Compilation Of Cases - Rule 59 Receivership.docx

Provisional Remedies by Atty. Joel Famador

COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 Cases 6. BA FINANCE CORPORATION, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO M. REYES, G.R. No. 102998. July 5, 1996

5. FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. CA and SPOUSES TADIAMA, [G.R. No. 115902. September 27, 1995.]

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WON employees of plaintiff may seize the property (NO) WON it is only the owner who can institute an action for Replevin. (NO)

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RULING

Spouses Tadiama purchased a 10 wheeler truck. They executed a PN and a chattel mortgage over the motor vehicle purchased to secure the PN Spouses defaulted and the petitioner filed an action for Replevin and damages The Replevin was issued and the truck was seized by men who turned out to be employees of petitioner The spouses filed a counter bond but the property was not returned. The representatives of FILINVEST said their Insurance was one that is black listed and they had to wait for their lawyer to tell them it was ok to return They went to the warehouse of FILINVEST with the representatives, the property custodian and the security guard of the FILINVEST garage Instead the spouses and their lawyer was sent on a goose case for the truck and petitioner would always deny knowing where the truck was. They found the truck in a garage of another company and it was “cannibalized”, meaning stripped for parts. RTC ruled in favor of FILINVEST and ordered sps to pay remaining balance of PN. However, ordering FILINVEST to pay damages to sps for the illegal seizure of property. CA affirmed in toto

AFFIRMED Section 3 and 4 of Rule 60 states that it should be a “public officer” to implement the replevin. In this case, it was not the sheriff or any proper officer of the trial court who implemented it. The petitioner, actually asked the court to appoint a special sheriff. Yet it used its own employees who misrepresented themselves as deputy sheriffs. They insist on Bachrach Motor v Summers which stated that the only restriction of the mortgagee from seizure is that he must act in an orderly manner and without creating a breach of the peace, subjecting himself to an action of Trespass. Where, however, debtor refuses to yield up the property, the creditor must institute an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to the sale contemplated in the provision above quoted. He cannot lawfully take the property by force against the will of the debtor. Upon this point the American authorities are even more harmonious than they are upon the point that the creditor is entitled to possession. As was said many years ago by the writer of this opinion in a monographic article contributed to an encyclopedic legal treatise, "if possession cannot be peaceably obtained the mortgagee must bring an action." (Trust Deeds and Power of Sale Mortgages, 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2d ed., 783.) In the Article of Chattel Mortgages, in Corpus Juris, we nd the following statement of the law on the same point: "The only restriction on the mode by which the mortgagee shall secure possession of the mortgaged property after breach of condition is that he must act in an orderly manner and without creating a

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 breach of the peace, subjecting himself to an action to trespass." (11 C.J., 560; see also 5 R.C.L., 462.) The reason why the law does not allow the creditor to possess himself of the mortgaged property with violence and against the will of the debtor is to be found in the fact that the creditor's right of possession is conditioned upon the fact of default, and the existence of this fact may naturally be the subject of controversy. The debtor, for instance, may claim good faith, and rightly or wrongly, that the debt is paid, or that for some other reason the alleged default is nonexistent. His possession in this situation is as fully entitled to protection as that of any other person, and in the language of Article 446 of the Civil Code he must be respected therein. To allow the creditor to seize the property against the will of the debtor would make the former to a certain extent both judge and executioner in his own cause — a thing which is inadmissible in the absence of unequivocal agreement in the contract itself or express provision to that effect in the statute. Replevin is, of course, the appropriate action to recover possession preliminary to the extrajudicial foreclosure of a chattel mortgage. Filinvest did in fact instituted such an action and obtained a writ of replevin. And, by ling it, Filinvest admitted that it cannot acquire possession of the mortgaged vehicle in an orderly or peaceful manner. Accordingly, it should have left the enforcement of the writ in accordance with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court which it had voluntarily invoked. Parenthetically, it must be observed that the trial court erred in holding that the action for replevin was "not in order as [Filinvest] is not the owner of the property (Sec. 2 par. (a) Rule 60)." 11 It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. A person "entitled to the possession" of the property also can, as provided in the same paragraph.

6. NORTHERN MOTORS, INC, vs. HON. AMEURFINA MELENCIO HERRERA, Judge of CFI, and RALPH R. TAGUB, [G.R. No. L-32674. February 22, 1973.]

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Respondent Taguba executed a PN in favor of Petitioner Upon default, Petitioner filed a complaint against Taguba and attached an Affidavit for Replevin, executed by an officer of Petitioner. RTC DENIED, because an affidavit must be submitted alleging that the plaintiff is the owner or that he is entitled to possession. It ruled that petitioner was not an owner and it is

Reversed, petition GRANTED. There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought, such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the mortgagor or

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 not entitled to its possession merely because the mortgagor has failed to pay the account guaranteed by the mortgage. o MR was filed but same was denied, the court saying that the Petitioner may only file a Replevin only for the purpose of delivering the chattel to the public officer for foreclosure sale o that even if the mortgagee has a right of possession, that right is not unqualified but is subject to the obligation of delivering the possession of the mortgaged chattel to the public officer for foreclosure    

from any person in whose hands he may find them. This is irrespective of whether the mortgage contemplates a summary sale of the property or foreclosure by court action As early as the case of Bachrach Motor Co. v. Summers (42 Phil. 6) We explained that when the debtor defaults, and the creditor desires to foreclose the mortgaged chattel, he must necessarily take the mortgaged property in his hands, but when the debtor refuses to yield the possession of the property, the creditor must institute an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to the sale contemplated under Section 14 of Act No. 1508. The right of the mortgagee to have possession of the mortgaged chattel after the condition of the mortgage is breached must be therefore deemed to be well settled. All what is required by Section 2 of Rule 60 is that upon applying for an order for replevin, the plaintiff must show  that he is "the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof";  that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant with an allegation on the cause of detention;  that the same has not been taken for any tax assessment or fine levied pursuant to law nor seized under any execution, or an attachment against the property of such plaintiff or if so seized that it is exempt from seizure.  The affidavit must also state the actual value of the property. The affidavit of S. M. Laureola, Assistant to the General Manager of Northern Motors, Inc. attached to the complaint, substantially complies with the aforecited requirements. There is nothing in the rules which state that it is only when the mortgagor refuses to surrender the chattel to the sheriff that the action of replevin may be instituted. while Section 14 of Act 1508 places upon "a public officer" the responsibility of conducting the sale of the mortgaged chattel, there is nothing in said statute which would authorize the officer to seize the mortgaged property; and that for the recovery of possession of said property, where the right is disputed, "the creditor must proceed along the channels by action in court."

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 The basic reason why the creditor should initiate such action is because of the circumstances that the creditor's right of possession of the subject-matter of the chattel mortgage, as a preliminary to an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, is conditioned upon the fact of actual default on the part of the principal obligor, and the existence of this fact may naturally be the subject of controversy. In case of such default and the mortgagee refuses upon demand, to surrender possession of the mortgaged chattel so that it may be sold at public auction pursuant to Section 14 of Act 1508, it would certainly be an exercise in futility for the mortgagee to first request or direct the sheriff to "foreclose the mortgage" or take possession of the property, before filing an action in court to recover its possession. Such a procedure is completely unnecessary not only because the sheriff has no duty or authority in the first instance to seize the mortgaged property, but also because whenever the sheriff proceeds under section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, he becomes pro hac vice the mere agent of the creditor. In any event it is only upon receiving the order of the Court requiring the sheriff to take forthwith such property into his custody, that the duty of said officer to take possession of the mortgaged chattel arises (Section 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). It was therefore error for the court a quo to hold that petitioner has not sufficiently averred its right to the possession of the property sought to be recovered.

7. Sps FERNANDEZ vs. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and PREMIERE INSURANCE & SURETY CORP WON the Writ of Replevin issued by MTC Pasay City could be enforced outside? (YES) WON

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Petitioners purchased a Nissan Sedan through a financing scheme from private respondent, ICB (Union Bank) and a chattel mortgage was instituted in favor of the respondent bank. Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money with replevin. Petitioner field a MTD because the principal amount involved was 553,944.00, they claim MTC does not have jurisdiction. o Petitioners contested the venue saying that their principal office was in Makati and residence was in Quezon o Baseless filing = robbery o They cannot be considered in default since they attempted many times to pay the bank their installments and they never received any statement of delinquency.

DENIED Territorial Enforcement of the Writ Resolution of SC, Jan. 11, 1983, a writ of Replevin may be served anywhere in the Philippines. As the resolution only specifically mentions the following to be enforced anywhere in the REGION: 1. Certiorari 2. Prohibition 3. Mandamus 4. Quo Warranto, 5. Habeas Corpus Therefore, any other writ whether produced by RTC, MTC, MeTC, MCTC may be served anywhere in the Philippines.

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 o

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8. ETHEL CASE and MINNA NANTZ, vs. FERNANDO JUGO, and FELIPE F. CRUZ, G.R. No. L-832. October 10, 1946. WON there is still a need to serve a copy of the counterbond to the plaintiff, when counsel already has personal knowledge. (NO)

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They attempted to consign the amount but was refused by the court for no reason. RTC denied the petition for dismissal as well as the lifting of the replevin o The parties had prior agreement of the venue in case there is case filed in court, in that case, MTC, Pasay, had jurisdiction o Under the ROC, the defendant had 5 days to post a redelivery bind in order to secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counterbond, double the amount of the chattel. In this respect, the defendant failed to exercise his right CA, affirmed o The basic claim of the case did not exceed 200,000.00, hence within the JD of MTC Pasay. o The issue of venue should have been raised before a responsive pleading was filed, otherwise, it is considered waived. o The Writ of Replevin could be validly executed anywhere in Metro Manila because Sec 27, BP 129 authorizes establishment of MTC MM with 82 branches could issue writs that could be validly be served and executed anywhere within MM Hence, this present petition.

Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 11 reiterated the foregoing distinction between the jurisdiction of the trial court and the administrative area:

Petitioners applied for a writ of seizure for the recovery of the truck and filed a bond of 20k as provided by Sec 5 and 6 of Rule 62 The order was issued and carried out Respondent field an ex parte motion for the return of the truck and filed a counterbond o Alleged: Attorney of Petitioner was asked WON the Cbond was sufficient and he had no objections. o This was denied by Petitioner counsel but stated he was present.

DENIED

The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The objection to Venue was too late, it should have been filed before the filing of a Responsive Pleading, otherwise, it is waived. In this case, the issue of Venus was raised on time, their objection is thus waived. Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is greater than 200,000.00, thus MTC does not have jurisdiction. However, what Petitioner fails to see is the fact that the amount on which jurisdiction should be based, is not on the property itself, but on the claim owing to the petitioners. The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as shown in respondent bank's Complaint, is the collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC Finally, the redelivery bond alone should have been double the amount of the chattel, thus, the consigned amount of the petitioner did not satisfy the requirments of ROC.

According to sections 5 and 6, Rule 62, of the Rules of Court, if the defendant in a case of replevin wants to have the property returned to him, he must put up a bond in double the amount of the chattel and furnish the plaintiff with a copy of the undertaking within ve days from the date the sheriff took possession of the property. Both requirements are mandatory. The furnishing of a copy of the counterbond has to be accomplished within the prescribed period if the plaintiff s to have an opportunity to contest the redelivery of the property sought by the defendant.

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 However, there was substantial compliance with the last requirement. Since the sole purchase of furnishing a copy of the counterbond is to enable the plaintiff to see if the bond is the prescribed from and for right amount and to resist the return of the property to the defendant if it is not, that opportunity was afforded the petitioners to the fullest extent when their attorney was shown in the sheriff's office the defendant's counterbond. After the plaintiffs' attorney read or saw the counterbond, service of a copy thereof on him became a purposeless, unnecessary formality. There is no reason why the maxim, "Equity regards substance rather than form," should not hold good here. 9. PASTOR D. AGO vs CA, HON. MANUEL P. BARCELONA, BENITO MACROHON, VENANCIO CASTAÑEDA and NICETAS HENSON, G.R. No. L-19718. January 31, 1966

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Respondents Venancio Castañeda and Niceta Henson, set up an action for Replevin in CFI, Manila to recover from Pastor Ago a Caterpillar Tractor, a jaeger hoist and a cargo truck. Asked for immediate delivery and thus posted a BOND. o CFI approved the bond and the seizure. o Petitioner Ago field counterbond to retain the possession of machinery. CFI rendered judgement for respondent, ordering the petitioner to return the machineries. Hence, appeal to SC. o During appeal, it was found out that the Surety became bankrupt. o Thus petitioner were ordered to issue a new sufficient counterbond. PETITIONER challenged the JD of trial court to issue the writ both in the CA and SC, but both were dismissed. SHERIFF served the writ to manager of Petitioner and found out that the machineries were severely deteriorated and has become useless. o Because of the “dilapidated condition” of the machineries the respondents refuse to take them. o The sheriff made a report to the court, stating that, because of respondents' refusal to take possession of the machines, "there is no other recourse but to return (them) to defendant Pastor D. Ago."

So basically what happened was, R filed an action for Replevin against P. it was issued but P gave counterbond so the property was

Affirmed, Petition DENIED. To begin with, where judgment is rendered for the articles or their value and they cannot be returned in substantially the same condition, it is settled that the prevailing party may refuse to take them and instead sue on the redelivery bond or, as in this case, execute on the judgment for value (Kunz v s . Nelson, 76 P2d 577 [1938]). If the prevailing party has this right after judgment, it is at once obvious that he must also have the same right when, asking for the delivery p e n d e n t e lit e of the same property, he afterwards nds them in a substantially depreciated condition. Here, the Court of Appeals found "beyond dispute" that the tractor and the hoist had so deteriorated that they had become unserviceable. This right to reject is assured in the first instance by the provision that the judgment in a suit for replevin must be in the alternative so as to afford a measure of relief where the property cannot be returned (Rule 60, sec. 9); in the second case it is implied from the requirement that "if for any reason the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant." (Rule 60, sec. 6). It then becomes the defendant's obligation to take them back upon tender of the sheriff. But if, as explained, it was petitioner's obligation to accept redelivery of the machines after their rejection by respondents, then it is clear that whether he took them back or not, he was liable for their detention. An action for replevin has for its object the recovery of some personal property; it is obvious that if the plaintiff in that action refuses to take delivery of the very property he sought to recover, it must be for very good reasons which defeat his object. But there is an even more fundamental reason why we think the lower court correctly ordered execution to proceed. As Moran aptly states: "[A] court cannot

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 returned to P. However, CFI went ahead and ruled in favor of R, thus the order of seizure was served to P. but the machineries were now useless. R now refuses to accept the machinery saying that when they returned the machinery it was in good condition. Now the SC affirmed the decision in the appeal and remanded to lower court. 

 BACHRACH MOTOR COMPANY, INC. vs RICARDO SUMMERS, G.R. No. 17393. July 21, 1921

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WON after default by the mortgage, the sheriff is unconditionally bound to seize the mortgaged property

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SC remanded to CFI and CFI issued a Writ of Execution for a total of P172,923.87. o Petitioner now claim that because of the “change in the situation of the parties” it made it inequitable to execute the writ. Petitioner claims that the machinery was never returned to him. o Since the truck was basically junk, its value could not be determined, P should not be made to pay 99,877.09 o DENIED motion of Petitioner saying he should have raised this before the judgement became final.  petitioner's house and lot in Quezon City were levied upon by the Sheriff and advertised for sale on October 25, 1961. o Petitioner filed MOTION to Stop the Sale, which was DENIED. MR was also denied. o Petitioner then filed Certiorari to CA, which was dismissed. o Hence, the appeal. o Elias Aboitiz executed a chattel mortgage upon Nash automobile, in favor of the Bachrach Motor Company to secure a debt. Mortgagor defaulted in payment of the installments. As a consequence the Motor Company determined to have the car sold for the purpose of foreclosing Motor Company requested Ricardo Summers, Sheriff of Manila to take the car from the debtor and expose it to the public sale. The mortgagor refused to surrender possession Motor Company instituted a Replevin Aboitiz gave a bond for the retention of the automobile pende lite

refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a nal and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after nal judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, nor can it refuse — and the reason is more compelling — to issue such writ, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed and armed by an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court." (2 Comments on the Rules of Court 257 [1963]) But those cases, as A m o r v s . J u g o, 77 Phil. 703 (1946) subsequently explained, cannot be invoked when the supposed change in the circumstances of the parties took place while the case was pending. The reason is that there is then no excuse for not bringing the matter to the attention of the court the fact or circumstance that affects the outcome of the case. Such was the supposed change in the situation of the parties in this case when, so it is claimed, the petitioner lost possession of the machines for the detention of which he was ordered by final judgment to pay damages. Thus, affirmed.

Demurrer sustained, Writ DENIED. In commercial usage the property which is the subject of a chattel mortgage is, as is well known, almost invariably left in the possession of the mortgagor, and this possession is not disturbed until the mortgagor defaults in the payment of the secured debt or otherwise fails to comply with the conditions of the mortgage. When default occurs and the creditor desires to foreclose, he must necessarily take the mortgaged property into his hands As will be seen, this provision supposes that the creditor has possession of the mortgaged property, for the power to sell imports a power to make delivery of the thing sold to the purchaser; and without actual possession delivery would be

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Motor Company filed a MANDAMUS to compel the sheriff to seized the car from the mortgagor and sell it. The sheriff instituted a Demurrer. Hence, this case

impossible. The right of the mortgagee to have possession after condition broken must therefore be taken to be unquestionable; and to this effect is the great weight of American authority. Where, however, the debtor refuses to yield up the property, the creditor must institute an action, either to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a preliminary to the sale contemplated in the provision above quoted. “The only restriction on the mode by which the mortgagee shall secure possession of the mortgaged property after breach of condition is that he must act in an orderly manner and without creating a breach of the peace, subjecting himself to an action for trespass." The reason why the law does not allow the creditor to possess himself of the mortgaged property with violence and against the will of the debtor is to be found in the fact that the creditor's right of possession is conditioned upon the fact of default, and the existence of this fact may naturally be the subject of controversy. The debtor, for instance, may claim in good faith, and rightly or wrongly, that the debt is paid, or that for some other reason the alleged default is nonexistent. His possession in this situation is as fully entitled to protection as that of any other person, and in the language of article 446 of the Civil Code he must be respected therein. To allow the creditor to seize the property against the will of the debtor would make the former to a certain extent both judge and executioner in his own cause — a thing which is inadmissible in the absence of unequivocal agreement in the contract itself or express provision to that effect in the statute. It will be observed that the law places the responsibility of conducting the sale upon "a public ocer;" and it might be supposed that an ocer, such as the sheriff, can seize the property where the creditor could not. The sheriff or officer becomes the pro hac vice the mere agent of the creditor. The conclusion is clear that for the recovery of possession, where the right is disputed, the creditor must proceed along the usual channels by action in court. Whether the sheriff, upon being indemnified by the creditor, could safely proceed to take the property from the debtor, is a point upon which we express no opinion. While it is true that in some sense the mortgage law puts the mortgagee in a position of owner upon default, any person versed in the English language would

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 know that the mortgage is meant as a security . The contract in fact merely imposes on the mortgaged property a subsidiary obligation by which it is bound for the debt or other principal obligation of the mortgagor. This is the equitable conception of the mortgage But whatever conclusion may be drawn in the premises with respect to the true nature of a chattel mortgage, the result must in this case be the same; for whether the mortgagee becomes the real owner of the mortgaged property — as some suppose — or acquires only certain rights therein, it is none the less clear that he has after default the right of possession; though it cannot be admitted that he may take the law into his own hands and wrest the property violently from the possession of the mortgagor. Neither can he do through the medium of a public ocer that which he cannot directly do himself. The consequence is that in such case the creditor must either resort to a civil action to recover possession as a preliminary to a sale, or preferably he may bring an action to obtain a judicial foreclosure in conformity, so far as practicable, with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The demurrer must be sustained, and the writ prayed for will be denied. It is so ordered, with costs against the petitioner. ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY, and ALEX DE LEON, G.R. No. 79021. May 17, 1993

WON the validity of a seizure made pursuant to a search warrant issued by a court can be questioned in another branch of the same court, where the criminal action filed in connection with which the search warrant was issued, had been dismissed provisionally.

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Judge Francisco of RTC cebu after examining 2Lt Dennis Canoy and 2 other witnesses issued a Search Warrant to search the premises of RR Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Shortly after, a civil action for Replevin/ Sum of Money was instituted by Petitioner against Respondent Canoy and one John Doe in the RTC presided by one Judge Canares: that he had not carnapped, that he did not sell the vehicle that he is the owner. The RTC issued the writ. Canoy filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint and to quash the writ. Both were DENIED. Respondent Canoy filed Certiorari with the CA CA, REVERSED RTC. The appellate court ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy. it was also pointed out in the same case that the validity of a

DENIED. A criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact that complainant therein is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle. What is material is the existence of evidence which would show that respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to another. Another aspect which needs to be stressed is the fact that since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case by the fiscal will not constitute double jeopardy and hence there is no bar to the filing of another complaint for the same offense (People vs. Medted, 68 Phil 435). The principle followed among courts in the dispensation of justice is that a judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot modify or annul the orders issued by another branch of the same court, since the two (2) courts are of the same rank, and act independently but coordinately

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search warrant may only be questioned in the same court that issued it Meanwhile a case for CARNAPPING was filed by Alex De Leon against Romeo Chua. It was provisionally dismissed without prejudice

It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 [1991]). The reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the, levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines: Provisional Remedies, p. 402 [1985]). It stated that in the Pagkalinawan case, there was a conflict in jurisdiction. On the other hand, in the Vlasons case, it was certain that no criminal case would ensue subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, hence no conflict in jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the property could arise. Thus, where personal property is seized under a search warrant and it appears that the seizure will not be followed by the filing of any criminal action, but there are conflicting claims asserted over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action by any interested party, or of an interpleader action by the Government itself, in the proper competent court to which the seizing court shall transfer custody of the articles. Another branch of the same court, in an action to recover said property and during the pendency thereof, cannot order the delivery of said personal property to therein plaintiff pendente lite. Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal action, and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant" (emphasis supplied), or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court. llcd

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COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60 Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal" of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.

LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD ADDURU SANTILLAN, Judge, Branch 38, RTC, Manila, DEPUTY SHERIFF REGIO RUEFA and TEE CHIN HO, G.R. No. 88938. June 8, 1992  MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, IPO LIMESTONE CO., INC., and ANTONIO VILLARAMA, G.R. No. L-7057. October 29, 1954

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Petitioner filed a complaint for Recovery of machineries and equipment sold and delivered to defendant at their factory. Respondent judge issued an order commanding thr dheriff to seize the property. (upon bond, attachment of affidavit of president of Petitioner) the defendants therein, protesting against the seizure of the properties in question, on the ground that they are not personal properties. The president’s attention was bought to the fact that the equipments could not be dismantled without causing damage. Despite that they told sheriff that a bind has been filed and directed for the support to be cut. Defendant filed a counterbond On March 21, 1953, the deputy sheriffs returned the properties seized, by depositing them along the road, near the quarry, of the defendant Company, at Bigti, without the benefit of inventory and without re-installing them in their former position and replacing the destroyed posts, which rendered their use impracticable.

AFFIRMED.

Lastly, although the parties have not cited, and We have not found, any authority squarely in point - obviously because real property are not subject to replevin - it is well settled that, when the restitution of what has been ordered, the goods in question shall be returned in substantially the same condition as when taken (54 C.J., 590-600, 640-641). Inasmuch as the machinery and equipment involved in this case were duly installed and affixed in the premises of respondent company when petitioner's representative caused said property to be dismantled and then removed, it follows that petitioner must also do everything necessary to the reinstallation of said property in conformity with its original condition.

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Provisional Remedies by Atty. Joel Famador

COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60    

REYNALDO SEBASTIAN vs. SHERIFF ALBERTO A. VALINO, A.M. No. P-91-549. July 5, 1993

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The Sheriff filed an urgent motion manifesting that Rocco the president, has been informed that the machineries should be reinstalled but it was not heeded. The court issued an order fot he plaintiff and the sheriff to reinstall Petitioner then filed a complaint in CA saying that CA acted in grave abuse of discretion for issuing the order to furnish the sheriff of Bulacan money to reinstall the CA o The question of ownership and the applicability of Art. 415 of the new Civil Code are immaterial in the determination of the only issue involved in this case. It is a matter of evidence which should be decided in the hearing of the case on the merits. The question as to whether the machineries or equipments in litigation are immovable or not is likewise immaterial, because the only issue raised before the trial court was whether the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, at the Petitioner's instance, was justified in destroying the machineries and in refusing to restore them to their originalform, at the expense of the Petitioner. Whatever might be the legal character of the machineries and equipments, would not in any way justify their destruction by the Sheriff's and the said Petitioner's." o MR denied. o Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) filed a Replevin against Marble, Inc. in order to foreclose the chattel mortgaged by Marblecraft RTC Makati issued a writ of seizure directed against Marblecraft The enforcement of the writ of seizure was delayed because of the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PDCP from proceeding with the foreclosure sale issued by the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila When it was dissolved, the respondent went to the office of Marblecraft to implement the writ Respondent and his

the Court finds respondent GUILTY of serious misconduct Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counterbond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). In violation of said Rule, respondent immediately turned over the seized articles to PDCP. His claim that the Office of the Regional Sheriff did not have a place to store the seized items, cannot justify his violation of the Rule. As aptly noted by the Investigating Judge, the articles could have been deposited in a bonded warehouse.

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Provisional Remedies by Atty. Joel Famador

COMPILATION OF CASES: RULE 60

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companions forcibly opened the lockers and desk drawers of the employees of complainant and took their personal belongings, as well as some office equipment issued to them. The employees filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal two criminal complaints for robbery against respondent and his companions. In implementing the writ, machinery and equipment were destroyed. Respondent turned over the seized articles to the counsel of PDCP and allowed these items to be stored in PDCP's warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila. Complainant posted a counterbond On November 14, 1990, complainant posted a counterbond. In an order issued on the same day, the Regional Trial Court, Makati, approved the bond and directed the immediate return of the seized items. After denying PDCP's motion to set aside the November 14 Order, the trial court reiterated the directive for the return of the seized items in its November 26 Order. Respondent did not implement the orders In his comment, respondent branded the administrative complaint against him as pure harassment filed by Marblecraft after he had refused to defer the implementation of the writ of seizure. Admin case was refered to RTC Pasig, which found respondent guilty of partiality when he immediately turned over the seized items to PDCP

Respondent must serve on Marblecraft not only a copy of the order of seizure but also a copy of the application, affidavit and bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). Respondent did not furnish defendant with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond. By his own admission, he only served it with a copy of the order of seizure (Rollo, p. 37). LLpr The more serious infraction of respondent is his refusal to implement the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati for him to return to complainant the articles seized pursuant to the writ of seizure dated March 30, 1990. Respondent could have avoided getting into his present predicament had he not turned over the possession of the seized goods prematurely to the PDCP. The complainant cannot be blamed if it harbored the suspicion that respondent was beholden to PDCP. The zeal with which respondent enforced the order of seizure in favor of PDCP was in sharp contrast with his inaction in enforcing the three orders of the trial court directing him to return the seized items to complainant. llcd It is not for respondent to question the validity of the orders of the trial court. It is for him to execute them.

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