Ny B5 Civilians- Extra Notes Fdr- 3-28-04 Mfr Re Info From Civilian Interviews Re World Trade Center 743

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Re: Information from civilian interviews Type of event: preliminary compilation and analysis Date: March 28, 2004 Special Access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: N/A Participants - Non Commission: N/A Participants - Commission staff: N/A

The following memo was prepared on March 28, 2004 as a preliminary compilation & analysis of information obtained from interviews with survivors from the WTC and families of victims, and related research. It was submitted as a work in progress. The author intended to supply footnotes and/or otherwise update or correct any statements which were questioned, contradicted, or elaborated by subsequent research. Due to time constraints, only the first page has been updated in this manner. Subsequent memos or statements by MB should be taken to supercede this memo in any respect in which they conflict. ORIGINAL MEMO Compilation of civilian information so far; will supplement with further interviews and information from letters written to OSHA by family members; SUMMARY: Impact to north tower destroyed all three stairwells, leaving civilians at and above impact floors trapped. All civilians on upper floors died. Most civilians below the impact survived; those who did not were trapped in either elevators or rooms, physically incapable of descending, or advised to remain in place. Occupants of south tower were advised by a public address announcement to remain in their building after the north tower was hit. Some evacuated against this advice; many remained because of announcement. Almost everyone on upper floors died. At least four people escaped down sole surviving staircase from upper impact floors1. Others presumably did not Others may have descended stairwell A from above the impact but died in the collapse of the tower while in the process of evacuating. Evidence suggests that there was a large group of people descending an

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know about staircase or could not reach it". Most people below impact survived except those who experienced the same problems as in the north tower. Some evacuees died in the concourse and/or on ground in collapse of south tower. People on upper floors in both buildings did not hear public address announcements after planes hit1". Some heard fire alarmslv. Information from 911 was generally standard and inconclusive. Civilians who got out generally relied on their own instincts. SEPTEMBER 11th

THE NORTH TOWER When Flight 11 hit the north face of the 1 WTC at 8:46, there were approximately 5,000 to 7,000V people in each of the two towers, as opposed to the possible 25,000 (50,000 total) who might have been there as little as fifteen minutes later. Within seconds, 911 calls came in from around the city reporting the event or some version or of it.vl Within minutes, most 911 and FDNY dispatch operators were able to indicate prior awareness of the event.v" The plane sliced through floors 93/94V!" to 98/991X killing hundreds of people on impact. While approximately 1344 people" would eventually die at or above the impact floors, a unidentified stairwell in the South Tower shortly before it collapsed. There is no evidence as to whether these people came from above or below the impact, but because of the timing, it is possible that they were descending from above the impact. On the other hand, evidence suggests that stairwell A became effectively impassable as the morning went on. " Some people may have reached stairwell A but not have been able to descend it (see FN above) III No evacuees interviewed heard p.a. announcements after their buildings were impacted; no family members and/or co-workers of victims interviewed heard p.a. announcements in the background of calls. This appears to be generally supported by technical analysis performed by NIS. However, an interview with the DFSD stationed in the north tower that morning suggests that some tenants in that tower may have heard p.a. announcements after their building was hit. Staff does not have the resources or expertise to draw conclusions on this topic and will therefore simply state relevant facts and testimony. IV Despite some evidence to the contrary, both the DFSD stationed at the North Tower FCS and the former PA FSD recall that at least some floor warden phones were working hi the NT after the impact. v Estimates from news reports. V1 Mostly general reports of a plane crash, explosion, or fire at the WTC, including 1 caller from inside tower 2 and from inside Tower 1. Some misidentify building, (i.e., 2 WTC, Empire State Building). Several identify AA aircraft and/or a 747, and some describe incorrectly (e.g., a small jet, a 737); one operator tells caller it was a helicopter. Several report that hit looked deliberate and speculate it might be terrorist attack. Some call to confirm it was a plane (as apparently being questioned by TV reports). Several ask operators for confirmation and information. At 8:54 an ADT security operator (unaware of the incident) calls to advise that a fire alarm is going off at the Marriott. ™ "Volunteer" witness Carl Tendler claims to be the first to have reported the incident to 911 on the basis that the operator who received the call expressed surprise; obviously this is not conclusive, as other 911 or FD dispatch operators may have had this info, which is likely considering Ladder ? actually witnessed the event with the French documentary crew from across the street. vl" Reports vary, is there an official source for this? lx Offices of Marsh & McClennan; assume we will not identify companies by name. x This number, which is only an estimate to begin with, varies from report to report. As there is no way to determine it with certainty, may be better to leave out or state more generally, e.g., approximately 1400.

New York Times study of the upper floors"1 estimates that approximately eight hundred people survived the initial crash.xn Due to a combination of the angle at which the plane hit and certain construction features"111 of the building, the three stairways at the building's center were rendered impassable from the 92nd floor up, trapping everyone on that floor and above.xlv The Fire Safety Director for the world trade centerxv claims that he was told by the fire command desk in the lobby of the WTC 1 that the deputy fire safety director in charge of that building had called a building evacuation within one minute of the tower being hit.xvl In the background of the PA transcripts, shortly after the report came that the 1st plane hit, a male can be heard in the background saying "start doing the evac (inaudible) the upper levelsxv" and other communications support this. However, survivors from the 91st floor, close to but still below the impact, never heard any announcements, even though they remained on their floor before descending for three to ten minutesxvl"; neither did a person on the 80th floor who was below the impact but on a severely damaged floorxlx nor a person from the 28th floor.xx Equally, a person who received two calls from the 106th floor specifically remembers not hearing any announcements'™. On the other hand, a 911 caller on the 10th floor stated at 8:54 AM that they had been told to evacuate.™1 The caller does not specify how he received this instruction, (given the low floor, it could xi NYT, May 26th 2002 "102 MINUTES: Last Words at the Trade Center; Fighting to Lie as the Towers Died", based on interviews, videotapes, photographs. (Comprehensive study of upper floors). "" It is theorized that this is because the damage from the plane crash was fairly localized, unlike that from a bomb which is designed to trigger wider spread destruction. Apparently, the plane was absorbed by the building as its nose was split by the inner concrete slabs. Contrary to common assumptions, much of the jet fuel, often attributed with causing the majority of the destruction, was actually burned off by the explosion; however thousands of gallons of fuel still poured into elevator shafts and air ducts, erupting into lethal fires and fireballs. ""' "Drywall" (commonly known as sheetrock) was blown off many essential areas on impact, diffusing its ability to contain fires and physically blocking passage points. City In The Sky: The Rise and Fall of the World Trade Center, by James Glanz and Eric Lipton; ™ It seems to be generally accepted that the stairwells were blocked from the 92nd floor down, however, I don't have any first-hand information on this; survivors from the American Bureau of Shipping office on the 91st floor cannot confirm that the stairway they used to evacuate, believed to be stairway C, was definitely plugged above them; it was very dark in the stairway and they were distracted with concerns of getting out, though one survivor believes that the stairway was blocked above her; interviewees recall someone from their company checking one other stairway and finding it to be in worse condition; the other (the most northeastern) was apparently not even accessible from their because of the damage; it is very likely that is was destroyed. Other sources for this information would be calls made by Carr Futures employees trapped alive on the 92nd floor; 911 calls from this floor do not shed any specific light on the situation, but news reports indicate that family members received calls; we could pursue this if deemed necessary; xv MFR Mike Hurley by Sam Caspersen; xvl Mike Hurley Interview by Sam Caspersen, 11/20/03; PA transcripts confirm that building was being evacuated after plane hit; xvii Volume II, p.3 xv"' See Interviews Claire Mclntyre and Francis Calton, American Bureau of Shipping. XK Int Sharon Premoli, Beast Financials Systems, see below; "* Int Ellen Levin, Blue Cross: never heard any announcements; floor had some damage, debris falling from ceiling; doesn't remember if electricity went out, but phones were still working; xxl See Interview Peter Lee, Data Synapse; recalls bouts yelling alternating with eerie bouts of silence; xxii Tape 17, Johnston, #3, GD.

have come from actual rescue workers climbing stairs or stationed nearby) but it is reasonable to assume it came over the PA system. At 8:50, a caller from the 85th floor also states that "we are going to abandon the floor"™11 though he does not indicate whether he has been specifically directed to do so. (This was obviously the logical choice for people who were able to.) While information from civilians is not conclusive on the issue, there is no reason to doubt that fire safety directors made an evacuation announcement and that it was simply not heard on upper floors because of a failure of electricity"™. In addition to the announcement, a basic fire / evacuation alarm appears to have been triggered by the impactxxv, though this is merely a siren without any words of direction or instruction. However, a survivors from the 80* and 20th floors do not remember hearing this either*™. Conversation over the PA Police Desk indicates that a chief was being sent to canvas Building One.*™' At some point, the ESU unit of the NYPD determined that it would be impossible to attempt to a rooftop evacuation. However ESU repellers were prepared to attempt specific individual rescues that might have been feasible (i.e., from windows, or preferably from the roofs), though no individuals were located in these places at time when conditions would permit a rescue attempt. [Must include when, why, and all parties who received information]. Civilians in the building were not made aware of this decision. (See below) It stands to reason that most of the initial survivors on upper floors were well above the zone of impact, which is supported by the relative dearth of 911 calls and news reports of personal communications from people on floors at or near the crashxxvl". While there were some communications from offices between the 93rd and 100th floors,xxlx most came from floors within the 100's, particularly the 104th through 107th. With regard to these floors, the Times concluded that conditions were worse on the very highest floors, e.g., 106th and 107th floors,xxx than on those directly belowxxxl. In support this claim, it cites a call from an employee in a northwest conference room on the 104th floor—made shortly Tape 15 Billing, #27, GD. See Interview Francis Calton, 91st Floor: believes that plane crash cut off electricity and that only emergency lights remained on; xxv See Int's Francis Calton and Claire Mclntyre; employees of ABS on the 91st floor confirmed hearing this; siren can also be heard in the background of 911 calls from the building; however, see Int Peter Lee; did not hear sirens in background of 2 calls received from Data Synapse co-worker on the 106th floor; again, this may be attributable to electricity problems or other damage; xxvi Int Sharon Premoli; Int Ellen Levin; "™ Volume II, p. 15 xxviu yj^s appears to be tme) however I have not read all news stories and books; "^ See below. xxx The 106th and 107th floors were occupied by Windows on the World; on September 11th, there was regular restaurant activity on the 107th floor and an information technology conference on the 106th floor. XXX1 The 104th and 105th floors, as well as space between the 101st and 103rd floors, were occupied by the offices of Cantor Fitzgerald. MUi XXIV

after the crash—reporting that he and approximately fifty colleagues were okay.xxx" It also mentions calls from other employees on the 104th and 105th floors who presumably expressed a lesser state of urgency than those on floors above.xxxm Consistent with reports of dire conditions on the top floors, an exhibitor from the information technology conference on the 106th floorxxxiv called his company at approximately 8:50 AM from a landline phone near the elevators reporting such bad smoke that he could not see to find his colleagues or his bagxxxv. Also civilians descended from the 107th to the 106th floor because smoke conditions were worse up there.xxxvl However, 911 calls indicate reports of bad smoke and fire from all floors between 104 and 107 fairly evenly within the first ten minutes of the crash. This may be explained by the fact that people in perceived pockets of safety on the 104th and 1051 floors did not feel the need to call 911, or possibly that callers were more restrained in talking to loved than to 911 operators. One employeexxxv" who reportedly made a call to his wife from the 105th floor called 911 from the same floor indicating increasing smoke and questioned the fire dispatcher's direction to stay put, as he believed there was too much fire in the hallways for firefighters to reach them. Also, the company which received a call from its employee on the 106th floor was in touch with two other employees in a different location via wireless email from 9:10 to 9:32XXXV1". Presumably these people were in a location with better conditions, good enough to see to receive and send emails. 911 calls from these floors began to dwindle shortly after 9 AM, though a couple were received at 9:43XXX1X and at 9:33 a person was seen hanging out windows of the upper floors, presumably of the north towerxl. The exhibitor mentioned above called his office again at approximately 9:10, after being cut off. The call was made from the same location on a landline phone and lasted until approximately 9:20, when he was suddenly cut off. The Times references phone calls from the 104th floor from as late as 9:35.xh

xxx"

According to the Times, this call was made by Andrew Rosenblum of Cantor Fitzgerald to his wife, Jill. He actually gave her phone numbers for other CF employees in the room so that she could have calls made to their loved ones letting them know that they were all right. This appears to be confirmed by a letter to OSHA written by the mother of a Cantor employee who appears to have called from this room as well: xxxl" If we need more first-hand information from these floors, we can pursue interviews with people identified in news articles as having received phone calls; many from Cantor Fitzgerald and WOW; XXX1V See Int Peter Lee, call from Raj Mirpuri of Data Synapse; xxxv This person had tried to get down the stairs but, for reasons not specified was unable to: See Int Peter Lee; In a letter to OSHA the sibling of a victim at WOW references an email in which his brother states that he is "trapped:" we can therefore conclude that, even that high up. the stairs at least appeared to be impassable: *xxvi PA Transcripts, Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 16. xxxv" Ian Schneider of Cantor Fitzgerald, 911 call at 8:54. xxxvin gee jnt peter Lee; rjata Synapse will provide actual copies of these emails. xxxix 1 from NW corner of the 104* floor; 1 from 105th floor; 1 at 9:48 reporting 50 to 100 people trapped in NW corner of 104th floor, but caller may have spoken to brother earlier (Tape 31, T3621, #3, GD); xl 911 call, Tape 2 Thomas, #75 GD. Most people hanging out of windows were in north tower; Stuart Lee of Data Synapse was picture hanging out a window on the 106th floor, but his boss does not know time of picture (believes it was in NYT). xlj Call from Andrew Rosenblum in "safe" northwest conference room; (see FN 31 too); also a call from a person stating I'm in the WTC on the 104th floor (doesn't say which tower) and then call goes dead at 9:53

Communications from people on slightly lower floors, at or nearer the point of impact, are anecdotal compared to the greater volume above. There are several early calls from people on the 103rd floor, one (presumably from the north tower; caller does not indicate) at 9:01 stating that people are getting crazy and breaking windows and, while no one is hurt, they cannot breathe; based on the time and conditions of the call it is likely that it came from the north tower"1"; another at 8:56xhn reporting a group of at least 110 people trapped in the northwest corner in bad smoke conditions; and another from the southwest corner at 9:05xllv reporting a room with about a hundred people already full of smoke. Below that, there was a 9:01 AM call reporting people caught in bad smoke in the northwest corner of the 102nd floor, and one from the northeast comer of the 100th floor reporting similar conditions at 8:54 AM. Again, both calls occurred relatively soon after the impactxlv. At9:15a911 caller reported seeing a person waving out a window from around the 100th floor, though this could easily have been higher up. On the other hand, a letter to OSHA references a call to a loved one by a victim on the 102nd floor indicating that he was okay "being checked out"; the call was made at 9:30 and the victim's call phone and blackberry "powered down" between 10:30 and 11 AM.xlvi Fires were reported to have been seen immediately on the 96th, 97th, and 98th floors, most intensely on the eastern sidexlv" where many people were seen falling or jumping into the plaza as early as 9:01xlvin. A survivor from the south tower watched people on impact floors literally chased out of the windows by fires; first hanging out, then deliberately deciding to jumpxhx. Surprisingly however 911 calls indicate that there were people alive in the northwest corner of the 95th floor as late as 9:43,' and eight people alive as late as 9:47 AM in the southwest corner of 93rd floor, where they had sealed doors and broken one window h. There is also a call reporting a person stuck on the 94th floor who can't breathe, but this is at 9:03, much closer to the time of impact.1" At 9:02, a 911 caller reports seeing people throwing themselves out windows on the "West & Liberty" (e.g., southwest) side.

(Tape 33. T3750. #1. GD): also another report of people trapped there at 9:55 who could not get through to 911 themselves (Tape 33. T3750. #3. GD) ld" Tape 12 Fountain, #117; If call was from north tower, it would be Cantor Fitzgerald offices; woman is identified as "Helen Tollsion" but this spelling does not appear on victim list. xliii Tape 1 Thomas, #67, GD. xliv Tape 18, Johnston, #32. xlv It is surprising that two of these calls came from the north side of the floor, where the building was hit; xlvi Letter writer's sister, who worked for Alliance Consulting on the 102nd floor of Tower One, made call to fmace. xlvii Int Richard Fern, Euro Brokers, 84th floor; City In the Sky xlviii 911 call from Millennium Hotel reports people falling, (MH is east of WTC), Tape 17 Johnston, #14, GD; xllx See Int Richard Fern; saw many people deliberately jump out of windows on floors nearly parallel with his (he was on the 84th floor so like these people jumping from lower or mid impact floors) ' Caller communicating with them by pager. 11 8 employees of Fred Alger Management, which occupied half of the 93rd floor; caller Ron Tartaro reports they have no access to radio for dispatcher and that it took him 30 mins to get through (calling from cell); '" Tape 16, Pompie, # 32; woman reporting husband stuck, can't breathe;

One floor below the impact, many people remained alive but trapped. A 911 call from the 92" floor reports bad conditions as early as 8:58 AM; however, people were still alive and trapped as late as 10:26, less than three minutes before the building would collapse.1"1 The procedure taught to civilians in fire drills is that fire warden are to gather people in their area to the center of the floor and use an emergency intercom phone to call down to the lobby command center to receive instruction on what to do. These communications are not recorded and there is no evidence of successful use of them by civilians. A person from the 106th floor, who appears to be a fire warden, states in a call to the PA police desk located in the lobby of 5 WTC that the "fire phones are out:" the officer answering the phones confirms that "all the lines are blown right now."llv It is not clear if this is a guess or a conclusion based on other evidence. However, the likely fact that these phones were not working on affected floors would explain civilians' decision use 911. and the police desk if they were aware of it, as a resource for information, which they could reach via cell and/or landline phones. Most civilians who were able to evacuate did so without stopping to take the time to attempt this procedure.lv In general, calls to 911 from floors at or above the impact indicate that callers were confused about what happened, unsure of what to do, and in many cases physically struggling due to smoke conditions. Transfers to relevant dispatchers (FDNY or EMS) were often unsuccessful and many calls were cut off on both ends, terminating crucial exchanges of informationlvi. Where contact was made to FDNY or EMS dispatch, callers were generally given standard advice, e.g., to stay low, remain where they were, and wait for emergency works to come and assist them. As exceptions to this, one caller in a group of a hundred people was told that he should leave if he couldlv", two were asked whether they could get down the stairs before being advised to waitlv111, and many were informed that it was all right to break open windows.11" One caller, who appears to be calling from the north tower based on the time and conditions of the call, specifically asked if there was a way of getting to the roof, but was given standard advice to stay put

'"' Reporting people alive but trapped; also 9:55 call stating if you can hear me I'm on the 92nd floor in the SW corner, than call goes dead (Tape 33. T375Q. #2. GDI Uv Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 16-17. lv Int's with survivors. lvi Employees of Data Synapse had to email their office to have them call 911 as their cell phones were generally not working. The fire department told the company to advise its employees that the FD was on its way and in no uncertain terms not to break windows. lvii 8:52:20 AM call from Howard Kane, Comptroller, WOW; transferred to FDNY 461; Same advice given to caller on 47th floor (below impact), also with 100 people, at 8:48, Tape 15 Billings, #18, GD. lviii Tape 1 Thomas, #78, GD; Tape 17, Johnston, #7, GD; they both answered no. lix 8:50:30 AM call to 911 from caller Hanley, WOW, 106th floor, reporting bad smoke; 8:56:20 AM call to 911 from north east side of 105th floor with group of 12 to 15 people, reporting smoke everywhere, transferred to FDNY 408. 1 caller actually expresses doubt about this advice from the FD, Tape 12 Fountain, #120 GD; Tape 17, Johnston, #7, GD, 103rd floor reporting smoke, advised by 911 operator; Tape 1 Thomas, #78, GD; also, in a 8:59 call from the 104* floor, an operator first advises caller not to break window, then FD (when transferred) doesn't know if caller should. Tape 17 Johnston, #9, GD.

and then cut off before the question could be answered1". 911 operators were not equipped to handle the volume or nature of these calls. When a caller from the 103rd floor asked whether to go up or down, the operator states that she does not know the answer; the call is cut off as the woman is begging for helplxi. One operator actually told a caller that the incident occurred in the other building, presumably because tower two was hit at approximately that time.lx" Transcripts from the PA police desk also indicate that people attempting to call 911 actually got "a machine."'""' On the other hand, PAPD answering phones at the police desk in the lobby of 5 WTC were generally advising civilians to evacuate down the stairs if possible. Civilians who stated that they were trapped were generally advised to get to the ground and await rescue.lxiv However, one person repeatedly calls from the 106th floor looking for advice on a safe location on the floor; she is first told to call back and then advised that help is on the way up; she does not believe based on conditions, that rescue workers will be able to reach them. She is consistently told that people are on their way up. lxv Eventually, when she conveys that the situation is deteriorating, she is told, in answer to her question, that she can break a window if it will get them air.XV1 PAPD likely knew it would be impossible for civilians to attempt to evacuate down from this point. [Apparently information from the fire command center, manned in the lobby by the deputy fire safety directors in charge of tower one, was not much more helpful, consisting of a recitation of the basic building policy, which is to evacuate the fire floor and the one directly above it and to leave only when directed or "when conditions dictate such actions."lxvii [Is this true?].

1)1 Tape 16, Pompie, #34; 9:06 call reporting 50 to 60 people on 106th floor w/ pregnant woman; told not to break window and stay; could be in tower two. '"' This is call from pregnant described above which may be from tower 2. lxii 9:03:00 AM 911 call from CF employee on 104th floor. 1x111 Vol. II, Ch. 9. p. 13; woman from Marriott trying to report burned woman in lobby; suggests that she is getting answering machine but perhaps a recording. Call from Suite 8327: if you can get to the stairs, go down; if not, get on the ground; Call from 78th floor: evacuate "right away" by the nearest stairway with the least smoke etc, Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 1-2; call from 39th floor: come down by the stairs, Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 23, call from 47th floor (suite 4711); just reports; Vol II, Ch. 9, p. 5-6; call from 79th floor (7967), can't seem to get to stairs; are sending people up; they call again stating they're in main reception area; call from 13th floor: "evacuate as soon as possible", Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 23 kv Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 18 - 19. Christine Olender, WOW; also p. 24; bv! Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 28 bcv" I do not have any direct information on this either from the Port Authority or from civilian interviews. It seems that people who could get out did so without wasting time to stop and call the lobby. However, the Times reports that Doris Eng, the manager of Windows on World, made several calls to the lobby command center, per standard fire drill procedure. (Fire wardens were instructed to gather people in the center of the floor and use the special phone to call down). Apparently this was revealed by phone calls to loved ones by people on that floor; this may be worth pursuing; Glen Vogt, the manager of WOW, may be a good person to talk to.

Fire alarms served no real purpose; and, while an evacuation announcement may have been made, it was not audible to people near the impact1™11. As it turned, the lack of, or conflicting, information given to people on the 92nd floor and above had no real impact on whether or not they survived as their fates were more or less sealed the moment the plane hit the building. If the angle of the plane had been different or the building better designed, they might have had a viable way out. However, given circumstances as they were, there was no means of escape downward, no possibility of evacuation from the roof, and given the magnitude of the fires and the conditions on the floors, not much of a chance that firefighters could reach them before they died or jumped, even if the tower had not collapsed. Therefore the quality of the information they received was effectively immaterial. That this was the case, however, was not known at the time, and advice to people to stay put could theoretically have kept them from discovering a way out (See below re south tower). Equally, the failure to alert civilians that a rooftop evacuation had been ruled out could have led them, or at least not discouraged them from, going in the wrong direction, e.g., up instead of down. Several 911 callers specifically discuss the prospect of going up the stairs or to roof.lxix After several people were rescued by helicopters in the 1993 bombing, this may have seemed like a feasible prospect, and given the magnitude of the fires below them, the logical choice. After 1993, civilians were apparently instructed never to evacuate up.lxx However, many do not recall this instruction. Even those who did would not have been unreasonable to conclude that the circumstances of the day provided an exception to the rule. At the very least, civilians should have been given a chance to factor this information—the only constant among a myriad of variable—into a life-and-death decision-making process which was essentially in their own hands. Below the impact, most of the thousands of people survived. Evacuation was generally possible from the 91st floor down. Offices in the northwest area of that floor suffered relatively little damage, the most extensive of which was in the northeast corner of their space, along a wall which extended through the center of the floor, separating northeast from northwest office space!xxi. The office closest to this zone was damaged but the lxvi"

It is unfortunate that the PA system, implemented primarily for the purpose of conveying information in emergency situations, was not able to function on the most relevant floors after the crash; it is understandable that it was not designed with such a catastrophic event in mind; however, a useful recommendation would be to update its capabilities, Sam recommended wireless... klx Tape 12 Fountain, #117, caller asks if they should go up or down; Tape 16, Pompie #34, caller asks if they can get to the roof, is there a way of getting there; FD says stay where you are and call is disconnected; Tape 17, Johnston #6, person can be heard in background of call yelling 'up or down?'; OSHA letters also indicate that people on upper floors of the north tower attempted to the get to the roof and found the doors locked. lxx One survivor, who was on the 106th floor of tower 2 in 1993, self-evacuated to the roof with a group of people at that time. He was later told that it was the wrong thing to do and that the procedure was always to evacuate down not up. He was told that people should go at least five floors below the fire below. Other people, including a fire warden, do not remember being given specific instructions on which way to evacuate, e.g., up or down, but instead recall being told to await direction at the time of an incident. Standard fire drills procedure was for the fire wardens (usually 4 or 5 per floor) to lead employees to the center of the floor and use the special phone to call down to lobby command. kxi See Int's Claire Mclntyre and Francis Calton of American Bureau of Shipping, 91st floor;

occupant was able to get out. One person remembers seeing flames along the wall. Other than that, employees described light smoke and an immediate disruption of electricity, though both recall hearing the fire alarm kick in immediately. The northeast corner of the floor is believed to have been demolished with one person asleep inside.1""" The condition of the south side of the floor, which was unoccupied office space, was unknown to interviewees1"""1. Employees of the company in the northwest corner of the floor did not hear evacuation instructions but decided without question to descendlxxiv. They were aware of what had happened, after at least one person had actually witnessed the second half of the plane going into the building. After checking the stairwell closest to them, one employee checked a farther stairwell. This was apparently in worse condition than the nearer onelxxv. The third could not be reached because of the damage on the floor, from which it is reasonable to conclude that it was destroyed in the crash. After accounting for everyone in the office, the group began descending the closest stairwell, believed to be stairway C, within three to ten minutes after the impact.lxxvi The stairway was very dark and slippery for the first few flights. After one person slipped, he and another man moved a piece of drywall covering the stairs to allow the rest of the group to descend. One woman apparently slipped down a couple of flights and hurt her knee. In one person's recollection the stairway was slightly smoky; this person also remembers fire hose being stretched along the stairway though there is no explanation as to how it got there. The group was initially alone in the stairs and began encountering other people somewhere in the 80'slxxvn. At this point the stairways were clear and brightlxxvin. People they met generally knew that a plane had hit the building, though most believed it to have been an accident. Some people, including most employees from the 91st floor, were confronted with a locked door on the 77th floor at the end of a transfer hallway, which caused them to turn around, ascend to the 78th floor Sky Lobby, and continue their b"" See Int Claire Mclntyre; this space was donated by the Port Authority to artists groups; it is believed that an artist had spent the night the night before and died when the building was hit. bo"119 other employees were in the office that morning but did not wish to participate in interviews; 1 is retired and has not yet been asked. bouv Among the group was one deputy fire warden and a searcher; they did not call down to the lobby command center; most had worked for the company in 1993 when it was on the 106th floor of tower 2; at least one person remembers being told since never to evacuate up [see above]; they did not stop to call down to the lobby command center; boiv See Int Claire Mclntyre; CM believes that the second stairway checked was in worse condition than the first one, e.g., darker, more debris, but not necessarily impassable. This was likely stairway B. k"™ All 11 eleven ABS employees who were in that morning descended from this floor; also 4 or 5 electricians / contractors working on the floor successfully evacuated, though one is reported to have died a couple of weeks later from injures; it is unclear whether the electricians descended with the ABS employees, See Int's Claire Mclntyre and Francis Calton, disagreeing. IMC™ Qne person remembers meeting people around the 88th floor; another believes it was slightly lower, near the transfer hall on the 82nd floor; ixxvm 'YYii^ among other improvements, was a result of updates made after the 1993 bombing; civilians who were there for both described improvements as very helpful; m Either by having seen the plane hit, seen people jumping from above, or hearing from others who had; this was somewhere between 8:55 and 9:05 (varying recollections).

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descent by another staircase1""". One person in this group recalls seeing several male Port Authority civilians in the high 70's who came from offices on the floor but stayed, stationed there, to keep people moving down. Another group, including at least one employee from the 91st floor, was not obstructed by this door and was able to remain on the same stairway all the way to the bottom. Down towards the 60's and 70's both stairways became very crowded. Both people describe the evacuation as relatively calm and orderly, though there was a sense of people wanting to get out. The person in what may have been stairway B recalls seeing firefighters as high up as the 50's at around 9:20 AM. At some point in the fifties she and a co-worker switched to a less congested stairway. She saw one group of firefighters in the first stairway and two groups in the second one. The firefighters were visibly hot with red faces and civilians were trying to get them water. Civilians moved to single file when they passed. Other than that, firefighters did not have any real exchange with civilians, who were doing the right thing by going down. The survivor recalls hearing noise over the firefighters' radios but does not remember if they were attempting to transmit messages or having trouble receiving instructions. They appeared just to be climbing. A few times civilians had to move aside to let people pass who were being assisted by co-workerslxxxi. The same occurred in stairway C where the other 91st floor employee was descending. In all cases in which people were being assisted down, it was by co-workers, not by emergency personnel. Primarily these were people whose physical condition made it hard for them to descend, though some people were seen in stairway C with slight injuries, such as cuts. The person in this stairway recalls encountering a Port Authority security guard dressed in a blue windbreaker (specifically not a blazer) in the 50's with a 2-way radio stationed to guide people down. He informed civilians that the second building had been hit. He did not seem to be having trouble transmitting or receiving messages, and appeared mostly to be listening to the radio. The person in this stairway, e.g., C, began encountering firefighters in the 30's, in groups of 3 to 5, and probably saw thirty altogether. In that same flight, a small group of civilians branched off to a cafeteria to attempt to find a drink. In the mid-20's a firefighter exited the stairs onto a floor because he was having heart trouble or fatigue and went to find a drink. Neither person recalls firefighters going onto floors in response to specific distress calls. At the plaza level, there were many emergency workers, stationed approximately fifteen to twenty yards apart, directing civilians down the escalators through the concourse. Civilians were evacuated through the concourse, as per earlier instructions from Mike Hurly, because of the hazards of falling debris and people on the street. They were directed to keep moving, not to look up or into the plaza, and to exit the concourse by Borders bookstore on Church St out of 5 WTC. Emergency workers were stationed throughout the concourse as well. One person i>«x possj|jiy stairway B. xl See Int. Claire Mclntyre; in 40's civilians had to move aside for an overweight man to stop; apparently he had to stop and rest after each flight; a co-worker stayed with him to help;

11

specifically remembers those being PAPD and EMS. At no point did any emergency personnel question either civilian from the 91st floor about where he or she came from, how they got down, or the conditions that they had encountered. A survivor from the 80th floor recounts a much more difficult evacuation.1"5"01 After hearing and feeling the plane hit from her office on the west side of the building, she yelled for everyone on the floor to leave. She never heard any announcements or a fire alarm at any point. She and a co-worker met up with fifteen others from their company in their reception area but were unable to proceed farther. Past this area, everything was blown out, floors were gone, walls were blocking them in.lxxxm As a result they descended a stairway at the 'back' of her office. They were stopped at the 77th floor where the stairway was locked (perhaps a transfer hallway, see below re south tower) and were forced to climb back to the 80th floor to look for a key. Somehow they got to the 74th floor where they waited for about fifteen minutes with some Summit security guards who were trying to find out which stairways they could descend. No phones were working and there was an injured man. Eventually they ran through a fire to get back into the stairslxxxiv. This was at about 9:10 AM. They entered the stairslxxxv in a group of approximately 20 people and conditions were very bad; the stairway was dark, with sprinklers onlxxxvl, and the smell of fumes from the plane and from the building and people burning. The survivor proceeded with wet paper towels which she shared with others. The stairwell was also very crowded and much too narrow to accommodate the number of people, often resulting in bottlenecks on key floorslxxxv" where evacuees were forced to wait up to ten minutes to proceed. There was a lot of fear but everyone was generally cooperative. Somewhere between the 74th and 50th floor, she encountered an overweight man sitting on the stairs unable to continue. In the 50's or 60's she began seeing firefighters ascending in heavy gear with their faces flushed. The heat in the stairway was terrible. They moved aside at various points to let firefighters and/or co-workers carry injured people down. On the 44th floor, she passed a Summit security guard who said she would get out because he was praying for her. Apparently there was no further exchange. At one point someone got a cell phone signal and people in the stairway shared the phone. boot" Int Sharon Premoli, Beast Financial Systems; Ms. Premoli, who volunteered through Sally Regenhard to be interviewed, does not remember many of the details of her experience because she was in shock and later became unconscious; it appears difficult for her to distinguish between first-hand recollections and information conveyed to her later by people in her group and reporters. However she is well-intentioned and feels strongly about communicating the horrors of her experience. xl" Int Sharon Premoli; because of damage on her floor, SP believes the impact zone began lower than reported; however, conditions may have resulted from a fireball which apparently exploded in the lower 80's right above her floor; see below; ixxxiv jnt gjjaron premoii; again this is a detail that SP admit she does not remember; however, she takes it to mean that all floors from 74 and above were destroyed by fires by this time. ixxxv gp (joes n()t jjjjQ^y wjjat stairway she descended but is certain we can get this (and much other) information from NYT reporter Kevin Flynn; he is writing an extensive book on the subject... k"™ Int Sharon Premoli; SP later indicates sprinklers were only on on very low floors; kxxvu This concerned is echoed by a company security guard in tower 2 who used to work security for the PA (Summit); see Int Jerry Banks;

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On the ground floor the air was very bad, people were having respiratory problems, and sprinklers caused water up to above their ankles in the lobby. She was never questioned about what floor she came down from. A security guard helped her over wet floor boards in the lobby and directed the group down the escalator—which was working—to the concourse. She was there when the south tower collapsed. (See below). An employee from the 28th floor described a somewhat similar experiencelxxxv"'. After hearing and feeling the impact of the plane, people on the floor instinctively began to evacuate: some galvanized others to do so. including a doctor who canvassed the floor and a security guard who remained there to take phone calls from families. Although this survivor does not remember hearing any instructions or an alarm, it was never a question that they were going to leave. Because of previous fire drill training, employees knew to use the stairs. Employees used all three stairwells to descend and the survivor descended the one that ends at the [plaza or concourse?] level. When she left the floor at 8:52 it was smoky1***'* and there was debris falling from the ceiling in the center of the floor. She does not recall if the electricity had been ruptured but the landlines phones on the floor were still working. The upper floors of the stairwell were well lit though smoke conditions were a problem for people with asthma. The stairs were packed and civilians stepped aside to let others help injured people down, specifically a burn victim from the 31st floor. This happened fairly often at first. At approximately the 23rd floor, civilians were stopped for about half an hour because of a locked door somewhere lower down in the stairwell. It was at about this point that they began encountering firefighters, who apparently helped to remedy the problem. Firefighters did question civilians about what floor they had come form, if there were other people on the floor and what the conditions were, making sure not to delay civilians too much in their evacuation. Firefighters got off on various floors. By this time, information was beginning to spread that a plane hit the building (some people were able to make cell phone calls from the stairwell) though everyone assumed it was a small plane. At around the 10 floor, the water pipes were broken and there did not appear to be lights in the stairwell,*0 though some emergency responders had flashlights. They exited the staircase at the center of the elevator banks where the ceiling was gone, the marble floor was gone, water was pouring down, and the elevator shafts were blown open: there were no lights except for electric lights strung upxcr. This was at approximately 9:55. There emergency personnel including PAPD and city workers, yelled at them to get moving and directed them through the concourse. In the concourse there were some emergency workers stationed to guide them, as well as PA and company security guards personally escorting civilians out and carrying injured people. The concourse was black and full of smoke and very crowded. The survivor felt that you could tell this building was going to go; you didn't need any engineer to tell you that. The survivor believes that some civilians were directed out through the south tower (unlikely) and some onto Vesey, though she. b[XX""

Int. Ellen Levin, Blue Cross Blue Shield; saw reflection of explosion from window in northeast corner of building; heard glass shattering and ran to center of floor where felt building shake. EBCBS was not at the WTC in 1993 but everyone on the floor knew to leave right away; *™"x Int Ellen Levin; survivor heard account from a company security guard that, as little as 10 minutes later, it was so smoky guard walked into closet instead of stairwell, though she eventually made it out. xc Int Ellen Levin; EL claims that, because of daylight from outside, it was not difficult to see even without these lights; however it is unlikely that daylight filtered into stairwell. xci Int. Ellen Levin; where is this???

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like most other civilians, were directed to exit near Borders bookstore onto Church Street. There, emergency responders screamed for everyone to go to Broadway. When the civilian stopped after meeting two colleagues near the corner of Broadway and Fulton, officials continued to yell at them to go north. They made it to far side of St. Paul's church when the south tower collapsed. I do not have further first-hand information concerning the evacuation in tower one, i.e., from people on lower floors. However, there are several reports of trapped people being rescued by emergency personnel."011 It is unclear, and likely indeterminable, how many people died below the impact in tower one, but it appears to be somewhere in the range of seventy to eighty.xcm Evidence indicates that many of the deaths occurred in the 80's, not too far from the impact. There is one call to the PA police desk reporting 4 people trapped on the 90th floor.XC1V Several 911 calls indicate people trapped on the 89th floor^, at least one of which shows up on a victim list.xcvl It also appears that a group of people got trapped in room 8617 on the 86th floor.xcv" One call from this room indicates that the exits on the floor were blocked with debris, which could account for other possible deaths on this floor. PA transcripts xc"

Several groups of people were reportedly rescued by Port Authority workers on the 86th and 89th floors.; Jim may have some information on this. Also, Shirley Dreifus, the owner of Strategic Communications on the 89th floor, who happened to be at home that day, told the media that she directed rescue workers to a group of her employees trapped on in an 89th floor office. 911 calls generally support this; there is one from her at 9:03 reporting 4 to 5 people trapped in that room and one at 9:21 from the people in the office. Reportedly, Frank Lombardi, the PA chief engineer, pried an elevator open on the 72 floor, allowing people to escape; and a man Jan Demczur pried an elevator door open near the 50* floor with a squeegee allowing occupants to kick through drywall and escape. There is also an 8:49 911 call reporting a group of four on the 87th floor with a fire in the hallway; as the caller's name does not appear on any victim list, I assume this group got themselves out. Mike Hurley also states tat firefighters rescued civilians trapped in an express elevator stuck at ground level. XC1" A USA Today article from Dec 01 puts the number at 72 and reports 10 bystanders killed by debris; it is unclear whether the 10 killed of the street are included in the 72 or in addition to it; Columbia estimates the number in the 80's. . xciv Vol II, Ch. 10, p. 9, Suite 9051; "can't get out"; sending people xcv From before? Now 1 at 9:41 reporting husband trapped with 10 people: doors locked an can't get out; in an office thinks 8945 or 65. from 8901: this may be the Shirley Dreifus group. Tape 31. T3621. #1 (GD). xcvi Abraham Ilowitz of Met Life; wife reports him trapped at 8:56 in 911 call; 8:52 call to 911 from Mr. Lin, trapped, no smoke in office but hall is full of smoke, male Lin on victim list but not clear if same person (Tape 1, Thomas, #71, GD); 8:57 call from male, Einstein, not on victim list (Tape 1 Thomas #77); 9:02 call from person trapped in office with smoke, directed by FD to put some wet clothing or rags at bottom of door and stay at location (Tape 17, Johnston, GD) (this operator gives same advice later). xcv" James Gartenberg of Julien J. Studley (deceased) reported trapped there by mother at 8:54; apparently he did live ABC broadcast from room: name appears on victim list; woman also reports son trapped there at 9:09 (appears to be follow up); conference call to 91 lat 9:38 [one caller named Geoff Hipschman?] says FD told them to stay put, and that two people told him the exits were blocked with debris (presumably coworkers), call is very frustrating with operator asking if WTC is between Chruch and West and then taking long time with EMS transfer; caller finally asks for answer as to whether or not ok to break window, meanwhile telling people near him to get on the floor and get soaking towels; operator agrees that's a good idea, but can't tell them to break windows that are not meant to open; goes to look for actual firefighter but they've all left for WTC. [Question: Is EMS dispatch operator in an actual firehouse?]; operator then reiterates SOP and says there's an announcement in the building saying this same thing [???]

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indicate that there were people unable to get into the halls because of smoke.xcvl" There were also a number of deaths on the 83rd floor"01" where a fireball reportedly exploded from within or near an elevator0, and on the 82nd floor which may have suffered related damage.01 PA transcripts show a call reporting 4 people on the 83rd floor who directed to the stairs and apparently got out.011 PA transcripts record a group of approximately 12 people who do not appear able to descend from the 79th floor.01" A news story reports that an elevator got stuck near the 78th floor, from which some people managed to escape but others apparently died.civ A call to the PA police desk states that there are fire in the elevator shafts on the 77th floor.ov There are two 911 calls about a woman trapped in a wheel chair on the 68th floor, but her name does not appear on the victim list, so it appears that she got. Jim Miller has confirmed that ten Port Authority workers died at a security command post on the 64th floor.CVI Four people are reported to have died from a company located on the 47th floorovl1, although three of the deaths occurred in the collapse of the south tower, and one was a person too tired to descend. It may be coincidental that 911 calls indicate distress on this floor.ovw Also a call to the PA police desk reports Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 2; Room 8647. 13 employees of General Telecom on the 83rd floor were trapped by debris in a corner office, confirmed by EW and 911 calls; reported in 911 call from room 8331 at 9:04 or 9:40 [time in Sam's notes says 9:4]; EMS advises them that "best thing I can tell you to do is run". 911 operator attempts to transfer to FD but loses caller; also 9:01 call from room 8311 with a "bunch" of people with smoke in hall, caller says something is crumbling, needs someone to tell us what to do; told to listen to the PA system: fire alarms can be heard in background. (Tape 12 Fountain, #119, GD); also call at 9:51 reporting 13 people trapped. really want advice. PD and FD can't give: she is asking if they can see TV. is the fire is above or below them, desperate for some direction, operator sort of tells them about wet towels, there is a lot of smoke: told not to go to halls and wait for FF's, then some official-sounding person comes in and says "everybody just sit on the floor": fire alarm can be heard in the background; Tape ? ?? GD notes c Jonathan Judd witnessed elevator doors on 83rd floor explode (from local elevator across hall), [CNN.com special report]; Manu Dhingra of Andover Brokerage reported being burned by a fireball shooting out of an 83rd floor elevator from which he had just exited; ci 911 calls reporting people trapped on 82nd (Tape 1 Thomas, #79, GD), (Tape 2, Thomas, #68, GD, reporting five people trapped on north side); 3 employees of NY Metro Transportation Council reported died (office on 82nd floor), [check with Emily for confirmation]; also 9:03 report of people stuck in an elevator on the 82nd floor (Tape 10 Armstead, #99, SC]. 011 Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 7, Suite 8327; do not appear on victim's list; do not indicate they cannot get to stairs when advised to do so if possible. dii Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 11 Clv Virginia DiChiara (Cantor Fitzgerald) and Roy Bell had just transferred into local elevator from 78th floor Sky Lobby when plane hit; doors remained open enough for them to escape, but badly burned; another CF employee, Ari Schonburn, (who apparently died) got them to a security office with 2 guards and about a dozen people; 1 guard couldn't get through on office phone and the other had a radio but was paralyzed, crying; only screams could be heard over the radio; a fire warden eventually came and got some of them down the stairs; others may have remained and gotten trapped or been unable to get out of the original elevator (Newsweek 12/31/01); also PA police desk transcript indicates hallways full of smoke on 78th floor. Vol. II. Ch 9. p. 1-2. cv Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 10 ™ Reportedly they were instructed to stay there; see PA radio transcripts. c™ First Union Bank; one reported to have stopped because she was tired and 3 who escaped but died in the collapse of the south tower; unclear if these count as deaths below fire or bystanders (or whether categories are conflated). [Check with Emily for confirmation; if not, Semi Selita is listed contact]. CV111 8:48 call with 100 people reports smelling a lot of gas; told to wait for instructions, or if you can get out then get ouUTape 15, Billings, #18, GD); since fewer than 100 people total died below the fires, some or xcviii XC1X

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people stuck in a room who smell gas and can't come outclx. Eleven people reportedly died from a company occupying space between the 17th and 31st floors.0". Finally there is a 911 call at 8:54 AM from a person on the 10th floor asking for evacuation assistance.0"1 This accounts for at least [45] deaths and provides likely circumstances for many more. 911 communications seemed to have followed the same pattern as above. Several people were advised to evacuate if they could, one was advised to listen to the PA system, which was apparently instructing an evacuation, and most were told to stay put. The quality of this advice can be seen from two angles. On one hand, it may have prevented callers who had a viable means of escape from attempting to pursue it, contributing to deaths which could have been avoided. Though several callers indicated that they were trapped [doors locked on 89th floor -what doors????], others appeared to be calling for advice from locations from which they might have escaped. As not all names appear on victim lists, many may have decided to do so on their own, or have followed later instructions by building personnel. On the other hand, unlike those trapped above the fire, these people had an actual chance of being rescued by emergency personnel if the building had not collapsed. Therefore, it may have been less detrimental to advise them to remain where they were rather than send them to places of potentially greater danger, whereas people on upper floors may have actually been "safer" attempting to evacuate if there was a possibility of being able to do so, given the certainty of the fate they would otherwise meet. However, it seems perverse to conclude that those with an actual chance to escape, e.g., those below the impact, were better advised to stay put than those without one. Without actual and specific information about the floors, it is difficult to evaluate the advice even in hindsight. However, it appears that operators were not basing their advice on these—or really any—considerations of this type; instead they were stating the standard advice which they believed best applied, which is all they were in a position to do. The caller from the 83rd floor specifically wants to know if the fire is above or below them, or if 911 has any information from the outside or from TV and they cannot give them this information and are transferred back and forth and eventually told to stay put [apparently these are GT people who died].

most of this group apparently did get out; also call at 9:01 from George Mene in suite 4789 with room full of smoke but no injuries, no answer at FD. told to put wet towel under door, stay and wait (Tape 17 Johnston, #16, GD); if correct spelling, not on victim list. C1X Vol. II, Ch 9, p. 6; Room 4711; unclear if trapped in room or hesitant to come out because of possible danger; cx Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield [check with Emily for confirmation]; one reported to have stayed behind with a disabled friend; other nine theorized to be trapped in elevators or rooms; there is one 91 Icall at 8:57 from Lorraine Sanders on east side of 31st floor which is full of smoke; she does not identify her company and her name does not appear on the victim list. (Tape 1, Thomas, #68, GD); it's also been reported that a Blue Cross employee, Ken Summers, was burned in the lobby by a fireball blast through elevators when the first plane hit; he appears to have survived. [Ellen Levin believes a person was killed outside by falling debris not from the collapse] CIU This is call which indicates that they have been told to evacuate, above, (Tape 17 Johnston, #3, GD); this floor is occupied by Bank of America [Emily may know if any employees died].

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Finally, it was reported that 83 elevator mechanics—who might have rescued some of the many people trapped in elevators below the fire—evacuated the building after the second plane hit. It is hard to criticize this decision, knowing the dangers they would have otherwise encountered. As we know, firefighters were criticized for making precisely the opposite choice. PLAZA / CONCOURSE: A call to the police desk reports that everyone is going crazy down in the concourse.0"" THE SOUTH TOWER When Flight 11 hit the north tower, occupants of the south tower did not know how to react. Initially, many did not know what had occurred and some concluded that an incident had taken place in their building. Even after learning what had happened from TV reports, people were unsure how to proceed. Many decided to leave, either by their own decision0"111 or at the advice of fire wardensoxlv; they used both the elevators and the stairs to evacuatecxv. The question was further complicated by at least one announcement over the PA system at approximately 8:55 AM assuring tenants that the building was secure and directing them to remain inside. There are various accounts of the precise wording of the announcement. One survivor, also a fire wardencxvl, believes he remembers it word-forword as the following: "Your attention please. Building two is secure. There is no need to evacuate building two. If you are in the midst of evacuation, you may use the re-entry doors and the elevators to return to your floor." The message was then repeated in full. Other variations express essentially the same message, primarily that the building is secure and occupants either can or should return to their officescxvn; one survivor recalls it being played continuously until the building was hit.cxvin Interestingly, another civilian— who was in the process of evacuating when she heard it—actually interpreted it as an instruction to continue, interpreting the statement that "the building was secure" and it Volume II, Ch 9. p. 1. See Int Judy Wein; JW saw fireball from window in southwest corner of 103rd floor and screamed to everyone on the floor to leave; occupants of high floors in the south tower could feel heat and see people jumping; Int Judy Wein, Int Richard Fern; CX1V On the 84th floor, at Euro Brokers, fire wardens evacuated approx 200 or the approx 250 employees who were there; approx 10 went back up either in response to the announcement or on the advice of building security; below the impact (where the lesser danger is known only in hindsight) Morgan Stanley's chief of security successfully evacuated all but 6 out of 3700 employees, 3 of whom were security officials, with a bullhorn; MS was the WTC's largest tenant and occupied space between the 43rd and 74th floors, [check with Emily for confirmation]. cxv See Int's Brian Clark, Judy Wein, Jerry Banks, describing massive amounts of people in upper stairwells attempting to descend; on the 92nd floor, a receptionist and two other women stayed to make sure new employees could fined stairs etc and got trapped (OSHA letter). c™ Brian Clark of Euro Brokers, 84th floor. cx™ Stanley Praimnath, Fuji Bank, 81st floor; Ron DiFrancesco, Euro Brokers, 84th floor office; Jerry Banks, Euro Brokers, heard announcement in 44th floor Sky Lobby; Richard Fern, Euro Brokers, 84th floor; Judy Wein, heard announcement in 78th floor Sky Lobby [see below]; OSHA letters. cxvl" Int Stanley Praimnath; heard announcement in lobby and then again up on 84th floor; cxii

cxm

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was "safe to proceed" to mean that it was safe to proceed out.cxlx This person had made a personal decision to evacuate herself and people on her floor after she witnessed the first plane hit. Another survivor recalls having possibly heard two announcements; one immediately after the plane hit the tower stating that a small plane had accidentally hit 1 WTC but that building 2 was secure and it was all right for occupants to return to their officecxx; and a later one saying that occupants could leave if they wanted to. Part of one announcement was reportedly recorded on a voicemail message to the wife of a victim0""1; it is quoted as saying the following: "it's secure here... but if the conditions warrant on your floor you may wish to start an orderly evacuation." The victim who made the call apparently took this as an instruction to leave as well,0""" which others may have done. Its more overwhelming effect, however, was to cause people to remain where they were0"""1 or actually cease evacuating and return to their floors.oxxlv One man actually decided to go back up to his office to collect his personal belongings and got stuck in an elevator along with others which was destroyed in the collapse.cxxv Additionally some people were personally directed back upstairs by security officials in the lobby.cxxvl Some civilians called the Port Authority Police Desk directly in 5 WTC seeking advice. A person from the 92nd floor is told to wait until further notice.oxxv" A person from the 87th floor is told to stand by.CXXVI" A person from an unidentified floor is told to get out, if possible by the stairs.OXXIX A security official for Morgan Stanley is told that everybody should get out of the building; he is also advised that the police desk is trying to announce an evacuation of building two right now.cxxx A person on the 95 floor is advised to evacuate everybody by the stairs.cxxxl

See Int Judy Wein; took stairs from Aon office on 103rd floor to 78th floor sky lobby where waiting for elevators for when message came on; assumed it meant to keep going; could not imagine otherwise; cxx Richard Fern, Euro Brokers, 84th floor; cxxi jj^s js geverjy Eckert, wjfe of Sean Rooney; is it worth it to try to pursue this? cxxu NYT reports that Sean Rooney began message saying "Looks like we'll be in this tower for a while" then paused to hear the announcement after which he said "I'll talk to you later, bye;" if there were in fact two announcements, this would have been the second one. cxxiii See Int's Brian Clark, Richard Fern, Jerry Banks, Judy Wein; cxxlv It is obviously impossible to determine a precise number; See Int Brian Clark, stating that approx 10 Euro Brokers employees returned to the 84th floor from stairs and/or elevator where they had been in the process of evacuating; Int Judy Wein, stating that people in 78th floor sky lobby got back on elevators to go up; Int Jerry Banks, stating that people in 44th sky lobby got back on elevators to go up; cxxv OSHA letter; See below in section on deaths below impact in south tower: cxxvi ^^er seemg fireballs outside his window, Stanley Praimnath evacuated to the lobby with 19 other employees of his company, Fuji Bank. They came from floors between 79 and 82. As they were exiting the turnstiles, they encountered two security guards (believed to be from Summit Security). One of them said "Where are you going? Go back to your office. Your office is secure." At that time, an announcement came over the PA system to the same effect. Mr. Praimnath told a temp who was in the group to go home. The security guards did not stop her from doing so. However, all other members of the group went back up; Mr. Praimnath followed half-heartedly; he is the only one to have survived. cxxvn y0iume ii; p 5. jnaie caner reports smelling smoke; sort of put on hold, keeps asking what to do, then says "okay, all right. Don't evacuate." cxxvl" Volume II, p. 7-8; male caller wants to know what's going on; told incident in other building; first emergency as far as rescue; cxxix Volume II, Ch. 9, p.2. cxxx Volume II, Ch. 9, p. 4. cxxxi Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 9

CX1X

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[PAPD gave an order over Channel W to effect a complex-wide evacuation at approximately 9AM; however, this seems only to have reached other police officers on Channel W, as opposed to the fire safety directors manning the PA system in the lobbies of the buildings who were on Channel X.] Many people had descended to the Sky Lobby on the 78th floor attempting to evacuate010™1 when UA 175 hit the southern face of the south tower at 9:03, crashing into floors 78 - 84. By this time, it estimated that two-thirds of the people on the upper floors had evacuatedcxxxm leaving about five to six hundred people at or above the impact floors and approximately fifteen-hundred below. The decision to encourage civilians to remain in the building is probably the most highly questioned aspect of the emergency response, as it contributed to the greatest numbers of deaths by the most quantifiable measures. If a firm and prompt evacuation had been ordered, it is likely that most occupants of the south tower would have reached a point of safety before the plane the hit their building. It is true that some might have disregarded the announcement,cxxxlv and also that people descending from higher floors might have ended up closer to the point of impact. As mentioned above, hundreds of people had descended to the sky lobby, which was in the lower impact zone; an evacuation instruction might have put more people in that area who could otherwise have remained "safely" above. On the other hand, many people would have descended sooner if not for the announcement. There was also a backlog of people on the stairs at or above the point of impact. But even with these qualifications, it is fair to conclude that different advice would have saved many lives. On the other hand, if a plane had not crashed into the south tower, a decision to evacuate the building might not have been as wise. An evacuation order would have put thousands of additional people on the street, significantly increasing congestion in a highly hazardous area. This could have resulted in many more people being killed by falling debris. More seriously, a secondary attack could have occurred on the street in anticipation of the mob. There was less reason at the time to anticipate the type of secondary attack which did in fact occur, e.g., another plane hitting. This does not mean that advice to remain in the building was necessarily correct, but rather that its wisdom is debatable. Therefore, it is not the type of "mistake" that should be taken into account in

cxxx"

Most people in the Sky Lobby were anxious to get out, some of whom had concluded that the plane crash into the other building was not an accident given the weather conditions, Int Judy Wein; some decided to go up to retrieve personal items; many decided to go back up after hearing the PA announcement; see Int. Judy Wein; 2 out of the 10 express elevators had been out of service for months: cxxxiv jn Middletown America, by Gail Sheehy, a police officer talks about traders who resisted evacuation orders during the 1993 bombing until they were threatened with handcuffs. Given the much greater magnitude of this event, it is unlikely that people would have disregarded specific instructions to leave, but it is not impossible that some would decided to stay. However, apparently a couple of employees on the 28 floor of the north tower had to be convinced by their company security to leave after their building was hit; being on a lower floor however, they might not have initially realized the magnitude of the event. Int. Ellen Levin.

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crafting recommendations for the future, as its incorrectness was contingent rather than necessary. As with the first plane crash, 911 calls came in right away to report the event. Again, they conveyed both general and specific information, and operators were soon able to indicate prior awareness. •

i•

•

CXXXV

It is reported that the deputy fire safety directors in the lobby of tower two began making urgent and repeated evacuation announcements as soon as the plane hit the building.cxxxvl. Mike Hurley also claims that he radioed the deputy fire safety director in charge of tower two to order a building evacuation after determining, with FDNY Chief Pfeifer, that a complex-wide evacuation should be donecxxxv". However, this communication does not appear in recorded Port Authority transcripts, hi support of it is a 911 call at 9:37 from the 97th floor in which the caller states that there was "an announcement to go to the stairs"; however, no survivors I have spoken with remember hearing any PA announcements at all after the plane hit their buildingcxxxvni. This may be because the electricity had gone out on their floors.cxxxixcxl Even more puzzling is an announcement that can be heard in the background of a 911 call at 9:19 AM stating: This is the fire command station in building two. We are in the lobby. We are holding down here. The conditions seem to have subsided somewhat. Some people in the building have left. If you wish to leave, you may now leave the concourse. You may walk through the concourse on this side [?] of building one. The condition seems to have subsided in the lobby of building two. Some people have left the building. We are here monitoring the situation. The Fire Department has concentrated their efforts on building one. People are leaving..." It is then muffled by the conversation between the caller on the 86th floor and the 911 operator conducting the callcxh. Only one survivor recalls hearing a fire alarm after the plane hit and did not find it to be of any help, as it was merely a siren without words of instruction. There is discussion over the Port Authority Police Desk phone about a unit being sent to Building Two to effect an evacuation, at some point after the south tower was hit.cx " Unlike in the north tower, many people appear to have survived on or near impact floors, including some who actually saw the plane inside the building. This is apparently due to the angle at which plane the hit, e.g., it is said to have tilted before it entered the building. cxxxv Qne person identified the plane as a UA 737 aircraft, one mistakenly identified it as a US Air Jet, several described it as a military type plane. cxxxvi j^ws interview with Dep. Fire Safety Director, Kevin Horan, former OCS employee; Sam has tried to reach him. CXXXVll " MFR Mike Hurley, by Sam Caspersen 11/3/03 cxxxviii See Int, Brian Clark, 84th floor, Richard Fern, 84th floor, Stanley Praimnath, 81st floor, Jerry Banks 84th to 44th floors; Judy Wein 103rd to 78th floor; cxxxix Int. Stanley Praimnath; cxl An OSHA letter references "repeated announcements" for people in south tower to stay in their offices; despite structure of letter, it is likely reference to PA announcement before plane hit: cxh We should listen to this again to confirm the time etc; if this is correct, it would disprove the theory that the PA was not working on upper floors. Cldii Volume II, P. 14-15.

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Another result is that at least one stairway remained intact, e.g., stairway A, which was allegedly open from the top to the bottom of the building as a viable escape route for anyone who could reach it. This was actually a fortuitous coincidence. At almost precisely the floors where the plane hit the building, this stairway diverts northward around elevators and other heavy machinery, bringing it away from the area affected by the plane, e.g., the southern half of building. The machinery is also theorized to have literally shielded the stairway from the impact. At least four people were able to safely evacuate down this stairway from at or above the area of impact. One person reached it within seconds of the impact, after exiting an 84th floor elevator which had just stepped into when the plane hit. He ran immediately to stairway A which happened to be closest exitcxhn. A few minutes later, a group of seven employees from the 84th floor began descending that stairway, led by a fire warden with a flashlight. The staircase was described as black and smoky, with no lights.cxllv On the 81st floor, they met two people ascending the stairs, one of whom yelled "you can't go down, stop, we've just come off a floor in flames." Based on the time and the physical condition of one of the people (quite heavyset), it is estimated that they could not have come from much lower than the 79th floor. The nine begin a debate about whether to go up or down, with the fire warden shining a flashlight on each. Within about fifteen seconds, the fire warden heard a cry for help coming from the 81st floor. He was able to squeeze through the space between the door frame and the damaged drywall to get onto the floor. Meanwhile the rest of the group began to ascend the stairs, with two men from the 84th floor assisting the heavy woman. One person, who was nearer the back of the groupcxlv, explained that they did so because the stairway was increasingly filling with smoke, not out of any intention or plan to get to the roof. They went up in search of clearer air, perceiving they had no alternative. The plan was to enter the first floor they could get onto, but each entry door was lockedcxlvl. By the 91st floor, they realized they were essentially trapped in the stairwell and had no choice but to go back down. The group had increased to approximately twenty people at this point, as people joined on each floor going upcxlv". The only survivor from the group claims that they managed to make their way down the "pretty black" stairway to the upper transfer hallwaycxlvi" which was blocked by burning drywall. The survivor managed to get through this area and continue his descent. The rest of the group, he claims, was "going to sleep", perhaps a result of his See Int Richard Fern. See Int's Ron DiFrancesco, Richard Fern; cxlv Ron DiFrancesco, Euro Brokers; Brian Clark recalls that RD accompanied him onto the 81st floor, but RD specifically denies this; however, some of RD's information may not be reliable as he appears to be highly traumatized by the event. cxivi y^e Building was supposed to have re-entry doors every 5 flights; cxivu gj-j (joes no j expiain why he didn't use this opportunity to get onto a floor; cxivm ^ j^e jQp an(j on ^e Bottom of the area where the stairway juts northward, there were hallways to bring a person descending respectively northward and southward, see diagram. The hallways were part of the stairways, e.g., a person did not have to exit to proceed; however there appears to have been at least one door through a person would have to pass. The same was true of stairway C which diverted southward, but was destroyed by the plane. cxim

Cld'v

21

instruction to stay low. In his recollection conditions were very bad in the stairway. He agreed that the people may have been passing out from inhalation. (See below for descent). Meanwhile, on the 81st floor, the person who had heard the cries for help found a man trapped behind a wall.cxllx This person had been standing by a window "looking toward the statue of liberty" when he saw the plane approach his building. He dove under a desk and it turned out to be the only structure that stood firm when the plane's wing wedged itself into his office door a mere twenty feet away. Immediately the ceiling caved in and the walls were knocked down, like a total demolition. The air was thick, like someone had thrown cement into it, and smelled profusely of jet fuel. There was no light except from the wing of the plane which started to burn; sparks were emitted from dislodged wires dangling in the path of water from the sprinklers. He began crawling across the floor and was led in the direction of stairway A by the fire warden's flashlight. He did not see any other people on the floor and believes, based on its conditions, that no one could have survived. Even if they had survived the impact, they would not have been able to reach the stairs soon without dying of suffocation. He says that it was extremely difficult to breathe and considers it a miracle that he survived. When the two men reached each other, the fire warden helped yank the trapped man over the wall that separated them. He then led him to stairway A which they both descended without question. (See below for their descent) In the 78th floor sky lobby, many were killed or severely injured by the impact of the plane, but many remained alive as well. One survivor does not recall hearing any PA announcements or a fire alarm.01 She describes conditions as dark and slightly smoky with some water on the floor. After searching for an information desk which was destroyed by the crash,0'1 she made her way to an area near the northwest corner of the floor. There was fresher air and light due to some windows having been blown out by the crash. She was soon directed to the stairs by the legendary "man in the red bandanna" who announced that anyone who could walk should walk to the stairs, and anyone who could help should help people who need assistance01". At the time the survivor got to the stairs with two co-workers, at least one other group had been directed down by this man.cliii It is generally presumed that stairways B & C were destroyed at the area of plane's impact, making it impossible for anyone to descend. This is based in part on the fact that no one is in fact known to have used them to descend. Also their locations in the tower Stanley Praimnath; See Int Judy Wein, Aon; ch This was in an area of increased darkness with many lifeless bodies; cl" This man, told of often in news reports, was an employee from the 104th floor who happened to be a volunteer firefighter; according to JW, his body was found generally intact in the lobby, where he apparently stayed to help FF's after he finished helping victims on the 78th floor; clm See Int Judy Wein; JW shared ambulance with Ling Young, burn victim, who had reached the ambulance before her; JW remembers seeing a fire extinguisher which LY had left on the stairs earlier; it had been given to her by the man in the red bandanna; cxlix d

22

make this a logical conclusion. Stairway B runs essentially straight down the core of the building and stairway C actually diverts southward in much the same way its counterpart, A, diverts northward. The four people who descended stairway A did not do so for any particular reason other than proximity, e.g., they did not check stairways B & C first and determine them to be impassable. However, at 9:29 AM a 911 caller reported that her uncle was trapped in the northwest corner of the 80th floor of one of the towers and that Stairwell B is demolished. This could have been either tower. However, in the south tower, stairway B is the closest stairway to the northwest corner on the 80th floor. Also, while there did appear to be damage in the vicinity of the 82nd and 83rd floor in the north tower, there is no report that stairway B was impassable that far below the impact. If this is in fact the south tower, it would substantiate that at least stairway B was impassable. (The caller does not give her uncle's name or company but she gives her name, Tomasino, and her phone number (718) 648-2575); if necessary we could consider pursuing it.) Equally an OSHA letter gives an account of a person descending a stairway to a point where approximately 4 or 5 flights of stairs were "gone." Again, neither the tower nor the floor is identified; however it is likely that this occurred in the south tower as people in the north tower do not appear to have able even to enter the stairs whereas there are many accounts of south tower occupants having done so. If this is indeed the south tower, it is likely that this person attempted to descend either stairway B or Ccllv. Also a security guard who worked for a company on the 84th floor and used to be employed by Summit Security believes there is no way that stairways B & C could have survived the collapse given their location.clv If stairway B was destroyed by the impact, it is highly likely that the more southern stairway, C, would have been destroyed as well. The only evidence to the contrary is that the first person to descend from the 84th floor (who ran from the elevator) may have switched stairwells, from A to another one, somewhere at or right below the impact floors; (see below) however it is likely that this person simply exited and re-entered stairway A in a lower transfer hallway. This will be resolved when we receive floor plans from Port Authority. More directly, I am going to request an interview with a person reported to have seen that stairways B & C were demolished. The Times estimates that approximately three hundred people remained alive at or above the impact floors, a lower number than in the north tower because many had evacuated, though probably a higher percentage. Also people were spread across a larger number of floors, making conditions more tolerable and leading to less necessity to break windows. Several 911 calls between 9:15 and 9:20 indicate people alive on the actual floors of impact but stuck in bad conditions.clvi The survivor from the 78th floor sky lobby has heard that the man in the red bandanna moved many injured, but living, people into stairwells for emergency workers to retrieve.clv" On the 84th floor, a company security Letter to OSHA written by victim's son: apparently a person on a lower staircase suggested that son try to jump down but parent surmises that he would not have wanted to leave other civilians behind; clv Int Jerry Banks, Euro Brokers; clvl Call from 84th floor reporting people dying of suffocation; call from 80th floor reporting stairwells blocked and very hot and hard to breathe (John Andreacchio, Fuji Bank); 9:30 caller reporting husband stuck on 83rd floor; dvii Int Judy Wein; dlv

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official moved injured people to the northwest corner of the floor to await rescue.clvl" This effort was still going on when the building collapsed. A person, apparently from the 82nd floor, called 911 to report that the door to stairway C on the 78th floor was locked.cllx As theorized about the north tower, it seems conditions were least urgent between the impact floors and those at the very top at the building. Callers from the 88th and 89th floors01" called mainly for advice on how to proceed. While they did report smoke, conditions did not appear to be nearly as urgent as those on floors below or above. One call from the 86th floor reported smoke and pitch black conditions at 9:19 AM.clxi However, it was not until approximately 9:45 that callers on the 88th and 89th floors indicated heightened distress0'"11, hi a letter to OSHA however, the mother of an employee of an 88th floor company0'"111 states that her son was unable to search for the stairs because every time he put his foot down, it went through the floor. Stairs were reported locked between the 87th and 89th stairs, trapping people up there.olxiv Also, a call to the PA police desk from the 90th floor suggests that people were trapped with smoke conditions.clxv Between 9:25 and 9:30, calls reported heavy smoke on the west side of the 97th floor, as well as tremendous smoke conditions on the 105th floor.clxvi At around this time, there were also reports of people stuck on the 99th and 103rd floors though the conditions of the floor were not described. A person called from a northwest conference room on the 100th floor at 9:16 AM, reporting that smoke was killing him.olxv11 There is also a call as late as 9:38 AM from the 105th floor asking which way to go, and another stating that the floor crumbled somewhere in the nineties. There are several other calls during this time period in which the caller does not state which tower he is in; as the floors and conditions correspond to those above, one can assume the calls came from the south tower. As in the north tower, 911 callers were generally advised to stay put and wait for help. As mentioned above, one caller indicates that there was an announcement to go to the stairs, but we have heard a conflicting announcement in the background of the 911 call at

dvm Int Jerry Banks; JB was communicating with senior security officials on the 84th by walkie-talkie from his location on Broadway and Liberty; after the first plane hit, he was carried down the stairs in a swarm of people and ended up exiting the building; he apparently maintained communication with co-workers inside the building via company walkie-talkies the whole way down the stairs: 0 lx Unclear if person is inside or out of stairwell; sounds like outside, though puzzling that doors would be locked from outside in; however, there was obviously a lot of trouble with stairways and doors, perhaps because of the deviation in the staircase; ch Offices of Keefe Brayette & Woods;. cb" Jeremiah Ahearn, NYS Department of Taxation and Finance clxu Calls at 9:40 indicating people can't see and are breaking windows; 9:45 call from Eric Thorpe, coughing and saying "we need help." This person reportedly called his wife Linda Perry Thorpe as well. ckiii Keefe Bruyette & Woods; clxiv PA transcripts, Vol II, Ch. 9, p. 29 cbtv Vol. II, Ch. 10, p. 25; not asking for advice, just calling to report themselves; clxvi George Bishop, Aon ch™ Most likely an Aon employee

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9:19.clxvin Unlike in the north tower, however, the lack of, or conflicting, advice these people received may have had a much more devastating impact, as better advice might have led them to a safe exit down stairway A. To determine the viability of stairway A as an exit for people on floors above the impact, some analysis obviously needs to be done. We know that stairway A was passable from at least the 91st floor down; from that we can conclude that it was probably passable from top to bottom, as the floors above the 91st were farther removed from the impact and therefore less likely to be damaged. However, even if the stairway itself was passable, it does not mean that all of the six-hundred some odd people trapped on upper floors could reach it. Survivors from impact floors reported tremendous debris; this could have obstructed people from reaching the stairs, either by trapping them or blocking staircase entrances. As mentioned above, a 911 caller from the 80th floor indicated that the stairways were blocked. This is a distinct possibility for other floors in the zone of impact, e.g. 79 - 84. On the other hand, we know that the survivor from the 84th floor was able to squeeze from stairway A onto the 81st floor and back. We also know that access to stairway A on the 84th floor itself was unobstructed. It is therefore likely that entrances higher up would have remained intact, as eighty-four was the highest floor to be damaged directly by the plane. Equally the survivor who ascended to the 91st floor states that people were in fact entering stairway A from floors above eighty-four. Still people may have blocked from even reaching the stairway entrance. While there were no real reports of fire on upper floors, many indicated debilitating smoke conditions which could have been disorienting and may have put callers in too much physical distress to search for stairs. On the other hand, there were many callers who appeared to be physically able to descend and were in fact calling for instructions on how to do so. For example, one person actually asks to be connected to someone who knows where the stairs are and is specifically told not to go to the stairs because it is worse there; he is on the 88th floor where stairway A was passable and likely accessible. Also, there were at least a hundred people alive on the 88l and 89th floors, one group in the northwest corner closest to stairway A; a person in this group was told to "stay where you're at; you don't want to be wandering around that building." Even if not all such people could have made it to stairway A, it is likely that many would have been able to. Equally some might have been able to reach other stairways, still intact above the impact, from which they could have transferred into stairway A on re-entry floors. With no information, they were probably not inclined to go on a wild goose chase. But knowing there was an actual viable way out, they would probably have been motivated to find it. Even if it meant having to pass through dangerous conditions, it was still a better option than remaining there to die, as it was unlikely that people on high floors would have survived long enough to be rescued even if the building had not collapsed.

were probably not as many calls to the Fire command center in the lobby as everyone who could get to the center of the floor to call down would probably have just kept going.

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The more difficult question is whether there was a way to get this information to these people, which would involve a two-step process. First, relevant authorities would have to obtain this information; then they would have to transmit it. The first part is the trickier one, as it would depend on on-the-spot communication between emergency personnel and the people who descended stairway A from impact floors. Though there were in fact only several such people, there may have been many with relevant information. Therefore, rescue workers would have been well-advised to have stationed themselves at the bottom of the three staircases asking people what floors they came from. If the floor was at or near the impact, the rescue workers could conclude that that stairway was in tact from there up. This would have taken some organization, as there were thousands of civilians evacuating and rescue workers wanted to get them to safety. But given the huge number of emergency personnel, there were certainly enough to get this done without wasting too much time.clxlx Even if people had to be taken off other jobs, it would have been a highly valuable use of resources. However, none of the people who descended from impact floors was questioned by authorities on the ground.clxx (See below) Most of them reached the lobby after the general evacuation was concluded, when the lobby was essentially empty. Also, the timing of their descent, as well as the physical condition of many, would certainly have indicated that they came from affected floors. It is true that the majority of these people exited the building shortly before the south tower collapsed, making any information they were able to transmit effectively moot in terms of helping further people to escape; even if the people got the information right away, they would not have had time to descend upwards of seventy-eight floors. However, the collapse of the south tower, like the fact of the second plane hitting, is a variable that no one anticipated. Therefore, the fact of its occurrence cannot retroactively condemn or justify a decision; whether the information about stairway A could have actually saved the lives of people who received it does not change the fact that it would have been helpful for emergency workers to pursue it. Additionally, at least one person reached the lobby well before the south tower collapsed, likely in enough time for people to have actually used the information to escape. If received, rescue workers could have been transmitted the information to the fire safety directors in charge of the building to announce over the PA. system; even if it was not working on certain floors, they would have had the information for people called down. Ideally it could have been transmitted to 911 operators as well. One should not necessarily fault relevant authorities for not theorizing and executing this somewhat involved procedure but it is worth considering in the context of making recommendations for the future. A more straightforward "mistake" on the part of authorities was their failure to inform civilians that a rooftop evacuation had been ruled out. As discussed above, there was literally no downside to making this fact known and, unlike in the north tower, the failure cixix Basically all they would have to ask civilians for was their floor; as they would be stationed at the bottom of the staircase, they would obviously know which staircase the civilian descended. aii 4 people from the 81st floor and above, and 1 from the 78th floor sky lobby; others descended from the sky lobby, but that was essentially "below" the impact.

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to do so may have had a material impact. A group of at least 200 people is reported to have gone to the roof in search of rescue, led by a window washer with a key.clxxi As it turned out, they were not able actually to get onto the rooflxx". However, they wasted valuable time attempting to pursue this option instead of looking for a way down. Others appear to have considered this possibility as well. As mentioned above, a 911 caller from the 88th floor asked if he should go up or down. The answer was inconclusive, but he was not advised to go down in no uncertain terms. Given his location it is highly possible that he could have gotten to stairway A. If civilians knew that that a rooftop rescue had been conclusively ruled out, they would have been much more likely to attempt to proceed down even if it meant passing through zones of danger. A combination of this and the information about the stairway might have led many to safety. The information about the roof should have been passed to the fire safety director in the building, 911 operators and any other person who may have been fielding calls from civilians. [No first-hand information on evacuation from lower floors;] The first of the people to descend stairway A was likely the man who ran there from the elevator on the 84th floor. When he entered the staircase, it was black with smoke and unlit, except for the glow stripes on the stairs and banisters. He used them to make his way down a few flights where his descent was obstructed by a wall. He was able to open a door on one side of him which led onto a floor with normal conditions, e.g., no smoke, functioning electricity. There he heard someone yell, don't take that staircase, take this staircase. He followed the voice to a group of about five people which he followed into either another staircase or another entrance to stairway A. The "second" staircase he entered was in good condition and well lit.clxxi" In the group of five was a receptionist from his company and two men who were helping a woman who was bleeding. This was at approximately 9:05 AM, right after the plane hit. This person then went straight down a couple more flights where he encountered two people who said they could not pass. He found a piece of drywall blocking the staircase and lifted it up to banister level to pass under it and kept going. One flight down was a similar obstruction which he was able to jump onto and slide over. A co-worker remembers meeting him before this point and helping him move the sheetrock walls out of the way, but he recalls passing through by I am attempting to find this person, Roko Camaj's, son Vinny, whom he called. In addition to being physically opened with a key, the lock to the door had to be triggered by a buzzer from a 22nd floor command center. By the time civilians reached the roof, the station had been evacuated or destroyed. cixxm jnt Rjcnarc[ pern; after an extensive conversation with RF, he concluded that he was stopped at a floor with a transfer hall; although he originally believed it was the upper transfer hall, it is much more likely, based on the normal condition of the floor he entered, that it was the lower one. This would make sense if it can be determined that the stairway juts out on the 84* floor and there was an entrance at the northernmost end, as he remembers walking straight down. We must get floors plans for these floors from Port Authority. The question then remains whether he re-entered stairway A or switched to another one, most likely B based on where it is; this would run contrary to the evidence of B & C being destroyed unless the damage was higher up. If there are 2 entrances to stairway A on these hallway floors he might have simply entered at the other end where conditions were better because of an intervening door. He is certain he began his descent in stairway A. Also, he encountered a Euro Brokers receptionist who is still alive; apparently she does not remember what floor she was on, but perhaps floors plans could help her if she agrees to meet with us.

clxxi

clxx"

27

himself. If this is indeed stairway A, it may account for why later evacuees were able to get down from this point relatively unobstructed, though no one mentions this second obstruction. At some point, this person switched to the facilities channels on his company walkie-talkie and heard communications between security officials on the ground and on the 84th floor. One of them apparently walked from somewhere in the 50's, where he had been escorting evacuees, back up to the 84th floor after the plane hit to assist in further evacuation and to help the injured.0 At some point between the 70's and the 30's a man with a neck injury ran past the person descending from the 84th floor; otherwise he passed only a handful of people on the stairs, most of them elderly or overweight. At approximately the 2nd or 3rd floor, or possibly the mezzanine level, he encountered about five firefighters going up. This was at about 9:25 AM. In the lobby, he got to the center elevator banks where the freight elevators were and saw mostly NYPD, PAPD, security guards and a man with a head injury propped up against the wall. He was directed by Port Authority security to the concourse where emergency personnel were stationed approximately every thirty feet and directed him towards the 5 WTC exit. One female cop told him not to use his cell phone because it would use up needed signals. He was not questioned by any authorities about what floor he had descended from or what staircase he took. It is likely that the survivor from the 78th floor descended stairway A after this point. However, she and her two co-workers also were the only people in the stairs and she does not recall drywall blocking her pathclxxv. She describes the stairs as "bright and clear" and the conditions as fairly normal. If there was any debris, it had already been removed, except at one area where they had to go under an obstruction, like a fallen pipe, and another where they had to walk through a puddle with a wire in it. Somewhere in the 70's they encountered a non-uniformed person communicating on a walkie-talkie.clxxvi She told him about the injured people on the 78th floor and he ran up and down past them and then back up again. Somewhere in the 60's they began encountering firefighters climbing the stairs who told them to go to the 40th floor for help. They saw about three or four sets of firefighters in all, who were in full gear and looked very tired. This was at approximately 9:30 AM. On the 40th floor, they met 1 firefighter and 2 Summit security guards who got them some water and took them (1 FF and 1 guard) down to the lobby in a small elevator.0 xxvn There they were turned over to a uniformed female security guard with a walkie-talkie who escorted them through the concourse to the designated exit on Church St out of 5 WTC. When the two people from the 81st floor began their descent down stairway A, they were the only ones in the staircase as well. During the entire descent, which spanned from about 9:05 to 9:40, they did not encounter any emergency personnel on the stairs. Near clxxiv

See Int's Richard Fern, Brian Clark, Jerry Banks re Jose Merrero, who died in collapse; It is possible that these people were not in stairway A, though I believe that the general consensus is that they were; we need to resolve discrepancies between this account and that of Richard Fern who descended from the 84th floor and may or may not have switched stairways near this point. ck™ Could be a PA civilian? Or perhaps a fire warden or security official from a company. c xxvn gee jn^ ju<jy \yeui- JW believes it may have been internal elevator for the 40th floor company; JW's husband heard reports that the very next elevator to make this trip got stuck and was destroyed in collapse; clxxv

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the impact floors the stairways were in bad shape. While the innermost layer of drywall, e.g., closest to the core, appeared to have held, the outer two layers (closest to the stairs) had blown onto the stairs, laying flat in some areas like a slide, and in other places, laying on an angle, propped up by the railing so that you would either have to lift it up or crawl underneath to pass. There was also a lot of water on the stairs. Flames were visible through cracks in the wall around the 78th floor but there were no roaring infernos. By the 74th floor, it was pretty much normal conditions, e.g., fresh air, lights on, maybe a little water. On the 68th floor, they met another fire warden from the first man's company who was actually ascending the stairs. (See above) On the 44th floor, they entered the lower sky lobby where they found a security guard [either South Asian or African American] waiting with a younger, severely injured Caucasian man of possibly Italian descent. The guard indicated that he did not have a working phone and asked them to call for help. They stopped on the 31st floor, a re-entry floor, where, after checking for heat, they found a workable phone which they used to call 911 at approximately 9:35 AM. Although the caller indicated that he was in the process of evacuating the south tower, 911 operators kept him on the phone for several minutes, during which he was asked to repeat the information several times. He finally reiterated the message and said they had to go. [They ended up escaping the complex just minutes before the south tower collapsed]. In the lobby, they were directed by a female security official (probably PA because no FF or police gear) to evacuate through the concourse and exit to the east near Sam Goody on Liberty Street. As they were exiting the lobby, the person rescued from the 81st floor noticed many firefighters and some police and EMS workers performing light triage, all of whom seemed to be in a daze. He yelled for them to go, that there was no one up there (as he believed everyone else to be dead) but they were "belching out: orders to run to Liberty, yelling don't look up or around, just run. As he exited the lobby, he saw them continuing to run the other way, e.g., in the direction of the stairs he had just come from. Additional firefighters were also continuing to enter the building. In the concourse there was random activity of firefighters, most getting themselves organized, not giving any specific instructions to civilians. As they exited the concourse and came out 4 of WTC, a firefighter told them, "If you're going to cross Liberty Street, you've got to go for it" (referring to danger of falling debris). One of the men asked if he should look up to determine an appropriate time to go, but the firefighter said no, they should just go for it. He looked up anyway and they managed to cross safely and made it to Trinity Church by the time the south tower collapsed minutes later. By the time the person from the 91st floor descended, he was the only person on the stairs. Between the 80's and the 40's, the conditions in the stairs were normal. In the forties, he ran into three firefighters who were climbing. He told them he was having trouble breathing and they directed him to continue downstairs for help. He also passed an injured lady being assisted by a man; they were proceeding but at a slower pace. [Based on the timing these people probably died in the collapse]. At the plaza level, he was directed by a female Port Authority worker to exit through the concourse. He attempted to exit onto Liberty Street but was stopped by police men who, along with

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firefighters, who were in the lobby. The concourse was fairly empty, although he ran into a colleague from the 84th floor. Not far across the concourse, the south tower began to fall. A fireball came across the lobby and engulfed this person; he woke up four days later in the hospital. It is indeterminable how many deaths occurred below the impact in the south tower. USA Today reports that only four people died, but goes onto say that six died from Morgan Stanley. The discrepancy may be due to the fact that at least one MS employee was apparently at the WOW conference,0'"™" but it would be an odd way to put it. Presumably the people seen walking slowly in the stairs, e.g., overweight and elderly people, were unable to make it out before the tower collapsed. Equally the injured person in the 44th floor (a Morgan Stanley floor) and the guard waiting with him would have died. There was also a 911 call from the 73rd floor (also an MS floor) at 9:16.clxxix In addition to that, a group of people died in an elevator that got stuck on approximately the 12th floor when the building was hit. These people entered the south tower after the north tower was hit and were apparently not discouraged from doing so by security personnel on the ground.clxxx An OSHA letter also references a group of people who got stuck in an elevator between the 50 and 55th floors, at least one of whom went back (apparently from the lobby) to collect his belongings after hearing the PA announcement that the building was secure.clxxxl Outside the towers, 911 calls continued throughout the morning, both from people reporting the events, and from relatives attempting to seek advice about loved ones. Those in the latter category were generally advised to watch the news. A person also called from the Marriott thinking a bomb had gone off there (8:50) SURROUNDING AREA Emergency personnel were obviously too focused on the towers to pay too much attention to nearby apartment buildings and offices. 911 callers from nearby locations were mostly told to use their judgment as to whether or not to evacuate. Civilians generally evacuated at key points in the morning, either after one of the two planes, or after the south tower collapsed. Many civilians self-evacuated and some left on the instructions of building security. Residents from Battery Park City apartments were directed towards the water where they were ordered onto ferries to Jersey City. By the el""™ A friend who knew this person gave me this information; cixxix £ajj g-om west sj,je of the building; the caller asked for evacuation procedures, saying the "idiots" had fire alarms but he can't [inaudible]; he then asks for WTC security because the FD told him to stay but he didn't think that was a good idea as he heard an explosion and there's smoke; the operator doesn't have the number for WTC security, so she calls the FD which confirms that he should stay, that it is worse in the hallways, but caller says room is filling with smoke and soon oxygen will be gone. He does not indicate whether there are other people with them. cixxx gee jn^ grjan qajk who heard account from co-worker's mother who was in communication with her daughter in the elevator, trapped and alive, apparently with other people; daughter was Michelle Scarpitta of Euro Brokers: cixxxi Lefter writer's husband worked on 61st floor of south tower: while stuck in elevator with his partner. they communicated out via walkie-talkie.

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time the south tower collapsed, most people were on their way out of the area. (More details on this later). PA transcripts state that all surrounding buildings are being evacuated.clxxxii A caller reports that a weird lady left a rented U-haul truck at a parking garage between 9th and 10th Avenue (430 W. 37th Sfl before WTC incident and he is suspicious.clxxxiii COLLAPSES At the time the south tower collapsed, the building seemed to have pretty much emptied below the impact floors, suggesting that everyone who could and knew how to get out had done so. One can conclude that the lower floors of north tower would have been pretty empty as well, as the evacuation there began twenty minutes sooner, hi support of this, we know that people from the 91st floor of the north tower, the highest to be able to descend, were through the concourse and onto Church Streetclxxxiv by the time the south tower collapsed. The person who descended from the 80th floor, who encountered trouble evacuating, had just ascended the escalator from the concourse at the top of 5 WTC when the south tower collapsed. While many describe the concourse as fairly empty, she recalls being in a line of people, almost like a human chain. When the tower collapsed, she was thrown into the plate glass window of Borders Bookstore. She became unconscious and later awoke on a pile of bodies and body parts. She believes that everyone in the line behind her died. Those alive were trapped in the concourse and did not make it out until firefighters managed to break through the glass windows of Borders bookstore. Another survivor from the north tower recalls the concourse as having been very crowded when she exited it just minutes before the south tower collapsed0 xxxv. A 911 call at 10:02 reported people trapped in a store at 116 Fulton Street but they eventually say they are going to leave.clxxxvi Also a call from 44 Beaver Street at 10:05 saving they cannot get out of the building: there is smoke outside: the operator tells them this is a state of emergency and puts on hold for FD. caller reiterates that there was a blast and the calls ends.clxxxv" Also a call at 10:04 reporting Paramedic Lt. Rene Pazella trapped on 1st floor of Hilton Hotel across the street from the WTC.clxxxviii Call at 10:10 reporting 40 people stuck in a restaurant at Rector and Trinity.clxxxix One at 10:10 from 120 Cedar St 4 floor stating across the street from the WTC and the front door of the building is blocked and everything, gets through to FD who will send somebody.cxc At 10:07, person reporting friend trapped with a police office in the truck dock at 225 clxxxii clxxxiii

cixxxiv Qaire Mclntyre had was just exiting the concourse when the tower fell; Francis Calton had just crossed Church Street; clxxxv Int. Ellen Levin cixxxvi Cajjers want to know wnat happened; everything fell over, Tape 34, T3816, GD. cixxxvii Call from Dr Malik from Dept Of sanitation Clinic, Tape 35, #1, GD. 6> T3833> #1> GD

clxxxix

cxc

Tape39,T3916,#l,GD.

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Liberty St (Tower 2), repeats facts to supervisor and call ends.cxcl Caller reports at 10:08 that his wife and about 100 people are trapped at 90 Williams St with fire and smoke outside the building and they can't get out, repeats to FD and call ends.cxc" According to many, the streets were pretty clear of civilians, and those who were there were trying to get away from the scene. On Church Street, where people were exiting, there were emergency workers directing civilians to move away and walk north or east, though at least one survivor recalls the streets being very crowdedcxc"1. The two people who had exited the concourse from 4 WTC had made it to Trinity Church by the time the tower had collapsed. One remembers the streets being empty, though the other remembers thousands of civilians stopped to watch. A person who evacuated from a nearby officecxciv right after the collapse said there were emergency personnel directing traffic firmly and directing hundreds of people east and north. THE MARRIOTT According to a Marriott website, between nine and eleven hotel guests were "unaccounted for" after the day. It is not known if they died in the building or were elsewhere in the complex, remains of the people trapped in the lobby have never been identified. At 10:16 caller reports getting a call from his manager at the Marriott, who is trapped in the front lobby by the bell closet w/ 2 FF's; asks FD is he should have the manager and FF's yell or something: FD will send someone.cxcv PROBLEMS ON SEPT 11th Other than the announcement for civilians to remain in WTC 2 after WTC 1 was hit—the wisdom of which is debatable—most of the shortcomings of the emergency operation were attributable to poor communications. 911 operators were not equipped to handle the volume and nature of the calls they received. Emergency personnel at the site were not organized to obtain key information and lack of inter-agency coordination prevented any information which was obtained from being passed to key authorities. The best way to address this problem would be to have representatives of relevant authorities based at one physical location, like an OEM office, which itself would be located in a safe place. There, information could be received from representatives stationed at the scene an incident, analyzed, coordinated, and transmitted to people at incident command. In the case of September 11th, information would be transmitted to building fire safety directors who would then announce up-to-date instructions over the PA system (assuming the PA system worked; if not, they would at least have the information for people who called down). There would be back-up 911 operators and all CXC1

'Tape40,T3919,#l,GD. "Tape43,T4090,#1, GD. 111 Int Ellen Levin; references crowds of people running up Broadway on TV. iv Int John Wilcox, 17 State St, 28th floor; :v Tape39,T3916,#l,GD.

cxcii

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911 calls would be directed to this location. However, civilians who could hear the PA would be advised not to call 911 unless they had information to report, or were in need of specific assistance, i.e., handicapped, trapped in a room, rather than simply seeking advice. Any information reported by civilians could also be circulated through authorities at the central location and transmitted back to incident command. Civilians could be instructed on the procedure during fire drills. Knowing that the system would yield the best, most-up-to-date information, they would feel comfortable being guided by it in emergency situations. This is obviously a Utopian model, but its basic structure is not untenable. More technical problems that occurred on September 11th were: 1) the fact that PA system apparently ceased to function on some or all impact floors, thwarting even hypothetical attempts to convey life-saving information; and 2) that the stairwells were too narrow. Recommendations correcting these problems would be useful. As to fire drills, civilians varied on whether they found them helpful. At least one person said they caused him to know where the stairs were on September 11th. Others said they did not pay much attention (as often happens) and suggested they would have been more helpful if civilians were actually taken onto the stairs. Therefore, while full evacuation drills might be unfeasible in buildings of that height, it could be useful to have civilians enter the stairways and possibly even begin a descent as part of standard fire drill exercises. Civilians who were at the towers in 1993 found the physical improvements to the building very helpful. QUESTIONS TO ADDRESS AT HEARING: (based on family members' and survivors' complaints) 1) Why the PA announcement was made? 2) Why the rooftop decision was made? (civilians don't seem to be focused on the fact that it wasn't communicated, just that it didn't happen) 3) What improvement were made since 1993? How they helped? 4) Stairways too narrow. 5) Locked Stairs 6) Fire drill/preparation/instruction

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