they never responded. The nearly three-hour session with Mullah Jalil produced no meeting of the minds. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council tried to persuade the Taliban to turn over Bin Laden. Two resolutions were adopted, in October 1999 and December 2000, and sanctions were imposed on the Taliban to accomplish that purpose. Again, the Taliban defied these calls by the international community. Meanwhile, the Taliban, and some of their supporters, tried to misrepresent our campaign against Bin Laden and terrorism as an attack against Islam. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States does not oppose Islam. The United States respects Islam. But we oppose those who commit or condone criminal acts, especially those who commit and inflict grievous injury against civilians in the name of any ideology, religion or cause. Today, the Taliban and their leader, Mullah Omar, are facing another hour of truth. Let us hope they will change their mind promptly and turn over Bin Laden to appropriate authorities in a country where he can be brought to justice and close down the terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan. If they do not, the United States will respond. The Taliban have been warned. Karl F. Inderfurth served as the assistant secretary of State for South Asian Affairs from 1997 to 2001.

Weather

Today: Increasingly cloudy. High 62. Law 50. Sunday: Rain earfy, windy. High 62. Law 52. Details, Page E2.

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SATURDAY, APRIL 18,1998

U.S. Wins Promise OfPeaceTalks InAfghanistan By KENNETH J. COOPEB Washington Post Foreign Service

SHEBERGHAN, Afghanistan, April 17—U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson won agreement today from Afghanistan's Taliban regime and its factional opponents to participate in structured peace talks for the first time since the radical Islamic militia took control of the capital 1% years ago. The negotiations that Richardson, the first U.S. official of cabinet rank to visit Afghanistan since 1974, conducted today with Afghan leaders in two cities significantly deepened the involvement of the United States in resolving nearly a decade of civil war in this impoverished, ethnically divided nation. . Richardson came close to committing the prestige of President Clinton to bringing peace to Afghanistan, a goal that so far has eluded five mediators appointed by the United Nations since the Soviet army ended a decade-long occupation in 1989. Agreements were negotiated among armed factions in 1992 and 1993, only to fall apart, leading to intensified fighting. "President Clinton wants peace in Afghanistan. This is why we are here," Richardson said after meeting with the Taliban's second-ranking leader, Mohammad Rabbani, ttf BJt SANGASH-ASSOOATED PUBS

See AFGHANISTAN,^, Col. 1

U.N. envoy Bill Richardson meets with Afghan staff members who have maintained the U.S. Embassy in Kabul since it closed in 1989.

THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL SATURDAY, APRIL 18,

Associated Press

Washington's representative to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, second from left, and President Clinton's special assistant, Bruce Riedel, left, joined hands yesterday with representatives of Afghanistan's factions.

Afghanistan Factions Agree to Cease-Fire KABUL, Afghanistan, April 17 (AP) — Prodded by Washington's representative to the United Nations, Afghanistan's warring factions agreed today to a cease-fire, an exchange of prisoners and face-to-face talks. The agreements were a significant first step, though many hurdles remain in the effort by the representative, Bill Richardson, to bring peace to Afghanistan. The war has claimed more than 50,000 lives since Muslim insurgents overthrew a Communist government in 1992 and then began battling among themselves. Mr. Richardson held three hours of talks with President Mohammed Rabbani and other leaders of the Taliban, the militant Islamic movement that controls two-thirds of the country. "We had good, positive negotiations," Mr. Richardson said afterward. He said face-to-face negotiations among the local warring parties could start at' the end of this month. Mr. Richardson, the highest-ranking American official to visit here in

A step toward peace in a war that has claimed more than 50,000 lives. two decades, then took off for Sheberghan, 180 miles north of Kabul, for talks with the alliance that is fighting the Taliban. Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, a leader of the alliance, said he would be willing to join the talks, to suspend military operations and to exchange prisoners. Mr. Richardson said the peace talks would be held in Pakistan, where both sides have met separately with mediators. In Kabul, Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel, a spokesman for the Taliban, confirmed that his side had agreed to talks and a cease-fire, and that it would release an unspecified number of prisoners of war by Saturday. The Taliban holds an estimated 4,000 war

prisoners, while their opponents hold 3,000. Fighting has been deadlocked on a front line north of Kabul for months. Mr. Richardson began his visit here with a ceremony at the boarded-up United States Embassy, where he placed flowers at a memorial to the last American Ambassador to serve in the country, Adolph Dubs, who was killed in 1979 in a Shootout between the police and his kidnappers, a renegade group representing minority Tajiks. The Taliban has imposed its strict version of Islamic rule since taking control of Kabul in 1996. Schools for girls have been closed, women are not allowed to work outside the home and men must pray at the mosque and grow beards. The restrictions have hindered United Nations programs and generated international condemnation. Mr. Richardson also discussed narcotics control and women's rights with the Taliban President. He said the Taliban had agreed to let women study at the university level and to work outside the home without being chaperoned by a male relative.

TASHKENT DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN

The Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the «Six plus Two» group, composed of the States bordering on Afghanistanthe People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan - as well as the Russian Federation and the United States of America, having met in Tashkent on July «19-20», 1999 with the participation of the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, having considered the situation in Afghanistan, being sincere friends of the Afghan people and desiring peace and prosperity for Afghanistan, have confirmed the following principles. We express the profound concern of our Governments at the continuing military confrontation in Afghanistan, which is posing a serious and growing threat to regional and international peace and security. We remain committed to a peaceful political settlement of the Afghan conflict, in accordance with relevant provisions of resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and we, in particular, recall

the

«talking points»

and the

«points of common

STATEMENT BY KARL F. INDERFURTH ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

MARCH 9,1999

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" W e ' r e K e e p i n g These S t i n g e r s "

GHOST W A R S

?the militia force with an instant cash infusion of between $5 million anq million, about double the amount later reported to have been provided t Taliban by bin Laden to aid the conquest of Kabul. (At the time of Sc request to travel to Kandahar, the United States had little evidence tha| Laden had connected with the Taliban.) While not a large amount by US program standards, such a payment would still be a sizable infusion of i stricted cash for a militia whose leaders daily announced new codes of | dieval conduct. Yet a presidentially authorized covert action policy at the | encouraged the CIA to buy Stingers wherever they could be found. It was unclear during the fall of 1996 whether the United States reg the Taliban as friend or foe. In the weeks after the fall of Kabul, American officials issued a cacophony of statements—some skeptical^ s apparently supportive—from which it was impossible to deduce a cle tion. American diplomats in Islamabad told reporters that the Taliba play a useful role in restoring a strong, central government to Afgh The Taliban themselves, worried about rumors that they received sup from the CIA and were a pro-American force, refused to receive a low-| State Department visitor to Kabul. "The U.S. does not support the' has not supported the Taliban, and will not support the Taliban," thej envoy, Lee Coldren, announced in reply. Within days then-US, ambass^ the United Nations Madeleine Albright denounced the Taliban decrees if as "impossible to justify or defend." But just three weeks after tha Raphel outlined the Taliban's claims to legitimacy before the UN,, Council and pleaded that they not be isolated. It was difficult to tell ^ these State Department officials spoke for themselves and which spd the United States.5 Raphel's call for engagement with the Taliban attracted support ou the Clinton administration, especially from Unocal. Marty Miller and hi| leagues hoped the Taliban takeover of Kabul would speed their pip gotiations. Within weeks of the capital's capture, Unocal formed a new I partnership to build the pipeline, announced the creation of an board made up of prestigious American experts on South and Cent and opened a new office in the Taliban heartland, Kandahar. Marty J sisted publicly that Unocal remained "fanatically neutral" about Afgha tics, but it was clear that the Taliban's military victory would be help reducing the number of parties to the Unocal pipeline talks.6 Republican and congressional experts also declared that Americ||

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on after the Taliban takeover of Kabul. "The Taliban does not practice anti-U.S. style of fundamentalism practiced by Iran. It is closer to the di model."7 This remained a common prism of American thinking about (list political movements: Saudi Arabia was conservative, pious, and nonatening, while Iran was active, violent, and revolutionary. As doctrinaire ni Muslims, the Taliban vehemently opposed Iran and its Shiite creed, and bat sense they were allied with American interests. Khalilzad was soon inl to join Unocal's advisory board, along with Robert Oakley, the former f ambassador to Pakistan. i this atmosphere of drift and desultory debate about the Taliban's meanf Gary Schroen and a team of embassy diplomats flew into Kandahar in ry 1997, on a scheduled United Nations charter. They circled down to st mud-baked plain laced by eroded riverbeds. The American team rolled \e airport through a dry, flat, treeless expanse where sagebrush hopped [.tumbled in the desert wind. Shadowed rock hills rose to the west. On the ded highway to town they passed state-owned farming cooperatives, i orchards, and walled farming villages. Amid smoky bustle, horse carts, I scooters they entered Kandahar city through a painted arch called Scken Post," protected by armed Taliban guards. Pedestrians crowded roadway—almost all of them tall, bearded Pashtun men in colorful as and loose, cool cotton robes. The city itself was a flat expanse of et stalls and mud-walled compounds. Mullah Omar's modest house lay ad a wall on the Herat Bazaar Road in the center of town, near Kandaf university, which the Taliban had converted into a religious madrassa. In |ity's central square the militia occasionally staged mock executions of rand televisions, bashing them to pieces and hanging them by their cords. |oen and his colleagues bunked overnight in a United Nations guest e, a small enclave of foreigners, fluorescent lights, and canned CocapThey contacted the Taliban foreign ministry to arrange their appoint: Omar declined to see them since they were not Muslims, but they were 1 an audience with the local governor and Omar's chief aide, Mullah lAhmed.8 ||iey drove the next day to the Governor's House, a striking, crumbling, 1 sandstone building set in a garden of spruce trees and rosebushes. The pin did not give the impression that they cared much for its carved ceil|br Persian-influenced mosaics. They laced the building with mines and is, and kept their Stingers in a locked storage area off the inner courtyard.

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