Ong Nov 2017 Crim Digest.docx

Criminal Law Case Digests November 2017 (RPC Books 1 and 2)

Janzl B. Ong JD 4-1

Topic: Treachery as qualifying circumstance for murder People vs Rafael Daroya Nov 8 2018 Gr. No. 229502 Doctrine: Treachery cannot be presumed from the mere suddenness of an attack; the suddenness of an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill.It must be shown proved that the accused consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself Facts: In the evening of October 19, 2002, Ceralde, who was then ferrying his pedicab along BonuanGueset, Dagupan City, saw Daroya suddenly appear. Ceralde noticed that Daroya's left hand was holding a piece of metal wrapped with a towel. Thereafter, Daroya suddenly punched Rolando, which caused the latter to fall down. Daroya then continued to punch Rolando using his left hand. Rolando was not able to fight back. Therafter, Daroya immediately ran away. Rolando then fell down facing the ground. After Daroya left, Ceralde and the other pedicab drivers brought Rolando to the hospital where he subsequently died. On the other hand, Daroya admitted that he punched Rolando, but claimed that he did so in selfdefense. He maintained that it was Rolando who started the fight. He claimed that on the date of the incident, at around 8:00 P.M., he was riding his pedicab waiting for passengers in the corner of Bonuan-Gueset in Dagupan City; that he was the first in line of about 80 pedicab drivers while Rolando was at the end of the line. Daroya averred that when the passengers were already coming, Rolando suddenly parked his pedicab in front of the line. Daroya and Rolando then fought on who among them should be the first in line. Daroya alleged that he punched Rolando three or four times and immediately went home after seeing Rolando fell on the ground Daroya was charged for murder on the ground that the killing was made with treachery by the suddent puches of Daroya. Issue: Is there treachery?

Ruling: None. The Court holds that the prosecution has not proven that the killing was committed with treachery. Indeed, other than their respective findings that Daroya "suddenly appeared" and continuously punched Rolando, while holding a piece of metal wrapped in a towel, until the latter fell to the ground, the lower courts failed to indicate any circumstance which would show that Daroya consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The prosecution has likewise failed to present any evidence showing that Daroya specifically chose to punch Rolando in his plan to kill him. It appears that Daroya's decision to punch Rolando, which eventually caused the latter's death, appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment brought about by their argument as to who among them should be first in line among the pedicab drivers. It is basic that a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Accordingly, the Court is compelled to disregard the finding of the existence of treachery by the lower courts. Daroya's guilt is thus limited to the crime of homicide.

Topic: Rape by sexual intercourse; Elements People vs Benjamin Austria Nov 8 2017 Gr. No. 210568 Doctrine: The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant's body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a compelling proof of defloration. What is more, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credibly is sufficient to convict. Facts: Victim AAA testified in court that her stepfather Benjamin Austria, in several occasions, raped her. During trial however, the prosecution themselves presented an expert witness who testified that AAA’s hymen remain intact. Accused Austria was convicted in the lower courts. Comes now this appeal, where the accused argues that the fact that the hymen of AAA remained intact, as established by the expert wintess by the prosecution themselves, rebuts and negates the possibility of rape. Issue: Can an accused be convicted of rape by sexual intercourse despite the fact the the hymen of victim remained intact?

Ruling: Yes.Hymenal Laceration is not an element of rape. An intact hymen does not negate a finding that the victim was raped, and a freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. In People v. Gabayron, we sustained the conviction of accused for rape even though the victim's hymen remained intact after the incidents because medical researches show that negative findings of lacerations are of no significance, as the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. It was noted that many cases of pregnancy had been reported about women with unruptured hymens, and that there could still be a finding of rape even if, despite repeated intercourse over a period of years, the victim still retained an intact hymen without signs of injury.

In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, we likewise affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim's hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim's hymen to remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. We elucidated that the strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one woman to another, such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse; on the other hand, it may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can ensue. In People v. Palicte and in People v. Castro, the rape victims involved were minors. The medical examination showed that their hymen remained intact even after the rape. Even then, we held that such fact is not proof that rape was not committed

Topic: Treachery as qualifying circumstance of Murder Peope vs Paul Duran Jr. y Mirabueno Nov 20, 2017 Gr. No. 215748 Doctrine: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack. Facts: A witness testified that on January 9, 2009 at around 1:48 in the morning, she was awakened by someone calling for her, uttering "Ninang". At that time she was inside her house She recognized the voice of the person as her godson named Gilbert Grimaldo. She then asked why. Grimaldo replied from outside saying "Ninang tulungan mo ako yung taong ito ay kinukursunada ako," "kinukursunada ako ng taong ito, me dala siyang baril". Then she opened the door for her godson. She then saw the accused Paul Duran shot Grimaldo with a .38 caliber revolver from behind at a distance of 2 1/2 feet. Grimaldo was hit at the nape, and then fell to the ground lying with his face down. Duran then left the place passing between their houses. Moments later accused returned and shot Grimaldo three more times to make sure that the latter was dead. For his part, the accused countered that he merely defended himself, as Grimaldo initially tried to rob him. Such act of Grimaldo resulted into an altercation, constraining the accused to chase and shoot Grimaldo. Accused Duran was charged for murder. Issue: Was there treachery? Ruling: There was no treachery. The victim was able to seek help from the eyewitness, and it was not established that the accused intentionally sought the means to insure the execution of his killing. The prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing him. The confrontation between Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been a chance encounter. It was also not proven that Duran deliberately and consciously employed means,

methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Grimaldo could not defend himself. Notably, eyewitness Quilana only witnessed the moment of the actual shooting but did not witness the inception of the fatal altercation. The prosecution failed to establish that Duran had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat. In this case, Grimaldo was aware of the impending attack and was even able to seek help from eyewitness Quilana.

Topic: Extinguishment of Criminal Liabilty People vs Calomia Nov 20, 2017 Gr.No.229856 Doctrine: The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; and the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delictois likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action. Facts: In two criminal cases, accused-appellant Ruben Calomia was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) two counts of qualified rape of his minor daughter, AAA, which he allegedly committed sometime in August 2007 and April 2008. After trial on the merits, the RTC promulgated its Decision on March 11, 2015 finding accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both counts of qualified rape. He appealed to the CA, which also affirmed his conviction. He then filed a notice of appeal before the Supreme Court on Sept. 21 2016. The accused however, died during the pendency of the appeal.

Issue:What is the effect of the death of the accused pending the appeal of his conviction? Ruling: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts e) Quasi-delicts Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. (Emphases supplied.) The death of an accused pending the appeal of his conviction extinguishes the criminal action, as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; and the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delictois likewise ipso facto extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action. In the instant case, accused-appellant's death occurred prior to the finality of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. Irrefragably, accused-appellant's death extinguished his criminal liability and his civil liabilities directly arising from and based solely on the crime/s he committed. Accused-appellant's conviction by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, must therefore be set aside as the same had already been rendered ineffectual.

Topic: Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610 (Sexual Abuse) Rizaldo Orsos vs People of the Philippines Nov 20, 2017 Gr. No. 214673 Doctrine: Lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. The term 'influence' means the 'improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective.' Meanwhile, 'coercion' is the 'improper use of power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it. Facts: At around 9:30 in the morning of April 21, 2007, while the CAT trainees, including AAA, were at the Sohot Spring in Dumalag for a cleanup drive, petitioner called AAA and asked her if she had decided on becoming a CAT officer, to which she answered yes. Petitioner then instructed her to go to his house at 1:00 in the afternoon of the same day for her supposed initiation. As she did not know where petitioner's house was located, she went back to the school at around 12:30 in the afternoon instead and waited for him to arrive. When petitioner saw AAA, he told her to follow him to his house and keep a little distance between them. Upon arrival thereat, petitioner instructed her to take a seat while he went to the bathroom for a few minutes. AAA noticed that except for the two of them, no one else was in the house. Thereafter, he emerged from the bathroom and asked her if she was really determined to become a CAT officer, to which she replied yes. Petitioner then told her that he had a crush on her, that he wanted her to become his mistress, and that he will give her all her needs.Then, he pulled her to his lap and asked her to kiss him. Thinking it was part of the initiation rites, AAA kissed his right cheek. Thereafter, petitioner asked her to sit on the sofa and proceeded to kiss her on the lips, leading her to cry. Petitioner then instructed her to lie down on the sofa, lifted her shirt and underwear, and sucked her right breast for about two minutes.AAA was frightened and could not complain. Petitioner was about to unzip her pants when she pleaded for him not to do so as she had her menstrual period then.At this point, petitioner stood up and went back to the bathroom. When he re-emerged, he told her to stop crying and not to report the incident if she truly wanted to become a CAT officer. Accused was later on charged with acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, where he was convicted. In his appeal, accused contended that the element of force and intimidation was not established.

Issue: Was there force and intimidation to warrant the conviction for the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610? Ruling: Yes. Under the law, There must be a confluence of the following elements before conviction can be had for acts of lasciviousness: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. On the other hand, The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7 610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

It was established that petitioner, who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA' s school, and therefore, a person who exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her, committed lascivious or lewd conduct against her by kissing her lips and sucking her right breast. It was established that petitioner, who was AAA's teacher and then the CAT Commandant in her school, was able to carry out his lewd acts by asking her twice if she was determined to become a CAT officer. Petitioner's inquiry strongly suggested that if AAA really wanted to become a CAT officer, she should accede to his demands and allow him to commit lascivious conduct upon her person. Therefore, petitioner exercised influence and coercion upon AA.A in order to commit the crime against her, thereby satisfying the element of force and intimidation in this case. Besides, although petitioner was not armed nor did he threaten AAA, his moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation. Hence, conviction is proper.

Topic: Grave and Slight Oral Defamation Digna Ramos vs People of the Philippines Nov 20, 2017 GR 226454 Doctrine: Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

Facts: Sometime in September 17, 2003, private complainant Patrocinia Dumaua (Dumaua) was watering her plants in her yard, when suddenly, she noticed five (5) schoolchildren pick up dried leaves and throw them into her yard. When Dumaua called the attention of the schoolchildren, the latter ran towards the direction of Sto. Nifio Elementary School, where Ramos works as a public school teacher.

A little later, Ramos arrived, picked up dried banana leaves, and allegedly threw them into Dumaua's yard, while saying "ta sinnu ti pabasulem nga agilappak ti bulung, siguro dakayo ta nagpabirthday kayo" which means "Whom do you blame throwing leaves? Maybe you did because you hosted a birthday party." This prompted a quarrel between Ramos and Dumaua, during the course of which Ramos uttered to the latter, "Ukininam, puta, awan ad-adalmo, nagbalay kayo ti nagdakkelan, magaburan daytoy balay kon" which translates to "Vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate, you built a very big house, it overshadows my house." In her defense, Ramos denied making any derogatory remarks against Dumaua, particularly "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo." She then narrated that on the time and date in question, she was traversing a pathway located between Dumaua's house and that of another neighbor when she saw Dumaua standing at her yard. Suddenly, Dumaua got angry at her, blamed her for the garbage in her yard, and threatened her not to use the pathway or else something will happen. An information for grave oral defamation was then filed against the accused, where she was convicted. Hence this case. Issue: Whether the accused shall be convicted for grave oral defamation? Ruling: Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony."26 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) A judicious review of the records of this case reveals that Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo," which means "vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate," against Dumaua. However, no evidence was presented to show that Ramos indeed started the altercation by instructing her schoolchildren to throw leaves into Dumaua's yard, and eventually, throwing dried banana leaves therein as well. It must be pointed out that Dumaua's claim to that effect was not supported by her corroborative witnesses whose testimonies only

pertain to matters transpiring during the height of the verbal altercation as they were inside the house when the fight started. Absent such evidence, the Court is inclined to lend more credence to Ramos's narration that she was just passing through a pathway adjacent to Dumaua's house when the latter got mad at her; started blaming her for the garbage in her yard; and warned her not to use the pathway anymore or else something will happen to her - all of which resulted in the two of them hurling invectives against one another. Thus, it may safely be concluded that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words against Dumaua, the utterances were made in the heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation on the part of the latter. As such, the Court is constrained to hold that Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.