Recap Notes 17.docx

Alma Covita vs. SSM Maritime Services, Inc. December 7, 2016 G.R. No. 206600 Peralta, J. Facts: On May 7, 2009, Rolando Covita, petitioner’s husband, boarded his vessel of assignment arising from the contract of employment with private respondent. However, after a week of employment,Rolando developed weakness of both lower extremities and was vomiting. Subsequently, he was medically repatriated to the Philippines. He was diagnosed by the companydesignated physician, with chronic renal failure. Rolando died on September 20, 2009. Hence, the petitioner herein filed with the LA a claim for death benefits under Sec. 20 of 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) which the latter granted. The private respondent appealed to the NLRC alleging that the cause of Rolando’s death was not work-related. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and granted the appeal. CA affirmed the reversal. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to claim for death benefits in the present case Held: No, her claim cannot be granted. The 2000 POEA-SEC provides that to be entitled for death compensation and benefits from the employer, the death of the seafarer: (1) must be work-related; and (2) musthappen during the term of the employment contract. Rolando was diagnosed with end stage renal failure which could not have developed over his one week employment in the private respondent. The petitioner must show substantial evidence to declare that the cause of her husband’s death is work-related or workaggravated.Moreover, when Rolando was medically repatriated, his contract of employment with respondent was effectively terminated. Since he died after the termination of the contract, it did not satisfy the second requirement that death must occur during

the term of the employment contract to be entitled for death benefits. Considering the foregoing facts, the Court ruled that Rolando’s death is not compensable. Issue: Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a proper recourse in the case at bar Held: Yes, the petition is proper. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. This Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to specific matters. However, factual issues may be considered and resolved when the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the CA as in the case at bar. Note: Landmark case of St.Martin Funeral vs NLRC 1998; observance of Heirarchy of Courts Angelina De Guzman vs Gloria A. Chico December 07, 2016 G.R. No.195445 JARDELEZA, J. Facts: Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA to annul the January 19, 2010 and April 19, 2010 Orders of the court a quo. Petitioners argued that CA committed reversible error in ruling that because of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, a certification of non-forum shopping was unnecessary in the ex parte petition, and thus it was unnecessary to examine respondent Chico and her counsel on said certification. Issue: Whether certification of non-forum shopping is necessary in this case

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Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that a certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The non-initiatory nature of an ex parte motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is best explained in Arquiza v. Court of Appeals. In that case the Court ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident or consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum shopping certification is dispelled. ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC., (AMCOW), vs. ASSOCIATION, INC. and CHRISTIAN CANGCO December 6, 2016 GR. No. 207132 Brion, j. Facts: On March 8, 2001, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 20015(AO 5-01) which directed the decking or equal distribution of migrant workers among the several clinics who are members of GAMCA. Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series of 20026holding in abeyance the implementation of the referral decking system. The DOH reiterated its directive suspending the referral decking system in AO No. 159, Series of 2004. In 2004, the DOH issued another administrative order, reasoning that the referral decking system did not guarantee the migrant workers' right to safe and quality health service.

On March 8, 2010, Republic Act (RA) No. 10022 lapsed into law without the President's signature. Section 16 of RA No. 10022 amended Section 23 of RA No. 8042, adding two new paragraphs - paragraphs (c) and (d). The pertinent portions of the amendatory provisions read: (c) Department of Health. - The Department of Health (DOH) shall regulate the activities and operations of all clinics which conduct medical, physical, optical, dental, psychological and other similar examinations, hereinafter referred to as health examinations, on Filipino migrant workers as requirement for their overseas employment. Pursuant to this, the DOH shall ensure that: (c.3) No group or groups of medical clinics shall have a monopoly of exclusively conducting health examinations on migrant workers for certain receiving countries; (c.4) Every Filipino migrant worker shall have the freedom to choose any of the DOH-accredited or DOHoperated clinics that will conduct his/her health examinations and that his or her rights as a patient are respected. The decking practice, which requires an overseas Filipino worker to go first to an office for registration and then farmed out to a medical clinic located elsewhere, shall not be allowed; Pursuant to Section 16 of RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its August 23, 2010 letter-order,directed GAMCA to cease and desist from implementing the referral decking system and to wrap up their operations within three (3) days from receipt thereof. On August 26, 2010, GAMCA filed with the RTC of Pasig City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (GAMCA's petition). It assailed: (1) the DOH's August 23, 2010 letter-order on the ground of grave abuse of discretion; and (2) paragraphs c.3 and c.4, Section 16 of RA No. 10022, as well as Section 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of the IRR, as unconstitutional. The RTC ruled in their favor, hence this petition. Issue: whether the Regional Trial Court legally erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the DOH CDO letters;

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Held:

Issue:

The RTC legally erred when it gave due course to GAMCA's petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Whether the DOH CDO letters prohibiting GAMCA from implementing the referral decking system embodied under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 10022 violates Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution for being an undue taking of property

Since the CDO Letter was a quasi-judicial act, the manner by which GAMCA assailed it before the courts of law had been erroneous; the RTC should not have entertained GAMCA's petition. In the present case, the act alleged to be unconstitutional refers to the cease and desist order that the DOH issued against GAMCA's referral decking system. Its constitutionality was questioned through a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC. The case reached this Court through a Rule 45 appeal by certiorari under the traditional route. In using a petition for certiorari and prohibition to assail the DOH-CDO letters, GAMCA committed several procedural lapses that rendered its petition readily dismissible by the RTC. Not only did the petitioner present a premature challenge against an administrative act; it also committed the grave jurisdictional error of filing the petition before the wrong court. Since the DOH is part of the Executive Department and has acted in its quasi-judicial capacity, the petition challenging its CDO letter should have been filed before the Court of Appeals. The RTC thus did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions and erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the DOH CDO letters. In procedural terms, petitions for certiorari and prohibition against a government agency are remedies available to assail its quasi-judicial acts, and should thus have been filed before the CA. Further, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City unduly disregarded the requirements that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law" and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, when it gave due course to the certiorari and prohibition petition against the DOH's CDO. In this case, GAMCA should have asked the DOH Secretary to reconsider or clarify its letter-order, after which it could appeal, should the ruling be unfavorable, to the Office of the President.

Held: The cease and desist order is a valid exercise of police power. To be considered reasonable, the government's exercise of police power must satisfy the "valid object and valid means" method of analysis: first, the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires interference; and second, the means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably present in Section 16 of RA No. 10022. The prohibition against the referral decking system is consistent with the State's exercise of the police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people. Public interest demands State interference on health matters, since the welfare of migrant workers is a legitimate public concern. BAYAN MUNA PATRY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE OCAMPO, ET.AL. VS. MENDOZA January 31, 2017 G.R. No. 190431 Sereno, CJ. Facts: On 15 December 1997, DOTC/LTO awarded to Stradcom a contract for the construction and operation of an information technology structurecalled the LTO IT Project Build-Own-Operate Agreement (BOO Agreement),making Stradcom the exclusive information technology provider of DOTC/LTO.The LTO IT Project is a long-term strategic plan to modernize the land transportation systemswhich will interconnect LTO's district offices nationwide, enable online transaction processing and integrate its mission critical business processes.

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On 26 September 2007, Stradcom presented to the LTO the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Project as an enhancement to the current motor vehicle registration system. On 6 May 2009, the DOTC issued Circular No. 2009-065 entitled DOTC RFID Rules. These rules required all motor vehicles to have an RFID tag "as a prerequisite to registration or reregistration."It also provided that after 1 August 2009, no motor vehicle shall be permitted registration without first having an RFID tag, for which afee of P350 shall be collected. On 16 June 2009, the RFID Memorandum of Agreement (RFID MOA)7 was entered into between DOTC/LTO and Stradcom. The RFIDMOA provided that fees due to Stradcom shall be collected and deposited by the LTO in a government depository bank account designated by and in the name of Stradcom. On 7 August 2009, the LTO issued Memorandum Circular No. ACL-2009-1199. The RFID IRR provided that the commencements date of RFID tagging shall be 1 October 2009 and that the RFID Tag, which has a shelf life of up to 10 years, is composed of two portions: (1) Write Once, which would contain the Unique ID (UID) number only and could not be changed during the life of the RFID tag; and (2) Write Many, which may save certain information that would be made available to authorized personnel with the use of the RFID Reader. The information which may be saved in the RFID Tag includes the following: (1) motor vehicle file number, (2) engine number, (3) chassis number, (4) plate number, (5) motor vehicle type, (6) color, (7) make, (8) series, (9) year model, (10) body type, ( 11) motor vehicle classification, ( 12) franchise, ( 13) route, ( 14) owner's name, (15) last registration date, ( 16) alarms (settled and unsettled), and ( 1 7) other data deemed necessary. Issues: 1. Whether the DOTC/LTO in implementing the RFID project committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated RA 9184 and RA. 6957. 2. Whether the assailed executive issuances are unconstitutional as the same were issued in usurpation of the legislative power of congress due to the absence of a law providing for the installation of radio frequency identification tag

on all motor vehicles as a pre-requisite for the registration or re-registration thereof. 3. Whether the assailed executive issuances are unconstitutional as the same fail to present compelling interest or interests and are absent of sufficient safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent impermissible intrusions on the right to privacy. Held: RA 9184.The RFID MOA is a separate and distinct contract from the BOO Agreement. To reiterate, the additions introduced by the RFID MOA are those that were not offered in the original bid and entailed changes in the original cost. Thus, from the terms of the BOO Agreement itself, these are not allowable variations. As a general rule, for contracts executed under the BOT Law, the government agency and the project proponent shall execute the draft contract as approved. However, certain contract variations are allowed, as long as they comply with the applicable law at the time the RFID MOA was entered into. The RFID MOA is not an allowable contract variation, involving as it does an increase in the agreed fees, tolls, and charges to be exacted upon the public. As previously stated, the RFID Project will entail an additional charge of P350 for every motor vehicle. This charge was not contemplated in the original contract and is not an increase allowed under the formula provided in Article 14 of the BOO Agreement. Further, as already discussed, there is a fundamental change in the contractual arrangement between the parties. It cannot be said either that this contract variation is necessary due to an unforeseeable event beyond the control of the parties. In conclusion, while the RFID Project may possibly be considered as an enhancement of the existing LTO IT Project, requiring as it does an integration into the existing motor vehicle registration system and other database and information technology systems, the RFID MOA is not an allowable "enhancement" or variation of the existing BOO Agreement. RA 6957.The RFID MOA is void for failure to undergo competitive public bidding.Hence,a violation of RA 6957. 4

Section 5 of the BOT Law provides that upon the approval of a project, a notice must be made inviting all prospective project proponents to a competitive public bidding. The public bidding must be conducted under a two-envelope/two-stage system: the first envelope to contain the technical proposal and the second one to contain the financial proposal. In this case, it is patently admitted by DOTC/L TO that no public bidding was conducted on the RFID Project, which was presented by Stradcom as a proposal that would enhance the existing L TO IT Project. Neither does this case fall under the exception to the rule on public bidding. The RFID MOA must, thus, be struck down by this Court for failure to comply with the rules on public bidding. There is no guarantee that the RFID fee that will be charged to the public is a fair and reasonable price, as it has not undergone public bidding.On the other hand, Stradcom, which has been awarded the exclusive right to develop and operate the RFID system without having undergone competitive public bidding, stands to earn considerable amounts of revenue from the contract. Even if one were to follow Stradcom's argument that the RFID MOA is not separate from the BOO Agreement, still, its case would not prosper. The RFID MOA is not so much a "mere enhancement" of the BOO Agreement as it is a substantial amendment thereof. It goes without saying that any contract awarded as a result of competitive public bidding must be executed faithfully by the parties. As to the second and third issues raised by petitioners assailing the constitutionality of the DOTC/LTO issuances for being issued in usurpation of Congress' legislative powers, and for violating the right to privacy, it is unnecessary to rule on the same considering the foregoing discussion declaring the RFID MOA null and void for failure to undergo competitive public bidding. Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Radio Frequency Identification Memorandum of Agreement dated 16 June 2009, entered into by respondents Stradcom Corporation and the Department of Transportation and Communication/Land Transportation Office, is hereby declared null and void. The RFID fees collected during the implementation of the RFID Project prior to the issuance of this Court's

Status Quo Ante Order are likewise ordered refunded to the payors thereof.

Buisan vs. Commission on Audit January 31, 2017 G.R. No. 212376 Reyes, J. Facts: In 1989, the DPWH undertook the construction of the Liguasan Cut-off Channel (Project) in Maguindanao to minimize the flooding in the area. In 2001, the DPWH received various claims for damages allegedly caused to land owners’ properties by the premature opening of the project which was subsequently investigated by the Regional Director, DPWH Regional Office, No. XII, Cotabato City that then recommended the payment of just compensation to the claimants. In 2006, an ad hoc committee was created to determine the legality and propriety of the claims. However, no final resolution was made the DPWH because of lapse of time and insufficiency of evidence. In 2010, the petitioners filed a petition with the COA praying that they be compensated for their damaged properties. The COA held that petitioners have committed laches and their cause of action has already prescribed for failure to file their money claims within a reasonable time. A motion for reconsideration by petitioners was denied. Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ claim was barred by laches and prescription. Held: Yes. Article 1146 of the Civil Code provides that actions upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years. The petitioners’ money claims had already prescribed since those were only filed in 2004 or even in 2001 considering that the alleged damages took place in 1989. Furthermore, “laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier.” In this case, the petitioners have committed laches because: (1) The premature opening of the project allegedly causing flash floods and damage to properties 5

took place in 1989 or even in 1992; (2) It took the petitioners 15 years to assert their rights in filing a complaint against the DPWH in 2004; (3) COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claims against the Government, among others as provided by Rule VIII, Section I(a); therefore, the petitioners’ money claims have prescribed and are barred by laches for their failure to timely file the petition with the COA; and (4) There is an apparent lack of notice that would give the DPWH the opportunity to defend itself since the petitioners failed to file a formal suit for their claims before the COA and either because the condition of the alleged inundation of crops has changed, or the physical impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged crops due to the considerable lapse of time, the plausibility of the allegations remains difficult. CHUA vs. DE CASTRO December 5, 2016 A.C. No. 10671 Reyes, J. Facts: Complainant Chua, alleged that his company Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC) filed a collection case against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel, Atty. De Castro. According to Chua, respondent employed unmeritorious excuses to delay the case, such as simple absence without notice, by alleging ailment without medical certificates, by claiming insufficiency of time to prepare, among others. As a result thereof, it took five years to present one witness for NCRC. Respondent Atty. Castro, in his defense, alleged that the resetting were without objection from the counsel of NCRC. He further alleged that the several postponements were found meritorious by the RTC, and some postponements were at the motions and at the instance of Chua’s counsel. Issue:Whether or not respondent be suspended for deterring the speedy and efficient administration of justice by employing delaying tactics. Held: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, every lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The Court found that the delay

in the disposition of the case was not solely attributable to Atty. De Castro. The trial court itself, either its own initiative or at the instance of Chua’s counsel, allowed the delays. Consequently, if not all of such delays were attributable to Atty. De Castro’s doing; it would be unfair to hold him solely responsible for the delays caused in the case. In the initial finding where Atty. Castro violated Rule 1.03 and Rule 10.3 of the CPR, the Court, however, found that Chua failed to show that Atty. De Castro was indeed moved to cause delays by malice, or dishonesty, or deceit, or grave misconduct as to warrant a finding of administrative liability against him. Notwithstanding with the absence of malice, dishonesty, or ill motive, it is good to remind Atty. De Castro that as a member of the Bar, he isexpected to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. CALDITO vs. OBADO January 30, 2017 G.R. No. 181596 Reyes, J. Facts: The record showed that as early as 1921, Lot No. 1633 was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Felipe Obado (Felipe). After Felipe's death, Paterno Obado (Paterno), whom Felipe treated like his own son, subsequently occupied Lot No. 1633 and continued to pay the realty taxes of the same. Antonio Ballesteros (Antonio) executed an Affidavit of Ownership dated February 23, 1995 claimed that Lot No. 1633 was coowned by Felipe with his five siblings. The next day, Spouses Ballesteros sold the property to the petitioners for the sum of P70,000.000by a Deed of Absolute Sale. In 2002, the petitioners attempted to build a house on the subject parcel of land but the respondents prevented them from completing the same. Respondents averred that the Spouses Ballesteros were not the owners and possessors of the subject parcel of land since the former had been in open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the whole property up to the present or for more than 30 years in the concept of an owner. The RTC decision in favor of the petitioners was reversed and set aside by the CA due to petitioners’ failure to support their claim while the respondents enjoy a legal presumption of just title in their favor since they are in possession of the entire Lot No.1633. 6

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the subject parcel of land.

Held: In resolving this issue, the pertinent point of inquiry is whether the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros, have lawful title over the subject parcel of land. In this case, the petitioners' cause of action relates to an action to quiet title which has two indispensable requisites, namely: ( 1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; find (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its primafacie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the petitioners' cause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite since the petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land. The petitioners' claim of legal title over the subject parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Ownership issued by Antonio cannot stand because they failed to prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros. The Court cannot give full credence to Antonio's Affidavit of Ownership for he simply made general and self-serving statements therein which were favorable to him, and which were not supported with documentary evidence, with no specifics as to when their predecessors-ininterest acquired the subject parcel of land, and when the Donations Propter Nuptias were made. The petitioners must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as in the instant case, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute evidence of great weight in support of the claim of title

of ownership by prescription when considered with the actual possession of the property by the applicant. Thus, it is clear that the petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for their claim that they merely purchased the same from the Spouses Ballesteros, the petitioners presented no other justification to disprove the ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses Ballesteros had no right to sell the subject parcel of land, the petitioners cannot be deemed to have been the lawful owners of the same. CAMINO vs. PASAGUI September 20,2016 A.C. No. 11095 PER CURIAM. Facts: Complainant is the vendor of a lot that is still registered under the name of the Heirs of her father. Respondent Atty. Pasagui was allegedly the lawyer of Cong. Mila Tan who was in charge of handling the payments for the property which Camino sold to Tan in 2010. Camino narrated that Atty. Pasagui offered her Tan's payment in the amount of P30,000. However, Camino refused to accept the same. Atty. Pasagui then told her that there will be a recall and Tan would not have enough money to pay her. The respondent also assured her that he will take care of everything and encouraged her to look for a new buyer and advised her to set its price at P7,000,000. Complainant informed the respondent that she has a new buyer, but the latter wanted to have a clean title of the property since it still not under her name. Respondent facilitate the transferring under her name. Respondent also told her that the transfer of the title in her name will cost about P700,000. Sometime in January 2011, Atty. Pasagui told Camino that they will proceed with the sale to another buyer. Convinced by Atty. Pasagui's, she told him that she will look for a sufficient amount of money necessary for the processing of the transfer of the title. Atty. Pasagui advised Camino to apply for a loan using her residential house and lot as collateral. The proceeds thereof will then be used for the expenses in transferring the title in her name. 7

Subsequently, Camino and her husband, executed an SPA in favor of respondent Atty. Pasagui, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan in their behalf with PHCCI to be secured by their own property. Camino inquire to Atty. Pasagui about the status of the loan application. She was informed that it was still in process and that she can only loan P700,000. After a month, Camino discovered that the loan was already approved and that the proceeds thereof amounting to P1,000,000 was already released.Upon meeting with Tan, an envelope containing the amount of P150,000 was handed to her. Atty. Pasagui gave her a signal to accept the envelope. Camino, confuse and wondering that Atty. Pasagui already told her that the sale of the property will no longer push through. On April 28, 2011, Camino tried to call Atty. Pasagui to follow up on Tan's payment but he did not answer her call. Neither did Atty. Pasagui get in touch with her after their meeting. Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Held: Yes. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 15 - A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In the instant case, Atty. Pasagui's guilt is undisputed. A perusal of the SPA issued by Camino and her husband to Atty. Pasagui clearly shows that the application of the loan with PHCCI was in behalf of the Caminos and that the property mortgaged was likewise the property of the latter. If it were true that it was a personal loan to him, Atty. Pasagui failed to provide an explanation as to why he used Camino's property as collateral. The failure of Atty. Pasagui to inform Camino of the status of the transfer of title despite the release of the loan to finance the transfer of the title, is a clear

indicium that he converted the money for his own use and constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence ·in the legal profession. Furthermore he violated the whole Canon 16 and its sub-rules. Canon 16 - a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Communication and Information Systems Corp. vs. Mark Sensing Australia Pty. Ltd. January 25, 2017 G.R. 192159 JARDALEZA, J. Facts: Petitioner MSAPL and respondent CISC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated March 1, 2002 whereby the latter appointed CISC as its "exclusive AGENT” to PCSO. MSAPL agreed to pay CISC a 8

commission of 24.5% of future gross sales to PCSO, exclusive duties and taxes, for six years. However, it stopped remitting commissions to CISC during 2nd quarter of 2004 alleging that Carolina de Jesus, President of CISC, violated her authority when she negotiated the Supply Contract with PCSO and three of MSAPL's competitors. For this reason, MSAPL felt shortchanged by CISC's efforts and thus decided to withhold payment of commissions. Consequently, CISC filed a complaint before the RTC for specific performance against the respondent and further asked the court an amended writ of attachment to include unpaid commissions in excess of the amount stated in their complaint and the same was granted.

In this case, both the RTC and CA determined that, based on Plaridel's financial statement that was attached to its certificate of authority issued by the Insurance Commission, its net worth is P289,332,999.00. Plaridel's retention limit is therefore P57,866,599.80, which is below the Pl 13,197,309.10 face value of the attachment bond. However, it only retained an insurable risk of Pl7,377,938.19 because the remaining amount of P98,819,770.91was ceded to 16 other insurance companies. Thus, the risk retained by Plaridel is actually P40 Million below its maximum retention limit. Therefore, the approval of the attachment bond by the RTC was in order.

On July 8, 2009, CJSC posted a bond in the amount of1,113,197,309.10 through Plaridel Surety and Insurance Company (Plaridel) in favor of MSAPL, which the RTC approved on the same date.24 Two days later, MSAPL filed a motion to determine the sufficiency of the bond because of questions regarding the financial capacity of Plaridel to underwrite the bond pursuant to Section 215 of the old Insurance Code.

Petition is GRANTED.

On September 4, 2009, the RTC denied MSAPL's motion, finding that although Plaridel cannot underwrite the bond by itself, the amount covered by the attachment bond "was likewise reinsured to sixteen other insurance companies." However, "for the best interest of both parties," the RTC ordered Plaridel to submit proof that the amount was reinsured. Plaridel submitted its compliance on September 11, 2009, attaching therein the reinsurance contracts.

In civil case for Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of Transfer and Cancellation of Titles, the Regional Trial Court held that Tansay is the lawful owner of the subjected lot. Petitioners assailed the decision of the trial court and filed an Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-opening of the trial, which was considered by the appellate court as motion for new trial and denied because the evidence presented was not the kind of newly discovered evidence contemplated by the rules.

Issue:

Issue: Can the CA receive new evidence on appeal?

WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the attachment bond whose faceamount exceeded the retention limit of the surety.

Held:

Held: No. The RTC not only correctly applied the law but also acted judiciously in requiring Plaridel to submit proof of its reinsurance contracts after MSAPL questioned its capacity to underwrite the attachment bond. Section 215 of the old Insurance Code, the law in force at the time Plaridel issued the attachment bond, limits the amount of risk that insurance companies can retain to a maximum of 20% of its net worth.

CRISPINO, ET AL. vs. TANSAY December 5, 2016 GR. No. 184466 Leonen, J. Facts:

Yes. Although the CA has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded powers under Sec 9 of BP 129, this power is not without limit. The CA cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If the interpretation were otherwise, then there would be no end to litigation. Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the CA may only receive evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This notwithstanding, the CA cannot accept any kind of evidence in a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial under Rule 53 is limited to newly discovered evidence. 9

Newly discovered evidence has a specific meaning under the law. Under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the following criteria must be satisfied for evidence to be considered newly discovered; (a) the evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial in the court below by exercise of due diligence and; (b) it is of such character as would probably change the result. Issue: Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed in an appeal of the appellate court’s decision. Held: Yes, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may be eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. In determining the correct procedural remedy, aggrieved parties must first ascertain the nature of the decision, order, or resolution they intend to challenge. A final judgment or order, from which an appeal may be taken, is one that finally disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be done by the court (e.g. adjudication on the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence). In contrast, an interlocutory order is one that merely resolves incidental matters and does not finally dispose of the case. When an interlocutory order is issued, the court is still tasked with adjudication on the merits of the case. The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal but a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The reason for the prohibition is to prevent multiple appeals in a single action that would necessarily cause delay during trial. This notwithstanding, a special civil action for certiorari is not the only remedy that aggrieved parties may take against interlocutory order, since it may be appealed in an appeal of the judgment itself. DASMARINAS T. ARCAINA and MAGNANI T. BANTA vs. NOEMI L. INGRAM, represented by MA. NENETTE L. ARCHINUE February 15, 2017 G.R. No. 196444 Facts: Arcaina is the owner of Lot No. 3230 (property) located at Salvacion, Sto. Domingo, Albay. Sometime in 2004, her attorney-in-fact, Banta, entered into a contract with Ingram for the sale of the property. The contract price

was P1,860,000.00, with Ingram making installment payments for the property from May 5, 2004 to February 10, 2005 totaling P1,715,000.00.6 Banta and Ingram' thereafter executed a Memorandum of Agreement acknowledging the previous payments and that Ingram still had an obligation to pay the remaining balance in the amount of P145,000.00.7 They also separately executed deeds of absolute sale over the property in Ingram's favor. Both deeds described the propertywith an area of SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (6,200) sq. meters more or less. Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be surveyed and discovered that it has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon learning of the actual area of the property, Banta allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains unsold. This was opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue of the sale. The MCTC held in favor of the petitioners and declared that for Ingram to be awarded the excess 5,800 sq. m. portion of the property, she should have presented evidence that she paid for the surplus area consistent with Article 1540 of the Civil Code. Since Ingram failed to show that she paid for the value of the excess land area, the MCTC held that she cannot claim ownership and possession of the whole property. On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Order of the MCTC. The RTC found that neither of the parties presented competent evidence to prove the property's actual area. Hence, the RTC concluded that the area of the property is only 6,200 sq. m. more or less. In addition, the RTC held that Article 1542, which covers sale of real estate in lump sum, applies in this case. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification. Petitioners now assail the CA' s declaration that the sale of the property was made for a lump sum. They insist that they sold the property on a per-square-meter basis, at the rate of P300.00 per sq. m. Since the sale was on a per-square-meter basis, petitioners argue that it is Article 1539,34 and not Article 1542 of the Civil Code, which govems. Issue: Whether the sale was made on a lump sum or persquare-meter basis. Ruling:

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We now resolve the main issue in this case and hold that Lot No. 3230 was sold for a lump sum. In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g, P1,000.00 per sq. m.) or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on an estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., Pl million for 1,000 sq. m., etc.)41 Here, the Deed of Sale executed by Banta on March 21, 2005 and the Deed of Sale executed by Arcaina on April 13, 200543 both show that the property was conveyed to Ingram at the predetermined price of Pl,860,000.00. There was no indication that it was bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus, Article 1542 of the Civil Code governs the sale.

Facts:

However, there is an exception. In Del Prado v. Spouses Caballero, we were confronted with facts analogous to the present petition. We did not apply Article 1542. In holding that Del Prado is entitled only to the area stated in the contract of sale, we explained:

However, on June 8, 2009, instead of an Answer respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on ground of prescription. Citing the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant Case), respondent alleged that the Petition for Review was filed out of time on the ground of having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period.

"x xx. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land Xxx” In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all the land covered within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered by the boundaries and the estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/ she shall do so only when the excess or deficiency between the former and the latter is reasonable. Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled only to 6,200 sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800 sq. m. more than the area intended to be sold is not a reasonable excess that can be deemed included in the sale. Deutsche Knowledge Services Pte. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue December 1, 2016 G.R. No. 197980. Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Petitioner avers that on March 31, 2009, it filed an application for Tax Credit/Refund of its allegedly excess and unutilized input VAT for the 1st quarter of the calendar year 2007 in the amount of P12,549,446.30 with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (empowered to act upon and approve claims for refund or tax credit as provided by law) through its BIR Revenue District No. 47. Citing inaction on the part of respondent, petitioner on April 17, 2009 filed a Petition for Review or seventeen (17) days after petitioner filed an application for tax credit/refund with respondent based on Section 112 and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended.

A day after or on June 9, 2009, respondent filed an Answer again citing the same grounds in the Motion to Dismiss in her Special and Affirmative defenses. After hearing and the filing of Comment/Opposition on the Motion to Dismiss, the former Second Division of this Court resolved to grant said motion on October 28, 2009. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereon on November 16, 2009. However, in an Order dated January 11, 2010, the case was ordered to be transferred to the Third Division of this Court pursuant to CTA Administrative Circular No. 01-2010, "Implementing the Fully Expanded Membership in the Court of Tax Appeals". Notwithstanding, on February 8, 2010, the former Second Division of this Court promulgated a Resolution which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc. However, the said tribunal merely affirmed with modification the assailed resolutions and dismissed petitioner's suit for having been prematurely

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filed prior to the expiration of the 120-day period granted to respondent to resolve the tax claim. Issues: Whether or not the petition for review of the petitioner was made properly pursuant to Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997.

Ruling: YES, the petition for review of the petitioner was made properly. In the instant case, the administrative claim or application for tax credit/refund of its allegedly excess and unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of taxable year 2007 was filed on March 31, 2009 or within the two-year prescriptive period. Respondent had 120 days or until July 29, 2009 to determine the validity of the claim. However, petitioner filed an appeal by way of a petition for review on April 17, 2009 or 17 days after the filing of the administrative claim. Apparently, petitioner did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period and this is in clear contravention of Section 112(D) [now Section 112(C)] of the 1997 NIRC. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque case) and stated that a judicial claim for refund of input VAT which was filed with the CTA before the lapse of the 120-day period under Section 112 of the NIRC is considered to have been timely made, if such filing occurred after the issuance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003. The SC in the San Roque case stated that the "taxpayerclaimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review," In the present case, the records indicate that petitioner filed its administrative claim for tax credit/refund of its allegedly excess and unutilized input VAT for the 1st quarter of the calendar year 2007 in the amount of P12,549,446.30 with respondent on March 31, 2009. Subsequently, petitioner filed its judicial claim on the same matter through a petition for review with the CTA on April 17, 2009. It is undisputed that the aforementioned date of filing falls within the period following the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003.

DIMSON vs. CHUA December 5, 2016 GR No. 192318 Reyes, J. Facts: The case herein is an offshoot from the labor case of illegal dismissal, which was filed by the petitioner representing the other 14 complainants against respondent. The said labor case was decided in favor of the complainants wherein SEASUMCO and MAC, as well as the members of their board of directors, were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P3,827,470.51. Petitioner filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an amended alias writ of execution asking for the inclusion of the board of directors and corporate officers of SEASUMCO and MAC to hold them liable for satisfaction of the decision. The said motion was granted by the LA which resulted in the inclusion of herein respondent. Respondent, aggrieved with the decision, elevated the matter to the NLRC arguing that he was denied of due process. The CA nullified and set aside the rulings of the NLRC, and made the writ of preliminary injunction permanent. The CA held that the respondent was indeed denied of due process for LA cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons, and in the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearing and judgment rendered by the LA are null and void. Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be held solidary liable with the corporation, of which he was an officer and a stockholder, when he was not served with summons and was never impleaded as a party to the case. Held: As to the respondent’s alleged solidary liability with the corporation, the Court sustained the CA’s ruling that the respondent as one of SEASUMCO’s corporate officer 12

and stockholder should not be held solidary liable with the corporation for its monetary liabilities with the petitioner. To hold the director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation of that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that officer acted in bad faith. In the absence of a finding that respondent acted with malice or bad faith, it was error for the labor tribunals to hold him responsible. The piercing of the veil of the corporate fiction is frowned upon and can only be done if it has been clearly established that the separate and distinct personality of the corporation is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate deception. To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be established clearly and convincingly. It cannot be presumed. Heirs of Pacifico Gonzales vs. Juanito De Leon December 7, 2016 G.R. No. 210428. Perez, J. Facts: Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land located at Sitio Guinting, Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by four (4) separate Transfer Certificates of Title registered under the name of Pacifico Gonzales. It appears that the said lots are covered by CARP based on the findings of DAR-PARO. The Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Cabuyao issued a Certification dated 18 July 2002 classifying the subject properties as a municipal park.Late Luningning Gonzales filed an Application for Exemption/Clearance. Petitioners stressed that the land is more than 18% in slope, it is not irrigated, 70% thereof is not cultivated, and is not planted to rice and corn, Petitioners filed a complaint for Ejectment against the respondents before the Municipal Trial Court. The MTC held that the evidence presented by the respondents failed to prove the essential requisites of tenancy relationship between plaintiff and respondents. DAR OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman (OIC-Secretary Pangandaman) acted on the application of the late

Luningning Gonzales and approve the Application for Exemption Clearance. OP affirmed DAR’s decision. Issue: Whether or not the subject lots are exempt from agrarian reform coverage? Held: Yes. Section 10 of CARP provides that Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act.

HEIRS OF SIXTO L. TAN, SR. vs. BELTRAN February 01,2017 A.C. No. 5819 Sereno, CJ. Facts: On July 2001, complainants filed a criminal action which was subsequently dismissed. Respondent as the counsel of the complainants filed an appeal via a Petition for Review before the Secretary of DOJ. It was, however, filed beyond the 15-days reglementary period. Consequently the SOJ dismissed it. The respondent no longer filed a motion for reconsideration to remedy the ruling. On September 2001, complainants instituted a related civil suit to annul the sale of their commercial properties before the RTC of Naga. Respondent was given P7,000 by his clients, to pay the docket fees computed at P 1,722. Unfortunately, the Clerk of Court erred in the assessment of the docket fees. To correct the error, the RTC required the payment of additional docket fees

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through an Order dated 20 May 2002, which respondent received on 29 May 2002. However, two weeks earlier, on 13 May 2002, he had moved to withdraw as counsel with the conformity of his clients. No separate copy of the Order dated 20 May 2002 was sent to any of the complainants. The balance of the docket fees remained unpaid. Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the civil case for nonpayment of docket fees as one of its bases. Aggrieved by their defeat, complainants filed a case against the respondent, for his actions and for he had unduly received P200,000 as attorney’s fee, despite his failure to render effective legal service for them. In his reply, respondent claimed that he could no longer move for the reconsideration as he had only learned of the dismissal after the period to file a motion for reconsideration had lapsed. He argued that while he prepared the Petition for Review, his clients themselves, through Nilo Tan and Recto Tan, signed and filed the same. Thus, he imputed to complainants the belated filing of the appeal. As for the dismissal due to non-payment of docket fees, respondent disclaimed any fault on his part, since he had already withdrawn as counsel in that case. Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for filing belated appeal before the SOJ Held: Yes. The SC ruled that failure of the counsel to appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice.

Issue: Whether the respondent is bound to inform complainants of the RTC Order even after his withdrawal as their counsel.

Held: Yes. The rule that the withdrawal of a counsel with the written conformity of the client is immediately effective, however, is not absolute. When the counsel's impending withdrawal with the written conformity of the client would leave the latter with no legal representation in the case, it is an accepted practice for courts to order the deferment of the effectivity of such withdrawal until such time that it becomes certain that service of court processes and other papers to the party-client would not thereby be compromised - either by the due substitution of the withdrawing counsel in the case or by the express assurance of the party-client that he now undertakes to himself receive serviceable processes and other papers. (Mercado v. CHED) When respondent herein received the RTC Order dated 20 May 2002, complainants still had no new counsel on record. Therefore, Atty. Beltran should have acted with prudence by informing his previous clients that he had received the directive of the court requiring the payment of docket fees. The respondent failed to act with prudence by failing to inform complainants of the RTC Order. Issue: Whether respondent unduly received P200,000 as attorney's fees.

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Held:

The excuse forwarded by respondent - that he delegated the filing of the Petition for Review to complainants - will not exculpate him from administrative liability. Respondent cannot disclaim negligence, since he was the lawyer tasked to pursue the legal remedies available to his clients.

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.

Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.

Complainants have the burden to discharge that required quantum of proof. Their argument has no other supporting evidence - object, documentary, or testimonial. General allegations will not meet the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence. 14

executory. The subject property was then transferred to NIDSLAND. Then Napal filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment, Napal sought the nullification of the SEC decision as well as the orders and writs issued pursuant to it. He argued that the SEC has no jurisdiction over the IMPERIAL & NISLAND CORP. vs. ARMES January 30, 2017 GR No. 178842 Jardeleza, J. Facts: Napal and Imperial entered into a MOA to organize a domestic corporation to be named NIDSLAND, for which they agreed to entered into a real estate business. For his capital contribution to the corporation, Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land consisting of four lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title, and to Imperial a two hectare portion of the Property situated in Taysan, Legazpi City intended for subdivision project. Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under the MOA, however, Napal failed to convey to NIDSLAND a certain portion of the property which was subsequently sold by Napal to Cruz as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. As Napal continued to refuse to convey the subject property to NIDSLAND under the MOA, Imperial filed for himself and in representation of NIDSLAND, a derivative suit before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Imperial also filed a notice of lispendens for the SEC case with the Registry of Deeds of Legazpi City. The notice of lispendens was carried over to the new TCT issued in the name of Cruz. The SEC case proceeded without the participation of Cruz who had possession of the new TCT covering the subject property during the continuation of the hearings. SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales rendered a decision in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND. The decision declared the Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab initio as the SEC found that the sale was simulated and was intentionally made to appear to have been perfected prior to the filing of the notice of lispendens. Thus, the SEC ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further, the SEC directed Napal to execute the proper deed of conveyance of the subject property in favor of NIDSLAND. The SEC also mandated Napal to deliver the possession of the subject property to NIDSLAND. Napal did not appeal rendering the decision final and

SEC case as it did not involve any intra-corporate controversy. CA on its decision dismissed the appeal, such annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not available to annul SEC decision, and the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. Following the decision of CA, the case was redocketed to the RTC, after trial parties submitted their respective memorandum in which Imperial and NIDSLAND assail the jurisdiction of the case. They file an Omnibus Motion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, such motion was denied. Imperial and NIDSLAND then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, such petition assailed the validity of Respondent Judge Armes' orders, however such petition was dismiss for lack of merit. Imperial then moved for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed this petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the two assailed resolutions, they argue that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision on the RTC petition. They argue that the CA should have reversed the error of the RTC Legazpi City in allowing the filing of the RTCpetition way beyond the 60-day period for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. They stress that the RTC petition was filed three and a half years after the finality of the SEC decision and two years and three months from the time Cruz received notice of its promulgation. They argue thatneither the CA nor Cruz was able to present any compelling reason for the relaxation of the reglementary period. While the First Petition was pending, RTC Legazpi City rendered a decision dated March 24, 2009. The RTC Legazpi City ruled that SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales acted with grave abuse of discretion when he annulled the Deed of Sale of the subject property between Napal and Cruz, ordered the cancellation of Cruz's TCT, and directed Napal to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of NIDSLAND. According to the RTC main decision, the CA has already definitively settled the issue of RTC Legazpi City's 15

jurisdiction over the case. It held that there is no merit in Imperial and NIDSLAND's contention that the RTC petition should have been dismissed for noncompliance with the 60-day period for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari and for failure of the RTC petition to state the material dates. On the other hand, the RTC main decision found that the SEC had no jurisdiction over Cruz and as such, in issuing orders affecting his ownership over the subject property, it violated Cruz's right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. Further, the RTC Main Decision stated that RTC Legazpi City cannot settle the issue as to the rightful ownership of the subject property in a special civil action for certiorari. The RTC Main Decision however affirmed the award of damages in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND in the SEC case. Issue: Whether RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the decision of the SEC? Held: The Supreme Court ruled the RTC petition should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and that the SEC decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction. Upon examination of the RTC petition, the SC rules that contrary to the findings of the lower courts, it is an action for the annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They held that the issue of the RTC petition's allegation is that the SEC declared as void ab initio the sale between Napal and Cruz without impleading Cruz in the proceedings. The SEC also had no power to order the transfer of title over the subject property from Cruz to NIDSLAND because Cruz was never heard in these proceedings. It is true in Cruz assertion that the SEC never acquired jurisdiction over his person. However in the issue raised, and with the passage of BP 129, it expressly vested the CA with jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of regional trial courts. Notably, it does not mention jurisdiction over annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies. While it is correct that both the regional trial courts and the CA cannot take cognizance of a petition for annulment of judgment of a quasi-judicial body under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, they may nevertheless do so, if a law categorically provides for such a remedy and clearly provides them with jurisdiction.

Applying this to the present case, we rule that there is no law at the time pertinent to this case, which allows the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC’s and the CA to set aside a void judgment of the SEC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. SC hasten to emphasize, however, that this pertains only to cases filed prior to RA 8799 which transferred the jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes to regional trial courts designated as commercial courts. As to the latter, Rule 4 7 clearly applies. This leads to the conclusion that the RTC petition is not the proper remedy to assail the SEC decision. Since it is an action for the annulment of judgment, the RTC petition cannot prosper as pointed out by SC because such remedy is not available in this particular case. However, the error in Cruz's RTC petition does not automatically warrant a dismissal of these proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled that the SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napal and Cruz and in ordering the cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of NIDSLAND, overstepped its jurisdiction. The SEC decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the SEC also does not possess the expertise to go into the reception of evidence and the conduct of hearings geared for the purpose of resolving issues proper for a civil action. The resolution of a civil action requires preponderance of evidence as a burden of proof. On the other hand, cases before quasi-judicial bodies require only substantial evidence. Hence, the propriety of annulling a sale and cancelling a Torrens title-which are in the nature of a civil action-on the basis merely of substantial evidence determined by an administrative body, raises due process concerns. Hence, because the SEC decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion and is therefore void, all acts emanating from it have no force and effect. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance issued pursuant to it has no legal effect. Jaime N. Soriano, et al. vs. Margarito B. Teves January 24, 2017 G.R. No. 184450/G.R. No. 184508/G.R. No. 184538/G.R. No. 185234 Sereno, CJ. Facts: These consolidated petitions seek to nullify certain provisions of Revenue Regulations No.10-2008. The RR 16

was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on 24 September 2008 to implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 9504. The law granted, among others, income tax exemption for minimum wage earners (MWEs), as well as an increase in personal and additional exemptions for individual taxpayers. The regulation allegedly restricts the implementation of the MWEs’ income tax exemption only to the period starting from 8 July 2008, instead of applying the exemption to the entire year 2008. They further challenge the BIR’s adoption of the prorated application of the new set of personal and additional exemptions for taxable year 2008. They also contest the validity of the RR’s alleged imposition of a condition for the availment by MWE s of the exemption provided by R.A. 9504. Supposedly, in the event they received other benefits in excess of P30,000, they can no longer avail themselves of that exemption. Petitioners contend that the law provides for the conditional exemption of MWEs from income tax and, thus, pray that the RR be nullified. Issues: Whether the increased personal and additional exemptions provided by R.A. 9504 should be applied to the entire taxable year 2008 or prorated, considering that R.A. 9504 took effect only on 6 July 2008. Whether an MWE is exempt for the entire taxable year 2008 or from 6 July 2008 only. Whether Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 are consistent with the law in providing that an MWE who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of P30,000 is no longer entitled to the exemption provided by R.A. 9504. Held: Yes. The personal and additional exemptions by R.A. 9504 should be applied to the entire taxable year 2008. The test is whether the new set of personal and additional exemptions was available at the time of the filing of the income tax return. In other words, while the status of the individual taxpayers is determined at the close of the taxable year, their personal and additional exemptions are reckoned when the tax becomes due, and not while the income is being earned or received. Further, R.A. 9504, like R.A. 7176 in Umali vs. Estanislao, was a piece of social legislation clearly intended to

afford immediate tax relief to individual taxpayers, particularly low-income compensation earners. The MWE is exempt for the entire taxable year 2008. The calendar year 2008 remained as one taxable year for an individual taxpayer. Therefore, RR-2008 cannot declare the income earned by a minimum wage earner from 1 January 2008 to 5 July 2008 to be taxable and those earned by him for the rest of that year to be taxexempt. Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 add a requirement not found in the law by effectively declaring that an MWE who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of P30,000 is no longer entitled to the exemption provided by R.A. 9504. To be exempt, one must be an MWE. Section 22 (HH) of the NIRC says he/she must be one who is paid statutory minimum wage if he/she works in the private sector, or not more than the statutory minimum wage in the non-agricultural sector where he/she is assigned, if he/she is a government employee. Thus, one is either an MWE or he/she is not. B. STA. ANA vs. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. (MCJI) February 15, 2017 G.R. 208459 Del Castillo, J. Facts: MCJI dismissed Julieta Sta. Ana as teller of its off-track betting outlet in Tayuman. The company cited loss of trust and confidence on her as ground. She allegedly (1) used MCJI personnel during office hours as conduit for her lending business, and (2) extended loan using corporate fund in one occasion. The second accusation stemmed from the cash shortages in the Treasury Department where Tejada, a friend of Sta. Ana, worked as Assistant Head/Cashier. The Special Disciplinary Committee (SDC) of MCJI reported that Tejada was lending money to co-employees using corporate fund. Herein petitioner was implicated based on the testimony of Benjie Sunga that the money he borrowed from Sta. Ana came from Tejada. Petitioner contested the validity of her dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC found it valid. The CA affirmed said decision hence this petition for review on certiorari. Issue:

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Whether or not Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Held: No, the dismissal of Sta. Ana was not valid. As a rule, petition under Rule 45 covers only questions of law subject to some exceptions. Said exceptions include a situation where the CA manifestly overlooked undisputed relevant facts which would warrant a different conclusion. To legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust, the employer must establish that: a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property; b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts; and, c) such loss of trust relates to the employee's performance of duties. While the petitioner held a position of trust and confidence and MCJI afforded her procedural due process, the respondent failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove items b and c above. The two borrowers who testified that a company driver delivered the money to them did not say that it was done during office hours. For the missing corporate fund, MCJI was not able to present credible evidence to link it to Sta. Ana’s business. Mere allegation of being business partner with Tejada does not prove the involvement of Tejada in her lending activities. The petitioner on the other hand presented various evidence to show her sources of funds used as capital for her lending business such as bank statements, bank certification of mortgaging her real property, and proof of selling property. LEODEGARIA SANCHEZ-PONTIGON vs. HEIRSD OF MELITON SANCHEZ December 5, 2016 GR. No. 221513 Perez,j. Facts: Meliton Sanchez had been the owner of a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Gutad, Floridablanca, Pampanga. Said property was duly-registered in his

name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 207 issued on October 15, 1938. Meliton died intestate, leaving the subject property to his surviving heirs Apollo, Juan and Flaviana. Juan is the father of Leodegaria, herein petitioner. The other heirs (respondents) alleged that they were deprived of their inheritance because while the property in issue has never been partitioned among the heirs, the petitioners fraudulently cause the registration of the parcel of land with the Register of Deeds in their own name, and in lieu of which, a Transfer Certificate of Title has been issued and the Original Certificate of Title cancelled. The petitioner also obtained a loan in the amount of P6,617,000.00 with Quedan and Rural and Credit Guarantee, and mortgaged the property to secure the said obligation an act which the respondent alleged to be fraudulently done, contending further that Quedan failed to verify the real owner of the property. Hence, herein respondents seek to declare the Transfer Certificate and consequently the mortgaged as null and void. In their affirmative defense, the petitioner alleged that the conveyance of the property subject of the dispute is evidence by an extrajudicial settlement, and that the co-owners Apollo, Juan, Flaviana sold the property to herein petitioners. They further contend that the action to nullify the same is already barred by prescription. While Quedan on the other hand averred that the mortgage is done in good faith since it has already verified the veracity of the title of the Petitioner with the Registrar of Deed. The RTC ruled that the action is not barred by prescription since the action is reconvenyance of property resulting from “trust relationship” established among the parties which is the exception to the 1 year prescriptive period to nullify Torrens Certificate of title. The CA affirmed the lower court, hence this case. Issue: Whether or not respondents' cause of action is barred by prescription Held: It is already barred by prescription. Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one ( 1) year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action 18

for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud. However, actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts may be allowed beyond the one-year period. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about. Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Accordingly, respondents should have commenced the action within ten (10) years reckoned from May 21, 1980, the date of issuance of TCT No. 162403-R, instead of on September 17, 2000 or more than twenty (20) years thereafter. Issues: Whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement binds the respondents. Held: The extrajudicial settlement binds the respondents. The extra judicial settlement is a private document that binds the parties to the agreement. This still holds true notwithstanding the glaring irregularities in the Petition for Approval. Obvious to the eye and intellect as the errors may be, they are of no moment since the Extrajudicial Settlement, a private writing and unpublished as it were, nevertheless remains to be binding upon any person who participated thereon or had notice thereof.

business under the name and style of UNIMASTER," was indebted to him in the amount of P 1,500,000.00, representing the price of boulders, sand, gravel, and other construction materials allegedly purchased by respondent from him for the construction of the Macagtas Dam in Barangay Macagtas,Catarman, Northern Samar. He claimed that the said obligation has long become due and demandable and yet, respondent unjustly refused to pay the same despite repeated demands. Further, he averred that respondent had issued three (3) bank checks, payable to "CASH" in the amount of P500,000.00 but when petitioner presented the subject checks for encashment on June 29, 1998, the same were dishonored due to a stop payment order. As such, respondent was guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation. RTC ruled that petitioner had a cause of action against respondent and ordered him to pay the petitioner the amount of P 1, 500, 000.00 representing the principal obligation and legal interest. CA reversed the ruling and found that petitioner’s unpaid deliveries had no merit. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. Issue:Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of cause of action. Held:Yes.The Court holds that the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint against respondent on the ground of lack of cause of action. Respondent was not able to overcome the presumption of consideration under Section 24 of the NIL and establish any of his affirmative defenses. On the other hand, as the holder of the subject checks which are presumed to have been issued for a valuable consideration, and having established his privity of contract with respondent, petitioner has substantiated his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence.

MANUEL C. UBAS, SR. vs. WILSON CHAN FEBRUARY 06, 2017 G.R. No. 215910 Perlas –Bernabe, J.

“'Preponderance of evidence' is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." Consequently, petitioner's Complaint shouldbe granted.

Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint for sum of money with application for writ of attachment before the RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar, Branch 19. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent, "doing

Although the checks were under the account name of Unimasters, it should be emphasized that the manner or mode of payment does not alter the nature of the 19

obligation. The source of obligation, as claimed by petitioner in this case, stems from his contract with respondent. When they agreed upon the purchase of the construction materials on credit for the amount of P1,500,000.00, the contract between them was perfected. Therefore, even if corporate checks were issued for the payment of the obligation, the fact remains that the juridical tie between the two (2) parties was already yestablished during the contract's perfection stage and, thus, does not preclude the creditor from proceeding against the debtor during the contract's consummation stage. Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra December 1, 2016 A.C. No. 11394. Perlas-Bernabe, J Facts: This instant administative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainant complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws 2 and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio ), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009. In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing complainant. The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause. His posts include the following excerpts: In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his

circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. He also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant. He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment. Issues: Whether respondent can validly invoke his right to privacy and whether respondent can validly invoke freedom of speech. Held: NO. He cannot invoke his right to privacy. Respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. The defense is untenable. Before, can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity -in this case, Facebook -it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without 20

any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same -or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile -will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following: 1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way"; 2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and 4. A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Face book friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated. He cannot validly invoke freedom of speech. As to the second issue, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ( "binaboy ") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services -all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa -which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice." In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI' s reputation. That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.. MAYOR MICHAEL L. RAMA vs. HON. GILBERT P. MOISES December 06, 2016 G.R. No. 197146, Benjamin, J. Facts: 21

The Cebu City formed the Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) in 1974.From 1974 to 2002, the Cebu City Mayor appointed all the members of the MCWD Board of Directors in accordance with Section 3 (b) of P. D. No. 198. It appears that Mayor Osmeña would be appointing Joel Mari S. Yu to replace Atty. Sitoy as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors. Governor Garcia filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the appointment of Yu as a member of the MCWD Board of Directors alleging that the appointment by Mayor Osmeña was illegal; and that it was the Provincial Governor of Cebu who was vested with the authority to appoint members of the MCWD Board of Directors because the total active water service connections of Cebu City and of the other cities and municipalities were below 75% of the total water service connections in the area of the MCWD. Issue: Whether the appointment of the board of directors of MCWD should be vested to the Provincial Governor. Held: No. Settled is the rule that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially struck down for being repugnant to the local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to LGUs, and for being inconsistent with the Local Government Code and related laws on local governments. Following the 1987 Constitution, Cebu City is reclassified as Highly Urbanized City. Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the province. All matters relating to its administration, powers and functions were exercised through its local executives led by the City Mayor, subject to the President's retained power of general supervision over Highly Urbanized Cities. In the case at bar, the decree was enacted to provide adequate, quality and reliable water and waste-water services to meet the needs of the local communities and their growing populations. The needs of the communities served were paramount. Hence, we deem it to be inconsistent with the true objectives of the decree to still leave to the provincial governor the appointing authority if the provincial governor had administrative supervision only over municipalities and component cities accounting for 16.92% of the active water service connection in the MCWD.Section 3(b) of

P.D. 198 is unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG vs. LEOMAR BUENO February 7, 2017 G.R. No. 191416 Reyes, J. Facts: The canteen owned by Emelita Mamba in Tuao, Cagayan was robbed. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan created by the Sanggunian Bayan of Tuao who undertook an investigation on the robbery invited Bueno, a minor at that time, for questioning on his supposed involvement in the incident to which the latter and his mother acceded. According to the herein petitioners, since there were no police investigators at that time, Bueno’s custody was referred to the Task Force. Bueno’s custody was only transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office after four days. However, according to Bueno, he was brought to Mayor Mamba’s house by some members of the Task Force and was subsequently beaten inside a van. His coaccused was also invited and they were both tortured to force them to admit to their involvement in the robbery. Respondent’s mother, Maritess, sought the assistance of P/Supt. Buenaobra but Bueno was already released. Maritess filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with CA and it was granted. The subsequent MR was also denied. The petitioner claims inter alia that a writ of amparo is not the proper remedy. Respondent claims that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period and that the MR was a prohibited pleading because it is dilatory. Issue: Whether the petition for review on certiorari before the Court was filed within the reglementary period Held: Yes, the petition was filed within the reglementary period. Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that an appeal from the final judgment under 22

Rule 45 shall be 5 working days from the notice of the adverse judgment. Also, the rule does not prohibit filing

of MR of a final judgment because it no longer affects the summary proceeding of the petition. What is prohibited are MRs against interlocutory orders or interim relief orders. Issue: Whether the grant of a Writ of Amparo was proper Held: Yes, the grant was proper. A writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence. In the case, the positive testimony of the respondent, corroborated by his witnesses, meets this requisite. In contrast, the testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners merely consisted in denial which is inherently a weak defense. Although the respondent was already released, a writ of amparo may still be issued to facilitate the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action. Medina v. Lizardo January 31, 2017 A.C. No. 10533 Leonardo-De Castro, J. Facts: Silvestra entrusted the owner’s duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 13866 and 3900 to Atty. Lizardo. However, since complainants are not the only owners of the properties, other heirs were asking for the original duplicate copies, requesting the return of said TCTs in 2011 but Atty. Lizardo refused because of lack of Martinez written consent. According to Atty. Lizardo, Silvestra and her sister Alicia entrusted the TCTs to him in 1987 because their shares in lots 456, 457, and 458 were sold to Martinez but their co-owners resisted the transfer of the titles to said properties, forcing them to file a Complaint for Partition. Martinez shouldered all the legal expenses for the partition to protect his interest. Upon the death of Alicia, her heirs executed an

Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale wherein the heirs agreed to convey in favor of Martinez. During the Mandatory Conference in 2011, Santos testified that he and Silvestra did not notice that said lots were sold and they did not read the Extrajudicial Settlement since they trusted Atty. Lizardo to sell only one parcel of land covering 1,000 square meters. This prompted them to terminate the services of Atty. Lizardo for total loss of trust and confidence and prayed for the latter’s disbarment. In the IBP Board of Governors Resolution, it was found that Atty. Lizardohas represented conflicting interests. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Lizardo violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving conflicting interests. Held: Yes. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. In the case at bar, it is undeniable that complainants, on one hand, and Martinez, on the other, have conflicting interests with regard to the disputed property which complainants assert they never sold to Martinez. Atty. Lizardo now finds himself arguing against the ownership by Silvestra and Santos of their shares in the disputed property, which is the very legal position he was bound to defend as their counsel in the partition case. As counsels for Silvestra and Alicia, Atty. Lizardo is required to deliver the property of his client when due or upon demand, and mandated to always be loyal to them and vigilant to protect their interests, in accordance with the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. 23

However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Atty. Lizardo's withholding of the TCTs entrusted to him by his clients to protect another purported client who surreptitiously acquired his services despite a conflict of interest is therefore a clear violation of several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. MEJIA-ESPINOZA and MEJIA-DELLOSA vs. CARIŇO January 25, 2017 G.R. No. 193397 Jardeleza, J. Facts: Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza was the plaintiff in an action for ejectment against NenaCariño before MTC of Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On August 25, 1998, MTC rendered a joint decision in favour of Espinoza. Cariño appealed to the RTC of Dagupan City which reversed the decision. Espinoza appealed to the CA which reversed the RTC decision and affirmed the decision of the MTC. Cariño was not able to elevate the case on certiorari because of her failure to file within extended period. Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution before the MTC. MTC granted the motion. On March 16, 2005, the writ was served by Sheriff Hortaleza upon Cariño. At that time, Sheriff Hortaleza found out the Cariño already vacated the place. Sheriff Hortaleza was able to successfully turn over the property to the plaintiff. He also levied a separate commercial lot owned by Nena to cover the monetary awards for rent, litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. Cariño filed a complaint before the RTC of Dagupan City arguing that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration on the order granting the writ of execution because she was not furnished a copy thereof. In her answer, Espinoza emphasized that the

writ of execution was properly served and received by Cariño on March 16, 2005. She added that Cariño already removed all her personal belongings from the premises before the service of writ. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that Cariña correctly filed the petition in accordance with Section 10 of Rule 47. (Remedial Law; Rule 47) Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the respondent’s complaint. Held: No. The RTC did not err in dismissing the complaint. A petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed only under certain extraordinary circumstances. Under Rule 47, there are three requirements. First, remedy is available only when petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. Second, an action for annulment of judgment may be based only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Third, the action must be filed within the temporal window allowed by the Rules. The averments of Cariño’s complaint do not make out an action for annulment of judgment or final order. The MTC’s issuance of the writ of execution, the notice of levy and notice of sale on the real property are not judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. The proper remedy for Cariño was to file a motion to nullify the writ of execution and notices of levy and sale before the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint. Therefore, the petition is granted. The CA decision is reversed and set aside. The decision of the RTC is hereby affirmed. NUEV A ECIJA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., AREA I, Mr. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, President, Board of Directors, and Mrs. EULALIA CASTRO, General Manager vs. ELMER B. MAPAGU February 15, 2017 G.R. No. 196084 Jardeleza, j: 24

Facts: Respondent Elmer B. Mapaguwas employed with NEEC as a data processor. The National Electrification Administration (NEA) conducted a special audit on the power bills and accounts receivables of the consumers, as well as related internal control and procedure, of NEEC. The audit revealed unaccounted consumption or readings which have accumulated due to under-reading and under-billing in prior years or months. Mapagu's electric consumption was found to be under-read and under-billed. As a result, petitioners charged Mapagu with grave violations of Sections 7.2.18 & 7.2.19 of the NEEC Code of Ethics and Discipline. Mapagu denied the allegation. NEEC created an Investigation and Appeals Committee (IAC) to investigate Mapagu and the other workers implicated in the special audit. The IAC held that while the charges of under-reading and under billing were not established, Mapagu failed to observe the highest degree of honesty as an employee. Nevertheless, and for humanitarian reasons, the IAC recommended that Mapagu only be suspended for two years, and was also ordered to pay his unbilled consumption. However, Mapagu received a Notice of Dismissal from service. Hence, he filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of allowances against petitioners. Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioners. Mapagu appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA. Petitioners sought reconsideration but this was denied by the NLRC. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules). The CA dismissed the petition outright. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Mapagu filed his Comment, claiming that the petition is filed out of time. He asserts that petitioners themselves disclosed that they received the Resolution of the CA denying their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011; hence, they only had until April 2, 2011 to file a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was filed on May 5, 2011, well beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners filed their Reply and insist that they have 60 days from March 17, 2011 (or until May 17, 2011) to file the petition for review on certiorari. Since the petition was filed on May 6, 2011, they maintain that the same

was in fact, filed 11 days ahead of the deadline for submission.

Issue: Whether the petition for review on certiorari was, filed before the CA within the reglementary period? Ruling: NO, The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The case before us calls for the application of the requirements of appeal under Rule 45, to wit: Sec. 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition. Petitioners failed to comply with the foregoing provisions. They confuse petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution sought to be appealed. Here, petitioners received the Resolution of the CA denying their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011. Under the Rules, they have until April 1, 2011 to file the petition. However; they filed the same only on May 6, 2011. This was 50 days beyond the 15-day period provided under Section 2, Rule 45 and 30 days beyond the extension asked for. Even if petitioners were given the maximum period of extension of 30 days, their petition before us still cannot stand. The Rules allow only for a maximum period of 45 days within which an aggrieved party may file petition for review on certiorari.

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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ASHARY M. ALAUY December 06, 2016 A.M. No. SDC-14-7-P PER CURIAM Facts: The financial audit on the books of accounts of Mr. Alauya, Clerk of Court VI, SDC, Marawi City was conducted for failure of the aforesaid court to submit monthly financial reports despite several notices and due to the anonymous letter-complaint filed against its clerk of court. Mr. Alauya denied that there were shortages incurred, non-remittance and/or delay in the remittance of collections and branded these charges as baseless and fabricated. Issue: Whether the Clerk of Court is liable of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Held: Yes. The clerk of court is an important officer in our judicial system. His office is the nucleus of all court activities, adjudicative and administrative. His administrative functions are as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. The clerk of court performs a very deficate function. He or she is the custodian of the courts funds and revenues, records, property and premises. Being the custodian thereof, the clerk of court is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and property. In the present case, it was established that cash bonds for the FF were not remitted to the depository bank, but instead, were kept by respondent clerk of court until withdrawn by the bondsmen.By failing to properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Mr. Alauya violated the trust reposed in him as the disbursing officer of the Judiciary. Delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty because this omission deprives the court of the interest

that could have been earned if the amounts were deposited in the authorized depository bank. It should be stressed that clerks of court are required by SC Circular No. 13-92 to withdraw interest earned on deposits, and to remit the same to the account of the JDF within two (2) weeks after the end of each quarter. Delay in the remittance of court funds in the period required casts a serious doubt on the court employee's trustworthiness and integrity. Mr. Alauya's failure to remit the court funds is tantamount to gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. PD 1271 COMMITTEE vs. RODRIGUEZ December 5, 2016 GR. No. 187291 Leonen, J. Facts: These consolidated case concern the validation of certain properties under PD 1271, which declared null and void all orders and decisions decreeing lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation in favor of the private parties. Rodriguez claims that the subject Transfer Certificates of Titles therein present an identical situation as that of titles found by the CA not to correspond to any application for validation that may be considered by the Baguio Validation Committee. She insists applying the law of the case. Issue: Whether the doctrine of law of the case applies on the application for validation of two the certificate of titles. Held: No. The law of the case does not apply to bar any ruling on the Transfer Certificates of Title. The doctrine of the law of the case provides that questions of law previously determined by a court will generally govern a case through all its subsequent stages where “the determination has already been made on prior appeal to a court of law resort. In People vs. Olarte, ‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such 26

decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

1. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees.

If an appellate court has determined a legal issue and has remanded it to the lower court for further proceedings, another appeal in that same case should no longer differently determine the legal issue previously passed upon. Similar to res judicata, it is a refusal to reopen what was already been decided.

2. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals on the other Transfer Certificates of Title is not a ruling that can bind or limit this court on another matter. The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of all legal questions brought before it. This court’s decision constitutes the final disposition of the case. This court’s judgment, when final, binds the lower courts and not the other way around. It is the lower courts that are bound by and cannot alter or modify doctrine. Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) vs. Michael B. Esquivel, et al. December 1, 2016 G.R. No. 218454. Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members thereto. On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1 % ) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries. The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase. Issues:

3. Whether the unreasonable.

agency

is

exorbitant

and

Rulings: 1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee” from nonunion members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed. 2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned. In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the 27

“inadvertent omission” of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union member. While the matter of implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up during the PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was no sufficient showing that the same had been duly deliberated and approved. The minutes of the Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN’s claim that the increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off were duly approved since it merely stated that “the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be implemented,” meaning, it would still require the submission of such matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval. 3. Yes. Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the increase in union dues from one percent (1 %) to two percent (2% ), as well as the deduction of the two percent (2%) union dues during PEUNUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July 1, 2010 GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in its March 6, 2012 Order, the July 1 2010 GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving the proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off, but merely to “confirm and affirm” a purported prior action which PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish. Corollary, no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom, and the submission of the November 2008 check-off authorizations becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union dues and agency fees more than that allowed in the

expired CBA, i.e., at one percent (1 %) of the employee’s monthly basic salary.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO January 25, 2017 GR No. 212818 Del Castillo, J. Facts: On November 17, 2002, Roberto Solayao was having a drinking session at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City. Paquito Solayao, Roberto’s father, came to fetch his son when he saw three persons fighting. He claimed that it was Gregorio who was holding Roberto’s hand at the back while Fleno was stabbing the victim. When Roberto’s father shouted, the assailants ran away. Roberto’s father ran after them but did not pursue the assailants anymore when they reached a dark alley. They brought Roberto to the nearest hospital buthe was already dead. Gregorio, the accused, claimed that he did not know nor met the victim even once. He was only invited to the birthday party where they had eaten and had partaken of liquor. He added that Roberto was angry with them. So to avoid trouble, he decided to leave the place of celebration. However, the group of Roberto was waiting for them along the road. Afterwards, a fight erupted. Fortunately, the residents of the place were able to pacify the protagonists. They left and went home. In 2004, he transferred his family from Sucat, Muntinlupa to Dasmariñas, Cavite. It was only in 2007 that someone told him about the warrant of arrest waiting for him in Parañaque City. On January 8, 2007, Quita was arrested and the case was revived. The Regional Trial Court found Gregorio guilty of the treacherous killing of Roberto Solayao. The testimonies of Paquitov Solayao and Dr. Vida, according to RTC, were enough to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused sought an appeal to the CA but to no avail. The CA only modified the civil liability but sustained the RTC decision with regards the criminal liability of Quita. Issue: Whether or not Gregorio Quita is guilty of murder for killing Roberto Solayao.

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(2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;

Held: Yes. The elements of murder are (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The Supreme Court is satisfied that the findings of both lower courts are in accord with the evidence on record. However, the civil liability shall be modified to conform strictly to the recent jurisprudence.

(3) that such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. The prosecution failed to prove the presence of force, threat, or intimidation. There was no evidence that the knife nearby was intended to threaten or intimidate AAA. Appellant did not even utter any word to such effect and AAA did not show any hint of rejecting him. Marquez immediately desisted when the alleged victim tried to move after feeling a slight pain during their sexual congress. Prosecution also failed to establish the absence of will power due to drunkenness. AAA was even able to stand up and go home immediately after the alleged rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC MARQUEZ February 15, 2017 G.R. 212193 Del Castillo, J.

People vs. Palanay February 1, 2017 G.R. No. 224583 Velasco, Jr., J.

Facts:

Facts:

AAA, 24 years old, testified that she had a drinking session with her assailants that night. Feeling dizzy, she took a nap. She woke up with 14 year old Elvin James Meneses raping her. She did not resist for fear that she would be killed with the knife lying in a table nearby. When Meneses left the room, herein respondent came in and asked her if he could have sex with her too. When she did not answer because she was still shivering, Marquez mounted her. Thereafter, respondent left the room and AAA went home.

Accussed-appellant Michael Palanay was found guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.

The trial court and later the CA found Juan Richard Marquez guilty of rape. Meneses could not be prosecuted due to his minority. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Juan Richard Marquez guilty of rape. Held: Yes.All the elements of rape must be present to overcome the presumption of appellant’s innocence, to wit: (1) that the offender is a man;

According to the victim, she was sleeping when she felt that someone was removing her pants and underwear. Upon waking-up, she discovered that it was her uncle and her mother’s brother, Palanay, who was lying beside her and was removing his own short pants. She narrated that Palanay kissed her lips, touched her breasts, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Accussed-appellant denied the accusations and as a defense told the court that he was at a friend’s house drinking until the wee hours of the morning during that day. He also contend that the charge against him was driven by the fight he had with the victim’s mother. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of qualified rape. Held: Yes. The elements of qualified rape as provided by Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B are as follows: 29

1. Sexual congress; 2. With a woman; 3. Done by force, threat, or intimidation without consent; 4. Victim is under 18 years of age at the time of rape; 5. Offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the victim, or the common-law spouse of the victim’s parent. In the case at bar, the victim asserted her uncle’s carnal knowledge of her as evidenced by undressing and touching her against her will and forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina. The Supreme Court ruled that accused-appellant’s argument that the victim failed to resist his advances are not tenable as rape victims react differently, with some offering strong resistance while others are left too weak to defend themselves. The Court added that in the case at bar, the accused-appellant being the victim’s uncle provided additional fear as he is expected to exercise moral authority over her, which in turn caused her to be immobilized and unable to offer physical resistance. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SUSAN M. TAMAÑO and JAFFY B. GULMATICO December 5, 2016 GR.208643 Peralta, J. Facts: Appellants Susan M. Tamaño and Jaffy B. Gulmatico were convicted of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.No.) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.Appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the CA to this Court via a Notice of Appeal. Issue: Whether there was a valid buy-bust operation Held: Yes. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu in this case, the following elements must be sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction therefor: ( 1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the

seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drugs seized as evidence. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods. 2.) Whether the chain of custody rule was complied with. Held: Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as follows: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized item from the time it was firstdiscovered until it was brought to the court for examination. The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until they are presented in court.

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People of the Philippines vs. Willy Vallar et. al. December 05, 2016 G.R. No. 196256 Sereno, CJ: Facts: That on June 21, 1989, accused Willy, Danny, Oracleo and Edgardo stole cash money of P15,000 from the store of Bagabaldo. Oracleo and Edgardo acted as lookouts. Danny and Willy pointed their guns and declared robbery, shot and stabbed Cipriano Opiso. RTC held Oracleo Vallar, Jr. et al guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstance of employment of disguise and commission of the crime by a band. CA modified ruling of the RTC and changed it to crime of robbery with homicide only, attended by the aggravating circumstances of employment of disguise and abuse of superior strength. Issue: Whether there is proof that appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of employment of disguise and abuse of superior strength. Held: Yes. It was held that the testimonies have been clear, categorical and straightforward. That even though the face of accused was not seen directly, he has been familiar with the physical build and bodily actions of the appellants. Concerning the legal characterization of the crime, the Court found that its proper designation is not robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide as inaccurately labeled by the prosecution and unwittingly adopted by the trial court but simply one of robbery with homicide. It has been jurisprudentially settled that the term homicide in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is to be used in its generic sense, to embrace not only the acts that result in death, but all other acts producing any bodily injury short of death. It is thus characterized as such regardless of the number of the homicides committed and the physical injuries inflicted. Both lower courts have properly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of employment of disguise, the commission of a crime by a band was not

established because Willy, Danny and Oracleo were proven to have carried arms. Nevertheless, the CA properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of superior strength, considering the number of malefactors and the kind of weapons used in facilitating the commission of the crime. PNB vs Raymundo December 07, 2016 G.R. No. 208672 Peralta, J. Facts: On July 30, 1993, Pablo V. Raymundo then Department Manager of PNB San Pedro Branch, approved for deposit a foreign draft in the amount of $172,549.00 issued by Solomon Guggenheim Foundation, drawn against Morgan Guaranty Company of New York, payable to Merry May Juan in the opening of the latter's checking account with PNB San Pedro Branch.On even date, Ms. Juan drew six (6) PNB Checks, five (5) of which were made payable to C&T Global Futures and one (1) payable to "CASH", all in the aggregate amount of FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00). The six (6) checks were negotiated by Ms. Juan and were approved for payment on the same day by Raymundo, without waiting for the foreign draft check, intended to fund the issued check, to be cleared by the PNB Foreign Currency Clearing Unit. For irregularly approving the payment of the six (6) checks issued by Ms. Juan, without waiting for the foreign draft check to be cleared, Raymundo, as then Department Manager of PNB San Pedro Branch, was administratively charged by PNB for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service and/or Gross Violation of Bank's Rules and Regulations. Accused Pablo V. Raymundo denied the allegations that he committed acts. He noted that it is the duty of the bookkeeper to go over the records of the account of each particular client. The RTC held that it would be too harsh and inequitable to impose criminal liability considering that Raymundo's duties as Branch Manager entailed a lot of responsibility and found it almost unreasonable to expect him to directly and personally check the books of accounts of each particular client.

31

CA ruled that Raymundo acted in good faith in relying upon his subordinates. It held that he has no duty to go beyond the verification of the documents submitted by the bookkeeper and the accountant, and to personally authenticate the procedures taken. (Remedial Law, Civil Liability) Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is civilly liable. Held: Yes. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. A bank's disregard of its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence. Payment of the amounts of checks without previously clearing them with the drawee bank, especially so where the drawee bank is a foreign bank and the amounts involved were large, is contrary to normal or ordinary banking practice. It is well settled that actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts, and courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and

amount of damages. While the PNB claims having suffered damages to the extent of P4,000,000.00 due to the encashment of checks drawn against uncollected deposit, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record show that it only incurred losses in the total sum of P2,100,882.87.Since PNB was unduly deprived of its use of the P2,100,882.87 due to Raymundo's gross negligence, the Court also finds it proper to impose on such forbearance of money legal interests in line with current jurisprudence. Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. Antonio K. Litonjua and Aurelio K. Litonjua, Jr. December 5, 2016 G.R. No. 204014 Perez, J. Facts: The Litonjua Group wrote a letter-agreement to Trendline Securities, Inc. (Trendline) through its President Priscilla D. Zapanta (Zapanta), confirming a previous agreement for the acquisition of the 85% majority equity of Trendline's membership seat in PSE, a domestic stock corporation licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to engage in the business of operating a market for the buying and selling of securities. In a letter-confirmation dated 21 April 1999, the Litonjua Group undertook to pay the amount of Php8,547,643.81 directly to PSE within three working days upon confirmation that it will be for the full settlement of all claims and outstanding obligations including interest of Trendline to lift its membership suspension and the resumption to normal trading operation. Further in the letter, Trendline was obligated to secure the approval and written confirmation of PSE for a new corporation to be incorporated that will own a seat. Trendline, in compliance with the conditions set forth in the 20 April 1999 letter-agreement, advised PSE of the salient terms and conditions imposed upon it for the acquisition of the membership/seat. Subsequently, the PSE, through Atty. Ruben L. Almadro (Atty. Almadro), Vice-President for Compliance and Surveillance Department, sent a letter to Trendline advising the latter that the Business Conduct and Ethics Committee (BCEC) of PSE has resolved to accept the 32

amount of Php 9,000,000.00 as full and final settlement of its outstanding obligations to be paid not later than 13 May 1999. The letter and checks were received by the PSE from Trendline on 13 May 1999 as evidenced by Official Receipt Number 42264. It bore an annotation that the checks were received as an advance payment for full settlement of Trendline's outstanding obligation to PSE Trendline, on its part, also sent a letter dated 13 May 1999 advising PSE of the payment of penalties and interest and reactivation of its suspension to seat/membership. Further, PSE was informed that Zapanta had already resigned as Trendline's nominee and in lieu of the position, nominate Aurelio K. Litonjua, Jr. as the new nominee to the seat/membership. Despite several exchange of letters of conformity and delivery of checks representing payment of full settlement of Trendline's obligations, PSE failed to lift the suspension imposed on Trendline's seat. On 30 July 2006, the Litonjua Group, through a letter, requested PSE to reimburse the P19,000,000.00 it had paid with interest, upon knowledge that the specific performance by PSE of transferring the membership seat under the agreement will no longer be possible. PSE, however, refused to refund the claimed amount as without any legal basis. As a result, the Litonjua Group on 10 October 2006 filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against PSE before the RTC of Pasig City Issue: 1.) Whether PSE considered a party to the letter agreement? Held: No. In corporations, consent is manifested through a board resolution since powers are exercised through its board of directors. The mandate of Section 23 of the Corporation Code is clear that unless otherwise provided in the Code, "the corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees ... " Further, as a juridical entity, a corporation may act through its board of directors, which exercises almost all corporate powers, lays down all corporate business

policies and is responsible for the efficiency of management. As a general rule, in the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even its officers, can validly bind a corporation. This is so because a corporation is a juridical person, separate and distinct from its stockholders and members, having powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. Admittedly in this case, no board resolution was issued to authorize PSE to become a party to the letteragreement. This fact was confirmed by PSE's Corporate Secretary Atty. Aissa V. Encarnacion in her direct testimony by way of judicial affidavit. She testified that based on her review of the meetings of the PSE Board of Directors from 1998 to July 2009, there was no record of any board resolution authorizing PSE to bind itself to the said obligations under the letter-agreement or to lift the suspension over Trendline's PSE seat in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said letter-agreement. PSE was never authorized by the Board to be bound by the obligations stated therein. This fact was confirmed by Antonio K. Litonjua himself when he admitted during cross-examination that he failed to ask from PSE for any board resolution authorizing itself to be bound by the terms of the letteragreement. 2.) Whether PSE is liable to return the payment received? Held: Yes. This is pursuant to the principles of unjust enrichment and estoppel; it is only but rightful to return the money received since PSE has no intention from the beginning to be a party to the agreement. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of anotheragainst the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another. Applying law and jurisprudence, the principle of unjust enrichment requires PSE to return the money it had received at the expense of the Litonjua Group since it benefited from the use of it without any valid justification. 33

holds a different view and contends that SCPC is bound to supply the entire 10.841 % of what MERALCO requires, without regard to any cap or limit. Power Sector Assets and Liabitlities Management Corporation vs. Sem-Calaca Power Corporation December 5, 2016 G.R. No. 204719 Peralta, J. Facts: The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136 by President Arroyo was intended to provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired competitive structure and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities with respect to the reform of the electric power industry. The EPIRA also provided for the creation of petitioner Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), a government owned and controlled corporation which took over ownership of the generation assets, liabilities, independent power producer contracts, real estate and other disposable assets of the NPC. PSALM's principal purpose under the law is to "manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and IPP contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner." On December 2, 2009, DMCI transferred all of its rights and obligations under the APA and the Land Lease Agreement (also called Final Transaction Documents) to SEM-Calaca Power Corporation (SCPC) by entering into an Amendment, Accession and Assumption Agreement that was signed by PSALM, DMCI and SCPC. SCPC also alleged that on that same date, it took over the physical possession, operation and maintenance of the Calaca Power Plant. On the same date, SCPC started providing electricity to customers listed in Schedule W of the APA, among which is MERALC0. SCPC contends that it is obliged to supply 10.841 % of MERALCO's total requirement but not to exceed 169,000 kW in any hourly interval. However, PSALM

Thus, during a period of high demand, specifically in the summer of the year 2010, when SCPC fell short of supplying the entire 10.841 % of MERALCO's requirements, the deficiency was filled by supply from the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM). SCPC contends that this was the consequence of NPC's and PSALM's nominations in excess of what SCPC claims to be the 169,000 kW cap or limit in its supply. PSALM disputes that there is such a cap or limit, noting that SCPC was obligated to supply the entire 10.841 % under Schedule W of the APA. Thus, NPC and PSALM, who contend that they were merely following the Transition Supply Contract (TSC) with MERALCO, billed the latter for the electricity delivered by SCPC and that supplied through WESM. SCPC claims, however, that PSALM withheld MERALCO's payments even for the electricity that SCPC supplied without the latter's knowledge nor consent. On March 16, 2010, SCPC wrote a letter to PSALM insisting that the 169,000 kW supplied to MERALCO "should be treated as the maximum limit of the MERALCO allocation which SCPC is bound to supply under the APA in accordance with Schedule W." On April 20, 2010, SCPC wrote a demand letter formally asking both PSALM and NPC to release MERALCO's payments for the period of January 26, 2010 to February 25, 2010 amounting to Php451,450,889.13 and to directly remit to SCPC all subsequent amounts due from MERALC0. On May 13, 2010, PSALM replied through a letter reiterating that SCPC assumed the obligation to supply 10.841 % of MERALCO's TSC and that the latter's payments would be remitted to SCPC only after deducting the cost of power supplied by WESM. Thus, PSALM proceeded to deduct from its remittances to SCPC the cost of the power that NPC allegedly purchased from WESM. SCPC claims that for the months of January 2010 to June 2010, the amounts due it wasPhp 1,894,028,305.00. Instead, PSALM paid it the amount of only Php934,114,678.04, or short of Php959,913,626.96, which allegedly represents the cost of electricity that PSALM charged against SCPC representing the power NPC supposedly obtained from WESM to fill the alleged deficiency in SCPC's supply to MERALCO. 34

Eventually, following negotiations PSALM agreed, through a letter dated June 21, 2010, to cap MERALCO's nominations from the Calaca Power Plant "in any hour up to 169MWh or 10.841 % of each hourly energy nomination submitted by MERALCO to NPC under the MERALCO TSC effective June 26, 2010." However, as SCPC was insisting that the MERALCO cap should have taken effect much earlier, or on December 2, 2009.Hence, SCPC initiated the instant case by filing a Petition for Dispute Resolution (with Prayer for Provisional Remedies) before the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) against NPC and PSALM. The CA sustained the ERC's interpretation of the APA that SCPC's obligation was to supply 10.841 % of MERALCO's energy requirement, but not to exceed 169,000 kW at any given hour, as such interpretation would reconcile the presence of the two figures in Schedule W and harmonize the provisions of the said contract. Likewise, the appellate court upheld ERC in explaining why a cap of 169,000 kW is placed on SCPC's obligation to supply electricity to MERALCO, the explanation being: unlike before the privatization when NPC, with all its generation assets, was the sole supplier of MERALCO and, therefore, could obtain electricity from any of those assets, in the current situation, SCPC is just one of many suppliers and SCPC's asset is only the Calaca Power Plant, which has a limited capacity. The CA likewise stated that the findings of administrative or regulatory agencies on matters within their technical area of expertise are generally accorded not only respect but finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Issue: Whether there was error in the CA's affirmation of the ERC's interpretation of Schedule W of the so called Asset Purchase Agreement (APA), i.e., the contract between the parties PSALM and SCPC, to mean that SCPC's obligation thereunder is to deliver 10.841% of MERALCO's energy requirements but not to exceed 169,000 kW capacity allocation, at any given hour. Held: It is general practice among the courts that the rulings of administrative agencies like the ERC are accorded great respect, owing to a traditional deference given to such administrative agencies equipped with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters. Factual findings of administrative agencies that are

affirmed by the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. Although there are instances when such a practice is not applied, such as when the board or official has gone beyond its/his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily without regard to its/his duty or with grave abuse of discretion, or when the actuation of the administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, none of such instances obtain in the present case which would prompt this Court to reverse the findings of the tribunal below. On the contrary, the Court found the ERC to have acted within its statutory powers as defined in Section 43 (u), RA 9136, or the EPIRA Law, which grants it original and exclusive jurisdiction "over all cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in the energy sector." Jurisprudence also states that administrative agencies like the ERC, which were created to address the complexities of settling disputes in a modem and diverse society and economy, count among their functions the interpretation of contracts and the determination of the rights of parties, which traditionally were the exclusive domain of the judicial branch. The ERC merely performed its statutory function of resolving disputes among the parties who are players in the industry, and exercised its quasi-judicial and administrative powers as outlined in jurisprudence by interpreting the contract between the parties in the present dispute, the so-called APA and specifically its Schedule W. As for the correctness of the ERC's interpretation and finding, this Court examined the records and found no reason to depart from the rule that especially when supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the findings of a quasi-judicial body like the ERC deserve the highest respect, if not finality. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES SOTERO December 07, 2016 G.R. No. 186976 JARDELEZA, J. Facts:

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Respondent Spouses Sotero Octobre, Jr. and Henrissa A. Octobre signed a Reservation Agreement with petitioner Pryce Properties Corporation for the purchase of two lots. Pryce had yet to deliver the certificates of title, which prompted Spouses Octobre to formally demand its delivery. Despite repeated demands, Pryce failed to comply. Thus, spouses Octobre filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for specific performance, revocation of certificate of registration, refund of payments, damages and attorney's fees.

PO2 Reci, brother of the complainant, was convicted in a criminal case. A Notice of Appeal was filed before the RTC but the records of the case were only transmitted after 3 years. The delayed transmittal led to reprimand and warning to the clerk of court and court stenographer of the said court. Feeling that such sanctions were insufficient, complainant filed this complaint against CA Marquez and DCA Bahia of Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty for failing to monitor the gross incompetence in the transmittal of the records in the criminal case.

Issue:

Issue:Whether CA Marquez and DCA Bahia should be administratively liable for Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Whether compensatory damages should have been awarded. Held: No. In the absence of adequate proof, compensatory damages should not have been awarded. Nominal damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, are proper in this case. Under Article 2221, nominal damages may be awarded in order that the plaintiff’s right, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown." So long as there is a violation of the right of the plaintiff—whether based on law, contract, or other sources of obligations—an award of nominal damages is proper. Proof of bad faith is not required. The HLURB Arbiter and the Court of Appeals appear to have confused nominal damages with compensatory damages, since their justifications more closely fit the former.

Held: No. Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or simple neglect of duty or negligence. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual liable for the aforesaid offenses is substantial evidence. Aside from his bare allegations, complainant has not shown any prima facie evidence to support his claim that CA Marquez and DCA Bahia should be held equally liable for the delay in the transmittal of the case records of criminal case. Absent any proof, the respondents are presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

RE: COMPLAINT OF AERO ENGR, DARWIN A. RECI AGAINST COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ AND DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR THELMA C. BAHIA RELATIVE TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-236956February 7, 2017 A.M. NO. 17-01-04-SC Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts:

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Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. John Raymund De Asis vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al. Ronald John Lim vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al. Janet Lim Napoles vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al. Mario L. Relampagos, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines December 6, 2016 G.R. Nos. 212014-15 G.R. Nos. 212427-28 G.R. Nos. 212694-95 G.R. Nos. 213477-78 G.R. Nos. 213532-33 G.R. Nos. 213536-37 G.R. Nos. 218744-59 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: The petitioners are altogether charged as coconspirator for their individual cooperation in the illicit pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010. As claimed, the PDAF scheme begins with Napoles meeting with Sen. Revilla giving an offer to get his PDAF allocation in return for a commission amounting up to a specific percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the condition of the PDAF, the relating Implementing Agencies (IA) entrusted to execute the same, and the lawmaker's commission or kickback ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the sum stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the prompt arrival of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse it to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for the release of the SARO. At this point, the portion of the commission would be transmitted by Napoles to the legislator and upon the release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff including BenhurLuy, Marina Sula, and MerlinaSuñas,

the whistle blowers, to produce the PDAF documents containing the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a conduit for the execution of the project and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff and would transmit the rest of the portion or adjust the commission of the legislator, which is normally conveyed by her staff, Lim and De Asis and once the documents are endorsed, the same would be transmitted to the Implementing Agencies (IA) which would deal with the planning of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the official's office, the IA and the picked NGO. From that point, the DBM would discharge the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/authority of which, in turn, would assist the exchange and arrival of the relating check to the PDAF disbursement in return for a (10%) in the project cost. Among those entrusted by Napoles to get the checks and store them to the ledgers of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the assets are in the record of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to encourage the withdrawal thereof. Napoles would then choose how much will be left in the workplace and how much will be gotten to her home. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones trained to convey the cash to Napoles and her staff would fabricate invented arrangements of recipients, liquidation reports, examination reports and comparative records that would make it create the impression that the PDAF-subsidized tasks were actualized when, in truth, they were not since they were really inexistent projects. Under this usual way of doing things, Sen. Revilla, with the assistance of applicants, among others, purportedly channelled his PDAF adding up to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, consequently, got commissions or kickbacks. The Ombudsman held that reasonable justification exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder because Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges with the assistance of his co-accused, who are also public officers and private persons and that Sen. Revilla collected or procured such ill-gotten wealth more than the amount of required in the crime of Plunder. Cambe then tried to abrogate and put aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his petition to suspend the proceedings contending that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a 37

condition precedent to the filing of the criminal accusations against him while Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman discovering reasonable justification against him for the violations charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla sued the Ombudsman for ignoring his defense and the absence of a competent testimony. On the other hand, the Ombudsman did not consider the whistle blowers’ testimonies who in accordance to the doctrine of res inter alias acta rule. Napoles comparably tries to annul the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order discovering reasonable justification against her for Plunder and for infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. She contends that the complaints did not build up particular acts of the crime in which she committed and that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be prosecuted by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld. Held: Yes. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld. First, in the probable cause against Sen. Revilla, the Supreme Court held that the finding of it against Sen. Revilla is sufficiently bolstered by the evidence on record which were the PDAF reports, comprising of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself asking for the IAs to discharge his PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs as well as the other documents which were made possible for the processing of his PDAF (e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator’s office, the IA, and the chosen NGO). All of the documents and records, even those not really signed by Sen. Revilla, directly implicate him for the crime charged, as they were all issued under the authority of his Office as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Second, the Supreme Court also held that all of the pieces of evidence are equally significant to establish probable cause against Cambe as Sen. Revilla’s trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of the legislator’s office including the allocation of the PDAF. Also,

Cambe’s signatures appeared on several PDAF documents (the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla’s PDAF funds allocated to various JLN-controlled NGOs). Cambe was also personally identified by the whistle blowers to have received the PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. Third, the Supreme Court also held that there is a probable cause against Napoles for the reason that records show clearly that she played an integral part or role in the illegal utilization as well as the disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF and was tagged to be the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. Fourth, there is also a probable cause found by the Supreme Court against De Asis because records show that he was designated as the President or Incorporator of KPMFI, one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles, that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla’s allocations. Also, Luy and Suñas named him as one of those who prepared the money to be given to Sen. Revilla and that he received the checks issued by the IAs and deposited it in the same bank to be withdrawn and tasked to bring the money back to Napoles’ house. Fifth, the probable cause against Lim. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, Luy and Suñas that Lim is one of the staff of Napoles which would prepare and deliver the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla. These acts of him are indeed an overt act that will relate him to his involvement in the PDAF scam. Lastly, as also pointed out by the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs were issued by the Office of Relampagos as the DBM Undersecretary where Nuñez, Bare and Paule are all working. Luy also identified him together with the others as Napoles’ contact person in the DBM.

Ricardo Del Poso y Dela Cerna Vs. People of the Philippines December 7, 2016 G.R No. 210810 Peralta, J. Facts: The petitioner caught the minor-victim complainant sleeping while attending to the former’s photocopying business. He then became furious and placed a heated flat iron on her which she tried to evade and as a result, 38

she sustained 1st degree burns on some parts of her body. The RTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Sec. 10(a) of RA 7610, which the CA affirmed. He then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and alleged that the CA erred in convicting him when he was just trying to scare the complainant, and that she sustained the burns through her own acts when she tried to evade the heated iron. Also, assuming his conviction was proper, the CA erred when it refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong and passion and/or obfuscation. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of RA 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Held: Yes. He was guilty for the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the violation of the said law present in the case at bar, namely: (1) the minority of the victim; (2) the acts constituting physical abuse, committed by petitioner against the victim; and (3) the said acts are clearly punishable under R.A. No. 7610. 2.) Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a proper recourse in the case at bar. Held: No. Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. A question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.” The issues presented by petitioner are all factual in nature, and thus, does not fall within the scope of a petition for review under Rule 45. 3.)Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the aforementioned mitigating circumstances in his favor.

Held: The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong can be taken into account only when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its

consequences. The facts found by the trial court and the CA show that petitioner intended the natural consequence of his act. He is also not entitled to the application of the mitigating circumstance of passion and/or obfuscation. It only applies if the act of the victim is both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind. A child who fell asleep while attending to a business establishment is not an offense at all and could not give rise to an impulse sufficiently powerful to naturally produce a justified diminution of an adult's self-control. SERI SOMBOONSAKDIKUL vs. ORLANE S.A. February 1, 2017 G. R. No. 188996 Jardeleza, J. Facts: Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its decision that affirmed the ruling of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) denying their application for the mark “LOLANE.” An application for registration of the mark was filed with the IPO for goods classified under Class 3 (personal care products). Respondent filed an opposition arguing that the mark “LOLANE” was similar to their mark “ORLANE,” which it has been using since 1948 for products like perfume, lotions, and make-up creams among others. In his answer, petitioner argued that there was no confusion over the two marks, may it be subjected to the dominancy test or the holistic test. In the CA decision, it found grounds that petitioner imitated respondent’s mark with the use of the mark “LOLANE,” which was concluded after applying the dominancy test. Issue: Whether or not there would be a confusion over LOLANE and ORLANE which would bar the registration of LOLANE. Held: No. According to Section 123 of Republic Act 8293, a trademark cannot be registered if it is identical with a 39

registered mark belonging to a different proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date. The Court cited the principle it laid down in Mighty Corporation v. E. & J. Gallo Winery particularly over requirements for finding of likelihood of confusion, in which the following should be met: a)

Resemblance between the trademarks;

b)

Similarity of goods to which trademarks are attached;

c)

Likely effect on the purchaser; and

d)

Registrant’s express or implied consent and other fair equitable considerations.

The Court also differentiated the dominancy test against the holistic test, wherein the former considers the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of consumers while the latter considers the entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. While the Court also used the same dominancy test as used by the CA, it arrived at a different conclusion, which are as follows: 1)

2)

That there are noticeable differences in the appearance of the marks “LOLANE” and “ORLANE,” particularly in the way they are written or printed; and The aural aspects of the marks “LOLANE” and “ORLANE” do not sound alike.

The petition was granted by the Court after finding distinct visual and aural differences of the marks after subjecting them to the dominancy test.

SPOUSES RODEL AND ELEONOR CAÑOS vs. ATTY. LOUISE MARIE THERESE B. ESCOBIDO FEBRUARY 06, 2017 A.M. No. P-15-3315 Jardeleza, J. Facts:

Complainant filed an administrative case to respondent for grave misconduct, grave violation of oath as a public official, and a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Escobido offered to get some items from the complainant to resell as she used to be in the same business. Since Sps. Caños trusted Escobido as clerk of court and as a lawyer, they agreed to her proposal. She purchased on credit various jewelry and imported goods, aside from that she also borrowed money from them. As payment, she issued postdated checks but the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED’. Sps. Caños made written and verbal demands for Escobido to pay her debts. Despite the demands, she refuses to pay her obligations. Finally, Sps. Caños alleged that Escobido useher position as clerk of court or profession as a lawyer to dissuade them from filing a case against her and boast about her connections in theOffice of the City Prosecutor of Davao City. Issue: Whether or not Escobido should be held administratively liable for willful failure to pay just debts and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Held: Yes. The Court agrees to the OCA that Escobido should be held administratively liable for the said offenses. Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that a public employee's failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), defines "just debts" as those: (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. The Court ruled that the penalty for willful failure to pay just debts is imposed at a civil servant's actuation unbecoming a public official, thus tarnishing the image of the public office. Public employees may likewise be penalized for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. Such 40

violation is classified as a grave offense, punishable by suspension of six months and one day to one year forthe first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense.

Laundering Act is unlawful as it permits the examination of a bank account with no notice to the affected party, that it violates the individual's right to due process and it violates the person's right to privacy.

The Court agrees with the OCA that Escobido’s repeated acts of contracting loans and paying them with worthless checks reflect bad faith on her part. It must be noted that Escobido, as clerk of court, is not a mere public employee. She is both an employee of the Court and a member of the Bar. Thus, she is expected to meet a high standard of uprightness and propriety. By deliberately failing to meet her contractual obligations, she fell short of such standard.

Issues:

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals, et al. December 6, 2016 G.R. No. 216914 Perez, J. Facts: A year before the 2016 Presidential Election, reports abounded about the disproportionate wealth of the then VP Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, where some of them were elected public officers. For this reason, the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations. From different news reports announcing the inquiry of VP’s bank accounts together with his family, the petitioner SPCMB was the most concerned with the article published in Manila Times entitled “Inspect Binay Bank Accounts,” it was written that the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the Council to peek in the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations and a law office where a family member was once a partner, the SPCMB Law Offices. By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times distributed another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay's assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution conceding the ex-parte application of the AMLC to look at the bank accounts of SPCMB. Prevented in the CA consequently charging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and sufficient remedy to secure its rights and interests in the ongoing unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by the public respondent AMLC, the SPCMB attempted direct resort to this Court by this appeal for certiorari and prohibition on the grounds that the Anti-Money

1.) Whether the Anti-Money Laundering Act is unconstitutional for it violates the person’s right to due process and right to privacy. Held: 1. No. The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), specifically Section 11 (Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits) is constitutional for it did not violate the person’s right to due process and right to privacy. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11 partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition, violates the attorney-client privilege, is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and is a form of political harassment of SPCMB' s clientele. The Supreme Court found that it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts: (1) the AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order, (2) the CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA, (3)a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order exparte for the principal account which court order exparte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into and (4)the authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply 41

with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. The Supreme Court affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments. 2.) Whether the Anti-Money Laundering Act violates substantial due process. Held: No. The Supreme Court held that Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question which brings these within reach of the judicial process, specifically a determination that the seizure violated due process and that at the stage in which the petition was filed, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.

3.)Whether the Anti-Money Laundering Act violates procedural due process. No. The Supreme Court held that procedural due process is essentially the opportunity to be heard. In this case, at the investigation stage by the AMLC into possible money laundering offenses, SPCMB demands that it have notice and hearing of AMLC's investigation into its bank accounts. Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order,

cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

YABUT v. ALCANTARA March 6, 2017 G.R. No. 200349 PERALTA, J. Facts: As far back as December 9, 1927, petitioner’s father, Ballesteros applied for a Sales Application (SA 10279) including the subject land with the Bureau of Lands. On July 31, 1928, Barbara Andoy filed a Sales Application (SA 10960) over a portion of the same land area applied for by Ballesteros. But SA 10279 was given due course. Andoy’s heirs entered and laid out their claims on portions of SA 10279. However, during Ballesteros’ absence being captured as prisoner of war, Andoy's son, Faustino Andoy Jamisola, sold 6 hectares of the subject property to PantaleonSuazola. Said part was later identified as Lot No. 6509-A. Upon his return, Ballesteros recognized the sale in an Affidavit, in deference to Suazola's son, who was his compadre, despite the covered property being part of SA 10279. But the sale turned out to be the whole 11.5 hectares belonging to Ballesteros; thus, he filed a letter of protest with the Director of Lands which ruled in favour of him. On August 5, 1969, Ballesteros sold Lot Nos. 6509-B, 6509-C, and 6509-D to his daughter, Yabut. Respondent Alcantara filed a Complaint for Reconveyance alleging that he was the true and lawful owner and possessor of parcels of the subject land after having bought it in 1960 from one Pantaleon Suazola and then applied for a Free Patent over the land on the same year and on 1962 over the other subject Lot. Further claiming that, Ballesteros, the father of petitioners, then purportedly employed fraud to have the contested property registered in his name. And barely six months later, Ballesteros sold the lots to his daughter, Fe Yabut. The lower court gave weight to Alcantara's free patent applications and declared him as the real owner of the properties in question.

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Issue: Whether or not there is legal basis to support the reconveyance of the properties in question in favor of the Alcantaras.

Held: No. Respondents failed to present adequate evidence to prove any legal and valid source of a right over the land they are claiming. It is settled that a free patent application is not proof of ownership until all requirements are met and the patent is granted. While Alcantara filed his application for free patent only on 1960 over Lot 6509-C only on October 15, 1960, and the one over Lot 6509-D on April 25, 1962, Ballesteros had filed his as early as December 9, 1927, which was decided with finality in G.R. No. L17466. In order to obtain title over public agricultural lands, the procedure laid down under the law should be strictly followed. But Alcantara simply bought the rights over the property from the defeated claimants and applied for free patents without fulfilling the requirements for the grant of a free patent. Alcantara's acts alone could not ripen into ownership over said public agricultural lands. Further, even assuming that the subject properties were indeed wrongfully titled in the name of Ballesteros, it would be the State, and not Alcantara, that has the legal standing to bring an action for reconveyance. Alcantara was deemed to have acknowledged that the lands covered by his free patent applications actually belong to the State when he filed a free patent application over the subject land.

PEOPLE v. EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA March 1, 2017 G.R. No. 179749 BERSAMIN, J. Facts: The lower court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a

quantity of shabu to a police officer-poseur buyer during a buy-bust operation. Under Section 21 of this Act, the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drug in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, a media representative and the Department of Justice and any elected official who must all sign the inventory and furnished with a copy thereof must be complied. Although no evidence has been produced to prove compliance of the procedure, in rendering its decision, the court believes that it is not fatal to the State's cause on the validity of the entrapment. Thus, the court gave full credence to the testimonies of the policemen concerned; according them with the presumption of regularity of performance of police duties. Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Held: No. Absence of proof showing the compliance by the arresting officers with the procedure under Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165 was fatal to the entrapment as it cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 put into serious question whether the sachet of shabu had really come from the accusedappellant, and whether the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from the accused-appellant at the time of the arrest. Testimonies provided by the police officers and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties did not override the non-compliance with the procedural safeguards instituted by our laws. Although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would not automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance. However, the State’s agent miserably failed to tender any justifiable ground for such non-compliance. Therefore, failure to prove chain of custody means that the guilt of the accusedappellant beyond reasonable doubt was not established by the prosecution.

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recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.”

JALANDONI v. ENCOMIENDA March 1, 2017 G.R. No. 205578 PERALTA, J. Facts: Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for claim for sum of money asserting that the latter borrowed money for the search and rescue operation of her children in Manila, who were allegedly taken by their father as well as payments for bills in Cebu. However, whenpetitioner came back to Cebu she never informed respondent. Encomienda then later gave Jalandoni 6 weeks to settle her debts. Despite several demands, no payment was made. When they had to appear before the Barangay for conciliation, no settlement was reached. But a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Kasambagan, Laureano Rogero, attested that Jalandoni admitted having borrowed money from Encomienda and that she was willing to return it. Jalandoni said she would talk to her lawyer first, but she never came back. For her defense, petitioner confirmed that respondent indeed deposited money in her account and has made payments for her expenses. But she insisted that when asked, Encomienda would tell her that she just wanted to extend some help and that it was not a loan. However, petitioner’s refusal to be fetched at the airport on her return to Cebu, allegedly made the respondent upset which caused the latter to eventually demand payment for the amounts originally intended to be gratuitous. Issue: Whether or not Encomienda is entitled to be reimbursed for the amounts she defrayed for Jalandoni. Held: Yes. Art. 1236 (2) of the Civil Code provides: “whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can

Clearly, petitioner cannot deny the fact that the unauthorized bank deposits and payments made by respondent inured to her benefit. Also, even after learning about the payments, petitioner did nothing to express her objection to or repudiation of the same, within a reasonable time. Thus, respondent has the right to reimbursement for the amounts defrayed for the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not there is unjust enrichment on the petitioner’s part. Held: Yes. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when: (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Clearly, allowing Jalandoni to keep the amounts received fromEncomienda will certainly cause an unjust enrichment on Jalandoni's part and to Encomienda's damage and prejudice.

PEOPLE v. ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN March 1, 2017 G.R. No. 212815 PERALTA, J. Facts: Accused-appellant Donio was charged of the crime of carnapping with homicide of Raul Layug. The prosecution presented the following evidence to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged: a. Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a police checkpoint at the junction of the MacArthur Highway at around 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003; b. His possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to produce its registration papers;

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c. He was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even presented it and introduced himself as Raul to the police; d. A blood-stained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle; e. Rodrigo, brother of the victim ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking for him on the same day that Donio and the others were flagged down; f. Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003 when he passed by at the Mawaque Terminal at the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque Road; g. Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at around 6:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia Resettlement comer Barangay Dapdap; h. Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument as depicted in the post-mortem examination sketch by Dr. Dizon and reflected in the Certificate of Death. i. Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04 Taberdo positively identified him as the driver they flagged down at the checkpoint On the other hand, respondent denied the accusations and asserted the following: a. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long palang for harvesting and cutting which was not similar to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo; b. On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac. However, from the evening of November 25, 2003 until the next day, he was at home after his wife fetched him to tend to their sick child. He first learned of the carnapping charge when the police officers came to his house looking for a certain Val Paulino. Moreover, respondent alleged that while it is true that criminal conviction may be predicated on a series of circumstantial evidence, the same must be convincing, plausible and credible. The facts established by SP04 Taberdo' s testimony are insufficient bases and do not

lead to an inference exclusively consistent with his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Whether or not circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are sufficient to convict Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. Held: Yes. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence as provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. To warrant conviction, it requires the following: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime. After a careful perusal of the records, the Court finds that the confluence of the following pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the Court disregarded respondent’s uncorroborated alibi that in Capas, Tarlac attending to his sick child at the time of the crime. For the alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the following: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. It must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. However,aside from his bare allegations, he failed to present convincing evidence of the physical impossibility for him to be at the scene at the time of carnapping. In sum, the prosecution established through sufficient circumstantial evidence that the accused was indeed one of the perpetrators of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

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Thus, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubtof the crime Carnapping with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties.

Issue: Whether or not accused-apellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide. Held: Yes. To prove such special complex crime, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Records show that all elements of carnapping were present in the case and were proven during the trial. Accused-appellant’s unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's death. Thus, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

GRANDE v. Philippine Nautical Training College March 1, 2017 G.R. No. 213137 PERALTA, J. Facts: Respondent PNTC is a private entity engaged in the business of providing maritime training and education. In February 2011, several employees of respondent's Registration Department, including the VP for Training Department, which is the current post held by the petitioner, were placed under preventive suspension in view of the anomalies in the enlistment of students. On March 1, 2011, the VP for Corporate Affairs, Frederick

Pios called petitioner for a meeting to relay the message of PNTC's President for her to tender her resignation from the school in view of her reported involvement in the anomalies under her department. Pios assured petitioner of absolution from the alleged anomalies if she would resign. Petitioner then prepared a resignation letter, signed it and filed it with the Office of the PNTC President. The respondent accomplished for her the necessary exit clearance. In the evening of the same date, petitioner, accompanied by counsel, filed a police blotter for a complaint for unjust vexation against Pios. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that she was forced to resign from her employment; that it was the "undue influence and pressure" exerted upon her by respondent that compelled her to submit the resignation letter. On the other hand, respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily resigned to evade the pending administrative charge against her. Obviously, the acts of petitioner - the resignation, the blotter with thepolice, the continued processing of clearance the day after the resignation and the filing of the illegal dismissal case showed that she used "calculated reasoning to protect herself from possible charges that PNTC may file against her. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed from service. Held: Yes. For the resignation of an employee to be a viable defense in an action for illegal dismissal, an employer has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary, and its evidence thereon must be clear, positive and convincing. In this case, the filing of the complaint in the NLRC the day after she tendered her resignation evidently belies respondent's claim that petitioner voluntarily resigned. “It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint”. (Valdez v. NLRC; Fungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong) Moreover, while indeed there was no employment of force from the language used by Pios, still, there was the presence of undue influence. Petitioner’s 46

resignation immediately tendered after the conversation is not voluntary. With an order coming from the President of PNTC, no less, undue influence and pressure was exerted upon petitioner. Thus, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.

Rosemarie B. Bintudan vs. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017 Ponente: Bersamin, J Facts: The petitioner was a Disbursing Officer II of DILG-CAR when some unidentified suspects robbed the Provincial Office by breaking the outer door of the steel cabinet but opening the vault through the combination number posted outside the door of the vault, and carted away an amount of P114,907.30. The petitioner reported the robbery to the provincial police as well as to the Audit Team Leader. She then requested from the ATL that she be relieved from liability over the stolen money. However, such request was denied by the Legal and Adjudication Office National of the COA because of the petitioner’s negligence. Bintudan filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied by the COA LSS by observing that her acts of posting the number combination of the safety vault on its door, the early withdrawal of the funds for the salaries of the employees, and her failure to inform the security office of the large amount of money kept in the vault constituted contributory negligence on her part. Petitioner then filed an appealto COA which was also denied.

man and reasonable man could not do. Stated otherwise, negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. Findings show that the petitioner was severely negligent in the performance of her duties as the disbursing officer. She did not properly discharge her responsibility to safeguard the public funds entrusted to her. The ATL found that she had withdrawn from a nearby bank the funds for salaries 13 days from the deadline for the submission of reports, and had placed the funds inside the safety vault despite the number combination having been left posted at safety vault's very door. She was further found to have even failed to inform the security guard on duty that she had kept a considerable amount of cash in the safety vault if only to ensure that the amount would be safe. As an officer of the Government having custody of public funds, she was fully accountable for the safekeeping of the funds under her custody. Although she could be exonerated from liability in cases of theft and loss caused by force majeure, she must be able to establish that the loss was not by reason of her negligence. She could have locked the safety vault, the steel cabinet, and the doors and windows of the office where the safety vault was kept, but the fact that she had not denied having allowed the posting of the number combination on the vault's door manifested her negligence.

Republic of the Philippines through its trustee, The Privatization and Management Office vs. Philippine International Corporation G.R. No. 181984, March 20, 2017 Ponente: Sereno, Cj

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of negligence. Ruling: Yes .Negligence is the omission to do something that a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent

Facts: The Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) and respondent PIC entered into a Lease Agreement. In that agreement, CCP leased to PIC a parcel of land located within the CCP Complex in Pasay City, including the building erected on a portion thereon, within the term of twenty five (25) years from and after the date of this 47

Contract, renewable for a like period under the same terms and conditions at the option of the lessee. Eight years later, CCP alienated the property in favor of PNB through Dacion in payment with lease. Five years later, PNB leased the property back to CCP. Through Proclamation No. 50, Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) was created. PNB, pursuant to Proclamation no. 50, assigned the subject property to the national government under a Deed of transfer, in which the national government also executed a Trust Agreement with APT with regard the said property. Later, PIC requested PNB to annotate its leasehold rights, which the latter refused to comply. Due to PNB’s refusal, PIC instituted a Complaint to compel CCP, PNB, and APT to respect the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement and the amendment thereto. PIC also wanted the three to be compelled to deliver the title of the subject property, so that the lease could be annotated thereon. The RTC decided in favor of PIC. When the term of APT expired, PMO was created and was mandated to take over the assets of APT and inherit the latter’s powers and functions. In view of the forthcoming expiration of the lease, PMO informed PIC that its request to exercise its option to renew the lease had been denied. PIC declined PMO's assertion for being without any legal basis. It insisted that it exercised its option and considered the lease renewed thereby. Due to PIC’s refusal to vacate the property, PMO filed a complaint of unlawful detainer to MeTC, which decided in favor of PIC. PMO appealed to RTC raising for the first time the issue that the lease contract cannot bind a non-party like PMO. RTC decided in favor of PIC, which cause PMO to appeal to the CA, which affirmed the decision of RTC. Issue: Whether or not PMO is bound of the lease agreement. Ruling: Yes. It is undisputed that PMO is the successor agency of APT. Consequently, it assumes the existing obligations of APT upon the termination of the latter's

existence.One of the existing obligations of APT upon the termination of its term was to respect the Lease Agreement. To recall, there is a previous judgment by the RTC and CA, as affirmed by this Court, finding that APT had an obligation to respect the lease by virtue of its constructive notice of the same. This is a judgment that has lapsed into finality. It is settled that the dictum laid down in a final judgment or order becomes binding between the same parties, their privies, and their successors-in-interest.

Joy Vanessa Sebastian vs. Nelson C. Cruz and Christina P. Cruz and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017 Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: The respondent spouse were the owner of a parcel of land which was sold by Nelson through his father and attorney-in-fact Lamberto P. Cruz to the petitioner, Sebastian. The parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein upon Sebantian’s payment of the purchase price Lamberto surrendered to her the possession of the subject land. When Sebastian was about to transfer the title into her name by presenting the said document to the Registry of Deeds, the latter directed her to secure a SPA executed by the spouses Cruz authorizing Lamberto to sell the land to her. Upon request, Lamberto promise to produce the SPA but was never been complied. Thus, Sebastian was constrained to cause the annotation. When Sebastian inquired in the Registry of Deeds about the status of the title, she discovered that Nelson executed an Affidavit of loss of the title and requested for the issuance of the second owner’s copy which was granted to him through the decision of the RTC. Sebastian filed a petition for annulment of judgment to the CA contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction of the case and that the decision shall have no effect because the title has never been lost and is in her possession all along. The CA dismissed her petition, thus, this case. 48

G.R. No. 182409, March 20, 2017 Ponente: Reyes, J. Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly denied due course Sebastian’s petition for annulment of judgment. Ruling: No. The following requisites must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System. Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over thejudicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA, the Court reiterated the rule that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Felix Plazo Urban Poor Settlers Community Association, Inc. vs. Alfredo Lipat Sr. and Alfredo Lipat Jr.

Facts: Alfredo Lipat Sr., as representative of Alfredo Lipat Jr., executed a Contract to Sell (CTS) two parcels of land to the petitioner subject to a condition that the petitioner has 90 days to pay in full the purchase price of the lands otherwise the CTS will automatically expire. The 90 days period had elapsed without payment of the full consideration by the petitioner. The petitioner contends that the 90-day period provided in the CTS was subject to the condition that the subject properties be cleared of all claims from third persons considering that there were pending litigations involving the same. Upon the expiry of the 90-day period, and despite the failure to clear the subject properties from the claims of third persons, the petitioner contributed financial assistance for the expenses of litigation involving the subject properties with the assurance that the CTS will still be enforced once the cases are settled. In the meantime, the petitioner agreed to pay rental fees for their occupation of the subject properties After the termination of cases involving the subject property, the respondent refused to enforce the CTS on the ground that the same has expired and that there has been no agreement to extend its term. The petitioner filed a case for Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents. The respondent’s defense was that the petitioner failed to pay the selling price before the expiration of the term which is why the latter is required to pay rental fees corresponding the property they are occupying. Moreover, petitioner contends that the so called financial assistance they received form petitioner is in a form of loan and it has nothing to do with the extension of the CTS. The RTC decided in favor of the petitioner and demanded that the CTS be enforced after the purchase price of the subject property be paid by the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the CA and was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but was denied.

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Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can oblige the respondents to sell the property covered by CTS. Ruling: No. Indeed, the contract executed by the parties is the law between them. Consequently, from the time the contract is perfected, all parties privy to it are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but likewise to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. The obligation of the seller to sell becomes demandable only upon the occurrence of the suspensive condition. In the present case, as correctly observed by the CA, the suspensive condition is the payment in full of the purchase price by the petitioner prior to the expiration of the 90 day period stipulated in their CTS, which the latter failed to do so. Thus the respondents are within their rights to refuse to enforce the same. Rogel Ortiz vs. DHL Philippines Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 183399, March 20, 2017 Ponente: Reyes, J.

be given suspension instead. He wrote a letter to the management to appeal for a lesser penalty, however, DHL denied the petitioner’s plea. It was pointed out that the gravity of the infractions and the fact that the same had been continuously committed for a period of two years amount to grave dishonesty and serious misconduct which deserved no less than dismissal. The petitioner received a Notice of Dismissal. Thereafter, he filed a case for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for the payment of indemnity, damages and costs of suit against DHL and its responsible officers. However, such complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with modification that the petitioner should receive a separation pay for his long service to DHL. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same. While, the CA decided affirming the decision of NLRC but with modification. CA deleted the award of separation pay, instead it was changed to nominal damages for the violation of the procedural due process. The petitioner filed a motion of partial reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the CA. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Ruling:

Facts: The petitioner is an employee of the respondent corporation. His shift is from 11 am to 8 pm. During his employment, he committed infractions by leaving the office before his shift ends and asking the security guard or his co-employee to punch out his time card minutes after 8 pm. This practice of him was discovered by their Branch Supervisor. At first he was reprimanded and told to practice proper diligence. There were also several memorandum asking for his explanation. However, the infractions continued to the extent he was made investigated and was proven that indeed he left the office before his shift ends. During confrontation, he apologized for his ill behavior and admitted all the charges against him. When he was informed that his infraction may warrant his dismissal he pleaded that he

No. It is well settled that a valid dismissal necessitates compliance with substantive and procedural requirements. Specifically, in Mantle Trading Services, Inc. and/or Del Rosario v. NLRC, et al., the Court emphasized that (a) there should be just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. After a careful examination of the facts and the records of this case, the Court finds that the petitioner's dismissal was founded on acts constituting serious misconduct and grave dishonesty which are grounds for a valid dismissal. The truthfulness of the charges against the petitioner was well established by the joint 50

affidavits executed by his co-employees and corroborated by documentary evidence presented by DHL. Apart from the foregoing, the petitioner readily admitted to the infractions he committed during the investigation conducted by the company.Further, right after the formal investigation, he wrote a letter to the management admitting his faults and undertook never to commit the same infractions again. Unfortunately for him, the management of DHL imposed the penalty of dismissal as stated in the company manual, stressing that the totality and the gravity of the offenses he committed do not merit consideration. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA vs. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION February 13, 2004 G.R. No. 147349 PANGANIBAN, J.: Facts: MIAA conducted a public bidding for a contract involving the structural repair and waterproofing of the International Passenger Terminal (IPT) and International Container Terminal (ICT) buildings of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). ALA was awarded the contract from the bidding. Respondent made the necessary repairs and waterproofing. After submission of its progress billings to petitioner, respondent received partial payments. Progress billing No. 6 remained unpaid despite repeated demands by respondent. Petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion date. Petitioner then advised respondent of a committee formed to determine the extent of the work done which was given until September 30, 1994 to submit its findings. Just the same, respondent was not fully paid. Respondent objected to the rescission made by petitioner and reiterated its claims. As of the filing of the complaint for sum of money and damages,respondent was seeking to recover from petitioner P10,376,017.00 as the latter’s outstanding obligation and P1,642,112.84 due from the first to fifth progress billings. With the filing of respondent’s surrejoinder to petitioners’ rejoinder, the trial Court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

Both parties executed a compromise agreement, assisted by their counsels, and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment based on compromise agreement. RTC approved the compromise agreement. CA reversed RTC decision and ordered to issue writ of execution to enforce respondents claim to extent of petitioners remaining balance. Issue: Whether or not the delay of petitioner in complying with its obligation under the Compromise Agreement is justified under the principle that no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable. Held: A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions to resolve their differences, thus avoiding litigation or putting an end to one that has already commenced. In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently held that a compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it. To be valid, a compromise agreement is merely required by law, first, to be based on real claims; second, to be actually agreed upon in good faith. Both conditions are present in this case. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement. Within thirty days from receipt of the judicial Order approving it -- on December 20, 1997 -- payment should have been made, but was not. Thus, nonfulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified execution. The Christmas season cannot be cited as an act of God that would excuse a delay in the processing of claims by a government entity that is subject to routine accounting and auditing rules. 51

A fortuitous event is one that cannot be foreseen or, though foreseen, is inevitable. It has the following characteristics: (a) [T]he cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. None of these elements appears in this case. First, processing claims against the government and subjecting these to the usual accounting and auditing procedures are certainly not only foreseeable and expectable, but also dependent upon the human will. Second, the Christmas season is not a caso fortuito, but a regularly occurring event. It is in fact foreseeable, and its occurrence has absolutely nothing to do with the processing of claims. Further, in order to claim exemption from liability by reason of a fortuitous event, such event should be the sole and proximate cause of the injury to or the loss or destruction of the object of the contract or compromise, which was the payment to be made by petitioner. Granting arguendo such loss or destruction, the Christmas season could not have been the sole and proximate cause thereof. Third, the occurrence of the Christmas season did not at all render impossible the normal fulfillment of the obligation of petitioner. It ought to have taken appropriate measures to ensure that a delay would be avoided. When it entered into the Agreement, it knew fully well that the 30-day period for it to pay its obligation would end during the Christmas season. Fourth, petitioner cannot argue that it is free from any participation in the delay. The Compromise Agreement was a contract perfected by mere consent; hence, it should have been respected. Basic is the rule that if a party fails or refuses to abide by a compromise agreement, the other may either enforce it or regard it as rescinded and insist upon the original demand. For failure of petitioner to abide by the judicial compromise, respondent chose to enforce

it. Foreseeable difficulties that occur during the Christmas season and cause a delay do not constitute a fortuitous event. The difficulties in processing claims during that period are not acts of God that would excuse noncompliance with judicially approved obligations. MST Maritime Services INc vs. Teody D. Asuncion March 27, 2017 G.R. No. 211335 Reyes, J. Facts: MST Marine, on behalf of its foreign principal Thome Ship hired Asuncion as a GP1 Motorman on board its vessel for nine months. On his way to the vessel while at work, he lost his balance and fell down the floor. He felt pain on his back which persisted despite intake of pain relievers. An Indian doctor recommended repatriation for medical evaluation and treatment. In Manila, he was designated to the company physician which conducted test showing normal results. Asuncion still complaining of low back pains. While undergoing therapy, Asuncion filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits with the Labor Arbiter. A private physician diagnosed him with Chronic Low Back Pain Syndrome. Dr. Escutin (private physician) rendered Asuncion having permanent disability and unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman. The company physician assessed Asuncion with Disability Grade 8- moderate rigidity of two-thirds loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. LA rendered MST Marine liable for permanent total and disability benefits. MST Marine, Thome Ship and del Castillo appealed the decision of LA with NLRC which affirmed LA’s ruling. CA promulgated the assailed Decision holding petitioners liable for total and permanent disability benefits. According to CA, the disability grading made by the company-designated physician is “not final, binding, or conclusive on the seafarer, the labor tribunals, or the courts.” Citing jurisprudence, the CA held that the true test whether Asuncion suffered total and permanent disability is his inability to perform his job for more than 120 days from the time he was repatriated to the Philippines, his disability is permanent and total. 52

Issue:Whether or not Asuncion deserves full and permanent disability benefits notwithstanding the partial disability Grade 8 assessed by the companydesignated physician. Held: The court held that the mere lapse of the 120—day period itself does not automatically warrant the payment of total and permanent disability benefits. In Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime, the Court ruled that a temporary total disability becomes permanent when declared by the company-physician within the period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of fitness or permanent disability. In Scanmar Maritime vs. Emilio Conag, the court reiterated that the disability grading received whether from a company-physician or from the third independent physician must be the basis for the declaration of disability. In Asuncion’s case, he neither sought to be referred to a third doctor nor did he offer any explanation for his non-observance of this procedure that when he filed the complaint for payment of disability, there was no factual medical basis rendering the complaint as clearly immature. The Court holds that the payment of Asuncion’s claim should be treated as voluntary settlement of his claim in full satisfaction of the NLRC Decision, rendering petition moot and academic. CA decision and resolution affirmed. People of the Philippines vs. Mryna Gayoso Arguelles March 27,, 2017 G.R. No. 206590 Del Castillo, J. Facts: Arguelles acted without the necessary permit from proper authorities, had in her possession and control and custody eleven sachets of shabu and another information charging appellant of selling, delivering and dispensing one small heat sachet of shabu whom she

entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. Joint trial ensued. RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and possession of shabu. Ruling that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they were bought from appellant and seized from her house. RTC rejected appellant’s defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive identification by eyewitnesses as the criminal offender. CA affirmed RTC ruling and ruled that all the elements of the sale of shabu were established during the “testbuy operation”. Issue:Whether or not chain of custody had been followed. Held: Contention has no merit. Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” The probable cause must be “determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Its determination is on whether the affiant has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused committed or is committing the crime charged. Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does not constitute instigation. Chain of custody is defined as “duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.” Four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be established:

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first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for the laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. In this case, no records show that the arresting officers have done both. There was a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody. In criminal prosecutions for illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance must be given to “the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt and innocence of the accused.” The court finds that the apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. The apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the place where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the DOH nor did it photograph the same in the presence of the appellant after the initial custody and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same. The appeal is granted and Arguelles acquitted of charges, her guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt. Joel T. Maturan vs. COMELEC and Allan Patino March 28, 2017 G.R. No. 227155 Bersamin, J.

In 2015, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy as Basilan Governor. Patino filed a petition for disqualification of petitioner on ground that the latter failed to file SOCE corresponding to 2010 and 2013 elections. Petitioner asserts that petition had been moot on account of his withdrawal from mayoralty race in 2013 and he was held accountable for failure to file SOCE in 2010 which he paid a fine. COMELEC first division rendered petitioner disqualified to hold public office. Issue: Whether or not a candidate who withdrew his candidacy is liable for not filing SOCE despite withdrawal. Held: Yes. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in the interpretation of RA No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”. Section 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. In Pilar vs. COMELEC, every candidate, including one who withdraws candidacy is required to file SOCE under Section 14 of RA 7166. Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification on candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCE, which cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with perpetual disqualification from holding public office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of public office who fail more than once to file their SOCE. Such penalty is intended to underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the sanctity of the electoral process. The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be properly imposed on a candidate for public office who repeatedly fails to submit his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166.

Facts:

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a bank by virtue of the fiduciary nature of its banking business, bad faith or gross negligence amounting to Sps. Carbonell vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company April 26, 2017 G.R. No. 178467 Bersamin, J.

bad faith was absent. Hence, there simply was no legal basis for holding the respondent liable for moral and exemplary damages. In breach of contract, moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. That was not true

Facts: Petitioners travelled to Bangkok after withdrawing notes from their dollar account, they had exchanged five of the bills into Baht but only four were accepted since the fifth was “no good”, then they have tried exchanging the same bill at the bank, the teller informing them that the dollar bill was fake and confiscated such note. They bought jewelry at Bangkok and was confronted by the owner the next day that the bills had turned out to be counterfeit. Upon return to Ph, they confronted the manager of the bank’s branch but the latter insisted that the dollar bills released are genuine. Said bills were submitted to BSP for examination which certified dollar bills as near perfect genuine notes. RTC dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit. CA promulgated assailed decision affirming RTC decision.

herein because the respondent was not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. This is pursuant to Article 2220 of the Civil Code, to wit: Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling the US

Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s failure to exercise the degree of diligence required in handling the affairs of its clients showed that it was liable not just for simple negligence but for misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to fraud.

dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty

Held:

the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they

Appeal is partly meritorious. The General Banking Act of

could not be compensated for the damage sustained.

2000 demands of banks the highest standards of

PEOPLE vs. UMAPAS March 22, 2017 GR. 215742 Peralta, J.

integrity and performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous care. In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant consequences, or that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and supervising its employees. Even if the law imposed a high standard on the latter as

towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given

Facts: The appellant Jose Umapas mauled his wife Gemma Umapas and with the use of alcohol, doused her with it and set her ablaze at their home located at Olongapo City. Gemma was brought to James L. Gordon Memorial Hospital for treatment Gemma was found to have suffered multiple injuries. Due to the severity of the injuries, the victim died from multiple organ failure

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secondary to thermal burns. The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty of the crime of parricide. Issue: Whether Appellant Jose Umapas is guilty of the crime of parricide. Held: Yes. Appellant Jose Umapas is guilty of the crime of parricide.

DY vs. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS March 22, 2017 GR.186088 Sereno, C.J.

Parricide is commited when;

Facts:

1. a person is killed; 2. the deceased is killed by the accused; 3. the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. In the instant case the accused Jose murdered his legitimate spouse Gemma by mauling her and setting her body on fire. Therefore, the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES INC. March 22, 2017 GR.214864 Caguioa, J. Facts: Petitioners herein advised NIASSI that PPA received numerous complaints regarding the poor quality of its services due to the use of inadequately maintained equipment. Petitioner further relayed that PP A would take over the cargo-handling services at the Nasipit Port. Issue: Whether the PPA can execute a cargo handling contract in favour of NIASI for a full 10 year term. Held: Yes. The PPA can execute a cargo handling contract in favour of NIASI for a full 10 year term. The Court compels the PPA to formally execute a 10 year cargo-handling contract at this time on the basis of conditions prevailing nearly two decades ago would certainly be unreasonable and iniquitous.

Respondents alleged that the registration of the trademark PHILITES & LETTER P DEVICE in the name of the petitioners will violate the proprietary rights and interests, business reputation and goodwill of the respondent over its trademark, considering that the distinctiveness of the trademark PHILIPS will be diluted. Issue: Whether petitioner can register a mark nearly resembling that of respondent’s mark. Held: No. The petitioner cannot register a mark nearly resembling that of respondent’s mark. Applying the dominancy test in the instant case, it shows the uncanny resemblance or confusing similarity between the trademarks applied for by respondent with that of petitioner's registered trademark. OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL vs. SPOUSES CAPANZA March 22, 2017 GR.189218 Sereno, C.J. Facts: Respondents imputed negligence to Drs. Ramos and Santos for the latter's failure to detect the heart disease of Regina, resulting in failure not only to refer her to a cardiologist for cardiac clearance, but also to provide the appropriate medical management before, during, and after the operation. Issue: Whether the petitioners are liable for negligence for the death of Regina. Held: Yes. The petitioners are liable for negligence for the death of Regina. 56

Applying the law, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA March 22, 2017 GR.224295 Reyes, J. Facts: The accused-appellant, with lewd design, through intimidation, did feloniously inserted his penis into the vagina and buttocks of his own daughter. The RTC held that the accused-appellant Ariel is guilty of qualified rape. Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty for the crime of qualified rape. Held: Yes. The accused-appellant is guilty for the crime of qualified rape. Article 266-A provides that rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman; through force, threat or intimidation; when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE TAPULADO, ET. AL. G.R. No. 199141 March 8, 2017 Mendoza, J. Facts: Deceased Tapulado was the owner of twoparcels of land located in Kiblagon, Sulop, Davao del Sur and another in Kisulan, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the subject lands under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program pursuant to

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27; and in 1978, awarded them to the farmer-beneficiaries. Tapulado, however, did not receive any compensation from the government. The respondents, the Heirs of Tapulado rejected the valuation of the subject lands at P38,002.4 7 or P 1,315 .00 per hectare. They filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the DARAB referred their petition to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao del Surfor the recomputation of the value of the subjectLands. Without waiting for the laters re-evaluation,the Tapulados filed a petition before the R TC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination and payment of just compensation. RTC pegged the amount of P200,000.00 per hectare and awarded the amounts of P300,000.00 as moral damages and Pl00,000.00 as attorney's fees. On appeal, CA agreed with the R TC that the computation of the just compensation should be in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 because the compensation had remained unsettled up to the passage of the new law. Issue: WON CA committed grave error of law when it ordered the remand of the case to the sac for the reception of evidence as to the date of the grant of emancipation patent and the computation ofj ust compensation in accordance with the market-data approach despite the clear mandate of DAR A.O. no. 1, series of 2010, implementing R.A no. 9700 as to the formula to be used and that the reckoning date in computing just compensation is June 30, 2009. Ruling: NO. The Court agrees with the CA that the case should be remanded to the RTC for the computation of just compensation. With the enactment of R.A. No. 9700, the LBP agreed with the order of remand for the computation of just compensation conformably with the said law. A reading of R.A. No. 9700, however, reveals that the case still falls within the ambit of Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657 as 57

amended. Section 5 of R.A. No. 9700, clearly provides that "previously acquired lands wherein the valuation is subject to challenge shall be completed and resolved pursuant to Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657, as amended. In the case at bench, the subject property was awarded to the farmer beneficiaries in 1978. On March 24, 1980, LBP approved its initial valuation. Clearly, the process of the determination of just compensation should be governed by Section 17 ofR.A. No. 6657. Accordingly, the Court sets aside the R TC valuation of their property at P200,000.00 per hectare. The RTC valuation failed to comply with the parameters of Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR regulation. In fact, the RTC neither used any formula in coming up with the valuation of the subject land nor explained its reason for deviating therefrom. It simply declared the amount of P200,000.00 per hectare as the fair and reasonable amount of compensation, without any clear basis. In the determination of just compensation, the RTC should be guided by the following: 1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer beneficiaries. 2. Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Nevertheless, while it should take into account the different formulas created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In which case, the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formulas in arriving at a reasonable just compensation. 3. Interest may be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking and

6% per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.

OCA vs. Retired Judge Chavez, et. al. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219 March 7, 2017 PER CURIAM: Facts: Respondent Judge Chavez previously presided over Branch 87 of the RTC of Rosario, Batangas along with Atty. Dimaculangan, JR., as Clerk of Court VI, Mr. Marquez and Ms. Bagsic as Court Interpreter III, and Mr. Caguimbal as Process Server, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, In February 1, 2010 Court resolution, administrative complaints of gross dereliction of duty, gross inefficiency, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, corruption and deliberate violation of the law on marriage; violation of Administrative Circulars; violation of Supreme Court Circular; violation of Section 5, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; gross inefficiency and incompetence and gross irregularity in the service of summons on annulment of marriages cases were charged to the respondents respectively. Judge Chavez himself admits that he has been overly lenient and lax and that, as Presiding Judge for 11 years, "he overly relied on the representations of his court staff, particularly his Clerk of Court that the case records and disposition of cases are proper and in order." He laments that he is a victim of his court staff's betrayal and perfidy Respondent Dimaculangan, Clerk of Court VI, blames the clerks-incharge having physical custody of the court's folders for the negligence. Respondent Caguimbal, denies the charges against him and states that he performed his duties with utmost good faith and honesty. Further, he alleges that in cases where summons were served to persons other than the respondent or defendant, he made sure that the summons were received by persons of suitable age and discretion. He also claims that he is unsure whether he

58

issued and signed some of the returns of summons concerning annulment of marriages.

sure that they are aware of and comply with the exacting standards imposed on all public servants.

For Bagsic, the main charge against respondent Bagsic involves her failure to transcribe TSNs in nullity and annulment of marriage cases. The OCA also found that the TSNs were not attached to their proper case records. Respondent Marquez claims that his failure to prepare the minutes of the proceedings was due to lack of sufficient time. He further claims that he prioritized criminal cases over civil cases. He also denies that he acted as an agent for Atty. Jose Calingasan when he referred said counsel to Ms. Rene Frane Arillano for possible lawyer-client relationship. He claims that he merely provided the names of counsels within the vicinity of the Hall of Justice.

Atty. Teofilo A.Dimaculangan, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct. Further, there was no evidence that respondent Dimaculangan complied with the requirements stated in Section 7(o) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: WON respondents are administratively liable. Ruling: YES. Judge Pablo R. Chavez is found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and undue delay of rendering decisions. Judge Chavez' unexplained and unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitute gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. Judge Chavez' excuses are not sufficient to absolve him of disciplinary action. Judges and clerks of court should personally conduct a physical inventory of the pending cases in their courts and personally examine the records of each case at the time of their assumption to office, and every semester thereafter. Judges should know which cases are submitted for decision and are expected to keep their own record of cases so that they may act on them promptly. In this case, the totality of the findings of the judicial audit team proves Judge Chavez' reckless and irresponsible attitude towards his duties. He utterly and glaringly lacked the necessary care and organization in handling and managing his court and personnel. He was completely remiss in his duties to ensure that there is order and inefficiency in his court, to maintain a wellorganized system of record-keeping and docket management, and to supervise his personnel and make

These guidelines emphasize the importance and seriousness of the duty imposed upon clerks of courts who manage and secure the funds of the Court. Mere delay in remitting the funds collected has, in fact, been considered gross neglect of duty or grave misconduct. Clerks of court are the custodians of the courts' funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of those entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively liable. Given respondent Dimaculangan's numerous and grave infractions, the Court finds that he was not only remiss in his duties; he took advantage of his position as clerk of court to circumvent and disregard the rules. His acts do not only point to gross neglect of duty but also grave misconduct. Misconduct is grave if corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. David Caguimbal is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty. The Court said that the duty of a process server is vital to the administration of justice. A process server's primary duty is to serve court notices which precisely requires utmost care on' his part to ensure that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties. It is therefore important that summonses, other writs and court processes be served expeditiously. Respondent Caguimbal committed grave misconduct and serious dishonesty when he signed process server returns without actually serving any such summons or court process. Misconduct is an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. To be considered as grave and to warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct 59

must be serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and it must have a direct relation to, and be connected with, the performance of his official duties amounting either to maladministration, willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. On the other hand, dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Editha E. Bagsic is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. Stenographers should comply faithfully with paragraph 1, Section 17, Rule 136, of the Rules of Court. Respondent Bagsic explained that it is their practice to keep TSNs in their cabinets. If there were stenographic notes that were not transcribed, she claims that this was due to lack of time. These excuses, however, are not acceptable. Clearly, respondent Bagsic was remiss in her duties as stenographer and should be held liable for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Armando Ermelito M. Marquez is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and simple misconduct. As court interpreter, respondent Marquez is duty-bound to prepare and sign the minutes of court sessions, failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty. Section 5, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins all court personnel from recommending private attorneys to litigants, prospective litigants or anyone dealing with the judiciary. As an employee of the judiciary, respondent Marquez must maintain a neutral attitude in dealing with party-litigants. In this case, respondent Marquez transgressed the strict norm of conduct required from court employees by referring a prospective litigant to a private lawyer. His act gave the impression that the court is indorsing a particular lawyer, thereby undermining the public's faith in the impartiality of the courts. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior which transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers, workrelated or not.

MANUEL L. BAUTISTA, et.al, vs. MARGARITO L. BAUTISTA G.R. No. 202088 March 8, 2017 Peralta, J. Facts: The present case stemmed from a Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the petitioners against Margarito and the other defendants over several properties allegedly co-owned by them, which included the subject property. The Bautista siblings - Margarito, Carmelita, Aniano, Florencia, and Ester, established a lending business through a common fund from the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of coconut land they inherited from their mother. Through the said lending business, the siblings acquired several real properties in San Pablo City. On March 2, 1998, Amelia obtained a loan in the amount of P690,000.00 from Florencia, and secured the same with a real estate mortgage over the Sta. Monica property. They later extended the mmigage through a Kasulatan ng Pagdaragdag ng Sanla, for an additional loan of Pl 15,000.00 on April 6, 1998; on May 13, 1998, Pl ,085,000.0010 and cancelled the previous loan of P690,000.00; and on April 12, 1999, Amelia and Florencia executed another in the amount of P57,500.00. Florencia, thereafter, received the owner's duplicate copy of the same property. On November 28, 2002, Amelia allegedly sold the subject property to Margarito through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan 13 for P500,000.00 and, likewise, cancelled the Pl ,085,000.00 loan while Florencia filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Owner's Duplicate and alleged that she was the mortgagee of the subject property, she misplaced the owner's duplicate title in her possession sometime in September 2002.

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Petitioners tried to oppose the issuance, but on January 30, 2003, the RTC granted the petition and the property was later issued in the name of Margarito as representative of Florencia. Failing to settle their differences, petitioners subsequently instituted a Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction over several properties against herein respondents. Petitioners averred that Margarito and the others refused their oral and written demands for the partition of the properties they co-owned, which included the Sta. Monica property. Petitioners presented copies of their bank transactions with Far East Bank to support their claim of coownership over the same.25 They also presented an undated, unnotarized, and blank Kasulatan, which Amelia purportedly executed and signed disposing the subject property in favor of the Bautista siblings. On February 16, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared, among other things, that the Sta. Monica property was commonly owned by the siblings. The RTC also ordered that the property be partitioned among all of them and that an accounting of its income be held. Aggrieved, Margarito elevated the case before the CA. The CA on March 06, 2012 concluded that petitioners failed to establish that they are co-owners of the Sta. Monica property. Issues: WON co-ownership is established by the petitioners. Ruling: YES. A special civil action of judicial partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them the part corresponding to him.42 The object of partition is to enable those who own property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements. Hence, unless and until the issue of coownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an estate.

In the case at bar, petitioners aver that although the Sta. Monica property was registered solely in Margarito's name, they are co-owners of the property because it was acquired through the siblings' lending business, as such, they are entitled to partition and the conveyance to them of their respective shares. To support their allegations, petitioners presented several mortgage contracts evidencing the transactions between Amelia and Florencia, computer printouts of their bank transactions, and the blank Kasulatan. It is elementary that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. It appears that Margarito's evidence of exclusive ownership are the certificate of title, the tax declarations pertaining thereto, his bank deposits, and other mortgage contracts involving different mortgagors. Despite all these, Margarito failed to prove that Amelia conveyed the Sta. Monica property exclusively in his name. It is also quite intriguing why he did not even bother to present the testimony of Amelia or of Florencia, who could have enlightened the court about their transactions. In addition, the Court find it incredible that a property, which secured a loan roughly over a million pesos, would be sold for considerably less than that amount or for only P550,000.00. Although a certificate of title is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land, the mere issuance of the same in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. From the foregoing, this Court finds that an implied resulting trust existed among the parties. The pieces of evidence presented demonstrate their intention to acquire the Sta. Monica property in the course of their business, just like the other properties that were also the subjects of the

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partition case and the compromise agreement they entered into. Although the Sta. Monica property was titled under the name of Margarito, the surrounding circumstances as to its acquisition speak of the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership of the property should belong to the Bautista siblings.

Spouses Louh had in fact availed of credit accommodations from the use of the cards. However, the RTC found the 3.5% finance and 6% late payment monthly charges18 imposed by BPI as iniquitous and unconscionable. Hence, both charges were reduced to 1 % monthly. Issue: WON the CA erred in sustaining BPI's complaint.

LOUH, JR. and LOUH, vs. BPI G.R. No. 225562 March 8, 2017 Reyes, J.

Ruling: NO.

Facts:

The Court affirms the herein assailed decision and resolution, but modifies the principal amount and attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and the CA.

BPI issued a credit card in William's name, with Irene as the extension card holder. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the cards' issuance, 3.5% finance charge and 6% late payment charge shall be imposed monthly upon unpaid credit availments. The Spouses Louh made purchases from the use of the credit cards and paid regularly based on the amounts indicated in the Statement of Accounts (SO As). However, they were remiss in their obligations starting October 14, 2009. 5 As of August 15, 2010, their account was unsettled prompting BPI to send written demand letters dated August 7, 2010, January 25, 2011 and May 19, 2011. By September 14, 2010, they owed BPI the total amount of ?533,836.27. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the Spouses Louh failed to pay BPI. On August 4, 2011, BPI filed a Complaint7 for Collection of a Sum of Money. RTC granted an extension of Time to File an Answer or Responsive Pleading of 15 days or up to March 4, 2012, but the Spouses Louh still failed to comply within the prescribed period. The Spouses Louh filed an Answer12 on July 20, 2012 or more than three months late. The RTC declared the Spouses, default. The RTC explained that BPI had adduced preponderant evidence proving that the Spouses Louh had in fact availed of credit accommodations from the use of the cards. However, the RTC found the 3.5% finance and 6% late payment monthly charges18 imposed by BPI as iniquitous and unconscionable. Hence, both charges were reduced to 1 % monthly. The CA affirmed that The RTC explained that BPI had adduced preponderant evidence proving that the

When they were thereafter declared in default, they filed no motion to set aside the RTC's order, a remedy which is allowed under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Spouses Louh failed to show that they exerted due diligence in timely pursuing their cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of the rules, which can only be made in exceptional cases. The Spouses Louh slept on their rights to refute BPI's evidence, including the receipt of the SO As and demand letters. BPI cannot be made to pay for the Spouses Louh's negligence, omission or belated actions.

TSM Shipping Phils., et al. vs Louie Patiñosa March 20,2017 GR No. 210289 Del Castillo, J. Facts: Petitioner entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent for a period of six months. While performing his duties in a foreign country, respondent injured his right hand and was repatriated. Respondent was examined by the company physician, Dr. Cruz, upon arrival and monitored his condition. Respondent filed for benefits and damages before Dr. Cruz rendered a disability rating of Grade 10 on September 29, 2010. Respondent consulted Dr. Escutin whose findings proclaim that respondent cannot fully perform his job as a seaman and thus not physically fit to perform the 62

job of a seaman. These findings became the basis for the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the appellate court’s decision in favor of respondent. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for total disability benefits Held: No. The Court reiterated the rule that “a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designate physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration” The final assessment, a Grade 10 disability rating which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability under the POEA-SEC, made by the company physician was made within the 240-day period. Moreover, the medical opinion of Dr. Escutin ought not to be given more weight than the disability grading given by Dr. Cruz. In Veritas Maritime Corporation v. Gepanaga, Jr., the Court held that in case of conflict of assessment between the company physician and the physician appointed by the seafarer, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the parties and its decision shall be final and binding on them. As the petitioner failed to observe the procedures, the certification of the company-designated physician regarding the respondent’s disability is final and binding.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Amado M. Mendoza March 20, 2017 GR No. 198799 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: Respondents opened a foreign currency savings account using a US Treasury Check. After respondents withdrew the amount deposited, the check was discredited by the correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New York, stating in an e-mail that it was due to “amount altered” and the original check was confiscated by the government. The RTC ruled in favor of herein petitioners stating that BPI duly notified respondents of the dishonor, and that Amado unmistakably acknowledged the same.

However, the CA reversed said decision citing that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the check. Issue: Whether or not BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check by merely presenting a photocopy and an e-mail from Bankers Trust stating the same was altered. Held: No. The Court held that in order to fail under the exceptions stated in Section 3, Rule 130, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) The absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability can be attributed. In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the requisites therefore the presentation of the photocopy of the subject check was permissible. As to the e-mail, while it was not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the same was corroborative evidence, and should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence proving respondents obligation towards BPI.

Felix B. Tiu vs. Sps. Jacinto Jangas and Petronila Mertoa-Jangas, et al. March 20, 2017 GR. No. 200285 Reyes, J. Facts: Gregorio Pajulas was an owner of a certain piece of land. Upon his death, the lot was divided to three equal shares for Gregorio’s three daughters, Adelaida, Bruna, and Isabel. Bruna sold her share to Spouses Gaudencio and Lucia Delayco. Bridiana Delayco, who was the heir of spouses Delayco, was issued a title of the whole lot to her name alone. Bridiana sold the land petitioner Tiu. 63

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Tiu is a buyer in good faith.

Held: No. The Court held petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of Bruna and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto. The respondents share of the lot were never alienated from them despite having the whole lot titled under Bridiana. Consequently, even when the lot in issue is titled under petitioners name, the respondents were never displaced. Moreover, petitioner had knowledge that there were other occupants of the subject property. When a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. In Hortizuela v. Tagufa, the Court held that the registration of a piece of land does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. As the Court is convinced that petitioner is not a byer and registrant in good faith, the petition was denied. Lourdes C. Rodriguez vs. Sps. Vicente & Estelita B. Javier et al. March 20, 2017 GR. No. 222980 Leonen, J. Facts: Petitioner Rodriguez was an employee of spouses Javier for 25 years. Over the course of time, Rodriguez was trusted with both personal and business affairs of the spouses. Petitioner alleges that she was constructively dismissed by reason that her employers were allegedly hotheaded, and embarrass her in the presence of coworkers.

Rodriguez also claims for her service incentive leave pay for the whole 25 years contrary to what the CA decided the she should only be rewarded service incentive leave pay for the last three years as the previous years had prescribed Issue: Whether or not petitioner Rodriguez was constructively dismissed by the respondents. Held: No. The Court held that there is constructive dismissal when an employer’s act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. The standard for constructive dismissal is “whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the circumstances.” Rodriguez was entrusted with the respondents’ assets, the care and safeguarding of their house, custody of company files, and authorization to make withdrawals and deposits to both the personal and business accounts of the respondents; all of which belies the claim that petitioner was treated harshly by the respondents. The Court further held that the words uttered by Estelita “Kung ayaw mo sa ginagawa mo, we can manage!” were merely a consequence of her spontaneous outburst of feelings from the petitioner’s failure to perform her task which was long overdue. The words were not sufficient to make the continued employment of petitioner impossible, or unreasonable; spontaneous expressions of an employer do not automatically render a hostile work atmosphere. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to 25 years worth of service incentive leave pay.

Held: Yes. In Auto Bus Transport System, Inc v. Bautista, the Court clarified the correct reckoning of the prescriptive period for service incentive leave pay: “.. In the case of service incentive leave, the employee may choose to either use his leave credits 64

or commute it to its monetary equivalent if not exhausted at the end of the year. Furthermore, if the employee entitled to service incentive leave does not use or commute the same, he is entitled upon his resignation or separation from work to the commutation of his accrued service incentive leave..” The Court, applying Article 291 of the Labor Code, conclude that the three-year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of commutation or upon termination of the employee’s services. Therefore, Rodriguez was entitled to the whole 25 year service incentive leave and not only three as determined by the Court of Appeals. People of the Philippines Vs. Chrisopher Mejaro Roa G.R. No. 225599 March 22, 2017 Facts: The accused was charged with murder for the killing of Eliseo Delmiguez. A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is known to have suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from others and the mother of the accused that the ailment is due to his use of illegal drugs when he was working in Manila. When accused returned from Manila in 2001, Issac recalled that, in marked contrast to the silent and formal deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter became talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself' and "complaining of a headache. On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the [Don Susana J.

Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. On March 16, 2007, at about 3 :30 p.m., it appears that Eliseo, then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in front of the store of Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3, San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters, the pair was spotted by Rico who, while waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby. When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was approached from behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back with a bolo locally known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches. Issue: Whether or not the defense of insanity is tenable. Ruling: No, it is not tenable. Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged In the case at bar, the testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster. First, the testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the accused in 2012, or about five years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was committed is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed the offense. While it may be said that the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony that the accused was 65

also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay. Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the possible underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao's testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately prior to, during, and immediately after accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation. There are circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. This is supported by the companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any danger when they saw accusedappellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accusedappellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the crime afterstabbing the victim indicates that he knew that what he just committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them. In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the date of the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007.

Facts: On September 13, 2004, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to annul the Deed of Sale (DOS) executed by and among respondents Caridad C. Almendras (Caridad), Rolando C. Sanchez (Rolando) and Leonardo Dalwampo over a parcel of unregistered land located at Inawayan, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur containing approximately 6.3087 hectares. Petitioner alleged that he owned and had occupied said parcel of land since September 21, 1978 until he was forcibly dispossessed by respondent South Davao Development Company, Inc. (SODACO) on April 23, 1994. Petitioner claimed that Caridad sold the property to Rolando, a purported dummy of SODACO. During the proceedings on March 16, 2010, Rolando filed a Request for Admission addressed to petitioner which the latter failed to respond to. Rolando, as a result, filed a motion for Summary Judgment which was opposed by Petitioner. RTC then concluded that by petitioner's failure to respond to the Request for Admission, he was deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the matters specified therein. In particular, petitioner is deemed to have admitted the fact that the property in question had been validly sold to Rolando thereby rendering the complaint without any cause of action. Aggrieved by the RTC's Orders, petitioner sought recourse directly to this Court via the instant Petition for Review. Issue: Whether or not the petition for review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion was proper. Ruling: No, it was not proper.

Alexis C. Almendras Vs. South Davao Development Corporation, Inc. (SODACO), et al. G.R. No. 198209 March 22, 2017

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is glaringly different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. "A petition for review under Rule 45 of the x x x Rules of 66

Court is generally limited only to questions of law or errors of judgment. On the other hand; a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction." Here, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the RTC claiming that contrary to the lower court's ruling, he could not have received the motion on March 24, 2010 (as stated in the postmaster's certification) given that the motion was filed only on July 26, 2010. It must be stressed that only questions of law may be properly raised in a petition for review. Whether or not petitioner received a copy of the motion on March 24, 2010 is a factual issue and such is not within the ambit of a petition for review. In any case, it may be well to remind petitioner that he never raised the issue of lack of service of the Motion for Summary of Judgment to him. His petition mainly rests on the failure to serve him a copy of the Request for Admission. Given that the Request for Admission was dated March 11, 2010, it would be logical to think that the registry return card was for the said Request. If he were really keen on protecting his rights after noting the flaw in the IVlarch 28, 2011 Order, it would have been prudent for him to file a Motion for Correction of Judgment or to seek a different mode of appeal (i.e. Petition for Certiorari) but he did not. Martin Villamor y Tayson and Victor Banaobra y Gianan vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 200396 March 22, 2017 Facts: Villamor and Banaobra, the former acting as a ‘collector’ and the latter as a manager and as an operator was charged with the violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 or collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng” and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash.

On July 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Penaflor received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Penaflor, Saraspi, PO 1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report. Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of cOLmtingbetsj described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets. When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to Pl ,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid arrest. Ruling: There was NO valid arrest in this case. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right. 67

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or caught in the act of committing an offense. PD Penaflor and his team of police officers claim that petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested without a warrant. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." It was not properly established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO 1 Saraspi and PD Penaflor, they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Penaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. Thee accused are acquitted by the Supreme Court.

People of the Philippines Vs. AnastacioHementiza y Dela Cruz G.R. No. 227398. March 22, 2017 Facts: On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, the police conducted a buy-bust operation at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City.A confidential informant (CI) told them that a certain Anastacio was peddling drugs in the area. Upon arrival, the CI pointed to their target person. Palconit approached accused-appellant and asked if he could buy shabu. After receiving the marked money, accused-appellant handed to Palconit one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. The accused was arrested and the substance and marked money were recovered. After examination, a report was issued confirming that the crystalline substance in the sachets were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that on May 25, 2003 at around 1: 15 o'clock in the morning, he was playing billiards at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio when three (3) armed men suddenly arrived and pointed a gun at him. Without saying anything, the men frisked and handcuffed him but found nothing illegal on him. He was arrested and brought to an office in Lores where he was detained, interrogated, and forced to admit a wrongdoing. He was also asked to point to other persons so that he could be released. Issue: Whether the guilt of the accused for the crimes charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling: No, it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug itself.Thus, the 68

chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti. In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the records are bereft of any showing that an inventory of the seized items was made. Neither does it appear on record that the apprehending team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized items. Based on his testimony, it is clear that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure; instead, the markings were only placed at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did not offer any justifiable reason. To make matters worse, from the place of seizure to the PDEA office, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit. Moreover, the identity of the investigating officer was unknown and it was uncertain who received the seized items when it was brought to the forensic laboratory. The records are bereft of any evidence as to how the illegal drugs were brought to court. Fabros merely testified that she made a report confirming that the substance contained in the sachets brought to her was positive for shabu. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. It could be that the accused was really involved in the sale of shabu, but considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the prosecution's evidence, the Court has no recourse but to give him the benefit thereof.

Landbank of the Philippines Vs. Antonio Marcos, Sr., namely: Anita M. Rubio, Lolita M. Pelino, Antonio Marcos, jr. and Ramiro D. Marcos G.R. No. 175726. March 22, 2017 Facts: The deceased Antonio Marcos, Sr. (Antonio) was the owner of two parcels of agricultural land in Sorsogon. On April 3, 1995, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, 6 Ramiro Marcos (Ramiro), authorized representative of the heirs of Antonio, namely: Anita Rubio, Lolita M. Pelino, Antonio Marcos, Jr. and Ramiro, offered to sell the landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). LBP valued the lands covered by TCT Nos. 2552 and 2562 at P195,603.70 and P79,096.26. The DARAB, however, set aside this value upon filing of the DAR, and a new valuation is fixed at P446,786.03 which the LBP opposed. The Special Agrarian Court (SAC)ruled in favor of the DAR and the CA upheld this decision. Issues: Whether or not the SAC may disregard the valuation factors under section 17 of R.A. 6657 which are translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Sps. Banal and Celada, in fixing the just compensation for subject properties? Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) may abrogate, vary or alter a consummated contract between the government and respondents in regard to subject properties? Ruling: 1. Yes. When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail, particularly when 69

faced with situations that do not warrant the formula's strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula's application to fit the factual situations before them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law and the rules have provided

In 2005, Spouses Alcantara filed before the RTC a Complaint against Spouses Belen for the quieting of title, reconveyance of possession, and accounting of harvest with damages of Lot No. 16932. Petitioners argued that their neighbors, respondents herein, had extended the latter's possession up to the land titled to Spouses Alcantara, and usurped the harvests therefrom.

In the case at bar, the RTC-SAC did not clearly explain why the formula was not applied although the factors enumerated were considered in determining just compensation. There was no reasoned explanation grounded on evidence on record why the court did not comply with the established rules. Thus, this Court finds that the case does not warrant for deviation from the factors and formula set forth by the law and rules applicable.

Elvira Alcantara traced her ownership of the property to her inheritance from her mother, Asuncion Alimon.

2. Yes. The LBP's valuation of lands covered by the CARP Law considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors provided in R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. The LBP's valuation has to be substantiated during an appropriate hearing before it could be considered sufficient in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR regulations. Since it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final determination of just compensation, the supposed acceptance of the LBP's valuation cannot be considered as consummated contract. Since this case needs to determine just compensation, the case was remanded to the court of origin, the SC not being a trier of facts. Sps. Elvira Alcantara and Edwin Alcantara vs. Sps. Florante Belen and Zenaida Ananias G.R. No. 200204. April 25, 2017 Facts:

In addition to the certificate of title, Spouses Alcantara submitted as evidence the Tax Declarations of the property registered to them and their predecessors-ininterest, receipts of their payments for real property taxes, and a Sketch/Special Plan[9] of Lot No. 16932 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Augusto C. Rivera. On the strength of a sales agreement called KasulatanngBilihangTuluyanngLupa, respondents countered Spouses Alcantara's claims over the property. Spouses Belen alleged that they bought the property from its prior owners. Even though respondents did not have any certificate of title over the property, they supported their claim of ownership with various Tax Declarations under the name of their predecessors-in-interest. Furthermore, Spouses Belen attacked the OCT of Asuncion Alimon. They claimed that fraud attended the issuance of a Free Patent to her, considering that the Belens had occupied the property ever since. According to respondents, they already protested her title still pending before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Issue: Whether or not the CA committed error in judgment in ruling against Sps. Alcantara despite their TCT and in favor of Sps. Belen with their Tax declarations and Deed of Sale. Ruling: Yes the CA’s judgment was erroneous. 70

A cursory reading of the facts clearly shows that the lot claimed by petitioners is not the property conveyed in the deed of sale presented by respondents. Aside from their difference in size, the two properties have distinctive boundaries. Therefore, on the face of the documents, the CA incorrectly ruled that these pertained to Lot No. 16932. The ruling of the CA that respondents own Lot No. 16932 based on their Tax Declarations is likewise erroneous. Tracing the history of the Tax Declarations registered under the names of respondents to those of their predecessors-in-interest, we find that none of these refers to Lot No. 16932. Even assuming that the Tax Declarations of respondents pertain to the subject property, this Court finds that the CA incorrectly applied the law on land titles. The appellate court should not have set aside the RTC's appreciation of the certificate of title registered to Spouses Alcantara just because Spouses Belen presented their Tax Declarations. Based on established jurisprudence, we rule that the certificate of title of petitioners is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their ownership of the property. The irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses Belen cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of Spouses Alcantara, as it is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. The CA Ruling was reversed and the SC ruled in favor of Sps. Alcantara. SPS ORSOLINO vs. VIOLETA FRANY March 29, 2017 GR.193887 Reyes, J. Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment over a house situated in Novaliches filed by Respondent SpsFrany against petitioners SpsOrsolino. SpsFrany claimed that Carolina Orsolino authorized his son Sander to sell subject property as evidenced by SPA to which the same was sold as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. However, despite repeated demands to vacate

said property, petitioners failed to do so. On the other hand, respondent contends that they were not aware of the sale, petitioner Dennis has no brother named Sander, signature of Carolina appearing in SPA and Deed of Sale is a forgery and that there were no demands letter coming from SpsFrany. The MeTC ruled in favor of SpsFrany and declared the sale valid and that there was no existence of forgery thereby dismissing the complaint. Upon appeal, RTC set aside the ruling of MeTC declaring the SPA and Deed of Sale showed patent irregularities and alterations which rendered it null and void ab initio. However on appeal to CA, it reinstated the ruling of MeTC. It upheld the validity of SPA and Deed of Sale which were duly notarized since the same carry evidenciary weight with respect to their due execution and this presumption was not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary by Spouses Orsolino.Hence, this case. Issue: 1. Whether the signatures of Carolina on the documents were falsified 2. Whether the authenticity and due execution of the SPA and Deed of Absolute Sale have been sufficiently established. Held: 1. Basic is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, thus, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In this case, the Court sustains the findings of the lower courts that the bases presented by SpsOrsolino were inadequate to sustain their allegation of forgery. Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same was forged. Furthermore, there had never been an accurate examination of the questioned signatures. 2. The court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the MeTC that the validity of the said documents must be upheld on the ground that it enjoys the presumption of regularity of a public document since the same carry evidentiary weight with respect to their due execution. Furthermore, the fact of forgery is not established by the patent irregularities and alterations in the said 71

documents, such as the changing of names of the places and the date written thereon. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs KING REX AMBATANG March 29, 2017 GR.205855 Leonen, J. Facts: Accused-appellant King Ambatang (Amabatang) was charged with murder of Ely Vidal (Vidal) with the use of knife hitting the victim in different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him fatal injuries which caused his instantaneous death. The said killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength which qualified such killing to murder. However, Ambatang in his defense claimed that he was at AMA Computer LeamingCenter. He stated that while he was doing the laundry, barangay tanods went to their house looking for a person named Louie.He then heard a noise from a commotion outside his house.His mother and sister went out and instructed him to stay in the sala with his girlfriend. Minutes later, he went out to see his friend Lobo who lived roughly eight to ten meters from their house. Lobo was not there, but he was able to speak to a certain Rael for a few seconds. He then left Lobo's house and was arrested by barangay tanods on his way home. In support of this testimony, his mother and girlfriend both testified that Ambatang was inside the house when the stabbing occurred. The RTC found Ambatang guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to which was also upheld by the CA which only modified to include an additional award of damages. Issue: Whether accussed-appellant Ambatang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder Held: The court held that the lower courts made definitive findings that Jennifer and Acaba made positive, unequivocal and categorical identifications of accussedappellant as the person who stabbed the deceased

Vidal. As against these, accused-appellant offered denial and alibi as defenses, which jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable. In addition, an alibi corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by the court with extreme suspicion for it is easy to fabricate and concoct. Ambtang also assails the inconsistencies in the statements of Jennifer and Acaba. The court ruled that regardless of Jennifer and Acaba's supposed discrepancies on how accused-appellant left his residence to stab Vidal and the exact number of times they saw him stab Vidal, what ultimately matters is that they witnessed how accused-appellant stabbed Vidal. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SPS CHIU March 29, 2017 GR.192345 Del Castillo, J. Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural lands located in Sorsogon which were acquired by the government pursuant to its agrarian reform program. The first parcel of land was acquired by PD 27 and the second was acquired under RA 6657 which was initially valued by LBP at P177,657.98 and P263,928.57, respectively. Respondents rejected LBP's valuation; hence summary administrative proceedings were conducted before PARAD to determine the just compensation. The PARAD recomputed the valuations arrived by the LBP. The PARAD recomputed the value of the RA 6657-acquired property at P1,542,360.00 (or P200,000.00/ha.) based on the comparable sales transaction of similar nearby lots as well as Municipal Resolution No. 79, series of2002, declaring Hacienda Chu as industrial area. In addition, it considered the subject property's good production, topography, and accessibility. As regards the PD 27-acquired land, the PARAD valued the subject property at P983,663.94 using the formula: Land Value= AGP x ASP x 2.5 (or Average Gross Production of 75.2 x Actual Support Price of 11350.00 x 2.5). LBP’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by DARAB. On appeal to RTC, it fixed the just compensation at P2,313,478.00 for the RA 6657-acquired property and P1,155,173.00 for the PD 27-acquired land. On appeal, the CA modified the RTC's ruling. The CA noted that the formula used by the PARAD (i.e., LV = AGP x ASP x 2.5) in computing the 72

valuation for the PD 27-acquired land is correct. However, the amount used for the ASP, which is P350, is erroneous. According to the CA, the mandated ASP in i Executive Order No. 22820 (EO 228) is only P35, not P350. Issue: Whether the CA committed serious errors of law when: 1. Insofar as the RA 6657-acquired land, it disregarded the valuation factors under section 17 of RA 6657 and the pertinent DAR Administrative Orders in fixing its value at P1,542,360.00 2. Insofar as the PD 27-acquired land, it refused to remand the instant case to the trial court for a recomputation of its value pursuant to section 17 of RA 6657, as amended Held: The court held that the judgment arrived at by the PARAD and the RTC, which rulings were subsequently affirmed in toto and with modifications, respectively, by the CA, as to the RA 6657-acquired property, was to some extent based on a misapprehension or erroneous appreciation of facts. As regards the PARAD's and the CA's ruling, on one hand, and the RTC's on the other, on the PD 27-acquired land, their findings thereon are conflicting. Additionally, the PARAD's and the CA's reliance on PD 27 and its implementing rules, which formed the basis of their respective Decisions, are now inapplicable thereto. Furthermore, this court cannot sustain LBP's valuation of P263,928.57 as just compensation for the RA 6657acquired property for failure to substantiate the same. In this case, we hold that the LBP was not able to justify its valuation. Although the LBP maintained that it stringently applied the pertinent law and its relevant implementing rules in arriving at its computation, it failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the truthfulness or correctness of its assertions. Also, we cannot agree to the valuations fixed by the PARAD and the RTC, valuations that found their way into rulings that were affirmed in toto and with modification by the CA, respectively. These rulings were arrived at in clear disregard of the formula set forth under DAR A.O. No. 05-98. As borne out by their respective Decisions, these tribunals considered only the Comparable Sales (CS) factor to the exclusion of the other factors, namely, the CNI and MY.

The court is thus constrained to remand the case to RTC for the receipt of evidence and determination of just compensation. Although RA 9700 was enacted during the pendency of this case, this court still views that this case falls within the ambit of sec 17 of RA 6657, as amended. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs TIRSO SIBBU March 29, 2017 GR.214757 Del Castillo, J. Facts: Appelant Tirso Sibbu was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder and of murder. Bryan the private complainant and a common witness to all cases testified that he was with his daughter, his mother and father on their azotea when he saw from a distance of five meters a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito. However, appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi stating that he did not leave the house because they had a visitor and that he tended to his child. Upon ruling, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder. The RTC gave credence to Bryan’s positive identification of appellant who shot his family and find the defense of denial and alibi weak. This was also affirmed by the CA. Hence, this case. Issue: 1. Whether the trial court erred in giving undue credence to the testimony of Bryan 73

2. Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and use of disguise were not sufficiently established Held: 1.The court upheld the findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, that Bryan positively identified appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha. It has consistently ruled that factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to respect and generally should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain substantial facts were overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. Bryan’s narration oh how he was able to recognize the appellant was credible and convincing because he was only five meters away from the appellant when the shooting incident happened and was able to get a glimpse of appellant's face when the latter fixed his bonnet. In addition, Christmas lights hanging from the roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to identify the appellant. Moreover, Bryan is familiar with the appellant's built, height, and body movements. 2. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying circumstance in the instant case. Treachery is present “when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” The victims were all unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial court correctly held: xx aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should

have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without xx. The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and are familiar with each other.

RENATO MA. R.PERALTA vs JOSE RAY RAVAL March 29,2017 GR. 188467 Reyes, J. Facts: This case involves a lease agreement over two parcels of land located in Ilocos Norte covered by TCTs under the names of Sps Arzaga. On 1974, Sps Arzaga, as lessors, entered into a 40yr Contract of Lease with Peralta, as lessee, over the subject lot and improvements thereon. Under the lease contract, Peralta was also to construct thereon a building that should become property of the Sps. Arzaga upon lease termination, to pay realty taxes for both lots and to develop water system for the use of both parties. However, Flaviano Jr filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of the contract against Peralta who allegedly breached his obligations which was later on dismissed and was upheld by the CA. Flaviano Jr assigned all his rights and interests to Raval via Deed of Assignment over the subject lots however Peralta refused to recognize such fact. Beginning 1995, Raval demanded from Peralta the compliance of the terms and conditions of lease contract.

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Castor, father and counsel of Raval, wrote a letter to Peralta demanding removal of structures that it built as he claimed it was not covered by lease agreement to which Peralta refused to heed. Hence, demand letters were sent and were later on referred to Brgy Conciliation. Raval filed for the rescission of leased contract to which Peralta opposed contending that Raval is not a real party-in-interest. RTC denied the rescission to which was modified by the CA by granting Raval an award for unpaid rental payments. Issue: 1. Whether the Deed of Assignment between Flaviano Jr and Raval is void and thus cannot be deemed to have conferred to Raval the rights of a new owner and lessor 2. Whether the lease contract should be rescinded Held: 1.The court sustains the validity of the Deed of Assignment. Raval cannot be deemed a "total stranger" to Peralta's contract of lease with the Spouses Arzaga because by the subsequent transfers of rights over the leased premises, Peralta became the original lessors' successor-in-interest. It is material that the lone heir of the Spouses Arzaga, Flaviano Jr., has executed the subject deed of assignment. Furthermore, the deed of assignment between Flaviano Jr. and Raval was declared valid by the trial court, as it ordered the cancellation of the Spouses Arzaga' s TCTs, and the issuance of new titles under Raval' s name hence this ruling resulted in an acknowledgment of Raval's rights over the property, his interest in the court action entitlement to monthly rentals from Peralta. The SC also upheld that RTC then correctly rejected Peralta's claim against the agreement's legality, as it states the prohibition against a collateral attack on the land titles. “Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." Pursuant to this

provision,the courts have consistently ruled against collateral attacks on land titles.” 2.Considering that the subject contract of lease provided for a 40-year term and was executed in 1974, the agreement had already terminated in 2014. Thus, a moot and academic case. "A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.” However, the court still finds it necessary to address other issues that are intertwined with the issue of rescission such as the allegations of prescription, the award of unpaid rentals. It must be emphasized though that specifically on the matter of rescission of lease agreements, Article 1659 of the NCC applies as a rule. It reads: “Article 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in Articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the contract and indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.” Article 1654 referred to in Article 1659 pertains to the obligations of a lessor in a lease agreement. Article 1657, on the other hand, enumerates the obligations of a lessee, as it provides: “Article 1657. The lessee is obliged: (1) stipulated; to pay the price of the lease according to the terms (2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased, according to the custom of the place; (3) To pay expenses for the deed of lease.” 75

As for the unpaid claims of monthly rentals, the court held that all payments made by Peralta for the account of Flaviano Jr. could not be simply disregarded for the purpose of determining Peralta’s compliance with his obligation to pay the monthly rentals. Since the records confirmed that Peralta has been paying his monthly rentals up to the time and even after the complaint for rescission was filed in 1998, the prayer in the complaint for unpaid rentals should have been denied. RODANTE GUYAMIN ET AL vs JACINTO FLORES ET AL April 25, 2017 GR.202189 Del Castillo, J. Facts: Respondents filed a complaint in the RTC for the Recovery of Possession against petitioners. Respondents alleges in their complaint that they are the registered owners of the land and that petitioners are their relatives who occupies the said property for many years by mere tolerance of respondents' predecessors and parents, the original owners of the same. Petitioners have been reminded to vacate the premises because respondents have decided to sell the property but petitioners failed to vacate. Respondents then made several attempts to settle the matter through conciliation before the Punong Barangay but the same proved futile to which the Punong Barangay was constrained to issue a Certification To File Action. Subsequently, summons and a copy of complaint were served upon petitioners through Eileen who nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. The RTC rendered its judgment rendering petitioners in default for failure to file their responsive answer within reglementary period of 15days and ordered the defendants to vacate said property. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this case. Issue: Whether CA erred in finding that the RTC was correct in declaring petitioners in default and proceeding to

receive respondent’s evidence ex parte and Whether CA erred when it ruled that the RTC validly rendered its decision favorable to the respondents without the filing of formal offer of evidence Ruling: The court supports the CA's pronouncement that since respondents' exhibits were presented and marked during the ex parte hearing, the trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of evidence was made. The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex parte hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and were incorporated into the records of the case. As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge referred to them in its Decision. If they were not included in the record, the RTC Judge could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment. By not attaching a copy of their Answer to their Petition, petitioners are shielding themselves from a perusal of their defense; in a sense, this is quite revealing of the merits of their claim, and in another, it is an ingenious scheme that this Court censures. Indeed, they failed to realize that this Court is not composed of machines that will mindlessly and mechanically solve a problem at the touch of a button; it will not be forced into motion on petitioners' turn of a key. Knights of Rizal vs DMCI Homes Inc. GR 213948 (TORRE DE MANILA CASE) Facts: On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a lot in Manila. The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project. DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning

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Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO). Then, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a "Fort-Nine (49) storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium" on the property. On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]" On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals i(MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013,14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for variance. The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds the prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still recommended the approval of the variance subject to the five conditions set under the same resolution. After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A, Series of 2013, on 8 January 2014, amending, condition (c) in the earlier resolution. On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06A. The City Council resolution states that "the City Council of Manila find[ s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratifies and confirm[s] all previous issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]"

Issue: Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project. Held: The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen against the government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls. In other instances, the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself -Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code -which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law. In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, 77

and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila Project. There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument. Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is governed by Ordinance No. 8119. The ordinance provides for standards and guidelines to regulate development projects of historic sites and facilities within the City of Manila; Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and facilities." Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the background of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument." Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an "anthropological or archaeological area" or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP. Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture, provides that "[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and resources x x x." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. One such law is Republic Act No. 10066, or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important 1 cultural properties [is] found

to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." This law declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property or building if there is "danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." Physical integrity refers to the structure itself -how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does not mention that another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law x x x." It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property, would violate substantive due process. The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, 'the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the application of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park.

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While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in IQ95," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure." Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve making a finding of fact. A finding of fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission of evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact, and determine whether the Torre de Manila project properly complied with the standards set by the ordinance. To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park -and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials if the City of Manila have a ministerial duty to consider these standards I to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty because these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. Dutch Movers Inc. vs Edilberto Lequin GR 210032 FACTS: DMI, a domestic corporation engaged in hauling liquefied petroleum gas, employed Lequin as truck driver and the rest of respondents as helpers; on December 28, 2004, Cesar Lee, through the Supervisor Nazario Furio, informed them that DMI would cease its hauling operation for no reason; as such, they requested DMl to issue a formal notice regarding the

matter but to no avail. Later, upon respondents' request, the DOLE NCR issued a certification revealing that DMI did not file any notice of business closure. Thus, respondents argued that they were illegally dismissed as their termination was without cause and only on the pretext of closure. The Labor Arbiter Aliman D. Mangandog dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The NLRC , however, reversed LA Decision. It ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed because DMI simply placed them on standby, and no longer provide them with work. The NLRC Decision became final and executory and the same issued an Entry of Judgment on the case. Consequently, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Execution. Later, they submitted a Reiterating Motion for Writ of Execution with Updated Computation of Full Backwages. Pending resolution of these motions, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead stating that upon investigation, they discovered that DMI no longer operates. They, nonetheless, insisted that petitioners -who managed and operated DMI, and consistently represented to respondents that they were the owners of DMI continue to work at Toyota Alabang, which they (petitioners) also own and operate. They further averred that the Articles of Incorporation (AOI) of DMI ironically did not include petitioners as its directors or officers; and those named directors and officers were persons unknown to them. They likewise claimed that per inquiry with the SEC20 and the DOLE, they learned that DMI did not file any notice of business closure; and the creation and operation of DMI was attended with fraud making it convenient for petitioners to evade their legal obligations to them. Respondents prayed that petitioners, and the officers named in DMI's AOI, which included Edgar N. Smith and Millicent C. Smith (spouses Smith), be impleaded, and be held solidarily liable with DMI in paying the judgment awards. In their Opposition to Motion to Implead, spouses Smith alleged that as part of their services as lawyers, they 79

lent their names to petitioners to assist them in incorporating DMI. Allegedly, after such undertaking, spouses Smith promptly transferred their supposed rights in DMI in favor of petitioners. Spouses Smith stressed that they never participated in the management and operations of DMI, and they were not its stockholders, directors, officers, or managers at the time respondents were terminated. They further insisted that they were not afforded due process as they were not impleaded from the inception of the illegal dismissal case; and hence, they cannot be held liable for the liabilities of DMI. On April 1, 2009; LA Savari issued an Order holding petitioners liable for the judgment awards. Later, petitioners moved to quash the Writ of Execution contending that the April 1, 2009 LA Order was void because the LA has no jurisdiction to modify the final and executory NLRC Decision, and the same cannot anymore be altered or modified since ·there was no finding of bad faith against them. On July 1, 2013, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC Resolutions, and accordingly affirmed the Writ of Execution impleading petitioners as party-respondents liable to answer for the judgment awards. Issue: Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay the judgment awards in favor of respondents. Whether the principle of immutability of judgment is applied in this case. Ruling: The Court denies the Petition. To begin with, the Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nevertheless, allows certain exceptions, which include such instance where the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the lower court or tribunal. Considering the divergent factual findings of the CA and the NLRC in this case, the

Court deems it necessary to examine, review and evaluate anew the evidence on record. Moreover, after a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that contrary to petitioners' claim, Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission, and David v. Court of Appeals are applicable here. In said cases, the Court held that the principle of immutability of judgment, or the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, the same can no longer be altered or modified and the court's duty is only to order its execution, is not absolute. One of its exceptions is when there is a supervening event occurring after the judgment becomes final and executory, which renders the decision unenforceable. To note, a supervening event refers to facts that transpired after judgment has become final and executory, or to new situation that developed after the same attained finality. Supervening events include matters that the parties were unaware of before or during trial as they were not yet existing. In considering the foregoing events, the Court is not unmindful of the basic tenet that a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its stockholders, and from other corporations it may be connected with. However, such personality may be disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced attaching personal liability against responsible person if the corporation's personality "is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws x x x." By responsible person, we refer to an individual or entity responsible for, and who acted in bad faith in committing illegal dismissal or in violation of the Labor Code; or one who actively participated in the management of the corporation. Also, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed where a corporation is a mere alter ego or a conduit of a person, or another corporation.36 Here, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced and accordingly, petitioners should be held personally liable for judgment awards because the peculiarity of the situation shows that they controlled DMI; they actively 80

participated in its operation such that DMI existed not as a separate entity but only as business conduit of petitioners. In this case, petitioners were impleaded from the inception of this case. They had ample opportunity to debunk the claim that they illegally dismissed respondents, and that they should be held personally liable for having controlled DMI and actively participated in its management, and for having used it to evade legal obligations to respondents. Finally, it appearing that respondents' reinstatement is no longer feasible by reason of the closure of DMI, then separation pay should be awarded to respondents instead. California Manufacturing Company, Inc vs Advanced Technology System, Inc. GR 202454 Facts: Petitioner CMCI is a domestic corporation engaged in the food and beverage manufacturing business. Respondent ATSI is also a domestic corporation that fabricates and distributes food processing machinery and equipment, spare parts, and its allied products. In August 2001, CMCI leased from ATSI a Prodopak machine which was used to pack products in 20-ml. pouches. In November 2003, ATSI filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against CMCI to collect unpaid rentals for the months of June, July, August, and September 2003. ATSI alleged that CMCI was consistently paying the rents until June 2003 when the latter defaulted on its obligation without just cause. ATSI also claimed that CMCI ignored all the billing statements and its demand letter. Hence, in addition to the unpaid rents A TSI sought payment for the contingent attorney's fee equivalent to 30% of the judgment award. CMCI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of extinguishment of obligation through legal compensation. The RTC, however, ruled that the conflicting claims of the parties required trial on the

merits. It therefore dismissed the motion to dismiss and directed CMCI to file an Answer.

Issue: Whether or not legal compensation between ATSI's claim against CMCI on the one hand, and the latter's claim against PPPC on the other hand, has not set in. Ruling: Any piercing of the corporate veil must be done with caution. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against another, in disregard of rights. Moreover, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas, namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. CMCI 's alter ego theory rests on the alleged interlocking boards of directors and stock ownership of the two corporations. The instrumentality or control test of the alter ego doctrine requires not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination of finances, policy and business practice with respect to the transaction in question. The corporate entity must be shown to have no separate mind, will, or existence of its own at the time of the transaction. The fraud test, which is the second of the three-prong test to determine the application of the alter ego doctrine, requires that the parent corporation's conduct in using the subsidiary corporation be unjust, fraudulent 81

or wrongful. Under the third prong, or the harm test, a causal connection between the fraudulent conduct committed through the instrumentality of the subsidiary and the injury suffered or the damage incurred by the plaintiff has to be established. None of these elements have been demonstrated in this case. Hence, we can only agree with the CA and RTC in ruling out mutuality of parties to justify the application of legal compensation in this case.

justification for its non-payment of the rentals for the subject Prodopak machine.

Article 1279 of the Civil Code provides:

The CA reversed the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Sibulo (Respondent)in a previous case involving damages arising from a vehicular collision owned by BMC (Petitioner) and driven by its employee and a car owned and driven by Sibulo. In the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Decision became final and executory. The court directed the Deputy Sheriff, upon motion of Sibulo, to implement the Writ of Execution against the real properties owned by BMC, as it appears that BMC has no personal properties. He sold the property and its improvements through public auction. For BMC's failure to redeem the property within one year from the sale, Nieva consolidated ownership over it. He filed a Petition for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate Title and Issuance of New [Title] in the RTC, granted. Petitioner failed to submit the owner’s duplicate thus the court ordered the Register of Deeds to annul TCT and issue a new title in Nieva's name which became final. Consequently, writ of possession was filed over the property, granted.

ARTICLE 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary: (1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be due; (4) That they be liquidated and demandable; (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. The law, therefore, requires that the debts be liquidated and demandable. Liquidated debts are those whose exact amounts have already been determined. CMCI has not presented any credible proof, or even just an exact computation, of the supposed debt of PPPC. It claims that the mobilization fund that it had advanced to PPPC was in the amount of P4 million. Yet, Felicisima's proposal to conduct offsetting in her letter dated 30 July 2001 pertained to a P3 .2 million debt of PPPC to CMCI. Meanwhile, in its Answer to ATSI's complaint, CMCI sought to set off its unpaid rentals against the alleged P 10 million debt of PPPC. The uncertainty in the supposed debt of PPPC to CMCI negates the latter's invocation of legal compensation as

Baclaran Marketing Corporation vs.Fernando C. Nieva and Mamerto Sibulo, Jr. G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017 FACTS:

In view of the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued against it, BMC filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA alleging that its counsel Atty. Rizon committed acts of gross and inexcusable negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud," which deprived it of due process and an opportunity to present its side claiming that they did not know Sibulo appealed and only have known of such fact upon paying real estate tax on the property that the title had already been transferred to Nieva. The CA denied the petition for Annulment of Judgment ruling that the remedy is not available to the petitioner. ISSUE: 82

WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioner RULING: YES. Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court governs actions for the annulment of final judgments, orders, or resolutions of regional trial courts in civil actions. It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no available or other adequate remedy. The Court ruled that the petitioner must comply with the requirements: (1) The remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner; (2) The grounds for the action of annulment of judgment are limited to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction; (3) The action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel; and ( 4) The petition must be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process over an identified object. In fine, only the Decision of the Parafiaque Court ordering the cancellation of BMC's title over the property qualifies as a final judgment. It is a judgment on the merits declaring who between Nieva and BMC has the right over the title to the property. Therefore, it may be the subject of an action for annulment of judgment. Be that as it may, BMC failed to prove that any of the grounds for annulment are present in this case. On the second requisite, Rule 4 7, Section 2 provides extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction as the exclusive grounds for the remedy of annulment of judgment. Case law, however, recognizes a third ground--denial of due process of law. We are not persuaded. Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party by his opponent preventing him from fully exhibiting his case by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. In this case, the CA correctly found that BMC neither alleged nor proved that the gross negligence of its fonner counsel was done in connivance with Nieva or Sibulo. Therefore, it is not the extrinsic fraud contemplated under Rule 47, Section 2. Asiatrust Development Bank vs. CIR G.R. No. 201530 and G.R. Nos. 201680-81, April 19, 2017

BMC's petition for annulment of judgment fails to meet the first and second requisites.

FACTS:

On the first requisite, Rule 47, Section 1 limits the applicability of the remedy of annulment of judgment to final judgments, orders or resolutions. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the com1 to do in respect thereto. In contrast, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something to be done upon its merits. In Guiang v. Co we declared that an auction sale and a writ of execution are not final orders. Corollarily, an order implementing a writ of execution issued over certain real properties is also not

On separate dates, Asiatrus received from the CIR three Formal Letters of Demand (FLD) with Assessment Notices for deficiency internal revenue taxes in the amounts of P131,909,161.85, P83,012,265.78, and Pl 44,012,918.42 for fiscal years ending June 30, 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Asiatrust timely protested. Due to the inaction of the CIR on the protest, Asiatrust filed before the CTA a Petition for Review praying for the cancellation of the tax assessments for deficiency income tax, documentary stamp tax (DST) regular, DST - industry issue, final withholding tax, 83

expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefits tax issued against it by the CIR. The CIR issued against Asiatrust new Assessment Notices for deficiency taxes in the amounts of Pl 12,816,258.73, P53,314,512.72, and P133,013,458.73 covering 1996, 1997, and 1998 respectively on which the petitioner paid partially leaving a balance. During the trial, Asiatrust manifested that it availed of the Tax Abatement Program for its deficiency trust assessments for fiscal years and had paid basic tax. Petitioner also claimed that they availed the Tax Amnesty Law. CTA declared 1996 tax assessment void for issuing beyond the three-year prescriptive period. However, due to the failure of Asiatrust to present documentary and testimonial evidence to prove its availment of the Tax Abatement Program and the Tax Amnesty Law, the CTA Division affirmed the deficiency assessments for the fiscal years 1997 and 1998 in the total amount of P142,777,785.91. Asiatrust filed a Motion for Reconsideration attaching photocopies of its Application for Abatement Program and other documents which support Tax Amnesty law while CIR filed a partial consideration assailing CTA’s decision finding of prescription and cancellation of assessment notices for deficiency for fiscal years ending 1997 and 1998. Petitioner’s motion partially granted setting hearing for the availment of tax amnesty law and refusal for the availment of Tax abatement program while respondent’s motion is denied. Meanwhile CIR apealled, CTA en banc dismissed petition for being premature still being in CTA Division. Petitioner filed a manifestation that BIR issued a certification. CTA rendered tax abatement program cannot be availed due to lack of termination letter but can now avail of tax amnesty law. Both appealed to CTA En Banc. Asiatrust contends that the certification if proof of availment and further posits that since it already paid the basic taxes, the affirmance of the deficiency final withholding tax assessment for fiscal year 1998 would constitute double taxation as Asiatrust would be made to pay the basic tax twice.

While CIR contest the dismissal of his appeal. The court denied both petition. ISSUE: WON Asiatrust is liable for Deficiency for final withholding tax of the fiscal year 1998? YES. An application for tax abatenu;mt is considered approved only upon the issuance of a termination letter. The BIR issued .RR No. 15-06 prescribing the guidelines on the implementation of the one-time administrative abatement of all penalties surcharges interest on delinquent accounts and assessments. Based on the guidelines, the last step in the tax abatement process is the issuance of the termination letter. The presentation of the termination letter is essential as it proves that the taxpayer's application for tax abatement has been approved. Thus, without a termination letter, a tax assessment cannot be considered closed and terminated. In this case, Asiatrust failed to present a termination letter from the BIR. Instead, it presented a Certification issued by the BIR to prove that it availed of the Tax Abatement Program and paid the basic tax. It also attached copies of its BIR Tax Payment Deposit Slips and a Jetter issued by RDO Nacar. These documents, however, do not prove that Asiatrust's application for tax abatement has been approved. If at all, these documents only prove Asiatrust's payment of basic taxes, which is not a ground to consider its deficiency tax assessment closed and terminated. WON paying the final withholding tax again would amount to double taxation? NO. Since no tennination letter has been issued by the BIR, there is no reason for the Court to consider as closed a.'1d terminated the tax assessment on Asiatrust's final withholding tax for fiscal year ending June 30, 1998. Asiatrust's application for tax abatement will be deemed approved only upon the issuance of a tem1ination letter, and only then will the deficiency tax assessment be considered closed and terminated. However, in case Asiatrust's application for tax 84

abatement is denied, any payment made by it would be applied to its outstanding tax liability. For this reason, Asiatrust' s allegation of double taxation must also fail. WON CIR failed to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA? YES. An appeal to the CTA En Banc must be preceded by the filing of a timely motion for reconsideration or new trial with the CTA Division. In order for the CTA En Banc to take cognizance of an appeal via a petition for review, a timely motion for reconsideration or new trial must first be filed with the CTA Division that issued the assailed decision or resolution. Failure to do so is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal as the word "must" indicates that the filing of a prior motion is mandatory, and not merely directory. The same is true in the case of an amended decision. Section 3, Rule 14 of the same rules defines an amended decision as "[a ]ny action modifying or reversing a decision of the Court en bane or in Division." As explained in CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, an amended decision is a different decision, and thus, is a· proper subject of a motion for reconsideration. In this case, :the CIR' s failure to move for a reconsideration of the Amended Decision of the CTA Division is a ground for the dismissal of its Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc. Thus, the CTA En .Banc did not err in denying the CIR's appeal on procedural grounds.

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Bankard Inc., vs. Luz P. Alarte G.R. No. 202573, April 19, 2017 FACTS: Petitioner Bankard, Inc. (Bankard now RCBC Bankard Services Corporation) is a duly constituted domestic corporation doing business as a credit card provider. In 2007, petitioner filed a collection case against respondent Luz P. Alarte before the MTC. In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent applied for and was granted credit accommodations under Bankard myDream JCB; that respondent, using the said credit card, availed herself of credit accommodations by "purchasing various products; that per Statement of Account dated July, 2006, respondent's credit availments amounted to a total of P67,944.82, inclusive of unbilled monthly installments, charges and penalties or at least the minimum amount due under the credit card; and that respondent failed and refuses to pay her obligations despite her receipt of a written demand. Despite service of summons, respondent failed to file her answer. For this reason, petitioner filed a Motion to Render Judgment which was granted. Plaintiff merely submitted a document that the balance indicating the alleged purchases made by single statement of account which merely reflected amounts imposed as late charges of the defendant and not as the result availment of the credit card. Therefore, MTC descion, case dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish evidence that would amount to preponderance of evidences needed as provided by the Rules on Summary Procedure. RTC affirmed. CA affirmed. Thus, this present petition. ISSUE: WON the petitioner had established a preponderance of evidence to support its claim? RULING: NO. Petitioner failed to established preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of

evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, x x x.' The statement of account submitted is worded indicates that it is a running balance, a continuing and mounting bill of charges consisting of a combined principal amount with finance and penalty charges imposed, which respondent appears to have failed to pay in the past. This is shown by the fact that respondent has failed to pay a past bill amounting to :P64,615.64 - the "previous statement balance" in the very first line of the above-quoted statement of account. This could mean that there really were no immediate purchase transactions made by respondent for the month that needed to be specified in the July 9, 2006 Statement of Account; that instead, she simply repeatedly failed and continues to fail to pay her credit card debt arising out of past credit card purchase transactions to petitioner, which thus resulted in a mounting pile of charges imposed upon her outstanding account as reflected in a statement or bill of charges or accounts regularly sent to her. While the Court believes that petitioner's claim mnay be well-founded, it is not enough as to allow judgment in its favor on the basis of extant evidence. It must prove the validity of its claim; this it may do by amending its Complaint and adducing additional evidence of respondent's credit history and proving the loan transactions between them. After all, credit card arrangements are simple loan arrangements between the card issuer and the card holder. Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, ( c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment.

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Philippine Steel Coating Corporation vs. Edward Quinones G. R. No. 194533, May 19, 2017 FACTS: This case arose from a Complaint for damages filed by respondent Quinones (owner of Amianan Motors) against petitioner PhilSteel. The Complaint alleged that in early 1994, a sales engineer of PhilSteel, offered Quinones their new product: primer-coated, long-span, rolled galvanized iron (G.1.) sheets. The latter showed interest, but asked Lopez if the primercoated sheets were compatible with the Guilder acrylic paint process used by Amianan Motors.. Uncertain, he referred the query to his immediate superior, Ferdinand Angbengco, PhilSteel's sales manager. Angbengco assured Quinones that the quality of their new product was superior to that of the non-primer coated G.l. sheets being used by the latter in his business and further guaranteed that a laboratory test confirming that they are compatible; hence, Quinones purchase the product and use it in the manufacture of bus units. However, sometime in 1995, Quinones received several complaints that the paint of the bus they bought are peeling off. Quinones sent a complaint to Philsteel invoking warranties. Philsteel said that the damage was attributable to the incompabality of the product, contrary to their prior assurance to Quinones. PhilSteel counters that Quinones himself offered to purchase the subject product directly from the former without being induced by any of PhilSteel's representatives and that the damages was caused by the erroneous painting application done by respondent. The R TC rendered a Decision in favor of Quinones because the assurance made by Angbengco constituted an express warranty under Article 1546 of the Civil Code. Quinones incurred damages from the repair of the buses and suffered business reverses.. CA Affirmed. Thus, this petition. ISSUES: WON vague oral statements made by seller on the characteristics of a generic good can be considered

warranties that may be invoked to warrant payment of damages? YES. As held in Carrascoso, Jr. v. CA, 7 the following requisites must be established in order to prove that there is an express warranty in a contract of sale: ( 1) the express warranty must be an affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the subject matter of the sale; (2) the natural effect of the affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the thing; and (3) the buyer purchases the thing relying on that affirmation or promise. A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods - contemporaneously and as part of the contract of sale - that has reference to the character, quality or title of the goods; and is issued to promise or undertake to insure that certiain facts are or shall be as the seller represents them. A warranty is not necessarily written. It may be oral as long as it is not given as a mere opinion or judgment. Rather, it is a positive affirmation of a fact that buyers rely upon, and that influences or induces them to purchase the product. Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, the finding of the CA was that the former, through Angbengco, did not simply make vague oral statements on purported warranties. Petitioner expressly represented to respondent that the primer-coated G .I. sheets were compatible with the acrylic paint process used by the latter on his bus units. This representation was made in the face of respondent's express concerns regarding incompatibility. Petitioner also claimed that the use of their product by Quinones would cut costs. Angbengco was so certain of the compatibility that he suggested to respondent to assemble a bus using the primer-coated sheet and have it painted with the acrylic paint used in Amianan Motors. Thus, it was not accurate for petitioner to state that they had made no warranties. It insisted that at best, they only gave "'assurances" of possible savings Quinones might have if he relied on PhilSteel's primercoated G.I. sheets and eliminated the need to apply an additional primer. 87

WON general warranties on the suitability of products sold prescribe in six (6) months under Article 1571 of the Civil Code? NO. Article 1398 is applicable. There being an express warranty, this Court holds that the prescription period applicable to the instant case is that prescribed for breach of an express warranty. The applicable prescription period is therefore that which is specified in the contract; in its absence, that period shall be based on the general rule on the rescission of contracts: four years (see Article 1389, Civil Code). In this case, no prescription period specified in the contract between the parties has been put forward. Quinones filed the instant case on 6 September 1996 or several months after the last delivery of the thing sold. His filing of the suit was well within the prescriptive period of four years; hence, his action has not prescribed. WON respondent as buyer is equally negligent NO. Negligence is the absence of reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in a given situation. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, where it is not stipulated in the law or the contract, the diligence required to comply with one's obligations is commonly referred to as paterfamilias; or, more specifically, as bonos paterfamilias or "a good father of a family." A good father of a family means a person of ordinary or average diligence. To determine the prudence and diligence that must be required of all persons, we must use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly person. Anyone who uses diligence below this standard is guilty of negligence. It bears reiteration that Quinones had already raised the compatibility issue at the outset. He relied on the manpower and expertise of PhilSteel, but at the same time reasonably asked for more details regarding the product. It was not an impulsive or rush decision to buy. In fact, it took 4 to 5 meetings to convince him to buy the primed G .I. sheets. And even after making an initial order, he did not make subsequent orders until after a painting test, done upon the instructions of Angbengco proved successful. The test was conducted using their

acrylic paint over PhilSteel's primer-coated G.I. sheets. Only then did Quinones make subsequent orders of the primer-coated product, which was then used in the mass production of bus bodies by Amianan motors. Francis C. Arsenio vs. Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo A.C. No. 8658, April 24, 2017 FACTS: A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Tabuzo, Overseas Eployment Adjudicator, which stemmed from an administrative complaint by the petioner against a recruitment agency. During a scheduled hearing, Atty. Tabuzo asked Asenio to sign 3 blank papers in which he complied with. A week after, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason why he was made to sign blank sheets of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said, "Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya pagdating.ng kalaban mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio again asked Atty. Tabuzo as per advised of Senator Cayetano but the latter again shouted at him saying, "Bwiset! Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso? x x x.” Arsenio later on discovered that his case against the agancy was dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. In a Resolution , Graft Investigation ordered that an Information be filed against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo upon finding of probable cause. Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that there is no Atty. Romeo Tabuso in the POEA and that he was never handed any copy of summons. He claimed that he was merely taking the initiative in filing the said motion to clear his name as he believed he was the person referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Motion Denied. RTC, acquitted Atty. Tabuzo. Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present ComplaintAffidavit before this Court. Case was recommended to IBP. Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him, claiming that the alleged unethical acts are baseless. He 88

averred that he had never acted in any conduct unbecoming of a public officer or uttered invectives and other alleged acts. IBP recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, denied. ISSUE: WON the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo? RULING: NO. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts In the recent case of Reyes v. Nieva, this Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence. In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD in recommending reprimand against Atty. Tabuzo is its consideration of the: (1) Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which states that there was probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA 3019; and (2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty. Tabuzo made offensive statements. However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree of proof indispensable in a disbarment case was not met. In Arsenio’s Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no other evidence was presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving. Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman together with the Affidavit of Arsenio cannot be considered as substantial evidence. For one, the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was decided on the basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to controvert the allegations of Arsenio. Also, the Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence was further offered to prove the allegations contained therein. While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is

not persuaded to exercise its disciplinary authority over Atty. Tabuzo. VILLARAMA vs. ATTY. DE JESUS April 17, 2017 G.R. No. 217004 PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Defendant agreed to render legal services for petitioner and as stipulated in their contract, aside from Professional Fee, Success Fee of P1 Million shall be paid to defendant upon the latter's success in retaining possession and titling of the property under the petitioner's name. Defendant was successful in retaining 70% of petitioner's possession of the property, however, was not able to fulfill the second condition due to (according to the CA) legal impossibility. ISSUE:Whether Atty. De Jesus is entitled to the stipulated success fee of P1 Million RULING: “Yes. He is still entitled to 50% of the P1 Million success fee stipulated in the contract. The payment of success fee is dependent on the fulfillment of the two conditions this falls under a contingent fee contract. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. There is no legal impossibility in the fulfillment of the second condition. It was petitioner-client who refused to pay the Bank 30% equity of the property for the whole property to be finally titled under his name. The SC considered the fact that through the services of defendant, petitioner was awarded 70% of the property. In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means 'as much as he deserved.'"

UNDURAN vs. ABERASTURI April 18, 2017 G.R. No. 181284 PERALTA, J. 89

FACTS: Petitioners contend that IPRA was not enacted to protect an IP from another IP whether from the same or different group, because they have their own means of resolving a dispute arising between them, through customary laws, as had been done for a very long time even before the passage of the law. Thus it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples which has the jurisdiction over such case involving a conflicting claim over an ancestral domain and not the regular courts. ISSUE:Whether it is the NCIP and not the regular courts who has the jurisdiction over such case RULING: “The NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under Sec 66 of the IPRA that 'no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws.' NCIP's jurisdiction under Sec 66 of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with the regular courts. The Court restates that under Sec 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction."

FERGUSON vs. ATTY. RAMOS April 18, 2017 A.C. No. 9209 Per Curiam: FACTS: Defendant-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for 6 months for engaging in a private practice while employed in the government service. The price of the property in the Deed of Sale of the petitioners was fraudulently altered by the defendant, their signatures were forged, and the same was notarized by the defendant without the presence of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ramos violated the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING: Yes. Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Rules· on Notarial Practice of 2004 mandates that a notary public, before notarizing a document, should require the presence of the very person who executed the same. The presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. It must be emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with public interest and only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. He likewise violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which obliges a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes; and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Ramos was mandated to exercise the function of his office and must observe with utmost care the basic formalities of his office and requisites in the performance of his duties. In Santuyo v. Atty. Hidalgo, the respondent lawyer similarly denied having notarized the subject deed of sale. The Court found him negligent not only in the supposed notarization but in allowing the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone. While in Ocampo-lngcoco v. Atty. Yrreverre, Jr., the Court held that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of the contents therein.

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ROY vs. HERBOSA April 18, 2017 G.R. No. 207246 CAGUIOA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner-movant declared that the SEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing SEC-MC No. 8 as the same was in compliance with the decision of the Court in Gamboa vs. Teves. The movant also raised his requisite standing because this case is one of transcendental importance and that the Court has the constitutional duty to exercise judicial review over any grave abuse of discretion by any instrumentality of government. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has a legal standing RULING: No. Movant's repeated invocation of the transcendental importance of the Gamboa case does not ipso facto accord locus standi to movant. Being a new petition, movant had the burden to justify his locus standi in his own petition. Indispensable parties are those with such a material and direct interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. There is a need of an actual case or controversy before the Court may exercise its power of judicial review. The movant's petition is not that actual case or controversy.”

QUIMVEL vs. PEOPLE April 18, 2017 G.R. No. 214497 VELASCO, JR., J. FACTS: The challenged rulings of the CA sustained and modified the petitioner's conviction by the Trial Court of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610. The issue raised in this case is if he may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

ISSUE: WhetherSec. 5(b), Art. III of RA 7610 shall be applied or Art. 336 of the RPC RULING: “Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against him. Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.- Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x The allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one 'exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse.' This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. The law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children.”

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VISAYAS GEOTHERMAL POWER CO. vs. CIR G.R. No. 205279 April 26, 2017 REYES, J.: FACTS: Petitioner filed for a refund of unutilized input VAT with BIR. After 45 days, petitioner immediately filed a petition for review with the CTA claiming that BIR failed to act upon the claim for refund. CTA denied the petition for being prematurely filed. ISSUE: Whether the tax refund was prematurely filed RULING: “Section 112(C) of the 1997 NIRC, provides that the Commissioner has 120 days within which to decide on an application for refund or tax credit, to be reckoned from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application. The Court ruled in San Roque case that 'failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer's petition.' With the current rule that gives a taxpayer 30 days to file the judicial claim even if the CIR fails to act within the 120-day period, the remedy of a judicial claim for refund or credit is always available to a taxpayer. The CTA en banc's reliance on the general rule enunciated by the Court in San Roque is misplaced. Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to wait for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA could still take cognizance of the petition for review.” In re: Alleged immorality and unexplained wealth of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado and Clerk of Court IV Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-21-SB-J April 4, 2017 Mendoza, J.

Facts: The case stemmed from an anonymous letter-complaint filed before the Office of the President charging respondents Justice Jurado and Atty. Buencamino with unexplained wealth and immorality. The anonymous letter was eventually referred to the Court by the Ombudsman. The respondents respectfully explained the alleged inconsistencies in the Office of Court Administrator report regarding their properties as indicated in their SALNs. Issue: Whether there is substantial proof to prove the guilt of the respondents Ruling: No. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for the finding of guilt is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence; it is the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, there is no prima facie shoeing that either of the respondents has unlawfully accumulated wealth. Both had sufficiently explained how they got into the business of real estate which was supported by the evidence on record.

Renato S.D. Domingo in his own behalf and on behalf of his co-heirs of the late Sps. Felicidad De Domingo and Macario C. Domingo vs. Sps. Engracia D. Singson and Manuel F. Singson/Heirs of Spouses Felicidad S.D. Domingo and Macario Domingo Vs. Engracia D. Singson, et al. G.R. No. 203287/G.R. No. 207936 April 5, 2017 Reyes, J. Facts: Respondent Engracia originally filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners alleging that she is the owner of the subject lot evidenced by Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioners contended that the signature in the 92

DAS was forged, hence charged the respondent of falsification of documents. Engracia filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding due to prejudicial question. Respondents alleged that the validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale which was the subject of the civil case was determinative of their guilt of the crime charged. The private prosecutor filed an opposition to the motion stating that the criminal case can proceed independently from the civil case. The motion to suspend however was granted. Issue: Whether prejudicial question exists Ruling: Yes. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in a said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed, The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present; 1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 2) in the resolution of the issue raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and 3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. Based on the issues raised in both civil and criminal case against the respondents, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense in the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property from their parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the DAS are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts, which would necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case.

California Manufacturing Company, Inc. vs. Advanced Technology System, Inc. G.R. No. 202454 April 25, 2017 Sereno, CJ. Facts: Respondent ATSI filed a complaint for Sum of Money against CMCI to collect unpaid rentals. CMCI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of extinguishment of obligation through legal compensation. CMCI argued that legal compensation had set in. Issue: Whether legal compensation has set in Ruling: No. Contrary to the claim of CMCI, none of the letter from the Spouses tends to show that ATSI was even remotely involved on the proposed offsetting of the outstanding debts of CMCI and PPPC. Article 1279 of the Civil Code provides that in order that compensation may be proper, the law requires that the debts be liquidated and demandable. Liquidated debts are those whose exact amounts have already been determined. CMCI has not presented any credible proof, or even just an exact computation of the supposed debts of PPPC. The uncertainty in the supposed debt of PPPC to CMCI negates the latter’s invocation of legal compensation as justification for its non-payment of the rentals of the machines,

Republic of the Philippines vs. Valentina Espinosa, et al. G.R. No. 186603 April 5, 2017 Jardeleza, J. Facts: A cadastral decree was issued to Espinosa. Espinosa sold the property to Caliston. The State filed a complaint for Annulment of the title and reversion of land claiming that the property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland area as indicated in a Land Classification Map. Caliston countered that the property was not a timberland.

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Issue: Whether the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title. Ruling: No. In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. Since cadastral; proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all the parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownerships after proving these jurisdictional facts. Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issue OCT No, the predecessor of Caliston’s TCT No. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings. This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through the action for reversion, as in the present case. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is frequently awarded and disposed to private individuals or corporations. There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such when a person obtains title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain.

People of the Philippines vs. Carlito Claro y Mahinay G.R. No. 199894 April 5, 2017 Bersamin, J. Facts: RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and was affirmed by the CA. The accused denied the allegation and invoke the sweetheart defense. Issue: Whether the lower courts correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling: No. The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong corroboration. This is because the mere fact that the accused and the victim were lovers should not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. In People v. Orquina, the Court observed that an allegation of a "love relationship" between the parties, even if found to be true, did not eliminate the use of force to consummate the crime because the gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent. Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual intercourse interposed by the accused. To be noted first and foremost is that he and AAA were adults capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse. The established circumstances- their having agreed to go on a lover’s date, the travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board the jeepney, their alighting in Rizal Avenue to take meal together, their walking together to the motel, and checking in together at the motel without the complainant manifesting resistance and their entering the designated room without protest from herindicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their lover’s date in bed inside the motel. Although she claimed that he had held her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence showing that she resisted in that whole time or exhibited a reluctance to enter the motel with him. Instead, she appeared to have walked with him towards the motel, and to have entered it without hesitation. What she did not do was eloquent proof of her consent.

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JONATHAN Y. DEE v. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, et. al, March 15, 2017 G.R. No. 224834 HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, et. al. v. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., et. al. G.R. No. 224871 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: Harvest, et. al. are minority stockholders of Alliance. As per Alliance by-laws, its Annual Stockholder’s Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15. However, the BOD, in its special meeting, passed a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing the ASM pending complete subscription to its Stocks Rights Offering (SRO)consisting of shares with total value of Php 1 Billion. Harvest filed the Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and TRO claiming that the subscription to the new shares cannot be made a condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM. They paid Php 8,860 as filing fees. Alliance raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest’s failure to pay the correct filing fees arguing that the same should be based on the SRO valued at Php 1 Billion. The RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed the same. Issue: Whether or not Harvest paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint Held: The Court, after having classified that the subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, remanded the case to the RTC to determine if the payment of the filing fees constitutes sufficient compliance with Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 (fees for all other actions not involving property), in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5,2016. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy being sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of the principal sought , the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. The action of Harvest is incapable of

pecuniary estimation since its main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation’s by-laws. ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR v. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES,INC. March 15,2017 G.R.No. 164749 Bersamin, J. Facts: Rommel Abrogar, the son of the petitioners, joined the ‘’1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon” running contest organized by the respondents. During the marathon, Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon. Despite treatment, Rommel died. Petitioners sue the respondents to recover damages for the death of their son. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and awarded actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. All the parties appealed. The petitioners contended that damages for loss of earning capacity should have been awarded. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that that they were not negligent and hence not liable in the death of Rommel. The CA reversed the decision and held, inter alia, that the respondents were not negligent and that the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable. Hence, this petition.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Court can review the factual issues of the case 2. Whether or not the respondents’ negligence was the cause of the death of Rommel 3. Whether or not the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable 4. Whether or not damages for loss of earning capacity should be awarded Held:

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1. Yes, the Court can review the factual findings because there was conflict between the findings of fact by the RTC and the CA on the issue of negligence. The Court recognized the following exceptions to the rule that the findings of the fact of the CA are conclusive and binding: a. When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; b. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; c. when there is grave abuse of discretion; d. When the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts e. When the findings of facts are conflicting; f. When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appelant and the appelee; g. When the findings are contrary to the trial court; h. When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; j. When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; k. When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion 2. Yes, the negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel but Cosmos was not liable for the negligence of Intergames. To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event closest in time to the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the damage. Intergames was negligent for not conducting the race in a road blocked off from vehicular traffic and in not properly coordinating the personnel manning the route. Vehicular accident was an event known and foreseeable which could have been avoided with due diligence. The negligence of the driver was not an efficient intervening cause enough to break the chain

of connection between the negligence of Intergames and the death of Rommel. 3. No, the doctrine of assumption of risk was not applicable. This doctrine means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It requires three elements,namely: 1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; 2) he must further understand its nature; and 3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. These elements were not shown to exist. 4. Yes, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded to the heirs of a deceased non-working victim simply because earning capacity, not actual earning, may be lost. The formula for this purpose is: Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income LESS Necessary Living Expenses) MERCEDITA C. COOMBS v. VICTORIA C. CASTANEDA, VIRGILIO VELOSO SANTOS, SPS. PANCHO & EDITH LEVISTE, BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY March 15,2017 G.R.No. 192353 Leonardo-De Castro, J Facts: Coombs is the owner of the real property covered by TCT No. 6715. When she tried to pay the RPT, she was told that said property was no longer under her name. She later found out that TCT No. 6715 was already cancelled and replaced by another under the name of Santos. TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by the RTC upon petition of Castaneda for the issuance of second owner’s duplicate copy. Coombs filed a petition for the annulment of said judgment contending that the TC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter because the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT was never lost and had always been in her possession but CA dismissed the same. Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter Held: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. What was conferred by Section 10 of RA No. 26 to RTC is judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title. Since the owner’s duplicate copy was never lost nor destroyed 96

because it has always been with the petitioner, then RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter. Grounds for annulment under Section 2, Rule 47 include extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the CA should have not dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al. March 15,2017 G.R.No. 192536 Bersamin, J. Facts: Alcantara was the owner of a parcel of land. The BIR informed him, through a letter, that a certain amount was still due from him representing deficiency income tax and fixed tax, surcharge, interest and compromise penalty for late payment but there was no response from Alcantara. The BIR then issued two demand letters but still there was no response. The CIR issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against the properties of Alcantara. Subsequently, the BIR issued a Notice of Seizure of Real Property but since no bidder appeared or the highest bidder is insufficient to pay taxes, a Declaration of Forfeiture of Real Property was issued and the levied property was forfeited to the Government to which a new title was issued. Subsequently, the BIR issued a Notice of Sale for the resale of the property to which Lagahit was proclaimed the winning bidder. Alcantara filed a complaint for depriving him of his property without due process of law. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the same on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction because what was being challenged was the validity of the assessment made by the BIR and that even assuming the RTC has jurisdiction, it is the CTA which has jurisdiction over the appeal. Issues: 1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint 2. Whether or not the proper appellate authority to question the decision of the RTC was the CTA

Held: 1. No, the RTC had no jurisdiction because what was being assailed by Alcantara was the assessment and collection of taxes made against him. Alcantara should have first protested administratively in the CIR as provided for in Section 229and 230 of PD 1158. 2. Yes, the CTA shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions of the CIR in cases involving disputed assessments as provided for by RA No. 1125 prior to its amendment by RA No. 9282. The CA was correct in dismissing the complaint because the appeal was erroneous (Section 2, Rule 50). DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC., v. BIGKIS MANGGAGAWA SA DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOL, INC. March 15,2017 G.R.No. 192648 Jardeleza, J. Facts: Union registration was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (BMDOMMC). Later on, a union registration was also issued to Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial School (BMDOMSI). De Ocampo filed a petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the BMDOMSI with the DOLE-NCR on the ground of misrepresentation, mixed membership of rank-and-file and managerial employees and inappropriate bargaining unit. DOLE-NCR ruled in favor of de Ocampo so BMDOMSI filed an appeal to the BLR. BLR reversed the decision. De Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA but the CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Whether BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation and fraud in applying for a union registration Held: No. For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enought to vitiate the consent of a majority union members.

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UST vs Samahang Manggagawa ng UST GR 184262 April 24, 2017 Perlas-Bernabe,J:

Bilag vs. Ay-ay G.R. No. 189950 April 24, 2017 Perlas-Bernabe, J:

Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal filed by the respondents. Respondents alleged that on various periods from 19901999 petitioner repeatedly filed the respondents to perform various maintenance work. Hence they should be deemed as regular employees. On the other hand maintained that they were merely hired on a per project basis evidenced by their contractual agreements that petitioner’s employment will be automatically terminated (a) upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific project for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project.

Facts: Respondents alleged that petitioners' predecessor-ininterest, sold to them separately various portions of a parcel of land and that they registered the corresponding Deeds of Sale. According to the respondents, the petitioner’s predecessor has acknowledge the same and has caused to remove the subject land to the Ancestral Land Claims.Petitioners averred that the subject lands are untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is the Land Management Bureau which is vested with the authority to determine issues of ownership over unregistered public lands. RTC ruled in the petioner’s favor.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were regular employees and were illegally dismissed?

Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the said case?

Held: Yes. Petitioners are regular employees. the law provides for two (2) types of regular employees, namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer (first category); and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed (second category). Petitioners fall under the second category. Also petitioners could not be considered as project employees because the specific undertakings or projects for which they were employed were not clearly delineated.

Held: No. RTC is without jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of acourt to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action. Since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands it is the Director of Lands who has the authority to award ownership.

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Mendoza vs Peroxide Phil Inc G.R. No. 203492 April 24, 2017 Reyes, J: Facts: The petitioner’s predecessor in interest executed a Contract of Lease with the respondents over a parcel of land. his case stemmed from the ejectment case filed by the petitioners against the respondents. The METC ordered the respondents to vacate the land. Upon a public auction the petitioner was the highest bidder and the levied properties of the respondents were found inside the subject property. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued and the deputy sheriff padlocked the said property. Petitioners however forcibly opened the gate and dismantled the machineries of the respondents. For several days petitioners refused to obey the court order. The petitioners' sole argument is premised on the fact that since they are the registered owners of the subject property, then the lower courts do not have legal basis in ordering that the subject property be turned over to respondents and the same be padlocked pending trial of the main case. Issue: Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injuction is proper? Held: Yes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is the 'strong arm of equity, An extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties. The sole purpose of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the main case can be heard. Under the factual setting of this case, PPI was able to sufficiently establish that it had a right over the properties which should be protected while being litigated. PPI' s claimed ownership over the improvements erected and/or introduced in the subject

property was then being violated by the petitioners who had started entering the premises and started dismantling the improvements and machineries thereon.

BIR vs Lepanto Ceramics G.R. No. 224764 April 24, 2017 Perlas-Bernabe, J:

Facts: Lepanto Ceramics filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation stating that it has entered into a state of insolvency. The Rehabilitation Court issued a Commencement order declaring the respondent to be under corporate rehabilitation and suspending all proceedings for the enforcement of claims against it. Despite such order the BIR sent a notice of informal conference and Formal Letter of Demand to the respondent. Issue: Whether or not the Commencement Order?

BIR

has

violated

the

Held: Yes. The inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the expenses of a distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period. However creditors of the distressed corporation are not without remedy as they may participate in the proceedings. The acts of sending a notice of informal conference and a formal letter of demand are part and parcel of the entire process for the assessment and collection of deficiency taxes from a delinquent taxpayer—an action for the enforcement o a claim which should have been suspended pursuant to the Commencement Order. Bustos vs Millians Shoe GR 185024 April 24, 2017 99

Sereno, CJ: Facts: A parcel of land was levied by the city government for non payment of real estate taxes. When the proper was auctioned the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder. The same property was also involved in a rehabilitation proceeding of the respondent company. The respondent aver that the previous owners of the property are shareholders of it as a close corporation and therefore liable for its obligations. Petitioner moved for the exclusion of the property from the Stay Order. RTC denied it. Issue: Whether or not the property is answerable for the obligations of the respondent corporation? Held: No. There is no evidence that the corporation is a close corporation. The Supreme Court thus applied the general doctrine of separate juridical personality which provides that a corporation has a legal personality separate and distinct from that of people comprising it.

Herma Shipyard, Inc. and Mr. Herminio Esguerra vs. Danilo Oliveros, et al. April 17, 2017 G.R. No. 208936 Del Castillo, J. Facts: The respondents were employees of Herma Shipyard (Herma) occupying various positions. They filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay alleging that they are Herma’s regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary and desirable in its business. However, they were dismissed from their employment. They also alleged that as a condition to their continuous and uninterrupted employment, Herma made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period of 1 to 4 months to make it appear that they were project-based employees and stated that Herma did this scheme to defeat their right to security of tenure and if they were project

employees, Herma should have reported to DOLE the completion of project but they failed to do so. As a defense, Herma argued that the respondents were its project-based employees in its projects and that the specific project for which they were hired has been completed and as a support, they showed the contracts of employment, Kasunduang Paglilingkod (PangProyeldong Kawani). The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Herma stating that the respondents were project-based employees whose services were validly terminated upon the completion of the specific work in which they were hired. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission sustained the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA and set aside the previous Decisions and held that even if the contracts of employment indicated were hired as project employees, their status have become regular since they were performing tasks that are necessary, desirable and vital to the operation of Herma’s business and their failure to present proof that the respondents were hired for a specific period and it’s not clear from the contracts presented that the completion or termination of the project was already determined. Also, it the respondents were repeatedly and successively rehired as employees. Issue: Whether the respondents were project-based employees and not regular employees of Herma. Held: 1. Yes, they were project-based employees of Herma. The Supreme Court ruled that project-based employee under Article 280 (now Art. 294) of the Labor Code is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. The principal test in determining whether the employees were engaged as project-based is whether they were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which was specified and made known to them at the time of the engagement. In this case, the respondents knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed the project-based employment contracts for all their contracts state clearly the date of the commencement of the specific task and the expected completion date. 100

Roberto P. Fuentes vs. People of the Philippines April 17, 2017 G.R. No. 186421 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: Roberto Fuentes (Fuentes) is the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte who in such capacity committed an offense in relation to his office which cause undue injury to Fe Valenzuela (Valenzuela), the private complainant, by refusing for unreasonable length of time the renewal of her Business Permit without any legal basis or reason despite the compliance of Valenzuela that caused damage to the perishable ship provisions of Valenzuela and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate business. The prosecution alleged that Valenzuela is the sole proprietor of Triple A Ship Candling and General Maritime Services (Triple A) which was operating in the Port since 1993 until 2001 through the Business Permits issued by the LGU of Isabela. However, in 2002, Fuented refused to sign Triple A’s Business Permit despite the compliance of the requirements. Initially, the company was able to carry its business by securing temporary permits but soon shut down after it was alleged to be involved in a smuggling and drug trading that caused the BOC to require Valenzuela to secure a Business Permit but to no avail. Fuentes then averred that as early as 1999-2001, he has been hearing rumors that Valenzuela was engaged in smuggling and drug trading but he did not act on the same. However, in 2002, he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and Isabel Chief of Police allegedly confirming the said rumors that prompted him to hold Valenzuela’s approval of Triple A’s permit. So she filed a criminal case against Fuentes in Sandiganbayan.

Held: 1. Yes, it is correct. The Supreme Court reiterated that the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused must be a public officerdischarging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (2) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. As to the 1st element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer. As to the 2nd element, Fuentes done the three modes of the commission of the crime for him himself testified that all of his basis were according to the rumors that he heard. As regards to bad faith, it is the prerogative of the mayor to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 1623 and 444(b) (3) (iv)24 of the Local Government Code even the fact that Valenzuela had complied with all the requirements, he did not issue Valenzuela a Business Permit. As to the 3rd element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make things worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple A's favor. Under prevailing case law, proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.

The Sandiganbayan found Fuented guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the prosecution had established all the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Aggrieved, Fuentes moved for reconsideration but was denied. Issue: (Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan’s Decision is correct.

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF ROWIE A. QUIMNO, Utility Worker I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court

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of Ipil -Tungawan - Roseller T. Lim, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay

utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

April 17, 2017 A.M. No. 17-03-33-MCTC Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Teddy Castro and Lauro Sebastian vs. Pablito V. Mendoza, Sr., et al. April 26, 2017 G.R. No. 212778 Jardeleza, J.

Facts: Rowie A. Quimno (Quimno) is a Utility Worker I on MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan-Roseller T. Lim in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The records of the Employees’ Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Quimno submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since February 2016 up to the present neither submitted any application for leave resulting to an absence without official leave since February 1, 2016. Moreover, Presiding Judge Ventura informed OCA that Quimno not only failed to submit his DTR since February 2016 but also failed to report for work since July 20, 2016 without applying for leave and that prior to this, he was either late for work or absent, was lazy, indifferent and unreliable. Thus, Quimno received unsatisfactory ratings. Later on, Judge Ventura found out that Quimno was arrested and was formally charged for violationg RA No, 9165 but still, Quimno has still not reported from work so OCA recommended that Quimno’s name be dropped from the rolls, that his position be declared vacant and be informed about his separation from service but still qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled and may still be reemployed in the government. Issue: Whether Quimno should be dropped from the rolls. Held: Yes. Under 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007, the effect of absences without approved Leave is that the official or employee shall be considered on absence without leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without proper notice. Indeed, the prolonged unauthorized absences of Quimno cause inefficiency in the public service and its continued absence without leave disrupts the normal functions of the court which contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve with

Facts: The respondents in this case are the compulsory heirs of Simeon Santos regarding a parcel of land while the petitioners are agricultural tenants of the original Santos property. From July 1981 when Teddy substituted his mother Rosalina Castro in the tenancy of the original Santos property, he has been in its actual possession, occupation, and cultivation, personally performing all aspects of production with the aid of labor from the other petitioner Sebastian and paying the agreed lease rentals. The controversy started when Jesus (owner-heir) sold his undivided share in the original Santos property to respondent Municipalitywhich was acquired for the expansion and construction of the Bustos public market.As of 1989, the lots surrounding the first public market in respondent Municipality, including the original Santos property and the portion sold by Jesus, have been classified as a commercial area.From 1991 to 1994, all phases of the sales transaction between Jesus and respondent Municipality and the subsequent construction and completion of the public market, were effected without issue or complaint from the petitioners. Most notably, after the transfer of ownership of the property to respondent Municipality, the latter, in 1993, began construction of the public market which was eventually inaugurated and after the inauguration of the public market, petitioners filed their complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction; Pre-emption and Redemption; and Damages before the PARAD. In their complaint, petitioners categorically manifested their serious intent to exercise their rights of preemption and redemption provided for under Sections 11 and 12, Republic Act No. 388and soon deposited the redemption price for the property. The PARAD ruled that the petitioners are the tenants of the entire original Santos property, including the property now 102

owned by respondent Municipality and both Jesus and respondent Municipality failed to give notice of the sale of the property to the tenants, the petitioners. On appeal, The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) also affirmed PARAD’s Decision but ruled that it would be impractical to reinstate them in the possession or allow them to redeem it where there is no showing of petitioner’s capacity to pay the redemption price. The petitioners appealed to the CA where it affirmed the rulings of PARAD and DARAB. Issues: 1. Whether the private respondents, as owners of the market stalls and lessees in the public market, are real parties-in-interest. 2. Whether the transfer of ownership is covered by the PARAD’s original ruling recognizing petitioners’ right to redeem the property. 3. Whether petitioners validly exercised their right of redemption. Held: 1. Yes, as vendor-owner of the market stalls, possessors of the property, private respondents are necessary parties who ought to have been impleaded in the case if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. 2. The Decision of PARAD indeed recognized petitioner’s right of redemption but it did not contemplate an adjudication of ownership. Basic is the rule that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.68 Such a rule rests on public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law. 3. No, under Section 12 of the RA 3844, the right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: (a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third patty without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR; (c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed;

and (d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from written notice of the sale by the vendee. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners are bona fide tenants of the original Santos property and portion of that land was sold by an owner-heir, Jesus, to a third party, respondent Municipality, without any written notice of the sale to petitioners and the DAR also the fact that the petitioners failed to consign the full redemption price when they filed the complaint, then there was no valid exercise of the right to redeem the property. CITY OF DAVAO, represented by RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, in his capacity as City Mayor, RIZALINA JUSTOL, in her capacity as the City Accountant, and ATTY. WIDEL E. AVISADO, in his capacity as City Administrator vs. Robert E. Olanolan April 17, 2017 G.R. No. 181149 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: Robert Olanolan (Olanolan) was elected and proclaimed as the Punong Barangay of Brhy. 76-A. an election protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso Tizon (Tizon) but was initially dismissed but was later granted by the COMELEC, 2nd Division, on appeal declaring Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay. Olanolan then filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with a prayer for the Issuance of a TRO where the Court en banc gave due course and issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which was immediately implemented by DILG resulting to the reinstatement of Olanolan. In his reinstatement, he presided and passed an ordinance. On March 2005, the Court en banc dismissed respondent’s petition and recalled its SQAO. He then filed for a motion for reconsideration but the DILG Region XI rejected Tizon’s legal counsel for immediate implementation of the Court’s Recall Order because the Recall Order was in effect, an order of dissolution which is immediately executory and effective that’s why the City of Davao refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into by Olanolan as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order. Nothwithstanding this, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay issued a Resolution requesting the Regional Director of DILG Region XI to issue a directive for the officials of petitioner to recognize the legitimacy of 103

Olanolan as the Punong Barangay but before any action could be taken by the DILG, he filed a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel petitioner to allow the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his administration. In the interim, the Court en banc denied with finality Olanolan’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC dismissed Olanolan’s mandamus for the reason that there was still an adequate remedy which are available in the ordinary course of law violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Dissatisfied, he filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied and elevated his case to the CA on certiorari and ruled that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion was present in that the mandamus only raised pure legal question, hence should not be dismissed and that it is the ministerial duty of the petitioner to release the share of Brgy. 76-A in the annual budget and that the city government is not authorized to withhold the said share. Aggrieved, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution. Issue: Whether the CA erred in reversing RTC’s dismissal of Olanolan’s mandamus petition. Held: Yes, the Supreme Court defined mandamus as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, Olanolan has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. Thus, considering that Olanolan had no right to the office of the Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus petition, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs of which altogether justifies the dismissal of his petition. Also, It is well-settled that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts.

In this case, the petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not te release the funds to Olanolan considering the COMELEC’s declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay and it was a part of petitioner’s fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay funds would not be released to a person without proper authority, that Barangay funds shall be kept in the custody of the city or municipal treasurer, at the option of the barangay and any officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of the law.

Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Bernabe Baya April 17, 2017 G.R. No. 188269 Perlas-Bernabe, J. Facts: Baya alleged that he had been employed by AMSFC and DFC since 1985 and from then, worked his way to a supervisory rank on 1997. As a supervisor, he joined the union of supervisors and formed AMS Kapalong Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multipurpose Cooperative (AMSKARBEMCO). In 1999, he was reassigned to a series pf supervisory positions in AMSFC’s sister company, DFC, where he also became a member of its supervisory union while at the same time, was active at AMSKARBEMCO. Later on, AMSKARBEMCO petitioned before DAR some hectares of AMSFC’s property a banana plantation which was covered by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and soon transferred to AMFSC’s regular employees as Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARB), including Baya. When AMSFC learned that AMSKARBEMCO entered into an export agreement with another company, it summoned AMSKARBEMCO officers, including Baya, to lash out and threatened them that the ARBs' takeover of the lands would not push through. A few days later, Baya received a letter stating that his secondment with DFC has ended, thus, ordering his return to AMSFC. However, upon Baya' s return to AMSFC, he was informed that there were no supervisory positions available thus, he wasassigned to different rank-and-file positions instead. He then filed a 104

written request to be restored to a supervisory position but was denied prompting him to file a complaint. In their defense, AMSFC and DFC stated that they did not illegaly or constructively dismiss Baya considering that his termination from employment was a direct result of the ARB’s takeover through the agrarian reform program. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Baya’s favor since it was undisputed that Baya held supervisory positions in AMSFC and DFC and that his demotion to various rankand-file positions without any justifiable reason constituted constructive dismissal. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the NLRC and reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA for they found that the termination was not caused by illegal or constructive dismissal but by the cessation of AMSFC’s business operation or undertaking in large portions of its banana plantation due to the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Baya moved for reconsideration but was denied prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the CA and reinstated the ruling of LA with modification of deleting the award of backwages, annual vacation leave pay, and subsidies for it is undisputed that the facts clearly establish constructive dismissal. Issue: 1. Whether Baya was constructively dismissed 2. Whether AMSFC and DFC are liable to Baya for separation pay. 3. Whether Sumifru should be held solidarily liable with AMSFC for Baya’s monetary awards.

supervisory positions in AMSFC and notwithstanding this, they still proceeded to order Baya’s return forcing him to accept rank-and-file positions. Thus, the Court cannot lend credence to the contention that Baya’s termination was due to ARB’s takeover of the banana plantation because the takeover occurred on September 2002 while the acts of constructive dismissal were performed as early as August 2002. 2. Yes, because Baya was constructively dismissed, the Supreme Court used the doctrine of strained relations. Under this doctrine, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust. 3. No, AMSFC and DFC are the ones guilty of acts constitutive of constructive dismissal performed against Baya. As such, they should be deemed as solidarily liable for the monetary awards in favor of Baya. Meanwhile, Sumifru, as the surviving entity in its merger with DFC, must be held answerable only for the latter's liabilities, including its solidary liability with AMSFC arising herein. A jurisprudence states that “in the merger of two existing corporations, one of the corporations survives and continues the business, while the other is dissolved and all its rights, properties and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation," as in this case.

Held: 1. Yes, the Supreme Court reiterated that constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. In this case, the records reveal that the top management of AMSFC and DFC were well-aware of the lack pf 105