Complete Rule 14-15.docx

RULE 13: Notice of Lis Pendens 225.)

G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007 MARTIN PEOSO and ELIZABETH PEOSO Petitioners, v. MACROSMAN DONA, Respondent. Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Facts: This case originated from a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance filed with the MTC by Macrosman Dona (respondent) against the petitioners, which was tried and decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Respondent alleged that he is the owner of a house and lot located at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in front of the house and lot is a barangay road where the petitioners constructed their house against the objections of the respondent; and that the house of the petitioners constituted a public nuisance. The petitioners, in their defense, contended that their house was constructed by the late Praxido Peoso, Martins father and Elizabeths husband, way ahead before the respondent arrived; that their house constitutes no public nuisance; that the respondent cannot demand a right of way; that the continued existence of their house brings no harm to the respondent; and that the respondent is not authorized to file the instant Complaint. The MTC rendered its Decision, in 1avour of the petitioners and against the respondent on the ground that respondent has no cause of action against the petitioners. It ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the house in question was constructed on a public property which may be abated only by the Municipal Mayor, unless it is specially injurious to a private person. Respondent appealed the Decision of the MTC to the RTC. The RTC rendered its Decision reversing the MTC. The RTC declared the house erected by the petitioners on a portion of the road fronting the house of the respondent as a nuisance; ordered the petitioners to immediately remove the said house at their own expense. The RTC denied the petitioners’ MR. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA dismissed the Petition for failure of the petitioners to include in their petition the required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners attaching a Certification dated from the Postmaster that the pleading in question had been actually received by the respondent. However, the CA issued denied the petition for lack of merit and ruled that petitioners’ subsequent compliance with the rules does not cleanse the petition of its infirmity. Hence, the instant Petition. Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on mere technical grounds. Ruling: Yes. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. Jurisprudence holds that the rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally is mandatory. However, in Ello v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined the circumstances when the court may exercise its discretionary power under Section 11 of Rule 13, viz: However, such discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the following factors: (1) the practicability of personal service; (2) the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein; and (3) the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. x x x[ Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the issues whether the petitioners house is a public nuisance; whether the subject house is constructed on an abandoned road; and whether the alleged nuisance is specially injurious to respondent; and, considering further the fact that the MTC and the RTC decisions are conflicting, the CA had valid grounds to refrain from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds. Page 1 of 56

Rules of procedure being designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their rigid application resulting in technicalities that tend to delay or frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Thus, in view of the foregoing jurisprudential trend to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for a just determination of his case, free from the severities of technicalities; the prima facie merit of the pleading; and, especially considering the conflicting rulings of the MTC and the RTC, the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on mere technical grounds. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed to REINSTATE the petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69472, for further proceedings.

226.) G.R. No. 104769 March 3, 2000 AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 135016 March 3, 2000 SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. INVESTCO, INC., substituted by AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. Petition: The above cases were consolidated and are appeals via certiorari Facts: Investco, Inc. was the owner of 6 parcels of land, located in Quezon City and Marikina. Investco, Inc. agreed to sell the 6 parcels of land to Solid Homes payable in 2nstalments. The Register of Deeds of Marikina issued in 2nstal of Investco, Inc. TCTs covering the Marikina portion of the property. The contract of sale to Solid Homes was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina nor annotated on the original titles issued in the name of Investco, Inc.

against Solid Homes, Inc.. Solid Homes prayed for dismissal of Investco, Inc.’s complaint alleging that the purchase price under the contract was “not yet due”. Solid Homes then filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina a notice of lis pendens requesting that the same be annotated on the titles in Investco, Inc.’s name. On the same date, the notice of lis pendens was recorded. However, the notice of lis pendens was not actually annotated on the titles in the name of Investco, Inc. The trial court rendered judgment in 2nstal of Investco, Inc. ordering Solid Homes to pay plaintiffs. In the meantime, Investco, Inc. offered to sell the property to AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., payable in 2nstalments. Investco, Inc. furnished AFP MBAI with certified true copies of the titles covering the Marikina property. AFP MBAI verified the titles with the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila and found that copies of the titles that Investco, Inc. gave were genuine and faithful reproductions of the original titles on file with the Register of Deeds. AFP MBAI noted that there were no liens or encumbrances annotated on the titles. After determining that the titles covering the Investco property were “clean” and “genuine,” AFP MBAI agreed to purchase the same from Investco, Inc. The Register of Deeds of Marikina issued TCTs in the name of AFP MBAI. The titles issued were “clean” and contained no annotation of any lien, encumbrance, or adverse claim by a third party. Solid Homes commenced action before the RTC, Marikina, against the Register of Deeds, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. for “annotation of lis pendens and damages” with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In its verified complaint, Solid Homes prayed, among others, that (a) the Register of Deeds be ordered to annotate on the titles registered in the name of Investco, Inc. the notice of lis pendens and to carry over the same to the titles in the name of AFP MBAI; (b) alternatively, to declare AFP MBAI as a buyer in bad faith, bound by the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 40615 In due time, the trial court rendered decision ordering the Register of Deeds for Marikina to annotate the Notice of Lis Pendens, on the titles registered in the name of defendant AFP MBAI, and declaring defendant AFP MBAI as a buyer in bad faith.

However, after paying the downpayment, Solid Homes made no further payment to Investco, Inc.. Subsequently, Investco, Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an action for specific performance and damages Page 2 of 56

Aggrieved thereby, AFP MBAI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which sustained the decision of the trial court. AFP MBAI filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

damages — not one affecting title to or possession of real property. Such counterclaim did not convert the nature of the action into a real action involving title to or possession of subject property.

Hence, this petition.

The rule that “all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title” applies herein with full vigor. In the absence of anything to excite suspicion, the buyer is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate.

Issue: Whether Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc. Ruling: No. Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation while a notice of lis pendensis an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is but a signal to the intending buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the prospect or non-prospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his money.” A notice of lis pendens is not and cannot be sought as a principal action for relief. The notice is but an incident to an action, an extra-judicial one to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. The notice of lis pendens — that real property is involved in an action — is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. As a settled rule, notice of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court which affects title to or possession of real property. Investco’s complaint was an action for collection of sums of money, damages and attorney’s fees to recover from Solid Homes unpaid 3nstalments on the purchase price of the subject property. To emphasize, the case was an action for collection of unpaid 3nstalments on the purchase price of subject real property. In such case, the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the property was not proper as the action was in personam. Consequently, the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable to this case. The Register of Deeds of Marikina correctly denied the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc. and the AFP MBAI. Even on the basis of Solid Homes’ counterclaim, which is disregarded in determining the nature of the action, notice of lis pendens is improper as the counterclaim was also for sums of money — alleged excess payment and for

“Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.” Here, Solid Homes alleged that Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI “confederated with each other in entering into the aforementioned sale in order to deprive herein plaintiff (Solid Homes) of its rights over subject properties under the Contract to Sell and to Buy. . .” However, Solid Homes adduced no evidence to In the absence of a valid notice of lis pendens annotated in the titles, AFP MBAI is a buyer in good faith and for value, and thus acquired clean and valid titles to the property in question. WHEREFORE, the Court: (1) In G. R. No. 104769, GRANTS the petition, and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27398 and, in lieu thereof, renders judgment: (a) dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 52999 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig Branch 165; (b) ordering the Register of Deeds of Marikina to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-104941, N104942, N-104943, N-104944, N-104945 and N-104946 of the Register of Deeds for Marikina, Metro Manila; © Ordering respondent Solid Homes, Inc. to pay AFP MBAI P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and costs. (2) In G.R. No. 135016, DENIES the petition, for lack of merit. With costs against Solid Homes, Inc. Page 3 of 56

227.) G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005 HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, respondents. Petition: This is a petition for review to reverse the Decision dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals. Facts: Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title before RTC of Pasig City (land registration court) which was granted. Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis, heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC. The motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners also prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. The land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings. The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses, hence, petitioners filed another motion to declare the same void. Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request. Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void. In a letter, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice of lis pendens. Three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. In its resolution, the LRA stated that the sole question for resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case. The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties but mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted.

Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of the LRAs decision. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the order of general default in the land registration case. Issue: Whether petitioners’ motion to declare void the decrees issued by the land registration authority is a proper basis for filing the notice of lis pendens Ruling: NO. The petition has no merit. Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names. The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. Section 76 of PD 1529 states: SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered. Page 4 of 56

Notice of Lis Pendens Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously did not exist. Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the property owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title. Thus, we have consistently held that The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property. The litigation must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals enumerated the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:

[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz: a) An action to recover possession of real estate; b) An action to quiet title thereto; c) An action to remove clouds thereon; d) An action for partition; and e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following cases: a) Preliminary attachments; b) Proceedings for the probate of wills; c) Levies on execution; d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.[27] The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens because the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this office will base its action. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice of lis pendens. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000. RULE 14: SUMMONS (SECTIONS 1 – 14) 228.) Cathay Metal Corporation vs. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. G.R. No. 172204. July 2, 2014 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED FACTS: This case involves an action for cancellation of adverse claims upon certain real properties. Page 5 of 56

Cathay, herein petitioner, was in possession of TCTs over certain parcels of land against which, respondent Laguna West had adverse claims. Petitioner then filed a complaint to cancel said adverse claims with the RTC.

The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in this court. Article VIII, Section 5(5). This means that on matters relating to procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will govern.

Laguna West was a cooperative and the official address indicated both in its Articles of Incorporation and Cooperative Development Authority Certificate Of Registration was Brgy Mayapa, Calamba Laguna. But subsequent representative appearances in behalf of Laguna West indicated that it has already moved to Brgy Looc Calamba, Laguna, there being no amendment made in the AOI nor in the CDACOR.

Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure. The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding.

The summons was first served in the official address of Laguna West in Brgy Mayapa, but it was returned unserved. In the postal return, the postman certified that the service was not successful because the “cooperative was not existing”. Substituted service by regular mail was resorted and upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared the service as successful. In view thereof, respondent was declared in default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex parte. Upon learning of the case, respondent manifested that it did not receive a copy of the summons and moved for the service of the same to its address in Brgy Looc. RTC granted the motion of the respondent. Instead of sending a copy of the petition, the petitioner filed an MR. The MR was set for hearing but the respondent did not appear during the hearing of the MR. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ruled that petitioner complied with the Cooperative Code which requires that the official address of the cooperative shall be used in sending notices. The CA ruled that there was no valid service of summons as the Rules of Court were not complied. Hence, this present petition. ISSUE Whether the provisions of a substantive law on service of summons may prevail over that of the Rules of Court. RULING Short Answer No. Promulgation of rules of procedure is vested by the Constitution with the Supreme Court. Service of summons is a matter of procedure. Hence, the Rules of Court must necessarily prevail over substantive law. Long Answer

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus: Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. —When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel. We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found. The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated officers. Petitioner failed to do this. No notice was ever sent to any of the enumerated officers. This case involves the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded due process. In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims. 229.) RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA Page 6 of 56

G.R. No. 184197. February 11, 2010 PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED FACTS: This case involves action for annulment of subdivision plans. The petitioner filed the action with the RTC against the respondents. With the personal service of summons returning unsuccessful, substituted service was resorted to. Summons was served upon the respondents’ house help. In view thereof, upon motion of the petitioner, the respondents were declared in default. After 8 long months, respondents filed a motion to lift order in default alleging that there was improper service of summons. RTC granted the motion and lifted the order of default and gave respondents 5 days to file the Answer. The respondents failed to file their Answer. Upon motion of the petitioner, the respondent was again declared in default.

additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.” Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.”

Respondents filed certiorari with CA insisting that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their person due to improper service of summons. The CA granted the petition. Hence, this present petition.

Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.

Petitioner argued that the motion by the respondents to lift order of default constituted voluntary appearance.

230.) Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Japzon G.R. No. 68037. July 29, 1992 PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the Regional Trial WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

ISSUE: Whether the respondents’ motion to lift default order constitutes voluntary appearance. RULING: Short Answer Yes. The motion to lift default order is an affirmative relief. The general rule is that when a party seeks affirmative relief from the court, he submits to the authority of the court, thereby constituting voluntary appearance, granting the court jurisdiction over his person. This is only exempted in the case of special or conditional appearance, which in this case was not done. Long Answer Jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for

FACTS: Japzon is the public respondent judge so do not mind him. This case involves a vehicular accident between a jeepney and a truck. Private respondents were passengers of a jeepney which was side-swept by the truck. Petitioner was the insurer of the truck. Respondents filed an independent civil action for damages against the drivers and owners of both the jeepney and the truck. In the action for damages, Atty Gloria filed a notice of appearance informing the court that he was the counsel of the driver, the owner of the truck, and Paramount Insurance. The RTC ruled in favor of the injured private respondents, which ruling became final and executory. Here came Paramount, asking the same court to set aside its ruling raising the issue that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person, as it has not been validly served with summons and that the appearance Page 7 of 56

of Atty Gloria on its behalf was not authorized. RTC dismissed the motion, hence this present petition directly with the SC. ISSUE: Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. RULING: Short Answer Yes. First, the irregularity of service of summons was merely alleged, but not substantiated. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumption of regularity prevails. Second, the filing of an answer with cross claim made by Atty Gloria in behalf of Paramount raises a presumption of authority. In the absence of proof to the contrary, presumption of authority prevails. Long Answer Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. In the case at bar, although petitioner questioned the propriety of the service of summons, it however failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not properly served with summons. Hence, the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed prevails. The records of the case, however, showed that all the pleadings, including the answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed by Atty Gloria stated that he represented Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance informing the court that he is representing the said defendants. The mere filing of the answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of authority to appear for petitioner Paramount in accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such presumption is rebuttable, but only by clear and positive proof. In the absence of such clear and positive proof, the presumption of authority should prevail over the petitioner’s self-serving denial of such authority. It strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he has not been authorized or employed by the party concerned.

231.) Boticano vs. Chu, Jr. No. L-58036. March 16,1987 PETITION for certiorari to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE FACTS This case involves vehicular accident between 2 trucks. The truck owned by petitioner Boticano was properly parked along the shoulder of the national highway when it was bumped by another truck owned by respondent Chu. Chu promised to pay for the expenses for the repair of the truck but subsequently failed to comply with said promise. Boticano then filed a complaint for damages with the CFI. Summons was served upon Chu thru his wife in their house. Chu failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period hence he was declared in default upon motion of Boticano. CFI ruled in favor of Boticano. Chu appealed with the CA. For the first time, he raised the issue on lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons. CA agreed with Chu, remanded the case to the CFI, and ordered the proper service of summons. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant despite irregularity in the service of summons. RULING Short Answer Yes. First, irregularity in the service of summons may be waived when the party fails to make timely objections. Second, assuming there was indeed irregularity in the service of summons, the court still acquired jurisdiction on account of the voluntary appearance of the defendant. Long Answer One of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the defendant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has Page 8 of 56

been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections. Coming to the case at bar, it has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court below, defendant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not. On the contrary, private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. Not only did he submit pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing held on May 14, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the pending incident.

served upon Panasiatic, however no summons was served in relation to the second amended complaint. Panasiatic was declared in default for failure to file an answer. Panasiatic then filed a motion to lift order of default, which was denied by the court. Respondent Destinations was allowed to present evidence ex parte and the decision was rendered in its favor and became final and executory. Panasiatic filed a notice of appeal with the CA which was dismissed for being filed out of time and that the decision has become final and executory. Panasiatic filed a petition for certiorari, but the CA similarly dismissed the petition. Hence this present petition.

Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. Thus, under this principle, it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.

It is the argument of the petitioner that it was not served with new summons in relation to the second amended complaint which introduced new causes of actions.

232.) Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals No. L-62781. August 19, 1988 PETITION to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 7. Purisima, J. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

Whether a new summons must be served upon the defendant whenever an amendment to the complaint introduces new causes of actions.

FACTS

No. The petitioner already appeared before the amendment of the complaint, therefore no new service of summons is required. Service of summons in relation to amended complaints is only proper when the complaint is amended at the time the defendant has not yet appeared in court.

Destinations Travel (Destinations), herein private respondent, filed a complaint for the refund amounting to 48k of unutilized airplane tickets issued by PanAsiatic Travel (Panasiatic), herein petitioner. Respondent Destinations filed a motion to declare Panasiatic in default. Panasiatic filed a motion to dismiss to question the jurisdiction of the court over its person. Destinations filed an amended complaint increasing the amount to be recovered from 48k to 100k upon. A copy of the amended complaint AND summons were served upon Panasiatic. Thereafter, Panasiatic filed several motions for extension for filing of answer. Instead of filing its answer though, Panasiatic filed a motion for bill of particulars. Instead of answering the bill of particulars, respondent Destinations filed a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint contained additional causes of actions. In addition to claim of refund, it also claimed commissions and incentives. The copy of the second amended complaint was

ISSUE

RULING Short Answer

Long Answer If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must be served upon him as regards the amended complaint, otherwise the court would have no power to try the new causes of action alleged therein, unless he had lodged an answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of the amended complaint to the defendant by registered mail is not equivalent to service of summons in such case. However, if the defendant had already appeared in response to the first summons, so that he was already in court when the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary service of that pleading upon him, personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon him. In the instant case, summons on the first amended complaint was properly served on PAN-ASIATIC. After which, the company filed several motions for extension of time within which to file responsive pleading, and then a Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions were granted by the trial court. With Page 9 of 56

the filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary, ordinary service being sufficient. There is no question that PAN-ASIATIC was properly served with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint and that it received a copy of the Order admitting said Second Amended Complaint. Since it failed to serve and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days, the trial court was correct in declaring the company in default, in holding trial ex parte, and in eventually rendering judgment by default. 233.)Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal G.R. No. 149380. July 3, 2002 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED FACTS Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were congressional candidates. Sandoval emerged victorious. However, Oreta filed a protest with the HRET anchored on allegations of irregularity in the election. Summons was served upon Sandoval, at his office, thru Maga, a freelance maintenance employee. Hence, Sandoval interposed the irregularity of the service of summons, the employee being neither a regular employee nor responsible officer at the petitioner’s office. HRET disagreed with the position of Sandoval. SolGen agrees with Sandoval. ISSUE Whether service of summons thru a maintenance employee was proper. RULING At the outset, let us note that ROC finds suppletory application to the House Rules. Short Answer No. First, there was no showing that personal service was attempted. Second, a maintenance employee is not a competent person nor a person in charge of the office for purposes of the substituted service of summons. He is not competet because he is not expected to understand the repercussions of the summons. He is not person in charge because he is neither granted authority nor possesses custody or management of the office.

Long Answer It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer’s return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent. Granting that Maga was an employee of petitioner at his district office, an assumption that we stress is contrary to the evidence on record, still it cannot be said that he was qualified to receive the summons. To be a “competent” person to receive the summons means that he should be “duly qualified” and “having sufficient capacity, ability or authority. “The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.”

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Clearly, in being assigned to do maintenance work and by ordinary human understanding, Maga could not be presumed to appreciate the importance of the papers delivered to him. Not only was Maga an incompetent person to receive the summons, he was also, more plainly, not in charge of petitioner’s office. To be “in charge” means to have “care and custody of, under control of, or entrusted to the management or direction of. We would not dare establish a precedent whereby any employee or anyone who pretends to be an employee, although found in the office of his employer, could validly receive summons for him. 234.) HENRY S. OAMINAL Vs.PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S. CASTILLO G.R. No. 152776; October 8, 2003 In the instant case, the receipt of the summons by the legal secretary of the defendants -- respondents herein -- is deemed proper, because they admit the actual receipt thereof, but merely question the manner of service. Moreover, when they asked for affirmative reliefs in several motions and thereby submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, whatever defects the service of summons may have had were cured. FACTS: Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against Pablito and Guia Castillo with RTC QC. The summons with complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of Mrs. Castillo.

Defendants filed an 'Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration with the Accompanying Plea to Reset'. RTC ruled that the 'Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim' was filed outside the period to file answer, hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of [the] order, [failing] which, the case will be dismissed. RTC ruled on the merits of the case which were made in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO). In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial court had validly acquired jurisdiction over them. The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them. It based its finding on the Sheriff's Return, which did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before substituted service was resorted to. Issue: Whether or not receipt by a legal secretary of a summons is deemed receipt by a lawyer in contemplation of law.

Defendants filed an urgent motion to declare service of summons improper and legally defective. They alleged that Sheriff failed to comply with Sec 1, Rule 14 of the ROC or the substituted service of summons. No hearing was conducted for the said motion.

Ruling:

Oaminal filed an Omnibus Motion to declare defendant in default and to render judgment because defendant failed to file an answer within the reglementary period.

Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration -are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief,

Defendants filed Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim. Further, it also filed an Urgent Motion to dismiss. All of which were filed on the same day. RTC denied the motion the dismiss and admitted defendant’s Answer then set the case for pre-trial.

NO. However, the lower court still acquired jurisdiction over the defendants when they submit themselves voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

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respondents cannot -- after failing to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate the very same authority they have invoked. 235.) SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON Vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003 Facts: Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land which Columbus Philippines leased per agreement it entered with the plaintiffs. Under the lease agreement, Columbus Philippines undertook to construct a building at the end of the third year. Columbus failed to comply and hence the spouses filed a complaint for rescission of the agreement with damages in RTC of Pasay. Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes. Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. That decision became final however, the following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by petitioners. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default. The Order of this Court on May 21, 1999 allowing the parties to file their respective memoranda within ten (10) days from May 21, 1999 is hereby revoked and set aside, since the incidents can be resolved based on the records. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It suffered the same fate as the motion for reconsideration for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement of the decision.

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favor. It reasoned out that the trial court erred when it denied private respondent’s motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Since service upon private respondent was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private respondent’s office, as evidenced by the latter’s employment record, such service cannot be considered valid. Issue: a. b.

Whether or not there is valid service of summons for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants. Whether private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was in order.

Ruling; a.

No. SC ruled in favor of the respondents and affirmed the decision of CA that there was no valid service of summons.

SC agreed to respondent’s arguments that the designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. The service of summons through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is invalid. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together Page 12 of 56

with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.1awphi1.nét We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner’s assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases15 cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case. At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process.16 We will deprive private respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons. b.

Yes. Since we have ruled that service of summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings held before it, including the order of default, are null and void. As private respondent points out, the second issue has become moot and academic.

236.) Spouses PATRICK JOSE and Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON G.R. No. 147369; October 23, 2003

RAFAELA

JOSE

Vs.

FACTS: Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed. [Petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. RTC issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. Afterwards, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte and RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by the respondent court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. RTC denied said motion. Respondents once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court (RTC). Page 13 of 56

The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. ISSUE: Whether or not there is valid service of summons hence, RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. RULING: NO, the service of summons is defective and therefore RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the respondents, Boyon. In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. A review of the records9 reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of Summons is reproduced as follows: "That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court." The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.

The necessity of stating in the process server’s Return or Proof of Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy, from which we quote: "x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective." Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed in Madrigal v. Court of Appeals as follows: "In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds." It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process Page 14 of 56

demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.

Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.

237.) FILOMENA DOMAGAS Vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN G.R. No. 158407; January 17, 2005

In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent, was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

FACTS: Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Calasiao, Pangasinan. By means of force, strategy and stealth, the respondent gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondent’s) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent’s house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same. Nonetheless, MTC ruled in favor of plaintiff. The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued. the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because of the following: (a) when the complaint was filed, she was not a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was in Oslo, Norway, at the time the summons and the complaint were served; (c) her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and summons; and (d)

The petitioner appended the following to her answer: (a) a copy13 of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jose Layno in her favor, dated August 26, 1992, showing that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; (b) a Real Estate Mortgage14 executed by the respondent, dated February 9, 1999 showing that she was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; (c) the Joint Affidavit15 of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macalanda, both residents of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, declaring that the respondent and her brother Oscar Layno were their neighbors; that the respondent and her brother had been residents of Barangay Buenlag since their childhood; that although the respondent left the country on several occasions, she returned to the Philippines and resided in her house at No. 572 located in the said barangay; and (d) the Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno, approved on June 15, 1997. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. It thus decided that the MTC decision was null and void. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent. The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the first complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent. Issue: Page 15 of 56

1. 2.

Whether the action is the first complaint is an action quasi in rem or in personam. Whether there is proper service of summons.

Ruling: 1.

The action is an action in personam. The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam. On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

2.

None. There is no valid service of summons as the action is in personam.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.34 The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective.35 As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :36 … The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as Page 16 of 56

prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.37 In Keister v. Narcereo,38 the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by separate promissory notes. Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand. However, demand was unheeded.

PER SHERIFF’S RETURN, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

The Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola Street, Cagayan de Oro City. Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the respondent bank. The respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by the court as Commissioner.

The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno dated June 15, 1997 wherein he declared that he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on April 5, 1999.

Arturo Toring, the branch manager of the respondent bank, testified that the spouses Biaco had been obtaining loans from the bank since 1996 to 1998. The loans for the years 1996-1997 had already been paid by the spouses Biaco, leaving behind a balance of P1,260,304.33 representing the 1998 loans. The amount being claimed is inclusive of interests, penalties and service charges as agreed upon by the parties. The appraisal value of the land subject of the mortgage is only P150,000.00 as reported by the Assessor's Office.

The decision of of the MTC is null and void as there is no valid service of summons.

Based on the report of the Commissioner, the respondent judge ordered Spouses to pay the plaintiff.

238.) MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO VS. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK G.R. NO. 161417 : February 8, 2007

The sheriff personally served the above-mentioned judgment to Ernesto Biaco at his office at Export and Industry Bank. The spouses Biaco did not appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court. On October 13, 2000, the respondent bank filed an ex parte motion for execution to direct the sheriff to sell the Page 17 of 56

mortgaged lot at public auction. The respondent bank alleged that the order of the court requiring the spouses Biaco to pay within a period of 90 days had passed, thus making it necessary to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction, as previously mentioned in the order of the court. The motion for execution was granted by the trial court.

allegedly connived with her husband to just leave a copy of the summons intended for her at the latter's office.

The sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses Biaco at their residence in #92 9th Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. The writ of execution was personally received by Ernesto. By virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction in favor of the respondent bank.

ISSUE:

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. She claimed that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated against her because the bank failed to verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate mortgage and did not inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory notes. She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The Court of Appeals considered the two circumstances that kept petitioner in the dark about the judicial foreclosure proceedings: (1) the failure of the sheriff to personally serve summons on petitioner; and (2) petitioner's husband's concealment of his knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings. On the validity of the service of summons, the appellate court ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other cannot be considered extrinsic fraud. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review,4 asserting that even if the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband's office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed. Petitioner contends that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated not so much by her husband, who did not inform her of the judicial foreclosure proceedings, but by the sheriff who

Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her person.

Whether or not trial court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Teresa Biaco. RULING: NO. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.15 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was served to her through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted to. Page 18 of 56

Without ruling on petitioner's allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to prevent summons from being served upon her personally, we can see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRB's ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses Biaco. This cannot be countenanced. Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v. Ferandos, et. al.20 and Perkins v. Dizon, et al.21 that in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res. Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner's personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case. 239. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sps. Ireneo M. Santiago and Liwanag P. Santiago, Centrogen, Inc. represented by Edwin Santiago G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 22007

complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injuction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the REM with BPI. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490, 000, including interest thereon was fully paid. In addition, Sps. Santiago and Centrogen argued that the original loan agreement was for the amount of P5M. Such amount will be supppsedly utilized to finance the squalene project of the company. However, after the P2M was released, FEBTC in violation of the agreement did not release the balance of P3M. As a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its obligations. BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer to the Complaint filed by Sps. Santiago and Centrogen. Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz Branch was not one of those authorized by Sec. 11, Rule 14 to receive the summons on behalf of the corporation. It also alleged that the complaint lacked a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. The RTC denied the MD and emphasized that the nature of the case merited its removal from the purview of Section 11, Rule 14. That based on the provisions of Sec 5, Rule 58 the RTC declared that the instant Order is still valid and binding despite non-compliance with Sec.11 of Rule 14. The RTC also issued an Order enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the subject property until the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction is ascertained. The RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI to avoid further argument as regards the proper service of summons. It also issued an order granting the Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE:

FACTS:

WON the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the original summons was served upon the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch.

This is a petition for review on certiorari. Centrogen on different occasions obtained loans from FEBTC, the total of which reached the sum of P4.65M, as evidenced by a PN executed by Edwin Santiago. As security for a fraction of the loan, Ireneo Santigao executed a REM. The REM secured the principal loan in the amount of P490k. Later on, the same property secure another loan obligation in the amount of P1, 504, 280.00. Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with BPI with the latter as the surviving corporation. BPI filed an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of REM for Centrogen’s default in the payment of the loan obligation. Upon receipt of the notice of Sale, Sps. Santiago and Centrogen filed a

DECISION Yes. Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served Page 19 of 56

on him. Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service of summons on BPI’s Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual. However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003, before the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on 20 March 2003, whatever defect attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly cured. In explaining the test on the validity of service of summons, Justice Florenz Regalado stressed that substantial justice must take precedence over technicality and thus stated: The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto were ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it. Prescinding from the above, we deem it best to underscore that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each. An injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s substantive right or interest; it is not a cause of action by itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, the only limitation being that the discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in a manner provided by law. Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) a right in esse or a clear or unmistakable right to be protected; (2) violation of that right; and (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

240. The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company vs. Hon. Augusto Breva in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regionla Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 10, and Milagro P. Morales G.R. No. 147937, November 11, 2004 Callejo, Sr. J. FACTS: This is a petition for review. Milagros filed a complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums against The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company (PALGIC) before the RTC of Davao City. The complaint stated that the complaint could be served with summons and other court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City. Summons together with the complaint was served and received by its Insurance Service Officer, Ruthie Babael. PALGIC filed a MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person since Babael was not among those named under Sec. 11, Rule 14 which could properly receive the summons. Milagros filed an Amended complaint, alleging that summons could also be served at its principal office at Manila, through its president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons. RTC denied the MD and directed the issuance of an alias summons in its main office. It ruled that the improper service of summons is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint considering the case was still in its initial stage. It ruled that the remedy was to issue an alias summons in Manila. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. It ruled that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over the person. ISSUE: WON the RTC committed GAD when it denied the MD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner due to improper service of summons DECISION. No. A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant. Page 20 of 56

It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an “original” or an “alias” summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the require ments under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the original complaint 241. SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P. BELEN, Vs. HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008, Tinja, J. FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The instant petition originated from the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment against Sps. Domingo and Dominga Belen, filed by Sps. Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Joselito Riveros, before the RTC of Batangas. The complaint alleged that Sps. Pacleb secured at judgement of default before the Superior Court of the State of California. The judgement ordered Sps. Belen to pay the amount of $56, 204.09 representing loan repayment. The summons was served on Sps. Belen’s address in Laguna and received by a certain Marcelo M. Belen. Atty. Alcantara entered his appearance for petitioners. In his Answer, he alleged that Sps. Belen were actually residents of California and their liability had been extinguished via a release of abstract judgement issued in the same collection case. RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence since Sps. Belen failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Before the scheduled ex parte presentation of evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a MD, citing the judgement of dismissal issued by the Superior Court of the State of California, which allegedly dismissed the case. The RTC held in abeyance the ex parte presentation of evidence pending the submission of a copy of judgement of dismissal. The RTC denied the MD for his failure to present eh alleged judgement of dismissal. Atty. Alcantara, sought the reinstatement of the MD by attaching a copy of the said foreign judgement.

Sps. Pacleb filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint. It averred that they were constrained to withdraw their complaint against Sps. Belen because of the prohibitive cost of litigation. The amended complaint prayed for judgement ordering petitioner to satisfy their obligation to private responded in the amount of P2, 810, 234.50. The Answer to the amended complaint raised the following defenses: (1) lack of cause of action; (2) res judicata; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants. Sps. Belen and Atty. Alcantra (passed away) failed to appear at the rescheduled pretrial conference. Thus, the RTC declared them in default and allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. A copy off the RTC decision intended for Atty. Alcantara was returned with the notation Addressee Deceased. A copy of the RTC decision was then sent to the purported address of Sps. Belen and was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Sps. Pacleb immediately filed an ex parte preliminary attachment with the RTC. It also filed a writ of execution of the RTC decision. Atty. Culvera entered in his appearance for Sps. Belen. He filed a MQ the writ of execution. The RTC denied the motion. ISSUE: 1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Sps. Belen through their proper service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners. 2. WON there is a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on Sps. Belen DECISION 1. YES. The appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleading were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the person of petitioners. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, if defendants have not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a decision, a party should first be subject to the court’s jurisdiction. In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539 (1998), the Court underscored the necessity of determining first whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons

Page 21 of 56

under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippine apply according to the nature of the action. The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the complaint, is for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of contract whereby petitioners were ordered to pay private respondents the monetary award. It is in the nature of an action in personam because private respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under said judgment. Applying the foregoing rules on the service of summons to the instant case, in an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case through personal service or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service as provided in Rule 14, Sections 6-7. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If the defendant, for justifiable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.” If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding decision The records of the case reveal that herein petitioners have been permanent residents of California, U.S.A. since the filing of the action up to the present. From the time Atty. Alcantara filed an answer purportedly at the instance of petitioners’ relatives, it has been consistently maintained that petitioners were not physically present in the Philippines. In the answer, Atty. Alcantara had already averred that petitioners were residents of California, U.S.A. and that he was appearing only upon the instance of petitioners’ relatives. In addition, private respondents’ attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, testified during the ex parte presentation of evidence that he knew petitioners to be former residents of Alaminos, Laguna but are now living in California, U.S.A. That being the case, the service of summons on petitioners’ purported address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court jurisdiction over their persons. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that

the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. Through certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly authorized by petitioners to appear on their behalf. For instance, in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint, Atty. Alcantara attached thereto a duly authenticated copy of the judgment of dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page of petitioner Domingo Belen’s U.S. passport. These documents could have been supplied only by petitioners, indicating that they have consented to the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on their behalf. In sum, petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves through Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the RTC. As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered by the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. 2.NO. In the instant case, a copy of the RTC decision was sent first to Atty. Alcantara, petitioners’ counsel of record. However, the same was returned unserved in view of the demise of Atty. Alcantara. Thus, a copy was subsequently sent to petitioners’ “last known address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna,” which was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. The subsequent service on petitioners’ purported “last known address” by registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail. Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address of the party and not at any other address of the party. Service at the party’s former address or his last known address or any address other than his present address does not qualify as substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by registered mail presupposes that the present address of the party is known and if the person who receives the same is not the addressee, he must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of the party. 242. Pedro T. Santos, Jr. vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008, Corona, J. Page 22 of 56

FACTS: This is a petition for review. PNOC filed a complaint for a sum of money against Santos in the amount of P698, 502.10 representing Santos’ unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by PNOC when he was still a member of its BOD. Despite earnest efforts, personal service of summon failed because he could not be located. Hence, the trial court allowed summons by publication in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to effect that he sent a copy off the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address When petitioner failed to file his Answer, respondent moved that the case be set for ex parte presentation of evidence. The motion was granted. The case was then submitted for decision after the ex parte presentation of evidence. Santos filed an Omnibus MR and to Admit Attached Answer. He alleged that the affidavit of service submitted by PNOC failed to comply with Sec 19, Rule 14 as it was not executed by a Clerk of Court. The trial court denied the MR. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. ISSUE: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person DECISION Yes. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.—In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied) Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication. Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of

the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit “showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.” The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication. 243. Aurora N. De Pedro vs Romasan Development Corporation G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014, Leone, J FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45. This case originated from separate complaint for nullifcaiton of free patent and OCT, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is De Pedro. The complaints were filed by ROMASA were it alleged that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo and that the government could not legally issue the free patents because that the time of its issuance, the land was already released for disposition for private individuals. Based on Mr. Ko’s narrative, Romasan’s representative, he discovered that De Pero put up fences on a portion of its property in Antipolo. Mr Ko. Confronted De Pedro, but she was able to show title and documents evidencing her ownership. Upon checking with the CENRODENR, it was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of its property to several persons. Attempts to serve the summons to De Pedro failed, hence, the summons were published in people’s Balita. Respondent moved to declare all defendants in default in its complaints, including De Pedro, for failure to file its answers and to be allowed to ex parte present evidence. The trial court granted the motions The RTC issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents. De Pedrom file a motion for new trial, alleging that the counsel received notive of the January 7, 2000 decision of March 16, 2000. De Pedro argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of summons. He pointed out that summons was not personally served upon her “for reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig there is no person in the said given address”. The RTC denied the motion. Page 23 of 56

On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC. It noted De Pedro’s belated filing of her MNT and that he failed to allege any ground that would justify the grant of MNT under Rule 37, Section 1. He also filed a petition for annulment of RTC’s decision on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been disposed of here property without due process. The CA denied the petition. It ruled that since petitioner availed herself of the remedy of new trial, and raised the case before the CA via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a petition for annulment of judgment

or if his or her whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or respondent’s whereabouts.

Issue: WON the trial court’s decision was void for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner De Pedro

The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment. Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper ground. Rule 37of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may grant a new trial based on the following causes: (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

Decision NO. Regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with authority and competence. Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons. Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or her. If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall be effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or she may be found. Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of summons through other modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve summons through personal service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time. Substituted service is effected “(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.” Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner

Service of summons by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or respondent does not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.

Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other remedies had already been availed. 244.) ALEXANDER TAM WONG Vs. CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA G.R. No. 183802; September 17, 2009 FACTS: Catherine Factor-Koyoma filed an action for specific performance against Alexander Tam Wong before RTC. Koyoma alleged that Wong refused to execute a deed of absolute sale and surrender the Condominium Certificate Title of a unit in California Garden Square (Mandaluyong). Koyama further averred that she had been renting out the subject property to foreign tourists, but Wong Page 24 of 56

padlocked the same while she was in Japan attending to her business. When she requested him to open the subject property, he reportedly mauled her, causing her physical injuries, and also took her personal belongings. RTC issued summons at Wong’s residence in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City; however, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint were returned to the RTC by Sheriff Sheriff Baloloy, who indicated in his Sheriff’s Return that said court process should already be deemed "DULY SERVED." According to his Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the summons at Wong’s address but the latter was always not around according He also attempted to leave the summons with Wong’s caretaker (Mira) who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same. Wong failed to file an answer. Koyoma filed a motion to declare him in default. RTC then declared Wong in default. Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail a Manifestation claiming that he did not receive any summons from said court. According to him, he was only informed unofficially by a tricycle driver regarding papers from a court in Caloocan City, which the tricycle driver returned to the court after failing to locate Wong. This prompted Wong to file an inquiry with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City as regards any case that might have been filed against him. In response, the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City issued a Certification bearing the details of the civil case against him. Wong asserted that he would not hesitate to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper procedure be observed. By special appearance of counsel, Wong filed a motion to dismiss asserting that there was no proper service of summons upon him. On the other hand, Koyama maintained that there was a proper substituted service of the summons as evidenced by the Registry Return Card. Wong filed a Reply alleging that said housemaids stated above are fictitious. The RTC denied Wong’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.It declared that the sheriff validly resorted to a substituted service of the summons. Wong went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. CA dismissed Wong’s petition for being the improper remedy. Wong elevated the case to the SC. In the meantime, since there was no TRO issued by the CA or SC, the RTC continued hearing the civil case for specific performance to which Wong actively participated. The RTC eventually issued an order rescinding the contract of sale of a condo unit between the parties and Wong was ordered to pay Koyama P 2,204,000.

ISSUE: Whether RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Wong since he was not served the summons. RULING: RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong. It is well-established that a summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself. Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. A careful study of Sheriff Baloloy’s Return, it can be said that he improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons. Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wong’s residence on three different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing else in the Sheriff’s Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. During his visits to Wong’s residence, he was informed by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know Wong’s office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the summons upon him at his office. Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to serve the summons at the former’s residence on 8 August 2007, there was no indication that Wong’s absence was other than temporary or that he would not soon return. Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Baloloy’s three visits to Wong’s residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate Wong; and Wong’s absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloy’s visits, since Wong Page 25 of 56

was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote impossibility of personal service of summons upon him. It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. 43 Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court recognizes that: Section 20. Voluntary Appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance before it in Civil Case No. C-21860. The Court is not referring to Wong’s filing of his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-21860, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over his person, because that clearly does not constitute voluntary appearance. The Court, instead, calls attention to the RTC Order dated 20 November 2008 allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama. Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of the opportunity opened to him by the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the 23 January 2009 hearing, despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the 25 September 2007 Order declaring him in default. By actively participating in the 23 January 2009 hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the RTC over Civil Case No. C-21860 and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court. 245.) SANSIO PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES MOGOL G.R. No. 177007; July 14, 2009 FACTS: Sansio Philippines filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. At the request of Sansio, the process server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons and the copy of the complaint on spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC. Respondent spouses were in the said premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal cases filed by petitioner against respondent Alicia for violations of BP

22. Upon being so informed of the summons and the complaint, spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. The counsel pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be served only at the address that was stated in both documents, i.e., at Lucena City, and not anywhere else. The counsel of respondent apparently gave back the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for the same. As the process server could not convince the respondent to sign for the aforementioned documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the courtroom. The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of Summons, declaring that respondents refused to accept it with no valid reason at all. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondents in Default. Petitioner averred that the summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly served upon the respondents at the courtroom of the MeTC. From the date of said service up to the time of the filing of the above-stated motion, respondent had yet to file any responsive pleading. Through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion to Declare Respondents] in Default. Respondents averred the service should have been effected at the respondent spouses’ residential address, as stated in the summons and the copy of the complaint. The MeTC of Manila ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not specify where service is to be effected.. Respondents were, thus, validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary period therefore, the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious. Respondent spouses Mogol filed an MR on the above Order, but the same was denied by the MeTC of Manila. Respondent spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the RTC of Manila against Judge de Castro, Jr. of the MeTC of Manila, and herein petitioner. Respondent spouses insisted there was no valid service of summons per return of the process server, which was binding on the MeTC judge, who did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondent spouses. They contended that the MeTC of Manila acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring them in default. The RTC of Manila issued an Order dismissing the petition. It held that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not mandate that summons be served strictly at the Page 26 of 56

address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said provision states that the service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and practicable. Therefore, it did not matter much that the summons and the copy of the complaint in this case were served inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at Lucena City. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal on the above-mentioned Order of the RTC of Manila, which was given due course. The CA held that there was no valid service of summons. . Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid service of summons to the respondent spouses RULING: YES; A summon is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the ROC, which read: SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. The essence of personal service is the handing or

tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines. In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. The act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material. Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the fact that respondent spouses Mogol based their case on a wrong appreciation of the above-stated provisions of the ROC. Respondent spouses principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without construing the same with Section 7. Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the ROC cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service. As to the reliance of the CA on the second paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons stating that the original and duplicate copies of the Summons were returned “UNSERVED,” the Court finds the same utterly misplaced. A simple reading of the first paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons, which contains the circumstances surrounding the service of the summons on the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol, manifestly reveals that the summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly served on the said respondents. They merely refused to receive or obtain a copy of the same. Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the process server in the aforesaid second paragraph – an error that undoubtedly Page 27 of 56

added to the confusion of the parties to this case – the same was, nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law, which does not bind the independent judgment of the courts. Indeed, it cannot be said that because of such a statement, respondent spouses Mogol had the right to rely on said return informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus justifying their non-filing of any responsive pleading. The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied and due process is served. 246.) Spouses Manuel vs Ong G.R. No. 205249; October 15, 2014 FACTS: Respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet a complaint for accion reivindicatoria. Ong charged the Spouses Manuel with having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly owned. Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. Sheriff Joselito Sales attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. Sheriff Sales made another attempt at personal service to petitioner Sandra Manuel but she refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within the required 15-day period, Ong asked that they be declared in default. RTC issued an order granting Ong's motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. RTC also granted motion for ex parte presentation of evidence. Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default.

They claimed that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet so summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address. RTC denied motion to lift order of default. Sps. Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the CA denied it for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel has been acquired. RULING: Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants was validly acquired because personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative :— substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. (Emphasis supplied) In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother. On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them. Page 28 of 56

The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of summons, was made. From this, they surmised that the "Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return was someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel. The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendant's address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service. In any case, the Court of Appeals is correct in pointing out that the Spouses Manuel's self-serving assertion must crumble in the face of the clear declarations in the sheriffs return. Pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the acts of Sheriff Joselito Sales and the events relating to the attempt to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel, as detailed in the sheriffs return, enjoy the presumption of regularity.23 Moreover, Sheriff Joselito Sales must be presumed to have taken ordinary care and diligence in carrying out his duty to make service upon the proper person(s) and not upon an impostor. 24 A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving) claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular about the sheriffs return or that it was otherwise incomplete. Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel to adduce proof of their claims. All they mustered was their self-serving allegation of an alternative address. If at all, this claim of maintaining residence elsewhere should not even be lent an iota of credibility considering that, as respondent Ramon Ong pointed out, the barangay clearances, which the Spouses Manuel themselves attached to one of their pleadings (as proof of their identities), actually indicated that they were residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet.25cralawred Their lie is, thus, revealed by their own pleading.

As the Spouses Manuel not only failed in discharging the burden of proving their allegation but even succeeded in contradicting themselves, Sheriff Joselito Sales' recollection of events must be taken to be true. Thus, valid personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made. From this, it follows that jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel was acquired by the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet.

247.) B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC. v. R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. G.R. No. 169919, September 11, 2009 FACTS: BD Long Span Builders, Inc (BD) and Ampeloquio Realty Inc (ARI) entered into an agreement wherein petitioner agreed to render rip rapping construction services at ARI’s resort in Ternate, Cavite for P80 Million. ARI failed to fulfill its obligation resulting in the cancellation of the project. Petitioner demanded the return of the P800,000 cash bond, but respondent refused to do so. Petitioners legal counsel sent two demand letters but the latter still refused to return the cash bond. BD filed with RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondent, through its staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Respondent failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint. Upon motion of petitioner, the RTC issued an Order declaring respondent in default, and allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of BD. ARI filed the case to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision stating that there was an invalid service of summons. A motion for reconsideration was filed but likewise dismissed. ARI further appealed to the SC. ISSUE: Whether there was an improper service of summons upon ARI. RULING: Page 29 of 56

Yes, there was an improper service of summons upon ARI. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted to. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent) through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons was served by substituted service on the defendants staff member, Romel Dolahoy.Substituted service was resorted to on the servers first attempt at service of summons, and there was no indication that prior efforts were made to render prompt personal service on the defendant. Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who received the summons in respondents behalf, shared such relation of confidence ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following

our ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioners contention that service on Romel Dolahoy constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. Petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: (1) he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; (2) if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and (4) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. Thus respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial courts judgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority. 248.) Planters Development Bank Vs. Chandumal GR No. 195619, September 5, 2012 FACTS: BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. BF Homes then sold to PDB all its rights and interests over the contract. On June 18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDP against Chandumal. Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's return, Sheriff Galing attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three dates but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by serving the same through Chandumal's mother who acknowledged receipt thereof. For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare Chandumal in default which was granted by the RTC. On February 23, 2001, Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default maintaining that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion which was reversed by the Court of Appeals due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of summons. Page 30 of 56

ISSUES: (1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons (2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court RULING: 1.) In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.23 These were reiterated and applied in Pascual v. Pascual,24 where the substituted service of summon made was invalidated due to the sheriff’s failure to specify in the return the necessary details of the failed attempts to effect personal service which would justify resort to substituted service of summons. In applying the foregoing requisites in the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.25Indeed, the sheriff’s return shows a mere perfunctory attempt to cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There was no indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific

whereabouts except that she was "out of the house", where she can be reached or whether he even tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and his failure to comply with the requisites renders such service ineffective.26 2.) Respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Despite that there was no valid substituted service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. Thus, it was ruled that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.27 The Court notes that aside from the allegation that she did not receive any summons, Chandumal’s motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer failed to positively assert the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was set forth therein was the substantial claim that PDB failed to comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6552 on payment of cash surrender value, 28 which already delves into the merits of PDB’s cause of action. In addition, Chandumal even appealed the RTC decision to the CA, an act which demonstrates her recognition of the trial court’s jurisdiction to render said judgment. Given Chandumal’s voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 255, had all authority to render its Decision dated May 31, 2004. The CA, therefore, erred in nullifying said RTC decision and dispensing with the resolution of the substantial issue raised herein, i.e., validity of the notarial rescission. Instead, however, of remanding this case to the CA, the Court will resolve the same considering that the records of the case are already before us and in order to avoid any further delay. Page 31 of 56

249.) ALLEN A. MACASAET Vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR. G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013

Respondent, a retired police officer sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published. The suit was raffled to the RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.

date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

In the morning, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return.

Petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pretrial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil action.

250.) HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED G.R. No. 159590. October 18, 2004

FACTS:

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed petitioners to file their answers. Undaunted, petitioners brought a petition for certiorari. The CA promulgated its questioned decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioners HELD: YES. There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same

FACTS: Respondent Catalan filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money with damages against petitioner HSBC due to HSBANKs alleged wanton refusal to pay her the value of five HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00. Summons was served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center, Tower I, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City. HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss. Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as co-defendant. HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati. Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, dated questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. HSBC TRUSTEE alleges Page 32 of 56

that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and distinct from HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place in the Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it has no resident agent upon whom summons may be served because it does not transact business in the Philippines.

In French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to rule that it is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign corporation is doing business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing business must first be "established by appropriate allegations in the complaint" and the court in determining such fact need not go beyond the allegations therein.

The RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss and held that it acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendants because the question of whether a foreign corporation is doing business or not in the Philippines cannot be a subject of a Motion to Dismiss but should be ventilated in the trial on the merits; and defendants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC setting up in their Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction.

The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not sufficiently show the fact of HSBC TRUSTEEs doing business in the Philippines. It does not appear at all that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act which would give the general public the impression that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and usual business undertakings in the country. Absent from the amended complaint is an allegation that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act in the country that would place it within the sphere of the court’s jurisdiction.

HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition with the CA. The CA dismissed the two petitions for certiorari. Hence, the present petitions. ISSUE: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction over HSBSC Trustee due to improper service of summons HELD: NO. The filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional appearance, entered precisely to question the regularity of the service of summons. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. HSBC TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC. Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

We have held that a general allegation, standing alone, that a party is doing business in the Philippines does not make it so. Also, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the domestic agent of HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus, the summons tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for HSBC TRUSTEE was clearly improper. There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot take cognizance of the case against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding undertaken by the RTC is therefore null and void. Accordingly, the complaint against HSBC TRUSTEE should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 251.) GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO SAYSON, JR. VS. NISSINUNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION G.R. No. 181517, July 06, 2015 FACTS: A Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.'s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the van's driver. Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to P567,070.68. NURC denied any liability therefor. Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. Page 33 of 56

NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service. NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its officers. The RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC. NURC elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC HELD: Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The rule now likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green Star claims that it was received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC's motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, although the

corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice. 252.) INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. AND EDMER Y. LIM VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATIONERY EXPRESSIONS SHOP, INC. AND JOSEPHINE LIM BON HUAN G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018 FACTS: Petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink), represented by its president, petitioner Edmer Y. Lim (Lim), filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and Joseph Lim Bon Huan (Bon Huan). Interlink sought from Expressions the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals and damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract. In the Sheriff's Return, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel (Sheriff Muriel) certified that he served the summons issued in the subject case, together with the copy of the complaint, on the respondents at the office of the defendant company's president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel stated that Liwanan undertook to forward the said documents to her superior. Respondents entered a special appearance through Atty. Generosa Jacinto (Atty. Jacinto) alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The trial court agreed that the summons was not served in accordance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering such service defective. Thus, it ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the respondents. In the Sheriff's Return, Sheriff Muriel certified that he served the summons on Expressions at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a certain Amee Ochotorina (Ochotorina), a person of suitable age and discretion, who introduced herself as one of the secretaries of Bon Huan. Sheriff Muriel added that Ochotorina assured him that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan. He added that he had insisted that the summons be received personally by Bon Huan, but Ochotorina refused and told him that Bon Huan was then attending to some business matters. The respondents alleged that the second service of the summons was still defective because Ochotorina did not work for nor was connected with the office of the president of Expressions, and that she was neither its president, Page 34 of 56

managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, nor its inhouse counsel. The trial court was convinced that there was sufficient compliance with the rules on service of summons to a juridical entity considering that the summons was received by the assistant/secretary of the president.

summons personally only once. Clearly, the efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to establish that it was impossible to personally serve the summons promptly. Further, Sheriff Muriel failed to cite reasons why personal service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina told him that Bon Huan was then attending to business matters, and that he was assured that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan.

The RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that Interlink was able to prove its claims against Expressions and Bon Huan.

RULE 14: SUMMONS (SECS. 15 – 20)

Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA annulled the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that the second service of summons was still defective, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents, thus rendering the RTC decision void.

253.) NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, petitioner, vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondent. G.R. No. 175799 November 28, 2011

Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the trial acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents HELD: NO. No valid service of summons. There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to its managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is further undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made upon Ochotorina, who was merely one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over Expressions. Even assuming arguendo that the second service of summons may be treated as a substituted service upon Bon Huan as the president of Expressions, the same did not have the effect of giving the trial court jurisdiction over the respondents. It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was not shown. The sheriffs return reveals that Sheriff Muriel attempted to serve the second

FACTS: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondent’s motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; the Complaint failed to state a cause of action; respondent does not have any against petitioner; and other grounds. The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss providing that there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during the trial. Petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss. Page 35 of 56

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.Hence, petitioner filed the present petition assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: WON there is proper service of summons based on Rule 14, Section 15 HELD: NO. Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Proceeding from this enumeration, we held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, 530 SCRA 170 (2007), that: Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be converted to one quasi in rem.

254.) Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, 554 SCRA 513, G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008 FACTS Petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquezs grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquezs mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons. Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons. In 2000, the court issued an alias summons in Taguig, Metro Manila upon petitioners motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on Vasquezs caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriffs return incorrectly stated Lazaro as Vasquezs surname. Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer. On petitioners motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new address. Trial court ruled in favour of Dolores. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was defective as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect personal service. Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had left as overseas seafarer when the sheriff served the summons in Taguig. Noting that Vasquezs seamans book indicated that he left the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000, they criticize the appellate court for anchoring its rulings on mere technicality.

Page 36 of 56

Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons should have been personal or by publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the country. Vasquez also added that the sheriffs return did not state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the summons ISSUE: WON there was valid substituted service of summons. HELD:

conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly prejudice petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service had Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he questioned the validity of service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to question the court’s jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.

YES. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.—When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section

255.) Cariaga, Jr. vs. Malaya, 143 SCRA 441, No. L-48375 August 13, 1986

Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968) offers a rational and logical solution of the issue. We held in said case that the normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service because personal service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in personam therein

Defendants, who are residents of the Philippines filed a motion to set aside the said summons and to declare the service of summons abroad by registered mail as null and void, it being allegedly irregular and unauthorized under the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court (Annex D ") to which motion plaintiffs filed their opposition. The court however ruled that there was substantial compliance with Rule 14.

FACTS: Plaintiffs (private respondents herein) Ana Almonte Cariaga Soon filed in her behalf and in behalf of her minor daughter Carolina, an action for (1) Annulment of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property, (2) Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3) Recovery of Real Property with damages, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna, Branch IV. All defendants in said action filed their answer with counterclaim with the exception of defendants (petitioners herein) Jose C. Cariaga Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-Celis who were both residing abroad and were not served with summons. The lower court upon motion of plaintiffs granted them leave to effect extra-territorial service of summons upon said defendants pursuant to Secs. 7, 17 and 18 of Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court. (Annex "A", P. 9, Record). Accordingly, summons with copies of the complaint were served to the defendants by registered mail abroad (Guam and U.S.A.) by the Clerk of Court at the instance of plaintiffs (Annex "B" and "C").

The letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final sheriff’s return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not Page 37 of 56

Defendants (petitioner herein), residing abroad, by special appearance and thru counsel filed their motion to consider the service of summons upon, them by registered mail as null and void. However such motion was denied. ISSUE: Whether the service of summons by registered mail upon defendants in the case at bar is one which is contemplated within the principles laid down in the provisions of Secs. 17, 7 and 22, Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court . HELD: YES .Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any Interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when defendant nonresident’s property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court). In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known-address of the defendant; and (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. The third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially complied with in this case. There is no question that the requirement of due process has been met as shown by the fact that defendants actually received the summonses and copies of the complaint and as evidenced by, the Registry Return Cards marked as Annex A-1 (page 56-Record) and Annex B-1. Whatever defect there may have been in the service of summons was aptly corrected by the court a quo in its assailed order dated January 16, 1978, which gave said defendants ninety (90) days from receipt of order within which to file their responsive pleadings. Defendants have no reason to complain that they were unaware of the action filed against them or claim that they were denied due process. 256) Romualdez-Licaros vs. Licaros, 401 SCRA 762, G.R. No. 150656 April 29, 2003

FACTS Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married on December 15, 1968. Out of this marital union were born Maria Concepcion and Abelardo, Jr. Ironically, marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board. In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2) children. In the United States, on April 26, 1989, Margarita applied for divorce before the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo where she manifested that she does not desire counseling at that time. On August 6, 1990, Margarita was granted the decree of divorce together with a distribution of properties between her and Abelardo. Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of Properties. This was followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. A decision was issued granting the petition and approving the separation of property agreement. Abelardo commenced for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita was then residing in U.S.A. Abelardo initially moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo Abelardo was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.The marriage between Abelardo and Margarita was declared null and void. Almost nine (9) years later, Margarita received a letter informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name Licaros inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner went to SC. ISSUE: Page 38 of 56

Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo HELD: YES. As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term “personal status” includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife. The Process Server’s Return of 15 July 1991 shows the summons addressed to Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Server’s certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. Before proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that “compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e) (sic) been duly established.” We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14. 257.) Busuego vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 376, No. L-48955 June 30, 1987

FACTS: Petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced an action before the Pasig Court of First Instance against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez to recover possession of a parcel of land and a three (3) unit apartment house standing thereon in Rizal. Immediately thereafter, summons was issued in the name of the four defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally served at the address given in the complaint, upon the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, personally." Defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an extension of fifteen (15) days to file answer which was granted. Defendants again through Atty. Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10) days to answer, as "[Atty. Roldan] has not yet conferred with all of [the four (4) defendants] which [was] necessary before any responsive pleading [could be] filed by him." Notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed by the defendants, for which reason, and upon motion of plaintiff Busuego, the lower court declared the defendants in default . Subsequently, plaintiff's case was heard and his evidence received, and on the basis of that evidence the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. Almost two years later, plaintiff filed before the lower court an ex parte motion for execution of the default judgment, which the lower court granted. Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a respondent herein, "on his [own] behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension of 30 days, within which to vacate the premises [be allowed] to give them sufficient time to look for another place where the five families composed mostly of little children, can reside. The lower court granted Romeo's motion and accordingly, the execution of the default judgment was held in abeyance. The defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default and/or to dissolve the writ of execution, solely on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel were ever furnished a copy of the judgment by default. The lower court denied Page 39 of 56

the motion, finding the above-motion to be purely dilatory in nature and plain harassment on the part of the defendants. The respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with the same court an omnibus motion, which included a motion to lift the order of default, a second motion for reconsideration and a motion to quash the writ of execution issued pursuant to the default judgment, alleging for the first time that their failure to answer was due to lack of notice. Petitioner opposed vigorously the above motion contending that, the defendants could not pretend absence of proper notice after they, through counsel, had filed the two motions for extension of time to answer. The lower court denied the omnibus motion, holding the motion for extension of time to vacate filed by respondent Romeo Lazaro for all the defendants to be equivalent to waiver of service of summons. Defendants, through their new counsel, filed what in effect was a third motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default, alleging that: the lower court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of lack of proper service of summons. The third motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants brought a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, asserting that the orders, judgment and writs complained of were all void for want of jurisdiction over their persons. ISSUE: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the persons. HELD: YES. Basically, there are two (2) ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent: (a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in court and his submission to its authority. With respect to service of summons, the Revised Rules of Court prescribe that a copy of the summons be served personally upon the defendant by “handing him a copy thereof in person or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.” Personal service, however, may be dispensed with and substituted service may be availed of if the defendant cannot be served personally “within a reasonable time.” It the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in seeking to serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof “through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally.” Perusal, however, of the

sheriff’s return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other defendants personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the sheriff’s return is essential for enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules of Court that substituted service may be resorted to only where it is not possible to serve the defendant or defendants promptly in person. As this Court ruled in Keister vs. Navarro, “[T]he impossibility of prompt service in person should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service—. As earlier noted, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can also be acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, for voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. As long ago as 1918, the essence of voluntary appearance was explained by this Court through Mr. Justice Johnson in Flores vs. Zurbito, as follows: “A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over this person. When the appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. x x x” In the case before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of times without raising any objection to the improper service of summons: (1) the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court and filed two successive motions for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint; (2) more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by the trial court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, filed a motion for Page 40 of 56

extension of time within which to vacate the premises involved and to look for another place to live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court over the persons of the defendants; and (3) the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court and for dissolution of the writ of execution, again without contesting the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. We hold that by anyone or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole series of acts, the defendants, respondents herein, effectively waived the initial lack of jurisdiction over their persons and submitted to the authority of the trial court. 258.) ALBERTO G. PINLAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 91486. January 19, 2001 FACTS: Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successorsin-interest. They filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC of Quezon City, claiming that they have acquired the forest land with 502 hectares through prescription and that they have filed applications for land titling in their respective names with the appropriate government agency. While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the public domain, they named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject property. One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). Since personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons by publication which was granted. Accordingly, the summons was published in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a periodical edited and published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan. Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the defaulted respondents. The court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners. Court declared petitioners as absolute owners of the aforesaid lots by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to the nondefaulted respondents. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners of the

subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgment was null and void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, for the reasons that they were never made parties, nor were their lots described in the complaint, published summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was VIL-MA, a totally separate and independent entity which had already ceased to exist way back in January of 1976. Moreover, the summons, as well as the Partial Decision was not published in a newspaper or periodical of general circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did not place the individual lot owners under the trial court’s jurisdiction, nor are they bound by the adverse judgment. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition and annulling the Partial Decision in Civil Case based on its finding that the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has acquired jurisdiction over respondent Vil-ma Maloles subdivision by the publication of the summons and so the partial decision was legal, valid and proper. RULING: We find no merit in the instant petition. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision is null and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the latter were not duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. The summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited and published in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the publication in said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan Newsweek, to be invalid because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree No. 1079, Section 1. Petitioners, however, contend that the service of summons by publication was legal and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of Court. The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders of the trial court. Page 41 of 56

While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules strictly require that publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order. The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective. Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical personality. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 259.) REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION VS. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204796, February 04, 2015 FACTS: Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Reicon and respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) entered into a Contract of Lease, whereby Reicon leased the subject property to Diamond for a period of 20 years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011. In turn, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee Foods

Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises (Maybunga), represented by its proprietor, Andrew D. Palangdao (Andrew). Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks it had issued by way of payments were all dishonored upon presentment. This prompted Reicon to demand the payment of the accrued rentals and terminate the contract. Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions of the subject property they respectively occupy. Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, alleging that the contract did not provide for its unilateral termination by either of the parties. As such, Diamond prayed that the unilateral termination of contract effected by Reicon, as well as the separate contracts of lease it entered into with Jollibee and Maybunga, be declared invalid and illegal. Further, it sought the award of unpaid rentals from Jollibee and Maybunga, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. By way of special appearance, Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons was not served upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required by the Rules of Court, but upon a certain Fernando Noyvo, a houseboy/gardener, at a residence located at Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, which is not the principal office of Reicon. Opposing Reicon’s motion to dismiss, Diamond argued that, even assuming that summons was not properly served upon Reicon, improper service is not a ground to dismiss its complaint. RTC denied Reicon’s motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of summons is not among the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules allowing for the dismissal of a complaint. Reicon moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon Presiding Judge of the RTC in not dismissing Diamond’s complaint. In a Resolution, the CA required Reicon to show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond. It appears that the CA’s earlier Resolution addressed to Diamond was returned to it, with the notation “RTS-Moved Out.” In its Compliance, Reicon stated that Diamond has not submitted any paper or Page 42 of 56

pleading notifying the RTC of any change in its address. As such, Reicon maintained that the service of its petition to Diamond’s address as aboveindicated should be deemed effective. In the alternative, it proffered that Diamond may be served through its counsel of record at the latter’s office address. Diamond filed a manifestation, under a special appearance, averring that Reicon’s petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failure to serve a copy thereof on its counsel of record. It cited the rule that when a party is represented by counsel, notice of proceedings must be served upon said counsel to constitute valid service. The CA dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition based on the following grounds: (a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. Reicon’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly served upon the person of Diamond. RULING: The petition is meritorious. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally filed before the CA, provide as follows: SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. – The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the

respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or filing of the person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicon’s certiorari petition had been served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its address at “Suite 305 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, in compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted. On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel. The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply. Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition outright for non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case. On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had Page 43 of 56

consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules provides: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. — The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e., the Resolution dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was returned with the notation “RTS-Moved Out,” the alternative mode of Diamond’s voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over its person. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1)

Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.” WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 21, 2012 and November 21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the CA is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845 under the parameters discussed in this Decision. SO ORDERED. RULE 15: MOTIONS 260.) JOSE DELOS REYES VS. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI G.R. No. 169135, June 18, 2010 Petition: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals

The trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 24858 in favor of respondent Josephine Anne B. Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Then, Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 480537 (subject property) during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was executed in her favor on even date. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court. Subsequently, the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. 480537. Respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial courts’ decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription. The trial court granted respondent’s the motion on the ground that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner thereafter sought review via certiorari before the CA. The CA denied the petition. The CA noted that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion, hence, the three-day notice rule does not apply. Further, it agreed with the trial court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. Issue: Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion. Petitioner’s Arguments: Petitioner contends that the motion filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a notice of hearing. Respondent’s Arguments: Respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and that petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be heard by the trial court. Ruling:

Facts: Page 44 of 56

The petition lacks merit. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right.

did not toll the running of the period of appeal, which rendered the decision final.

The CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/ Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot, therefore, validly claim that he was denied his day in court.

The RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failure to appeal within the 15 days reglementary period and declaring the 22 January 2004 Decision as final and executory. The RTC ruled that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day notice rule. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed by the RTC. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 13, 2005 Decision and August 3, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87972 are AFFIRMED. 261.) FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR. VS. MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010 Petition: petition for review FACTS:

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The CA held that the three-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma. As found by the RTC, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 February 2004 was received by respondent only on 3 March 2004, or six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that all violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 which render the purpose of the notice of hearing of the motion nugatory are deemed fatal. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE:

Petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. filed with the MTC of Batangas a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the disputed land. Respondent appealed to the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas. The RTC, in its Decision dated 22 January 2004, reversed the MTC decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was set for hearing on 26 February 2004. Petitioner sent a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration to respondents counsel by registered mail on 23 February 2004. During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004. Meanwhile, it was only on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, that respondent’s counsel received a copy of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May 2004 and was further reset to 6 August 2004. After the hearing, respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss, claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule

Whether petitioner had violated the three-day notice rule RULING: We find the petition meritorious. In upholding the RTC Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals relied mainly on petitioners alleged violation of the notice requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which read: SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner Page 45 of 56

as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioners Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.

Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one day short of the prescribed minimum three days notice. We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioners Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondents receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days notice. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22 November 2005 and the Resolution dated 3 March 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89621. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas to resolve petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion on the merits. 262.) PURITA DE LA PEÑA, JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RTC-Br. 2, Balanga, Bataan vs. PEDRO R. DE LA PEÑA, BENJAMIN P. BRIONES G.R. No. 116693 July 5, 1996 FACTS: A Complaint was filed against petitioner in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, seeking (a) the annulment of the deed of sale and deed of extrajudicial partition executed between Fortunata de la Peña and Purita de la Peña, (b) the partition of the estates of Fortunata de la Peña and Gavina de la Peña, and (c) the award in their favor of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of the suit. Petitioner Purita de la Peña filed her Answer with Counterclaim. Subsequently, the parties entered into partial compromise agreements where they agreed to Page 46 of 56

settle their respective claims. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig dismissed the complaints for annulment of the deeds of sale and extrajudicial partition, partition of the estates of Gavina and Fortunata de la Peña, and the counterclaim of Purita de la Peña for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement.2 Respondents herein as plaintiffs before the trial court received copy of the aforesaid decision on 2 July 1993. On 15 July 1993, plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration which is now being assailed as pro forma since it did not contain a notice of hearing. Judge Baclig denied the motion for reconsideration as he found no cogent and compelling reason to warrant the reversal or modification of the decision sought to be reconsidered. Consequently, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal. On the other hand, petitioner herein as defendant in the court below filed a Motion for Execution contending that the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiffs did not toll the running of the prescriptive period as it failed to contain a notice of hearing hence pro forma.

of the decision was received on 2 July 1993. Consequently, respondents had until 17 July 1993 within which to file their notice of appeal. Since they filed their Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal on 20 August 1993 or 49 days after receipt of the decision, the appeal was clearly filed out of time. On that date the decision of the court a quo already attained finality 34 days earlier, hence, could no longer be reviewed much less modified on appeal. The filing of the Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal was a futile exercise. There was no longer any period to appeal nor a decision that could still be appealed. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 25 May 1994 and 29 July 1994 are SET ASIDE and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court declaring the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent as pro forma is REINSTATED. Consequently, the judgment dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim has acquired FINALITY. SO ORDERED.

Judge Baclig issued another Order 5 denying the motion for extension to file an appeal and ruled that plaintiffs' period to appeal had already lapsed as it was not tolled by the motion for reconsideration earlier filed, the latter being pro forma for lack of a notice of hearing. As regards defendant's motion for execution, the court a quo found no necessity to issue a writ considering its earlier ruling dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's counterclaim.

263.) Manacop vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104875.November 13, 1992 PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED FACTS

The Court of Appeals held null and void the order of the trial court declaring private respondents' motion for reconsideration pro forma. Petitioner moved to reconsider. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and reiterated its ruling that the motion for reconsideration was not a mere scrap of paper so that the notice of appeal was timely filed; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner was the president of the Manacop Construction Corp. Manacop Corp was first impleaded in the original complaint for sum of money filed by respondent Cruz Inc. Respondent Cruz Inc amended the complaint to drop Manacop Corp, and implead petitioner Manacop in his personal capacity instead. The trial court ruled in favor of Cruz Inc and a writ of preliminary attachment was issued.

RULING:

To the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner interposed an Omnibus Motion grounded on the following: 1) the issuance of the writ was irregular, there being no affidavit therefor; 2) the feasibility of utilizing the writ prior to his substitution as party defendant; 3) his family home is exempted from attachment under Family Code. The motion was denied.

No. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any notice of hearing. It was therefore pro forma, hence it did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The copy

In the CA, the petitioner propounded additional defense. He should not have been made liable as his personality is separate and distinct from his corporation. The CA ruled in favor of respondent Cruz Inc.

ISSUE: Whether motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs suspend the running of the prescriptive period

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ISSUE Whether the additional defense must be accepted despite the filing of an Omnibus Motion of which it was not included. RULING Short Answer No. An Omnibus Motion must include all available defenses and those not excluded are deemed waived. Long Answer Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have pierced the veil of corporate fiction because he is distinct from the personality of his corporation and, therefore, the writ of attachment issued against the corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in custodia legis. This puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law adverted to and employed in exculpation by petitioner, during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the appellate court and even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for such subtle experiment is proscribed by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus: “A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.” The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant to raise all available exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so that multiple and piece-meal objections may be avoided. 264.) Azajar vs. Court of Appeals No. L-40945. November 10, 1986 PETITION to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals appealed from, are affirmed FACTS Azajar, herein petitioner, ordered 100 kegs of nails from Samco, herein private respondent. The consideration was fully paid but Samco only delivered a portion of the order.

In the case before the CFI, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state cause of action, and improper venue. The motion was accompanied by a notice of hearing however, instead of directing to the parties, the same was directed to the clerk of court. In view thereof, and upon the instance of the petitioner, Samco was declared in default, as the motion to dismiss failed to toll the period for filing answer, it being defective. The CFI ruled the case in favor of respondent petitioner Azajar. In the CA, on MR, case was ruled in favor of Samco. The CA held that the notice of the hearing was a substantial compliance with the rules. Hence, this present petition. ISSUE Whether failure to strictly comply with the notice of hearing is fatal. RULING Short Answer No. First, the notice of hearing, while defective for failure to direct to the parties, constitutes substantial compliance. Second, in consideration of the grounds for the motion to dismiss, which are failure to state cause of action and improper venue, it is plausible that there be no hearing at all. Third, cases should be determined on the merits. Long Answer It was wrong, of course, for Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a motion shall be served by the appellant to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. The uniform holding of this Court has been that a failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion, as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for resolution. Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads however that under the circumstances the error be not regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as constituting excusable negligence, warranting relief. It argues that legal and logical considerations, which it took to be tenable, caused it to theorize that a Page 48 of 56

hearing on the motion was dispensable. It also adverts to its possession of affirmative defenses in addition to those set out in its motion to dismiss which, if ventilated and established at the trial, would absolve it from all liability under the complaint.

subsequently justify on the ground that said motion did not contain the requisite notice of hearing. The respondent was however able to file the memorandum within the extended period prayed for. RTC nonetheless dismissed the appeal.

These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movant’s duty to give notice to the adverse party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose of said notice being, as already stressed, not only to give the latter time to oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its submission for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the Court.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA ruled in favor of respondent and remanded the case to the RTC. Hence this present petition.

Withal, the reasons for Cham Samco’s erroneous notion of the dispensability of a hearing on its motion to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the Intermediate Appellate Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Samco has meritorious defenses which if proven would defeat Azajar’s claim against it, and the eminent desirability more than once stressed by this Court that cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections, all conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that “the ends of justice would be better served in this case if we brush aside technicality and afford the petitioner its day in court” 265.) Sarmiento vs. Zaratan G.R. No. 167471. February 5, 2007 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit FACTS: Petitioner Sarmiento filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent Zaratan. MTC ruled in favor of petitioner Sarmiento. Respondent appealed the decision with the RTC. Respondent also filed a motion for extension of time for the filing of the memorandum for a period of 5 days on the ground that the counsel was sick, lack of staff, and flooding in the office occasioned by a storm. The motion was not acted by the RTC which it will

ISSUE: Short Answer Whether the inaction by the RTC upon the motion for extension was proper on the ground that the motion did not contain a notice of hearing. RULING: No. The motion for extension of time is an ex parte motion which does not prejudice the substantive right of the opposing party. As such, the failure to comply with the requisite notice of hearing is not fatal. Long Answer “SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion.—Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.” As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. As a general rule, notice of hearing is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. Page 49 of 56

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question. Further, it has been held that a “motion for extension of time is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.” It has been said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion 266.) ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 165952. July 28, 2008 PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit. FACTS A huge tract of land was subdivided into 39 lots, 22 of which belonged to petitioner Aneco, and 17 to Landex. The issue arose when Landex started building a fence on 1 of its lots. Petitioner Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC, which ruled in its favor. Landex moved for reconsideration, but the motion did not contain the

requisite notice of hearing. Realizing its fault, respondent Landex filed another motion, this time to set the hearing for its motion for reconsideration. The hearing was set but Aneco failed to attend. RTC eventually granted the reconsideration and dismissed the case filed by Aneco. The CA affirmed RTC. Hence this present petition. ISSUE Whether the subsequent motion to set hearing cures the defect in a prior motion filed without the requisite notice of hearing. RULING Short Answer Yes. The purpose of the requisite notice of hearing is to give the opposing party the opportunity to oppose the motion. The same purpose was achieved by the subsequent motion to set the hearing of the defective motion, therefore, it cannot be said that there was deprivation of due process. Long Answer It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is within the court’s sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied. We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for reconsideration but Aneco’s counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration. Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was Page 50 of 56

afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the CA correctly ignored the procedural defect. 267.) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION and BERLITA DEANG G.R. No. 177931. December 8, 2008 PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED FACTS Respondents filed a complaint for reformation of contract and specific performance against petitioner PNB. In the RTC, 25 days after summons was served upon the petitioner, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioner PNB in default. On the same date, the petitioner filed a motion for extension, which the RTC granted. The motion to declare default was denied by the RTC. Respondents then via certiorari went to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of respondents and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA found that the filing of the motion for extension was laden with procedural irregularities: 1. 2.

The Motion for Extension was served and filed via LBC, a private courier, a mode which is not recognized by the rules. The Motion was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period of 15 days from service of summons.

Long Answer It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. The court’s discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such motion’s timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend. More. Petitioner served and filed the Motion for Extension through a private courier, LBC, a mode not recognized by the rules. Explanation for availing such mode was not stated in the Motion. The mode was, nonetheless, clearly unjustifiable, considering that (a) petitioner’s handling counsel was based in nearby location; (b) postal registry service is, for lack of explanation to the contrary, available in the city; (c) urgency is out of the equation because the official date of filing done via private messengerial service is the date of actual receipt of the court, and had the motion been personally filed the following day, it would have reached the court earlier. It thus shows that the mode was utilized to obscure any indication that the motion was filed out of time. In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious. Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.

Hence, this present petition. ISSUE

268.) CESAR V. AREZA and LOLITA B. AREZA Vs. EXPRESS SAVINGS BANK, INC. and MICHAEL POTENCIANO

Whether a motion for extension filed after the lapse of the period sought to be extended may be granted.

FACTS:

RULING Short Answer No. First, once the period has already lapsed, the court becomes powerless to extend the same. Second, rules pertaining to periods are construed strictly. No compelling reason was given for the belated filing of the answer. Third, filing and service via a private courier is not recognized by law. The petitioner did not provide explanation for its conduct.

Petitioners Cesar V. Areza and LolitaB. Areza maintained two bank deposits with respondent Express Savings Bank’s Biñan branch: 1) Savings Account No. 004-01-000185-5 and 2) Special Savings Account No. 004-02-000092-3. They were engaged in the business of "buy and sell" of brand new and secondhand motor vehicles. On 2 May 2000, they received an order from a certain Gerry Mambuay (Mambuay) for the purchase of a second-hand Mitsubishi Pajero and a brand-new Honda CRV. Page 51 of 56

The buyer, Mambuay, paid petitioners with nine (9) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) checks payable to different payees and drawn against the Philippine Veterans Bank (drawee), each valued at Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) for a total of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,800,000.00). About this occasion, petitioners claimed that Michael Potenciano (Potenciano), the branch manager of respondent Express Savings Bank (the Bank) was present during the transaction and immediately offered the services of the Bank for the processing and eventual crediting of the said checks to petitioners’ account.4 On the other hand,Potenciano countered that he was prevailed upon to accept the checks by way of accommodation of petitioners who were valued clients of the Bank.5 On 3 May 2000, petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account with the Bank. The Bank, inturn, deposited the checks with its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank, in Biñan,Laguna. Equitable-PCI Bank presented the checks to the drawee, the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks. On 6 May 2000, Potenciano informedpetitioners that the checks they deposited with the Bank werehonored. He allegedly warned petitioners that the clearing of the checks pertained only to the availability of funds and did not mean that the checks were not infirmed.6 Thus, the entire amount of ₱1,800,000.00 was credited to petitioners’ savings account. Based on this information, petitioners released the two cars to the buyer. Sometime in July 2000, the subjectchecks were returned by PVAO to the drawee on the ground that the amount on the face of the checks was altered from the original amount of ₱4,000.00 to ₱200,000.00. The drawee returned the checks to Equitable-PCI Bank by way of Special Clearing Receipts. In August 2000, the Bank was informed by Equitable-PCI Bank that the drawee dishonored the checks onthe ground of material alterations. Equitable-PCI Bank initially filed a protest with the Philippine Clearing House. In February 2001, the latter ruled in favor of the drawee Philippine Veterans Bank. Equitable-PCI Bank, in turn, debited the deposit account of the Bank in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. The Bank insisted that they informed petitioners of said development in August 2000 by furnishing them copies of the documents given by its depositary bank.7 On the other hand, petitioners maintained that the Bank never informed them of these developments.

On 9 March 2001, petitioners issued a check in the amount of ₱500,000.00. Said check was dishonored by the Bank for the reason "Deposit Under Hold." According topetitioners, the Bank unilaterally and unlawfully put their account with the Bank on hold. On 22 March 2001, petitioners’ counsel sent a demand letter asking the Bank to honor their check. The Bank refused to heed their request and instead, closed the Special Savings Account of the petitioners with a balance of ₱1,179,659.69 and transferred said amount to their savings account. The Bank then withdrew the amount of ₱1,800,000.00representing the returned checks from petitioners’ savings account. Acting on the alleged arbitrary and groundless dishonoring of their checks and the unlawful and unilateral withdrawal from their savings account, petitioners filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against the Bank and Potenciano with the RTC of Calamba. On 15 January 2004, the RTC, through Judge Antonio S. Pozas, ruled in favor of petitioners. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioners filed a motion for execution from the Decision of the RTC on the ground that respondents’ motion for reconsideration did not conform with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court; hence, it was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the running of the period to appeal. On 22 April 2004, the RTC, through Pairing Judge Romeo C. De Leon granted the motion for reconsideration, set aside the Pozas Decision, and dismissed the complaint. The trial court awarded respondents their counterclaim of moral and exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 each. The trial court first applied the principle of liberality when it disregarded the alleged absence of a notice of hearing in respondents’ motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted the award of damages. Any argument as to the notice of hearing has been resolved when the pairing judge issued the order on February 24, 2004 setting the hearing on March 26, 2004. A perusal of the notice of hearing shows that request was addressed to the Clerk of Court and plaintiffs’ counsel for hearing to be set on March 26, 2004.

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CA agrees with appellants that they should not pay moral and exemplary damages to each of the appellees for lack of basis. The appellants were not shown to have acted in bad faith. Petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari arising both procedural and substantive issues. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in in upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion for Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 ofthe Rules on Civil Procedure RULING: NO. Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states: Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the adverse party as the rules require. Petitioners add that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from the date of filing. As held in Maturan v. Araula, the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the adverse party has beensubstantially complied with when a copy of the motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party, coupled with the fact that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as prayed for, issued an order setting the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004. We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing Rule if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party. 269.) G.R. No. 176697 September 10, 2014 CESAR V. AREZA and LOLITA B. AREZA, Petitioners, vs. EXPRESS SAVINGS BANK, INC. and MICHAEL POTENCIANO, Respondents. FACTS:

Petitioners Cesar V. Areza and LolitaB. Areza maintained two bank deposits with respondent Express Savings Bank’s Biñan branch: 1) Savings Account No. 004-01-000185-5 and 2) Special Savings Account No. 004-02-000092-3. They were engaged in the business of "buy and sell" of brand new and secondhand motor vehicles. On 2 May 2000, they received an order from a certain Gerry Mambuay (Mambuay) for the purchase of a second-hand Mitsubishi Pajero and a brand-new Honda CRV. The buyer, Mambuay, paid petitioners with nine (9) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) checks payable to different payees and drawn against the Philippine Veterans Bank (drawee), each valued at Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) for a total of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,800,000.00). About this occasion, petitioners claimed that Michael Potenciano (Potenciano), the branch manager of respondent Express Savings Bank (the Bank) was present during the transaction and immediately offered the services of the Bank for the processing and eventual crediting of the said checks to petitioners’ account.4 On the other hand,Potenciano countered that he was prevailed upon to accept the checks by way of accommodation of petitioners who were valued clients of the Bank.5 On 3 May 2000, petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account with the Bank. The Bank, inturn, deposited the checks with its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank, in Biñan,Laguna. Equitable-PCI Bank presented the checks to the drawee, the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks. On 6 May 2000, Potenciano informedpetitioners that the checks they deposited with the Bank werehonored. He allegedly warned petitioners that the clearing of the checks pertained only to the availability of funds and did not mean that the checks were not infirmed.6 Thus, the entire amount of ₱1,800,000.00 was credited to petitioners’ savings account. Based on this information, petitioners released the two cars to the buyer. Sometime in July 2000, the subjectchecks were returned by PVAO to the drawee on the ground that the amount on the face of the checks was altered from the original amount of ₱4,000.00 to ₱200,000.00. The drawee returned the checks to Equitable-PCI Bank by way of Special Clearing Receipts. In August 2000, the Bank was informed by Equitable-PCI Bank that the drawee dishonored the checks onthe ground of material alterations. Equitable-PCI Bank initially filed a Page 53 of 56

protest with the Philippine Clearing House. In February 2001, the latter ruled in favor of the drawee Philippine Veterans Bank. Equitable-PCI Bank, in turn, debited the deposit account of the Bank in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. The Bank insisted that they informed petitioners of said development in August 2000 by furnishing them copies of the documents given by its depositary bank.7 On the other hand, petitioners maintained that the Bank never informed them of these developments. On 9 March 2001, petitioners issued a check in the amount of ₱500,000.00. Said check was dishonored by the Bank for the reason "Deposit Under Hold." According topetitioners, the Bank unilaterally and unlawfully put their account with the Bank on hold. On 22 March 2001, petitioners’ counsel sent a demand letter asking the Bank to honor their check. The Bank refused to heed their request and instead, closed the Special Savings Account of the petitioners with a balance of ₱1,179,659.69 and transferred said amount to their savings account. The Bank then withdrew the amount of ₱1,800,000.00representing the returned checks from petitioners’ savings account. Acting on the alleged arbitrary and groundless dishonoring of their checks and the unlawful and unilateral withdrawal from their savings account, petitioners filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against the Bank and Potenciano with the RTC of Calamba. On 15 January 2004, the RTC, through Judge Antonio S. Pozas, ruled in favor of petitioners. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioners filed a motion for execution from the Decision of the RTC on the ground that respondents’ motion for reconsideration did not conform with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court; hence, it was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the running of the period to appeal. On 22 April 2004, the RTC, through Pairing Judge Romeo C. De Leon granted the motion for reconsideration, set aside the Pozas Decision, and dismissed the complaint. The trial court awarded respondents their counterclaim of moral and exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 each. The trial court first applied the principle of liberality when it disregarded the alleged absence of a notice of hearing in respondents’ motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted the award of damages.

Any argument as to the notice of hearing has been resolved when the pairing judge issued the order on February 24, 2004 setting the hearing on March 26, 2004. A perusal of the notice of hearing shows that request was addressed to the Clerk of Court and plaintiffs’ counsel for hearing to be set on March 26, 2004. CA agrees with appellants that they should not pay moral and exemplary damages to each of the appellees for lack of basis. The appellants were not shown to have acted in bad faith. Petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari arising both procedural and substantive issues. Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in in upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion for Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 ofthe Rules on Civil Procedure Ruling: NO. Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states: Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the adverse party as the rules require. Petitioners add that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from the date of filing. As held in Maturan v. Araula, the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the adverse party has beensubstantially complied with when a copy of the motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party, coupled with the fact that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as prayed for, issued an order setting the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004. Page 54 of 56

We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing Rule if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party. 270.) MICROSOFT CORPORATION and ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED Vs. SAMIR FARAJALLAH, VIRGILIO D.C. HERCE, RACHEL P. FOLLOSCO, JESUSITO G. MORALLOS, and MA. GERALDINE S. GARCIA (directors and officers of NEW FIELDS (ASIA PACIFIC), INC.), G.R. No. 205800; September 10, 2014 Respondents.

reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe software products." An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC. Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913 were issued on the same date. The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software.

FACTS: Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia (respondents) are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower, PhilippineStock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

On 6 June 2010, New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two warrants served (Search Warrant No. 10-15912).11 The motion was received by petitioners on 10 June 2010 and was set for hearing on 11 June 2010. During the hearing on the motion, petitioners were allowed by the RTC to file their Comment/Opposition on or before 21 June 2010. In their Comment/Opposition dated 21 June 2010,13 petitioners alleged that:

Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc.(OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software.5 On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The case was assigned to Police Senior Inspector Ernesto V. Padilla (Padilla).6 On 26 March 2010, Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of respondents. Using a legitimate business pretext, they were able to use two computers owned by New Fields and obtained the following information regarding the installed Microsoft and Adobe software. Padilla was trained to distinguish original from counterfeit software,7 and he saw the screens of the computers used by the OSI staff, including the product I.D. Nos. of the installed software. After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then issued certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to "copy, print,

The Motion [to Quash] failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day notice rule under the Rules of Court. Hence it is nothing but a worthless piece of paper. In this case, the Motion of Respondents was scheduled for hearing on 11 June 2010. However, Respondents only furnished [petitioners] a copy of the Motion on 10 June 2010, or just1 day before the scheduled hearing, which was in clear violation of the 3-day notice rule. On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that "allthe items seized from the respondents be returned x x x." According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified which specific computer had the pirated software. The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet, despite the fact that the seized items have been in petitioners’ possession for several weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the petitioners’ contention that the threeday notice rule was not complied with because petitioners were already notified of the motion personally. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari26 under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Quash despite: (1) respondents’ failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2) the existence of probable cause, and personal knowledge of the warrant applicant. Page 55 of 56

The CA denied the petition for certiorari. It ruled that when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it grant the motion to quash when respondent’s failed to comply with the three day notice requirement. RULING: NO. SC ruled that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case. However, it sustain petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both warrants. In Anama v. Court of Appeals,29 we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the ruleis to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed with. As correctly pointed out by the CA: In the instant case, when the court a quoordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.

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