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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  The different meanings and concepts of “Local Government”

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Distribution of powers to Local Government as limitation to political authority

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The idea of distributing governmental powers is one of the basic and minimum characteristics of the concept of the rule of law. Horizontal and vertical distribution prevents over-centration of powers on one branch or agency of the government and is another way of limiting political authority.

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By horizontal distribution of government powers, the powers of government are distributed among the three (3) branches of national government, namely: legislative, executive, and judicial. In the US and the Philippines, there is complete separation of powers between the three branches.

the higher governmental level for delegation of authority. Concept of local gov. Does not only connote higher authority but also territorial boundary of governance . The International Union of Local Authorities refer to it as “GEOGRAPHIC SUBDIVISIONS” (higher authority + territorial boundary). Divisions:

Politically and terrestrially subdivided to: State

different provinces or cities (independent and highly urbanized.

province

Municipalities and/or component cities

Independent and highly barangays urbanized cities Municipalities and component cities

barangays

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By vertical distribution of government powers, the powers of government are distributed among two (2) levels of government. At the upper level is the national government and the lower level are the local governments.

-a cluster of brgys. Compose a municipality/city -a cluster of municipalities/ component cites = province  section 1, article X “provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are political and territorial subdivision of the Republic of the Phil. The Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras are considered autonomous regions.

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Local governments as political and territorial subdivisions of the State

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In MMDA vs Bel-air Village, local government is defined as a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has a substantial control of local affairs.”

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Local Government Unit is also defined in Section 15 of the Local Government Code of 1991 as “body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.”

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Local government are subordinate entities, having no inherent powers and moust look up to

a)

Local governments as municipal corporations

Local governments are essentially municipal corporations. As such, it is a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof. b) Municipal corporations are established by law as agent of the state to assist in the civil government of the country and chiefly to regulate and administer the local internal affairs of the city, town, or district incorporated. c) As a result of this concept of local governments as municipal corporations, the “corporation” is

therefore legally considered distinct from its members. Local Gov. System 1. HISTORY I. Pre-Spanish  Datu- exercised all 3 gov. Function: Executive, legis. And judiciary often upon CONSULTATION with the Elders. ◦ Organized the Balangay (barangay) BUT these Balangays are not yet perceived as local governments but it has a status of CITY STATES (independent, not subordinate of higher gov.) 2. Spanish Period  Centralization-main tool in colonizing and controlling the country.  Encomiendas (parcels of lands)- given to privileged and favored persons who assisted them in the pacification of the islands.  They created: .. in ascending hierarchy ◦ Cabildos -cities ◦ Pueblos- municipalities ◦ Provincias- provinces ◦ Barangays- reduced to Barrios (it became the lowest rung in ascending power of gov. power)  Datus demoted to Cabezas de Barangay(FUNCTION: assist higher gov. Only in collecting tributes) 3. American Period  Continued the convenient system of the Spaniards  Why? Phil. Is so regionalized, centralization is needed to wholly govern the Phil. For themselves 4. Later peiods  1935 consti only one sec. In art. 7, sec 10 “pres. Shall exercise gen. Supervision over local gov. As provided by law”  1972 Pres. And congress determined relationship of national and local gov. Statutes and Eos  1972 martial law- strengthened Pres. Power over LGUs despite the provision in the 1973

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consti and creation of dep. Of local gv and community dev.. Marcos created and abolised offices changing the relationship between the national and local gov. AFTER PEOPLE POWER- 1987 consti. Provided for the special forms of LGU in response to ethnic peculiarities in Muslim Mindanao and Cordilleras ◦ LGU code of 1991 was passed – devolution of powers and services.

Structures and System of Philippine Local Government 

Creation

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Although the LGC of 1991 provides for a devolution of powers, the Philippines remains a unitary state. The national government, by law, creates, merges, or abolishes local government units, endows them with powers within their jurisdiction, and determines national-local relations.

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Tiers of Local Government

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In the Philippines, there are several levels of local authority. The province is the intermediate unit, providing supervision to the municipalities and component cities under it, and performing services for national government.

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The Unitary System of Government

1) In a Unitary System of Government, municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. 

Since ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state, any for form of autonomy granted to local governements will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority

SEE the other file for chapters 2 and 3 Chapter 4: Local Governments and Unions or Federations of Local Governments in the Philippines Local Units and Autonomous Regions: 1. Local govt. units should be created by law. The constitution does not create local government units but merely ensures that no law can abolish barangays. 2) Barangay – the basic political unit. It is the primary and implementing unit of government policies, plans, forums. It is where the views of the people may be expressed and considered. It is also where disputes may be amicably settled. 3) Municipality – consists of a group of barangays. Its purpose is the consideration and delivery of basic, regular, and direct services / effective governance. 4) City – consists of more urbanized and developed barangays. Its purpose is the coordination and delivery of basic, regular, and direct services / effective governance. 5) Province – composed of a cluster of municipalities and component cities. It serves as a dynamic mechanism for developmental processes. It governs the LGUs under its jurisdiction. Regular LGUs: provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Autonomous Regions: Muslim Mindanao and the cordilleras. Classification of Cities: 6) Highly Urbanized – they have an income of at least 50 million pesos

7) Independent Component Cities – their charter prohibits the city’s inhabitants from voting for provincial elective officials / to be voted as provincial elective officials 8) Component Cities – all other cities Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions: 9) Can be created by congress through law subject to plebiscite 10) Component cities / municipalities regain basic autonomy and are entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. 11) Their jurisdiction only includes basic services. They cannot exercise local political powers. Loose Federations: 12) These are formed when LGUs group themselves and coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes beneficial to them 13) May be created through ordinances enacted by the LGUs 14) Not considered a new corporate body Regional Development Councils: 15) Composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and govt. offices. Includes NGO representatives to strengthen autonomy of the LGU and accelerate economic growth. 16) Established by president, no need for authorization from congress. CASES:  Abella vs. COMELEC Facts: 17) Silvestre Dela Cruz filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte

18) Dela Cruz claimed that Larrazabal wasn’t truthful regarding her residence, and that she lied in her Certificate of Candidacy. He also claimed that she was a resident of Ormoc. 19) The petition was granted but Larrazabal was already governor. Issue: 20) WON or not the person with the 2nd highest votes can become governor if the current governor ends up disqualified Held: 21) No. They cannot. Larrazabal was presumed to be a bonafide candidate at the time of the election and the people voted for her. The person with the second highest votes still lost the election.  Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) vs. Bel-Air Village: Facts: 22) MMDA, a government agency tasked with delivering basic services in Manila, sent Bel-Air a notice requesting that the latter open Neptune Street to public vehicles 23) Bel-Air refused and filed an injunction. However, Bel-Air lost. 24) However, on appeal the court ruled that MMDA had no authority to order the opening of the street (which was inside a private subdivision) Issue: 25) WON MMDA had the authority to open up Neptune Street Held:

26) No. The MMDA only has the following powers: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. They do not have legislative powers. The powers granted in their charter are limited, and their primary function is merely to help organize the transportation system.

Chapter 5: The Local Government Code of 1991 Constitutional Mandate:  The 1987 constitution mandates congress to enact a local government code that shall provide for a more responsive and accountable LGU structure through decentralization.  This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development comes from strengthening local autonomy. Scope:  All provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays, political subdivisions. Officials, offices and agencies of the local government.  Applies to autonomous regions until they come up with their own local government code.  Existing tax ordinances remain in force  All general and special laws, acts, charters, decrees, and executive orders that were inconsistent with the code were repealed or modified accordingly. Rules of Interpretation:  Provisions on the powers of LGUs should be interpreted liberally in the LGU’s favor.

In case of doubts, it should be resolved in favor of the devolution of powers  Tax ordinances or revenue measures should be interpreted strictly against the LGU. It should favor the tax payer. HOWEVER when it comes to tax exemptions, it should be interpreted against the person claiming it.  General welfare provisions should be interpreted in favor of the LGU.  Rights and obligations arising from contracts should be governed by the original terms.  If no legal provisions or jurisprudence is available, the controversy shall be governed by the customs and traditions of the place.

CHAPTER 6: CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF BOUNDARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND ABOLITION Political Subdivisions Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” Creation and Conversion  General Requirements

 LAW -by law enacted by Congress in the case of a provonce, city, municipality, or any other politiical subdivision -by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jursidiction  PLEBISCITE -The constitution specifically requires that a plebiscite should be held in order to lawfully create a municipal corporation (sec 10, art X)

 COMPLIANCE with CRITERIA on INCOME, LAND AREA and POPULATION Income- it must be sufficient to provide for all essential government facilties, services and special functions commensurate with the size of population. Population- it shall be determined as the total number of inhabitatants within the territorial jurisdiction. Land Area- it must be contiguos, unless comprises 2 or more islands; properly indentified by metes and sufficient to provide for basic services. NOTES:  Sec. 7, LGC: compliance with the following shall be attested by Dept. Of Finance (DOF), National statistics office (NSO) and Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the DENR  Compliance with the criteria is a question of fact answered by DOF, NSO and DENR. Such is binding unless there is grave

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abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or clear error of facts. INCOME (dept. Of finance order no. 35-93)- all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU from REGULAR sources of local general funds including internal revenue allotment (IRA). internal revenue allotment (IRA)items of income ◦ form part of gross accretion of LGU funds ◦ regularly and automatically accrue to local treasury without need for further actions on the part of the LGU ◦ constitute income Converting municipality to city or cluster of brgy to component city (because of RA (9009 ammending sec 450 of LGC-increase income from 20M to 100M(-IRAs no longer included in the computation of annual income for complying with income requirement INHABITANTS- needed otherwise no muncorp at all TERRITORY- boundaries must be definite, fixed or certain otherwise void. (sec 7, LGC)

 Specific Requirements LGU Barangay

Income none

Population 2,0005,000

Municipality

P2.5M ave. For 2 consecutive preceding years P100M in the

25,000

Component

City

Highly Urbanized City Province

case of conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a city per R.A 9009 (6/30/’01) P50M latest annual income P20M ave. annual income

200,000

Not anymore stated in law

250,000

2,000sq.km (contiguous)

Merger and Division - The division and merger of existing LGU’s shall comply with the same requirements prescribed for their creation provided that such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the LGU’s to less than the minimum requirements. -Sec 8, LGC- income classification of LGU shall be updated within 6 months upon effectivity of this code - When two or more municipal corporations are consolidated under one government, the old corporations become extinct in most instances. - new ones entitled to: 1. all assets and immunities 2. severally liable for all its then subsisting debts 3. vested power to raise revenue to pay them by levying taxes on property transferred and people living there 4. annexed territory dissolved and become part of annexing corp. 5. officers and agents terminate their relations with offices Land Area 6. title to properties passed without none compensation 50 sq.kmm. 7. its debts and obli assumed by annexing corp. Except if an Unless otherwise provided by law island

Substantial Change of Boundaries 150,000

100 sq.km.

- No substantial alteration of boundaries shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected.

CASES:  League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

 The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009. The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Facts:  During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of Representatives.  However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income.  In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.  Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Issue:  Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional? Held:

FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. ISSUES: 2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its

transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). 3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution (sec. 1, art X consti) No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon

effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution . It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. Creation and Conversion 1.law Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General FACTS: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned. ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to. 2. plebiscite  Miranda vs Aguirre Facts:  1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720

was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.  1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city.  Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. Held:  When an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. Requires participation of residents of orig. LGU not just those residing in LGU sought to be created: Padilla vs COMELEC Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all the voters of the Municipality of Labo—the parent unit of the new municipality. The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to set aside the result arguing that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution does not

include the parent Municipality of Labo.

political

unit—the

Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid? Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. HOWEVER in Abbas vs COMELEC, merger of administrative regions which pertains to executive branch will not require plebiscite.  Navarro vs. Executive Secretary Ermita Facts:  The President of the Republic approved into law (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).  Then the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the (LGC).  November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Held:  The Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a fullfledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.

CHAPTER 7: DE JURE and DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS De Jure -If its creation perfectly complies with all the requirements of an incorporation, a municipal corporation is considered de jure. De Facto -Not all requirements are complied with provided certain elements are present: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Valid law authorizing incorporation; Attempt in good faith to organize it; Colorable compliance with law; and Assumption of corporate powers.

CASES:  Pelaez vs. Auditor General - the Supreme Court denied the President the power to create local government units because the creation of LGU’s is essentially legislative. Pelaez vs Auditor General undue delegation of legislative power Facts: The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice

President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.” Issues: Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Discussions: Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be

vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Rulings: Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.  Sultan Osop Camid vs. Office of the Pres. -the Supreme Court confirmed that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where its is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge of the legislature and without interruption and objection.

CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, (ARTICLE X Section 10: Creation, Abolition, Change of boundaries) FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong.The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (asa private citizen and taxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full-blown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has its own highschool, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2)17 barangays with chairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong. In the Certification of DILG, thereis an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through anexecutive order. Thus, this petition. ISSUE:Whether or not theMunicipality ofAndong berecognized as ade facto municipal corporation HELD:SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge

and acquiescence of the legislature,and without interruption or objection for periodlong enough toaffordtitle by prescription. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following reasons: (A) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1)The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated inPelaezCase, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment. (B) Andong did not meet the requisites set by Local Government Code of1991Sec.42par. d regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Codeshall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. (C) The failure to appropriatefundsfor Andong and theabsence ofelections inthe municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality. (D) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House ofRepresentatives tothe different legislative districts inthe Philippines, enumeratesthe various municipalities encompassed inthe various districts) did notinclude Andong.

Mun of San Narciso, Quezon vs Mendez Sr. G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994 FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same

province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives.” Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General. Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality and that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.) Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. ISSUE: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation. HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of

the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

Here SC considered the following factors which validated the creation: see p71  Municipality of Jimenez Case -Sincaban was considered to ahve attained de facto status at the time of 1987 Constitution took effect and was not subject to plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code.Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the

boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. Issue: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES Held: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following factors are present: 1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complaned of was done or committed. 4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering

into an agreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban. CHAPTER 8: POWER RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUPREME COURT, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS; INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS LGUs and National Government in General: LGUs are agents of the State  Municipal governments are only agents of the national government  Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred to them by Congress as the national lawmaking body Magtajas vs Pryce Properties

 PAGCOR expanded its operations to CDO. It was met with various protests and demonstrations by civic organizations and religious elements.  Petitioners contended that PAGCOR’s operations is violative of City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.  Respondents invoke PD 1869 which created PAGCOR to help regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.  ISSUE: WON the City Ordinances are valid  HELD: No. Cagayan de Oro, like other political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances as expressed in Sec 16 of LGC. However, there is a requirement that an ordinance should not contravene with a statute. Municipal govts are only agents of the national government. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.  Casino gambling is authorized by PD 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. LGUs and the Supreme Court: LGUs’ acts are subject to Judicial Review Acts of LGUs are within the scope of judicial review, under Art 8 Sec 4(2), 1987 Constitution,  The SC has jurisdiction over all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard

en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations LGUs and the President: President exercises General Supervision  President shall exercise general supervision over local governments, to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.  National agencies and offices with project implementation functions shall coordinate with one another and with the LGUs concerned in the discharge of these functions Drilon v Lim  Then Secretary of Justice Drilon declared Ordinance No 7794 null and void for noncompliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinance and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.  This power to revoke is provided in Sec 287 of the LGC which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance, and of warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.  ISSUE: WON Sec 187 of the LGC is constitutional  HELD: Yes. When a Sec of Justice alters or modifies or sets a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgement for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Sec Drilon did set aside the ordinance, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the code should be. He did not exercise an act of control but only supervision.

Does the President’s power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit? -Yes. The liga ng mga barangay is an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials.  The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented by their punong barangays.  LGUs and Congress: LGUs derive their existence and powers from Congress  No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of votes cast ina plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Mother LGU and Component LGU: Mother LGU reviews acts of component LGU d) In general  The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.  This is to ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions e) Provincial relations with Component Cities and Municipalities  The province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions.

 Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the province f) City and Municipal relations with Component Barangays  The city or municipality, through the city or municipal Mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions Two types of reviews by a Mother LGU of acts of Component LGU:  Executive: Local Chief Executive (LCE) of Mother LGU reviews Executive Orders (Eos) of LCE of Component LGU  The governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal Mayor within his jurisdiction (shall be forwarded to the governor 3 days after issuance)  The LCE concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city or municipal ordinances.  If there is inaction on the part of the governor or the city or municipal mayor, the EO shall be deemed valid.  Legislative: Sanggunian of Mother LGU reviews Ordinances of Sanggunian and EOs of LCE of Component LGU 2.1 Component City and Municipal Ordinances and Resolutions  Within 3 days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and resolutions made by the local development councils.  Within 30 days after receipt of copies, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine

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the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there is none, to the provincial atty for prompt execution The provincial atty shall inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of his comments and recommendations If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it can declare such ordinance as invalid Inaction by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within 30 days from submission = ordinance presumed valid ◦ Barangay Ordinances Within 10 days from its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinance Inaction by Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan within 30 days from submission = ordinance deemed valid If Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law, it shall return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment or modification

LGUs and National Agencies and Offices (with project implementation functions): Prior consultation and approval before implementation  No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations

mentioned in Sections 2(c) and 26 of LGC are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained, provided that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.  The requirement of prior consultations found in Sec 2(c) and 27 of the LGC apply only to national programs and/or projects that are to be implemented to a particular or local community  Since Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO, the provision on prior consultation will not apply. (Lino vs Pano) Lino vs Pano FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or

temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

LGUs and National Agencies, offices and GOCCs (with field units in the LGU): Monthly Reportorial Requirement for Information and Guidance  National agencies and offices including GOCCs with field units or branches in a province, city, or municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his information and guidance, monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures.

LGUs and National Agencies, offices and GOCCs(with environmental programs): Consultation  It shall be the duty of every national agency or GOCC authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of plant or animal species, to consult with the LGUs, NGOs and other sectors concerned and to explain the goals and objectives of the program, its impact upon the people and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof (Sec 26 of LGC) LGUs and the PNP, Fire Protection Unit and Jail Management Personnel: Operational Supervision and Control by LGU Andaya vs RTC  There was a vacancy in the position of chief of police in Cebu. The regional

director of the Cebu police Andaya submitted a list of 5 eligible appointed to the position to the Mayor of Cebu  However, the mayor refused to appoint one because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was not on the list due to being disqualified.  ISSUE: WON the mayor can require the Regional Director to include the mayor’s protégé in the list?  HELD: No. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It is the prerogative of the regional director of the police to choose the eligible person who should be included in the list without intervention from local executives (Sec 51 of R.A 6975) LGUs and NGOs: LGUs shall support, and may give assistance to, NGOs LGUs shall promote the establishment amd operation of people’s and NGOs to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy

CHAPTER 9: LOCAL TAXATION AND RELATED POWERS AND PRIVILEGES Power to Create Sources of Revenues and to Levy Taxes, Fees and Charges  Local Taxation Power Under the sec 5 art X, 1987 Constitution, each LGU has the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provode, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Shall accrue to LGU  This is only a general power to tax. Their special power to tax is subject to

the guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide  The delegation to tax is not absolute and unconditional; the legislature must see to it that:  The taxpayer will not be overburdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions  Each LGU will have its fair share of available resources  The resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed  Local taxation will be fair, uniform and just Basco v PAGCOR (decided before the LGU code)  P.D 1869, which exempts PAGCOR from “paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise , as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” was questioned by the Manila City government and it allegedly waives the latter’s right to impose taxes and license fees, violating its constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy (Sec 5, Art X 1987 Constitution)  ISSUE: Does the Local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?  HELD: The power of an LGU to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law  Municipal corporations have no inherent power to tax and their power to tax must always yield to a legislative act for they are mere creatures of Congress wherein the latter has the power to create and abolish municipal corporation due to its general powers

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v Marcos  The SC took a different path compared to the previous case (Basco v PAGCOR) on the same issue  MCIAA was created by virtue of R.A 6958, mandated to principally undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control, management, and supervision of the MIA and Lahug Airport  Since its time of creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of tax exemption of realty taxes in accordance with Sec 14 of its charter.  However, The Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment from realty taxes from MCIAA.  MCIAA objected to the demand and asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing Sec 133 of the LGC.  ISSUE: WON MCIAA is a taxable person  HELD: Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAA’s exemption from payment of taxes is withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. Statutes granting tax exemptions shall be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally construed in favor of the taxing authority.  MCIAA cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from payment of realty taxes.  Manila International Airport Authority v CA  SC reverted to the Basco doctrine  The MIAA operates the NAIA Complex in Parañaque City under EO 903.  On March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued

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Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the LGC withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Sec 21 of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid real estate taxes already due. OGCC clarified that the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA then pointed out that it is exempt from real estate tax ISSUE: WON airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax? HELD: Yes. Because: (1) MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation, and (2) second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.

 Construction of Local Taxation  Local tax measures, being in derogation of property rights must also be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it and liberally in favor of the taxpayer in case of doubt  The principle of “Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception” still applies   

Fundamental Principle in Local Taxation Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU Taxes, fees charges and other impositions shall: ◦ Be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay ◦ Be levied and collected only for public purposes ◦ Not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory

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Not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade; The collection of local taxes, fees and charges and other impositions shall in no case be left to any private person The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the Code shall inure solely to the benefit of and be subject to disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee or other imposition unless otherwise specified Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation

 Taxing Authority The power to impose a tax, fee, or charge to generate revenue under the Code shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the LGU concerned through an appropriate ordinance. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers: Unless otherwise provided in the code, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following.  Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions 

Documentary stamp tax

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Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies, and other acquisitions in mortis causa, except as otherwise provided by the code.

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Custom duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except when wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the LGU concerned

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Taxes, fees and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or chandies.

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Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen

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Taxes on business enterprises certified by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of 6 and 4 years from the date of registration

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Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products

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Percentages or VAT on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided Taxes on gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land, or water.

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Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession

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Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof

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Taxes and fees or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided in the code

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Taxes, fees or other charges on the countryside and barangay business enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and R.A. No. 6938. Taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units

The taxing powers of LGUs shall not extend to the levy of any kind of tax on the national government, its agencies, or its instrumentalities. Section 133 states that the common limitations on taxing powers prevails over section 193 which grants the LGU’s with taxing powers, so the limitations prevail. Procedural Matters Affecting Tax Ordinances and Measures: A) Public Hearing – a mandatory requirement B) Questions on Constitutionality or Legality of the Tax Ordinance – may be raised on appeal 30 days from the effectivity thereof. The Secretary of Justice shall then render a decision 60 days from the date of receipt. The appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity C) Publication and Public Dissemination – Within 10 days of the approval, certified true copies of tax ordinances must be published in full for three consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation, or be posted for 2 days in a conspicuous and publicly accessible place

D) Enforcement of Void or Suspended Tax Measure – sufficient ground for disciplinary action against the local officials responsible for it E) Tax Rate Adjustment – LGUs can adjust them but not more than once every 5 years F) Tax Exemption Privileges – may be granted by LGUs through ordinances that were approved. HOWEVER, under the code unless otherwise provided, tax exemptions – except those for local water districts, cooperatives registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions – were withdrawn upon the code’s effectivity Despite this, congress may enact a law restoring such exemptions or privileges.

Just Share in the National Taxes: G) LGUs have a just share to national taxes. Their share is determined by law and shall be automatically released to them. The LGUs’ shares shall be released to them on a quarterly basis. H) The national government cannot withhold part of this share for any purpose. Amount of Shares: I) Under the code, the LGU shall have a share based on the collection of the third fiscal year proceeding the current fiscal year as follows:   

30% on the first year 35% on the second year 40% on the third year

In case of an unmanageable deficit, the president is authorized upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance to adjust the allotments. HOWEVER, it cannot fall below 30% of the taxes collected during the third fiscal year. J) Before the president may interfere in local matters there must be: 

Unmanaged public sector deficit

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Consultations with the officers of the senate and house of reps / the presidents of various local leagues

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The corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the department of finance, interior and local govt, and budges and management

Allocation of Shares: K) Provinces – 23 % L) Cities – 23 % M) Municipalities – 34 % N) Barangays - 20 % The share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined by this formula. O) Population – 50 % P) Land Area – 25 % Q) Equal Sharing – 25 % Share of each barangay with a population not less than 100 shall not be less than 80,000 pesos per annum chargeable against the 20% share of the barangay from the internal revenue allotment, and the balance to be allocated. This is the formula: R) On the first year: Population – 40 % Equal sharing – 60 %

S) On the second year: a. Population – 50% b. Equal Sharing – 50% T) On the third year and thereafter a. Population – 60% b. Equal Sharing – 40% To ensure that the shares benefit the local community, each LGU shall appropriate AT LEAST 20% of their annual budget to developmental projects. Equitable Share in the Proceeds of the Utilization and Development of the National Wealth Within their Respective Areas: U) Before the code PNOC didn’t have to give the LGUs anything, now they pay millions of pesos to the LGUs. V) LGUs are entitled to 40% of the gross collection derived by the national government from the preceding fiscal year from mining taxes, royalties, forestry and fishery charges and etc. W) LGUs have a share from government agencies or government cooperatives engaged in the development of national wealth. X) The proceeds from the shares of LGUs from the utilization and development of national wealth shall be appropriated by their respective sanggunian to finance local development, but 80% derived from the utilization of hydrothermal, geothermal, and other sources of energy shall be applied to lower the cost of electricity in the LGU Y) LGUs are empowered to create their own sources of revenue and they also have the authority to dispose of real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity to apply their

resources and assets for productive, Chapter 10 - LOCAL POLICE POWER Police Power

1) It is the inherent power of the State to regulate conduct for the promotion of general welfare. It has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. 27) Based on the ancient doctrine - salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law. 28) In Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), the SC stated that: “The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self protection, and is not inaptly termed the ‘law overruling necessity.’ 29) Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense , the greatest and most powerful attribute of government” 30) The exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. 31) Thus, the state in order to promote general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Police Power in Municipal Corporations

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Police power is essentially legislative in character and is inherently vested in Congress of the Philippines.  It is inherent in the State, but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of power by the Legislature which may be through express delegation or inferred by the mere fact of creation of the municipal corporation.

developmental, or welfare purposes. Congress delegates this power to local governments under the Local Government Code, through Section 16 thereof, the General Welfare Clause.  This clause provides that “every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of general welfare….” (See Sec. 16 of LGC)  It is general rule that the ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.  Being Legislative in character, local police power is exercised by the Sanggunian of the local government through the enactment of the appropriate ordinances.

Requisites for Valid Exercise of Local Police Power For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature.

These principles require that a municipal ordinance:

 Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute,

Delegation through Local Government Code

 Must not be unfair or oppressive  Must not be partial or discriminatory  Must be general and consistent with

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 Must not be unreasonable

In matters that are deemed within the competence of local governments to handle,

public policy

As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met:

 The interests of public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, require the interference of the State, and  There must be concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. In Lim vs Pacquing, the national government contended that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant Associated Development Corporation (ADC), a franchise to conduct jai alai operations is void and ultra vires. The SC upheld national government’s contention stating that jai alai is not a mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate but is essentially gambling so that whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions primarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, taking into account national and local interests. SC added that police power of the State (not of local government) is paramount. In Balacuit vs CFI of Agusan de Norte, SC agreed with the petitioners(theater owners) that Ordinance No. 640 of Butuan City is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. The said ordinance penalized any person engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances who would require children between 7 and 12 yrs of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults (they should only charge one-half of the value of the said tickets). The Court can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. In De la Cruz vs. Paras, the Supreme Court ruled that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations

Association Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, SC affirmed the validity of a mere regulatory ordinance that required the owner, manager, keeper, or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer without his filling up the prescribed form in the lobby open to public view at all times in his presence. In White Light Corporation vs City of Manila, SC nullified the Manila City Ordinance as “overbreadth” prohibiting hotels, motels, pension houses, and similar establishments from offering a short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates to minimize or eliminate the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.

Interpretation of the General Welfare Clause Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community. In Zoomzat, Inc. vs People, the SC court ruled that under the general welfare clause, the LGU can regulate operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding structures and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts such as the grand of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires. In Tan vs Perena, the SC acknowledged the ability of the national government to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subjects of the regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one of such

conditions. Territorial Limitations

exercise police power in the protection of the territory to insure cleanliness, and prevent any business and conduct likely to corrupt the fountain of water supply for the city.

It has been held that the municipality may and acting pursuant to an ordinance;

 It is for public use, or purpose, or welfare for Chapter 11 - LOCAL EMINENT DOMAIN POWER Eminent Domain

1. The right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. 2. This power is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled but may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. 3. However, the right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can be exercised, some law must exist conferring the power upon it.

When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law.

Specific requirements for local eminent domain (Sec 19 of LGC)

 It is exercised through its chief executive

the benefit of the poor and the landless;  Payments of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; and  A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted.

 Exercised through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance In Municipality of Paranaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation, the SC ruled that the LGC of 1991, which was the law already applicable, specifically requires “ordinance,” such that a mere “resolution” will not suffice. The court said that there is a difference between an ordinance and a resolution in that the former has the force and effect of laws while the latter is merely an expression of the sentiment of the local legislative body. 2. For public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless This concept of “public use,” was limited to the uses that are readily available to any member of the community like in the case of a public road, bridge, or public plaza. However, this concept had been expanded to mean “promotion of general welfare.” The following shall be considered as public use, purpose or welfare (Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code):

 Socialized housing;  Construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks, viaducts, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, or piers;  Construction or improvement of public buildings;  Establishment of parks, playgrounds, or

       

plazas; Establishment of market places; Construction of artesian wells or water supply systems; Establishment of cemeteries or crematories; Establishment of drainage systems, cesspools, or sewerage systems; Construction of irrigation canals or dams; Establishment of nurseries, health centers, or hospitals; Establishment of abattoirs; and Building of research, breeding, or dispersal centers for animals

In Lourdes de la Paz Masikip vs. City of Pasig, where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, not withstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, cannot be considered to be for public use. 3. Payments of just compensation (Sec 9 Art II of the 1987 Constitution) “Just Compensation” is described as a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private owner by the expropriator. This is to indemnify the owner for the loss he has sustained as a result of the expropriation.

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Where only a portion of the private property is expropriated, the owner is entitled to a just compensation on the basis of the fair market value of the property plus consequential benefits.

The concept of “fair market value” also presupposes that it shall be paid within a reasonable time or it is no fair market value at all.

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The SC interpreted the requirement that payment of just compensation should be made within a reasonable time means that the expropriator must pay the property owner just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgement in the expropriation case.

In Republic vs. Lim, the SC mandated that “the landowner is entitled to recover possession of the property expropriated if the government fails to fully pay just compensation to the owner within a periof of five (5) years from the finality of the judgement in expropriation proceeding. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted.

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As required, the Local Government must first make an offer (must be in writing) to buy the private property before it can legally initiate an expropriation proceeding so that if the owner of the property agrees to sell it, the local govt need not expropriate the property.  It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for acquisition and the price offered.  If the owner/owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.  If the owner/owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher that that offered to them, the local chief executed shall call them to the conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price.

 If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.  The Local chief executive shall cause the provincial, city, or municipal attorney concerned or, in his absence, the provincial or city prosecutor, to file expropriation proceedings in the proper court in accordance with the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws.  The LGU may immediately take position of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to the expropriated.

For expropriation of for purposes of urban land reform and housing (RA 7279 Urban Development Housing Act of 1992), read Sec. 9 and 10.

CHAPTER 12 – POWER TO RECLASSIFY LANDS A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearing for that purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition-1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture, or 2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned. However, such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: 1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent; 2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent; 3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent. The President may, when public interest so requires and upon the recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set forth above. Nicolas Laynesa v. Uy

 The SC ruled that despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural land by a local government unit, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in question for threatened ejectment and redemption.  The local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

CHAPTER 13 – CLOSURE OF ROAD, ALLEY, PARK OR SQUARE A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local or national road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction. However, it is submitted that such power shall be deemed implied in the General Welfare power of every local government unit. Permanent Closure  The ordinance authorizing it must be approved by at least 2/3 of all the members of the sanggunian concerned, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.  No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein.  No park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.  No permanent closure of any local road, street, alley, park, or square shall be affected unless there exists a compelling reason or sufficient justification thereof such as, but not limited to:  change in land use  establishment of infrastructure facilities

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projects or such other justifiable reasons as public welfare may require.

 Macasiano v. Diokno  aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. Cebu Oxygen and Acetelyne Co. v. Berciles  The City Council of Cebu through a resolution declared a terminal road as an abandoned road and authorized its sale through a public bidding.  The SC held that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use. LGC of 1991: “a property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the locla government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed.” Temporary Closure  Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during:  an actual emergency or fiesta celebrations  public rallies or agricultural and industrial fairs  undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects

 The duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned in a written order.  In case of fiesta celebration, the closure should not exceed 9 days.  No national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.  Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close or regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any public place where shopping malls, Sunday flea or night markets or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public. No Just Compensation in general  The closure of a road, alley, park or square presupposes an exercise of police power. Hence, for any loss or inconvenience caused to a property owner is a “damnum absque injuria” (damage without injury) thus, no compensation. Sangalang v. IAC  When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation. Power to close road, etc., discretionary to LGU  The local legislative body has the competence to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.

 Such discretion will not be ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts. Pilapil v. CA  The establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal was found to be the sole prerogative of the Municipality. CHAPTER 14 – CORPORATE POWERS The Local Government Code mandates that every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers: (Section 22, LGC). 1. To have continuous succession in its corporate name; 2. To sue and be sued; 3. To have and use a corporate seal; 4. To acquire and convey real or personal property; 5. To enter into contracts; and 6. To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other laws. 1. To have continuous succession in its corporate name  In order to be able to act as a juridical entity and exercise such corporate powers granted to a local government, it must first have a corporate name.  Under the Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may, in consulation with the Philippine Historical Institute, change the name of component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, provided that the same shall be effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected.  A change of name will not dissolve nor destroy the identity of the municipal

corporation, nor affect its rights, privileges or liabilities.  It is prohibited to use the names of living persons except for justifiable reasons.  The term “corporate” signifies that a local government unit has “distinct and separate personality.”  Local government units may only be held liable for acts of its officers only when they acted “by authority” annd “in conformity with the requirements of the law”. Otherwise, the officers will be held personally liable. 2. To sue and be sued  While it is not an inherent power of municipal corporations, this power is vested in the local government units not only by the LGC of 1991, but also in the charters creating them.  This explicit grant of the power to sue and be sued is one form of an express consent on the part of the State to be sued.  Suability vs. Liability  Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law, and the established facts. The fact that the state is suable does not mean that it is liable. It can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.  Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendants is liable.  As a rule, the local government unit sues through its local chief executive and as authorized by the Sanggunian. City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon  The City of Cebu sued through its councilors in a “representative suit” and as “taxpayers”, in order to declare null

and void a contract which was executed by defendant city mayor purportedly in behalf of the city without valid authority and which had been expressly declared by the Auditor-General to be null and void ab initio.  This case is considered peculiar because the local chief executive, the Mayor of Cebu City, could not have represented the local government unit as he was in fact the defendant in that case. FACTS: Respondents Mayor Cuizon and Tropical Commercial Co. entered into a contract involving the purchase of road construction equipment for $520,912.00 cash from Tropical. The City Council of Cebu filed with the CFI a complaint to nullify said contract as having been executed without prior authority from it. Complaint was dismissed for lack of legal capacity. The lower court held that there is no provision of law authorizing the city council to sue in behalf of the city and that the authorized representative under the LGC is the city mayor for that purpose. Hence the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the city councilors have the legal capacity to question the validity of the contract entered into by the mayor. RULING: Yes. Generally, suit is commenced by the local executive, i.e. the mayor, upon authority of the sanggunian, except where the city councilors themselves and as representatives in behalf of the city, bring the action to prevent unlawful disbursement of public funds. Here where the defendant city mayor’s acts and contracts purportedly entered into on behalf of the city are precisely questioned as unlawful, the city mayor would be the last person to file such a suit on behalf of the city, since he precisely maintains the contrary position that

his acts have been lawful and thus duly bind the city. To adhere to the lower court’s interpretation would mean that no action against a city mayor’s acts and contracts in the name and on behalf of the city could ever be questioned and subjected to judicial action for a declaration of nullity and invalidity, since no city mayor would file such an action on to question, much less nullify, contracts executed by him on behalf of the city and which he naturally believes to be valid and within his authority. Hence, the order appealed from is set aside and the lower court is ordered to proceed with the trial and disposition of the case. Ramos v. Court of Appeals  Under the Revised Administrative Code, only provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. It is only when the government lawyer is clearly disqualified to handle the case that the local government unit may hire private lawyers. Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989 Ponente: Regalado, J.: Facts: 1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. 2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city.

Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest NO. 1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building.

Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental  The law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. 3. To have and use a corporate seal  Local government units may continue using. Modifying, or changing their existing corporate seal. It should be registered with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). 4. To acquire and convey real or personal property  The corporate personality of the local government unit allows it to acquire and convey real and personal properties.  A municipal corporation may acquire property in its public or government powers and private or propriety capacity. 4.1 Public and Patrimonial Properties  The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.(Art. 423, NCC)

 Local government units hold properties in their: a. government capacity as for properties for public use; and b. propriety capacity as for properties deemed patrimonial.  Property for public use in the provinces, cities, and municipalities:(art. 424, NCC)  provincial roads  city streets  municipal streets  the squares  fountains  public waters  promenades  public works for public services  All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by the New Civil Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.  If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.  The manner by which it was acquired and the kind of fund used in acquiring the property may serve as guide to identify whether the property is public or matrimonial. Knowing whether the property of the local government unit is held in its governmental or proprietary capacity is important in the following areas of concern: g) Property for public use is under the control of Congress because the lgu in this instance is merely a political agent of the State/Natioanal Government. h) Property for public use cannot be the subject of a contract as it is beyond the commerce of man.

i) Public property cannot be acquired by prescription against the state. j) Public property cannot be the subject of attachment and execution. k) Public property cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga (conflict between special law and NCC, former prevails) properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation Art. 424 NCC: ...All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case Rabuco v. Villegas Facts: The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of the City of Manila contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate area into disposable and alienable lands of the state and placing its administration and disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into lots and selling it to bona fide occupants thereof in installments constitutes a deprivation of the City of Manila of its property by providing for

its sale without the payment of just compensation. Issue: Whether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed without paying just compensation to the City of Manila? Held: The court held that the assailed RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in question are owned by the City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it which cannot be deprived from the City without just compensation and without due process. RA 3120 expressly provides that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. It has been an established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to classify its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on such power of the state. Villanueva v. Castaneda (Very important case guys) Facts: municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the subject property within the vicinity of the public market. CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of stalls. While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution No. 29 which declared the subject area as a parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the subject land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man. The preliminary injunction was made permanent.

Petitioners argued that they had right to occupy the area by virtue of lease contracts entered into with the municipal government, and later, by virtue of space allocations made in their favor for which they paid daily fees. The municipality denied that they entered into said agreements. It argued that even if the leases were valid, the same could be terminated at will because rent was collected daily. ISSUE: Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property. HELD: No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Dacanay v. Asistio ISSUE May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission? HELD: NO 1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract

2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve such as for traveling 3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is going to be contrary to the general law Viuda de tantoco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo(very important too)  NOTE: properties for public use held in municipal corps. Are not subject to levy and execution FACTSThe widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the two strips of land which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots. ISSUE Whether the Municipal properties can be executed in lieu of the unsatisfied obligation? HELD No, property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable. The rule is that property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves landing places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses, public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation. Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois

Issue: May the fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay or its usufruct may be levied upon and subject to execution? How about the revenue or income derived from the renting of these fishery lots? Held: No, properties for public use held by municipal corporation are not subject to levy and execution. The reason= held in trust for the people. HOWEVER, revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. These are profitable, it is a sort of sideline, so that even without it the municipality may still continue functioning and perform its essential duties as such municipal corporations. City of Angeles vs CA ISSUE Whether a subdivision owner/developer is legally bound under Presidential Decree No. 1216 to donate to the city or municipality the “open space” allocated exclusively for parks, playground and recreational use HELD: YES. it is no longer optional on the part of the subdivision owner/developer to donate the open space for parks and playgrounds; rather there is now a legal obligation to donate the same. These are non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable. No portion of the parks andplay grounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or purposes. PD 1216: open space- an area reserved exclusively for parks,playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities 4. 2. Submerged Lands, foreshore lands, and reclaimed lands  Generally: they belong to the state’s inalienable natural resources.

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Exception: after being reclaimed, in accordance with the law, they cease to be public properties and may be disposed as patrimonial properties. QUESTION:Who may acquire such lands after being reclaimed?

Chavez vs PEA and Amari Coastal Bay dev. Corp. (Amari case)- important case (take note of the comparison of this case to the Ponce case (Ponce et. al. Vs City of Cebu et. al) Amari case

Ponce Case

ISSUE: WON private corp. (Amari) can lawfully acquire submerged and reclaimed submerged lands in Manila bay? HELD: Submerged lands, like waters (sea or bay) above them are inalienable. This is also true to FORESHORE lands. Any sale of submerged or forshore lands is void being contrary to the constitution. --Here, the bulk of lands subject of the ammended joint venture agreement (JVA) are STILL SUBMERGED lands, therefore unalienable. --According to the JVA, PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation.

Admit that submerged lands still belong to the national gov. And inalienable except agricultural lands (sec 2, art. XII constitution) --Cebu city ordinance merely granted Essel Inc. An “irrevocable option to purchase the forshore lands AFTER reclamation, it did not actually sell the still to be reclaimed foreshore lands. --Option to purchase referred to RECLAIMED lands, not foreshore lands which are inalienable. --Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or submereged and may qualify as alienable public agricultural lands.

Illegal- There is an immediate transfer to the joint venture. Amari’s right to own the submerged land is IMMEDIATELY effective upon approval of the ammended JVA,

legal-ONLY an irrevocable option to purchase of foreshore lands once actually reclaimed

not merely an option to be exercised in the future if reclamation is actually realized.

Same Amari case: Court reiterated the need for PUBLIC BIDDING (sec. 379, LGC 1991)  Who will reclassify the land? DENR Constitutional Ban on acquisition of alienable pub. Lands and pub. Corp; Enduser government agency doctrine 

LGU is a pub. Corp. And is qualified under the constitution to hold alienable or even inalienable lands of public domain.

PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs CA - The Iloilo Fishing [P]ort [Complex/IFPC] constructed by the State for public use and/or public service falls within the term “port” in the aforecited provision which can’t be subject for execution/sale. Whether there are improvements in the fishing port complex that should not be construed to be embraced within the term ‘port’. Any doubt on whether the entire IFPC may be levied upon to satisfy the tax delinquency should be resolved against the City of Iloilo. The NFPC cannot be sold at public auction in satisfaction of the tax delinquency. The land on which the NFPC property sits is a reclaimed land, which belongs to the State. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court declared that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public or private.

5. To enter into contracts  can enter into contracts  must be respected by congress thus any obligations arising out of municipal contracts CANNOT be impaired by congress.

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HOW? Local chief executive + sangunian’s approval + posting SECTION 22, LGC ▪ unless otherwise provided by this code, NO contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of LGU without prior authorization of the SANGGUNIAN concerned. ▪ Legible copy of such must be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol, city of brgy. Hall.

5.1 Requisites for valid LGU contract -conditions for a local chief executive may enter into a contract in behalf of LGU: PSPACFPG (Papa is SuPer ACtive For the President’sGovernor) A) LGU must have the POWER to enter into the particular contract (note: LGU’s cannot enter into contracts on extracting natural resources, it is the national government); B) Prior authorization by the SANGGUNIAN concerned and legible copy of such must be POSTED at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol, city of brgy. Hall.(sec. 22c, LGC); C) If contract involves expenditure of public funds there should be ACTUAL APPROPRIATION and CERTIFICATE OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS by the treasurer of LGU (Secs. 46 and 47, chapter subtitle B, Book V, 1987 admin, code);

D) Conform with FORMAL requisites of written contracts prescribed by law; E) If province is a party conveying real property, it must be approved by the PRESIDENT (sec 2068 revised admin code). If a municipality is a party conveying real property or any interest or creating lien, must be approved by GOVERNOR (sec 2196 revised admin code).

Note: statutes requiring pub. Bidding apply to contracts already executed in compliance with law if such amendments ALTER orig cont.

5.2 Prior authorization by Sanggunian QUISUMBING, et al. vs GARCIA, et al. (very important case) Facts: COA conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu and found out that several contracts were not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 221 of R.A. No. 7160. Gov Garcia sought reconsideration of this findings. However, without waiting for its resolution, filed an action for declaratory relief with the RTC. Gov claimed that the no prior authorization is required because the expenditures incurred are already authorized by the appropriation ordinances of the previous year which are deemed re-enacted. RTC ruled that no prior authorization is required. HELD:

and void. -Cannot be ratified. B and D requisites

-Defective BUT can be ratified expressly or impliedly

-DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL will not apply to void contracts when LGU already received benefits because it will only validate the void contract. -DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED MUNICIPAL LIABILITY apply to transactions without contracts BUT could have been valid had one been entered to to the extent of the benefit received. Vergara vs Ombudsman: (important case) FACTS: The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara, entered into the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).

1. Reenacted- ONLY for salary and wages 2. Not reenacted- appropriation ordinance describing new projects in generic terms such as infrastructure, inter municipal water works, drainage etc. It NEEDS sanggunian’s approval.

The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council. Petitioner, however, alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on Audit.

5.3 EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE of the Requisites

Respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact Resolution No. 280.

Question (note: this might come out sa exam) :



Distinguish Ratification from Authorization. Ratification (after) presumes that there is already an authorization (before). 

Effects: (refer to 5.1 Requisites for valid LGU contract)

Entered without compliance with: A and C requisites

Effect/Ratification

-Ultra Vires (acting or done beyond one's legal power or authority) and null

ISSUE: Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the ratification by the City Council of Calamba. HELD: Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not

ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No. 280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots. ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots.

Power to Negotiate and Secure Grants SECTION 23, LCG GENERAL RULE: Local executive may, upon AUTHORITY of sanggunian negotiate and secure financial grants and donations in kind, in support of services and facilities given in sec. 17, LGC from local and foreign assistance agencies WITHOUT necessity of securing clearance or approval from any department, agency, or office of the national government or from any higher LGU. EXCEPTION: projects finance by such grants or assistance with national security implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned PROVIDED that when national agency FAILS to act on request for approval within 30 days from receipt, it is deemed approved. Local chief executive, within 30 days upon signing of such grant agreement of deed of donation, report the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both houses of congress and the President.

CHAPTER 15: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES Liability for Defective public works  Article 2189, NCC “Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and

other public works under their control and supervision. ◦ requires only CONTROL and SUPERVISION for liability to arise regardless of ownership. ◦ Specific on defects on road...etc. 

Art. 471, rules and Regulations Implementing LGC “ extent of liability shall be governed by the provisions of the civil code on quasi delict”.

Cases (okay, here comes the manholes :) Jimenez vs City of Manila A victim fell in an uncovered opening in a public market managed by Asiatic Integrated corp. Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for... any cause attributable to it. However Article 2189 of the Civil Code which governs liability due to "defective streets,... public buildings and other public works" requires only that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. There is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former. In fact it employed a market master to take direct supervision and control to check the safety of the place. Guilatco vs City of Dagupan Facts: Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when she accidentally fell into an open manhole resulting in her hospitalization

and continuing difficulty in locomotion. City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. ISSUE: Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco. HELD: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. Here, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers.

Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila Vs. CA Municipal liability for injuries caused by failure to regulate drilling and excavation attaches weather it be in a national or municipal road so long as it is within the latter’s jurisdiction. LIABILITY for Torts If LGU is engaged in governmental functions, it is not liable for such damages but if it is engaged in proprietary functions, it is liable. Cases: Municipality of San Fernando La Union vs Firme this case was decided on Feb. 1989 when LGC was not yet effective (take note of the difference of this case to the case of Sps. Jayme vs Apostol) The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions

and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. NOTE HOWEVER that under section 24, LGC, LGU and their official are liable are NOT EXEMPT from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property Sps. Jayme vs Apostol Liability of LGU under art. 2180 of the NCC is clear that the obligation imposed in 2176 is demandable not only for ones acts and omissions but also for those whom he is responsible. Torio vs Funtanilla Municipal council of Malasiqui ordered the construction of wooden stage for the town fiesta however it collapsed causing serious physical injuries to the participants. Held: Municipality is liable for holding a fiesta is a proprietary function not for general welfare. The councilors were however absolved for they can be likened to members of the board of directors in private corp. having a distinct personality since celebration of fiesta is not a government function. They are not liable for damages for negligence of an agent and the employees of government unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross negligence. City of Manila vs IAC in the absence of special law, North cemetery is a patrimonial property of the city of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery were under the city health officer and the order and police of the cemetery, opening graves etc. were under the superintendent of the cemetery. City is therefore liable for the tortuous acts of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior. Liability for Contracts: 

LGU’s 2 fold power:

1. public, governmental or political▪

▪

administering power of the state and promoting public welfare including: legislative, judicial, public and political functions.

2. corporate, private and proprietary▪

for special benefit and advantage of the community.

▪

Including: ministerial, private and corporate

1. Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability 

 

municipality may be obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has general power to contract. Apply to all cases where money and property is receive under general law principles rests on the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in unlawful contract but arises from considerations outside it.

Province of Cebu vs IAC by reaping benefits out of the contract, city of Cebu is estopped from questioning its validity 2. Doctrine of Estoppel, not applicable to VOID contracts limitation of no. 1. It cannot be applied to mun. corp. to validate a contract which corp. has no power to make or which it is not authorized to do so. -Otherwise, it will allow the Mun. to do acts indirectly what it cannot do directly. (San Diego vs Mun. of Naujan) Liability for Illegal Dismissal of Employees -an illegally dismissed employee who is later reinstated is entitled to back wages and other

monetary benefits at the time of dismissal to reinstatement. BUT who will be liable? The LGU or the officer who effected it? 1. Municipal liability Municipality of Jasaan vs Gentallan permanent appointee to the position, Gentallan is entitled to security of tenure and benefits. So who should be liable for damages? Since no finding of malice or bad faith which attended illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers, latter can’t be accountable for back salaries so municipal government was ordered to disburse funds to answer to such. HOWEVER, if the LGU approved or permitted the illegal act of the officials in removing its employees, it may be held jointly and severally with the pub. Official (Laganapan vs Asedillo). 2. Enforcement of Monetary Judgment 2.1. remedy- levy on patrimonial property of the government (Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois) 2.2. But is the LGU do not have patrimonial properties- Remedy file petition for mandamus to compel it to pay to satisfy judgment (Mun of Makati vs CA) 2.3. file money claim with Comm. Of Audit (COA) --- HOWEVER, the money of LGU in the bank CANNOT be GARNISHED if it came from PUBLIC FUNDS. Such is exempted (Mun. of Makati vs CA)

3. Personal Liability of Officials General rule: they can be held liable for acts claimed to be in connection to their official duty where they acted ultra vires or there is bad faith (Chavez vs SB) Rama vs CA gov, v-gov, members of sanggunian, prov. Auditor, treasurer and engineer- solidarily liable for damages to some 200 employees of prov. Of Cebu who were eased out because of party affiliations. Correa vs CFI Bulacan

Gen: LGU is liable for the acts of its officers acting within the scope of their authority Exception: a pub. Officer who commits tort or act in excess of beyond his scope of duty is not protected by his office and is like to a private individual. In JONES vs LOVING- However, legislative officers are not personally liable for the adoption of ordinances. They are exempt for passing such within their authority, nor their motives be inquired.

Chapter 16: Elective Officials I. Qualifications a. For LGU Officials (sec. 39, LGC) 1.) Citizen of the Philippines  Need not be a natural born citizen at the time of the election  Naturalized officials are allowed to run provided they surrender their other citizenship 2. Registered Voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province (For a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlunsod or bayan- the District where he intends to be elected) 3.) Resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceeding the day of the election 4.) Able to Read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect b. For Gov, VG/Member of the s. panlalawigan/Mayor or VM for s. panlungod 5.) At least 23 years of age on election day c. For M or VM of independent component cities/municipalities 6.) At least 21 years of age on ED d. For members of the s. panlungsod/s.bayan 7.) At least 18 years on ED e. For Punong Barangay/ member of s. barangay 8.) At least 18 years on ED

f. For S. Kabataan 9.) at least 15 y/o but not more than 21 (or 24) on ED Frivaldo v COMELEC “Philippines citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of such qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.”  Definition for “at the time of election” = on the day of the proclamation  It is immaterial WON you were not a Filipino during the filing of the candidacy, but what matters is that you are a Filipino at the time of election  Therefore, Frivaldo is not considered as a Filipino citizen because although he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the PH that he had renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be posessesd not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC Residence- one’s permanent or temporary place of abode Domicile- the fixed place of abode where one has an intention on returning  A person can only have a single domicile, unless for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice  Rationale for the requirement: To give the candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituents

Ruling: Therefore, Imelda was qualified to run for the reason that Leyte is her domicile even tho she claims to have more than 1 residence Torayno v COMELEC 3 Classifications of Domicile (BLC) 1. Domicile by Birth 2. Domicile by Law 3. Domicile by Choice Ruling: residence is required because electives are needed to be familiar with the issues surrounding that specific place. Thus, Emano was allowed to run, satisfying the 1 year requirement for having an ancestral home in CDO. II. Disqualifications LGC. Sec. 40 1. Those sentenced by Final Judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment  Moral Turpitude- everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals.  Moreno v COMELEC When an officer is under probation (for the commission of a crime), it does not mean that he is disqualified from office because probation suspends his sentence. Furthermore, probation will restore all civil rights lost because of conviction  Therefore, Moreno’s probation granted him the right to run for public office because Probation law provides that the final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his convuction and to fully discharge his liability for

any fine imposed as to the offense 2. Those removed from office as a result for an Administrative case 3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the Oath of allegiance to the republic 4. Those with Dual citizenship  Rule: Dual Citizenship is not a ground for disqualification, HOWEVER, dual allegiance is.  Mercado v Manzano Dual Citizenship- a person is considered to be a national of a country because of an involuntary decision Dual Allegiance- it is the voluntary decision to be a national of a country 5. Fugitives from justice in a criminal or nonpolitical case here or abroad  Marquez v COMELEC “Fugitive from justice” refers to: - a person fleeing from conviction to avoid punishment, or; - a person, who after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution 6. Permanent residents in a foreign country of those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right  Acquistion of residence abroad = positive act of abandonment  Caasi v COMELEC Rule: any person who is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office UNLESS the person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.  Although the LGC does not mention the word “immigrant”, it is understood to mean a permanent resident in foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad

 Rationale: the law reserves the privilege for its citizens who have cast their loyalty to the republic without mental reservation 7. The Insane of feeble-minded

Chp. 17: Disciplinary Actions of Public Officials I. Sources 1. Local Government Code of 1991 2. RA 3019 3. Code of Ethics 4. Revised Penal Code 5. 1987 Constitution 6. The Ombudsman Law 7. The Sandiganbayan Law 8. Plunder Law II. Grounds for Disciplinary Action (DOA-DOA-CU) 1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the PH 2. Comission of an Offense involving moral turpitude or of an offense punishable by at least prision mayor 3. Abuse of authority 4. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence or dereliction of duty 5. Other grounds provided by law 6. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or resident or immigrant status 7. Culpable violation of the constitution 8. Unauthorized absence for 15 consective working days, EXCEPT in the case of members of the sangguniang Ombudsman v Rodriguez Ruling: Elective officials can only be removed by the courts because the court, being an unelected entity, is free from any political intervention. The Local Government Code is the basis, and the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction Pablico v Villapardo Ruling: the sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to prosecute erring local elective officers III. Preventive Suspension Objective: (PA)

1. To Prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence 2. To Assist prosecutors in firming up a case against erring local officials. Imposed by: (PGM)  The President- if the respondent is an elective of a province, highly urbanized or an independent component city  The Governor- if respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality  The Mayor- if the respondent is an elective offial of the barangay Requisites of Preventive Suspension: Joson III v CA  After the issues are joined (when the complaint has been answered and there are no longer any substantial preliminary issues)  When the evidence of guilt is strong  Great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witness or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidences Rule: PS shall not extend beyond 60 days Rule: PS shall not extend beyond 90 days within a single year on the same ground if several administrative cases are filed against an erring local official Rule: The respondent official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension

Except: he shall be paid full salary or compensation upon exoneration and reinstatement IV. Penalty: Effects 1. The investigation of the case shall be terminated within 90 days from the start thereof. Within 30 days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or the sangguniang concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be furnished to the respondent and all interested parties. 2. The penalty of suspension shall not eceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of 6 months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualification required for the office. 3. The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position. V. Administrative Appeals Decisions in administrative cases may, within 30 days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the ff: 1. The S. Panlalawigan- of decisions from the S. Panlulungod of component cities and S. Bayan 2. Office of the Pres- of decisions from the S. Panlalawigan and Panlungod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. Decisions from the Office of the President shall be final and executory Rule: an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. VI. The Aguinaldo Doctrine

A public official cannot be removed for administrative conduct committed during a prior term. Rationale: a candidate’s re-election signifies a condonation of the offenses committed during his prior term because the public now knows of his character and life, hence the reason why they elected him. Carpio-Morales v CA & Binay Overturned the Aguinaldo Doctrine for the reason that the same has no legal basis; election is not a mode of condoming administrative offenses. The decision was based from the Pascual Doctrine (US Jurisprudence) VII. Removal of Local Elective The office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts.