Pragmatism

Pragmatism Written by: critical (on Scribd.com) April 96 A philosophy is to be taken as pragmatist if it follows three central doctrines. Firstly, the rejection of foundationalism. Secondly, recognition of the role of human cognition as an important survival tool in the propagation of humanity.

Thirdly,

cognitive success should be seen in terms of a distinctly technological praxis. In rejecting the universality imposed on the world by a foundationalist view, historicism is embraced as a doctrine of important revelation in the absence of foundationalist doctrines.

Realism and idealism are rejected as independent

alternatives to one another and as meaningful paradigms of cognitive opposition. The tacit condition that human cognitive powers are sufficient conditions for the survival of the species.

That these powers of thought including the various conceptual

frameworks we may devise (and have devised) are sufficiently based in the reality of the world to provide survival conditions in the face of sustained adherence to them. The framework of social interaction with the world has a continuous and instrumental relation to our ability to survive and is a necessary condition to our survival in the world. That our cognitive powers as a species do interact favourably with the world and this social-technological praxis is indeed an assurance of survival (through the device of being sufficiently based in reality).

An adequate account of the objects of inquiry of the world is not by any means guaranteed by a competition between competing theoretical accounts of the world. Our cognitive abilities to survive apparently do not require the survival of the fittest ideas merely the survival of the fittest overall cognitive abilities as a species. As for a certain or absolutely correct account of the things of the world relativism appears to be the most precise adjudication between competing ideas -- a relativism that

accepts that competing ontologies may well both have similar claims on reality. The correspondence theory of truth as well as dualist representations of good and bad are rejected, and further, are considered to be the source of the false paradigm that incompatible ontologies must be a perseverance of the good over the bad (evil). The foci for modern philosophy as Margolis sees them are also amazingly very well suited to the rest of what he has said in his paper. 1. Our interactive praxis with the world is inescapably (fated to be) technological. 2. Non-empirical discoveries or cognitive journeys are in fact a form of, or are closely related to (evolutionarily speaking), empirical discovery.

Naturally these two sentences are immensely

complementary perhaps even fundamentally circular bliss in a variety of ways -- the majority of which have already been covered. The second foci entails a very similar conceptualization to Heidegger's priorities of Dasein. The uniqueness of humans as users of language who can thereby be the sole agents of discovery of the realm of knowledge and ontology. Thus not only allowing for humanity to be a great inquirer in a world with no competition but also relieving any worries that technology might be its sole means of interface with the world. For the first foci of this paragraph it is asserted that the transcendental nature of humanities grasp on technology is evidence that it has positive confirmation that reality is just as it envisions, most especially to the degree that humanity has interventionist control over the world (nature). Thus the power over something is considered proof positive that the empowered one also has explicit understanding of and through that power. The second element of the first foci asserts that our fundamental humanity as embodied by empirical questions is not eclipsed by our transcendentality nor by the increasingly technological nature of our interaction with the world -- there is nothing to fear. Not only is our technological state of existence inescapable but it is also not inescapably fearful -- there is no need to attempt to escape from our destiny of technological progress. Our social and

cognitive evolution will inexonerably continue toward increasing technology, toward more control over nature.

Thus combining the optimism of Marx's dialectic-

materialism with the optimism of Heidegger's historicity and aletheia with very little of the pessimism of either (too little survival value in pessimism).

The key to the recovery of transcendental reflection lies, not surprisingly, with social praxis and of course the inescapable technological praxis.

Thus

transcendental questions will take the traditional forms, but without the skeptical perspective interfering with all the fun. These transcendental questions will be the voice of the society not of singular voices. And in the end these transcendental collectives will become tools to modify our social praxis. Transcendental "inferences" will become occupied with the conditions that provide for a singular system world. A world system that allows differing theories that are not too radically opposed to be comparable while precluding the possibility of having multiple possible worlds that can not have even an inkling of understanding among them.