Shared Responsibilities: A National Security Strategy For The Uk

arTS & CulTure DeMoCraCy & CulTure DIGITal

This is the final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, an all-party Commission preparing an independent national security strategy for the united Kingdom. Based on research and Commission deliberations over a two-year period, the report sets out a wide range of proposals designed to make our country and its citizens, businesses, and communities more secure.

eCoNoMy

Shared Responsibilities

CrIMe

Shared Responsibilities

eDuCaTIoN

our recommendations include:

eNVIroNMeNT

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a new approach to the situation in afghanistan and Pakistan

euroPe

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Proposals to improve the uK’s energy security

FaMIlIeS

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Measures to address radicalisation and the threat of terrorism here in the uK

HealTH

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The call for a transformation in our approach to defence policy, and measures to strengthen both NaTo and the european pillar of the transatlantic alliance

WWW.IPPr.orG

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Measures to strengthen and improve the institutions handling security at the centre of government

INTerNaTIoNal

MIGraTIoN

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Proposals for improved global governance

SeCurITy

PuBlIC INVolVeMeNT

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a call to strengthen and deepen the legitimacy of the security strategy we pursue.

eQualITIeS

HouSING INTerNaTIoNal MeDIa

The final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century

PuBlIC SerVICeS reGIoNS SeCurITy TraNSPorT WelFare

Institute for Public Policy Research 30–32 Southampton Street london WC2e 7ra united Kingdom tel: +44 (0)20 7470 6100 fax: +44 (0)20 7470 6111 email: [email protected] Printed on chlorine-free paper made from at least 75% post-consumer waste

www.ippr.org registered Charity No. 800065

The final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century

SoCIal PolICy

our report, as with our interim report, Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World, is a call to action. We face serious and worsening international security challenges but provided we are willing to learn lessons, to change the way we think, to find the necessary political will and to adapt our policy solutions and instruments to new circumstances, there is much that can be done. In the post 9/11, post financial crisis world of complex threats and limited national resources, this report charts a safer course for the country in turbulent times.

A national security strategy for the UK

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Summaryand Recommendations Thissummaryisdividedintofourparts: • Asetofobservationsonthecurrentsecuritycontext

• Astatementofprincipleswhich,intheviewoftheCommission,shouldshapeand underpintheUK’sresponsetothatcontext

• Asummaryoftheconclusionsreachedinthereport • AlistofalltheCommission’srecommendations,whichturntheseconclusionsinto callsforspecificactioninawiderangeofareas.

Observationsonthecurrentsecuritycontext AspartoftheworkforourInterimReport,publishedinNovember2008,the Commissionanalysedtheunderlyingdriversoftheinternationalsecurityenvironment andmadeaseriesofbasicobservationsonthenatureofthechallengesnowfaced.We standbythoseobservations1 today.Theyarethat:

• Aprocessofglobalisationandpowerdiffusionischangingthenatureofglobalorder, dilutingthecontrolofnationalgovernments,deepeninginterdependenceacross bordersandempoweringafarwiderrangeofactorsthanbefore.Theseactorsinclude statesthatareemergingontotheworldstage,butalsoprivatecompanies,nongovernmentalorganisations(NGOs),terroristorganisations,criminalgangsandothers. Theoverallresultisincreasedfreedomforsometodisruptordestroy,andreduced statedominanceofthesecurityenvironment,sothatnostatetodaycanprovidefor itssecurityneedsbyactingaloneandstateinstitutionsingeneralareunderpressure toadapt.

• Fragileandunstablestatesoutnumberstrong,accountableandstableonesinthe internationalsystemtodaybymorethantwotoone,anddisorderlystatesarenowa greaterthreattointernationalpeaceandsecuritythanisinter-statewar.

• Climatechange,globalpovertyandinequalityareexacerbatingthisproblemandthe combinationofthesefactorswithresourcescarcityiscontributingtoaglobalconflict environmentthatstilltakestoomanylives,displacestoomanypeopleandviolates toomanyhumanrights.

• Transnationalcriminalnetworkshaveexpandedtheirtraffickingoperationsindrugs, armsandpeopleandinmanycountriesareunderminingandcorruptingstate governancearrangementsfromwithin,facilitatingandprofitingfromviolentconflict intheprocess.

• Aglobalisedneo-jihadiideologyhasemergedasasignificantdriverofthe internationalsecuritylandscape.

• Wehavenowenteredasecondandfarmoredangerousnuclearageinwhich proliferationnotonlytootherstatesbutalsotonon-stateactorsisagreaterdanger thaninter-statenuclearconflict.

• Rapidadvancesininformation-andbio-technologiesarecreatingnewvulnerabilities, makingcyber-crime,cyber-terrorismandnewformsofbiologicalwarfareallmore likelyinthefuture.

• Thecombinationofglobalisation,urbanisationandevercloserhumancohabitation withagreaterdiversityofanimalspeciesisexposinghumanitytogreaterrisksfrom pandemicdisease. 1.Thefullanalysisthatunderpinsthese observationsisavailableintheInterim Report(ippr2008).

• ComplexityhasenteredthephysicalinfrastructureofmodernlifeintheUKandour relianceonstretchedandinterconnectedinfrastructureshasincreased.Morecritical infrastructureisnowinprivatesectorhandsthanformanydecades,andthepriorities

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ofcompanieshave,naturally,beenprofit,notresilience.Theresultisnewinternal pointsofsocietalvulnerabilityandlessdirectstatecontroloftheservicesessentialfor everydaylife. Theseobservationsdescribeamuchchangedandevolvingworld.But,justas importantlyforUKnationalsecuritystrategy,therelativeplaceoftheUKanditsmajor alliesintheworldorderischangingtoo.Inthisreport,wedrawattentiontothe followingimportantaspectsofthatcontext:

• ThepositionoftheUnitedStatesinworldaffairsischanging. ItisourviewthattheUnitedStateswillremaintheworld’smostpowerfulnationfora decadeormore,butitwillholdthatpowerinadifferentcontext,notasthesingle superpower,butasthepowerofgreatestoverallimpactinamultipolarworldinwhich newmajorplayersareemergingontheworldstage. Theglobalfinancialcrisisandtherecessionthathasfollowedinitswakehave acceleratedthetrendtowardsarelativedeclineinUSpoliticalinfluence.TheUSfaces severeeconomicstrainsathomeandstrongerchallengestoitsgloballeadership abroad.Atthesametime,itisbecomingmorefocusedonthegenuinelyglobalspread ofitsinterestsandalliances,andEuropeisbecominglesscentraltoitsoverallworld view. Thefulleffectsofthelong-termprocessesofchangeunderwaycannotbepredicted, butitispossiblethatwiththesechangesintheUSpositionwemayalsobeseeing thebeginningoftheendoffivecenturiesofdominanceofWesternpower, institutionsandvaluesoverinternationalaffairs.

• Althoughstillsomeoftherichestcountriesonearth,theindividualcountriesof Europe,includingtheUnitedKingdom,arelikewisecontinuingalongandgradual processofdeclinerelativetootherpowersemergingontotheglobalstage.Both demographictrendsandfuturerelativeeconomicgrowthpotentialsuggesta continuationofthistrend,unlesscooperationamongtheEuropeanpowersleadsto theEuropeanUnionemergingasamoreeffectiveplayerontheworldstage.

• ThereareharderconstraintsontheamounttheUK,theUSandtheEuropeanNATO alliescanaffordtospendonsecuritythantherehavebeenformanydecades.These constraintsaregrippingusjustassecurityrisksarediversifying,theglobalrecessionis bitingandlong-termpressurestowardscompetition,conflictandstatefailureare buildingupintheinternationalsystem.FinancialpressureswithinEuropemayalso causeadditionalstrainsinthetransatlanticpartnership.

Principles Giventhisoverallcontext,thisreportidentifiesandappliesprinciplesthatwebelieve shouldunderpinUKnationalsecuritystrategyinthecircumstancesdescribed.These principlesaresetoutbelow.Whiletheyfurnishaviewonthespecificissuesconfronting ustoday,theyalsoactasaguidetothelonger-termsecuritychallengesfacingtheUK. 1.TheobjectiveofanationalsecuritystrategyshouldbetoprotecttheUKpopulation fromthefullrangeofriskssothatpeoplecangoabouttheirdailylivesfreelyandwith confidenceunderagovernmentbasedonconsent. 2.Theriskstonationalsecuritymustbedefinedwidelyincurrentconditions,tocover majorman-madethreatsandnaturaldisasters. 3.Inplayingourroleontheinternationalstage,Britishsovereigntymustbeexercised responsibly.Thismeanshelpingothercountriesandpeoplestoaddresstheirown problems,becauseinaninterconnectedworldtheneedsandwell-beingofourown peoplearelinkedtotheneedsandinterestsofothers. 4.Amajorincreaseinlevelsofmultilateralcooperationisneeded. 5.ExtensivepartnershipworkingwithintheUK,withtheprivatesector,withcommunity groupsandwithlocalgovernmentandcitizensasindividuals,mustlikewisebeafeature ofsecuritypolicy.

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

6.Demonstratingandestablishinglegitimacyofstateactionisastrategicimperative. 7.Weneedtorefineourconflictpreventionpolicy.Whenwelltargetedandbasedona goodunderstandingofthedynamicsofemergingproblems,preventiveactionsaves money,livesandpoliticalrelationships.

“Inshort,the Commission believesthat governmentneeds tothinkbroadly, prepare thoroughlyand actearly”

8.Acommitmenttobuildingnationalresilience,especiallyinourinfrastructure,by measuresincludingeducatingandincreasingtheself-relianceofourcommunities,isan integralpartofsecuritypolicy. 9.Weneedflexibleandwellcoordinatednationalcapabilities,forgingawiderangeof policyinstruments,militaryandnon-military,intoacoherentwhole. Inshort,theCommissionbelievesthatgovernmentneedstothinkbroadly,prepare thoroughlyandactearly.Becausetoday’schallengesaremorediverseandcomplex,and becauserelativestatepowerisnowmorelimited,governmentshavealsotocoordinate theirinternaleffortmoreeffectivelyandtocooperateexternallywithmanyotheractors whileatthesametimebeingcarefultodemonstratethelegitimacyoftheactionthey take. Thisconcept,ofadistributed2,coordinatedandlegitimateresponsehasbeenusedto shapemuchofthestructureandcontentofthisreport.

Policyconclusions Giventhecontextandprinciplesoutlined,weconcludethat:

• Tohelpbuildadistributedresponseexternally,theUKmustinvestpoliticalcapitaland resourcesineffortstobuildmoreeffectiveinternationalcooperation.Ifwecan encourageotherstodothesame,wecanpushuppower,responsibilityandeffective actiontomultilateralinstitutionsandextendtheirauthorityintopoorlyregulated areasoftheglobalspace.Wesuggestitisimportanttodothisacrossawiderangeof issues,includingenergycompetition,climatechange,nuclearproliferation,thecontrol ofbiologicalandchemicalweapons,terrorism,transnationalcrime,cyber-security challengesandtheincreasinglyimportantusesofouterspace.

• TobuildadistributedresponseinternallyintheUK,andtodealwithchallenges relatedtoresilience,counter-radicalisationandcounter-terrorismathome,central governmentneedstodevolveanddelegatepowerandresponsibilitydownandoutto localgovernment,communities,NGOs,businessesandcitizensandtoenlistallof themaspartnersinthedeliveryofnationalsecurity.

• Tocoordinateourownwidelydispersednationaleffortandtobetterintegrateour instrumentsatnationallevel,theUKneedstostrengthenthestrategiccentreof governmentandtobreakdownthebarriersbetweendepartmentalstovepipes;to conductnotaStrategicDefenceReviewbutaStrategicReviewofSecurityinthe widestsense,whichincorporatesbutgoesbeyondarmeddefence;toestablisha singlecross-governmentsecuritybudgetincorporatingallareasofspendingon nationalsecurity,includingdefence;toreviewtherole,relationshipsandremitof theDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DfID)sothatitsactivitiescanbe moreeffectivelyintegratedwiththesecurityeffort;andtoenhancetheDiplomatic Service,sothatitiscapableofthemoredemandingtaskswenowneeditto perform.

• Onlegitimacy,wearguethereisaneedtothinkmorecreativelyandbemore demandingofourselveswhenitcomestodemonstratingitinpractice.Thisismore thanaquestionofvalues.Itispartofthewiderpoliticalstrategywithinwhichour securitypoliciesmustsit.OurrecommendationsinChapter11ofthisreport,and summarisedbelow,putfleshontheseideas. Inadditiontotheseconclusionsonoverallstrategy,theCommissionhasreached importantconclusionsonarangeofmorespecificissues. 2.Adistributedresponseisonespread overawideareaandsharedbya numberofactorsatavarietyoflevels.

• OntheimmediatechallengeofAfghanistan-Pakistan,weconcludethatsuccessthere requires:moreassistanceforPakistan;moreeffectiveintegrationoftheinternational

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effort;bettercoordinatedregionaldiplomacy;andtheuseofmilitaryforceonlywithin awiderpoliticalstrategythatprotectsciviliansandbuildslegitimacyontheground. Suchanapproachwillbeneededalsoinanyfutureinternationalinterventions.

• WecallforurgentinvestmentintheUK’sstrategicgasstoragecapacityandformore cooperationonenergyattheleveloftheEuropeanUnionaspartofawiderpackage ofmeasuresonenergysecurity.

• Ondefence,wecallforatransformationofthearmedforcesand,withinthecontext ofthealliancesofwhichweareapart,forgreaterdefencecapabilityspecialisation. Wepointtoover£24billionoffutureplanneddefencespendingthatneedstobe re-thoughtaspartofafullStrategicReviewofSecurity. Alliances Onalliancerelationships,theCommissionhasexaminedthefollowingfiveoptionsfor theUK. 1.TheUKcouldtrytoperpetuatethestatusquo,inwhichthecountrydependsona versionofthetransatlanticalliancethatisheavilyreliantonAmericancapabilitiesand resourcesandinwhichtheUKtriestoretainfull-spectrumdefencecapabilitiesbutona muchsmallerscalethantheUS. 2.ItcouldpursueamajorstrengtheningofEuropeandefenceandsecuritycooperation, notasanalternativetoNATObutasaroutetoreducingabsolutedependenceonthe UnitedStateswhilecontinuingtobuildmoreeffectivemultilateralinstitutionsasa longer-termproject. 3.Itcouldlooktosomeotherintergovernmentalgrouping,suchastheCommonwealth, toplayagreaterroleorchooseadhoc arrangementsforspecificissues. 4.Itcouldtrytogoitaloneandonlylookforallieswhenabsolutelynecessary. 5.Itcouldpursueahedgingstrategythatassumesthatnofundamentalchoicesare necessaryandleavesallfouroftheaboveoptionsinplay. Inthisreport,wemakeadeliberatechoice.WearguethatOption2aboveservesthe nationalsecurityinterestsoftheUKmoreeffectivelythananyother.Weneedto buildbetterglobalinstitutionsacrossawidefront,butfortheforeseeablefutureUK securitywillbebestservedbyourmembershipofthetransatlanticalliance.Thecosy statusquo,however,inwhichtheUStakesmuchofthestrainwhileEurope dissipatesitslimiteddefenceandsecurityresourcesonduplicatedcostsandColdWar museumarmies,willnotbeavailableindefinitely.IfwedonotstrengthenNATOby reinforcingitsEuropeanpillar,notjustondefencebutonwidersecurityissuestoo, theresultwillbeneitherthestatusquonorsomeotherfantasyofwidercollective securitycooperation.Therewillbeafuturecrisisthatleavesusvulnerabletoshifting Americaninterestsandopinion,relativeUSdeclineandEuropeandisunityand weakness,whenNATO’spoliticalgluefailstoholdandEuropeisleftmoreexposed thanatanytimesincetheSecondWorldWar. TheBritishandEuropeanrelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesshouldthereforeremainthe strongestpillarofournationalsecuritystrategy,butitcannotbetheonlyone. StrengtheningoursecuritybaserequiresfarmoreeffectiveactionatEuropeanlevel.We needtoinvestpoliticalcapital,diplomaticeffortandfinancialresourcesintheEuropean SecurityandDefencePolicy.WehavetopersuadeourEuropeanpartnerstoraisetheir minimumlevelsofsecuritycommitmentandresources.AndweneedtomodifytheUK’s defenceposturetopursuegreatercapabilityspecialisationwithintheoverallalliance effort,areducedscaleofcommitmenttofull-spectrumcombatcapabilities,andmore targetedinvestmentinthekindsofcapabilitieswearelikelytoneedintheless conventionalconflictenvironmentofthefuture. Therearerisksinrelyingmoreonothers.Inreality,however,bothduringtheCold Warandsince,wehavebeenlivingwiththoserisksformanyyears.Thereisagreater danger,inourview,intakingtheUnitedStatesforgrantedorinattemptingtorely, inevitablyinadequatelygiventheresourceconstraints,onanyeffortwecanmount

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

ourselves.NoEuropeancountry,includingthisone,hastheresourcestogoitalone todayandattemptingtodosowouldbeamisjudgementofhistoricproportions. Resources Onthequestionofresourceconstraintsandthepublicfinances,weconcludethatthe debateisjumpingtoofasttowardsraisingtaxesormakingcuts,skippingoverthe questionofhowwegetmorevalueoutofwhatwealreadyspendonsecurity.Bothcuts andtaxincreasesmaywellbenecessary,butbeforewegettothatstageweshouldbe fullyexploringanapproachthat:

• Isbasedonaproperstrategicassessmentofthreatsacrossthewholesecurity spectrumandthatdeploysourresourcesinawaythatisruthlesslytargetedatthose threatsonacross-departmentalbasis

• Facesuptodifficultchoicesondefencepolicyandmoreeffectivelycoordinatesand exploitssynergiesacrossdevelopmentandsecurityspending

• Makesbetter,moretargeteduseofotherresources.If,forexample,wecansave moneybyreplacingtheIDcardschemewithmorepervasiveuseofbiometric passports,thenthatoptionshouldbeexplored.Ifwecansavemoneybybuilding moreeffectivecooperationandcollaborationbetweentheMoDpolice,theBritish TransportPoliceandtheCivilNuclearPolice,allofwhichplayaroleinprotecting elementsofthenationalinfrastructure,weshouldlooktodoso. Weshouldalsoadoptanapproachthat:

• Makesmoreofouralliancessothattheburdenismoreeffectivelysharedbetween internationalpartners

• Coordinateswiderinternationalactionmoreeffectivelytoensurebetteroutcomesfor themoneyweinvest

• Rationalisesourprocurementpolicytotargetessentialcapabilities • Makesarealityofwellplannedandrelativelycheapeffortsatconflictprevention insteadofwastingmoneyandliveswhenconflictshavebrokenout

• Lookstospreadthecostsandeffortinareaslikeprotectionofthecriticalnational infrastructure,energysecurityandmaritimepiracyfairlyacrossthepublicsector, privatebusinesses,consumersandcitizens. Wedonotpretendthatthesechoiceswouldmiraculouslyremovetheresourceproblem weface,butaddressingthatproblemwithoutafundamentalre-thinkwillundermine publicsupportforcontinuedinvestmentinnationalsecurityandwouldbeshort-sighted. Itwouldalsobeamissedopportunitybecausethescaleofthefiscalpressurewe currentlyfaceisanopportunitytogetonandtackletherangeoftaskswesetoutinthis reportandshouldbedoinganyway.

Recommendations Thespecificrecommendationsthatflowfromtheseoverallconclusionsarepresented below,intheorderinwhichtheyappearinthefullreport,wheregreatercontextand detailforeachrecommendationisprovided. Chapter3:DealingwiththechallengeofAfghanistanandPakistan Recommendation1: TheGovernmentshoulddirectmoreresourcesatthesituationin Pakistan,bothintermsofcapacitybuildingandoperationalsupporttohelpthe Pakistanisecurityforcesdealdirectlywiththethreatfrommilitants,andintermsof developmentassistance.TheborderareasofPakistanarenowtheepicentreofthe challengeswefaceintheregion.ItisfromherethatbothAfghanistanandPakistanare beingdestabilisedandfromthisareathatmilitantgroupscanplantheirattacks,bothin theregionandintheWest. Recommendation2: InrelationtoAfghanistan,whileacknowledgingtheneedforalongtermcommitmentontheUK’spart,theCommissionbelievesweneedmuchmoreclarityand realismonthenatureoftheendstatewearetheretohelpdeliver.Thefocusneedstobeon

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helpingthewritofthedemocraticallyelectedgovernmentinKabulrunthroughoutthe country,andonpreventingAfghanistanfrombeingusedasabasefromwhichtoattackus. Itshouldnotbeontryingtoimplantourownculturalnormsinacountrythatisnotours. Recommendation3:TheinternationalcommunityneedsasingleplanforAfghanistan, developedinpartnershipwiththeAfghanauthorities,withtightlydefinedprioritiesand adeterminationbyallmembersoftheinternationalcommunitytooperateitwithreal unityofpurposeandvoice.Thereareover50countriesengagedinbilateralactivitiesin Afghanistan,andmanymultilateralorganisationsareactivetoo.Thepowertodo somethingaboutcoordinatingallthiseffortlieswiththeinternationalcommunity,not withouradversariesontheground. Recommendation4:Theuseofmilitaryforce,bothinAfghanistanandintheborder areasofPakistan,mustbelockedmorefirmlywithinacoherentpoliticalplanthatis designedtodefeattheadversariesweface.Thatplanshouldprioritisethesafetyand protectionofAfghanciviliansandshouldbefullyexplainedtothepeopleofthecountry. Recommendation5:TheUKgovernmentshould,withinternationalpartners,further developitseffortsatnarcoticseradicationinAfghanistanbypursuingamultidimensional strategyfocusedoncropdestruction,livelihoodsubstitution,anddealernetwork disruption.ThiswillhelpbothtodevelopAfghanistan’slegaleconomyandtoundercut theTaliban,whichprofitsfromthenarcoticstrade. Recommendation6: TheGovernmentshouldsupportandencouragetheUStopursuea widerregionalapproachtoimprovingthesituationinAfghanistanandPakistan.Many neighbouringcountriesareaffectedbywhatisgoingonthereatthemomentandthe regionhasseveralwider,interlockingsecuritychallengesthatrequireregionalsolutions. India,China,Russia,IranandthecountriesofCentralAsianeedtobebroughtintoa coordinatedprocess. Recommendation7: TheUK’scapacityforcombinedcivilian-militarystabilisationand reconstructionoperationsmustquicklygrowin-countryandincreasinglybeAfghanised wherepossible.WehavebeengoodatwinningmilitaryvictoriesinAfghanistan,butless goodatbuildingastablepeaceafterwards. Chapter4:Energysecurity TheUKhasbeenusedtoplentifulsuppliesofenergy,oftenavailableclosetohomeand atlow,stableprices.Thiseraisnowover.Wearebecominganenergy-importingcountry, moreexposedtoarangeofrisksthataccompanyincreasedrelianceonothers.Of particularconcernisthesupplyofgasfrommainlandEurope,whichwillbeagrowing featureoftheUK’senergymixintheyearsahead.Consequently: Recommendation8: TheUKshouldcontinuetopressforanintegratedandcoordinated gasmarketacrossthewholeoftheEU.TheintegrationoftheEuropeangasmarketisa foundationstoneofEUunityovercomingdecadesanditisinallmemberstates’interests toensurethatEuropecannotbedividedbysuppliersseekingtoexertpoliticalinfluence. Recommendation9:TheUKshould,asamatterofurgency,furtherdevelopitsstrategic gasstoragecapacity,andgovernmentshouldsetatargetdateforachievingtherequired capacity.Privatesectorproviderswillnotprovidethestrategicreserveweneed.Strategic gasstorageisvitaltoensuringsupplyandtheavoidanceofpossibleenergyblackmail. Recommendation10:TheGovernmentshouldfurtherdevelopalternativestogasin powergeneration.Aspressuretocutcarbonoutputincreases,aswitchfromcoaltogas islikelyinpowergeneration.Topreventthisfromfurtherincreasingourexposureto importedgas,theUKneedstoexplorerenewables,furtherdevelopcarboncaptureand storagetechnologyand,ifitpursuesmorenuclearpower,ensurethishappenswithout creatingadditionalsecurityrisks. Recommendation11: TheUKshouldfollowtheexampleofCaliforniaandestablisha regulatorystructurethatgenuinelyincentivisesbothsupplycompaniesandconsumersto saveenergyandincreaseefficiencylevelsintheuseofgas.Thisagainwouldcontribute toreducedrelianceonimportedgasandthereforetoimprovednationalsecurity.

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Chapter5:Defencepolicy Itisclearthereisablackholeinthedefencebudget.Therehavealsobeenstrainsonthe operationaleffectivenessoftheArmedForcesduetotheintensityofrecentoperations. TheCommissionbelievesthissituationcannotcontinueasitis. Recommendation12: AfullreviewoftheUK’sdefencerequirementsisneededurgently, butthisreviewshouldformanintegralpartofawiderStrategicReviewofSecurity.It shouldnotbeaStrategicDefenceReviewconductedinisolationfromtherestof governmentthinkingonnationalsecurityrisksandresponses.Thedefencecomponent ofthiswiderreviewshouldfocuson:increasedcapabilityspecialisation;capabilities requiredtohandlerisksthatarespecifictotheUK;areducedcommitmenttothefull spectrumofconventionalwarfightingcapability;anemphasisonpost-conflict stabilisationandreconstructioncapabilities;andanewapproachtotheUK’snuclear deterrent,Trident.Eachoftheseisaddressedinfurtherrecommendationsbelow. Recommendation13: Thefuturedefenceinvestmentprogrammeshouldpursue greaterUKdefencecapabilityspecialisationwithinthecontextofadeepeningof EuropeandefenceintegrationandthewiderNATOallianceofwhichweareapart. Weneedafocusoncommandandcontrolassets,tacticalground-airsupport, heavyliftaircraft,cyberwarfarecapability,andSpecialForces.Wealsoneedto emphasisehighqualityServicepersonneltrainingandanincreaseinoverallService numbers. Recommendation14: TheGovernmentshouldgivehighprioritytothecapabilities requiredtodealwitharangeofUK-specificsecuritychallenges.Thesemightinclude majorcivilcontingencies,majorterroristincidentsonUKterritory,smallscaleriskstoUK communitieslivingabroad,andsomeelementsofmaritimesecurity. Recommendation15: TheGovernmentshouldthoroughlyre-examine,aspartofa StrategicReviewofSecurity,itsprojecteddefenceequipmentrequirements.Thisreexaminationshouldexploreallviableoptionsforcapabilitydowngradingandquantity reductions,aswellasforcompletecancellationofsomeequipmentprogrammes.For illustrativeratherthancomprehensivepurposes,wesuggestthatprogrammessuchas theFutureCarrier,theJointStrikeFighter,andpurchasesofType45Destroyersandof Astuteclasssubmarinesshouldbeintheframe. Recommendation16: TheUKshouldcreateaStabilisationandReconstruction Force,onlytheheadquartersofwhichshouldbeapermanentstandingelement. Thiswouldbeajointcivilian-militaryforce,partlystaffedfromatrainedcivilian reserve,capableofbeingdeployedintostilldangerouspost-conflictenvironments atshortnotice. Trident TheCommissionbelievesfirmlyintheneedtopursueaworldfreeofnuclearweapons andintheneedfortheUKtoplayanactiveroleinbringingthatabout.Inthe meantime,andinrelationtoTrident,theCommissionrecommends: Recommendation17:ThefutureofBritain’sindependentnucleardeterrentshouldbe consideredasanintegralpartoftherecommendedStrategicReviewofSecurity.This shouldconsider:

• Whether,astheCommissionbelievesisthecase,aminimumUKdeterrentisstill needed

• Thebestandmostcost-effectivewaytoprovideit,includingconsiderationofwhether weshouldreplacetheTridentsystem,asiscurrentlyplanned,seektoextendthelife ofthecurrentsystemfurtherordecidethatsomeothersystemforprovidingBritain’s deterrentinanucleararmedworldwouldbebettersuitedtothestrategic circumstancesinwhichwethenfindourselves

• Theopportunitycostsofmaintainingourdeterrent,inallitspossibleforms,forother sectorsoftheUKdefenceandsecuritybudget.Thismusttakeintoaccountthecosts thatwouldbeinvolvedindecommissioningTridentanditsfacilities. Recommendation18: Inordertomaintaintheoptionofrefreshingthecurrentsystemas

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partoftheStrategicReviewofSecurity,theUKshouldcontinuewiththecrucial ongoingpreparatoryworkontheconcept,designandassessmentphasesoftheTrident refresh. Recommendation19: Toprovidemaximumadditionalflexibilityinourposition,theUK shouldalsonowrecommencedetailedexploratoryworkonthecostsandviabilityofa furtherrun-on,beyond2024,oftheexistingVanguardsubmarinehulls,sothatthe StrategicReviewofSecurity,shoulditconcludethatTridentistheappropriatewaytogo, canalsoconsiderthisoptionifdesired. Recommendation20: Finally,beforeanyfurtherdecisionofsubstanceistakenonthis matter,Parliamentmusthaveafurtheropportunitytovote. Chapter6:Deepeningalliancecooperation:NATO,theEUandthetransatlantic partnership Inlinewiththecommentsmadeearlierinthissummaryontheneedtostrengthenthe EuropeanpillarofNATO,theCommissionmakesthefollowingrecommendations. Recommendation21:RegardlessoftheoutcomeoffuturedeliberationsontheEU’s TreatyofLisbon,theUKgovernmentshouldsupport,fullyengageinandifnecessary leadmovestocreatepermanentstructureddefencecooperationamongapioneergroup ofEuropeanUnioncountries. Recommendation22: Pioneergroupdefenceministers,backedwherenecessarybytheir nationalleaders,shouldalsopursueincreasedlevelsofinvestmentinpriorityareassuch ason-the-groundforceprotection,improvedtransporttoandwithinthefieldof operations,bettercommunicationsandintelligence,improvedlogisticsandmore precision-guidedweapons. Recommendation23: Onthesupplyside,weneeddeepercollaborationintheEuropean defenceindustry,particularlyasthisrelatestolandandseasystems.Thereisstillwasted researchanddevelopmentinvestmentinsmall-scalenationaldefenceindustriesinthese areas,inflatedpricestotheEuropeantax-payer,andconsequentlymissedexport opportunitiesforEuropeandefencemanufacturers.Thisallneedstobestrippedout,via Europeandefenceindustryconsolidation. Recommendation24: Tohelpfreeupresourcesformuchneedednewinvestments, Europeancountriesshouldeachpursuemorepoolingofresourcesandahigherdegree ofrolespecialisation.Clearly,totalrelianceonrolespecialisationwouldbedangerousin theabsenceofprioragreementonstrategyandcommitmentstodeployforces,but provideditdevelopsincrementallyandtakesplaceonastrictlyvoluntarybasis,itshould beencouragedandexpandedwhereverpossible. Recommendation25: Atthestrategiclevel,thereisanurgentneedforanagreedEU externalcrisismanagementdoctrine,whichwouldcovertherangeofissuesfrom preventiveengagementandinterventioninhostileenvironmentstopeacekeeping, conflictstabilisationandpost-conflictreconstruction. Recommendation26:Toensurethatanydoctrineismorethancosmetic,thereisalsoa needtoinvestintherightkindsofEuropeancapabilities.EUcountriesshouldincrease thenumberofBattlegroups3 onstandbyatanyonetime,whileexpandingthesizeof supportunitssuchaslogisticians,engineers,helicoptersquadrons,medicsand intelligenceteamsthatmayberelevantnotonlytoshort-termBattlegroupinterventions butalsotolonger-termstabilisationoperations.Individualcountriesshouldalsoinvest moreinbuildingdeployablegendarmerie,policingandciviliancapabilitiesneededfor post-conflictstabilisationandreconstructionoperations. Recommendation27:TostrengthenEuropeanabilitiestodealwithlesstraditional securitychallengesliketransnationalcrime,andtomakemoreeffectiveuseofborder crossingpointsasopportunitiesforinterdictionsofarms,drugsandpeoplesmuggling, theUKshouldbothmorefullyengageandsupporttheEUsecuritybodyFrontex’s activitiesatthebordersoftheEuropeanUnionandpursueamuchenhancedandmore centralisedrolefortheEuropeanPoliceOffice,Europol.

3.AnEUBattlegroupisamilitaryforce consistingofatleast1,500combat soldiersdrawnfromEUmemberstates.

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

NATOreform Recommendation28:There-thinkofNATO’sStrategicConcept,initiatedatthe60th AnniversaryStrasbourg-KehlSummit,shouldbeusedasanopportunitytore-affirmthe commitmenttocollectivedefence,asavehicletoclarifyandupdatetheorganisation’s roleandmissionfortoday’schangedcircumstances,andtostimulatefurtherdebateon whatNATOsolidarityandthecollectivesecurityguaranteemeaninpracticeincurrent conditions.SinceweliveinaworldwhereEuropeanandNorthAmericancountriescan behithardfromaremotepointandwithlong-termeffects,solidarityrequiresNATO membersbothtocommittothedefenceofhometerritoryandalsotobecollectively willingandcapableofrespondingtonon-conventionaland‘outofarea’challenges.This hastobecomeacorefeatureofbothdeterrenceandcollectiveself-defence,notan optionalextra. Recommendation29: Inthecontextoftheeconomicdownturn,thereintegrationof FranceintoNATOmilitarystructuresandtheappointmentofafourstarFrenchgeneral toleadAlliedCommandTransformationinNorfolk,Virginia,effortsatthetransformation ofNATOcapabilitiesmustnowbeaccelerated. Recommendation30:FargreaterconsiderationshouldbegiventohowNATO’smilitary capabilitiescanbeusedincoordinatedfashionwithpolicing,civiliananddevelopment instrumentsaspartofmoreeffectiveandintegratedstrategiesinconflict,post-conflict andcomplexemergencysituations. Recommendation31: NATOmustcontinueattemptstoreformitsinternalprocedures andorganisation.Itcannotanylongerbethesametightlyorganised,consensus-based organisation.Itneedsreformtoitspersonnelstructures,forceplanninganddecisionmaking,aswellasitsfinancing.Inparticular,the‘costs-fall-where-they-lie’approach needstobereplacedbyfinancialcontributionsthatarebasedonsizeofmembercountry GDP.Thosecountries,suchastheUKandGermany,thatinsistonlimitingtheNATO budgettonoughtpercentgrowthinrealterms,yearonyear,shouldalsodesistfrom doingso. Recommendation32:NATOmustkeepitsdooropentonewmemberswherethisis consistentwithitsfundamentalidealsandpurpose.Thecriteriaofmembership,bothcivil andmilitary,needtobemadeclearerandmoredemanding,butwheretheycanbemet, newmembersshouldbeconsidered.Nonon-memberstateshouldhaveavetooverthis process. Chapter7:Strengtheningglobalcooperation Actiononfragilestates Theconsequencesflowingfromweakandfragilestatesareapotentiallygreaterthreatto securitytodaythantheactionsofstrongones.Totacklethisissuemoreeffectively,the Commissionbelieves: Recommendation33:TheUKgovernmentshouldadoptapoliticalratherthana technocraticstancewhenengaginginfragilestatesanditshouldencourageotherstates andinternationalinstitutionstodothesame.Providingassistancetoincumbent governmentsintheseenvironmentscansometimespropupflawedandillegitimate politicalregimes.Weneedtofindwaysofdeliveringfinancialaidthatareconditionalon improvementsingovernance,citizenship,peaceanddevelopment. Recommendation34:TheGovernmentshouldincreaseitsengagementwithandsupport forregionalorganisationsthatpromotegoodgovernanceintheirspheresofinfluence. OrganisationssuchastheAfricanUnion(AU),theNewPartnershipforAfrican Development(NEPAD)andtheAfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM),whilestill facingchallenges,havehadsomesuccessinfosteringaccountablepoliticalgovernancein theirregionandwouldbenefitfromincreasedinternationalsupport. Recommendation35:TheGovernmentshouldgivefullsupporttoapackageof measuresdesignedtoreducecorruptionandincreaselegitimacyinweakandfragile states.Corruptionintheseenvironmentsfurtherunderminesgoodgovernance,destroys livesandcreatessecurityrisks.

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Recommendation36: TheGovernmentshouldcommittomorepredictable,effectiveand longer-termassistancetofragileandpost-conflictstates.Stableassistancepackagesare particularlyimportantinpost-conflictenvironmentswheretooofteninternational assistancebeginstotaperoffjustastheabsorptivecapacityofthestateisincreasing. Recommendation37: Whereitisappropriatetodoso,theGovernmentshouldincrease investmentinpooledresourcesforfragilestates.Donorcoordinationinthese environmentsisoftenpoorandcommonaimsandobjectivesunclear. Climatechangeandenergycompetition Climatechangeisthemostpotentlong-termthreatfacinghumanityandthegreatest challengetoouringenuityandleadership.Therearenoscenariosinwhichunchecked climatechangeisgoodforeitherinternationalornationalsecurity.TheUKhaslimited influenceonthisissueandanenforceableinternationalagreementonemissionstargets isunlikelyintheshortterm.However,wecanstillactand,inourview,theUKshould focusontwoissueswithoutwhichanyeffectiveinternationalactiononclimatechange willbeimpossible:first,howmitigationandadaptationeffortsindevelopingcountries aretobefinanced;andsecond,howlow-carbontechnologydevelopment,transferand deploymentaretobeorganised.Consequently,theCommissionbelieves: Recommendation38:TheUKgovernmentshouldsupportthecreationofacoordinating bodyforinternationalclimatefinanceflowsaimedatsupportingclimatechange adaptationandmitigationactivitiesindevelopingcountries. Recommendation39: TheGovernmentshouldprioritisesupportfortechnologytransfer initiatives,especiallyinenergyefficiency.Whileemissionsreductionstargetsandcarbon pricingissuesframeinternationalengagementonclimatechangeintermsofburdensharing,thedevelopmentoflow-carbontechnologytransformsthatengagementintoa discussionaboutsharingtheindustrialgainsthatwillflowfromactiontomeetthecrisis. Thisisinherentlymoreproductive. Inaddition,becausethereisaseriousdangerofcompetitionandconflictoverfossilfuel energysuppliesinfuture,particularlyoncetheglobaleconomycomesoutofrecession, theCommissionbelieves: Recommendation40: TheGovernmentshouldplanforandadvocateatrulyglobal forumforenergycooperation(withoutprecludingexpansionoftheInternationalEnergy Agency).Thiswouldhelptolimitcompetitivepressurebyimprovinginternational cooperationandcoordinationonthisissue. Nuclearnon-proliferation TheCommissionbelievestheGovernmentshouldvigorouslypursuethegoalofanuclear weapons-freeworld.Thisisagoalthatmaytakegenerationstodeliverbutactionin pursuitofitmustbeginimmediately.Intakingactiontohelpbringthisabout: Recommendation41: TheUKGovernmentshouldvigorouslypursueastrengtheningof theNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)provisionsonmonitoringandcompliance,toprovide greaterassurancestoallpartiesontheeffectivenessoftheTreaty.TheInternational AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)AdditionalProtocol,requiringastatetoprovideaccessto anylocationwherenuclearmaterialispresent,shouldbeacceptedbyallnationssigned uptotheTreatyandthepolicygoalshouldbetomakesuchacceptancemandatoryat theNPTReviewConferencein2010. Recommendation42: TheGovernmentshouldprovidefurtherpracticalhelptothose statesthatwishbutareunabletofullyimplementSecurityCouncilResolution1540on thesafetyandsecurityofnuclearstockpiles. Recommendation43:TheGovernmentshouldcontinuetoadvancethecaseforthe internationalisationofthenuclearfuelcycleandforthecreationofnuclearfuelbanks underIAEAcontrol. Recommendation44: TheGovernmentshoulduseallitsinfluenceinsideNATOto ensurethatthereviewofNATO’sstrategicconceptproducesaresultsensitivetoand supportiveoftheneedforasuccessfulstrengtheningoftheNPT,boththroughoutthe 2010NPTReviewConferenceperiodandbeyond.

“Thereareno scenariosinwhich uncheckedclimate changeisgoodfor eitherinternational ornational security”

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Inadditiontoanefforttopromoteastrategicdialogueonnon-proliferationamongthe P-5(theUS,UK,France,RussiaandChina),moreover: Recommendation45:TheGovernmentshouldalsofundandcontributetoasecond, informaltrackofdiplomaticactivityinvolvingformerseniorofficialsandpolicyexperts fromtheP-5plusIndia,IsraelandPakistan. Biologicalandchemicalweapons Biologicalandchemicalweaponsareagrowingconcern.Toaddressthechallengesinthis area: Recommendation46:TheUKgovernmentshouldusetheperiodleadinguptothe2011 ReviewConferenceoftheBiologicalandToxicWeaponsConvention(BTWC)topushfor thecreationofaneffectiveverificationmechanismforthistreatyandtoimprovethe monitoringofstatecompliancewithitsterms. Recommendation47: TheGovernmentshouldtakestepstorestartstallednegotiationson theestablishmentofanOrganisationfortheProhibitionofBiologicalWeapons,similarin structuretotheOrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(OPCW)thatwas setupin1997toensureimplementationoftheChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC). Recommendation48: TheGovernmentshoulduseitspositionasaDepositoryStatefor theBTWCtotakealeadindevelopingprogrammestoeducateindividualscientistsabout thepotentialsecurityimplicationsoftheirwork. Recommendation49:TheGovernmentshouldworkwithothermajorpowersto eliminatetheloopholesrelatedtolawenforcementintheChemicalWeaponsConvention (CWC),whichhaveencouragedsomestatestodevelopnewandincapacitatingchemical agentsbasedonadvancesinneuroscience. Cyberandspacesecurity Aswebecomemoredependentonnetworkedtechnologiesandcommunicationsrouted throughsatellites,twootherareasareripeforstrengthenedinternationalcooperation. Thefirstoftheseiscyber-security.Onthis,webelieve: Recommendation50:TheUKgovernmentshouldincreaseitspoliticalandfinancial supportforglobalactiontoenhance‘cybersecurity’,recognisingthehighpriorityalso beingplacedonthisbytheObamaAdministrationintheUS.Asafirststep,concerted actionataEuropeanlevelisrequiredthroughsupportingandbuildingonthegoodwork ofEuropeanNetworkandInformationSecurityAgency(ENISA). Onspacesecurity,wealsobelieve: Recommendation51: TheGovernmentshouldpromotetheideaofafollow-ontreatyto theOuterSpaceTreaty,andpursueanyandallotherpossibleformsofcooperative dialoguetodeveloptheinternationallegalregimearoundthemilitaryusesofspace. Chapter8:Resilience Astherecommendationsaboveindicate,athemerunningthroughtheCommission’swork hasbeenthatwelivetodayinacomplex,denselynetworkedandheavilytechnology-reliant society.Extensiveprivatisationandthepursuitofcompetitiveadvantageinglobalised marketshavealsoledustoparedownthesystemswerelyuponuntillittleornomarginfor errorremains.Wehaveswitchedtoleanproduction,stretchedsupplychains,decreased stockinventoriesandreducedredundancyinoursystems.Wehaveoutsourced,offshored andembracedajust-in-timeculturewithlittleheedforjust-in-case.Thismagnifiesnotonly efficiencybutalsovulnerability.Everythingdependsoninfrastructurefunctioningsmoothly andtheinfrastructureofmodernlifecanbebrittle:interdependentsystemscanmakefor cascadesofconcatenatedfailurewhenonelinkinthechainisbroken. Criticalinfrastructure TheCommissionbelievestheUKmustdomoretoaddressthechallengesthatflowfrom thecontextdescribed.Inparticular,webelieve: Recommendation52: TheUKgovernmentshouldreviewitspowerstomandaterealistic minimumlevelsofresilienceinrelationtoallcriticalinfrastructuresandinrelationtoall

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areasofinterdependencebetweendifferentinfrastructuresectors.Wherewider interpretationoramendmentofexistinglegislationisnotsufficientandnewprimary legislationisrequired,thisshouldbeincludedintheplannedfurtherBillonCivil Contingencies. Recommendation53:TheGovernmentshouldbringtogetherregulatorsofthedifferent infrastructureindustriesandrequirethemtoenforcehigherresiliencestandardsintheir ownsectors,aswellastoinvestigateandstrengthenresilienceinareasof interdependenciesbetweensectorsandinsectorsupplychains. Recommendation54: TheGovernmentshouldgofurtherandsignaltosectorregulators thatitwouldwelcomeinvestmentbyutilityprovidersinrelevantareasoutsidetheirown corebusinessareaswheresuchinvestmentwouldreduceinterdependenceonother elementsoftheinfrastructure.Investmentbythepowergenerators,nationalgridand energydistributioncompaniesinmobilecommunicationsthataremoreresilientagainst powerfailure,forexample,wouldbewelcome. Recommendation55:TheGovernmentshouldinstructtheOfficeofCommunications (Ofcom)tomakeadequatespectrumavailabletoensureemergencyserviceaccessto nextgenerationmobiletechnology.Thiswillbeincreasinglyimportanttotransmitting andreceivingthedatarequiredforsituationalawarenessandcoordinatedandtimely emergencyresponseinthefuture,andmaybeespeciallyimportantforoccasionswhen Airwavetrafficishighest,suchasduringtheLondon2012OlympicandParalympic Games. Recommendation56: TheGovernmentshouldworkwiththeOfficeofGasand ElectricityMarkets(Ofgem)toensureasupportiveregulatoryenvironmentforrapid investmentinSmartGrids.Bydiversifyingandlocalisingsourcesofenergysupply,this technologycouldsubstantiallyincreasetheoverallresilienceoftheUK’senergy infrastructure. Recommendation57: TheGovernmentshouldtasktheCentrefortheProtectionof NationalInfrastructure(CPNI)withthedevelopmentofsecurityrecommendationsaimed atmitigatingcommandandcontrolrisksassociatedwithSmartGridsastherehavebeen concernsraisedinthisarea,iftheiruseissignificantlyexpanded. Recommendation58: Industryshoulddevelopmarketingcommunicationscampaignsto promotetheuseofSmartGridcapabilitiesbydomesticconsumers,includingtheuseof attractiveoff-peaktariffsthatareassociatedwiththem. Recommendation59: TheGovernmentshouldtasktheCPNItocarryoutathorough analysisoftheextenttowhichspace-basedtechnologiesareembeddedinourcritical infrastructureandconductacriticalassessmentofthequalityofexistingmitigation planningagainsttheirloss. Inordertoensurethatweaknessesinthesoftwarecodethatincreasinglyrunscritical partsofourinfrastructureareminimised: Recommendation60:TheGovernmentshouldalsoapproachtheEuropeanCommission andtheincomingSwedishPresidencytosponsoraprogrammeforthecreationofa rangeofsecureandreliablestandardsoftwaremodules(suchassimpleoperating systems,databasemanagementsystemsandgraphicaluserinterfaces).Thesemodules shouldbedevelopedusingformalmethodsandbemadeavailablefreeofcharge throughanopensourcelicencetoencouragetheirwidespreaduse. Enterpriseresilience NotalloftheactionrequiredtomaketheUKmoreresilientshouldcomefrom governmentdirectly.Thebusinesscommunitymustmakeimprovementstoo.To encouragethis: Recommendation61:TheGovernmentandbusinessorganisationsshouldworktogether onacommunicationscampaign,specificallytargetingsmallandmediumsized enterprises(SMEs),toovercomemisconceptionsabouttheresilienceofexisting infrastructureservices.SomeSMEsassumethatbasicserviceswillbeprovidedunder almostallcircumstancesandthatback-upplansarethereforenotrequired.

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Recommendation62:TheGovernmentandbusinessorganisationsshouldencourage majorpurchasersofinfrastructureservices(including,forexample,logisticsandpower companies)todemandarangeofoptionsandservice-levelagreementsforthe availabilityofresilientinfrastructureservicesagainstarangeofpricepoints.Thiswould helptostimulateaprivatesectormarketformoreresilientservices. Recommendation63: TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheprovisionoffinancial incentives,suchasinsurancepremiumreductions,forSMEstoundertakebusiness continuityplanning. Recommendation64: TheGovernmentshoulddisseminatetoSMEsreal-lifecasestudies ofinstanceswherecompanieshavefoundtheyhavebenefitedfromhavingbusiness continuityplansinplace. Recommendation65: TheGovernmentshouldproduce‘boardroombriefs’onresilience forcompaniestouseintheircorporategovernance. Recommendation66: TheGovernmentshouldpromoteBusinessContinuityPlanningas anelementofCorporateSocialResponsibility,establishaschemeofChampionsof Resilience,andencouragebigbusinessestoinsistonsatisfactionoftheBritishStandard onBusinessContinuity,BS25999amongtheirsupplierssotheirpurchasingpowerdrives thisstandardmoredeeplyintothesupplychain. Communityresilience Sincecentralgovernmentcannotpreventalldisastersoralwaysbeonsiteimmediatelyto providethenecessaryresponse,communitiesandcitizensneedtotakemore responsibilityforresilienceintheirlocalareatoo.TheCommissionthereforebelieves: Recommendation67:TheGovernmentshouldassistcommunitiestounderstandriskorienteddecision-makingprocessesandoutcomesandenablethemtoaccessfundingto buildcommunity-levelschemes,localnetworksandcapacitytocontributetoresilience ontheground. Recommendation68:LocalandRegionalResilienceForumsshouldreviewhow theymightbenefitfromfurtherthirdsectorinvolvement,whatrelevanttraining theycouldfacilitateforinterestedindividualsandvoluntaryandcommunitysector organisations,andhowtheycouldmorewidelyconsultonanddisseminatetheir emergencyplans. Recommendation69: TheGovernmentshouldissuemoreadvicetothepublicon basicpreparatoryactionsthatcouldbetakenatalocalleveltobolsterresilience.Itis important,inthiscontext,thatwhenadviceisissuedtothewholepopulation,it actuallyreachesthem.Effectivecommunityresiliencereliesoneffectiveinformation provision. Recommendation70:TheGovernmentshouldexaminetheextenttowhichexisting goodpracticeinthefieldofcommunityemergencyresponseandsupportnetworks,such astheKeswickFloodActionGroup,WRVS(whichgivessupporttotheelderly)andthe RadioAmateurs’EmergencyNetwork(RAYNET),offermodelsforbroaderadoption. Finally,onresilience,theGovernmentshouldencouragearesponsenotonlyfromlocal communitiesbutalsofromtheUK’sinformationandcommunicationstechnology community.Inparticular: Recommendation71:Governmentshouldfacilitatethecreationofthecyberequivalent of‘NeighbourhoodWatch’,byengagingpositivelywiththelaw-abidingtechnical community(systemsadministrators,internetserviceproviders,‘white-hat’or‘ethical’ hackersandothers)toenlisttheirhelpinsecuringimportantsystemsandnetworks. Chapter9:CounteringradicalisationandterrorisminsidetheUK TheCommissionremainsconcernedaboutthe‘homegrown’terroristthreat,thequality oftheGovernment’sunderstandingoftheradicalisationofBritishcitizens,andthe strengthofthe‘Prevent’strandofitscounter-terrorismstrategy.Wefocusmanyofour recommendationsinthisarea.Inparticularwebelieve:

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Recommendation72: TheGovernment,CharityCommissionandMosquesandImams NationalAdvisoryBoardshouldencourageandsupportmosquemanagement committeestoemployBritishimamswhoareproficientintheEnglishlanguage,havean understandingofmodernUKyouthcultureandaretrainedtobeabletodiscuss controversialtopicssuchasjihadandhumanrightswiththeircongregations.Thiswould helptoreconnectmoreestablishedinstitutionswiththeyoungMuslimpopulation. Recommendation73: TheGovernmentshouldtrainfrontlineyouthworkersdealingwith youngpeoplewhoarevulnerabletoradicalisingmessagesinhowtoaddresstheissues involved,buildingonworkalreadyunderwaywiththeYouthJusticeBoard. Recommendation74:TheGovernmentshoulddevelopfurthermaterialstoassistlocal authoritiesandtheirpartnerstounderstandUKIslaminallitsdiversity,withits associatedculturesandtraditions,andtounderstandwhichdenominationsandsystems areconcentratedinwhichareas. Recommendation75:TheGovernmentshouldcommissionfurtherresearchtounderpin thiseffort.Thisshouldfocuson:

• TheradicalisingeffectsofglobaleventsatUKstreetlevel • Therelationshipsbetweennon-violentIslamistideologiesandterrorismintheUK • Theprocessesofdisengagementfromviolenceandderadicalisation • ThedynamicsofextremismamongmorerecentlyarrivedBritishimmigrantcommunities. Withregardtoinformationsharing,webelieve: Recommendation76:Thereshouldbefurthermovementfroma‘needtoknow’ approachtoa‘responsibilitytoprovide’mentality.GovernmentshouldsharewithLocal AuthorityChiefExecutives,CouncilLeadersandPoliceBoroughCommandersmore sanitisedinformationandintelligenceproductsregardingperceivedvulnerabilitiesto radicalisationintheirrespectiveareas. Recommendation77: Moregoodpracticeon‘Prevent’shouldbesharednationally:itis currentlyconcentratedinonlyasmallnumberoflocalauthorities,usuallythosethat haveexperiencedterroristandcounter-terroristactivitydirectly,andthelessonslearned needtobespreadmorewidely. Recommendation78:TheGovernmentshouldexpandthenumberofhigh-securitypolice andprisoncells.ThecustodysuiteofLondon’sPaddingtonGreenPoliceStationisnowno longerbigenoughandthelackofappropriateprisoncapacityelsewheremeansthatBritain’s convictedterroristsareexcessivelyconcentratedinBelmarshPrison.Thisconcentrationdoes notsupportourwiderattemptstodealwiththeproblem,anditmayinfactexacerbateit. Recommendation79: TheProbationService’ssmall,new,centralcounter-terrorismunit shouldbesupportedtodevelopthecapabilityandcapacitytounderstandandsupport growingnumbersofindividualsonprobationwhohavebeenreleasedfromcustodyafter havingbeenconvictedforterrorism-relatedoffences.Somesuchindividuals,suchasAbu IzzadeenandSaminaMalik,havealreadybeenreleased.Manymorewillbereleasedin theyearstocome. Recommendation80:TheGovernmentshouldexplainfurtherhowitsstatedwillingness toaddresslegitimategrievances,includingwithregardtoUKforeignpolicy,willbe carriedforwardinpractice. Recommendation81:TheGovernmentshouldworkwiththepoliceandCrownProsecution Servicefollowingterroristconvictionstoreleasemoreinformationtothepublic(fromwhom, ofcourse,jurorsaredrawn)aboutthenatureofdisruptedterroristplots.Thiswouldassist withpublicunderstandingofthenature,locationandseverityoftheterroristthreat. Recommendation82: TheGovernmentshouldfurtherreviewitsuseoflanguageinthis arena,buildingontheworkofResearchandInformationCommunicationsUnit(RICU) withintheHomeOffice.Wewelcometheannouncementthatphrasessuchas‘waron terror’willnolongerbeused.

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Recommendation83: TheGovernmentshouldreview,inconsultationwiththepublic,the unintendedimpactsatcommunitylevelofexistingcounter-terrorismpolicyandpractice. Recommendation84: ThepoliceandpartneragenciesmustnowrecruitmoreMuslim staff.Whetherinspecialistdepartments,deliveringtrainingorperformingcommunityfacingroles,thelanguage,lifeskillsandculturalandreligiousunderstandingsuchstaff bringtothecounter-terrorismeffortisinvaluable. Chapter10:Makinggovernmentmoreeffective TheCommissionbelievesimprovedcoordinationoftheUKgovernmenteffortisvitalin currentconditions.Notonlyaresecuritythreatsandhazardsmorediversebut governmentitselfneedstointegrateawiderangeofpolicyinstrumentstobeeffectivein response.Tostrengthenstrategiccoordinationofthenationalsecurityeffortandto breakdowndepartmentalstovepipesinWhitehall,theCommissionbelieves: Recommendation85: TheGovernmentshoulddeveloptheexistingMinisterial CommitteeonNationalSecurity,InternationalRelationsandDevelopment(NSID)intoa NationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)atgovernment’sheart.Thisshouldbechairedbythe PrimeMinisteror,inhisorherabsence,byanotherveryseniorfigurefromtheCabinet. ThecentraltaskoftheNSCshouldbetodevelopaclearviewonthenationalsecurity challengesfacingthecountryandacross-departmentalstrategicresponse. Recommendation86:TheGovernmentshouldreplacethepracticeofconducting periodicstrategicdefencereviewswithaprocessofconductingaregularStrategic ReviewofSecurity(SRS).Thisshouldhappeneveryfiveyearsandshouldincludebutgo wellbeyondissuesrelatedtodefencetoconsiderthesecuritycontextinitsentirety. Recommendation87: TheGovernmentshouldcreateasinglesecuritybudget,covering theentirenationalsecurityterrain,asatooltoensurethattheNationalSecurityCouncil hasfullvisibilityofallcurrentgovernmentspendingofrelevance,canmakeinformed trade-offsbetweendifferentsecurityinvestmentpriorities,hasareadyfacilitytotransfer financialresourcesbetweendepartmentalbudgetsifnecessaryandcandosointhemost effectiveandopenlyaccountablewaypossible. Inaddition,webelievesomechangestotheworkoftheDepartmentforInternational Development(DfID)arerequired.AswepointedoutinourInterimReport,global povertyandinequalityaremajordriversofinstability,andviolentconflictisamajor barriertodevelopment.WesupportmovestakenbyDfIDoverthepastfiveyearsto understandthecausesofconflict,tomakeitsdevelopmentworkmoreconflict-sensitive andtoshiftadditionalresourcestowardsfragileandconflict-affectedstates.Toensure moreeffectiveintegrationofsomeelementsoftheworkofDfIDintothewiderUK nationalsecurityeffort,however,theCommissionbelievesfurtherchangeisneeded.Asa result,wealsorecommend: Recommendation88: TheInternationalDevelopmentAct2002shouldbeamendedto saythatthemissionoftheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentistopromote developmentthroughpovertyreductionandthepromotionofconditionsofsafetyand securityinthedevelopingworld.Webelievethischangeisnecessarytoremoveany ambiguitythatmayexistoveraDfIDroleindevelopmentactivitiesnotdirectlyrelatedto povertyreduction. Recommendation89:TheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentshouldpublish explicitcriteriafordecidingwhereitsresourcesareallocatedandforwhatpurpose.These arecurrentlyabsent.Aspartofthischange,wewouldliketoseeaportionoftheDfID budgetmadeavailableforactivitiesthatwouldnotordinarilybeclassifiedasaid,suchas stabilisationandreconstructionactivitiesinconflict-affectedareas.Inordertomakesure thatthisdoesnotunderminelongertermeffortsordiminishtheassistanceforfragile andfailingstatesrecommendedinChapter7,thismayneedtobedonethroughthe creationofaRapidResponseFund. Recommendation90:GovernmentshouldconductareviewintohowDepartmentfor InternationalDevelopmentandForeignandCommonwealthOfficeoperationsin overseaslocationscanbemoreeffectivelycoordinated.Wearenotconvincedthat

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runningparalleloperations,asiscurrentlythecaseinmanyplaces,isacost-effective wayofoperatingordeliversthebestresults. Webelievethattherecommendedchanges(alongwiththerecommendationthatthe UKcreateajointcivilian-militaryStabilisationandReconstructionForce,putforwardin Chapter5),whencoupledtoDfID’songoingeffortstoimproveitsroleandcontribution onissueslikejusticeandsecuritysectorreformin-country,wouldimproveDfID’s contributiontomeetingbothdevelopmentchallengesindangerousplacesandnational, regionalorglobalsecuritythreats. Beyondthis,webelieveotherchangestothemachineryofgovernmentarealso necessary.Werecommend: Recommendation91: TheCabinetSecretaryshouldhaveasingleseniorDeputyfor NationalSecurityatPermanentSecretarylevel;andthenationalsecuritysecretariatin theCabinetOfficeshouldbeexpandedtoprovideproperservicingandcoordinationof businessfortheNationalSecurityCouncilandtoensurethatdecisionstakenbyitare followedupacrossWhitehall. TopromotemoreeffectiveexternalchallengetotheGovernmentonnationalsecurity,we believe: Recommendation92: TherecentlycreatedNationalSecurityForum,apanelofeminent individualsfromoutsidegovernment,shouldhaveanindependentratherthana ministerialchair,abudgetthatwouldenableittocommissionitsownexternalresearch, andenoughofficesupporttoallowpublicationofitsownconclusions. Recommendation93: TheGovernmentshoulddeveloptheideaofasingleUK intelligencecommunity(bywhichwedonotmeanasingleintelligenceagency,whichwe arenotinfavourof),withaclearlyidentifiedheadatpermanentsecretarylevel(who couldalsobethechairpersonoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee[JIC]). Recommendation94: ThesingleheadoftheUKintelligencecommunityshouldbegiven responsibilityforcoordinatingallofthehorizon-scanningactivitygoingonacross government,inordertoensurethatitisproperlycoordinatedandthat,where appropriate,issuesarebroughttotheattentionoftheNationalSecurityCouncil. Recommendation95:TheGovernmentshouldincreasethecapacityoftheintelligence communitytoanalyseandmakeuseofthehugeamountsofopensourceinformation nowavailable. Recommendation96:TheStrategicReviewofSecurityshouldtakeintoaccountthe contributiontosecuritymadebytheUK’sdiplomaticcapabilitiesandensureadequate levelsoffundingforthiscomponent. Chapter11:Theroleandrequirementsoflegitimacyinnationalsecuritystrategy IntheviewoftheCommission,quiteapartfrombeingcrucialtotheoperationofany democraticstate,demonstrablelegitimacyofactioncanbeaninfluencemultiplierwhen itcomestoattemptstomanagetheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Inaworldwhere poweriswidelydispersed,itisanimportantpartoftheroutetoissue-specificalliances andpartnershipsandconsequentlytogreaterpolicyreach.Webelieve,therefore,that legitimacyisastrategicnecessity,notapleasantbonus,andthatapparenttensions betweenlegitimacyofactionandseriousnessofpurposeare,forthemostpart,illusory. Inourview,legitimacyresidesinademonstratedcommitmenttoanumberofmore specificideas.Theseinclude:

• Acommitmenttotheruleoflawathome • Acommitmenttoarules-basedinternationalsystemandtoconformitywith internationallaw

• Awillingnesstoupholdandprotectfundamentalhumanrights • Acommitmenttomoredemocraticandtransparentpolicymaking,opentoawide arrayofinputsandsubjecttoeffectivepublicscrutinyandaccountability.

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SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

TheUKhasmuchinitshistorytobeproudofinrelationtomanyoftheseareasandin spiteofourcolonialhistory,weshowasolidunderstandingofandrespectforother cultures.Equally,however,wedonotalwaysliveuptosuchidealsaswellaswemightin practice.Themorewidelyacommitmenttotheseideasissharedandpractisedathome andaroundtheworld,themorelikelywearetoenjoybothnationalandinternational securitynowandinthelongterm.Consequently,theCommissionmakes recommendationsinanumberofrelatedareas.Theseinclude: Theruleoflawathome TheCommissionbelieves: Recommendation97: Suspectedterroristsshouldbetreatedassuspectedcriminalsand shouldbedealtwithusingthestandardCriminalJusticeSystem. Recommendation98: TheGovernmentshouldcontinuetoexplorewaysinwhich interceptevidencemightbeusedincriminalproceedingswithoutprejudicingnational security. Recommendation99: TheGovernmentshouldputadraftConstitutionalBillofRights andResponsibilitiesfortheUnitedKingdombeforeParliament,asacontributionto effortstowinheartsandmindsandtohelpcounter-radicalisation. Publicaccountabilityandengagementinpolicymaking Inthisarea,theCommissionbelieves: Recommendation100:TheGovernmentshouldstrengthentheroleofciviceducationin theNationalCurriculumtaughtinourschools,withtheaimofinstillinganawarenessof thenationalandinternationalneedforinterculturalunderstanding. Recommendation101: AshasalreadybeenmootedbyGovernment,asingleNational SecuritySelectCommitteeshouldbesetupinParliament,madeupofmembersofboth Houses,withamembershipalsodrawnfromacrossotherrelevantSelectCommittees. Recommendation102:ThelevelofresourceandprofessionalsupporttotheIntelligence andSecurityCommitteeshouldalsobeincreased,toallowittobetteroverseethecrucial butalsohighlysensitiveworkoftheintelligencecommunity. Recommendation103:TheGovernmentshoulddedicateadditionalresourcestothe ForeignandCommonwealthOfficeoutreachprogrammeandexpanditintoabroader ongoingprogrammewhichwouldsystematicallyinformtheBritishpublicabout importantforeignpolicyquestionsandissuesandfacilitateamoreopendialogueand exchangebetweeninterestedmembersofthepublicandFCOministersandofficials. Arules-basedinternationalsystem Atinternationallevel,wemayneedtoworkwithawiderrangeofpartnerstobuildthe rules-basedorderthatweseek,includingthroughtheG20,theUnitedNationsandother groupings.Buttwoissuesremainfundamentaltoourattemptstopursueprogressinthis area.Thefirstrelatestotheuseofforceandthesecondtohumanrights.Onthese,the Commissionbelieves: Recommendation104:Iftheuseofmilitaryforceisdeemednecessary,itshouldbe basedontheprinciplesoftheUnitedNationsCharterorthespecificapprovalofthe SecurityCouncil.Wherethelatterisnotpossiblebecausenationalinterestsparalysethe SecurityCouncileveninthefaceofserioushumanrightsviolations,ahumanitariancrisis oradevelopingthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,thenanyactiontakenshould haveastrongclaimtolegitimacyinotherelementsoftheUNCharter,beconsistentwith internationallaw,beproportionate,haveareasonableprospectofsuccess,andshould onlybetakenasalastresortafterallpeacefulanddiplomaticavenuestoavertconflict havebeenexhausted. Onhumanrightsandtorture,theCommissionbelieves: Recommendation105: TheGovernmentshouldensureitsownagentsareproperlytrained asinterrogators,employonlylegalmethods,andchallengerobustlyallegedorsuspected tortureorcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentofprisoners,wherevertheyencounterit.

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Recommendation106:TheGovernmentshouldsignandratifytheInternational ConventionfortheProtectionofAllPersonsfromEnforcedDisappearance. Recommendation107: TheGovernmentshoulduseitscloserelationshipwiththeUnited StatestoencouragetheUStoratifyinternationaltreaties,conventionsandcovenantson theRightsoftheChild(ratifiedbyallUNmemberstatesexcepttheUSandSomalia); theEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen;ForcedDisappearances; Protocol1totheGenevaConventions;andtheRomeStatuteoftheInternational CriminalCourt(increasinglyimportantinaworldinwhichthepowerofnon-stateactors isgrowing). Recommendation108: TheGovernmentshouldalsoputmoreeffortintopromotingand defendinghumanrightsaroundtheworldbyapplyingwhateverpressureitcanbringto bearonregimesthatviolatethoserights.Thereisaparticularneedtodothisin countriesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawithwhichwehavefriendlyrelationsbut wheretoolittleisdonetorespecthumanrights.Althoughwemayhavelimitedcapacity forinfluencebilaterallyinmanyofthesecases,weshouldseektoensurethathuman rightsissuesareakeyelementshapingtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy,apartof EUactivitywithagreaterpotentialforregionalinfluence. Recommendation109: TheGovernmentshouldavoidattemptingtodeportsuspect foreignnationalsonthebasisofmemorandaofunderstandingordiplomaticassurances tocountrieswhichpractisetorture,unlesssucharrangementscanincluderobust independentadditionalmonitoringtoensurethesafetyoftheindividualsinvolved.