T1 B24 Doug M Misc Unclassified Fdr- Al Qaeda And Affiliated- Lines Of Inquiry And Key Questions 592

AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATED TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS

Lines of Inquiry and Key Questions A. We propose to organize our initial research around three over-arching questions, which will be used as principal "lines of inquiry." 1. What is the history of al-Qaeda and its linkages to other transnational terrorist entities prior to the 9/11 attack? 2. What can we determine, through a comprehensive examination of all evidence now available - synthesizing the information available earlier with that obtained post-9/11 - regarding the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks? 3. What is now known of the present composition and threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliated entities, and what does this indicate regarding the threat posed? Each of these lines of inquiry is building blocks that encompasses many specific component questions. We can identify some of these component questions at the outset of the research and are listed below as a means of focusing the initiation of our research, and they are listed below as a means of focusing the initiation of our research. However, new component questions will emerge from our discoveries as our research progresses. Thus, one of the aims of the initial research is be to identify the additional key component questions for our research. One of the crosscutting issue to which we will pay close attention is al Qaeda's collaborative relationships and connections with various other entities, as these will be critical in assessing the means and capabilities for future attacks. B. The following is a list some of the key subsets of component questions that will be engaged to focus the initial research: 1. What is the history of al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack? a. What are its origins, ideological roots, doctrines, and worldview, and how have these evolved over time? Who have been its key functionaries? How has it recruited personnel? b. What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al-Qaeda, mounted on its own or in collaboration with other terrorist groups? How were they carried out? c. With what other terrorist groups has it been affiliated, whether in collaborative operations or through funding and logistic support? d. How has al Qaeda functioned organizationally and financially? e. What have been its relationships with governments, or government components, or government components acting outside the purview of their own political leadership, including but not limited to those governments or factions that provided al Qaeda with support and sanctuary?

2. What can we determine, through a comprehensive examination of all evidence now available - synthesizing the information available earlier with that obtained post-9/11 regarding the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks? a. What can we now understand regarding strategic objectives of the attack? b. How were the targets and the means of attack chosen? By whom? How was intelligence collected and employed for this purpose? c. What do we know of the origins and details of the operational planning? E.g. the designation of operational command, the selection of the hijacking teams, the establishment of logistic and financial support? When was the plan finalized? Was it fixed or flexible? d. What were the key planning and decision variables? For example, is there any evidence of variables that would have resulted in a decision to abort the plan? Who had the final authority to carry out the plan or abort it? e. What training, exercises, and/or rehearsals were carried out? f. What staging areas and support networks were employed were employed in carrying out the plan? Did affiliated entities play any role in staging or supporting the attacks? 3. What is now known of the present composition and threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliated entities, and threat do they now pose? a. How has al-Qaeda sought to adapt and compensate for its losses? What changes have taken place since 9/11 in such areas as tactics, doctrine, personnel, and financial practices? b. What is the current status of al Qaeda's active membership and its access to weapons and training? c. What has happened to the many thousands who passed through the training and vetting camps in Afghanistan? d. What role has al Qaeda played in terrorist attacks mounted since 9/11, whether thwarted or actually carried out? e. What has been the role, if any, of affiliated and collaborative entities in these attacks, and what is the status of the connections between al Qaeda and other terrorist groups? f. Is there any evidence that al Qaeda is currently receiving any support from any states actor? g. What is the status of the efforts to acquire WMD?

We will start our research on the first line of inquiry - in effect, the construction of the "base building block" -in the 1989-90 time frame, when bin Laden's "foundation," or "al Qaeda," was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, and bin Laden himself returned to Saudi Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in 1990, bin Laden intensified his tirades against the "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world and called for expulsion of the American "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites" of Islam. In 1991 bin Laden moved his base to Sudan. Some context:

During this time frame several major terrorist operations took place in which bin Laden is known to have been involved, as well as additional attacks for which there is evidence of, at least, bin Laden's support. These include the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemen used as a stopover for American troops on their way to Somalia; the February 193 bombing World Trade Center (WTC I); the pre-empted "Day of terror" plot targeted at New York City landmarks; the 1994-95 "Bojinka Plot" in Manila, which included plans to blow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean, assassinate the Pope and the U.S president, and fly an airplane laden with explosives into the CIA's headquarters; and the November 1995 bombing of the Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh that killed five US soldiers. In addition, although the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did not take place until August 1998, the planning was already well underway while bin-Laden was residing in Sudan where he reportedly reviewed the plans for the attacks and reconnaissance photos used for these plans. The multiple connections offer insights into the evolving structure of al Qaeda. For example, Wadih el-Hage, who served as bin Laden's personal "secretary " while he was based in Sudan and who has now been identified as a key player in the African embassy bombings, had previously (in 1991-92) headed a so-called charitable organization in New York City that ostensibly raised funds for veterans of the Afghan Jihad. The organization had previously raised funds to support those fighters during the Jihad. While in new York el-Hage also had contact with at least one of the participants in WTC I and was later convicted for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings. Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, who managed the WTC I, escaped after the attack and ended up in Manila, where he worked with future 9/11 commander Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on the aborted Bojinka plot.

Our research will then follow bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of 1996 and the establishment of his infrastructure there. One of the key developmental lines to be examined in this period will be the further expansion of al Qaeda's global reach through recruitment, indoctrination, training and dispersal of cells, at least some of which played critical roles in the later 9/11 attacks. Some context: Al Qaeda's base and operational infrastructure expanded by a significant order of magnitude after bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in 1996, entrenched its "army" infrastructure of bases for training in weapons, tactics, and production of explosive devices. This infrastructure also provided centers for ideological indoctrination and for screening the ranks to spot and vet individuals for the inner cadre of terrorist cells. This was the source of a large portion of the individuals dispatched to form cells in cities around the globe - a process vividly demonstrated in what is know known of many of the 9/11 hijackers. The home-base system in Afghanistan also facilitated sequestered gatherings for strategic and operational planning, and for collaboration sessions with leaders of other major terrorist groups. We now have evidence revealing a significant expansion of collaborative arrangements with other terrorists took place from the Afghan bases. It is now known, for example, that al Qaeda collaborated with two Asian terrorist groups in

attacks carried out in Manila and Jakarta in December 2000. This same connection was used to set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, whose participants included individuals who would be involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 and the 9/11 attacks, and October 2002 Bali bombing. Similarly, a report released by Singapore police reveals while the Southeast Asian terrorist organization Jema'ah Islamiyya palnned to provide the foot soldiers for the thwarted plan for multiple suicide attacks in Singapore and Malaysia in early 2002, al Qaeda leaders made the strategic planning decisions at meetings in Afghanistan and provided financing and muchof the target reconnaissance.

Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing the planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks in excruciating detail, from its origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging the inflow of newly developed information (including findings emerging from the parallel research on the al Qaeda origins and development) with that available from existing sources. Our specific objectives include the identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities, including possible links with state sponsors. These could be a major element in the nature of the threat that evolves in the future. Some context: Evidence now available indicates that the concept of using aircraft not just as targets of a terrorist attacks but as the weapons for carrying out the attacks — crashing them into major sites - was raised with top al Qaeda leaders as far back as the mid1990s, at the same time the Manila plot for multiple hijackings was underway. Some have also theorized that the concept of employing hijackers with pilot training evolved from the failed attempt of Algerian hijackers to force pilots to steer a hijacked aircraft into the Eiffel Tower in 1995. The process of selecting individuals for piloting the aircraft, bringing together the operational teams, moving the financial support for the training and maintenance of the teams, and most notably coordinating the actions of the diverse components entering the US from both sides of the continent, and coordinating the implementation with flights from three major airports are prima facie indication of the linchpin role of the "central staff" role of al Qaeda's inner circle.

The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing specific areas of focus and identifying sources for pursuing the third line of inquiry: What has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the face of the intensified worldwide coalition in a war against terrorism, and what all of this reveals of its present composition and the threat it and its affiliated entities pose to the US. > While the research on the earlier developments up through the 9/11 attacks will by itself feed into the understanding of the more current lines of inquiry, we plan to step back at various intervals to examine what specific component questions and "branches" of inquiry have emerged from the research on the evolution trail, and use these to sharpen the focus of the examination of the specific issues of current threat potentials.

Document Research We propose to initiate our research by digging into key known lodes of information. This needs to be understood as a starting point, however, because one of the desired products of an in-depth research effort is the identification of new branches and potential sources for further research. We plan to look preliminarily to open sources, many of which have already been employed to begin shaping our detailed timeline of the al Qaeda emergence and actions since its formation in the late 1980s. (Some of the most useful books are included in our list of suggested reading materials.) We then propose to examine the following key sources: 1. The records of information obtained by the Joint Inquiry, both as substantive sources and as a means of identifying what else to look for and where to look. All of the documents that have been made available to the Joint Inquiry are maintained in specific storage bins by the agencies from which they originated. 2. The FBI's PENTBOM file, which contains the details of what has been learned from the investigations of the 9/11 conspiracy, including a detailed timeline of what the FBI knows of the origins and movements of each of the pilot's participants. 3. Records of statements of individuals interrogated in connection with several major terrorist prosecutions and trials in the Southern District of New York Federal and elsewhere. This is a critical lode of information for examining the evolving cell structure, transnational connections and key players in the evolution. The documents include records of investigations and interrogations from the first trial of participants in the WTC I attack, which concluded in March 1994; the trial of the conspirators in the New York City landmarks case, including "Blind Sheikh," which concluded in October 1995; the two trials of Ramzi Yousef, first for his role in the "Bojinka plot," concluded in September 1996, and then for his role in the 1993 WTC attack, concluded in November 1997; the investigation of the pre-empted "millennium strike" on Los Angeles International Airport; and the prosecution and trial of perpetrators of the African embassy bombings, concluded in July 2001. In addition, the gunman in the 1990 assassination of Meir Kahane, the leader of the Jewish Defense League, was later convicted for his involvement in the 1993 plot to bomb New York city landmarks. We intend to review the records from the Kahane assassination and other related investigations to determine the origins of the New York cell. 4. Documentary reports of information relating to the 9/11 attacks and the history of al Qaeda obtained from individuals and material taken into custody since 9/11. The Intelligence Community has obtained a vast amount of the information from the large number of operatives, documents and equipment captured since 9/11. We will start with the Director of Central Intelligence's Review Group, which has been tasked with accumulating all information on bin Laden, al Qaeda, and terrorist plots against the United States interests worldwide.

This information is critical to the task of examining al Qaeda's development, structure, key players and collaborative ties with the other regional and transnational terrorist entities, which is particularly important in assessing the threat al Qaeda currently poses. Many key individuals and materials have in fact been captured since the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry, including, according to media accounts, individuals who played key roles in the al Qaeda leadership circle, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaida, as well as some key field operators such as Bin al-Shib, Umar Faruq and Mohammed Monsour Jararah. The latter two are sources for information on the global reach, because of their central role in collaborative of al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist groups in the December 2000 attacks in Manila and Jakarta in, the planned multiple attacks in Singapore and Malaysia thwarted by local authorities in December 2001, and the October 2002 Bali bombing. Others currently in custody, such as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, served on the other side of the collaborative actions, as regional points of contact with al-Qaeda in coordinating the actions and in funneling support such as finances and materials. 5. Reporting received from foreign intelligence and law enforcement entities. This body of information, in combination with the detainee sources, provides the largest amount of information about al Qaeda that has been obtained since the 9/11 attacks. In addition to what has been provided through more traditional allies, the reporting provided by Singaporean and Malaysian authorities is a rich lode, as exemplified by the January 7, 2003 Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs report to its Parliament detailing connections between al Qaeda and Jema'ah Islamiyya. The initial survey of these materials will then be employed to design the more detailed targeting of the research. An extensive list of individuals with whom interviews will be sought has also been started, and will continue to be unfolded as the process unfolds. Initial interviews would be prioritized on their potential for providing guidance and clues to mining known and potential information lodes. Additional interviews would be taken up as the research process proceeds, on the guiding principle that the effectiveness and productivity of factual interviews is directly related to the time and effort given to preparatory research the more informed the interviewer, the more effectively the interview can be targeted.