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CONSTI cases 1. *Article 8, Section 1 Ilustrative Cases 

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 l. ed. 60 (1803)

Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against President Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the Congress. Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission. Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,”� mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court. Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of

constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the federal government. 

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142. March 31, 1973

FACTS: On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable. 2.Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. 3.Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people. 4.Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief. 5.Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force. HELD: First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we

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Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution. Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive

Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite. Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. 

Lagman vs Medialdea G.R. No. 231658/G.R. No. 231771/G.R. No. 231774. July 4, 2017

FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued

Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25, 2017, submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City; established several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic repercussions once it falls under the control of the lawless groups. After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation 216. The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial law. ISSUES: [1] W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court; [2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts? B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported? [3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately; [4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters for review? B. Who has the burden of proof? C. What is the threshold of evidence? [5] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief? [6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void: a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region; [7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region; [8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus; and [9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region. RULING: 1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court. 2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require him otherwise would impede the process of his decisionmaking. b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only on the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President. 3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. 4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;

and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. 5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. 6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other rebel groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses. b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke. 7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed. Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but

likewise against civilians and their properties. There were bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of civilians, forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of medical services and delivery of basic services, reinforcement of government troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55. The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose. b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional. *** Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

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The Trillanes amnesty controversy – see links sent by email

In issuing Proclamation No. 572, the President revoked the amnesty granted to Senator Sonny Trillanes for being void ab initio on the ground that he did not comply with the "minimum requirements to qualify under the amnesty proclamation." The Proclamation cited a certification from the Armed Forces of the Philippines' Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel that there is no available copy of Trillanes' application for amnesty, and that he refused to admit his guilt. Much like Sereno who was booted out of office after her appointment was declared void ab initio, Trillanes now finds himself under threat of arrest after his amnesty proclamation is being revoked for the same reason.

A patent illegality

The revocation of the Trillanes amnesty is illegal. Without any doubt, Proclamation 572 is a patent illegality, if not outright unconstitutional. It is riddled with legal loopholes to such an extent that it gives the unmistakable impression that it has been dished out for no other reason than to silence a staunch and implacable critic of the President. Proclamation 75, under which Senator Trillanes applied for amnesty in connection with his involvement in the Oakwood mutiny, was processed by the military, approved by then president Benigno Aquino III, and concurred in by Congress. Unlike pardon, amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which Trillanes was charged that he, being released by amnesty, stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. There is no question that Trillanes is a grantee of a valid amnesty proclamation, as such his criminal liability was fully extinguished. Contrary to the President’s statement that Trillanes did not submit an application and a copy of which cannot be found in the Requirement Room, there is ample evidence that this application was in fact submitted. Abigail Valte, a spokesperson of former President Aquino, in fact shared on Twitter a photo of Trillanes' amnesty application and a video of the document's filing. Even assuming that a copy of the application could not be found, can the presumption of regularity at least be held in favor of the officials who issued, processed, and had custody of his amnesty application? Same goes with Trillanes’ admission of guilt which, prior to the issuance of Proclamation 572, had never been questioned nor put under scrutiny by the previous administrations. The Proclamation tethers as an ex post facto law for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon Trillanes for an act done prior to its issuance when before the eyes of the law, he has not committed any crime. It is akin to a bill of attainder which singles out the opposition senator for punishment without trial. Both are proscribed under the Constitution and have no place in a democratic and civilized society. It should also be noted that an amnesty is not a unilateral act by the President. Granting it required congressional concurrence. This is to make sure the whole government, indeed the country, is bound that decision. It cannot be undone by the presidential fiat.

Other Stories

DOCUMENT: Proclamation No. 572 voiding Trillanes' amnesty Here's a copy of President Rodrigo Duterte's Proclamation No 572 voiding amnesty granted to Senator Antonio Trillanes IV and ordering the military and police to apprehend him

U.N. council expected to hold urgent meeting on Golan Syria has requested the meeting in a March 26 letter sent to France, which holds the council presidency for the month of March

Human rights in Hong Kong 'deteriorating severely' – Amnesty 'The concept of 'national security' as used by Hong Kong government...is arbitrarily applied to suppress dissent and political opposition,' the Amnesty International report says That the President is ordering the immediate arrest of Trillanes, a civilian, is another reason to declare the Proclamation illegal. We all know that a warrant to arrest an individual can only be issued by the courts. The President is but the chief implementor or executive and is not vested under the Constitution with judicial powers. Hence, he cannot simply order the arrest of an individual whimsically, without a judicial fiat. The courts on the other hand cannot issue an arrest warrant for cases that have already been dismissed by virtue of the amnesty.

An unwise policy The revocation of the Trillanes amnesty is not right for the country long-term. Indeed, policy-wise, the revocation of any amnesty is disastrous for a country riven by social conflicts. Time and again, political amnesties have been resorted to as a means of healing social and national strife. In the Philippine-American war, as the hostilities wound down, amnesty was resorted to so that everyone would have an option to come down from the hills. After World War II, even as it was controversial, amnesty was offered even to collaborators with the Japanese so the country could move

on. In the 1960s and 1970s, and even during the Martial Law era, amnesties were resorted to bring the Huks, Moro rebels, and other groups back to the fold of the law. More recently, members of the Moro National Liberation Front, the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army, several left-wing groups independent of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and military rebels were granted amnesty. In the future, amnesty has to be granted to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as well as the cadres and combatants of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People’s Army, and National Democratic Front of the Philippines if a permanent peace settlement is achieved with the latter groups. As far as I know, there has never been an instance when amnesty given by one president has been revoked by a subsequent president. If this becomes a rule, future presidents would have lost an important tool for national healing and unity. Who would trust any president who makes promises to rebel groups if his or her successor could at a whim revoke an amnesty?

Immoral and unjust The revocation of the Trillanes amnesty is evil. It is immoral and unjust because it is done for a personal reason, for partisan political motives, and not for the good of the country. Most of President Duterte’s most vociferous critics have been silenced or are in danger of being silenced. First on the chopping block was Senator Leila de Lima who had the misfortune of initiating an investigation against then mayor Duterte for supposed human rights violations when she was still the head of the Commission on Human Rights. Then the Commission on Human Rights itself was attacked when it questioned the President’s prosecution of the war on drugs, the administration’s centerpiece campaign. His allies in Congress made an attempt to emasculate the constitutional body with a paltry P1,000-budget. Fortunately, this attempt proved too blatant even for administration allies. Then came former chief justice Maria Lourdes Sereno who had to go after she was ousted under dubious circumstances by her own colleagues via a quo warranto conviction.

Vice President Leni Robredo’s position is also under threat because of a pending electoral protest before the Supreme Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Of course, we all have been witness to the verbal attacks made by no less than Duterte against the Catholic Church, the President’s favorite whipping boy, which remains an influential institution in the country. So, it is no small wonder that Senator Trillanes, President Duterte’s nemesis, would be targeted next. If at all, it is a cause of wonderment why it took this government so long, more than two years, to make its move. It may be because the senator proved to be the hardest nut to crack of all the lot. Considering all the recent actions being undertaken by this administration to stifle any and all opposition and critics, coupled with the President’s chilling pronouncements giving preference to a dictatorship or a military junta over the Vice President, as the mandated Constitutional successor, one cannot help but entertain the thought that we are inexorably sliding towards an extraconstitutional regime.

Is a repeat of the Marcos dictatorial regime in the offing? After Trillanes, who’s next? The prospects are simply too chilling to contemplate. – Rappler.com