T2 B14 Tenet Letter To Shelby Re Adci Fdr- Entire Contents- 2-3-98 Letter (highlighted With Critical Comments)

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505

3 February 1998

The Honorable Richard Shelby Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman: 'Among other things, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 created three new presidentiallyappointed, Senate-confirmed positions under a new Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community-Management: an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, the Assistant Director of. Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and the Assistant 'Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. In his signing statement on the bill, the President stated: "[T]he DCI has communicated to me his strong opposition to provisions in the Act that would establish three new Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence, each requiring Senate confirmation. I share his concerns that these provisions will add another layer of positions requiring Senate confirmation without a substantial corresponding gain in the DCI's authority or ability to manage the Intelligence Community-. I understand that the DCI intends to seek repeal or significant modification of these provisions in the 105th Congress. .,J will support^** such efforts." ^^^ My predecessor, John Deutch, left office at the beginning of the 105th Congress before he could act upon the President's commitment. It has now fallen to me as the new DCI to address this matter. Let me say at the outset that I share the concerns of my pre'decessor and the President. While this legislation was undoubtedly well-intentioned, I do not believe that implementing it would improve my ability to manage the Intelligence Community. Indeed', I believe filling these positions is apt to create more problems than it would solve.

0800955

The Honorable Richard Shelby

I come to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the legislation creating these three positions adds nothing to the authority of the DCI to manage the Intelligence Community. While I appreciate the practical difficulty the Committees faced in legislating additional authority for the DCI consistent with the authority of the heads of departments and agencies which have elements within the Community, the creation of three positions subordinate to the DDCI/CM does nothing in and of itself to enhance the DCI's authority vis-a-vis these elements. To the contrary, I believe filling these positions would create an unnecessary bureaucratic layer which could hamper, rather than- facilitate, -the Community's day-to-day v;ork. VJhile it is essential that elements of the Community with common functions (e.g. collection, analysis) communicate with each other and closely coordinate their day-to-day activities, any effort to administer these functions on a dai'ly'basis from single focal points on the Community Management Staff is likely to fail. ' I also think that creating a management layer of officials subordinate to the DDCI/CM who are presidentiallyappointed and Senate-confirmed would be seriously out of keeping with the Community's overall organizational framework, creating confusion in terms of who outranks whom and blurring the existing lines of authority. In addition, I consider certain of the functions assigned to the new Assistant Directors to be misplaced. The new Assistant Director .for Analysis and Production, for example, is charged with establishing priorities for all analysis and production carried out by elements of the Intelligence Community (e.g. the. National Intelligence Council, the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, DIA, State INR, the production elements of the military departments) as well as with identifying the intelligence to be collected by" the elements of the Intelligence Community (e.g. NSA, NIMA, the CIA Directorate of Operations). Performance of these functions would necessarily require substantive analytical expertise that the Community Management Staff, as currently staffed, does not possess. If such a capability were to created, it would mean duplicating the capability that now resides within the National Intelligence Council and/or Directorate of Intelligence, requiring substantial augmentation of the Community Management Staff. This woul clearly be unwarranted, in my view, whatever the perceived shortcomings in the coordination of analysis and production.

The Honorable Richard Shelby

A similar problem exists with regard to the function apparently envisioned for the new Assistant Director for Collection. If Congress truly intends that this official' manage intelligence collection across the board -- utilizing all of the human and technical capabilities of the Community -- on a daily basis against every intelligence target, several hundred new and highly knowledgeable employees would likely be required. Congress provided no additional personnel to perform this function when it enacted this legislation, of course -- nor would I recommend that it do so. While there may be instances where collection opportunities are missed due to inadequate or untimely •-GGHirRUR-icat-ion between the .various collection disciplines,- to my knowledge, such lapses have neither been so frequent nor so consequential as to justify the creation of an additional bureaucratic layer at CIA headquarters,vwhich I fear would be as apt to stifle timely intelligence-gathering -as to facilitate it. Finally, I am concerned generally with expanding the number of intelligence officials -- especially officials whose responsibilities include managing collection assets and intelligence production -- who are subject to presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. Positions which carry such responsibilities should be filled (and aspired to) by intelligence.professionals. J4any,qualified professionals would simply choose not to seek such positions if they were made political jobs. Moving further in this direction, in my judgment, would.inevitably lead to greater politicizing of the intelligence function and move us away from establishing the kind of professional career -service that is needed to accomplish our mission. For these reasons, then, I believe the prudent course of action is to repeal the legislative provisions creating the three ADCI positions and attempt to address the concerns" that prompted the creation of these positions through a. combination of legislative and administrative actions. The legislative action I envision is redefining the statutory functions of the DDCI/CM in a way that imposes responsibility more directly upon this official to deal on my behalf with the concerns raised by the Committee. In this regard, I am enclosing a proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 (together with explanatory report language) which I plan to submit for inclusion in the annual Intelligence Authorization bill offered by the Administration, the final version of which will be formally transmitted to the Committee later in the year.

The Honorable Richard Shelby

In addition to working with you on these statutory changes over the forthcoming year, the new DDCI/CM, once , confirmed, as well as others on my staff, will work with you on a continuing basis to develop and implement such administrative actions as may be needed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Intelligence Community -- from collection, to analysis and production, to instituting administrative measures designed to improve our overall performance. In this regard, it is essential that you appreciate the many collaborative processes already in being within the Community which specifically address the sorts of concerns raised by Congress. I think we have made, -and -are -Gonfcin-uing- to make,- s-ubet-aivisi-a-l-- --headway -in dealing with most of them. In the end, I believe this approach will get us where we all want to be in the least disruptive, most productive fashion. Congress created the new DDCI/CM to assist the DCI in executing the DCI ' s statutory responsibilities as head ,of the Intelligence Community. While I can understand your desire to ensure that the DDCI/CM has an adequate subordinate structure to carry out this role, it is preferable, in my view, to give her (as well as her successors in office) an opportunity to determine what organizational structure is needed for effective Community management without imposing such a structure by statute. I look forward to working with you and the rest of the Committee over the next year to bring this matter to a mutually- satisfactory resolution . An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Kerrey and the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence . Sincerely,

Enclosure

Proposed Amendment :

'

1. Subsection 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.403 (d)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraphs (A) through (D) and inserting in lieu thereof-"(A) Directing the operations of the Community Management Staff, or any successor organization (B) Executing the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence set forth in subsections 103(c)(l), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of this Act; provided, however, that this subsection does not preclude the Director of Central Intelligence 'from •* -----— ----~del~egHii'rftg any—or cell of the funccions, in whole"" or in part, to such other subordinate of.£icjLal-s as the Director may choose. (C) Performing such other functions as the Director of Central Intelligence may direct." 2. Subsection 102 (e) (2) of«fche National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 (e)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraphs (E) , (F), and (G), and by redesignating subparagraph (H) as subparagraph (E). 3. Subsections 102 (f), (g), and (h) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 (f), (g), and (h) are repealed. 4. Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code/ is amended by deleting the following: "Assistant Directors 'of "Central Intelligence (3).".

Report Language to Accompany Proposed Amendment 1. Paragraph 1 would amend subsection 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 to redefine the responsibilities of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management to clarify that this official is responsible for executing the enumerated statutory functions of the Director of Central Intelligence as head of the Intelligence Community. Such responsibilities would continue to be carried out subject to the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, the Director of Central Intelligence would not be precluded from delegating these responsibilities, in whol-e "Uf^in'part, " t'o"othe"r" subordinate' of ficials, "or" 'from " assigning additional responsibilities to the DeputyDirector of Central Intelligence for Community Management as the Director saw fit. Subparagraph (A) is the same as, found in existing law except that the phrase "or any successor orgatvi^atlon'1 "has been added at the end of the subparagraph. It Is anticipated with the creation of the position ,of-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM) that the Community Management Staff shall become the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. It is prudent, in any event, to provide flexibility for the DDCI/CM to organize and name liis or her subordinate organizations. Subparagraph (B) provides expressly that the DDCI/CM shall execute the statutory functions of the DCI as head of the Intelligence Community enumerated by section 103(c) of the Act, namely subsections 103(c)(l), (c) (2), (c) (3) , (c) (4) and (c) (5) ; provided that this subparagrapii does not preclude the Director of Central Intelligence from delegating any or all of the functions, in whole or inj.partJ.«to such other subordinate officials as the Director may choose. Subsection 103 (c) (1) of the Act sets forth the responsibility of the DCI to develop an annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities, to include developing and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and forparticipating in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program.

Subseccion 103 (c) (2) of the Act sets forth the responsibility of the DCI to establish requirements and priorities to govern the collection of national intelligence by elements of the Intelligence Community. Subsection 103(c)(3) of the Act sets forth the responsibility of the DCI to approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President. It is anticipated that pursuant to this authority, the DDCI/CM will assess, as appropriate, intelligence, collection against priority targets _.tp ensure, such collection is both effective and efficient. Subsection 103(c)(4) of the Act sets forth the responsibility of the DCI to promote and evaluate t
3. Paragraph 3 repeals the applicable subsections of the National Security Act of 1947 which create/ and set forth the functions of, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, the Assistant Director of ' Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, and the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration. • 4 . Paragraph 4 is a conforming amendment that strikes the three Assistant Directors from the list of those entitled by law to the Executive Level IV Pay Level.