Practice Court Additional Cases For Midterms.docx

G.R. No. 171855

October 15, 2012

FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F. APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR AP AREJADO,Petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.

On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a Resolution3 recommending the filing of an Information for Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with multiple murder in an Information4 dated February 15, 2005, which reads: The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses SSGT Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu. CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom, stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division, Philippine Army, Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate, committed as follows:

DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners Fe Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie Aparejado, · as represented by Edgar Aparejado, seeking to set aside the Orders dated December 6, 20051 and January 11, 2006,2 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 11846. The antecedents are as follows: Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate.

That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of their superior strength as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their government issued firearms, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths. CONTRARY TO LAW. Masbate City, February 15, 2005.

Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and Edwin Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents. Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, they received information about the presence of armed elements reputed to be New People’s Army (NPA) partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the information, they coordinated with the Philippine National Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat, they encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense firefight. When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons, namely: Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova were found sprawled on the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states that a legitimate military operation was conducted and in the course of which, the victims, armed with high-powered firearms, engaged in a shoot-out with the military. On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was no encounter that ensued and that the victims were summarily executed in cold blood by respondents. Hence, they requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the case. After investigation, the NBI recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate City that a preliminary investigation be conducted against respondents for the crime of multiple murder. In reaching its recommendation, the NBI relied on the statements of witnesses who claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians.

On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 47, but before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus Motion6 dated July 20, 2005, with the trial court seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court denied the motion filed by the JAGO on the ground that respondents have not been arrested. The JAGO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,8and in an Order9 dated December 6, 2005, the trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of the case were turned over to the Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate action. Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was denied by the trial court in an Order11 dated January 11, 2006. Hence, the present petition with the following arguments: I HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COURT MARTIAL, AS THE SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND IN LAW, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.

II IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS IN JURISDICTION IF NOT GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ON THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD ONLY BE REVIEWED THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT YET ON THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.12 Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil courts by Republic Act No. 7055 (RA 7055).13 On the other hand, the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that the acts complained of are service connected and falls within the jurisdiction of the military court. The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which actually falls within its jurisdiction. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.14 As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.15 In the case at bar, the information states that respondents, "conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of their superior strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths." 16 Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.17 Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law. Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has jurisdiction over the case at bar because the crime charged was a service-connected offense allegedly committed by members of the AFP. To support their position, respondents cite the senate deliberations on R.A. 7055. Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani to define a service-connected offense as those committed by military personnel pursuant to the lawful order of their superior officer or within the context of a valid military exercise or mission.18 Respondents maintain that the foregoing definition is deemed part of the statute.1âwphi1

However, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate that the proposed definition was not included as part of the statute. The proposed definition made by Senator Shahani was not adopted due to the amendment made by Senator Wigberto E. Tañada, to wit: Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED. This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these servicerelated or connected offenses or crimes would be. (Emphasis supplied.) The President. What will happen to the definition of "serviceconnected offense" already put forward by Senator Shahani? Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of War. SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I will suspend the session for a minute, if there is no objection. There was none. It was 5:02 p.m. RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed. The President. The session is resumed. Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment, subject to refinement and style. The President. Is there any objection? Silence There being none, the amendment is approved.19 In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized: Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by persons subject to military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-related or connected. And we specified which would be considered service-related or connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.20 (Emphasis supplied.) The said amendment was later on reflected in the final version of the statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1. Section 1 of R.A. 7055 reads in full:

Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is serviceconnected, in which case the offense shall be tried by courtmartial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Articles 72 to 92 Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. (Emphasis supplied) The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as amended,21 to wit:

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender. Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 56. False Muster.

Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition.

Art. 57. False Returns. Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion. Art. 59. Desertion. Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert. Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter. Art. 62. Absence Without Leave. Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers. Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court. Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer. Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. Art. 92. Dueling. Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.

Art. 97 General Article.

In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of "service-connected offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.22 Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.1âwphi1 WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 47, dated December 6, 2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively, in Criminal Case No. 11846 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate City, is DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal Case No. 11846 to its docket and conduct further proceedings thereon with utmost dispatch in light of the foregoing disquisition. SO ORDERED. DIOSDADO Associate Justice

M.

PERALTA

WE CONCUR: PRESBITERO Associate Chairperson

J.

VELASCO,

TERESITA J. LEONARDOROBERTO A. DE CASTRO* Associate Justice Associate Justice JOSE Associate Justice

CATRAL

JR. Justice

ABAD

MENDOZA

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of tile Court's Division. PRESBITERO J. Associate Chairperson, Third Division

VELASCO,

JR. Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES Chief Justice

P.

A.

SERENO

G.R. No. L-21450

April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant. F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees. Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio. Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc. DIZON, J.: On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month. After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs. After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors: I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding companyappellant. III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution. Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows: It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in

which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.) We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision. There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñët ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court. It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almostfifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific

obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170). Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court, as follows:1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

SO ORDERED.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:

On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.

In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60). Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.

As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.

Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines. (Sgd.) Judge

JOSE

(Record on 64-65, emphasis ours)

M.

Appeal,

MENDOZA

pp.

Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.

On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958. From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 — denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively — the surety has interposed the appeal on hand. The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads; "Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours) Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is

resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for consideration. In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court. It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto. It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond. UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc. Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 158121

December 12, 2007

HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2 respondents.

3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendant[s] themselves; 4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21 forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings; 5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;

DECISION PUNO, C.J.: On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision3 and resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions 5 and order6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents. The relevant facts are undisputed. Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots. Sr. 7

The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano and his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered: 1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab initio; 2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;

6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.8 On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners, 9 this time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a onehectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered: 1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942; 2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the defenda[n]t herself; 3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.10 In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered: 1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare located as (sic) the western portion of said lots as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;

2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants themselves[;] 3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.11 The three complaints12 commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser. On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.

Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.15 The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration,16 to no avail.17 Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining Order Ex Parte18 with the CA, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19 the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues. Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following issues, viz: FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS. SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION. THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).20

In their memorandum,21 respondents reiterated their arguments in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of action for reconveyance, the same have already been barred by prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the complaints are barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review by this Court. Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22 In their Supplemental Memorandum,23 petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited: a) Raymundo v. CA24which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation; b) Swan v. CA25where it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos v. CA26 where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA27 where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.28 It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties. 29 To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.30 The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.31 An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.32 There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered

owner33 and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.34 The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz: (a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;35 (b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36 (c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37 (d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed38 [their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];39 (e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;40 and (f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.41 These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.42 Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x. In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit: Civil Case

No. Lot No.

Assessed Value

5188

6195

P1,030.00

5433

6196-A

4,500.00

5434

6196-B

4,340.00

7529-A

1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases. Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous. In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of title45 to or to quiet title46 over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148 in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and

second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice." 49 The cases of Raymundo v. CA50 and Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,51 relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94727076 was therefore improperly laid." Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA52 and Santos v. CA53 cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed.54 In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties

as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

17

Order dated May 10, 2000; id. at 305-306.

18

Id. at 307-334.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.

19

Dated November 29, 2002; id. at 7-14.

20

Id. at 36-37.

21

Id. at 568-641.

22

Id. at 703-710.

23

Id. at 722-733.

24

G.R. No. 97805, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 457.

25

G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114.

26

G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162.

27

G.R. No. 125008, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 439.

SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona,

Azcuna,

Footnotes 1

Also referred to as "Lomocso" or "Lumucso" in the records.

2

The Court of Appeals was removed as public respondent pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and our ruling in Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499, 504.

28 3

Promulgated on November 29, 2002; Rollo, pp. 7-14.

4

Promulgated on April 10, 2003; id. at 16.

Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 667, 672, citing Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941). 29

5

Annexes "M," "N" and "O" of the Petition; id. at 281-295.

6

Annex "R" of the Petition; id. at 305-306.

7

Died on May 12, 1999.

8

Rollo, pp. 98-99.

9

Id. at 119-125, 143-149.

Republic v. Sangalang, L-58822, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 515. 30

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla, et al., 106 Phil. 591 (1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941). 31

Rollo, pp. 283, 288, 293.

32

10

Id. at 124.

11

Id. at 148-149.

Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No. 149992, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431, 442. 33

Ponce, D.R. Florencio, The Philippine Torrens System (1965), p. 213.

12

Id. at 93-106 (Civil Case No. 5188), 119-132 (Civil Case No. 5433), 143-158 (Civil Case No. 5434). 13

Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses for the Dismissal of the Complaint and the Instant Case (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 169-189; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 191-210; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 212-231. 14

Opposition to Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 233-248; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 249-264; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 265-280. 15

In its separate Resolutions all dated 1999; id. at 281-285, 286-290, 291-295. 16

Id. at 296-301.

December 9,

34

Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 489, 499, citing Lucena v. CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47. 35

Rollo, pp. 94, 120, 144.

36

Id. at 95, 121, 145.

37

Ibid

38

Id. at 95-96, 121-122, 145-146.

39

Id. at 96, 122, 146.

40

Ibid.

41

Id. at 97, 123, 147.

42

See Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines Vol. II (1992), pp. 148-149. 43

Rollo, pp. 105, 132, 157, 158.

44

Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 421; Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 120435, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 474. 45

Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162, 163; Swan v. CA, G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219. 46

Mendoza v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646, March 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 764, 768; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, supra. 47

Also known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended, which provides that: SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: x x x (b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts; x x x. 48

An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on March 25, 1994. 49

Sponsorship Speech of Senator Biazon, Record of the Senate dated October 6, 1993. 50

Supra Note 24.

51

Supra Note 27.

52

Supra Note 25.

53

Supra Note 26.

54

Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 826; See also Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law, Doctrines Enunciated in Ponencias on Jurisdiction, Procedure and Evidence Including Useful Outlines (2002), p. 218.

G.R. No. L-27033

October 31, 1969

POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant. Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for plaintiff-appellee. Isidro T. Almeda and Mario T. Banzuela for defendantappellant. SANCHEZ, J.: Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of action to recover the purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to defendant.1 Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He claims that by contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not answer the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was rendered against him on September 21, 1966, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the following amounts: First Cause of Action — P60,845.67, with interest thereon at 1% a month from May 9, 1965 until the full amount is paid. Second Cause of Action — P51,952.55, with interest thereon at 1% a month from March 30, 1965 until the full amount is paid. Third Cause of Action — P53,973.07, with interest thereon at 1% a month from July 3, 1965 until the full amount is paid. Fourth Cause of Action — P41,075.22, with interest thereon at 1% a month2 until the full amount is paid. In addition, defendant shall pay plaintiff attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the principal amount due in each cause of action, and the costs of the suit. The amount of P400.00 shall be deducted from the total amount due plaintiff in accordance with this judgment. Defendant appealed. 1. The forefront question is whether or not venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident. Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance — and this is one — provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement — "By written agreement of

the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just quoted. According to defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by written contracts covering the four causes of action, stipulated that: "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila." This agreement is valid.3 Defendant says that because of such covenant he can only be sued in the courts of Manila. We are thus called upon to shake meaning from the terms of the agreement just quoted. But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant's residence. The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes of action. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert Theatrical Co., 151 N.Y.S. 593, 594. And this, became there the stipulation as to venue is along lines similar to the present. Said stipulation reads: "In case of dispute, both contracting parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna courts." And the ruling is: "By the clause in question the parties do not agree to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction of the Viennese court, and to those courts only. There is nothing exclusive in the language used. They do agree to submit to the Viennese jurisdiction, but they say not a word in restriction of the jurisdiction of courts elsewhere; and whatever may be said on the subject of the legality of contracts to submit controversies to courts of certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such agreements should be strictly construed, and should not be extended by implication." Venue here was properly laid. 2. Defendant next challenges the lower court's grant to plaintiff of interest at the rate of one per centum per month. Defendant says that no such stipulation as to right of interest appears in the sales confirmation orders which provided: "TERMS — 60 days after delivery with interest accruing on postdated cheques beyond 30 days." The flaw in this argument lies in that the interest and the rate thereof are expressly covenanted in the covering trust receipts executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff, as follows: "All obligations of the undersigned under this agreement of trust shall bear interest at the rate of one per centum (1%) per month from the date due until paid."

On this score, we find no error. 3. Defendant protests the award of attorneys' fees which totals P51,961.63, i.e., 25% of the total principal indebtedness of P207,846.51 (exclusive of interest). Defendant's thesis is that the foregoing sum is "exorbitant and unconscionable." To be borne in mind is that the attorneys' fees here provided is not, strictly speaking, the attorneys' fees recoverable as between attorney and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the attorneys' fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause.4 It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant.5 The attorneys' fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not counsel, who is the judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by execution.6

Footnotes 1

Civil Case 224-V, entitled "Polytrade Corporation, Plaintiff, versus Victoriano Blanco, Defendant." 2

Interest should start from March 24, 1965. See: Decision, R.A., pp. 38- 39. 3

Navarro vs. Aguila, 66 Phil. 604, 608; Borreros vs. Philippine Engineering Corporation, L-6500, September 16, 1954; Bautista vs. De Borja (1966), 18 SCRA 474, 480, citing Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169. 4

Luneta Motor Company vs. Limgenco, 73 Phil. 80, 81. 5

The governing law then is Article 2227 of the Civil Code, viz.: "Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable." For this reason, we do not really have to strictly view the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees in the light of such factors as the amount and character of the services rendered, the nature and importance of the litigation, and the professional character and the social standing of the attorney. We do concede, however, that these factors may be an aid in the determination of the iniquity or unconscionableness of attorneys' fees as liquidated damages. May the attorneys' fees (P51,961.63) here granted be tagged as iniquitous or unconscionable? Upon the circumstances, our answer is in the negative. Plaintiff's lawyers concededly are of high standing. More important is that this case should not have gone to court. It could have been easily avoided had defendant been faithful in complying with his obligations. It is not denied that the rawhide was converted into leather and sold by defendant. He raises no defense. In fact, he did not even answer the complaint in the lower court, and was thus declared in default. Nor does he deny the principal liability. Add to all these the fact that the writ of attachment issued below upon defendant's properties yielded no more than P400 and the picture is complete. The continued maintenance by defendant of the suit is plainly intended for delay. The attorneys' fees awarded cannot be called iniquitous or unconscionable. In the very recent case of Universal Motors Corporation vs. Dy Hian Tat (1969), 28 SCRA 161, 170, we allowed attorneys' fees in the form of liquidated damages at the rate of 25% of the total amount of the indebtedness. Here, the trial court has already reduced the attorneys' fees from the stipulated 25% "of the total amount involved, principal and interest, then unpaid" to only 25% of the principal amount due. There is no reason why such judgment should be disturbed. FOR THE REASON GIVEN, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, except that interest granted, in reference to the fourth cause of action, should start from March 24, 1965. Costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

6

Government vs. Lim, 61 Phil. 737, 739.

Gan Tion vs. Court of Appeals (1969), 28 SCRA 235, 237.

G.R. Nos. L-27897-98 October 29, 1971 LORENZO IGNACIO and MAGDALENA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN and FELIZARDO LIPANA, respondents. Romerico P. Flores for petitioners. Restituto M. David for respondent F. Lipana.

MAKALINTAL, J.: Petition for certiorari and prohibition in forma pauperis questioning the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan, in an ejectment case against petitioners, which case was subsequently appealed to the Court of First Instance, where it was shown that another case had been filed ahead in the Court of Agrarian Relations wherein petitioners asked that they be declared the lawful tenants of the disputed landholding. Upon motion of petitioners, alleging that private respondent had moved in the Court of First Instance for the execution of its decision affirming an order of the Municipal Court which found them guilty of contempt of court and ordering them to vacate the landholding in question, We ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P200.00. The said landholding consists of two hectares, more or less, included in a larger tract owned by Felizardo Lipana and tenanted by Alipio Marcelo until his death on December 3, 1962. Two cases involving the land were pending in the Court of Agrarian Relations at the time of death, namely: CAR Case No. 750-Bulacan '62, "Alipio Marcelo vs. Felizardo Lipana;" and CAR Case 827-Bulacan '62, entitled "Felizardo Lipana vs. Alipio Marcelo."1 In both cases the deceased was subsequently substituted by Maximo Marcelo and Emilia Tabor Vda. de Marcelo, surviving son and wife, respectively. A third case — CAR Case No. 895 — was filed on December 20, 1962 by Maximo Marcelo against Felizardo Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz (the latter having been the alleged common-law wife of Alipio Marcelo), praying that he, Maximo be declared as entitled to succeed to the tenancy and status of the deceased. One of the allegations of Lipana in his answer to the complaint was that he "signified his intention to recognize as his tenant Magdalena dela Cruz who is the widow of Alipio Marcelo." This is an admission that as far as Lipana was concerned it was Magdalena who had the right to succeed the deceased Alipio as tenant. On July 23, 1963, acting on a motion of Maximo Marcelo to enjoin Magdalena dela Cruz from interfering with his peaceful cultivation of the landholding, as well as an urgent motion of Felizardo Lipana for leave to cultivate the same land, the CAR issued the following order: For this Court to be able to resolve the above prayer a motion intelligently and judiciously, there is necessity for formal hearing to determine the following questions of fact:

(1) Since the demise of the former tenant, Alipio Marcelo who has been and is in actual possession and cultivation of the holding in question? (2) Did the deceased voluntarily surrender the holding to respondent in November 1962? (3) Is Maximo Marcelo the natural son of the late Alipio Marcelo? It appears, however, that these are the factual issues directly involved in CAR Case No. 895-Bulacan '62 where petitioner therein has already presented three (3) witnesses and several exhibits. Respondents have not yet presented any evidence. The cause of action indicated, therefore, is for this Court to withhold action on Maximo Marcelo's prayer for interlocutory order and Felizardo Lipana's urgent motion for leave to cultivate the holding. In the meanwhile, to forestall any untoward incidents and in order not to disturb the productivity of the land, this Court shall undertake the cultivation thereof by administration through an impartial third-party. All the parties in the above-entitled cases shall be restricted from doing any act of cultivation or planting on the land and reaping harvesting or threshing of crops thereon. WHEREFORE, Maximo Marcelo, Emilia Tabol de Marcelo, Magdalena dela Cruz, Felizardo Lipana and/or their agents are directed to desist from performing any act of cultivation or planting on the landholding formerly tenanted by Alipio Marcelo at Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, with a seedling capacity of 30 gantas of palay, or from reaping harvesting or threshing any crops thereon until further orders from this court. Pursuant to: Section 9, Rep. Act No. 1267, as amended, Mr. Severino Madronio, Agricultural Extension Officer, Bureau of Agricultural Extension, Bulacan, is hereby directed to repair to the landholding in question, take possession of the same and undertake the cultivation thereof and/or planting thereon according to his best judgment and to proven farm practices. If the hiring of laborers for the purpose of complying with this Order is called for, the afore-named Agricultural Extension Officer shall give preference of employment to Maximo Marcelo and Magdalena dela Cruz at the prevailing wage for agricultural laborers in the locality but in no case shall the wage be less than P2.50 per day, with no allowance for board and lodging. Thereafter, a compromise agreement in the three CAR cases was entered into by Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana, wherein the former surrendered all his rights over the landholding in favor of the latter. A judgment in accordance with the terms and conditions of said compromise was thereupon rendered by the trial Judge on November 5, 1964, declaring that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 895 and 827 were deemed closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana. On January 27, 1965 the CAR ordered the issuance of writ of execution in the three cases. On the same day another order was issued, discharging the administration of the landholding by the Agricultural Extension Officer. On February 5, 1965 the corresponding writ of execution was issued, commanding the

provincial sheriff of Bulacan to place Felizardo Lipana in possession; and on the following February 25 the provincial sheriff submitted to the court his return of service. On July 15, 1965 Magdalena dela Cruz filed a complaint against Lipana (Case No. 1221), asking the CAR to declare her the lawful tenant of the landholding, to fix the annual, rentals thereof during the past three years and to award damages in her favor by way of attorney's fees and consequential expenses. In her complaint she alleged the Alipio Marcelo, the former tenant, surrendered the landholding to Lipana on November 21, 1962, where upon she succeeded as such tenant upon agreement with the latter that on November 13, 1964 the CAR issued an order stating that the dismissal of CAR Case No. 895 was without prejudice to her right to file an independent action to assert her claim against Lipana, her codefendant therein; the together with her husband2 she continued to work on the land during the agricultural year 196465, but that after they had plowed the land in preparation for the agriculture natural year 1965-66 defendant's henchmen created some disturbance at the place for the purpose of ejecting her for forcibly therefrom. Plaintiff was allowed to litigate as pauper, and notice of the filing of the complaint was served up Lipana on July 31, 1965. On July 29, 1965 Lipana in turn went to the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on an action for "Ejectment and Forcible Entry" (Civil Case No. 235), with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Magdalena dela Cruz and her husband Lorenzo Ignacio, alleging that he, Lipana, had been placed in possession of the landholding by the provincial sheriff of Bulacan by virtue of the order of the CAR dated January 27, 1965 in CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895. Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim on August 11, 1965, denying the substantial averments of the complaint and alleging as affirmative defense the pendency of CAR Case No. 1221. In their counterclaim for damages, defendants alleged that Magdalena dela Cruz was the tenant of Felizardo Lipana but that the latter wanted to eject her because she married her co-defendant Lorenzo Ignacio, who was a member of a farmers' organization in the locality. On August 2, 1965 the Municipal Court of Plaridel ordered defendants, pending the hearing of the case on the merits, to desist from plowing, harrowing, and/or planting the land in question upon the filing by plaintiff of a bond of P2,000.00. On October 7, 1965 plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in contempt of court for having plowed, narrowed and planted the land in question in spite of the existence of the injunctive order. In their opposition dated October 18, 1965 defendants pointed out that they did so as tenants of the land subject of CAR Case No. 1221 and that if they observed the injunctive order of the Municipal Court they would in effect be violating their rights and obligations in said CAR case. On November 25, 1965 the Municipal Court found defendants guilty of contempt and sentenced them to pay a fine of P50.00 each or suffer imprisonment for ten days. This order was appealed by defendants, in forma pauperis to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3280-M.

On May 31, 1966 a decision in Civil Case No. 235 was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering defendants to vacate the land and to remove their house therefrom. This decision was likewise appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3363-M. Again, defendants were allowed to appeal as paupers. In due time the trial in CAR Case No. 1221 was terminated and the trial Judge, in an order dated September 13, 1966, gave both parties fifteen days from notice that the stenographic notes had been transcribed within which to submit their memoranda, after which period the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The CAR, however, held its decision in abeyance for the reason the "it is powerless to modify or set aside the decision rendered by the Municipal Court in Civil Case No. 235, now on appeal with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan." In Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M before the Court of First Instance, defendants (petitioners herein), in motion dated April 28, 1967, asked for the postponement of the hearing scheduled on May 2, 1967. The court denied the motion on May 2, 1967 and allowed plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte before the Deputy Clerk of Court. On May 16, 1967 defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, pleading that the evidence presented by plaintiff be disregarded and the hearing of the case reset for another date. This motion was also denied. On July 27, 1967 the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M, which reads as follows: Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. With respect to Civil Case No. 3280, finding the defendants guilty of contempt of court and sentencing them each pay a fine in the sum of P50.00 or to suffer an imprisonment 10 days; 2. With respect to Civil Case No. 3363, ordering the defendants and/or anybody acting under them, to vacate the premise in question and remove their house therefrom within 30 days from notice hereof. The facts show clearly that these cases proceed from and involve essentially a tenancy dispute. Before Civil Case No. 235 was filed in the Municipal Court of Plaridel three cases involving the same landholding had already been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The issue as to who had been in actual possession of the land since the death of the tenant Alipio Marcelo was before the CAR in Case No. 895, a suit brought by Maximo Marcelo against Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz, wherein he sought to be declared as the tenant by right of succession to Alipio Marcelo. The case, however, was dismissed together with CAR Cases Nos. 725 and 827 originally brought by Alipio Marcelo, without the issue of actual possession having been resolved, by virtue of the compromise agreement entered into between Maximo and Lipana. Magdalena dela Cruz thereafter filed her complaint — CAR Case No. 1221 — to have herself declared the lawful tenant of the landholding.

While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or forcible entry is determined by the allegations in the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. 3 The decision of the CAR, it should be remembered, was rendered upon a compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana. The right of Magdalena dela Cruz, who was a co-defendant in CAR Case No. 895, was not touched upon in said agreement. There the decision simply stated that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895 were "deemed closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana;" and the writ of execution was limited to "placing Mr. Felizardo Lipana immediately in possession of the landholding formerly cultivated by Maximo Marcelo or any person, agent, and/or representative acting in behalf of Maximo Marcelo." It was therefore incorrect for respondent court to conclude from the decision and writ of execution in the CAR cases that Lipana had actual possession, as against Magdalena dela Cruz, over the landholding prior to the alleged unlawful detainer and/or forcible entry. While both Maximo and Magdalena asserted the right to succeed to tenancy of the same landholding after the death of Alipio Marcelo, the CAR did not adjudicate that right to either of them nor did it resolve the question as to who had actual possession of the landholding after the death of Alipio. What it did, in order to prevent further trouble between Maximo and Magdalena was to place the landing under the administration of the Agricultural Extension Officer, with instruction that Maximo and Magdalena should be given preference in working on the land as laborers. The allegations in the complaint in CAR Case No. 1221 reveal that they worked on different portion of the land in accordance with the CAR's order. This was how things stood when Maximo entered into a compromising agreement with Lipana surrendering his rights over landholding in favor of the latter. For all intents purposes, therefore, the decision and writ of execution effected only the claim of Maximo Marcelo as tenant and actual possession of the portion of the land on which he was working by virtue of the provisional arrangement ordered by the CAR. Since the tenancy dispute remained unresolved with respect to Magdalena dela Cruz and was actually the subject of litigation in CAR Case No. 1221, the filing of the ejectment case was an intrusion upon the jurisdiction of said court. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and decision of respondent court in Civil Cases Nos. 3280-M and 3363-M is set aside. No costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, concur. Footnotes 1 (a) CAR Case 750 was a claim of Alipio Marcelo change of tenancy relationship from sharing to leasehold; reliquidation of the previous harvests against Felizardo Lipana; (b) CAR Case 827 was a claim of Felizardo Lipana again Alipio Marcelo for accounting of the produce of auxiliary crops. 2 Magdalena dela Cruz had married Lorenzo Ignacio on June 30, 1964.

3 See Evangelista vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-13875, October 31, 1960; Basilio vs. David, L-8702, April 28, 1956.