Rule 16 Cases 274-278.docx

274. Carmelita T. Panganiban vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 131417, January 22, 2003, Carpio, J. Facts: This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the CA. Panganiban entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA) with Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Through the SLDA, Pilipinas subleased to Panganiban a gasoline station in Caloocan City. The property was owned by Serafin Vasquez and was covered by a Lease Agreement with Pilipinas from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 2002. In a letter, Pilipinas informed Panganiban that the SLDA was about to expire and advised her to wind up her business on or before July 31, 1995. Believing that the SLDA has not expired and was still effective until December 31, 2002, Panagabinabn continued paying rentals. Pilipinas refused to receive the payments. Panganiban filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC. Pilipinas filed its Answer. Pilipinas also filed an unlawful detainer case before the MTC. 8 months after the Answer in the RTC case was filed, Panganiban filed a MD. It claimed that the issue of the renewal of the lease should be raised in the unlawful detainer case pending before the MTC. The MTC issued a decision in favor of Pilipinas. On appeal, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition for declaratory relief. It ruled that considering that there has been a breach of SLDA on the part of the Panganiban as said leased had supposedly expired on 31 July 1995, and that consequently, an ejectment has already been filed against Panganiban by Pilipinas before the MTC so that in this petition, and considering further that the issue on possession can be threshed out in the said ejectment cased based on jurisprudence in Rosales vs. CFI. On review, the CA upheld the order of the trial court dismissing the petition for declaratory relief on the ground of litis pendentia

Petitioner questions the preference given by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to the unlawful detainer case filed by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that based on priority in time, the action for declaratory relief, the case filed earlier, should not have been abated in favor of the ejectment suit, a case filed much later. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of actions and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. We have set the relevant factors that a court must consider when it has to determine which case should be dismissed given the pendency of two actions. These are: “(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties.” An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the latter’s right to hold possession under a contract, express or implied. Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the SLDA as to when the SLDA would expire is the key issue that would determine petitioner’s right to possess the gasoline service station. When the primary issue to be resolved is physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment suit, and not in any other case such as an action for declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits.

Decision:

Indeed, the action for declaratory relief had become vexatious. It would have been an exercise in futility for the Regional Trial Court to continue the proceedings in the action for declaratory relief when the Metropolitan Trial Court had already ruled that the term of the SLDA was for only five years or until July 31, 1995. Moreover, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court once it attains finality would amount to res judicata. The proper forum for petitioner to clarify the provision of the SLDA on the expiration of the term of the contract is in her appeal of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the unlawful detainer case.

NO. The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the time for filing the answer is not absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal. Litis pendentia is also one of the grounds that authorize a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.

Petitioner erroneously believes that the unlawful detainer case should have been dismissed because private respondent was already guilty of laches when it filed the ejectment suit 269 days from July 31, 1995, the date private respondent claims the SLDA expired. A complaint for unlawful detainer should be filed within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession occurs. When the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term, it

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s dismissal of civil case on motion of Pilipinas on the ground of litis pendentia which was filed long after Pilipinas had filed its answer.

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is upon the expiration of the term of the lease that the lessee is already considered to be unlawfully withholding the property. The expiration of the term of the lease immediately gives rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer. In such a case, a demand to vacate is no longer necessary. Private respondent therefore had one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the case for unlawful detainer. Laches definitely had not yet set in when private respondent filed the unlawful detainer case 269 days after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not sleep on its right when it filed the unlawful detainer case well within the prescriptive period for filing the action.

275. United States of America , Capt. James E. Galloway, William I. Colllins and Robert Gohier, vs. Hon V.M. Ruiz, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and Eligio De Guzman & Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, Abad Santos, J. Facts: This is a petition for review. United States invited the submission of bids for projects for the repair of wharves and shoreline. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Thereafter, a letter was sent saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the plaintiff to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. In its complaint, the company alleged that the US had accepted its bids because “A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant US bidding practices.” The defendants entered their special appearance “for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.” Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the

writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. The MTC granted the MD. On appeal, the CFI sustained the MTC. Issue: WON the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defending party Decision: No. On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case at hand interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. 779-M is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

276. Editha Padlan vs. Elenita Dinglasan and Felicisio Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, Peralta, J. Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari. Elenita was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Elenita’s mother, Lilila had a conversation with Maura Passion regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots, under the name of Elenita and her husband Felecisimo. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Sps. Dinglasan, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. Maura sold the lot to Lorna Ong. Lorna, then sold to Editha Padlan the said lot.

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For Padlan’s failure to surrender possession of the said lot to Sps. Dinglasan, they initiated a complaint for the cancellation of Padlan’s TCT. Summons was served to Editha’s mother Anita. Sps. Dinglasan moved to declare Editha in default and prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte. Editha filed an Oppossiton to Declare Defendant in Default with MD for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only by means of substituted service through her mother. The RTC ruled that Editha was a buyer in good faith, and consequently dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that Editha was a buyer in bad faith. Editha filed a MR arguing that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and subject matter of the complaint. The CA applying the ruling in Tijam vs Sibonghanoy that when the RTC denied petitioner’s MD, petitioner neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case again when the CA rendered an adverse decision. Issue: WON the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case Decision: NO. In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. An action “involving title to real property” means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the “legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the

property itself.” “Title” is different from a “certificate of title” which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right-or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.

277. Universal Robina Corporation vs. Alberty Lim, doing businesss under the name and style New H-R Grocery, G.R. No. 154338, October 5, 2007, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. URC sold to Lim grocery products in the total amount of P808, 059.88. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle his obligation despite repeated demands. URC filed with the RTC a complaint for a sum of money against Lim. The trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint motu propio of the ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. It ruled that there is not even a remote connection by the parties to Quezon City, where this RTC sits, the plaintiff corporation has principal office at Pasig City and the Lim is, as provided in the complaint, from Laaog City. URC filed an MR with an amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. It was granted. Summons was served upon Lim. However, due to his failure to seasonably file his Answer the court, upon motion by URC, declared him in default and allowed ex parte presentation of evidence. However, the trial court was still unsure whether the venue was properly laid, hence it issued an Order directing URC to file a Memorandum of Authorities. Subsequently, the trial court again dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint due to URC’s failure to attach thereto an explanation why copies of the petition were not served by personal service but by registered mail, in violation of Section 11, Rule 14. Issue: WON the trial court may dismiss motu propio petitioner’s complaint on the ground of improper venue Decision: NO. In personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her residence or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a place where neither of them resides. Page 3 of 5

Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings.

278. Felicissima Galindo, Nestor Galindo, Beatriz Galindo, Catalina Galindo, Danilo Galindo, Librada Galindo, Cesar Galindo, Juanita Galindo Rivera and/or the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan vs. Heirs of Marciano Roxas, represented by Reginald S. Roxas, G.R. No. 147969, January 17, 2005, Callejo, Sr., J Facts: Lot 1048 was possessed by the late Gregorio Galindo. Gregorio died intestate, leaving as his only heir his children. Subsequently, his children sold whatever his rights and interest Gregorio had in the Lot 1048 to Marciano Roxas. In the said document, the signatories thereto obligated themselves to transfer the land to Marciano A. Roxas as soon as it would become feasible to do so, and as security that Urbano Galindo would ratify the same upon reaching the age of majority, Florencio Galindo ceded to Marciano A. Roxas title to Lot 833. On February 13, 1948, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2145 covering the property in question was issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the legal heirs of Gregorio Galindo. This, on account of the fact that the sale of the right of Gregorio Galindo made by his heirs in favor of Marciano A. Roxas was not registered with the Bureau of Lands because of the minority of Urbano Galindo at the time. Marciano Roxas died intestate and was survived by his widow, Cirila Roxas and their nine children. Said heirs filed an action for specific performance against the heirs of Gregorio Galindo with the CFI of Bulacan to compel the latter to execute a deed of absolute sale over a parcel of land.The trial court ruled in favor of Marciano Roxas. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In the meantime, Urbano Galindo died intestate. On December 16, 1997, Felicissima, the widow of Urbano, and their children, Nestor, Juanita, Beatriz, Catalina, Danilo, Librada and Cesar, all surnamed Galindo, executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with Waiver of Rights” in which they adjudicated

unto themselves, as owners, the undivided rights and interests which they claimed Urbano had over Lot 1048. Heirs of Marciano Roxas, through Reginal S. Roxas, filed a complaint for annulemt of documents, cancellation of title and damages with prayer of preliminary injunction against Juanita Galindo Rivera. Defendant filed a MD based on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sure; and (2) that the cause of action is barred by statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. It ruled that they were the legititmate children of the deceased Roxas, such plaintiffs are the real parties-in-interest. On the second, it was an action for quieting of title, which commenced only in 1998, hence, it is not yet barred. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Issue: WON the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue Decision The general rule is that only those parties in a case and their privies and successors-in-interest are bound by the order or decision of the trial court. Persons or entities who are not parties to the case are not and should not be bound or adversely affected by the said order or decision; otherwise, they will be deprived of their right to due process. Since the petitioners, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties in the RTC and in the CA, they are not bound by the assailed orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA against petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; hence, they are not the proper parties to appeal from and assail the said orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA. All the petitioners, who executed the said deed, are indispensable parties as parties defendants in the RTC and as parties-petitioners in the CA under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and should have been impleaded by the respondents in their complaint. Without the presence of the said petitioners as defendants, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief to the respondents. The failure of the respondents to implead all the petitioners as parties- defendants constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said cases and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only persons or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Section 4, Rule 8 of the said Rules further Page 4 of 5

provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of that person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Corollary, the defendants can assail the facts alleged in the complaint through a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has no capacity to sue under Section 1(d) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, that is, that he does not have the representative he claims.

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