Ny B16 9-11 Calls Fdr- 5-19-04 Matsis Letter Re Wtc And Helicopter Rescues 086

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DEMOSTHENES MATSIS 9/11 Personal Privacy

May 19, 2004 Commissioners The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 301 7th Street, SW Washington, D.C 20407 RE:

Turf Wars and Official Malfeasance In The Response To The 9-11 Attacks

Commissioners: By 9:37:35 A.M. on September 1 1 , 2001, a jet fighter was was patrolling the Manhattan airspace after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center ["911 Log of Terror," The Daily News, September 30, 2001, page 7J. Between 9 A.M. and:.,.. 11 A.M., above my home, a police helicopter hovered in place at 89th Street, off the Hudson River, while six miles away the two towers of the World Trade Center were in flames and 1,100 survivors of the initial impacts were locked behind the roof doors of the stricken towers, and no attempt to rescue them with the six available, ten passenger, police helicopters was undertaken ["Fighting To Live As The Towers Died: The History From Messages of Victims," The New York Times, May 26, 2002, page 22]. THE FIRE CHIEF'S TURF BATTLE In a March 25, 1993 letter to Mayor Dinkins the New York City Fire Chiefs Association ferociously denounced the Mayor and his Police Commissioner for their helicopter rescue of 28 medically impaired people who had evacuated to the roof following the February 26, 1993 terrorist bombing of the basement of the WTC North Tower. Thereafter a "1994 Response Protocol" was accepted by Mayor Giuliani, and the Police Department, which barred the use of helicopters to do rescues until a request was made by the Fire Chiefs ["No Escape: Could Helicopters Have saved People ...," Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2001, page A-14 (4)]. Deputy Chief Peter Hayden, who was in charge of the Fire Department's command post in the North Tower Lobby on Septem-

ber 11, 2001, said that he and other department brass made a decision to begin withdrawing firefighters from the Tower minutes after the second plane crashed into the South Tower at 9:03 A.M. ["Radios Hindered Bravest," The Daily News, December 19, 2001, page 5]. Despite the limited risk from an accidental rescue helicopter crash and the additional debris, and despite the cancellation of the "internal rescue option" by the fire Chiefs, neither the Chiefs, nor the Fire Commissioner, nor Mayor Giuliani requested a police helicopter rescue as a last resort. In light of the fact that the Los Angeles Fire Department has its own six-helicopter rescue wing, and in light of the fact that helicopters have rescued workers from burning oilrigs in the darkness of night and smoke, and heat, The September 1 1 , 2001 adherence to a limited respoRser Protocol, i.e., internal evacuations only, was a reckless disregard for life. THE PORT AUTHORITY'S TURF BATTLE During the February 26, 1993 bombing of the WTC, personnel of the NYPD Aviation Unit had to pry open the roof door of the North Tower and had to clear away sub-antennae to permit a landing. After the emergency, the private and rogue Port of Authority of New York and New Jersey rejected a Police Department recommendation that a portion of the one acre roof be kept clear. The Port Authority replaced the sub-antennae and relocked the roof-doors at both WTC Towers without installing an inside panic-bar lock release which could have been monitored by a local alarm and/or by the Port Authority's 22nd floor control room. ["No Escape: ...," Supra, October 23, 2001, page A-1 (2) and page A-14 (4).] Neither Mayor Giuliani, nor the NYC Buildings Department, nor the Fire Department pressed the Port Authority as to the legality of its Building Code Violation and its criminal recklessness was allowed. THE MAYOR'S TURF BATTLE In 1997 former Mayor Giuliani transferred responsibiltiy for major NYC emergencies from the Police Department to the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management. On June 7, 1999 Mayor Giuliani opened his $13 million Emergency Crisis Center at 7 WTC, and the Mayor thereby rendered superfluous the established Police Crisis Center located at the nearby Police Headquarters Building at One Police Plaza.

On January 2000 Mayor Giuliani replaced Police Commissioner Howard Safir with his personal hand puppet, Bernard Kerik. ["Police Dept. and Emergency Agency Seem To Be In Turf Wars," The New York Times, December 24, 1999, page B-1 . ] THE POLICE TURF WAR RESPONSE NYPD Aviation Officer Greg Semendinger, a 1993 WTC roof-top rescues stated that the wind cleared from a corner of the North Tower right of its collapse at 10:28 A.M. on September 1 1 , survivors could have safely gathered there and ["No Escape: ...," Supra, page A-1, Par. 11.]

veteran of the kept the smoke up to the time 2001, and been rescued.

At 9:06:41 A.M., after the Fire Department's 9:03 A.M. cancellation of the internal rescue operation, and when no request for a police-helicopter rescue was made by the Fire Chiefs or the Mayor, in deference to the 1994 Response Protocol, Police Air-Sea Unit Number 14 reported to 911 Dispatchers that he was unable to land on the roof. Although the Fire Chiefs and the Mayor had ended rescue operations, as late as 10:12:35 A.M. a male survivor called 911 Dispatchers for help ["911 Log ...," Supra, page 7]. THE 9-11 AFTERMATH The Port of Authority of NY/NJ policies and practices continue to be jurisdictionally immune from public oversight, and the victims of the WTC collapse and the country paid the emotional cost and legal price of its recklessness. The Towers that will replace the WTC will have a spire and no roof or helipad. Fire drills helped sone 24,700 survivors below the impact of the plane crashes evacuate themselves. Rank-and-file Firemen, by internal rescue, helped some 300 survivors below the crashes evacuate. The Fire Chiefs, the Police Commissioner, and Mayor Giuliani, the principal incident commanders, could have rescued the 1,100 guests, workers, and mothers and fathers above the crash impact, but they saved none. On 9-11 the Al Queda enemy made an extraordinary attack on the World Trade Center, and an extraordinary response was required by the City's Incident Commanders. Sadly, The Fire Chiefs began a general retreat at 9:03 A.M. without trying an alternative response by way of police helicopters for the purpose of escape evaluation and rescue. Neither Mayor Giuliani, nor Police Commissioner Kerik stepped up to order police helicopters to evaluate the upper stairwells and to make rescues.

Former Mayor Giuliani and his Commissioners will have to live with their scandalous response and retreat. The current Commissioners Scopetta and Kelly offer little more by way of a future "full" response. Sincerely submitted for your consideration.

cc: Mayor Bloomberg

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