Ny B10 (3) Mcallan- Richard Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Letters- Memos- Govt And Press Reports (1st Pgs For Reference) 494
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Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2003 14:30:24 -0500 From: "" <jfarmer@9-11 commission.gov> ft To: "" <[email protected]>4P,"" 41 Subject: Fwd: Another Call Part(s): S\ unnamed text/html 2.47 KB 1j&
Forwarded message from Dan Leopold Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2003 13:55:39 -0500 From: Dan Leopold Reply-To: "" Subject: Another Call To: "" <[email protected]>, "" I just received a call from Richard McAllan, the gentleman who sent the fax last week that I forwarded to you. He would like to talk to you more in depth about the FDNY's radio system, and why it wasn't fixed in a timely manner. His cell number is | |, and his fax number is .1 I I t--.....He would like his phone numbers and correspondence wi.th the Commission to"remain confidential.
Thanks,
""--•-...... 9/11 Personal Privacy
Dan
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12/3/2003
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George Delgrosso From:
Richard McAllan |
Sent:
Saturday, December 06, 2003 3:03 PM
To:
George Delgrosso
|
Subject: Patient Steering by Private Hospital Ambulances Please find then NYC Comptroller Hevisi's June 2001 Press Release concerning his study on patient steering by private hospitals attached. These ambulances are directly operated by New York Hospital and about 15 other private hospitals in NYC. They are dispatched on NYC 911 requests For ambulances by the NYC EMS 911 Dispatcher. Shortly after the sample period ended, the commercial ambulances were added to the EMS system and are also dispatched by the EMS dispatcher on officially received 911 calls. So the already bad patient steering situation described in this report has gotten worse since then. Of course §1 patient steering is supposed to be a violation of the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute but that law doesn't seem to apply in NYC.
RJM
12/8/2003
Mail :: INBOX: Cover Letter to 9-11 Commission
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From: Richard McAllan | To: '9-11 Commission NYC'^ Subject: Cover Letter to 9-11 Commission Part{s): ^29-11 Comm Nov 24 2003.pdf application/pdf 422.37 KB ^j
Here is a copy of my cover letter to Mr. Felzenberg, dated Nov 24, 2003.
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12/4/2003
/'9/11 P e r s o n a l Privacy
Richard J. McAllan
November 24, 2003
Mr. Al Felzenberg Deputy for Communications National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street, SW Room 5125 Washington, D.C. 20407 Re.
Failure of FDNY Radios at the 9-11 Disaster
Dear Mr. Felzenberg: I read in Friday's newspaper that Mayor Bloomberg is resisting the 9-11 Commission's subpoena for information relating to the NYC Fire Department's emergency preparedness at the 9/11/2001 disaster. While I certainly agree with the Mayor that there are legitimate security and privacy issues involved here, I am deeply concerned that Mayor Bloomberg is trying to "cover up" the NYC Fire Department's deplorable lack of emergency radio preparedness at the 9/11 disaster. With that said, let me state clearly that I do admire the heroism of the thousands of emergency professionals who entered those Towers while they were burning out of control. Given the early collapse of the WTC Towers, many of those rescuers who were on the upper floors were not going to get out in time no matter what kind of communications and/or other emergency equipment they were carrying. However, it is my position that the overwhelmed FDNY VHP radio system, which was in use by FDNY at 9/11, could have contributed to the high number of Firefighter casualties when the Towers collapsed. Certainly the Firefighters would have a better chance of hearing an evacuation order at the 9/11 disaster if the City had timely corrected the same type of FDNY radio deficiencies which were documented at the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing. l And while I understand that we can't change this tragedy, perhaps some responsibility and accountability on the part of the agencies involved will come out of this horrible disaster. In April of this year I prepared a comprehensive letter for US Representative Maloney on this radio failure subject. This letter attempts to explain some of the 9/11 technical radio issues involved in this disaster. I have just faxed a copy of that letter to you for the Commission to use as a starting point in the 9/11 emergency preparedness investigation. For the Commission's information, the Bloomberg Administration retaliated against me for providing this letter to the Congressperson by eliminating my permanent civil service position as an EMS Paramedic in EMS Telemetry Control within 48 hours of when the City learned about the existence of this letter. By way of background, in March of 2001 there was a major FDNY portable radio scandal revealed in New York City. Apparently the Giuliani Administration had been secretly purchasing thousands of digital Motorola portable radios for the NYC Fire Department starting in 1999. After these radios suffered dangerous failures in field service when a Firelighter in distress couldn't be heard on the digital radio, the NYC Comptroller investigated the purchase of the digital radios. Then NYC Comptroller Hevisi found that the portable radios had been unlawfully purchased because the Giuliani Administration had not obtained prior capital budget approval for this important purchase of radios. Comptoller Hevisi referred his finding to the NYC Department of Investigation but no report on this subject was ever publicly issued by DOI. When these revelations came to light, I called for Von Essen's resignation before the NYC Council because of his illegal purchase of the Motorola digital portable radios. A copy of the NYC Council briefing paper for that hearing is being faxed to you under separate cover. The Giuliani Administration was quick to retaliate against me following this testimony. Indeed, one of the central allegations of subsequently filed McAllan v Von Essen First Amendment Complaint is that Defendants Von Essen and Giuliani were retaliating against me for my April 2001 testimony before the NYC Council.
A comprehensive report on the 1993 WTC bombing, which includes this report by then FDNY Chief of Department Fusco, can be found at: http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdi7publications/tr-076.pdf [2003. July 17].
In May of this year I provided a copy of the Representative Maloney letter to the NYC City Corporation Counsel under my discovery obligations as part of my pending First Amendment lawsuit. Just two days later, the Bloomberg Administration eliminated my permanent job line as a Paramedic for EMS/FDNY. After I complained to Federal Court, I was returned to my Telemetry position on a temporary basis but my permanent job line remains eliminated at this time. As the 9-11 Commission may be aware, after Mayor Giuliani left office he took all of his official files and illegally secreted them in a secure warehouse in Queens. Mayor Bloomberg did not demand the return of these official files to City hands but rather cooperated with the former Mayor by allowing the original files to remain in Giuliani's possession before any duplicate copies were made. Thus, none of the former Mayor's files are available to members of the public under the NYS Freedom of information Law. In my view, this is why the Bloomberg Administration is "stonewalling" the important work of this Commission. I have so far been unable to access any of these files even though I have a pending First Amendment lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The City of New York Corporation Counsel has strongly resisted my attempts to gain access to those files. Rather, the City has called my request for relevant files a "fishing expedition" in Federal Court. I have recently filed a separate First Amendment lawsuit against Mayor Bloomberg and FDNY Commissioner Scoppetta which principally alleges continuing First Amendment retaliation and spoliation of evidence. I would respectfully suggest that the Commission use its subpoena powers to discover just what files former Mayor Giuliani has embargoed in the secure warehouse in Queens. I will provide the Commission with all of the FDNY radio information which I have been able to develop despite the City's efforts to keep the truth under wraps. Of course, the Commission can access other reports such as the McKinnsey Report on the Internet but these reports don't compare the FDNY radio failures at the 1993 WTC bombing with the same type of radio failures which FDNY later experienced at the 9/11 disaster. I have just forwarded the transcript of the FCC 911 Subcommittee Report on 9/11 to you by email. One of the most devastating documents in these attachments is FDNY's All Unit Circular # 179. This AUC was published after former FC Von Essen became Fire Commissioner in 1996. Section 8.3 states that only three or four FDNY VHF radio frequencies would
be available in certain areas of the City due to known radio interference problems. Given this fact, it is easy to see why the Fire Department's limited radio frequencies were overwhelmed and oversaturated on 9/11. This AUC has been forwarded to you by email. For reasons I can't explain, when the City of New York was granted additional radio frequencies by the FCC in 1995, they did not immediately deploy these UHF 480 Mhz radio frequencies as analog frequencies to relieve the overcrowded FDNY VHP analog radio system. This grant of additional radio spectrum from TV Channel 16 was ideal for New York City because both NYPD and NYC EMS already operated on UHF 470 Mhz frequencies. Thus, these additional UHF frequencies would have allowed one portable radio to communicate among the three principal emergency services of this City if these additional radio frequencies had been deployed correctly before 9/11. Giuliani apparently allowed the NYPD to license these additional UHF frequencies as conventional analog frequencies with the FCC. These additional NYPD UHF frequencies were operational by 1998. (These frequencies are licensed as analog frequencies in the FCC database.) FDNY, on the other hand, was apparently captured by the techies and was made to wait for an expensive digital trunked radio system which still has not materialized. (The FDNY frequencies are licensed as trunked frequencies in the FCC database.) According to what I have read, the experience of most American cities has shown these trunked radio systems to be expensive turkeys which are not reliable for emergency voice radio transmissions between dispatchers and emergency personnel in the field. When NYC EMS tried a trunked 800 Mhz radio system for voice dispatch some years ago, the trunked system was quickly abandoned for emergency voice transmissions because of unreliability of the digital voice signals. The EMS ambulances do have Mobil Data Terminals (MDT's) in the ambulances. These MDT's allow the EMS Dispatcher to transmit 911 dispatch information directly to the responding EMS ambulance. These MDT's do operate on 800 Mhz frequencies for data transmission purposes. In either event, as this letter is prepared, FDNY is still operating on the same antiquated 154 Mhz system which was in place on 9/11/2001 and at the 1993 WTC bombing. The City still has not deployed their available 480 Mhz frequencies on even an interim analog basis to correct the FDNY radio saturation problems found at the 9/11 disaster.
While the City has made a few interoperability changes with NYPD's proven analog voice dispatch radio system, FDNY does not have any additional radio frequencies in service for the firefighting field personnel post 9/11. In fact, even today, the Captain of a Fire Engine cannot contact the Fire Dispatcher directly if the engine company gets in trouble upstairs in a high rise fire and can't reach the Chief(s) commanding the fireground operation. This same shortsightedness by the FDNY Administration has led FDNY to remove the NYPD Division frequencies from the NYC EMS portables as well. For twenty years NYC EMS crews have enjoyed direct communications with NYPD Dispatchers and NYPD field units for enhanced safety and coordination of the EMS units with NYPD responders. Until FDNY turned the clock back on EMS, the EMS ambulances had direct radio communications with both EMS and NYPD Dispatchers. It is this kind of backwards FDNY thinking that poses such great risks to the emergency professionals in FDNY and EMS. I hope that this letter has shed some light on the communications problems which FDNY experienced at 9/11. I also hope that the truth of what happened at 9/11 will be brought to light so that the Bloomberg Administration would be forced to immediately upgrade the emergency preparedness of FDNY and EMS. It is certainly most unfortunate that the Mayor has chosen this route. But I respectfully urge toe Commission to act at once so that the citizens of NYC will enjoy better coordination of emergency services should NYC experience another terrorist attack in the future. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Should the Commission wish to reach me, please call me a\h is my home phone number. This line is usually
set to fax. My cell phone and voice mail number isj
|
Sincerely,
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Richard J. McAllan Senior Paramedic NYC EMS
9/11 Personal Privacy
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From: Richard McAllan \ To: '9-11 Commission NYC'^ Subject: [No Subject] Part(s): ^ 2 AP Story NIST Dec 2003.pdf
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^ 3 washingtonpost_com Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled.htm text/html
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Please find various stories about FDNY radios attached.
The MRT story is an interesting one and contrast with the "immediate fix" analog system which I advocated in my letter to Congresswoman Maloney in April of this year.
The FDNY's own AUC states at section 8.3 that only three or four 154 Mhz radio frequencies would be available for use in various parts of the City. Von Essen was Fire Commissioner when this AUC was issued. As you know, Von Essen was former UFA President and therefore had to know that the FDNY had deficient radios for years—at least since the 1993 WTC bombing.
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12/4/2003
washtngtonpost.com: Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled
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washingtonpost.com
Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled New System Being Tested
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By Clarence Williams Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, November 9,2003; Page COS
A technology and public safety team has been all over the District in recent weeks, visiting scores of nightclubs, apartment buildings, offices and other places as they tested the city's new emergency communications system.
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The troubleshooters targeted locations where emergency radios previously were apt to cut out, if they worked at all. Now, thanks to $40 million in improvements, police officers, firefighters and emergency medical crews are getting more dependable, clear signals, officials say. The system has been up and running since late September. Rick Burke, a wireless technology manager for the city, and a public safety team recently concluded weeks of crisscrossing the city to test it. They found that the changes have made a big difference in signal strength and sound quality, Burke said. "It's a major improvement. The city and its first responders are much safer now having a highly reliable, state-of-the art communications network," Burke said. District officials are touting the system as one of the most advanced in the nation. The federal government footed most of the bill in an aid package approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The fire department contributed nearly $3.5 million to the venture.
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This is not the first time that the city tried to fix the problem. It spent less than $6 million for a network that was put in operation in January 2001, but the system remained unreliable. Police officers, firefighters and rescue workers complained that poor communications continued to put them and citizens at risk -- on the streets, in burning buildings and even in hospitals. Digital fire radios would "honk out" - a signal radios make when communication is cut off-- and the police department's analog system yielded poor sound quality. "This presented a danger, both to firefighters on fire grounds and police on incident calls," said Suzanne J. Peck, the city's chief technology officer, whose department oversaw the recent project. Officials said the new money was spent to upgrade what was already in place. The backbone of the system is now much stronger: six more radio antenna sites have been installed, bringing the total to 10, in all quadrants of the city. Seven sites are on rooftops of hospitals or D.C. government buildings. The' other three are communications towers, including a new one at a police facility on Rhode Island Avenue NE.
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12/4/2003
Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled The Washington Post (November 9, 2003) A technology and public safety team has been all over the District in recent weeks, visiting scores of nightclubs, apartment buildings, offices and other places as they tested the city's new emergency communications system.
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The troubleshooters targeted locations where emergency radios previously were apt to cut out, if they worked at all. Now, thanks to $40 million in improvements, police officers, firefighters and emergency medical crews are getting more dependable, clear signals, officials say. The system has been up and running since late September. Rick Burke, a wireless technology manager for the city, and a public safety team recently concluded weeks of crisscrossing the city to test it. They found that the changes have made a big difference in signal strength and sound quality, Burke said. "It's a major improvement. The city and its first responders are much safer now having a highly reliable, state-of-the art communications network," Burke said. District officials are touting the system as one of the most advanced in the nation. The federal government footed most of the bill in an aid package approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The fire department contributed nearly $3.5 million to the venture. This is not the first time that the city tried to fix the problem. It spent less than $6 million for a network that was put in operation in January 2001, but the system remained unreliable. Police officers, firefighters and rescue workers complained that poor communications continued to put them and citizens at risk - on the streets, in burning buildings and even in hospitals. Digital fire radios would "honk out" -- a signal radios make when communication is cut off -
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It can be fixed by Don Bishop Mobile Radio Technology, Oct 1, 2002
Better radio communications could have saved some of the 343 firefighters who perished in the collapse of the New York World Trade Center towers. That's the contention of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, a union that represents about 2,500 captains, lieutenants and battalion chiefs among the Fire Department of New York's 11,500member department. "One of FDNY's staff chiefs gave an order to evacuate the north tower, and 56 minutes transpired from the time he gave the order to when the tower collapsed, and no one heard the order. We lost 120 firefighters in the building," said FDNY Lt. Steve Carbone, the vice president of UFOA. UFOA President Peter Gorman issued a demand during an August news conference that FDNY replace the aging VHP hand-held portable two-way radios that were in use on Sept. 11,2001. Early last year, the department had replaced its older 3,000 VHP analog radios with 3,800 UHF dual-mode, digital-and-analog radios that were set to digital mode. But by March 2001, the UHF radios were withdrawn because of what Gorman said were complaints about inadequate coverage. The department re-deployed its older VHP radios, which then were in use on Sept. 11, 2001. Gorman has called for a grand jury investigation of what he described as the failure of the UHF radios and the resultant delays in replacing the old radios. On Sept. 11, 2001, and continuing until the time of Gorman's press conference 11 months later, FDNY was still using the old radios he described as "inadequate." The company that manufactures the radios, Motorola, said that both the old and the new radios work fine — but without radio infrastructure, no portable two-way radios can achieve the coverage that the union wants. Portable radio signals normally cannot pass through multiple floors of a high-rise building without a signal-boosting network infrastructure. "The laws of physics haven't changed. It's not the radios, it's the network behind the radios," said John McFadden, Motorola's vice president of major system sales for the
DCN: 4.03.06
A.U.C. 179 July 1,1996
UTILIZATION OF COMPANY HANDIE TALKIE
INDEX SECTION
1.
1.
Description of Handie-Talkie.
2.
Equipment Distribution and Assignments.
3.
Instructions for Utilization of Handie-Talkie MX 330/6 VHF.
4.
Security of Handie-Talkie Equipment.
5.
Operations with Handie-Talkie Equipment.
6.
Maintenance and use of Handie-Talkie Equipment.
7.
Repairs to Handie-Talkie's.
8.
Frequency Allocation and Use.
9.
Battery Chargers.
10.
Special Features.
DESCRIPTION OF HANDIE-TALKIE The Handie-Talkie to be used is designated a "MOTOROLA HT 330/6 VHF". It comes equipped with a carrying case and an adjustable shoulder strap to allow for carrying the H.T. on ones person. Power output is approximately 1 watt, supplied by a rechargeable nickel cadmium (NiCad) battery.
Mail :: INBOX: Radio Problems at 9-11
/9/n Personal Privacy
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INBOX: Radio Problems at9-il (12 of 867) CMove|co py This message to Delete | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Redirect | Blacklist | Message Source | Resume | Save as | Print Back to INBOX ^ I Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 12:03:03 -0500 From: Richard McAllan M
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To: '9-11 Commission NYC' ^ Subject: Radio Problems at 9-11 Part(s): ^ 2 911 Dunn Unanswered Questions.pdf application/pdf 136.61 KB j^| jjft 1.2 unnamed text/html 1.44 KB |§j
I will be sending you articles and the like that I have found on my searches of the Internet.
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UNANS WERED ODES TIONS ABOUT FIRE RAD IPS AND COMMUNICATIONS AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER TERRORIST ATTACK ON 911 By Vincent Dunn, Deputy Chief FDNY (ret)
There are still two unanswered questions about fire radio communications at the World Trade Center terrorist attack: 1. How important a role did radio communications play on 9/11? 2. What should be the telecommunications industry's priorities in workingto aid the fire service in future catastrophes? The answer to the first question is radio communications played a major life-and-death role at the World Trade Center terrorist attack. A brief history of radios in the FDNY: In the 1960s, firefighters for the first time were issued handie-talkies, or so-called portable radios. Firefighters no longer relied on hand signals, shout ing and runners to communicate at fires. These "analog" radios operated on a VHP channel. In 2001, the FDNY purchased new "digital" portable radios for fire-fighters. These digital radios operated on UHF channel. Soon after issue, there appeared to be a delay in signal transmission and a voice-quality problem with these new digital radios. They were temporarily withdrawn from service until these problems could be solved. The new UHF digital radios have been reprogrammed in the analog mode in an attempt to remove the communication delay and to improve the voice quality. Chief officers have been issued command radios. There were eight major life-and-death "communication events" at the World Trade Center on 9/11: Communication event 1- After the first plane struck the World Trade Center's north tower, a fire safety director instructed occupants of the south tower to return to their offices and not exit the building onto the plaza. Communication event 2 - The fire department and the police department did not use the unified incident management system to communicate with each other.
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From: Richard McAllan To: '9-11 Commission NYC'<§f Subject: Fire Engineering Article Part(s): ^ 2 Fire Engineering -Archives High Rise Fires 1995.htm text/html 61.67 KB [^ <® 3 Why the WTC Building Collapsed.htm
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Here is a 1995 article by FDNY Chief Dunn on high rise fires and a later article by Chief Dunn.
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Fire Engineering - Archives
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WHY CANT THE FIRE SERVICE EXTINGUISH FIRES IN HIGHRISE BUILDINGS? WHY CAN'T THE FIRE SERVICE EXTINGUISH FIRES IN HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS? BY VINCENT DUNN
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There is a deadly trend in high-rise fires. In the 1970s, New York City experienced a two-floor fire in a high rise; in the 1980s, Los Angeles had a five-floor fire in a high-rise; and in the 1990s, Philadelphia suffered a nine-floor high-rise fire. What can we expect in the next decade? All three of these fires had one thing in common: They all occurred beyond the reach of fire department ladders. Outside aerial master streams could not be used. The New York fire, at 1 New York Plaza, was on the 33rd and 34th floors; the Los Angeles First Interstate Bank fire burned out the 12th to 16th floors; and the Philadelphia One Meridian Plaza fire burned the 22nd to 30th floors to a crisp. These high-rise fires killed three building employees and three firefighters. The fires were fought using an interior attack. Aerial master streams were not an option available. (In the Meridian Plaza fire, portable deluge guns were operated from nearby and adjacent buildings, with no effect on the fire.) At a low-rise building fire, after 30 or 40 minutes of fast and furious firefighting, the fire usually is extinguished. If it is not, firefighters may be withdrawn to safer outside positions and the fire is fought using an outside attack. Not so at a high-rise building fire. Here, if the fire is not controlled within the first 30 to 40 minutes, the next two or three hours of firefighting are also spent inside the burning building. It took six hours to extinguish two floors of fire in New York in 1970, eight hours to extinguish the Los Angeles five-floor high-rise fire, and more than 16 hours to extinguish-with nine sprinkler heads on the 30th floor-the Philadelphia nine-floor fire. That's roughly two hours of firefighting per floor. Will the next great high-rise fire require the fire department to operate with interior handlines for two or three days? HIGH-RISE VS. LOW-RISE BUILDINGS What is a high-rise building? How does a high-rise building fire differ from a low-rise building fire? Why can't the fire service extinguish fires in high-rise buildings? Some reasons follow. Height. A high-rise building can be defined as a structure more than 75 feet high if your aerial ladder reaches only 75 feet or as a structure more than 40 feet high if your highest ladder is a 40-foot extension ladder. People trapped in a burning high-rise building who cannot be reached by your highest ladder will leap to their deaths, attempt to climb down knotted bedsheets and fall, scribble notes telling where they are trapped and drop them from smoky windows, or have their last cries for help recorded on fire dispatchers" telephones.
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When buildings are constructed beyond the reach of a fire department's highest ladder, two important firefighting strategies are taken away from firefighters. First, life-saving victim removals using ladders are eliminated. Searches and rescues can be accomplished only from inside stairways. People trapped at windows, when flames are between them and a stairway, will have to jump or burn to death. The second firefighting strategy a high-rise building takes away in many cases is the ability to extinguish a fire with an outside master stream. The only strategy for a high-rise fire beyond the reach of an aerial ladder is an interior attack. Firefighters must extinguish the fire using handheld hose streams advanced through heat and smoke from an inside stairway. If this method fails, there is no alternate plan. An outside attack is not an option.
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Why the WTC Building Collapsed
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World Trade Center September 11, 2001 Photo by: Steve Spak
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Mail:: INBOX: Articles in "The Chief Leader"
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From: Richard McAllan \ To: '9-11 Commission NYC'9 Subject: Articles in "The Chief Leader" Part(s): Gft 2 The Chief F.D. Claification Media Policy Dec 5 2003 OCR Corrected.doc application/msword 63.63 KB ^D L--f ^"^ iff] 3 The Chief Conspiracy Theory Not Nuts Dec 5 2003 OCR.doc
application/msword 73.21 KB ^J
Here are two OCR copies of articles which are in this week's edition of "The Chief-Leader."
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12/4/2003
The CHIEF-LEADER Newspaper Page 1
Friday, December 5, 2003
MEDIA POLICY REVISED
F.D. 'Clarification': Unions Say 'Huh?' By Mark Daly Picture of Rudy Sanfilippo Caption Under Picture: RUDY SANFILIPPO: Need further translation.
Firefighters, tell us your good news. But don't talk out of turn. That's the Fire Department's message to its field units, as revealed by a recent overhaul of its policy on speaking to the media. The new regulation, released in July and reissued last week, explains in detail how firefighters are to refer questions from the press up the chain of command, while laying out topics that are off-limits for public discussion. They're There to Serve At the same time, FDNY's Office of Public Information reminded firefighters in a Nov. 12 memo that it's there to help when reporters come calling—especially when fire companies want to share a story of a dramatic rescue or charity event. Calling the regulations a "clarification" of existing rules, the chief spokesman for the FDNY said the recent notices are meant to help firefighters get publicity for their good deeds, while avoiding trouble with superiors for shooting off their mouths while on duty. "This is not something new and totally out of the blue," said Frank Gribbon, the FDNY's Deputy Commissioner for Public Information, whose office issued the Nov. 12 memo. "We're encouraging them to come to us. It's a reminder that we're here." Fire union leaders, who have tangled with the department through the news media this year on such hot button topics as the FDNY's readiness for a terrorist attack and the closing of six fire houses, say the approach is confusing.
The Chief-Leader Newspaper, Friday, December 5, 2003 Page 4
Razzle Dazzle
Conspiracy Theory Not Nuts By Richard Steier One former high-ranking Fire Department official who crossed swords with Richard McAllan described him as a malcontent malingerer. Current department officials, fend off lawsuits the former president of Emergency Medical Service Local 2507 has filed on matters ranging from a recently scrapped FDNY gag order prohibiting employees from talking to the press without permission to the elimination of his job line, have depicted him as merely a malcontent. Mr. McAllan maintains, however, that those officials have wanted to silence and/or get rid of him because he has this uncomfortable habit hanging their dirty laundry out in public. He can make a compelling case that if he sometimes seems extreme, it is only because of extreme measures resorted to by the Giuliani administration to conceal details of unsavory deals it made to privatize some ambulance work and purchase new radios that didn't work properly. Pursuing Rudy's Role on Radios More recently, he contended, the Bloomberg administration has sought to remove him from the payroll, using a budgetary pretext, and thwart his efforts to examine ex-Mayor Rudy Giuliani's private communications regarding the FDNY radio system, because it is looking to protect his reputation as a heroic figure in the aftermath of the WTC attacks. Mr. McAllan contends that those papers may show that the Mayor had an active role in the mass purchase of defective radios and then—after they were exposed as such in the spring of 2001—in delaying the purchase of adequate radios. The failure of the FDNY's radio communications system—in contrast to that of the NYPD—was a prime reason why the Fire Department 343 members during the World Trade Center rescue efforts while just 23 NYPD cops were killed. A month ago, Mr. McAllan succeeded in having the Fire Department scrap the gag order it imposed on March 1, 1999, getting a settlement that was approved by U.S. District Court Judge Barbara Jones in Manhattan. He is still before Judge Jones on another suit 1
Mail:: INBOX: NYC Radio Licenses
/9/n Personal Privacy
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INBOX: NYC Radio Licenses (6 of 867)
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To: '9-11 Commission NYC' 9 Subject: NYC Radio Licenses Part(s): ^ 2 FCCULSNYPDWIM471.pdf
application/pdf 569.07 KB ^J
fQ 3 FDNY DOITT WPPU442 Oct 2003.pdf application/pdf 601.21 KB ^j tjft 1.2 unnamed text/html 2.47 KB fig Here are excerpts of NYC's respective radios licenses from the FCC database.
Please note that NYPD licensed their additional frequencies as analog and had them up and running in 1998.
As I said in the Maloney letter, FDNY was captured by the teenies and all of their 480 Mhz frequencies are tied up in a trunked radio system which is still not operational.
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12/4/2003
Pagel of 2
FCC WTB Radio Station Authorization
Federal Communications Commission Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Radio Station Authorization (Reference Copy) This is not an official FCC license. It is a record of public information contained in the FCC's licensing database on the date that this reference copy was generated. In cases where FCC rules require the presentation, posting, or display of an FCC license, this document may not be used in place of an official FCC license.
Licensee: New York, City of (Police Department) FCC Registration Number (FRN):
0003462421 Call Sign: W1M471
ATTN FCC License Coordinator New York, City of (Police Department) 50-16 59th Place WOODSIDE, NY 11377-7407
File Number:
Radio Service: PW-Public Safety Pool, Conventional Regulatory Status: PMRS Frequency Coordination Number:
Effective Date 11/28/2001
Grant Date 10/04/2000
Print Date 10/09/2003
Expiration Date 10/18/2005
STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Fixed Location Address or Mobile Area of Operation Loc. 1 Address: CHASE BANK 4 METROTECH CTR City: NEW YORK
County: NEW YORK
State: NY
Lat (NAD83): 40-41-41.4 N Long (NAD83): 073-59-05.5 W ASR No.:
Ground Elev: 5.0
Loc. 2 Address: TIVOLI TWRS 49 CROWN ST City: NEW YORK
County: NEW YORK
State: NY
Lat (NAD83): 40-40-04.4 N Long (NAD83): 073-57-40.5 W ASR No.:
Ground Elev: 37.0
Loc. 3 Area of Operation Operating within a 48.0 km radius around 40-44-54.4 N, 073-59-08.5 W Antennas Loc. Ant. Frequencies Sta. No. No. (MHz) CIs.
1 2 3
1 1 1
482.78750 482.78750 485.78750
No. Units
No. Pagers
Emmission Output ERP Ant. Ant. Construct Designator Power (watts) Ht/Tp AAT Deadline Date (watts) meters meters
FB2
1
0
20KOF3E
50.000 225.000 137.0 128.0
FB2
1
0
20KOF3E
50.000 225.000 49.0
MO
2500
0
20KOF3E
25.000 100.000
111.0
Control Points Pt No.1
http,7/wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/printAuth_landMobile.j sp?licKey=l 289631
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 2
ULS License
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department) Call Sign
WIM471
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
Status
Active
Auth Type
Regular
Grant
10/04/2000
Expiration
10/18/2005
Effective
11/28/2001
Cancellation
Dates
Control Points 1 POLICE PLZ, MANHATTAN, NY P: (212)374-4307
Licensee ID SGIN
L00094886 000
FRN
0003462421
Type
Governmental Entity
Licensee New York, City of (Police Department) 50-16 59th Place WOODSIDE, NY 11377-7407 ATTN FCC License Coordinator
P:(718)476-7554 F:(718)476-0205
Contact
Extended Implementation
Assoc.Call Signs
Eligibility 90.20
j and Demographics Radio Service Type
Mobile
Regulatory Status
Interconnected?
Alien Ownership Is the Applicant a foreign government or the representative of any foreign government? Is the Applicant an alien or the representative of an alien? Is the Applicant a corporation organized under the laws of any foreign government?
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/LIlsSearch/license.jsp?licKey=1289631&printable
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 1
Federal
rCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers | Find People
;
Communications Commission
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > y_LS_ > Online Systems > ULS License
FCOSite Ma_p
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department)
HELP
Frequencies Summary *\w Search Oy Refine Search Rh Return to Results License f
MAIN
ADMIN
Call Sign
WIM471
LOCATIONS
f&l Printable Page
FREQUENCIES Radio Service
|scl = Special Condition
Define View: General | Buildout | COSER | Emission | IRAQ
Frequency
Loc#
Ant#
48Z78Z50 482,78750 485.78750
1 2 3
1 1 1
Freq ID
Station Class
Buildout First Use
Buildout Deadline
Buildout Notification
1
FB2
11/03/1998
02/01/1996
1
FB2
11/03/1998
02/01/1996
1
MO
11/03/1998 Filter Frequencies By Location:
3 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies par Summary Page
ULS Online Systems
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
Filter Frequencies By Location: All Locations • GO .
3 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies per Summary Page
ULS Help
||j) Reference Copy •"/•Map
ULS Glossary - FAQ - Online Help - Technical Support - Licensing Support CORES/Call Sign Registration - ULS Online Filing - License Search - Application
About ULS
Privacy Statement - About ULS - ULS Home
Basic Search
j By Call S i g n ] £ [ = j
'
——~
SUBMIT
RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseFreqSum.jsp?freqType=B&licKey=128...
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 1
Federal '. Communications Commission
FCC Home | Search i Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers | Find People
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
FCC_.SJte_MaE
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department)
Administration 0^ New Search Q^ Refine Search Qh Return to Results License f
MAIN
ffi
Printable Page
C3HEL53
|||) Reference Copy •%* Map
'i
Call Sign
WIM471
Receipt Date
File Number and Type
Status
QQOQ668Q21.
Granted
11/27/2001
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
AU - Administrative Update Automated LeKsrs None CoireiirirseiMs None S-'iis'isn; 11/28/2001
Administrative Update Applied
10/20/2000
License Converted
10/04/2000
Authorization Printed
All History (5) Refer to Locations and Frequencies Tabs for special conditions at those levels "CONDITIONAL WAIVER GRANTED TO PERMIT USE OF CHANNEL 16 ON A NONINTERFERENCE BASIS TO RECEPTION OF TELEVISION BROADCAST LICENSEES. FOR CONDITIONS, SEE ORDER RELEASED MARCH 17, 1995, FCC 95-115"
ULS Help
ULS Glossary - FAQ - Online Help - Technical Support - Licensing Support
m e n i<= fCORES/Call Sign Registration - ULS Online Filing - License Search - Application ULS online systems Search . A>chive License Search About ULS
Privacy Statement - About ULS - ULS Home
Basic Search
| By Call Sign
SUBMIT
RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/Ul sApp/UlsSearch/licenseAdminSum.jsp?licKey=1289631
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 1
FCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers j Find People
Federal ;
Communications Commis.swn
Universal Licensing System £CC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
FCCLSite Mafi
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department)
Frequency 000485.78750 Q^ New Search 0^ Refine Search Qh Return to Results License f
MAIN
|f
Call Sign
AOMIN
|&] Printable Page
OElHELP
1^) Reference Copy •%» Mag
]f LOCATIONS'! FREQUENCIES
WIM471
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
* Return to Frequencies Summary
Station Class
MO - Mobile
Units
2500
Output Power Paging Rec
25.000
Maximum ERP 100.000
Emissions 20KOF3E
FCC Admin Serial Number
Date Sent
IFRB Serial Number
Date into Register
Buildout Dates First Use
11/03/1998
Deadline
Notification
COSER No COSER information on file IRAC No IRAC information on file
© Frequency Special Conditions None
ULS Help
ULS Glossary - FAQ - Online Help - Technical Support - Licensing Support
in <= Online nni;n<> Systems c.,c».»«c Search CORES/Call Sign Ucense Registration - ULS Online Filing - License Search - Application ULS . Arch|ve Search About ULS
Privacy Statement - About ULS - ULS Home
Basic Search
j By Call Sign
SUBMIT • RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseFreqDetail.jsp?pageNumToReturn=l&f...
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF Page 1 of 2
FCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives 1 For Consumers ] Find People Federal • Communications Commission
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
£CC_Sjte_Mafi
ULS License
Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF *\w Search Qy Refine Search Q^ Return to Results License
flEEOSHIf ADMIN
Y
[&1 Printable Page
|j}i| Reference Copy -y- Mag
LOCATIONS '(FREQUENCIES]
Call Sign
WPPU442
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Status
Active
Auth Type
Regular
Grant
01/14/2000
Expiration
01/14/2005
Effective
05/02/2003
Cancellation
Dates
Control Points 1
1 CENTRE ST,NEW YORK, NY
P: (212)699-2100 Licensee Licensee ID SGIN
L00033053 000
FRN
0003462512
Type
(View Qwne_rshirj)
Governmental Entity
Licensee NEW YORK, CITY OF 11 Metrotech Center, 3rd Fl Brooklyn, NY 11201 ATTN Felix L. Melendez
P: (718)403-8278 F: (718)403-8241 E:[email protected]
Contact NYC DEPT OF INFO TECH & TELECOMMUNICATIO
F:(212)669-2277
La ad Mobile Data Extended Implementation
Assoc.Call Signs
WPPU560
Eligibility 90.20A - APPLICANT IS THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RADIOS WILL BE USED TO COORDINATE
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/license.jsp?licKey=1303298
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY O... Page 1 of 1
Federal 1 Communications Commission
FCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers
Find People
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > ULS > QrjlLne_Syrstems > ULS License
FCC.Site_Mae
Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
SHELP
Frequency 000482.00625 <\h <\e Search Qh Return to Results License f
MAIN
ADMIN
Call Sign
[&J Printable Page
|^j Reference Copy «/• Map
YLOCATIOHS1FREQUENCIES
WPPU442
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
* Return to Frequencies Summary
000482.00625 Station Class
FB8 - Centralized Trunk Relay
Units
Paging Rec
Output Power
110.000
Maximum ERP
225.000
Notification
12/29/2000
Emissions 11K3F9W
FCC Admin Serial Number
Date Sent
IFRB Serial Number
Date into Register
Buildout Dates First Use
01/14/2000
Deadline
09/14/2000
COSER No COSER information on file IRAC No IRAC information on file © Frequency Special Conditions None
ULS Help
ULS Glossary - FAQ - QnJjneJjejQ - Technical Support - Licensing Support
ULS Online Systems
CORES/Cal1 sjgn
About ULS Basic Search
Registration - y.LS_Qnline_FMi.ng - LicensejSearch - Application
Statement - About ULS - ULS Home | By Call Sign
SUBMIT < RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseFreqDetailj sp?pageNumToReturn=l&f...
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY O... Page 1 of 2
Federal j Communications Coinmi$sk>n
FCC Home | Search
Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers | Find People
Universal Licensing System £CC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
FCC_S_ite_Map.
Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
0 HELP
Frequencies Summary H. New Search License f
Refine .Search Hh Return to Results
MAIN Call Sign
ffi
Printable Page
Reference Copy •«*>• Map
YLOCATIONS" FREQUENCIES
ADMIN WPPU442
Radio Service
152 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies per Summary Page
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Filter Frequencies By Location: JAII Locations •*]
GO
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 [Next »] (scl = Special Condition
Define View: General I Buildout | COSER | Emission | IRAC
Frequency
Loc#
Ant#
Freq ID
48.Z00625
2
01/14/2000
1
FB8
01/14/2000
482.03125
.3.
FB8
01/14/2000
482MU75
2
1 1 1 2
FB8
482.01875
1 1 1 1
FB8
01/14/2000
482.05625
1 3
1 1 1
2 2 3
FB8
01/14/2000
FB8 FB8
01/14/2000
1 1 1 1
3 3
FB8
01/14/2000
FB8
01/14/2000
4
FB8
01/14/2000
4
FB8
01/14/2000
482.06875
Station Class
Buildout First Use
482.08125
2
482,09375
1
482.10625
3_
48211875_
2
48213125 48214375
1 3
FB8
01/14/2000
2
1 1
4
482.15625
5
FB8
01/14/2000
482.16875
1 2
1 1
5
FB8
01/14/2000
6
FB8
01/14/2000
482.19375
1
FB8
01/14/2000
3
5
FB8
01/14/2000
7
FB8
01/14/2000
48.2,23125
1
7
FB8
01/14/2000
482J24375
3
1 1 1 1 1
6
482.20625 482,21875
6
FB8
01/14/2000
48218125
2
152 Frequencies for all locations
01/14/2000
Buildout Buildout Deadline Notification 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000
Filter Frequencies By Location:
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseFreqSum.jsp?freqType=B&licKey=130...
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY O... Page 1 of 2
F&deral ;
FCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers
rind People
Communications Commission
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
FCC.Site Map.
Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
[3 HELP
Frequencies Summary ^ New Search License fMAIN
Q^ Refine Search Qh Return to Results
YADMIN
Call Sign
S|f
t&i Printable Page
Reference_CoEy
•%»• Ma|>
LOCATIONS*]) FREQUENCIES
WPPU442
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Filter Frequencies By Location: j All Locations ~~^\O •
152 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies par Summary Page
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 [Next_> >J (sg = Special Condition
Frequency Loc# Ant#
Define View: General | Buildout | COSER | Emission 1 IRAjC
Freq Station ID Class
482,00625
2
1
1
F B 8
482,01875
1
1
1
F B 8
482,03125
3
1
1
FB8
482.04375
2
1
2
FB8
482.05625
1
1
2 FB8
482,06875
3
1
2
482.08125
2
1
FB8
3F B 8
Units
Paging Rec.
Output Maximum Power ERP 110.000 225.000 110.000 225.000 225.000 110.000 110.000 225.000 110.000 225.000 110.000 110.000
48JLQ9375
1
1
3
FB8
110.000
482.10625
3
1
3
FB8
110.000
482JL.1875
2
1
4F B 8
482J1125
1
1
4 FB8
110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000
482^1437_5
3
1
4
FB8
482,15625
2
1
5
FB8
482^16875
1
1
482;JL8125
2
1
6
FB8
482.19375
1
1
6
FB8
4_82J20625
3
1
5F B 8
482^21875
2
1
7F B 8
482,23125
1
1
7F B 8
482.24375
3
1
5F B 8
6
FB8
152 Frequencies for all locations
110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000
225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000
Filter Frequencies By Location:
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseFreqSum.jsp?licKey=1303298
10/9/2003
Federal : Communications Commission
FCC Home j Search | Updates | E-Filing | initiatives ] For Consumers j Find People
Universal Licensing System FCC > WT.B > ULS > Online.Systems > ULS License
FCC_Sjte_Map
Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
LTJHELP
Locations Summary ^ New. Search. Q^ Refme.Search QH Return j:o..Results_ License f
MAIN Call Sign
ADMIN
f&l PjLntable_Page
!jjl) Reference Copy
1
.Map.
LOCATIONS |FREQUENCIES|
WPPU442
6 Total Locations 10 Locations per Summary Page
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Locations Displayed: All | Fixed | Mobile | Itinerant | Temp. Fixed 6.1m
Iscl = Special Condition Location
2.-...Fixed. 3_-_ Fixed 4_-_ Fixed 5 - Fixed § ..- .Temporary Fixed
Transmitter Address /Area of Operation
Status
QUEENS CO 83 88 WOODHAVEN BLVD 40-41-55.4 N, 073-51NEW YORK, NY QUEENS County 15.5 W
P
FDNY RADIO SHOP 48-67 34TH ST NEW YORK, NY QUEENS County
40-44-20.4 N, 073-55-
P
BROOKLYN CO 35 EMPIRE BLVD NEW YORK, NY KINGS County
40-39-49.4 N, 073-57-
1129 E 180TH ST NEW YORK, NY BRONX County
40-50-32.4 N, 073-52-
STATEN ISLAND CO 65 SLOSSON AVE NEW YORK, NY RICHMOND County
40-37-10.4 N, 074-07-
40.0 km radius around centerpoint
40-42-19.0 N, 073-52-
52.5 W P
39.5 W P
29.5 W P
00.5 W 27.0 W
6 Total Locations 10 Locations per Summary Page
ULS Help
Latitude, Longitude
Locations Displayed: All I Rxed | Mobile | Itinerant | Ternp_ Fixed 6.1m
yLS_Glpssa_ry - FAQ - Online, HeJB - Technical..Support - Licensing Support
CQRES/CaJLSigii Registration - yLS_jOnHne_Fi|ing - Ljcense_ Search - Application ULS Online Systems Search - Archive License Search About ULS
Pnyacy_Staternent - About JJkS - ULS_Hpme.
Basic Search
| By Call Sign
SUBMIT
RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseLocSum.jsp?licKey=1303298
10/9/2003
;9/ll P e r s o n a l Privacy
.- INBOX:
Page \f 1
INBOX Empty Trash compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout 130.10;MB / 476.84MB (27.28%)
INBOX: Other Radio Articles (3 of 867)
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Thu, 4 Dec 2003 14:58:58 -0500 j Richard McAllan \ '9-11 Commission NYC'4f Other Radio Articles
Part(s): ^2 Boston FDNY In Building Repeater Dec 2003.pdf application/pdf 129.71 KB ^ ^ 3 Communications Failures April 15 1996 NYP.pdf application/pdf 684.63 KB ID •0 4 EMS Ops Order 2002-054 Radios.pdf •§ 5 FDNY Radio Enhancements Feb 2003.pdf
application/pdf 494.13 KB ^J application/pdf 1745.77 KB |^|
<® 1.2 unnamed text/html 1.39 KB (H
Here are some more articles and radio procedures.
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12/4/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WPRI772 - BOSTON, CITY OF Page 1 of 2
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Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WPRI772 BOSTON, CITY OF QH, New_Search *\e Search Q- Return to Results ffi Printable Page License
ADMIN
^ Reference Copy -y- _Map
Y LOCATIONS YFREQUENCIES]
Call Sign
WPRI772
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
Status
Active
Auth Type
Regular
Grant
10/04/2000
Expiration
10/04/2005
Effective
10/04/2000
Cancellation
Dates
Control Points
1
59 FENWAY, BOSTON, MA P: (617)343-2875
Licensee Licensee ID SGIN
L00077082 bfd
FRN
0004034237 (View Ownership)
Type
Governmental Entity
Licensee BOSTON, CITY OF 59 FENWAY BOSTON, MA 02115 ATTN FIRE DEPT GREG RICHARDSON
P:(617)343-2875 F: (617)353-0884
Contact BAYSTATE COMMUNICATIONS INC
F: (978)664-6769
194 NORTH ST NORTH READING, MA 01864-1313
Land Mobile Data Extended Implementation
Assoc.Call Signs
KGA659
Eligibility 90.20 - THIS IS AN IN HOUSE REPEATER FOR THE FIRE DEPT USE ONLY DURING THE EVENT OF A
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/license.jsp?licKey=1300313
12/4/2003
NEW YORK POST,
SMITH
LENER
YOUNG
*
MONDAY, APRIL 15, 1996
SIEDENBUR6
MCLAUGHLIN
DRENNAN
3
WILLIAMS
DID SNAFUS KILL FIRE HEROES? Communication foul-ups eyed
ByDANJANISON Communication foul-ups have been linked to fires that have killed seven city firefighters over the past two years, The Post has learned. The discovery has sparked deep concern in the Fire Department's ranks — and led to different theories about the cause of the mix-upa — from training problems, to supervi-. sion, to staffing levels on engines. But the latest revelations about events that led up to firefighter James Williams' death in Queens on Jan. 5 add to a pattern of crossed signals and faulty messages, as cited in official reports, and in interviews with a number of sources. These problems — a botched Mayday response, a jammed walkie-talkie frequency, one fire company losing touch with another — cropped up repeatedly among the other factors that varied from one fatal fire to the next.
Stricken Bravest is stable
EXCLUSIVE - Last week, a union official revealed — and inside sources confirmed — that a battalion chief, expected to help supervise .operations at the Queens blaze where Williams died, arrived late. The reason: art aging computer dispatch system had crashed in Brooklyn — the borough from which the chief was assigned — and some fire officers weren't aware the chief hadn't been notified. Uniformed Fire Officers Association President Richard Brower cited a need for "better communications at the fire scene," as well as more rapid response of supervisors and improved training. Whether the chiefs pres-
ence would have changed the outcome is doubtful, insiders say. But iniscoimnunication has loomed larger in other cases: B Months after a backdraft fatally injured Ladder Co. 5 Capt. John Drennan and firefighters Chris Siedenburg and James Young on March 28, 1994, safety officers cited miscommunication between fire companies. The three men were going up a stairway as flames quickly spread through a door, when the fireball struck. The department's safety division cited as one cause- of the tragedy: "There was no communication from [department] members operating on the fire floor to the members of Ladder 5, warning them of rapidly deteriorating conditions." • In the Aug. 7, 1994, fire
that cost the life of Ladder Co. 136 Capt. Wayne Smith, one "indirect" cause was described as, "overwhelming of the portable radio system by radio traffic." . Officials also found that a Mayday transmission . from Smith was heard by 14 firefighters, but that only one reacted. New radio protocols were issued. • "Communication problems" were cited by the Safety Division as an "early" contributing factor in the blaze that killed Ladder Co. 6 Lt George Lener on June 5, 1994. Lener called out a Mayday from a basement at 79 Worth St., but there was noise from machinery working nearby and messages became hard to hear, according to that incir dent report.
A Queens firefighter remained in .stable condition yesterday, a day after suffering crippling chest pains while battling a raging three-alarm, fire at a funeral home. Firefighter Robert Winterfeld, 34, was operating a hose line inside Crowe's Funeral Homes at 107-44 Sutphin Blvd. in Jamaica Saturday morning when he experienced intense chest pains. Winterfeld, an eight-year veteran assigned to Engine Co. 275, was rushed to Mary Immaculate Hospital, where he was visited by Mayor Giuliani and outgoing Fire Commissioner Howard Safir. Four other firefighters suffered minor injuries fighting the blaze. Eric Stirgua Firefighters in the rear of the building called off the response to a Lener"s Mayday, thinking it was from someone else who'd already been located, the report suggests. • Miscommunication may also have been at work in an October 1995 Maze that claimed the life of firefighter Peter Mclaughlin.
Although an internal probe remains incomplete as an arsonist is prosecuted, sources said officers at the scene lost touch with McLaughlin at some point and didn't know his exact location. McLaughlin was found in the. wreckage of a top-floor apartment where a roof and cockloft had collapsed.
BUREAU OF OPERATIONS EMS OPERATIONS ORDER2002-054 Issued Date:
July 30,2002
MOTOROLA XTS 3500R TYPE III PORTABLE RADIO INSTRUCTIONS
1.
GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1
The Department is in the process of issuing new portable radios, the Motorola XTS 3500R Type
2.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MOTOROLA XTS 3500R
2.1
The XTS 3500R Type HI portable radio works similar to the Astro Saber portable radio, currently in use. Below is a diagram identifying controls and features of the Motorola XTS 3500R Type HI portable radio:
m.
Switches, Buttons, Knobs, and Indicators Bicolor LED Indicates the radio's operating status;
\ "Transmitting
\ Red = Channel Busy or Low
Double Blinking Red = Receipt of encrypted audio Blinking Green - Receipt of Individual Call
. Antenna 16-Position Select Knob Selects the operating system (zone) a or specific channel.
Radiates and receives radio-frequency energy.
Microphone Accepts audio.
On/Off /Volume Control Knpb
Speaker ./Emits audio.
Turns the radio on and off and adjusts the volume level.
Push-To-Talk (PTT) Switch Puts the radio in the transmit (send) mode.
Home Key ^ Returns you to the home display.
Arrow Keys C^J (*) Used to scroll through softkeys and lists.
Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) Provides visual information (status Indicator line, plus two display lines with 12 characters maximum on each display line).
Softkeys (bottom two display lines of LCD) Display of radio features controlled by soltkey buttons.
Softkey Buttons Select "softkey" features.
Battery Rechargeable, 7.5Vdc power source.
3 x 4 Alphanumeric Keypad Provides Interface to your radio's features; arranged and functions like a standard telephone keypad.
\ (white transmit
CTTYOF NEW YORK
FIRE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK FIELD COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS FEBRUARY 2003
Nicholas Scoppetta Commissioner
Frank Cruthers Chief of Department
Mail:: INBOX: Comptroller Hevisi's Letter
. ,
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INBOX: Comptroller Hevisi's Letter (3 of 869) 00
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Delete | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Redirect | Blacklist | Message Source | Resume I Save as | Print Back to INBOX ^ Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 16:29:20-0500 From: Richard McAllan \: '9-11 Commission NYC'
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^ 4 LA Times Stories on LAPD Radios Aug 2001.pdf application/pdf 960.85 KB fjj$ ^ 5 LAPD Press Release 2001 .pdf ^ 6 No Documents Released per AP Oct 2002.pdf
application/pdf 128.46 KB (^ application/pdf 257.93 KB [U
^ 1 .2 unnamed text/html 2.76 KB (^j Here is the letter that then NYC Comptroller Hevisi wrote to Von Essen concerning his investigation of the purchase of the XTS portable radios.
He said at the time that he was referring his findings to DOI. I have not been able to get a copy of that DOI report but Von Essen claimed in his book that nothing came of these investigations.
The other attachments primarily concern the same sort of digital radio problems—and long delays-experienced in LA when they tried to "upgrade" their radio system.
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12/4/2003
0 '01
12:52
P. 02
COMPTROLLER of THE CITY OF New YORK i CENTHE ST«EET NEW YORK. NY JOOO7-2341 (212) 669-3500 G. HEVESI
,
coMt.TRou.tR
-, , ~nn.
Apnl 3,2001
Hon; Thomas Von Essen Commissioner New York City FJre Department 9 Metrotech Center Brooklyn, NY 11201
Dear Commissioner Von Essen: I am writing to inform you of the results of our inquiry into the circumstances that led up to the purchase by the Fire Department of Motorola XTS 3500 portable radios costing approximately S14 million- Based upon our review of the Motorola contract, discussions with Mororola and the FONY's response to our questions, w« have concluded that: •
The circumstances surrounding the FDNY's use of a S2.9 million sole source contract to purchase S14 million in new radios and reteled equipment raise serious concerns regarding the Department's contracting process;
• The FDNY's approval of ihe XTS 3500 as a substitute for a discontinued model was apparently an attempt to circumvem the City's competitive bidding standards; •
•
•
The FDNY failed to thoroughly test the XTS 3500 UHF Portable Radio prior to its decision to order 3,818 units and related equipment costing approximately $14 million; The information the FONT received from the field after the XTS 3500s were deployed in March 2001 (See attached) would have been obtained in 2000 had proper fold tests, under real fire conditions, been conducted at that time; The FDNY internal controls regarding testing procedures, documentation requirements and approvals were inadequate;
On March 21, 2001, it was reported in the press that a firefighter tan out of oxygen in a burning building. The firefighter's Mayday call for help over the XTS 3500 UHF portable radio failed to transmil,properly. At the subsequent request of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, I ordered an inquiry by my staff into the circumstances leading to the purchase by Jhe FDNY of this model radio, including a survey of other major metropolitan cities. My staff found many problems in the procurement of these radios by the Department, including a failure to adequately test the XTS 3500 UHF portable radio, as well as possible misrepresentations by FDNY staff responsible for obtaining the radios. In addition, the FDNY often offered contradictory or incomplete information in its unsatisfactory attempt to justify this multi-million
Matte Fiem \GVA FscyclW Paow
4 '01
12:53
P. 03
dollar purchase of life saving equipment. The survey of the fire departments of nine major cities found none that used the XTS 3500.J In conducting its inquiry, my Office of Contract Administration has reviewed the subject procurement. The review consisted of an evaluation of the contract documents, queries to and information received from the New York City Fire Department as well as discussions with Motorola. Additionally, we surveyed nine major metropolitan fire departments to determine whether they had experience with the Motorola XTS 3500 UHF portable radio. The survey including Boston and Chicago, which arc the cities that the FPNY's senior leadership indicated to the press were the sites That used this same portable radio.
The revie\ of the procurement found many problems, which left more questions than answers. The survey of the nine cities found -none thauised the XTS 3500 portable radio. The circumstances surrounding the FDKY's use of a S2.9 million sole source contract to purchase $14 million in new radios and related equipment raise serious concerns regarding the contracting process. In 3 997, the FPNY requested that the Department of Citywide Administrative Services ("DCAS") enter into a three year, "sole source" contract with Motorola forproviding "a total of 750radjosl' and associated optional equipment "in the amount not to exceed" S2.8S8.910. At that time, the FDNY stated that it would "... always evaluate new technologies and products.. ." in order to develop future competition. Notwithstanding the contractual limits and the FDNY's representation that it would continue to evaluate new technology to develop future competition, there is no evidence that any such sreps or related evaluation occurred in this insiance. To date the FDNY has not shown that ii conducted any evaluation of the XTS 3500 radio versus other manufactures' radios prior to its decision to purchase the product. Additionally, it is a matter of serious concern that Ihe FDNY used a $2,888,910 contract to purchase, without competition, roughly 4,000 radios, costing over SI4 million- In order to achieve this result, we found that the FDNY circumvented the City's Financial Management System's (FMS) controls through its inappropriate use of purchase orders. If proper procedures had been followed by the FDNY, it is likely ftai this purchase would not have occurred. (It should be noted that we found no evidence of the $33 million Figure which appeared in the press.) The FDKY's approval of the XTS 3500 as a substitute for a discontinued model was apparently an attempt to circumvent the City's competitive bidding standards. The 750 radios specified by the contract fell into five different model configurations: three carried designations indicating that Their use was to be by FDNY personnel engaged in fire fighting, as follows. Saber 1 VHP (1-2.5 watts) Astro Saber 1 VHP (1-5 watts)
52,055 per unit per unit
L 52,425
Los Angeles, Denver, San Francisco, Austin, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Dcttgjf. Boston and Chicago.
'
flpr
Astro Saber 1 UHF CM ^atts)
""
< $2,425 per unit
Q '01
"~~
12:54
P. 04
, _"]
Tvyo modejs carried a desi^^ioo foroseby the Emergency Medical Services ("EMS"). Saber HI UHF (i -5 watts) Astro Saber HI UHF fl-4 watts)
S3,1S4 per unit 52,748 per unit
As indicated above, the EMS Saber IB UHF model was priced at S3,154 per unit, the most expensive of the five models. The contract contemplated that the FDNY would purchase up to 150 units of any one model configuration. In May 1998, Motorola informed the FDNY thai it was discontinuing one of the models the Saber 1 VHF. The Motorola contract allowed for substitution of an existing radio model with another if the new model was: 1) approved by theFDNY; and 2) offered at no additional cost. We have no evidence that a substitution of the Saber 1 VHF model was contemplated by the FDNY. In February 1999, Motorola informed the FDNY that the Saber III UHF model specified in the contract for EMS use would be discontinued after June 30,1939. Motorola stated that the discontinuance of the EMS radio would have little impact upon the value of the contract because the ihree remaining radio models would "continue to be available to FDNY and EMS for your current radio needs." Therefore, it does not appear that there was any immediate necessity to purchase the XTS 3500. Nevertheless, on November 12, 1999 (see attached), the FDNY wrote to DCAS and represented that it had "tested and evaluated" the new Motorola Model XTS 3500 UHF Portable Radio and approved its substitution for the existing, expensive radio designated for use by EMS. Thereafter, a substitution to the contract was made to allow the purchase of up to one hundred and fifty XTS 3500 UHF radios. The unii cost of ihe XTS 3500 was 53,154 - the same price as the existing EMS radios - for a total expenditure of up to S473,l 00. In December 1999 the FDNY ordered 2,700 XTS 3500 UHFtadios. Sometime in 2000 (FMS records indicate March 2000, while the FDNY indicated October 2000), the FDNY placed orders for an additional 1,118 XTS 3500 UHF radios. The ?ota! cost for the 3,318 XTS 3500 radios and optional equipment was 513,969,142. Ii is not clear from the information provided to us by the Department why these 3,S18 radios were purchased and why the order was so large. As slated above, Motorola had assured the FDNY earlier that the discontinuance of the EMS radio would not impact on the agency's needs because other radios, specified in the contract, were still available. There is a major question, therefore, as to why the FDNY inappropriately used a contractual provision that allows for product substitution in limited circumstances to circumvent the City's competitive bidding statutes.
4 '01
12:55
P. 05
The J?DNY failed to thoroughly test the XTS 3500 UHF Portable Radio prior to its decision to order 3,818 units and related equipment costing approximately SI4 million. Based upon the information provided to the Comptroller's Office by the FDNY and our discussions with Motorola, the XTS 3500 was not adequately tested by the Department prior to, or after, its purchase. Notwithstanding the representations made by the FDNY to DCAS in its November 12,1999 memorandum that it had tested and evaluated the radio, whatever testing procedures were performed by the FDNY prior to purchase were solely technical in nature. They included bench testing, submergibifity testing (which the radios later failed), a voice clarity test, a drop test and features testing. From the information provided by the FDNY to date, we found nothing to prove that the XTS 3500 was adequately field tested. The FDNY attempted to give the impression that the radio was tested in the field. In so doing, the Department represented that it field tested a. VHP, noiaUHF. version of the XTS 3500 and that this testing was under actual fixe conditions at Rescue 2. In the documents provided, however, the FDNY acknowledges that the narrow scope of this testing was limited to testing the new functions of the radio,"... such as,, button placement and features." Additionally, as stated below, no description or documentation was provided to support the statement that the VHP XTS 3500 was tested under actual fire conditions or, if it had been tested, what benefits would be obtained from field testing a different frequency radio. The FDNY did not represent to us, as it has in the press, that the radio was tested at the Fire Academy. According to a Motorola representative, different "iterations" of the XTS 3500 were submitted to the FDNY between December 1999 and the summer of 2000 - afterihe order was piaged. According to that representative, the radios were "technically" tested by the FDNY during that time period. Apparently, that testing found that the radios failed to pass submergibility tests and the first shipment of 2700 XTS 3500 radios all had to be returned to Motorola, Thus it is apparent that even the technical testing of ihe XTS 3500 UHF portable radio prior to the decision to purchase it was based upon inadequate testing or testing of too small a sample of radios. Motorola stated to us that it was not given the go ahead to deliver the final agreed upon XTS 350D iteration until late summer of 2000. That is the unit, which recently failed under real life fire fighting circumstances. The information the FDNY received from the field after the XTS 3500s were deployed in March 2001 (see attached) would have been obtained in 2000 had proper field tests, under real fire conditions, been conducted at that time. My office has obtained documents signed by high ranking officers throughout the City describing various problems with the XTS 3500 radios after they xvere put into service on March 14,2001. Proper fteld testing of the XTS 3500 before deployment to all Firehouses would have likely resulted in the rejection of the unit or would have identified and allowed for correction of
4 '01
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p.06
serious performance flaws. Below are four excerpts from some of those Fire Department documents. 1. "There were numerous transmissions thai didn't reach their intended receiver. I -was receiving a number of transmissiops that stopped in mid sentence. A May Day and Urgent were transmitted at the same time. I was one of two people that I could find that heard the May Day. I didn't receive ihc Urgent. When I transmitted over the HT as to who transmitted the May Day no one answered." • 2. "At an ail hands on third floor of an H type building, there were a few transmissions that were only partially received and some transmissions were garbled. When there ate a few HTs in the same area it seems to exacerbate the problem." 3, "1.) The quality of the digital voice transmission is unacceptable for fireground use. It is nearly impossible to identify a particular firefighter's voice even in good conditions. This is not some luxury or inconvenience problem. It is vitally important to accomplish such things as functional supervision. It is nearly impossible to discern voice inflections, There is abig difference between "stop" and "STOP!!!" It just does not come across in the digital voice encoding. 2.) The delay time from key up to transmit is unacceptable for foreground use. These examples should suffice. Key mike — "STOPJ" — transmission starts Key mike - "MAYDAY!" - transmission starts 3.) The delay of ihe transmitted voice signal is unacceptable for fjreground use. The echo effect caused by the time it takes to encode and decode the digital signal is much more than just "odd" or different. While it would not be noticed in business or police uses where individual radios are operated in locations remote from one another. On the fireground this distracting effect puts one more processing task on the firefighter's brain which should be engaged with more important endeavors," 4. "At a recent operation (Second Alarm Brooklyn Box 2665 on 3/14/01) units operated using the new himdi-lalkie radios. The performance of these new radios ivas less than satisfactory. The quality of communications was simitar to that of a Cellular phone. Some of the problems encountered are as follows. 1) Many messages were distorted to the extent that they were unreadable. 2) It appeared that there were some 'dead spots' as many messages were transmitted but not received. 3) The built-in delay, from transmission to reception, caused minor difficulties when transmitting member was in close proximity to other radios. While transmitting, the member would hear previous portions of his messages, via the surrounding radios.
Rpr
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P. 07
4) Too many unnecessary transmissions as a result of all members havbg ladios. Wtu le I agree that every member should have a jadio for safety reasons, I recommend that certain positions, i.e, CAN, IRONS, NOZZLE & BACKUP, only be permitted to make emergency transmissions." The FDNY internal controls regarding testing procedures, documentation requirements and approvals were inadequate. Prior to a purchase of equipment as critical as portable radios for firefighters, there should be an agreed upon testing protocol, adequate documentation of the testing perfotmed and interim and final approvals by the testers and their superiors. In this instance, however, the FDNY has not demonstrated that there were adequate internal controls to ensure that the radios would perform properly. The inadequate "field" testing performed by the FDNY was done using a XTS 3500 VHP radio, not the UHF model that it planned on purchasing. Additionally, according to the Department it issued the VHP model for testing to only one unit (Rescue 2) and has stated fhat it has no documentation regarding what the testing entailed, where it wa$ tested, how many radio(s) %vere involved in the testing, how the radio(s) performed, who tested the radio(s) and whether Rescue 2 was satisfied with the radio's performance. This is an unacceptable methodology for justifying the expenditure of $14 million in public fonds and especially troubling given that the failure of these radios to perform adequately has the potential for causing serious harm to the firefighters who rely on this equipment for their safety. According to press reports, senior FDNY officiafs indicated that the XTS 3500 was in use in Chicago and Boston. Our review of nine municipal frre fighting departments, including Qiicsso and Boston, found Jbar while many use Motorola radios, none use the XTS 3500. Until this matter is satisfactorily resolved, I have ordered that no further payments be made to Motorola by the FDNY. I am forwarding a copy of this letter and enclosures to the Department of Investigation for its review and consideration.
Alan G. Hevesi
AGHyg Enc. ccr Commissioner Edward J. Kuriansky
npr
4 '01
12:58
P. 08
FIRE DEPARTMENT
9 MmoTECH CENTER
BROOKLYN. N.Y. 11201-3557
DONALD Z.STANTON Assistant Fife Commissioner Bureau of Technology Development
Systems
Room 75-R
November 12,1999
TO:
Hairy Heishkowitz Buyer, D.CAS
FROM:
Donald E. Stant Assistant CojnmissiolSZ for Technology Development and Systems, KDNY
SUBJECT: Request for the Substitution of XTS 3500 Portable Radio into Requirements Contract No. 9887218.
FDNY would like lo exercise an existing clause within the current Portable Radio Requirements Contract No. 988721S. This clause, SHOO 117B-ALL located on page B 002, allov/s for the substitution of an existing model radio, with a new model radio,'that has been approved by FDNY and which is to be supplied at no extra cost. FDNY was informed by letter from Motorola that item £2 Portable Radios, Motorola Saber III, Model H99SASPEMS, v/as being discontinued on June 30* 1999- FJDNY icquested and received sample XTS 3500 portable radios from Motorola for FDNY testing. These radios have been tested and evaluated by FDNY. Based upon this testing and evaluation, FDNY requests that DCAS perform the necessary tasks to facilitate the substitution of the existing T SABER III portable radio with &e new XTS 3500 portable radio along with necessary appurtenances. This substitution will be made at no extia cost. Listed below are the new portable radios and appurtenance part numbers along with associated pricing. In some casts, the new appurtenances reflect a decrease in pricing. Please bs advised, we cannot eliminate certain existing appurtenances that are listed on the contract since these items would be required if we were to procure another model radio that remains on the contract. For simplicity sake, I have appended applicable appurtenance line item numbers with the suffix of "a" for those items that need to be'added to the contract. Additionally, those items that will be sahstituied for, in entirely, iwe reflected with the same item number! Obviously, if you want to add these additional items as new item numbers to the end of the contract, leaving all other items as they are, this i's an option as well. In.either case, it is your call as to the best way to modify the contract.
4 '01
DESCRIPTION
QUAN
UO!
12:59
UNIT PRICE
P. 09
EXTENSION
CLASS/ZQjff AWARft 02
rt£M NUMBER: 2. MOTOROLA INC PORTABLE RADIOS; MOTOROLA, XTS 3300. MODEL: H24SDXSPFD
150
EACH S3154.QO S473100.00
TO BE CONFIGURED AS FOLLOWS; A. 1-5 WATTTX.UHF; CLEAR; SPW7AN B. UHF CLEAR; CONVENTIONAL: 450-570 MHz; # Q2« ISP C. TMVffi OUT TIMER; *H9M
D. SOFTWARE/HARDWARE SPJMW99SP
E. FACTORY MUTUAL APPROVED-, «HZZJ F. REMOTE SPEAKER MIC V/ITH
HANG-UP BUTTON IN REAR; gNMN6l93BSPFD01
. 0. H. SHOULDER. STRAP; SXXSPFDNY 1. LEATHER CARRY CASE; eNTN8382FDSP X. K. T-STRAP; #>tTN838JA
L. MDC!200JD;SH939 . M. UWT EVGRAVWG PER FDW SPEC; H353SPZMS
ITEM WJMBtfc 6*. MOTOROLA INC XTS SIWGLE UNTT DESKTOP CHARGER, J HOUR KAPJD CHARGE J75 MOTOROLA* NTNH68
EACH
ITEM NUMBER: 9»- MOTOROLA INC REMOTE SPEAKER MICROPHONE WITH HANG-UF BUTTON
375
EACH 5170.00 . S63750.00
ITEMJWMBER: 11. MOTOROLA WC LEATHER CARRY CASE
75
EACH S4S.4J
$3633.75
rrEMNUNSER: 12. MOTOROLA INC T-STRAP MOTOROLA* NIW385A
15D
EACH SS.10
$765.00
ITEM NUMBER: 13. MOTOROLA INC ULTRA MOH CAPACITY BATTERY XTS 3500 MOTOROLA (5NTN8297
375
EACH
$25873.00
MOTOROLA 2 NMN6193SSPFD01
5107.50
S40312.50
MOTOROLA f NTWJ82F0SP
ITEM NUMBER: J 5. MOTOROLA INC STEEL TIP ANTENNAS MOTOROLA
S69.00
EACH S20.CO
JEI5W.OO
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P. 1Q
UOI
UNIT PRICE
EXTENSION
EACH
S40.45
5161.80
EACH
560-00
EACH
S172.2D
5638.80
EACH
520.00
580.00
ITEM NUMBER 2fi. MOTOROLA INC XTS 3500 RADIO SERVICE SOFTWARE MOTOROLA *RVN4l 70 •
EACH
5325.00
51300.00
ITEM NUMBER: 39. MOTOROLA INC SMART RADIO INTERFACE BOX MOTOROLA * RLNt 0 J 5
EACH
$325.00
S975.00
EACH
(S492.00) (S49200.00)
DESCRIPTION
QUAN
FTEM NUMBER: 19. MOTOROLA INC INTERFACE CABLE MOTOROLA* 30-80390848 ITEM NUMBER: 20. MOTOROLA INC INTERFACE CABLE MOTOROLA # 30-8QJ90849 ITEM NUMBER 22. MOTOROLA INC TEST CABLE MOTOROLA? RKN4035 ITEM NUMBER 25. MOTOROLA INC XTS 3500 SERVICE MANUAL MOTOROLA* 6SS1089CSO
IT5M NUMBER: 80. MOTOROLA INC DEL: HARDWARE KEYPAD MOTOROLA *KMC
100
Item number 80 allows for the deletion of the hardware keypad torn the XTS 3500 portable radio. This wiUreswlt in a price decrease of $492.00 per radio. This allowsFDNY to procure a lesser priced radio for personnel notrequiringa hardware keypad. If you require any additions] infonnatiojn, please let me know.
Cc: T.fitzpalrick S. Gregory A, Achilla
Newsday.com: Disaster Foreshadowed
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http://www.newsday.com/news/printeditJQn/ny-nyhigh3 1 2440024oct31 .story AMERICA'S ORDEAL
Disaster Foreshadowed Deputy warned of high-rise fires in 1995 article By Graham Rayman STAFF WRITER October 31,2001 In a high-rise building fire, elevators stall or shut down. Fire radios don't function above a certain floor. Fire ladders are too short. Civilians jump to their deaths. Air-conditioning ducts allow the fire to spread. In short, it is extremely difficult to fight a major high-rise fire, particularly one on the upper floors. These conclusions aren't from a report issued since the attack on the World Trade Center. Rather, they were written six years ago by Vincent Dunn, a deputy chief in the New York Fire Department. The 1995 article on high-rise fires in general, which appeared in Fire Engineering magazine, illustrated many of the problems confronted by firefighters six years later on Sept. 11. Dunn, a nationally respected expert on high-rise fires who retired recently after 42 years, also included a warning. "After fighting high-rise fires in midtown Manhattan, New York City, for the past 10 years, it is my opinion that the fire service has been lucky," he wrote. "Despite the limitations in fighting high-rise fires, we have not had a great loss of life or another multifloor high-rise fire." In an interview yesterday, Dunn of Queens said there is nothing wrong with Fire Department tactics in high-rise fires, but he believes firefighter communications in such buildings can be improved and manpower can be added to units in high-rise districts. He also said a lighter weight oxygen mask needs to be developed. "High-rise fires are the biggest challenge in the fire service," he said. As for buildings, Dunn said elevators need to be more reliable, and interior antennas should be added to improve radio transmissions. "The building owners have to prove to their occupants that their buildings are safe," Dunn said yesterday. "No fire safety director is going to be too influential. We have to get the confidence of the people back." Since Sept. 11, fire department officials have said they are re-examining how to fight high-rise fires. The collapses of the Twin Towers have also generated debates in recent weeks over whether to rebuild the enormous structures and how to apply lessons of Sept. 11 in new construction. http://www.newsday.../printstory.jsp?slug=ny%2Dnyhigh312440024oct31§ion=%2Fnews%2Fprinteditio 4/9/2003
Los Angeles Times Site Search Results
http://www.latimes.com/cgi-bin/slwebcli...sc=%27Can%20You%20Hear%20Me%20Now%3P/o27
Thursday, August 2, 2001 Home Edition Section: California Page: B-14 'Can You Hear Me Now?' "Can you hear me? Can you hear me now?" Like someone on a cell phone trying to keep a connection, frustrated Los Angeles police officers now repeatedly ask these questions when their new digital radios fall silent because more than one officer is trying to talk at the same time. Whatever the cause, this problem should be resolved quickly before any breakdown in communications, no matter how briefer rare, allows a tragedy to happen. Los Angeles Police Chief Bernard C. Parks says training will help officers become accustomed to the new radios. Two officers couldn't speak simultaneously on the old radios without breaking up or blocking out most words, but the sputtering signaled that the analog radios remained on. When the Motorola digital radios go quiet some cops think, "My radio's not working." No patrol officer needs that kind of uncertainty. Communication with LAPD helicopters also is a problem. Motorola does not even manufacture a digital radio system for helicopters. The department knew that and turned to a company that specializes in aviation technology, but it will be one or two more months before the equipment arrives. Meanwhile, helicopter pilots rely on a jury-rigged Motorola system. As for the handheld radios, which are also used in squad cars, Los Angeles City Controller Laura Chick wants to see reassurance in writing from the LAPD before she cuts a check for $18,000 owed to Motorola. That is a tiny fraction of the $51-million contract for the system, but her stance sends a message to Motorola and all other companies that do business with the city: Get it right and without delay or wait for your money. Chick's demand also puts the LAPD management on notice. She asks what is taking so long to implement projects paid for by Proposition M, a $235-million bond issue that voters approved in 1992 to provide adequate and reliable emergency radio and 911 telephone communications. During her tenure as chair of the Los Angeles City Council's Public Safety Committee, Chick heard plenty about problems, glitches and delays on the 911 upgrade and installation of new message display terminals in squad cars. The LAPD isn't the only major department with radio problems. In May, the Orange County Grand Jury said that a new police radio system, also made by Motorola, posed a threat to public safety because of faulty transmissions and would cost millions to fix. The grand jurors blamed county government, saying it had failed to provide adequate training to officers and to test the system beforehand and had made decisions that reduced radio coverage. We hope that the LAPD will not suffer lingering problems of this nature. Immediate radio communication is essential. No cop should have to ask another, "Can you hear me now?" j of 2
8/8/01 9:28PM
Los Angeles Times Site Search Results
http://\vww.latimes.com/cgi-bin/slwebcli...o%20Risk%20Seen%20in%20Radio%20G!itches
Wednesday, August 1, 2001 Home Edition Section: California Page: B-4 Los Angeles No Risk Seen in Radio Glitches 1 Police: The LAPD's new digital system is not a threat to public safety, officials say. Devices sometimes don't allow officers to talk to each other.
By: KURT STREETER TIMES STAFF WRITER The problems Los Angeles police officers are experiencing with a new, multimillion-dollar radio system are not creating a threat to public safety, department officials said Tuesday. Dozens of patrolmen and women have complained about the department's new digital radios, which have been installed in the LAPD's roughly 5,000 patrol cars since June. Officers have said that they could not hear or understand those in other patrol cars at times and that communication between department helicopters and patrol cars was often poor. Officers have resorted to using cellular phones and other means of communication. "We are having to work around this one," said Capt. Mike Hillman, who oversees the department's fleet of helicopters. Officers have had to come up with "intermediate solutions," including patching two radios together and then plugging them into the helicopter's console to improve their chances of exchanging information with colleagues on the ground, Hillman said. "It is cumbersome," he said. "In terms of immediate concerns, I would be remiss if I didn't say there were problems. But will it change? Yes." The conversion from the older analog to digital radio systems, part of a massive, $51-million communications upgrade, has become a significant concern to patrol officers and department and union officials as glitches have been reported during the last several months. But department officials also say they expect fewer problems after officers receive more training in how to use the new system. Motorola, the company contracted by the city to provide the radios, has said it is confident that its equipment is reliable.
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8/8/01 9:27PM
Los Angeles Times Site Search Results
http://www.latimes.com/cgi-bin/slwebcli...APD%20Radios%20Get%20Negative%20Reviews
Tuesday, July 31,2001 Home Edition Section: California Page: B-l New LAPD Radios Get Negative Reviews Communication: Some say poor sound poses a safety risk. The city may withhold payment from the maker, which says police just need to get used to the devices. By: KURT STREETER TIMES STAFF WRITER Los Angeles police officers using a new, $21-million radio system cannot communicate with one another at times, raising safety concerns and questions about the equipment's reliability, department and union officials said Monday. The new equipment, which has been in all squad cars since June, has resulted in technological glitches and confusion among officers who need more training, said Cmdr. Sharon Papa, a Los Angeles Police Department spokeswoman. "We're trying to understand what is going on in the field and make the best decisions on how to fix it," she said. Officials said some officers have complained that they cannot hear anything at times or can barely understand what is being said by someone in another squad car. In addition, communication has been poor between department helicopters and patrol cars, they said. After hearing widespread complaints from officers who are worried that a tragedy will occur because of poor communication, the Police Protective League sent a letter to Chief Bernard C. Parks on Friday, demanding a quick remedy. "This is about the safety of officers on the street," said Ted Hunt, a member of the union's Board of Directors. "They need to figure this one out as quick as possible." City Controller Laura Chick said she is considering withholding payment from Motorola, the company that supplied the equipment, until she is satisfied with the product. "There are some serious problems with the system," said Chick, noting that an $18,000 payment is due soon. "If I am not satisfied Motorola is working to fix them, we are not going to pay. I need to be sure we are getting what we pay for." Motorola spokeswoman Adrienne Dimopoulos said the company is confident its equipment is working properly.
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LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE Tuesday, July 31, 2001 "ASTRO Digital Technology" Los Angeles: In 1992, the voting Los Angeles public approved a $235 million dollar bond measure. The purpose of the bond measure was to build two new dispatch centers, one in the metropolitan Los Angeles area and the second in the San Fernando Valley, and to replace the Master Radio System. The Master Radio System is a 56 channel Ultra High Frequency (UHF) simulcast system that utilizes Motorola ASTRO digital technology. In 1996, the Department began deployment of the new ASTROs [radios] however, up until recently, these radios were being operated in an analog mode. Over the last several weeks, the Department has completely switched operation from an analog to digital mode. Over the course of the switch, the Department and Motorola have received operational feedback from our patrol officers. Officers have voiced concerns over operational aspects of the radio. Some of the most frequently cited concerns by officers include, the frequent fluctuations in volume levels during radio communications, periodic echoing effects during voice transmissions, degradations during unit-to-unit voice communications in the simplex mode and problems during air-to-ground transmissions. file://C:\Documents and Settings\Richard J McAllanYMy DocumentsXMac F Two Nov 200..ALAPD Radios.ht 4/3/2003
freedomforum.org: Despite promises, few records released from Giuliani archives
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Despite promises, few records released from Giuliani archives By The Associated Press
10.05.02
NEW YORK — Shortly after Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office in January, he pledged to make accessible thousands of pages of historically important documents that were quietly removed from City Hall by the Giuliani administration. But the Bloomberg administration has released little in response to a months-long effort by the Associated Press to gain access to portions of the Giuliani archives, raising questions about whether the records are truly available to the public. The AP requested copies of all records related to Giuliani's establishment of the Twin Towers Fund, a multimilliondollar charity for the families of Sept. 11 victims, and all documents detailing the administration's response to the anthrax scare that terrified the city last fall. The AP's requests, first made six months ago under the state's Freedom of Information Law, have led to the release of just 13 pages related to the Twin Towers Fund, and a single press release regarding the city's handling of the anthrax scare. Corporation Counsel Michael Cardozo, the city's top lawyer, said the Bloomberg administration complied lawfully with the AP's request, and repeated assurances that the public would be given speedy access to records. "I believe that the public is receiving the same access to the Giuliani records it would have had had the contract with the Giuliani Center not been entered into," Cardozo said. But by contrast, the state Attorney General's office released more than 300 pages of Twin Towers documents generated by the city and filed with the state agency. Those documents were made available by the attorney general within a single business day in response to the AP's request. "The problem was absolutely predictable and now it's all coming true," said Robert Freeman, director of the state Committee on Open Government, the agency that oversees state laws governing access to public records. Mayoral records from the Giuliani administration, the vast majority of which are presumed to be public documents, are no longer in the city's possession. Seven days before Giuliani's term expired, the city agreed to hand over all of the mayor's records to the Rudolph W. Giuliani Center for Urban Affairs, a private organization run by colleagues of the ex-mayor. The agreement, unprecedented in New York City, drew protests from archivists, historians and some public officials who feared that the public would lose access. "I thought it was wrong to keep the documents, and I still think a great error was made," said former Mayor Ed Koch. "A lawsuit should be brought to restore them to the municipal archives." Bloomberg, who has spoken often about the need for "transparency" in government, had assured the public it would have access to the Giuliani records as long as the documents were not personal in nature. http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=17060&printerfriendly=l
11/6/2002
September 28, 1990 JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT NEW UHF RADIO SYSTEM
1.
BACKGROUND The New York City Fire Department is the country's largest fire department comprising over 11,000 uniformed firefighters and fire officers, and over 1,000 civilians. The Department is organized into 12 commands, 49 Battalions, 209 engine companies and 144 ladder companies. There are numerous specialty units such as: Decontamination, Health Services, Thawing Apparatus, Ambulance, Salvage, Brush Fire, Rescue, Searchlight, .Hazardous Material,, Field Communication, Mobile Headquarters, -Mask Service and Marine., (fireboat) . Fire Operations cover the entire 5 borough region,,of' New York City. : y
As an indication of the volume .of fire traffic processed, in 19.89 the Department handled 848,715'calls', of "which 696,339 were alarms received. 'Total fires for that year were 104,626.
.
The present 5 duplex channel••• radio system was configured in .-the early 1960's. Since that . time, no additional .channel capacity has been added. Imminently, the Department will have 2700 mobile units ...on this system. The near future- will see a total of approximately 4200 units, of necessity, ;on;the; same system. .. ;
The City has 5 borough dispatch operations . and one Citywide operation. Because of the channel', scarcity, "5. boroughs must share. "'"""4 channels, with
OVERLOADING OF PRESENT'VHF SYSTEM Presently, the Department must operate with 5 VHF duplex channels and one simplex frequency (for fire ground tactical). By any standard, FCC or operational, this system is severely overloaded. Loading is presently at 450 units per channel, far in excess of the FCC loading standard of 100 units- per channel. After the imminent replacement of obsolete portables with new radios having duplex channel capability, channel loading will increase to 540
/9/11 P e r s o n a l
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To: '9-11 Commission NYC' 9 Subject: NYC Council Oversight Hearing Part(s): ^2 Council Oversight Briefing Paper April 10 2001.pdf application/pdf 1244.26 KB Jg) ^ 3 Justification For Radios 1990.pdf
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^ 4 McAllan Testimony Excerpt.pdf
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fJ3 5 Problem New Radios Attach 5 Part 1 .pdf
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^ 6 Problem New Radios Attach 5 Part 2.pdf
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"^ 7 Timeline Attach 3.pdf
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These attachments center around the NYC Council's Oversight April 2001 Hearing concerning the purchase of the Motorola Digital Portable Radios.
To say the least, this was a contentious hearing in which Von Essen tried to defend the purchase of these bad radios. (If you would like to have it, I have a full PDF copy of the transcript of that hearing.)
Key to the radio's failure in the field was the fact that they were programmed to transmit digitally on the fire ground point to point frequencies. (I am not sure on which bandwidth.)
As some of the other attachments to my emails indicate, these same radios were eventually re-programmed to transmit in analog mode in the 154 Mhz range.
Why FDNY and DOITT chose digital point to point is of course a good question which remains unanswered.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?index=l 130
12/4/2003
Louis Vetrone, Counsel to the Committee Andrew Neuman, Legal Daryl Finizio, Policy Analyst Stephen Feger, Finance
Office of Oversight and Investigation: John P. Graham, Deputy Director Erich Giebelhaus Robert Gormley Thomas Rogers Chris Winward
THE COUNCIL BRIEFING PAPER OF THE LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION RICHARD M. WEINBERG, DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL AND OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION CATHERINE McALEVEY, DIRECTOR
COMMITTEE ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES Chair Lawrence A. Warden April 10, 2001 OVERSIGHT: THE PROCUREMENT, DISTRIBUTION AND TESTING OF DIGITAL TWOWAY RADIOS BY THE FIRE DEPARTMENT
Introduction On March 14, 2001, the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) issued new Motorola XTS3500R digital two-way radios (commonly referred to as "handie-talkies") to firefighters throughout the City.' On March 19, 2001, while firefighter Luke Healy was battling a fire in the basement of a home on Myrtle Avenue in Richmond Hill, Queens, his oxygen tank began to expire.2 As Healy attempted to exit the basement, his oxygen tank ran out.3 Initial reports indicated that Healy's seven Mayday calls went unheard by firefighters at the scene and that they were only alerted to his need for assistance after a firefighter at another location, ten blocks away, heard a Mayday call from Healy.4 Subsequently, FDNY documents revealed that Deputy Chief Weinlein, who was at Myrtle Avenue, reported that he and another FDNY official at the scene heard a Mayday, but that when he used the radio to ask who transmitted the Mayday, no one answered. According to Deputy Chief Weinlein, Healy was eventually found by officers who heard his calls for help from the basement, not over the radio.5 On March 21, 2001, the FDNY announced that the following day, the newly issued radios would be recalled from the field with the intention of addressing operational issues with the radios and returning them to service shortly.6
' William Murphy and Melanie Lefkowitz, "Static Over Radios; FDNY Recalls New Models After Firefighter's Close Call," Newsday, March 22, 2001; March 20, 2001 memorandum from FDNY Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro to All Divisions. ~ Herbert Lowe, "Mayor Backs FDNY's Use of Radios," Newsday, March 26, 2001; Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close Call Leads to $4M Radio Recall," Ne\v York Post, March 22, 2001. Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close Call Leads to $4M Radio Recall," New York Post, March 22,2001. 3
Susan Saulny, "In Safety Move, Fire Department Pulls New Radios From Service," New York Times, March 22, 2001. 4
5 March 19, 2001 memorandum from FDNY Deputy Chief Weinlein to Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro regarding "Ht Operations at Box 2-2 9635."
March 20, 2001 memorandum from FDNY Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro to All Divisions; Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
6
Subsequently, it was revealed that during the eight days the new radios were in the field, firefighters experienced numerous problems with them, such as delays in transmission, messages not being received, messages getting cut off, and an echoing effect contributing to poor sound quality. Since the radios were recalled, many conflicting reports have circulated concerning the procurement, testing and distribution of the Motorola digital radios by the Fire Department. With the safety of firefighters as its overriding concern, the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services plans to address these and other issues that have arisen with respect to these radios at today's hearing.
Procurement of the Motorola XTS3500R Digital Radios Prior to March 14, 2001, the FDNY utilized radios that operated in analog mode7 that it had purchased from Motorola for well over a decade. In 1997, the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), pursuant to the FDNY's request, executed a sole source contract8
7AnaIog and digital radio systems have substantially different transmission characteristics. In an analog radio system, the signal generated by the speaker's voice remains unchanged from the transmitter to the receiving radio. Analog radio operations are generally less expensive to implement, and remain the most widely used communications system. In a digital radio system, a voice frequency is sampled at the transmitter and converted into a digital signal by a voice encoder. Once the digital signal is received, it must be converted again to an analog copy of the original voice. While a digital signal is largely consistent over the entire coverage area, an analog signal grows weaker and noise levels increase the further a receiver is from the point of transmission. Digital systems are capable of superior spectrum efficiency and are said to provide better building penetration. See http://www.mot.com/LMPS/RNSG/conv/tvDes.htrn: See also, Nebraska State Radio Communications Task Force, "Recommendations for a State and Local Government Public Safety Statewide Wireless Communications Infrastructure" January 1, 1999, available at http://www.doc.state.ne.us/radiotf7NRCFinalReport.html
Section 3-05 of the Procurement Policy Board ("PPB") Rules governs the procedures to be used for sole source contracts. Specifically, the rules require that sole source procurements be used only when there is one source for the required goods. In such situations, the accepted price and terms and conditions shall be achieved through negotiation between the agency and the supplier. In determining whether to sole source a contract, the Agency Chief Procurement Officer ("ACCO") shall make a written determination that there is only one source for the required goods. For sole source procurements for goods and services of $10,000 or more, the ACCO is required to include a description of the efforts made to ensure that offers were solicited from other sources, and where applicable, a statement of intended actions to develop competition in the future. A copy of the ACCO's determination must be forwarded to the Comptroller's office within five days of completion. 8
with Motorola9 to purchase a total of 750 radios for a total of approximately $2.9 million.10 According to its terms, the contract could be used by the FDNY to purchase from among three different types of digital radios and two different types of analog radios.11 The contract also included provisions allowing for the substitution of a different radio if it were first approved by the FDNY and were offered at no additional cost. The Procurement Policy Board (PPB) Rules require that an agency give public notice of its intent to enter into sole source negotiations with a supplier. These public notices are published in the City's official newspaper, The City Record. If expressions of interest are received, the agency is required to evaluate them and, if it appears that the goods are available from more than a single source, a solicitation is required to be issued in accordance with Chapter 3 of the PPB Rules. The FDNY provided notice in The City Record on April 25, 1997, that it intended "to enter into Sole Source negotiations with Motorola to purchase VHP Analog Saber I Submersible Radios, UHF Analog Saber II Radios, VHF Astro Digital Capable Saber 1 Submersible Radios, UHF Astro Digital Capable Saber I Submersible Radios, and Astro Digital Capable Saber II Radios; all with spare parts."12 This notice states that "[ajny vendor who is qualified to compete on this procurement is invited to express their interest in writing by 4-30-97."
A review of the VENDEX system reveals that New York City issued 168 contracts and 531 purchase orders to Motorola, with a total value of $167.8 million. 9
10
DCAS Pre-Solicitation Review Report for FDNY Contract With Motorola, IV.C.4.
" According to FDNY officials, the City's Department of Information Technology and Telecommunication (DoITT) had determined that the FDNY should move toward modernization of its radio communications, including the ability to communicate with other City agencies and outside public safety agencies. Interoperability between the FDNY and other agencies is easier to achieve with a digital radio system, n VHF frequency bands for public safety include frequencies between 150-174 megahertz (MHz) while the UHF public safety bands encompass frequencies between 450 - 512 MHz. In general, natural and manmade noise is found at higher levels at lower frequencies. In general, UHF frequencies have shorter wavelengths and better building penetration. See Kathy J. Timel and James W. Hart, P.E. "Understanding Wireless Communications in Public
In its Pre-Solicitation Review Report, dated July 16, 1997, and signed by the FDNY's Agency Chief Contracting Officer (ACCO) Robert L. Scott, the FDNY reported that this procurement "was initially processed under an open market solicitation."
However, because
Motorola was the only bidder that could meet the operational and technical standards, a sole source procurement was sought. In the same document, the FDNY stated that "several manufacturers are developing CAI [Common Air Interface]-compliant products [one of the FDNY's standards], as digital and narrowband operations are being pushed by the FCC [Federal Communications Commission]" and that "[t]he FDNY will always evaluate new technologies and products as they become available." In May 1998, Motorola informed the FDNY that it was discontinuing one of the two analogonly radios included in the 1997 contract - the Saber 1 VHP. In a letter dated February 18, 1999, Motorola informed the FDNY that it was also discontinuing the other analog-only radio in the 1997 contract - the Saber III UHF - and offered to substitute the XTS3500R, which according to Motorola "would provide FDNY/EMSC a radio with greater technical and electrical specifications, analog and digital capability, while reducing the cost to the city." On February 24, 1999, the FDNY sent Motorola a written request for samples of the XTS3500R. Motorola, in a letter to the FDNY dated November 19, 1999, and referencing an earlier telephone conversation, said it "accepts and concurs with the [FDNY's] substitution of the XTS3500R Portable Radio Equipment and Appurtenances" for the discontinued analog radio. Thus, despite its acknowledgment two years earlier that several manufacturers were developing technology that might meet FDNY's CAI specifications, and in apparent disregard of its pledge to evaluate new technologies and products, the
Safety: A Guidebook to Technology, Issues, Planning, and Management," The National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, March 2000, available at http://www.nlectc.org
FDNY appears to have elected to accept a radio representing an entirely new communications technology from Motorola rather than conduct a competitive review of products and prices. Compounding its failure to subject this new communications technology to a competitive procurement process, the FDNY also exceeded the 1997 contract's ceiling on the number of radios to be procured (750 units) and the amount of the contract, $2.9 million. In December 1999, the FDNY ordered 2,700 XTS3500R radios from Motorola, and in 2000, ordered another 1,118 radios. The total cost for the 3,818 radios was approximately $14 million.13'14 There were conflicting media reports attributed to the FDNY concerning the amount of the entire contract to Motorola. Initially, several media sources reported on March 22, 2001, that the Motorola radio contract was worth $4.5 million, according to the FDNY.15 However, subsequent to a conflicting media report concerning the size of the contract, the FDNY adjusted this figure to represent a multi-year contract with Motorola for S33 million.16 The FDNY explained this discrepancy as the result of an error in calculation and "internal confusion" at the FDNY.17 There
13 In a memorandum dated November 12,1999, Donald E. Stanton, the Assistant Fire Commissioner for the FDNY's Bureau of Technology Development and Systems, requested "that DCAS perform the necessary tasks to facilitate the substitution of the existing SABER III portable radio with the new XTS3500R portable radio." It should be noted that in its February 18, 1999, letter informing the FDNY that the SABER III was to be discontinued, Motorola listed the price of the XTS3500R as $3,132. However, in all its memoranda to DCAS, the FDNY lists the price of the XTS3500R as $3,154, the price of the discontinued SABER III. In addition, the Stanton memorandum states that the new radio "is to be supplied at no extra cost." This is technically true, since, in Stanton's memorandum, the XTS3500R is said to be replacing the SABER III portable radio, which Motorola sold to the FDNY for $3,154 per radio. 14 To date, the FDNY has encumbered $13,969,142 for the XTS350CR radios and has paid for $5,858,927 worth of XTS3500R radios and accessories. 15 William Murphy and Melanie Lefkowitz, "Static Over Radios; FDNY Recalls New Models After Firefighter's Close Call," Newsday, March 22, 2001; Susan Saulny, "In Safety Move, Fire Department Pulls New Radios From Service," Mew York Times, March 22, 2001. 16 William K. Rashbaum, "Fire Union Demands Inquiry Into Contract for New Radios," New York Times, March 25, 2001. A report from WNBC-TV that aired on March 23, 2001, initially reported the $33 million figure. A review of contract documents submitted to the Council by DCAS, to date, does not support this $33 million figure, however. 17 William K. Rashbaum, "Fire Union Demands Inquiry Into Contract for New Radios," New York Times, March 25, 2001.
were also conflicting accounts from the FDNY presented in various media outlets concerning the number of radios purchased under the Motorola contract.'8 Testing and Distribution of the Motorola XTS3500R Radios by the FDNY The FDNY reportedly purchased the Motorola XTS3500R (UHF version) digital radios because they would provide better overall quality voice transmission and better radio penetration when used inside buildings.19 Nevertheless, all information provided to date indicates that the XTS3500R's were not adequately tested to ensure that they would meet the FDNY's operational needs, and that FDNY firefighters and officers were not sufficiently trained in operating the new radios. According to the FDNY, prior to placing their order for the new Motorola radios, the Department performed shop testing on the UHF version of the XTS3500R, including receiver and transmitter specifications, submersibility testing of the waterproof characteristics of the radio, a voice clarity test, a drop (shock) test, verification of controls, channels, radio features and accessories, and a battery life test. In addition, the FDNY has indicated that it also performed technical propagation testing and a comparison of VHF versus UHF, and analog versus digital coverage. According to the FDNY, the XTS3500R met these technical specifications. The FDNY has stated that its Rescue 2 unit tested the radios from July 23, 1999, to August 1, 1999. However, although the Rescue 2 unit tested an analog, VHF model of the XTS3500R, the FDNY purchased a digital, UHF model. Thus, the Rescue 2 unit never tested the radios or technology subsequently purchased by FDNY. Furthermore, the FDNY has indicated that Rescue 2
18 Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001; Patrice O'Shaughnessy and Maki Becker, "FDNY in a Radio Daze; Heat Rises as Faulty System Nixed," Daily News, March 25, 2001. 19 Kevin Flynn, "Unions Say Fire Dept. Ignored Concerns Over New Radios," The New York Times, March 31, 2001.
primarily tested the ergonomics of the radios such as button and knob placement, and other features.20 FDNY officials have admitted that Rescue 2 did not generate any written reports concerning the radio testing. Despite the lack of field testing, the FDNY began ordering the digital XTS3500R's (UHF version) in December 1999. According to the FDNY, the original shipment of 2,700 radios was received in January 2000. The FDNY began "shop testing" (lab testing) the radios in February 2000. In March 2000, all of the radios were returned to Motorola after the FDNY detected a problem regarding the submersibility characteristics of the radios. Motorola attempted to solve this problem and re-delivered 100 radios to the FDNY in May 2000. The FDNY found that the problem was not adequately addressed and again returned the radios to Motorola. In July 2000, Motorola reshipped 1,000 radios, with a random sample passing FDNY tests. In October, 2000, FDNY ordered another 418 radios. Between September 2000 and December 2000, Motorola fulfilled the FDNY orders. In January 2001, all radios from the original order and the 418 from the second order were tested for frequency assignment, transmission power output, receiver sensitivity, a vacuum test, and transmitter error. According to FDNY officials, the radios met all specifications, and were accepted for use by the Department. According to conversations with FDNY officials and media reports, approximately 20 of the radios were then "field-tested" at the FDNY Fire Training Academy on Randall's Island between January and February 2001.21 Acknowledging that, as of April 3, 2001, they were still gathering departmental documents related to this alleged testing, FDNY officials were unable to provide Council staff with further details surrounding this alleged testing, such as whether written
20
As a result of the Rescue 2 testing, design changes were implemented by Motorola.
The Fire Academy teaches new firefighters, as well as provides fire companies with continuing education, in the classroom and through simulated fireground training. 21
instructions concerning the scope of testing were provided to training officers; whether written reports were requested of and transmitted by officers; or who decided the radios should be tested at the Fire Academy. Noting that they were collecting documentation as part of their internal investigation, these FDNY officials said that they would have them in time for the City Council's hearing. Pursuant to procedure, the FDNY field-tests products prior to actual purchase. The FDNY has asserted that the XTS3500R radios were field-tested at the Fire Academy, but this was after the FDNY had already accepted delivery of all 3,818 radios. Moreover, representatives of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association (UFOA) state that the radios were not tested at the Fire Academy. Officers at the Academy were told to utilize the hew radios in simulated drills merely to "familiarize" them with the new radios, and that the exercises were not intended to evaluate the radios.22 Nevertheless, problems with the radios were detected through this familiarization. According to the UFOA, an officer told the Assistant Commissioner for the Bureau of Fire Communications, Stephen M. Gregory, on several occasions during the training at the Fire Academy in January and February of 2001 that there were serious flaws in the radios and that "at least one senior department official was aware of the problems since January [2001]."23 According to the UFOA, the officer was told directly by Assistant Commissioner Gregory not to
22
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001.
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001. This article states that several officers reported problems to Assistant Commissioner Gregory. Also in this article, a senior FDNY official is reported to have stated that the problems experienced during the Fire Academy "testing", which Assistant Commissioner Gregory was alerted to, "involved the half-second delays in transmission and echoes that are inherent to the digital technology." Also see Kevin Flynn, "Unions Say Fire Department Ignored Concerns Over New Radios," New York Times, March 31, 2001. 23
10 file a written report of problems observed with the new digital radios, and that the FDNY was already aware of these problems.24 The radios were delivered to FDNY firehouses in February/March 2001. The FDNY put the XTS3500R radios into service on March 14, 2001. According to the FDNY, firefighters and officers received training through an instructional video produced by the FDNY and through at least one visit from a battalion chief to each firehouse. Inasmuch as the video should contain instructions to firefighters and officers on any operational idiosyncrasies inherent to the radios, logically, it should have been produced after field testing. However, the video was produced before the fall of 2000, well before the radios were sent to the Fire Academy. This explains why the instructional video does not mention transmission delays and echoes, or any other problems identified in January and February 2001 at the Fire Academy. According to FDNY officials, within the first few days of the XTS3500R's being put into service, the Department received oral reports from the field of problems with the radios, including reports of messages being "stepped on"25 and messages not being received. Based on these reports, Donald J. Burns, FDNY Citywide Tour Commander, sent a memorandum on March 16, 2001, to all Deputy and Battalion Chiefs directing them to forward a report to the Bureau of Operations, and to provide immediate telephone notification through the chain of command to the Citywide Chief, if they encountered any problems "in the use of the new handie-talkies at fire or other operations." The memorandum further states that "[t]here have been some rumors of problems but there has been NO official notification of any problems." Despite this assertion, there were two March 14, 2001,
24
Ibid.
A term used to describe when several individuals transmit messages concurrently, causing some messages to be interrupted or lost.
25
11 reports £jm Battalion Chiefs of problems encountered with the use of the new radios. Reports of problems were also submitted on March 15, 2001. After the March 16, 2001, memorandum from Donald J. Burns was distributed, numerous written reports were sent to FDNY staff concerning problems encountered in the field with the new XTS3500R's. Reported problems included: • transmitted messages that were never received; • simultaneous transmissions that cancel each other out; • messages "getting cut off;" • slight delays in transmissions; • "transmissions from remote companies are interspersed with fireground transmissions;" • quality of transmissions were better when speaking with personnel not present at the scene of an incident; • "when in close proximity ... a reverberation or echo is experienced"; and • difficulties experienced in discerning voice inflections. According to FDNY officials, after the March 19, 2001, Mayday incident, five Deputy Chiefs convened at the FDNY's training site on Randall's Island on March 20, 2001, to test the radios' reported problems. After testing the radios and experiencing the same or similar problems reported from the field, the Chiefs recommended that the radios be removed from service to address these problems. Subsequently, on March 21, 2001, FDNY Commissioner Thomas Von Essen ordered that the XTS3500R radios be removed from the field the following day.
12
Upon recalling the radios from the field, the FDNY initially stated that the Motorola XTS3500R radios were currently utilized by fire departments in Boston and Chicago.'6 However, as later reported by the media, firefighter unions in Boston and Chicago stated that their departments do not use the same Motorola model.27 In fact, the Boston and Chicago fire departments had considered - and rejected - digital systems, opting instead to continue purchasing analog radios under an analog system.
Mistakes Repeated In 1980, two firefighters died when a safety rope broke at a Manhattan fire. Top fire officials insisted that the rope broke after it was cut on the broken edge of the roof coping. In fact, a subsequent investigation by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) concluded that the Fire Commissioner, Chief of Department, Chief of Training Division, and other chiefs knew for as many as five months before the accident that the rope had repeatedly failed to meet safety standards established by the FDNY and the cordage industry.29 In addition to determining that upper levels of FDNY management actually knew of the rope's substandard
Michele McPhee, "FDNY Chief Says Radios Cost City $33M," Daily News, March 26, 2001; Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
26
27
Michele McPhee, "FDNY Chief Says Radios Cost City S33M," Daily News, March 26, 2001.
28 The Boston Fire Department has confirmed to Council staff that they do not use the XTS3500R as part of their analog radio system. The Chicago Fire Department has confirmed to Council staff that they use an analog version of the XTS3500R, in addition to other analog radios, as part of their analog system. Moreover, while the Baltimore Fire Department does have a digital system in place, it does not use the XTS3500R digital radio. The Philadelphia Fire Department presently has an analog system and will be implementing a digital system in the near future similar to that of the Baltimore Fire Department. Council staff also contacted public safety agencies in a number of other cities and municipalities, including Atlantic City, New Jersey; Hamilton County, Ohio (metropolitan Cincinnati); Traverse City, Michigan (which has a system linking much of northern Michigan); and Boca Raton, Florida. None of these municipalities use the XTS3500R radio.
New York City Department of Investigation, "Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the June 27, 1980, Fire During Which Two Firemen Were Killed During an Attempted Rescue With a Roof Rope," Report 1034/80D, December 1980.
29
13 performance, the DOI report also concluded that the FDNY internal investigation was handled unprofessionally, and that FDNY officials carelessly made inaccurate and unsubstantiated public statements about this incident. A review of the FDNY's procurement, testing, distribution, and recall of the Motorola XTS3500R digital radios reveals that FDNY officials failed to heed the recommendations made by DOI in its 1980 report. Specifically, the FDNY did not follow testing and evaluation protocols established subsequent to the DOI report, including consulting with the fire unions about the testing or introduction of safety equipment. Moreover, following the March 19, 2001, Mayday incident, the FDNY repeatedly released incorrect or incomplete information to the media. Despite this, and the passage of 20 days, there has been no information released by the FDNY from their internal investigation. DOI Recommendation: New FDNY Testing and Evaluation Protocols The safety equipment provided to firefighters is a vital lifeline. Recognizing this, the DOI report made several recommendations concerning the proper evaluation and testing of "newest technologies, as well as routine changes in the standards, usages, and reliability of existing equipment."30 The DOI report recommended that the FDNY create a new bureau whose full-time concern would be to review and evaluate all equipment. Subsequent to the release of the DOI report, the FDNY upgraded its then existing safety unit to form the Safety Division.31 Within the Safety Division of the FDNY is a Research and Development Unit. In March 1983, the FDNY established protocols within the Safety Division for the testing and evaluation of new products with the creation of "All Units Circular (A.U.C.) 273." The
30
Ibid.
31
1981 Preliminary Mayor's Management Report, p. 37.
14 FDNY stated that the purpose of A.U.C. 273 is to "insure that information about new equipment placed in the field for pilot testing is available to all members of the Department.in the event that their operations might involve or be concerned with these programs."32 Under protocols established by A.U.C. 273, before products are purchased by the FDNY, they are distributed in a pilot phase to selected fire units across the City to be tested in actual field conditions. All units across the City are notified of this pilot phase through addenda to A.U.C. 273, not just the fire units that are selected to participate in the pilot-testing phase. Selected fire units then file written reports directly to the Research and Development Unit based upon their experience with a product. Council staff obtained numerous examples of the FDNY's adherence to this protocol, even when there were only slight changes to the specifications of a product currently being used by the FDNY. For example, since October 25, 2000, a new fire hose has been pilot-tested by several FDNY engine companies, with pilot testing scheduled to end on April 15, 2001.33 In this case, fire units are to file reports to Research and Development any time a hose is stretched. A.U.C. addenda for other products reveal varied reporting guidelines. In the case of the XTS3500R radios, there has been no documentation presented by FDNY that indicates that a notice pursuant to A.U.C. 273 protocol was issued at all. The FDNY asserts that actual field tests of the XTS3500R digital radios by units was not possible because the digital radios could not communicate with the analog radios already being used in the field.34 However, the XTS3500R radios could have been tested in field simulation drills that are conducted by multiple units while out of actual field service, such as the FDNY's "Pipeline"
32
FDNY, "Pilot Programs - Equipment/Apparatus," All Units Circular 273, March 29, 1983.
" A.U.C. 273 Addendum #287, October 25, 2000. 34
William Van Auken, "FDNY Pulls Plug on Faulty Radios", The Chief, March 30, 2001.
15 drill, airport drill, Perm Station drill, and other multi-unit drills that are conducted within battalion districts. Additionally, the radios could have been tested prior to purchase under simulated fire conditions at the Fire Academy, as the FDNY claims they subsequently were. DPI Recommendation: Consultation With Fire Unions in Testing of New Products The 1980 DOI report also recommended that fire unions should be fully represented and consulted in the testing and evaluation process of new products, as well as with changes in standards and reliability of existing equipment. Subsequent to the issuance of the DOI report, the FDNY named an eight-member Safety Committee, chaired by the First Deputy Commissioner, with both management and union representation?5 Although union representatives told Council staff that the Safety Committee does not meet on a pre-determined basis, they did say that they are routinely notified and consulted about the testing and evaluation of new products and proposed changes to existing equipment by way of the Safety Committee and in other ways, including the contractually established Labor-Management Committee and other meetings. For instance, when bunker gear was introduced (during which time, the current FDNY Commissioner was then the president of the UFA), the UFOA and UFA report that they were actively involved in the process. In the case of the XTS3500R digital radios, the UFA and the UFOA have stated that fire unions were not consulted at any point in the FDNY's decision to procure the new digital radios, marking a distinct departure from existing FDNY protocols.37
35
1981 Preliminary Mayor's Management Report, p. 37.
36
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001.
37
Ibid.
16
DPI Recommendation; Proper Investigation of Reported Incidents: The DOI report states that the FDNY conducted their investigation of the 1980 rope incident unprofessionally, and noted serious managerial weakness within the FDNY at that time in conducting formal investigations.38 The DOI investigation found in the case of the rope incident that the FDNY had "engaged in a number of actions that raised questions about the competence and objectivity of command investigations conducted internally within the Department."39 The DOI report recommended that a new "emergency response investigative unit" be created within the FDNY to respond to unusual incidents that would be "independent of all intermediate commands," but that the investigative unit should "maintain close working relations with and draw on the expertise of the Inspector General's office, the Fire Marshals and the Office of Legal Affairs."40 This unit would seek, among other things, "to ascertain whether there are any major flaws in the way firefighting practices and equipment are employed so that the loss of life may be prevented in the future."41 The report also stated that "the persons involved in any disaster should be professionally and thoroughly interviewed as soon as possible after an incident occurs."42 DOI concluded that when it was directed to conduct its investigation less than one month after the tragic incident, "individual witness recollections were growing
38
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980, p. 28.
39
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980, p. 3.
40
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980, p. 28.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
17 stale; and various individuals and entities had developed interests in the outcome of the matter that might affect the version of what happened."43 With regard to the FDNY's current internal investigation regarding the procurement, inadequate testing and training, and operational difficulties with the XTS3500R radios, FDNY officials have been reported as saying that their "internal review has first focused on the radios themselves, with the Department questioning Motorola engineers about what problems may exist with the technology."44 This is consistent with UFOA's statement that none of the UFOA members who reported problems with the radios have been interviewed as part of the FDNY's internal investigation.45 It has been 20 days since the FDNY Commissioner's decision to recall the XTS3500R digital radios, and the FDNY has yet to interview key witnesses or release any results of its reported investigation. DPI Finding: Misleading Information In 1980, the DOI report found that the FDNY had released misleading information to the public regarding the rope incident. Similarly, subsequent to the first public reports of problems with the new XTS3500R digital radios, there have been several instances of inaccurate and incomplete information provided by FDNY to the media: > Based upon conversations with the FDNY, many media outlets reported on March 22, 2001, that the FDNY contract for the new digital radios was $4.5 million.46 Another
43
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980.
44
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001.
45
Ibid.
Associated Press, "Fire Department Withdraws New Handheld Radios", published in Stolen Island Advance, March 22, 2001; Susan Saulny, "In Safety Move, Fire Department Pulls New Radios From Service," New York Times, March 22, 2001; William Murphy and Melanie Lefkowitz, "Static Over Radios; FDNY Recalls New Models After Firefighter's Close Call," Newsday, March 22, 2001; Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close 46
18 news story indicated that Motorola and FDNY official, provided a total figure of $18 million to replace the old analog radios.47 In subsequent reports, this figure was adjusted to $33 million for the entire multi-year contract with Motorola, which included all components of the new digital system.48 The FDNY also initially provided incorrect information to media outlets that the Boston and Chicago Fire Departments used the same digital XTS3500R radios being used by the FDNY.49 Boston and Chicago Fire Department officials subsequently denied that they had ever used digital XTS3500R radios,50 and this was later confirmed by Council staff. The FDNY also provided conflicting information about the number of digital radios that were purchased under their Motorola contract and the cost for those radios. On March 22, 2001, several news stories stated that the FDNY had purchased 2,700 new digital XTS3500R radios from Motorola,31 while another news story on the same date put the figure at 4,000 radios.52 The 2,700 figure on the number of radios was then
Call Leads to $4 Million Radio Recall," New York Post, March 22, 2001; Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001. Donna de la Cruz, "Fire Unions: Official Knew of Radio Problems," Associated Press, published in Stolen Island Advance, March 31, 2001.
47
William K. Rashbaum, "Fire Union Demands Inquiry Into Contract for New Radios," New York Times, March 25, 2001; Michele McPhee, "FDNY Chief Says Radios Cost City S33M," Daily News, March 26, 2001; William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001. A report from WNBC-TV that aired on March 23, 2001, was the initial source for the $33 million figure. 48
49
Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
50 Patrice O'Shaughnessy and Maki Becker, "FDNY in a Radio Daze; Heat Rises as Faulty System Nixed," Daily News, March 25, 2001.
Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close Call Leads to S4M Radio Recall," New York Post, March 22, 2001; Associated Press, "Fire Department Withdraws New Handheld Radios", reported in the Staten Island Advance, March 22, 2001. 51
52
Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
19 quoted from the FDNY sources in subsequent news stories. Finally, the figure was adjusted to 3,818 radios on March 31, 2001.53 > Finally, the FDNY has also provided the media with misleading information concerning the contents of the instructional video provided to firefighters for the XTS3500R radios. Assistant Commissioner Gregory reportedly stated to a senior FDNY official that problems that had been reported to him during January and February 2001, when the radios were been "tested" at the Fire Academy -- "halfsecond delays in transmission and echoes that are inherent to the digital technology" - were discussed in the XTS3500R instructional training video.54 Council staff reviewed the instructional video, and there is ho mention of transmission delays or echoes.
Kevin Flynn, "Unions Say Fire Department Ignored Concerns Over New Radios" New York Times, March 31, 2001. 53
54 William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001. This account is also discussed in William Murphy, "Delayed Response: Documents Show FDNY Radio Problems," Newsday, April 9, 2001.
1 2
CITY COUNCIL
3
CITY OF NEW YORK 4 5
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES 6
of the 7
COMMITTEE ON FIRE And CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 9 10 11
April 10, 2001 Start -. 10 : 58 a .m . Races s : 3:05 p . m•
12
City Hall Council Chambers
13
New York, New York
14
B E F O R E : 15
LAWRENCE WARDEN Chairperson,
16 17
COUNCIL MEMBERS: 18 19 20 21
Stanley Michels Victor Robles Walter McCaffrey Ronnie Eldridge Madeline Provenzano James Oddo Kathryn Freed Speaker Peter Vallone
22 23 24 25
LEGAL-EASE COURT REPORTING SERVICES, INC. 217 Broadway Suite 511 New York, New York 10007 (800) 756-3410
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756-3410
1 2 A P P E A R A N C E S 3
4
Thomas Von Essen Commissioner NYC Fire Department
5 6
Daniel Nigro Chief of Operations NYC Fire Department
7 8
Tom Fitzpatrick Deputy Commissioner for Administration NYC Fire Department
9 10
Don Stanton Bureau of Technology Department NYC Fire Department
11 12
Scott Cantone First Deputy Commissioner NYC Department of Citywide Administrative
Services
13 14
Michael Best Director Mayor's Office of Contracts
15 16
Brian Cohen Deputy Commissioner DoITT
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Thomas Manley Firefighter, Sergeant-At-Arms Health and Safety Officer Uniformed Firefighters Association Captain Peter L. Gorman President Uniformed Fire Officers Association Jack Ginty Vice President Uniformed Fire Officers Association
24 25
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(800) 756-3410
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A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)
3
4 5 6 7
Ken Denslow Corporate Vice President/General Manager Northern Sales Division Motorola, Inc. Jeff Parsons Northern Sales Division Manager Motorola, Inc.
8 Jerome Hauer
9 10
Donald Faeth Vice President, EMTs and Paramedics FDNY Local
2507, DC 37 AFSCME
11
12
Richard McAllan Senior New York City EMS Paramedic
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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any questions, but I welcome your testimony, and you
3
can feel assured that we will continue
4
investigation.
our
5
MR. FAETH: Thank you very much.
6
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Mr. Richard
7
McAllan. Welcome back.
8
MR. McALLAN: Thank you.
9
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Okay, you may
10
proceed.
11 12
Just state your name and affiliation for the record.
13
MR. McALLAN: My name is Richard
14
McAllan. I am a senior paramedic, New York City EMS.
15
Currently
16
in the Fire Department. I will be brief, certainly you have
17
heard plenty of speeches about the bidding problems
18
and so on, so they need not be touched on here, with
19
the key exception of the City Council should be
20
aware that the Fire Department has been cutting the
21
New York City EMS budget, and I submit to you that
22
you should be investigating where the Fire
23
Department got the extra $10 million to cover this
24
overage in the purchase of these radios. They have
25
eliminated our specialty units, HASTAC units, they
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FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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have cut our supervisory staff, the paramedic ranks
3
are depleted. They have cut an awful lot of
4
overtime, they are not running full complement of
5
ambulances. I submit to you that they have been
6
doing budget modifications to cover up the $10
7
million overage and that EMS budget has been
8
suffering as a result.
9
SERVICES
As to the radios themselves, it is my
10
opinion that these radios will never be acceptable
11
for emergency use, and just as Mr. Hauer said a
12
minute ago, they inherently have a transmission
13
delay. That is because the signals are processed by
14
an internal processor into a digital system.
15
Everyone says here that they are unacceptable for
16
use on the fireground, I certainly agree with that,
17
but they are deeply unacceptable for use at a police
18
1085 forthwith, at a 1013, at a multiple calls for
19
assistance with EMS units, and for exactly the same
20
reasons, there be multiple portables there, there
21
would be signal delays, there would be technical
22
difficulties with all these portables. If a number
23
of sector cars respond to a particular emergency,
24
the same issue would apply as it would on a
25
fireground, there would be perhaps 10 portables
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there, maybe more, and they would have these same
3
signal delays.
4
So, it is my position that an analog
5
radio is the best radio for emergency use, and what
6
Motorola was saying, that while the firefighters
7
have a 15-year-old radio, well, fine, they want to
8
upgrade the radio, may I recommend the EMS radio,
9
which was purchased by the Health and Hospitals
10
Corporation, the Sabre radio, which was in the
11
Comptroller's report and which is every bit as
12
capable and has been a proven radio for New York
13
City EMS.
14
Then you will see in my testimony
15
there are other issues here that the Fire
16
Commissioner has arbitrarily turned off the mixer on
17
a lot of EMS frequencies, jeopardized our members'
18
safety, because they think it makes dispatch a
19
little better. It comes back to the issue of units
20
stepping on one another because they can't hear each
21
other. It comes back to the issue again of
22
difficulties in communications in the field.
23
My understanding is also they weren't
24
going to give us the police frequencies which are in
25
every EMS portable in this City. I have been
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assaulted in the back of the ambulance. And I got
3
police assistance through the use of portable
4
radios. The NYPD frequencies, and I fought for that
5
20 years ago. We have had police frequencies in our
6
portables for 20 years.
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SERVICES
First we have police radios, now they
8
are in our technology
advanced, they are in the EMS
9
portable, so if a unit is in trouble, we have had
10
units pinned down by sniper fire, et cetera, if they
11
are in trouble, the New York City EMS units can go
12
on the police frequencies to request
13
assistance.
14
emergency
My understanding of these new radios
15
is we weren't going to have that capability. So
16
there are some very significant issues here that
17
should be addressed by the City Council.
18
think these radios will ever be acceptable for use
19
because of the signal delay, a proper choice for
20
this City and for signal penetration is the 400
21
megahertz analog radios. It is exactly what PD is
22
using and exactly what EMS is using.
23
I don't
When Mr. Hauer says there is some
24
historical accidents on that issue, yes, EMS were
25
given 480 frequencies by the FCC ten years ago
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because our frequencies were overwhelmed,
3
there have been some issues, firefighters used 155
4
megahertz for a number of years.
5
the 480s would probably be a good choice. I don't
6
have any problems with that, but on an analog radio
7
and an analog system.
8 9
SERVICES
and, yes,
Moving them into
So, those are the key issues that I would raise to the City Council and ask you to
10
investigate. And if you will indulge me for just one
11
second? This morning I was at the wake of paramedic
12
Helene Cheynes (phonetic), and she was the first
13
female paramedic in the City of New York Emergency
14
Medical Service, so if I may, I would just like to
15
remember her to the City Council as the pioneer that
16
she was.
17
She graduated as a paramedic, say,
18
1978 or thereabouts, recently retired from EMS.
19
Apparently suffered a heart attack.
20
So, anyway, sir, in conclusion
on the
21
radios, I don't think those radios will be
22
acceptable. I am certainly outraged that the Fire
23
Department would go 410 million overbudget on an
24
unproven radio, jeopardize my members' safety,
25
jeopardize firefighters' safety. Certainly, a
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firefighter that is not getting an adequate supply
3
of oxygen cannot be expected to, you know, react in
4
an appropriate situation here. You have to have a
5
radio that is dependable, you have to have a radio
6
that is certain to work and is not going to step on
7
a mayday or whatever else by some signal delay that
8
is inherent in digital technology.
9
SERVICES
So, I put in my testimony and I am
10
happy to say in the record, I think Commissioner Von
11
Essen should resign, for the $10 million overage and
12
for cutting the EMS budget, and, obviously, being
13
dishonest to everyone involved here. If those radios
14
had gone through a proper approval process, a proper
15
testing process, I don't think that model radio
16
would have been purchased, but certainly he has an
17
obligation to follow the law and to engage in
18
competitive bidding appropriately, like everyone
19
else does in this society and in the City of New
20
York.
21
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Thank you very
22
much for your testimony. Your words will be factored
23
into the Committee's deliberations.
24
MR. McALLAN: Thank you, sir.
25
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Good seeing you
Legal-Ease Court Reporting Services, Inc.
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1
FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES
2
again.
3
4 5
MR. McALLAN: Good afternoon.
Thank
you . CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Barring anyone
6
else to testify for this Committee, I deem this
7
Committee adjourned.
8
(Hearing concluded at 3:05 p.m.)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Legal-Ease Court Reporting Services, Inc.
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1
2
CERTIFICATION
3 4
5
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
6
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
}
7 8 9
I, CINDY MILLELOT. a Certified
10
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the
11
State of New York, do hereby certify that the
12
foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the
13
within proceeding.
14
I further certify that I am not
15
related to any of the parties to this action by
16
blood or marriage, and that I am in no way
17
interested in the outcome of this matter.
18 19
'
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
I have hereunto
set my hand this 10th day of April 2001.
20 21 22 23 24
25
CINDY MILLELOT, CSR.
Legal-Ease Court Reporting Services, Inc.
(800) 756-3410
219
1 2
C.E.RT.I.F.I.C_AT.I_ON
3 4 5 6 7 S 9
I, CINDY MILLELOT, a Certified Shorthand
10
Reporter and a Notary Public in and for the State of
11
New York, do hereby certify the aforesaid to be a
12
true and accurate copy of the transcription of the
13
audio tapes of this hearing.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
--.
CINDY MILLELOT, CSR. 25
Legal-Ease Court Reporting Services, Inc. (800) 756-3410
FIRE DEPARTMENT 50 11 7IH AVECUK BRDOJviW. TEL ?ll 9W-
1 1220
BATTALION 40
TO:
"Dinid A Nigro
Chief Of Op
FROM:
Vincenx 7. MandaU
Baruliuc Chief
DATE-
March 11, 2001
SUBJECT:
Nsw Hindi-Tiliie
Ax t recent optntiou (Second Ailrm Brooldyo Box 1665 on 3.'l4>01) units operated wing *h* ne
I: ippnred tt*« »)»»•« w«r* some noc received. 3) The built-in deUy, frco: Jriasnii^ion to KCSSUQ^ ciMscd tainor difCcuhici craasmiKiDg member v« in close piojdroi^ to other radioj. Wbil* trtasmtung. tb> ovenibef would he»r previous ponJcxu of bis messages via ihc surroundiai ridtos. 4) Too miay uonec«*»«y trMinuMwns « a rewh of »U roembcw liavjnj ridloj. \VhUe I ajrre t^*t every mftrabtr ihoald h*ve ft ndio for safety rmuus, I recommend tb*t ctrtaiu position*, U. CAN, IRONS, N022LE it BACKUP, only b« permitted to make emergency trioimisjians. Euiicr tfei! day LI 14 wd Batr .40 conducted a check of ths ntw ndioi at tac BtooVlya Ancy Tttsuaal. Tbe reJuIii of tbi? t«t were more than arisfsrtory. Members b pair* bnmcbed out tc; the ftr r«avh« of the buildiaj and were 4ble w wmrtuniaw quke \vell w.-ith z toembcr »a ti* lobby. There WM very little distottion. very few "dead spou" and the bvili b deity (Cd Bflt any prob!«au. As a nutter effect, the dinortioa and "deii spots" only became «vid»nr wkea t trcuoiitttr And rectiver were iojidt ocuupaacien at remote eodj of iHs cxtteo»«ly lar^c buUdi Durieg thij t«»X ai oppose4 w til* Jecood alann,, oaly t\vo rtdioi were in elojso proximity to e«b o:bcr wbea trwuaxJsJoas "were
a2
.
.
.
.
.
.
It is apparent 'hat these radios work very well \vfcwx u&y arc not m clou proximity to one another. Havcver, wkto numerous tadlo* «e in close prcrximity their cpcv»tioa luvy much to bs desired, « coDomuolcattoas become d'utoned wd uardubU.
Disapproved Q
rar D'.visioci 8
I
Groupf
Date
I was the Incident coramancJer at the above m e n t i o n e d 2ns alarm segree t o t a l l y with B . C . M a n d s l a ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s . 1. These new H . T 3 . are' d e f i n a t u l y note power f u l l t h a n the oldeH.Ts. We era m o n i t o r i n g Brooiclyn fires from our office on Staten Island whsich we ware never able to do b e f o r e . This a double edged knife," The down aide is that we are going to h a y * to switch to the s e c o n d a r y tactical f r e q u e n c y more o f t e n a n d this is going to be d i f f i c u l t when members ora b u n K s up 'with m a s k s on and u n a b l e to see frequency number, thay wi. h a v e to do It by feel sod this could lesd errors. 2. We do get f e e d b a c k and in addition there is atransmission d* t h a t causes an echo vhich is confusing. When the officer, especially in engine companies making the initial attack ani the officer is bunchad up with the other firsfightersd near the rxozzl* the echo or f e e d b a c k is transmitted when the o f f i is xmitting. This causo garbled •
3. the channel aelectftr switch is mor* prominent and "more easily turned than the on/off_volvtut.—* — "• — •*•--*• ---• -• • •-•,
tf.
tlioTt! ched , t• h a t is -the channel switch T"~g?r • a c t i v a t e d instead of the on/off volume switch,
To:
08
Battalion
Company
L024 "^^
Wro Manhattan. Date Received
Incident Number
March 17
New York, March IS ^""•"•»• ~ ^^^^™-
0227
Box No.
1 9 0 1 T i m e Received
19Ql ^mmm*
0776
14:00
Location or Addraa* 41 g 42 St
Responded to Signs.
7-5
Received by
adi
4
While ag Due on
Arrived 1st
in _7
ninutea. Assigned
Type of incident
Ordered to return
Members 'relieving
Structural by d-3
to qtra
Time Returned 16:30 Data Returned Maroh 17, 2001 responding
2nd
At Work
02 houra
LT. B R O W N . F T LUCANNI
IT NORTON
FF LCMBARDI
FT ST .JOHN
FF SENTOWSK1
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
30 minute*
REMARKS none
WORK PERFORMED L-24 forced entry to ataira from lobby proceeded to 7 th floor the reported location of fire.on 7th floor found light amok* condition. L-24 roof reported heavy smoke on 8th floor. L-24 and members proceeded to 8th floor where R-lraported fire in suite 811 1-24 forced doors on eighth floor found no additional fire returned to fire door called for line. 1-24 proceeded to stairs twice to locate engines.after 2nd attempt ot gat water L-24 streched house line to fire and put water on fire. L-24 found communications poor and was unable to understand transmissions.Bn.9 relieved L-24 and L-24 took up.
EDWARD BROWN Rank
Lieutenant
Group No.
24
FI IE D E P A R T M E N T ISJE'StST.N.Y. 100J2 TEL. 211 510 4338 FAX2U 355-67''3 CEL9I7 769 0401
BATTALION 8
"Newwik To;
^
Daniel A. Nig i >
Chief of Operations
From:
Thomas P. De.!ingelis
Battalion Chief
Subject:
Problems At 10-76 776 With XTS3500R Haridi T4lkies
Date:
March 19,20(i.
Saturday, 3/17 01,41 E42 St. was the scene of a -76. There was smoke on several floors and the new ha^/di talkies significantly complicated operations The transmissions were garbled at best DC GaMn and I were constantly checking > wth each other to see whether we understood the transmissi ois, and the units were unable to un< erstand our transmissions, We were forctgt to use the floor warden phones foi communications with the Operations Chief. Only due t
Respectfully Submitted,
Battalion Chi ef Group 17 Battalion 8
Examined & Approved:
Q ]
Disapproved
Division Commander: •Divisions
Date
Group
MKti UJsFAKTM'lsNT 91-45 121 ST RICHMOND HEX, NY 11418 TEL 718 476-6283 FAX 718 $50-1504
DIVISIONS
TO:
Daniel Nigro
Chief Of Operations
Frank Cruthers
City Wide Tour Commander Deputy Chief
DATE:
Michael Weinlein '» March 19, 2001
SUBJECT:
Hi Operations At Box 2-2 9635
FROM:
I have just concluded operatamsat box 2-2 3381 and have experienced some difficulties in HT operation. Theire were numerous transmissions that didn't reach their intended receiver. I was receiving & number of transmissions that stopped in mid sentence. A May Day and Urgent were transmitted at the same time, I was one of two people tfcat I could find that heard the May Day. I didn't receive'the Urgent. When I transmitted over the HT as to who transmitted the May Day no one answered. When the member who transmitted the Urgent for fire extending to .the first floor didn't get .a response, he came out of the building and told me in person. When I spoke to Captain DaSilva E305 fee sfeted he said he didn't hear the May Day over the HT but heard the member grving.jt in the .basement He moved in the direction of the source and found Lt. Rigoli in the process of removing FF Healy. Before I arrivcjd at this fire two )me? were stretched. One to the top of the basement stairs and the second to the exterior cefiar entrance (bilko doors). With the first line protecting the interior of the building the battalion elected to- have the second line advance and extinguish the fire. The first due engine had trouble 'receiving HT transmissions to this effect and were attempting to advance down the interior stairs.' We were fortunate that a member who forced the rear door to the first floor had also forced entry to. the bilko doors. He entered the first floor and saw what the first engine was attempting. He was able to tell them that the second engine was advancing from the exterior. This prevented two different lines from advancing in opposition to each other.
After the fire we did a simulation in the street with two HPs in the transmitting mode at the 3ame time. When both HT'.s wre transmitting qntfring ram* atw.^ fl tfrifd HT When I returned
to quarters we. did another more intensive simulatioa with the use of four HT's. This time when HT 1 and 2 were transmitting at me same time, HT 3 heard what HT I was saying and HT 4 heard what HT 2 was saying. In another test HT 3 heard what HT 1 was saying and then midway during the transmission HT 3 heard what HT 2 was transmitting. These observations are very 'disturbiHg in light of having these new HT's being put in service. I have had operations where Acre have been some problems with wmmunications but never have I had a fire where this many transmissions were not received. I am attaching-.ieports from Battalion 50 and 51 and Ladder 143 as to some problems mat they experienced with the HT durfng this operation and over the past few days. I believe some of the problems that Battalion 50 and 51 elude to in their reports can be fixed with training. The echoing and delay may take some time to get used to, but something has to be done when two radios are transmitting at the same time, It could be that die second transmission is being started in the time of the delay in pressing the button and voice being heard. Respectfully submitted,
/*&*4/^wk,
Deputy Chief Div. 13 Gr. 24
FIRE DEPARTMENT 153-lLffiJLLSlDEA.VB JAMAICA, NY 11423 TECT18 m 52*8 FAX 718 358 »903
'*
BA1TALIONM
TO:
Michael Weialain
Deputy Chief
FROM:
James Mara&an
BettslicnCHef
DATE:
C3/I9/CI-
SUBJECT:
Kandi-Talki* Problems
OPS CIRC*
DJVCTRC.*
During the iajt u eek units of Battalion 50 have bad the following problems v/itb. the NcuHandi-Taliies. 1. There hai beea nurc^rowa complaints that messages Kave VQ\t received. I have experienced this proWum as well as Chief Tauber ecd other members.
2. 7 have also experienced messages sddressed to me tist are gctiing cut off. Chisf Tauber has a! so had this happen. 3. Member* ue finding it 4'flfi-culi gauinj; use to the Kalf fi-icond delay ia tn»5saii«sions. PersonaUy I fiel I'm m a Opdjnlla inovic. The lip? are moving aad The vcices are coming afterwards. Seriousiy.-k's extreoaly irritatiog listftninic to your own voice a seccod after you speak. 1 feel members should have ^een trained Lc this :o getth«m use to tfaii delay.
Respectfiilly submitted.
B.C. BATT50 GR.1
LADDER COMPANY 143
1-01-02 Jamaica Avenue Richmond Hill. N.Y. 1141B , T«». 71&-47W294 Fax718-347-5099 i.
To:
Michael C. YVelniein
Division Commander
From:
Paul Dombrowsky
Subjact;
H/T XTS 3SOQR p-ar-formece at Box 2-2 9635
Date:
March 19,2001 .
Captain
L-143
1} L-143 members operating-at this box did not hear Mayday transmission. x
2) 3 transmissions by L-143 Officer to B-51 \wu not responded to. 3; Two indvidual transmlsildns «t the same time ssems to cancel out botn transmissions. 4) Attrw first stages of the firt, djuring myiransmJssions in #2 above. I pfcrcievftd that one irietrb^r operating atlWs fire possibly nad 9 * Swck Button"
Capt P«il bonibro^skyGr.* 24, L- /T?
143
BATTALION CBDDCF.
BN.
GR.
DATE
DIV.
GR.
DATE
DEPUTY CHIEF
IIR-E DEPARTMENT FAX 711
&ATTAIION51
".TO! FROM
fipttalion Qhief
DATE •
>
.
; SUBJECT:. ^
:jPijAin^.gWflj'S^y
Haadi TaMe Radlos >
:' On 3/1^01
alaim. firei acd fbuad ti.ft fbliov^ng problems
'•' 1 . :
w?tet|^?3» of yoiix voice w.nh.a sli^n delay fcekj- transmitted from ettin uasd to h should not be an
othsg ra)S*
...
. .2.
ateL coiKrol since in mij' bo^et too IOTV. -^d hot h^ar a payda^cn by a member of E-305. cf Wssages ^erc iiot-'beu^ received or were ceuog
..
••4. Ji •5.
itnng too s,aop. a&ic pressing the mike button and this £ '••
Respectfully submitted,
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MKE DEPARTMENT tUraoTicxCwm B-,. —w.N.
To:
All DM*.,** SOC ChitfofOpatsioo*
Dttft:
Mtrtb20,2001 MotoroU XTS3SOO HnuU«.TaUdes
Qpmttoail isiuis iuve DMB nportad ftftrdir j the MotoroU XT93500. Hie caoet t ^fitil r«4k> «4 iifiul rtdto* cn&ot neeiw when two aMfliafcs«c bttag fiffiuhatpuibr tratatod. Two proyrwaunt dwifii will bt toted toiMrfiOTily od rtouM ovcccou this probltnu Ottthu»diy,MirA22, 2001, all imitj wlU rttuni to usins lh«^VHF Hiadk-Tinoiei. Th* prowrdure th»li b« iitobctl X) thtt tacd on March U* to place (he UHF Hindie.rinBalai«vice. Uteilwoch«Bi>ov
Ttnsmliodyi^^ cs*attmJtiiwilt^^
nont of thdf mewtes will b« properly iwcivwi W«it uctil t SMWH* u ooopUirt bcfort yoo tt«i«n* - do not attempt to "tifltoW wiotbw «WIL Tit XTS3500 hu i fretter noge of wnsmtosloa tod li more ifluly tatai*rfhr»wirh oduv otviy opnttionf .
ihiU. wfetn (ho tihnttow ij toad*, be s^urad fa quttWtt paodipg re-
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i fc' .^J*rc*lems enco'i3faer«f wbcc using the
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BA1TALION ONE NEW HI PROBLEM SHEET 2001 DATE PROBLEM 3/14** 3/14* 3/15* 3/15*
RESULT
At \VTC fire: no commo concourse to street. Tuna channel switch instead of volume Battery went dead at an operation. Pick-up distant transmissions.
Relay necessary Vol should be larger knob Need gang charger for BN Confusion
•
• .
•
•
•
FIRE DEPARTMENT*
3--16.-01
To:
All Deputy and Battalion Chiefs
From:
Donald J. Bums -v4}3
Subject:
New Handi-taikic Radios. (AUC 1 79)
Citywide Tour Commander
If any problems are noted in the use of the new handi-talkies at fire o: other operations, Chief Officers arc to forwafd a report to the Bureau of Operations ASAP. An immediate notification via telephone through the chain of command to the Citywide Chief shall also be made. There have been some rumor* of problems but there has been NO official notification of any problems.
FIRE DEPARTMENT Balttfon 44
To:
Donald J Bain?
Froro:
Roben 3. Btovm
Bahalion Chief
NEWHT'» At on all hand* on tH-rd floor c-1 »a K type building, there \y*re iranssi/'ssions that wae onl,)' p4rt aU;/ r?«jvtd »nd somt tr«a$UuS5i<3tVi n«^ g«tb]ed. When th«e ait a f«\ HTs in ti* sara« area it secmi to «acerfMt« ihe problem.
Rwoecrfuliy Subntitteu.
Hxaonoxed and approved;
tf
xbc
Divisiw 15
Group
Dau
April 10, 2001
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. McALLAN REGARDING IMPROPER PURCHASE OF DEFECTIVE DIGITAL PORTABLE RADIOS BY FDNY BEFORE THE NEWYORK CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES CHAIRED BY COUNCIL MEMBER LAWRENCE WARDEN (D-BX)
It is my pleasure to testify before this Committee once again. With that said, however, the seriousness of this testimony cannot be over emphasized. Portable radios are often the emergency professionals' lifeline for assistance in emergency situations. This faulty Motorola digital radio purchase has finally embroiled the Commissioner in a pork barrel scandal that will surely go down in NYC history. You can tell the seriousness of the scandal when Mayor Rudy Giuliani attacks the Comptroller for exposing this scandal while telling us what a wonderful Commissioner Von Essen has been for this City. Von Essen may be a wonderful guy as Rudy says, but I would venture to say that Rudy's judgment on Von Essen's service as Fire Commissioner has been clouded by Rudy's desire to have yes-men surround him What is clear to your writer is that this scandal only hints at the true extent to which the FDNY Administration has fleeced the taxpayers of this City in this so-called EMS/Fire Merger. As you may recall, Thomas Von Essen served as President of the UFA when then Candidate Rudy Giuliani was running against former Mayor Dinkins in 1993. The UFA put a lot of time and money into this race in support of Rudy's candidacy. Rudy won a narrow victory over Mayor Dinkins in that race. Later, Mayor Giuliani selected Von Essen to replace then Fire Commissioner Howard Safir. I have said before, that in my opinion, that despite Von Essen's labor background, FDNY Commissioner Von Essen has overseen the most destructive administration ever to operate the New York City Emergency Medical Service. Leaving aside
the dual issues of the Fire Administration's arrogance and medical incompetence when it came to NYC EMS operations—what we have exposed now is likely to be the improper diversion of the EMS budget for the purchase of unauthorized and dangerous portable radios. This scandalous purchasing misconduct by FDNY goes a long way to explain why FDNY is bleeding the NYC EMS budget dry.
The Digital Radio Scandal: According to NYC Comptroller Hevesi's press release, this digital radio scandal dates back to 1999. Apparently FDNY has a standard three-year "needs replacement" contract in place for the purchase of replacement FDNY or EMS radios that had been badly damaged and/or lost or stolen. This contract would allow FDNY to purchase up to 750 replacement radios over the three year period at the approximate cost of $3 million dollars. Such a contract, if implemented correctly, is perfectly appropriate under competitive bidding regulations. This needs replacement contract was approved for the purpose of keeping sufficient portables in the field that could operate with the current FDNY and/or EMS analog radio systems.
Almost all of the radio systems currently in use by the New York City Government are analog radio systems. According to Motorola: "In an analog system, voice and signals are sent overthe-air in an unaltered form. Voice communications are heard in the same timetrame over which they were communicated. No compression or digitizing of voice occurs. Although digital has many benefits, analog systems remain the most popular communications system in existence. Motorola is one of the world's largest providers of reliable, analog conventional systems." Motorola goes on to say that: "In digital radio systems, such as with Motorola's ASTRO systems, voice is converted to a digital format before being sent over-the-air. When the digital system reaches the receiving radio, it is converted back to analog so that it is intelligible to the human ear." [See www.Motorola.com for more technical info on these digital capable XTS 3500 UHF Radios.]
But digital and/or trunked [combined radio frequencies] radio systems can pose a lot of technical problems in densely packed urban areas such as ours. Some years ago, EMS attempted to switch the NYC EMS Ambulances to 800 Mhz trunked analog radios. While this trunked 800 Mhz
system is still in use for non-emergency radio transmissions, the use of this "trunked" system for emergency radio transmissions was abandoned long ago. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the 480 Mhz UHF EMS analog systems transmit and/or penetrate better in this high rise packed City. An analog transmission is more likely to reach its destination even if the signal quality is scratchy. Because the digital signal has to be reprocessed by the receiving digital radio's computer, a "broken up" digital transmission is far more likely to deliver no successful transmission at all. By the way, NYPD uses the same kind of 480 Mhz analog radio system for their emergency dispatch operations in NYC. FDNY was utilizing VHP Radios in the 155 Mhz range until this latest digital radio fiasco. FDNY was forced to re-deploy these 155 Mhz radios to their Fire units in the field after the near fatal failure of these UHF Digital Radios. According to Comptroller Hevesi, FDNY has already dumped approximately $14 million dollars down the proverbial FDNY budgetary "black hole" for these defective digital radios. {Approximately 2,700 of these defective digital radios were returned to MotoroJa for repairs after they failed a submergibility test before they ever reached the fire units in the field.)
Hevesi reported that FDNY used a "bait and switch" tactic to purchase 3,818 of these faulty digital radios when Motorola announced that it was discontinuing some older model portables. But as Hevesi pointed out, there was simply no reason for FDNY to switch to untested and unproven digital radios when the same needs replacement contract had other proven Motorola analog portables still available. Hevesi also conducted a survey of nine Fire Departments in other major American cities {including Boston and Chicago} that revealed that these faulty portables were not in use in any of those Departments. [Von Essen had originally said that these digital portables were already in use in Boston and Chicago. Channel 4's Tim Minton showed that to be a lie early on in this scandal.] The Comptroller men called for what the Fire Unions have been calling for all along—proper testing and approval of FDNY's life-saving radio equipment in the future. Clearly the fact that the FDNY Administration would needlessly place our firefighter's lives in jeopardy was the last straw for our brothers and sisters in the fire unions. (These same faulty radios were about to be issued to NYC EMS units as well.}
These Digital Radios Are NOT Acceptable For Emergency Use in NYC: But Von Essen's FDNY Administration is not one to comply with such trifles as the laws of physics or competitive bidding. Obviously digital radios are only useful in a digital radio system. Even if we assume that the technical problems of urban digital radios can be overcome, digital radios serve no purpose unless the entire system can be successfully upgraded to be a dependable digital system. This is apparently where FDNY is getting the extra twenty million dollar cost for their illegal digital radio system. This digital upgrade could take years to accomplish and, if NYC EMS's trunked radio experience is credited, still deliver a radio system that is unacceptable for use in emergency situations. In fact, the Fire Department's Chiefs had already voiced the same types of garbled emergency transmission complaints that the EMS units voiced years ago concerning the trunked 800 Mhz system. According to documents obtained by Comptroller Hevesi, high-ranking Fire Officers had already complained that the technical problems (such as transmission delays and echoes} they found with these digital radios resulted in these digital radios being unacceptable for the all-important fire ground use.
These digital signal delays and other technical problems would also pose unacceptable radio difficulties for the NYPD when they have multiple units responding to a police emergency such as a crime in progress or other emergency call for police assistance. The same technical problems would pose unacceptable radio difficulties for NYC EMS units as well. As far as your writer can tell, FDNY was also planning to eliminate the twenty-year old practice of providing EMS crews with NYPD frequencies in their portables for emergency use when these faulty FDNY digital portables were put into use. The arbitrary removal of these police frequencies shows just how dangerous FDNY can be to the continued safety of the EMS crews in emergency situations. For example, your writer was assaulted in the back of my ambulance some years ago. I was able to get prompt assistance for myself and my partner by the use of the NYPD police radio. All too often, other NYC EMS crews have been shot at and/or have encountered other life-threatening dangers in the performance of their duties. Since NYPD has the best emergency radio coverage in this City, the EMS crews utilize the police radio as the fastest and most dependable way to obtain emergency assistance in this City.
Worse, Von Essen continues to defend the dangerous practice of keeping the EMS units in the dark by turning off the simulcast "mixer" in various parts of this City. Von Essen has publicly defended this "mixer off practice by saying that preventing EMS units from hearing each other's radio transmissions improves response time. Of course, this practice ignores the increased danger to the EMS units should they need emergency assistance and have trouble transmitting to the EMS Dispatcher. Since other units can't hear these transmissions, the EMS units are more likely to be "stepped on" during these and other routine radio transmissions, I have already criticized Von Essen and stated that Von Essen should go into some stinking drug location hallway with an EMS crew and then decide if he wanted his personal safety compromised by his "mixer off or no police radio policy.
This Portable Radio Scandal Has Likely Caused Significant Damage To The EMS Budget: The key question that remains unanswered is where did the FDNY Administration get all that unappropriated money to pour into their digital radio scandal? Well, as we in EMS all know, the only budget that has been ruthlessly cut by the FDNY Administration during these good economic times has been the EMS budget. Therefore, it is not a very big stretch to say that FDNY was raiding the NYC EMS Operations budget for funds to cover up this explosive radio scandal. This certainly could explain why FDNY has cut out such essential EMS functions as the EMS specialty Response Units [HAZTAC] and/or has downsized the EMS supervisory force. The current battle over reasonable accommodations for EMS EMTs and Paramedics could also be laid to FDNY raiding the EMS budget for more "budget modification" money. NYC EMS Paramedic units do not have pulse oximetry or certain other more expensive cardiac arrest medications that have recently been recommended by the American Heart Association. FDNY's "running down" our municipal EMS units could easily be another desperate raid on the EMS budget.
Given FDNY's desperate need to cover up their faulty radio budgetary hole, it is little wonder our NYC EMS Operations are in such deplorable condition under this FDNY Administration.
Von Essen Must Take Responsibility For This Purchasing Scandal And Resign forthwith; We are all fortunate that we did not lose a firefighter in this digital radio scandal. But we came all too close because of the gross misconduct of this City's Fire Administration. Although Hevesi has refrained from using the word corruption in the manipulation of this contract, Hevesi has already proven that FDNY committed numerous Purchase Order violations to spend $ 10 million that was not properly appropriated for these faulty radios. Hevesi has already requested that DOI iavestigate further. But we all know that any DOI investigation of this scandal is likely to he a non-starter in this Administration.
I for one have already strongly criticized Commissioner Von Essen for being a showman in handing out harsh punishments to "NYC EMS workers so that he would look good on the 6 o'clock news. At the same time Von Essen has attacked his critics saying that they have the responsibility to communicate the truth when they criticize the agency. Well, here we are Commissioner— you have been caught in repeated lies and gross misappropriation of City funds in this radio scandal. And whether or not this unconscionable misconduct is the tip of the iceberg or not under your Administration, a proper dose of your own medicine is clearly in order—you should resign your position of trust forthwith. Only then could the NYC Fire Department and NYC EMS that you have so badly damaged even start on the road to recovery.
Respectfully Submitted,
Richnrd Senior NYC EMS Paramedic P.O. Box 478 Bronx, N.Y.
10463
Pager: 1-800-225-0256, Pager ID # 80816
FIRE DEPARTMENT
To:
JohnMoran
Battalion Chief, S.O.C.
From:
James M. Rice
Lieutenant, S.O.C.
Date:
3/16/01
• Subj «{:
Problems With New Portable Radios
As pec our conversation here followj a summary of some of the problems with the new radios. This is in no way complete or comprehensive due to the very short time we have been exposed to this new "improvement". • ! .) The quality of the digital voice transmission is unacceptable for fireground use. It is nearly impossible to identify a particular firefighter's voice even in good conditions. This is not some luxury or inconvenience problem. It is vitally important to accomplish auch things as functional supervision. It is nearly impossible to discern voice inflections. There is a big difference between "stop" and "STOP!!!" It just does not come across "w the digital voice encoding. 2.) The delay time from key up to transmit is unacceptable for fireground use. These examples should suffice. Key mike - "STOP1" - transmission starts Key mike -'MAYDAY!1'--transmission starts 3.) The delay of the transmitted voice signal h unacceptable for fireground use. The echo effect caused by the time it lakes to eucode and decode the digital signal is muc= more Own just "odd" or different. While it would Dot be noticed in business or police uses where iodiyjdual radios arc operated in locations reniotejrojn. one another. On the fireground this distracting effect puts one more processing task on the firefighter's brain which should be engaged with more important endeavors. , J
Respectfully submitted,
Examined and forwarded: I have not had the opportunity to us<: the new handi-talkie* al an all hands or larger incident. However, at a water main break in lower Manhattan yesterday I did encounter some difficulty understanding transmissions on the new radios. Pethaps this difficulty will be alleviated as we gain experience and grow accustomed to the new radios. However. I do feel I.t Rice has valid concerns that should be brought to the administration's attention
Date
DEPARTMENT 10474 FAX 71 W91-7
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Chief Of Operations
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Or. 17
FIRE DEPARTMENT 64-04 SPRINGFIELD BLVD. FLUSHING, NY 113(54 TEL. 718 475-6253 FAX 718 279-3778
BATTALION 53
TO:
Daniel Nigro
Chief Of Operations
FROM:
Stephen Moro
Battalion Chief
DATE:
March 17, 2001
SUBJECT:
New Handle-Talkie Problems Division 14 Circular 3-26
While operating at Queens Box 8550 for a fire in the Afntrak tunnel between Queens and Manhattan at the East River several units experienced problems with the new handie talkie radios. This operation featured numerous handie talkies hi use on the same primary tactical channel in Queens and Manhattan interfering with routine transmissions from across the river from each other necessitating the utilization of the secondary tactical channel Some other problems encountered were: 1. Messages being cut off in the middle of transmissions. 2. Quality of transmission better with units on the other side of river than with units fifty feet or less away. 3. When in close proximity to other units a reverberation or echo is experienced. 4. At times there appeared to be a few seconds delay receiving messages which led to members stepping on each others transmissions.
Respectfully Submitted, Battalion Chief Battalion 53
Examined & Approved [~1 Disapproved Deputy Chief. Division 14
Group 20
n Date
Group #
FIRE DEPARTMENT > METRO TICK CE
BATTALION ONE
To:
Daniel A. Ni*ro
-
From.:
William P. Blalch
Subject:
New HT and MD! Prototype Problems
B>te:
March 18. 20QI
Chiefc!1 Operations Battalion Chief, Bn. i
The attached sheets list some problem* that Battalion 1 his experienced with the new HT$ sod the MDI apparatus touch screen prototype. Respectfully Submitted:
William ?.Biaich BC,BN.-l,Gv. 19
si-.-e, P*-IG Examined & Forwarded: _
Deputy Chief: Division I /
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ate
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March 29,1983
PILOT PROGRAMS - EQUIPMENT/APPARATUS
1.
INTRODUCTION The Department's effort to improve safety, efficiency and operating procedures involves the testing and/or pilot programming of new equipment on an extensive and on-going basis. In many cases, except for the firefighters in the units immediately concerned, the members of the Department are unaware of this effort.
2.
OBJECTIVE The purpose of this All Units Circular is to insure that information about new equipment placed in the field for pilot testing is available to all members of the Department in the event that their operations might involve or be concerned with these programs. This Ail Units Circular will also make members aware of the scope of the Department's efforts to obtain the best and safest equipment.
3.
IMPLEMENTATION 3.1
This All Units Circular will be the base document to which addenda will be added for each new pilot program that is introduced into the field.
3.2
The addenda will be numbered consecutively.
3.3
When a pilot program proves an item is successful and it is adopted for use, the addendum will be revoked and the standard documentation will be issued. If the items fail to be successful or useful the addendum will be revoked on a Department Order.
3.4
Periodically an index of current addenda will be issued by the Bureau of Operations.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
. Li J
September 1,2000
KEVLAR SEARCH ROPE
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Kevlar Search Rope
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
September 1,2000
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
September 1,2001
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT: A lightweight Kevlar search rope, 200' long, capable of withstanding high heat. Rope is stored in a highly visible yellow nylon carrying case.
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
6.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM:
Ladder 4, Squad 288, and Rescue 3
To assure rapid tangle free deployment of search rope. 7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
Research & Development
Interim reports due at three-month intervals. R&D Fax (718) 349-1960
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
ft £ I?
. Z
April 3, 2000
CAIRNS "VIPER" THERMAL IMAGING CAMERA
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Cairns "Viper" Thermal Imaging Camera
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
April 3, 2000
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
October 3, 2000
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT: The Caims "Viper" Thermal Imaging Camera allows the user to see objects clearly through smoke and darkness. By looking through the camera, firefighters can spot unseen obstacles, locate victims, and detect the seat and spread of fire. Rescue Company 1 and Squad 270
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
6.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM: Use of the Cairns "Viper" Thermal Imaging Camera will enhance the search and rescue capabilities of the FDNY. The camera is lightweight and portable, not attached to member's equipment and thus it is not restricted to use by only one member at an incident or operation.
7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
The Research and Development Unit.
The company involved is to forward a narrative report to the Research & Development unit with recommendations as to the value of this equipment in its operations. The Caims "Viper" Camera shall be used for drills and any other operations that the Company Commander determines are suitable.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
Rev. 4/25/00
A.U.C. 273 AUUtyNU'UiYl ff
October 25,2000
GLO TEK 75' LIGHTWEIGHT HOSE
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Lightweight 214" hose
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
October 25, 2000
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
April 15, 2001
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT:
A new type lightweight 2Vz inch, 75 foot hose (32 Ibs. with butts). This new hose is 7 Ibs. lighter than our current 2l/z inch, 50 foot hose (39 Ibs. with butts). It is designed to reduce kinks, has a reflective stripe on each length for recognition, and is flame resistant. Engine Company 23
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
6.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM:
Less fatigue to members and less chance of kinking. 7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
The Research and Development Unit.
Reports shall be forwarded to R-&D whenever this hose is stretched. R&D Fax # (718) 349-1960.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
A.U.C. 273 ADDENDUM # 289 January 2,2001
VINDICATOR NOZZLE
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Vindicator Nozzle
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
January 15, 2001
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
July 15, 2001
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT:
New type solid bore nozzle.
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
Engine Companies 23, 42, 65, 69, 92, 93, 249,255, 275, and 283.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM: More gallons per minute on the fire, easier maneuverability, and less fatigue to firefighters. 7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
The Research and Development Unit
Evaluations shall be faxed to R&D whenever this nozzle is used at any operation. R&D Fax #(718) 349-1960.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
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Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2003 14:30:24 -0500 From: "" <jfarmer@9-11 commission.gov> ft To: "" <[email protected]>4P,""
Forwarded message from Dan Leopold
Thanks,
""--•-...... 9/11 Personal Privacy
Dan
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12/3/2003
Page 1 of 1 9/11 Personal Privacy
George Delgrosso From:
Richard McAllan |
Sent:
Saturday, December 06, 2003 3:03 PM
To:
George Delgrosso
|
Subject: Patient Steering by Private Hospital Ambulances Please find then NYC Comptroller Hevisi's June 2001 Press Release concerning his study on patient steering by private hospitals attached. These ambulances are directly operated by New York Hospital and about 15 other private hospitals in NYC. They are dispatched on NYC 911 requests For ambulances by the NYC EMS 911 Dispatcher. Shortly after the sample period ended, the commercial ambulances were added to the EMS system and are also dispatched by the EMS dispatcher on officially received 911 calls. So the already bad patient steering situation described in this report has gotten worse since then. Of course §1 patient steering is supposed to be a violation of the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute but that law doesn't seem to apply in NYC.
RJM
12/8/2003
Mail :: INBOX: Cover Letter to 9-11 Commission
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From: Richard McAllan | To: '9-11 Commission NYC'
Here is a copy of my cover letter to Mr. Felzenberg, dated Nov 24, 2003.
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12/4/2003
/'9/11 P e r s o n a l Privacy
Richard J. McAllan
November 24, 2003
Mr. Al Felzenberg Deputy for Communications National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street, SW Room 5125 Washington, D.C. 20407 Re.
Failure of FDNY Radios at the 9-11 Disaster
Dear Mr. Felzenberg: I read in Friday's newspaper that Mayor Bloomberg is resisting the 9-11 Commission's subpoena for information relating to the NYC Fire Department's emergency preparedness at the 9/11/2001 disaster. While I certainly agree with the Mayor that there are legitimate security and privacy issues involved here, I am deeply concerned that Mayor Bloomberg is trying to "cover up" the NYC Fire Department's deplorable lack of emergency radio preparedness at the 9/11 disaster. With that said, let me state clearly that I do admire the heroism of the thousands of emergency professionals who entered those Towers while they were burning out of control. Given the early collapse of the WTC Towers, many of those rescuers who were on the upper floors were not going to get out in time no matter what kind of communications and/or other emergency equipment they were carrying. However, it is my position that the overwhelmed FDNY VHP radio system, which was in use by FDNY at 9/11, could have contributed to the high number of Firefighter casualties when the Towers collapsed. Certainly the Firefighters would have a better chance of hearing an evacuation order at the 9/11 disaster if the City had timely corrected the same type of FDNY radio deficiencies which were documented at the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing. l And while I understand that we can't change this tragedy, perhaps some responsibility and accountability on the part of the agencies involved will come out of this horrible disaster. In April of this year I prepared a comprehensive letter for US Representative Maloney on this radio failure subject. This letter attempts to explain some of the 9/11 technical radio issues involved in this disaster. I have just faxed a copy of that letter to you for the Commission to use as a starting point in the 9/11 emergency preparedness investigation. For the Commission's information, the Bloomberg Administration retaliated against me for providing this letter to the Congressperson by eliminating my permanent civil service position as an EMS Paramedic in EMS Telemetry Control within 48 hours of when the City learned about the existence of this letter. By way of background, in March of 2001 there was a major FDNY portable radio scandal revealed in New York City. Apparently the Giuliani Administration had been secretly purchasing thousands of digital Motorola portable radios for the NYC Fire Department starting in 1999. After these radios suffered dangerous failures in field service when a Firelighter in distress couldn't be heard on the digital radio, the NYC Comptroller investigated the purchase of the digital radios. Then NYC Comptroller Hevisi found that the portable radios had been unlawfully purchased because the Giuliani Administration had not obtained prior capital budget approval for this important purchase of radios. Comptoller Hevisi referred his finding to the NYC Department of Investigation but no report on this subject was ever publicly issued by DOI. When these revelations came to light, I called for Von Essen's resignation before the NYC Council because of his illegal purchase of the Motorola digital portable radios. A copy of the NYC Council briefing paper for that hearing is being faxed to you under separate cover. The Giuliani Administration was quick to retaliate against me following this testimony. Indeed, one of the central allegations of subsequently filed McAllan v Von Essen First Amendment Complaint is that Defendants Von Essen and Giuliani were retaliating against me for my April 2001 testimony before the NYC Council.
A comprehensive report on the 1993 WTC bombing, which includes this report by then FDNY Chief of Department Fusco, can be found at: http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdi7publications/tr-076.pdf [2003. July 17].
In May of this year I provided a copy of the Representative Maloney letter to the NYC City Corporation Counsel under my discovery obligations as part of my pending First Amendment lawsuit. Just two days later, the Bloomberg Administration eliminated my permanent job line as a Paramedic for EMS/FDNY. After I complained to Federal Court, I was returned to my Telemetry position on a temporary basis but my permanent job line remains eliminated at this time. As the 9-11 Commission may be aware, after Mayor Giuliani left office he took all of his official files and illegally secreted them in a secure warehouse in Queens. Mayor Bloomberg did not demand the return of these official files to City hands but rather cooperated with the former Mayor by allowing the original files to remain in Giuliani's possession before any duplicate copies were made. Thus, none of the former Mayor's files are available to members of the public under the NYS Freedom of information Law. In my view, this is why the Bloomberg Administration is "stonewalling" the important work of this Commission. I have so far been unable to access any of these files even though I have a pending First Amendment lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The City of New York Corporation Counsel has strongly resisted my attempts to gain access to those files. Rather, the City has called my request for relevant files a "fishing expedition" in Federal Court. I have recently filed a separate First Amendment lawsuit against Mayor Bloomberg and FDNY Commissioner Scoppetta which principally alleges continuing First Amendment retaliation and spoliation of evidence. I would respectfully suggest that the Commission use its subpoena powers to discover just what files former Mayor Giuliani has embargoed in the secure warehouse in Queens. I will provide the Commission with all of the FDNY radio information which I have been able to develop despite the City's efforts to keep the truth under wraps. Of course, the Commission can access other reports such as the McKinnsey Report on the Internet but these reports don't compare the FDNY radio failures at the 1993 WTC bombing with the same type of radio failures which FDNY later experienced at the 9/11 disaster. I have just forwarded the transcript of the FCC 911 Subcommittee Report on 9/11 to you by email. One of the most devastating documents in these attachments is FDNY's All Unit Circular # 179. This AUC was published after former FC Von Essen became Fire Commissioner in 1996. Section 8.3 states that only three or four FDNY VHF radio frequencies would
be available in certain areas of the City due to known radio interference problems. Given this fact, it is easy to see why the Fire Department's limited radio frequencies were overwhelmed and oversaturated on 9/11. This AUC has been forwarded to you by email. For reasons I can't explain, when the City of New York was granted additional radio frequencies by the FCC in 1995, they did not immediately deploy these UHF 480 Mhz radio frequencies as analog frequencies to relieve the overcrowded FDNY VHP analog radio system. This grant of additional radio spectrum from TV Channel 16 was ideal for New York City because both NYPD and NYC EMS already operated on UHF 470 Mhz frequencies. Thus, these additional UHF frequencies would have allowed one portable radio to communicate among the three principal emergency services of this City if these additional radio frequencies had been deployed correctly before 9/11. Giuliani apparently allowed the NYPD to license these additional UHF frequencies as conventional analog frequencies with the FCC. These additional NYPD UHF frequencies were operational by 1998. (These frequencies are licensed as analog frequencies in the FCC database.) FDNY, on the other hand, was apparently captured by the techies and was made to wait for an expensive digital trunked radio system which still has not materialized. (The FDNY frequencies are licensed as trunked frequencies in the FCC database.) According to what I have read, the experience of most American cities has shown these trunked radio systems to be expensive turkeys which are not reliable for emergency voice radio transmissions between dispatchers and emergency personnel in the field. When NYC EMS tried a trunked 800 Mhz radio system for voice dispatch some years ago, the trunked system was quickly abandoned for emergency voice transmissions because of unreliability of the digital voice signals. The EMS ambulances do have Mobil Data Terminals (MDT's) in the ambulances. These MDT's allow the EMS Dispatcher to transmit 911 dispatch information directly to the responding EMS ambulance. These MDT's do operate on 800 Mhz frequencies for data transmission purposes. In either event, as this letter is prepared, FDNY is still operating on the same antiquated 154 Mhz system which was in place on 9/11/2001 and at the 1993 WTC bombing. The City still has not deployed their available 480 Mhz frequencies on even an interim analog basis to correct the FDNY radio saturation problems found at the 9/11 disaster.
While the City has made a few interoperability changes with NYPD's proven analog voice dispatch radio system, FDNY does not have any additional radio frequencies in service for the firefighting field personnel post 9/11. In fact, even today, the Captain of a Fire Engine cannot contact the Fire Dispatcher directly if the engine company gets in trouble upstairs in a high rise fire and can't reach the Chief(s) commanding the fireground operation. This same shortsightedness by the FDNY Administration has led FDNY to remove the NYPD Division frequencies from the NYC EMS portables as well. For twenty years NYC EMS crews have enjoyed direct communications with NYPD Dispatchers and NYPD field units for enhanced safety and coordination of the EMS units with NYPD responders. Until FDNY turned the clock back on EMS, the EMS ambulances had direct radio communications with both EMS and NYPD Dispatchers. It is this kind of backwards FDNY thinking that poses such great risks to the emergency professionals in FDNY and EMS. I hope that this letter has shed some light on the communications problems which FDNY experienced at 9/11. I also hope that the truth of what happened at 9/11 will be brought to light so that the Bloomberg Administration would be forced to immediately upgrade the emergency preparedness of FDNY and EMS. It is certainly most unfortunate that the Mayor has chosen this route. But I respectfully urge toe Commission to act at once so that the citizens of NYC will enjoy better coordination of emergency services should NYC experience another terrorist attack in the future. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Should the Commission wish to reach me, please call me a\h is my home phone number. This line is usually
set to fax. My cell phone and voice mail number isj
|
Sincerely,
/")
^--n £__,. /? Q _
Richard J. McAllan Senior Paramedic NYC EMS
9/11 Personal Privacy
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From: Richard McAllan \ To: '9-11 Commission NYC'
application/pdf
^ 3 washingtonpost_com Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled.htm text/html
432.67 KB ^ 12.63 KB fp3
@ 4 From The Wire Washington DC.doc
application/msword 148.48 KB JU
!|Pj 5 It can be fixed MRT.doc
application/msword 98.53 KB ^
@ 6 AUC 179 Year 1996.DOC
application/msword 407.79 KB §|J
^} 1.2 unnamed text/html 3.01 KB (f|
Please find various stories about FDNY radios attached.
The MRT story is an interesting one and contrast with the "immediate fix" analog system which I advocated in my letter to Congresswoman Maloney in April of this year.
The FDNY's own AUC states at section 8.3 that only three or four 154 Mhz radio frequencies would be available for use in various parts of the City. Von Essen was Fire Commissioner when this AUC was issued. As you know, Von Essen was former UFA President and therefore had to know that the FDNY had deficient radios for years—at least since the 1993 WTC bombing.
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12/4/2003
washtngtonpost.com: Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled
Page 1 of2
washingtonpost.com
Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled New System Being Tested
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By Clarence Williams Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, November 9,2003; Page COS
A technology and public safety team has been all over the District in recent weeks, visiting scores of nightclubs, apartment buildings, offices and other places as they tested the city's new emergency communications system.
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The troubleshooters targeted locations where emergency radios previously were apt to cut out, if they worked at all. Now, thanks to $40 million in improvements, police officers, firefighters and emergency medical crews are getting more dependable, clear signals, officials say. The system has been up and running since late September. Rick Burke, a wireless technology manager for the city, and a public safety team recently concluded weeks of crisscrossing the city to test it. They found that the changes have made a big difference in signal strength and sound quality, Burke said. "It's a major improvement. The city and its first responders are much safer now having a highly reliable, state-of-the art communications network," Burke said. District officials are touting the system as one of the most advanced in the nation. The federal government footed most of the bill in an aid package approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The fire department contributed nearly $3.5 million to the venture.
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This is not the first time that the city tried to fix the problem. It spent less than $6 million for a network that was put in operation in January 2001, but the system remained unreliable. Police officers, firefighters and rescue workers complained that poor communications continued to put them and citizens at risk -- on the streets, in burning buildings and even in hospitals. Digital fire radios would "honk out" - a signal radios make when communication is cut off-- and the police department's analog system yielded poor sound quality. "This presented a danger, both to firefighters on fire grounds and police on incident calls," said Suzanne J. Peck, the city's chief technology officer, whose department oversaw the recent project. Officials said the new money was spent to upgrade what was already in place. The backbone of the system is now much stronger: six more radio antenna sites have been installed, bringing the total to 10, in all quadrants of the city. Seven sites are on rooftops of hospitals or D.C. government buildings. The' other three are communications towers, including a new one at a police facility on Rhode Island Avenue NE.
file://C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\gdelgrosso\Local%20Settings\Temporary%20Int...
12/4/2003
Police, Fire Radios Are Overhauled The Washington Post (November 9, 2003) A technology and public safety team has been all over the District in recent weeks, visiting scores of nightclubs, apartment buildings, offices and other places as they tested the city's new emergency communications system.
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The troubleshooters targeted locations where emergency radios previously were apt to cut out, if they worked at all. Now, thanks to $40 million in improvements, police officers, firefighters and emergency medical crews are getting more dependable, clear signals, officials say. The system has been up and running since late September. Rick Burke, a wireless technology manager for the city, and a public safety team recently concluded weeks of crisscrossing the city to test it. They found that the changes have made a big difference in signal strength and sound quality, Burke said. "It's a major improvement. The city and its first responders are much safer now having a highly reliable, state-of-the art communications network," Burke said. District officials are touting the system as one of the most advanced in the nation. The federal government footed most of the bill in an aid package approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The fire department contributed nearly $3.5 million to the venture. This is not the first time that the city tried to fix the problem. It spent less than $6 million for a network that was put in operation in January 2001, but the system remained unreliable. Police officers, firefighters and rescue workers complained that poor communications continued to put them and citizens at risk - on the streets, in burning buildings and even in hospitals. Digital fire radios would "honk out" -- a signal radios make when communication is cut off -
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It can be fixed by Don Bishop Mobile Radio Technology, Oct 1, 2002
Better radio communications could have saved some of the 343 firefighters who perished in the collapse of the New York World Trade Center towers. That's the contention of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, a union that represents about 2,500 captains, lieutenants and battalion chiefs among the Fire Department of New York's 11,500member department. "One of FDNY's staff chiefs gave an order to evacuate the north tower, and 56 minutes transpired from the time he gave the order to when the tower collapsed, and no one heard the order. We lost 120 firefighters in the building," said FDNY Lt. Steve Carbone, the vice president of UFOA. UFOA President Peter Gorman issued a demand during an August news conference that FDNY replace the aging VHP hand-held portable two-way radios that were in use on Sept. 11,2001. Early last year, the department had replaced its older 3,000 VHP analog radios with 3,800 UHF dual-mode, digital-and-analog radios that were set to digital mode. But by March 2001, the UHF radios were withdrawn because of what Gorman said were complaints about inadequate coverage. The department re-deployed its older VHP radios, which then were in use on Sept. 11, 2001. Gorman has called for a grand jury investigation of what he described as the failure of the UHF radios and the resultant delays in replacing the old radios. On Sept. 11, 2001, and continuing until the time of Gorman's press conference 11 months later, FDNY was still using the old radios he described as "inadequate." The company that manufactures the radios, Motorola, said that both the old and the new radios work fine — but without radio infrastructure, no portable two-way radios can achieve the coverage that the union wants. Portable radio signals normally cannot pass through multiple floors of a high-rise building without a signal-boosting network infrastructure. "The laws of physics haven't changed. It's not the radios, it's the network behind the radios," said John McFadden, Motorola's vice president of major system sales for the
DCN: 4.03.06
A.U.C. 179 July 1,1996
UTILIZATION OF COMPANY HANDIE TALKIE
INDEX SECTION
1.
1.
Description of Handie-Talkie.
2.
Equipment Distribution and Assignments.
3.
Instructions for Utilization of Handie-Talkie MX 330/6 VHF.
4.
Security of Handie-Talkie Equipment.
5.
Operations with Handie-Talkie Equipment.
6.
Maintenance and use of Handie-Talkie Equipment.
7.
Repairs to Handie-Talkie's.
8.
Frequency Allocation and Use.
9.
Battery Chargers.
10.
Special Features.
DESCRIPTION OF HANDIE-TALKIE The Handie-Talkie to be used is designated a "MOTOROLA HT 330/6 VHF". It comes equipped with a carrying case and an adjustable shoulder strap to allow for carrying the H.T. on ones person. Power output is approximately 1 watt, supplied by a rechargeable nickel cadmium (NiCad) battery.
Mail :: INBOX: Radio Problems at 9-11
/9/n Personal Privacy
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INBOX: Radio Problems at9-il (12 of 867) CMove|co py This message to Delete | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Redirect | Blacklist | Message Source | Resume | Save as | Print Back to INBOX ^ I Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 12:03:03 -0500 From: Richard McAllan M
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To: '9-11 Commission NYC'
I will be sending you articles and the like that I have found on my searches of the Internet.
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12/4/2003
UNANS WERED ODES TIONS ABOUT FIRE RAD IPS AND COMMUNICATIONS AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER TERRORIST ATTACK ON 911 By Vincent Dunn, Deputy Chief FDNY (ret)
There are still two unanswered questions about fire radio communications at the World Trade Center terrorist attack: 1. How important a role did radio communications play on 9/11? 2. What should be the telecommunications industry's priorities in workingto aid the fire service in future catastrophes? The answer to the first question is radio communications played a major life-and-death role at the World Trade Center terrorist attack. A brief history of radios in the FDNY: In the 1960s, firefighters for the first time were issued handie-talkies, or so-called portable radios. Firefighters no longer relied on hand signals, shout ing and runners to communicate at fires. These "analog" radios operated on a VHP channel. In 2001, the FDNY purchased new "digital" portable radios for fire-fighters. These digital radios operated on UHF channel. Soon after issue, there appeared to be a delay in signal transmission and a voice-quality problem with these new digital radios. They were temporarily withdrawn from service until these problems could be solved. The new UHF digital radios have been reprogrammed in the analog mode in an attempt to remove the communication delay and to improve the voice quality. Chief officers have been issued command radios. There were eight major life-and-death "communication events" at the World Trade Center on 9/11: Communication event 1- After the first plane struck the World Trade Center's north tower, a fire safety director instructed occupants of the south tower to return to their offices and not exit the building onto the plaza. Communication event 2 - The fire department and the police department did not use the unified incident management system to communicate with each other.
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INBOX: Fire Engineering Article (11 of 867) CEI
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From: Richard McAllan To: '9-11 Commission NYC'
text/html 36.91 KB g|
Here is a 1995 article by FDNY Chief Dunn on high rise fires and a later article by Chief Dunn.
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12/4/2003
Fire Engineering - Archives
Page 1 of4
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WHY CANT THE FIRE SERVICE EXTINGUISH FIRES IN HIGHRISE BUILDINGS? WHY CAN'T THE FIRE SERVICE EXTINGUISH FIRES IN HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS? BY VINCENT DUNN
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There is a deadly trend in high-rise fires. In the 1970s, New York City experienced a two-floor fire in a high rise; in the 1980s, Los Angeles had a five-floor fire in a high-rise; and in the 1990s, Philadelphia suffered a nine-floor high-rise fire. What can we expect in the next decade? All three of these fires had one thing in common: They all occurred beyond the reach of fire department ladders. Outside aerial master streams could not be used. The New York fire, at 1 New York Plaza, was on the 33rd and 34th floors; the Los Angeles First Interstate Bank fire burned out the 12th to 16th floors; and the Philadelphia One Meridian Plaza fire burned the 22nd to 30th floors to a crisp. These high-rise fires killed three building employees and three firefighters. The fires were fought using an interior attack. Aerial master streams were not an option available. (In the Meridian Plaza fire, portable deluge guns were operated from nearby and adjacent buildings, with no effect on the fire.) At a low-rise building fire, after 30 or 40 minutes of fast and furious firefighting, the fire usually is extinguished. If it is not, firefighters may be withdrawn to safer outside positions and the fire is fought using an outside attack. Not so at a high-rise building fire. Here, if the fire is not controlled within the first 30 to 40 minutes, the next two or three hours of firefighting are also spent inside the burning building. It took six hours to extinguish two floors of fire in New York in 1970, eight hours to extinguish the Los Angeles five-floor high-rise fire, and more than 16 hours to extinguish-with nine sprinkler heads on the 30th floor-the Philadelphia nine-floor fire. That's roughly two hours of firefighting per floor. Will the next great high-rise fire require the fire department to operate with interior handlines for two or three days? HIGH-RISE VS. LOW-RISE BUILDINGS What is a high-rise building? How does a high-rise building fire differ from a low-rise building fire? Why can't the fire service extinguish fires in high-rise buildings? Some reasons follow. Height. A high-rise building can be defined as a structure more than 75 feet high if your aerial ladder reaches only 75 feet or as a structure more than 40 feet high if your highest ladder is a 40-foot extension ladder. People trapped in a burning high-rise building who cannot be reached by your highest ladder will leap to their deaths, attempt to climb down knotted bedsheets and fall, scribble notes telling where they are trapped and drop them from smoky windows, or have their last cries for help recorded on fire dispatchers" telephones.
Fire e-NI The Ser Clic mor
When buildings are constructed beyond the reach of a fire department's highest ladder, two important firefighting strategies are taken away from firefighters. First, life-saving victim removals using ladders are eliminated. Searches and rescues can be accomplished only from inside stairways. People trapped at windows, when flames are between them and a stairway, will have to jump or burn to death. The second firefighting strategy a high-rise building takes away in many cases is the ability to extinguish a fire with an outside master stream. The only strategy for a high-rise fire beyond the reach of an aerial ladder is an interior attack. Firefighters must extinguish the fire using handheld hose streams advanced through heat and smoke from an inside stairway. If this method fails, there is no alternate plan. An outside attack is not an option.
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12/4/2003
Why the WTC Building Collapsed
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This is G o o g I e's cache of http://vincentdunn.com/wtc.html. G o o g I e's cache is the snapshot that we took of the page as we crawled the web. The page may have changed since that time. Click here for the current page without highlighting. To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.googie.com/search? q=cache:eORaVUsNOwYJ:vincentdunn.com/wtc.html+7+World+trade+center++new+construetion+sprinklers&hl=enSie=UTF-
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World Trade Center September 11, 2001 Photo by: Steve Spak
Why the World Trade Center Buildings Collapsed file://C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\gdelgrosso\Local%20Settings\Temporary%20Int..,
12/4/2003
Mail:: INBOX: Articles in "The Chief Leader"
Page 1 of 1 19/11 P e r s o n a l P r i v a c y
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From: Richard McAllan \ To: '9-11 Commission NYC'
application/msword 73.21 KB ^J
Here are two OCR copies of articles which are in this week's edition of "The Chief-Leader."
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12/4/2003
The CHIEF-LEADER Newspaper Page 1
Friday, December 5, 2003
MEDIA POLICY REVISED
F.D. 'Clarification': Unions Say 'Huh?' By Mark Daly Picture of Rudy Sanfilippo Caption Under Picture: RUDY SANFILIPPO: Need further translation.
Firefighters, tell us your good news. But don't talk out of turn. That's the Fire Department's message to its field units, as revealed by a recent overhaul of its policy on speaking to the media. The new regulation, released in July and reissued last week, explains in detail how firefighters are to refer questions from the press up the chain of command, while laying out topics that are off-limits for public discussion. They're There to Serve At the same time, FDNY's Office of Public Information reminded firefighters in a Nov. 12 memo that it's there to help when reporters come calling—especially when fire companies want to share a story of a dramatic rescue or charity event. Calling the regulations a "clarification" of existing rules, the chief spokesman for the FDNY said the recent notices are meant to help firefighters get publicity for their good deeds, while avoiding trouble with superiors for shooting off their mouths while on duty. "This is not something new and totally out of the blue," said Frank Gribbon, the FDNY's Deputy Commissioner for Public Information, whose office issued the Nov. 12 memo. "We're encouraging them to come to us. It's a reminder that we're here." Fire union leaders, who have tangled with the department through the news media this year on such hot button topics as the FDNY's readiness for a terrorist attack and the closing of six fire houses, say the approach is confusing.
The Chief-Leader Newspaper, Friday, December 5, 2003 Page 4
Razzle Dazzle
Conspiracy Theory Not Nuts By Richard Steier One former high-ranking Fire Department official who crossed swords with Richard McAllan described him as a malcontent malingerer. Current department officials, fend off lawsuits the former president of Emergency Medical Service Local 2507 has filed on matters ranging from a recently scrapped FDNY gag order prohibiting employees from talking to the press without permission to the elimination of his job line, have depicted him as merely a malcontent. Mr. McAllan maintains, however, that those officials have wanted to silence and/or get rid of him because he has this uncomfortable habit hanging their dirty laundry out in public. He can make a compelling case that if he sometimes seems extreme, it is only because of extreme measures resorted to by the Giuliani administration to conceal details of unsavory deals it made to privatize some ambulance work and purchase new radios that didn't work properly. Pursuing Rudy's Role on Radios More recently, he contended, the Bloomberg administration has sought to remove him from the payroll, using a budgetary pretext, and thwart his efforts to examine ex-Mayor Rudy Giuliani's private communications regarding the FDNY radio system, because it is looking to protect his reputation as a heroic figure in the aftermath of the WTC attacks. Mr. McAllan contends that those papers may show that the Mayor had an active role in the mass purchase of defective radios and then—after they were exposed as such in the spring of 2001—in delaying the purchase of adequate radios. The failure of the FDNY's radio communications system—in contrast to that of the NYPD—was a prime reason why the Fire Department 343 members during the World Trade Center rescue efforts while just 23 NYPD cops were killed. A month ago, Mr. McAllan succeeded in having the Fire Department scrap the gag order it imposed on March 1, 1999, getting a settlement that was approved by U.S. District Court Judge Barbara Jones in Manhattan. He is still before Judge Jones on another suit 1
Mail:: INBOX: NYC Radio Licenses
/9/n Personal Privacy
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INBOX: NYC Radio Licenses (6 of 867)
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application/pdf 569.07 KB ^J
fQ 3 FDNY DOITT WPPU442 Oct 2003.pdf application/pdf 601.21 KB ^j tjft 1.2 unnamed text/html 2.47 KB fig Here are excerpts of NYC's respective radios licenses from the FCC database.
Please note that NYPD licensed their additional frequencies as analog and had them up and running in 1998.
As I said in the Maloney letter, FDNY was captured by the teenies and all of their 480 Mhz frequencies are tied up in a trunked radio system which is still not operational.
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12/4/2003
Pagel of 2
FCC WTB Radio Station Authorization
Federal Communications Commission Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Radio Station Authorization (Reference Copy) This is not an official FCC license. It is a record of public information contained in the FCC's licensing database on the date that this reference copy was generated. In cases where FCC rules require the presentation, posting, or display of an FCC license, this document may not be used in place of an official FCC license.
Licensee: New York, City of (Police Department) FCC Registration Number (FRN):
0003462421 Call Sign: W1M471
ATTN FCC License Coordinator New York, City of (Police Department) 50-16 59th Place WOODSIDE, NY 11377-7407
File Number:
Radio Service: PW-Public Safety Pool, Conventional Regulatory Status: PMRS Frequency Coordination Number:
Effective Date 11/28/2001
Grant Date 10/04/2000
Print Date 10/09/2003
Expiration Date 10/18/2005
STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Fixed Location Address or Mobile Area of Operation Loc. 1 Address: CHASE BANK 4 METROTECH CTR City: NEW YORK
County: NEW YORK
State: NY
Lat (NAD83): 40-41-41.4 N Long (NAD83): 073-59-05.5 W ASR No.:
Ground Elev: 5.0
Loc. 2 Address: TIVOLI TWRS 49 CROWN ST City: NEW YORK
County: NEW YORK
State: NY
Lat (NAD83): 40-40-04.4 N Long (NAD83): 073-57-40.5 W ASR No.:
Ground Elev: 37.0
Loc. 3 Area of Operation Operating within a 48.0 km radius around 40-44-54.4 N, 073-59-08.5 W Antennas Loc. Ant. Frequencies Sta. No. No. (MHz) CIs.
1 2 3
1 1 1
482.78750 482.78750 485.78750
No. Units
No. Pagers
Emmission Output ERP Ant. Ant. Construct Designator Power (watts) Ht/Tp AAT Deadline Date (watts) meters meters
FB2
1
0
20KOF3E
50.000 225.000 137.0 128.0
FB2
1
0
20KOF3E
50.000 225.000 49.0
MO
2500
0
20KOF3E
25.000 100.000
111.0
Control Points Pt No.1
http,7/wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/printAuth_landMobile.j sp?licKey=l 289631
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 2
ULS License
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department) Call Sign
WIM471
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
Status
Active
Auth Type
Regular
Grant
10/04/2000
Expiration
10/18/2005
Effective
11/28/2001
Cancellation
Dates
Control Points 1 POLICE PLZ, MANHATTAN, NY P: (212)374-4307
Licensee ID SGIN
L00094886 000
FRN
0003462421
Type
Governmental Entity
Licensee New York, City of (Police Department) 50-16 59th Place WOODSIDE, NY 11377-7407 ATTN FCC License Coordinator
P:(718)476-7554 F:(718)476-0205
Contact
Extended Implementation
Assoc.Call Signs
Eligibility 90.20
j and Demographics Radio Service Type
Mobile
Regulatory Status
Interconnected?
Alien Ownership Is the Applicant a foreign government or the representative of any foreign government? Is the Applicant an alien or the representative of an alien? Is the Applicant a corporation organized under the laws of any foreign government?
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/LIlsSearch/license.jsp?licKey=1289631&printable
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 1
Federal
rCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers | Find People
;
Communications Commission
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > y_LS_ > Online Systems > ULS License
FCOSite Ma_p
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department)
HELP
Frequencies Summary *\w Search Oy Refine Search Rh Return to Results License f
MAIN
ADMIN
Call Sign
WIM471
LOCATIONS
f&l Printable Page
FREQUENCIES Radio Service
|scl = Special Condition
Define View: General | Buildout | COSER | Emission | IRAQ
Frequency
Loc#
Ant#
48Z78Z50 482,78750 485.78750
1 2 3
1 1 1
Freq ID
Station Class
Buildout First Use
Buildout Deadline
Buildout Notification
1
FB2
11/03/1998
02/01/1996
1
FB2
11/03/1998
02/01/1996
1
MO
11/03/1998 Filter Frequencies By Location:
3 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies par Summary Page
ULS Online Systems
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
Filter Frequencies By Location: All Locations • GO .
3 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies per Summary Page
ULS Help
||j) Reference Copy •"/•Map
ULS Glossary - FAQ - Online Help - Technical Support - Licensing Support CORES/Call Sign Registration - ULS Online Filing - License Search - Application
About ULS
Privacy Statement - About ULS - ULS Home
Basic Search
j By Call S i g n ] £ [ = j
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SUBMIT
RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/licenseFreqSum.jsp?freqType=B&licKey=128...
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 1
Federal '. Communications Commission
FCC Home | Search i Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers | Find People
Universal Licensing System FCC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
FCC_.SJte_MaE
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department)
Administration 0^ New Search Q^ Refine Search Qh Return to Results License f
MAIN
ffi
Printable Page
C3HEL53
|||) Reference Copy •%* Map
'i
Call Sign
WIM471
Receipt Date
File Number and Type
Status
QQOQ668Q21.
Granted
11/27/2001
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
AU - Administrative Update Automated LeKsrs None CoireiirirseiMs None S-'iis'isn; 11/28/2001
Administrative Update Applied
10/20/2000
License Converted
10/04/2000
Authorization Printed
All History (5) Refer to Locations and Frequencies Tabs for special conditions at those levels "CONDITIONAL WAIVER GRANTED TO PERMIT USE OF CHANNEL 16 ON A NONINTERFERENCE BASIS TO RECEPTION OF TELEVISION BROADCAST LICENSEES. FOR CONDITIONS, SEE ORDER RELEASED MARCH 17, 1995, FCC 95-115"
ULS Help
ULS Glossary - FAQ - Online Help - Technical Support - Licensing Support
m e n i<= fCORES/Call Sign Registration - ULS Online Filing - License Search - Application ULS online systems Search . A>chive License Search About ULS
Privacy Statement - About ULS - ULS Home
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| By Call Sign
SUBMIT
RESET
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/Ul sApp/UlsSearch/licenseAdminSum.jsp?licKey=1289631
10/9/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of... Page 1 of 1
FCC Home | Search | Updates | E-Filing | Initiatives | For Consumers j Find People
Federal ;
Communications Commis.swn
Universal Licensing System £CC > WTB > ULS > Online Systems > ULS License
FCCLSite Mafi
Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WIM471 - New York, City of (Police Department)
Frequency 000485.78750 Q^ New Search 0^ Refine Search Qh Return to Results License f
MAIN
|f
Call Sign
AOMIN
|&] Printable Page
OElHELP
1^) Reference Copy •%» Mag
]f LOCATIONS'! FREQUENCIES
WIM471
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
* Return to Frequencies Summary
Station Class
MO - Mobile
Units
2500
Output Power Paging Rec
25.000
Maximum ERP 100.000
Emissions 20KOF3E
FCC Admin Serial Number
Date Sent
IFRB Serial Number
Date into Register
Buildout Dates First Use
11/03/1998
Deadline
Notification
COSER No COSER information on file IRAC No IRAC information on file
© Frequency Special Conditions None
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ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF Page 1 of 2
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Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF *\w Search Qy Refine Search Q^ Return to Results License
flEEOSHIf ADMIN
Y
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LOCATIONS '(FREQUENCIES]
Call Sign
WPPU442
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Status
Active
Auth Type
Regular
Grant
01/14/2000
Expiration
01/14/2005
Effective
05/02/2003
Cancellation
Dates
Control Points 1
1 CENTRE ST,NEW YORK, NY
P: (212)699-2100 Licensee Licensee ID SGIN
L00033053 000
FRN
0003462512
Type
(View Qwne_rshirj)
Governmental Entity
Licensee NEW YORK, CITY OF 11 Metrotech Center, 3rd Fl Brooklyn, NY 11201 ATTN Felix L. Melendez
P: (718)403-8278 F: (718)403-8241 E:[email protected]
Contact NYC DEPT OF INFO TECH & TELECOMMUNICATIO
F:(212)669-2277
La ad Mobile Data Extended Implementation
Assoc.Call Signs
WPPU560
Eligibility 90.20A - APPLICANT IS THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RADIOS WILL BE USED TO COORDINATE
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Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
SHELP
Frequency 000482.00625 <\h <\e Search Qh Return to Results License f
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YLOCATIOHS1FREQUENCIES
WPPU442
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
* Return to Frequencies Summary
000482.00625 Station Class
FB8 - Centralized Trunk Relay
Units
Paging Rec
Output Power
110.000
Maximum ERP
225.000
Notification
12/29/2000
Emissions 11K3F9W
FCC Admin Serial Number
Date Sent
IFRB Serial Number
Date into Register
Buildout Dates First Use
01/14/2000
Deadline
09/14/2000
COSER No COSER information on file IRAC No IRAC information on file © Frequency Special Conditions None
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Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
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YLOCATIONS" FREQUENCIES
ADMIN WPPU442
Radio Service
152 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies per Summary Page
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Filter Frequencies By Location: JAII Locations •*]
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 [Next »] (scl = Special Condition
Define View: General I Buildout | COSER | Emission | IRAC
Frequency
Loc#
Ant#
Freq ID
48.Z00625
2
01/14/2000
1
FB8
01/14/2000
482.03125
.3.
FB8
01/14/2000
482MU75
2
1 1 1 2
FB8
482.01875
1 1 1 1
FB8
01/14/2000
482.05625
1 3
1 1 1
2 2 3
FB8
01/14/2000
FB8 FB8
01/14/2000
1 1 1 1
3 3
FB8
01/14/2000
FB8
01/14/2000
4
FB8
01/14/2000
4
FB8
01/14/2000
482.06875
Station Class
Buildout First Use
482.08125
2
482,09375
1
482.10625
3_
48211875_
2
48213125 48214375
1 3
FB8
01/14/2000
2
1 1
4
482.15625
5
FB8
01/14/2000
482.16875
1 2
1 1
5
FB8
01/14/2000
6
FB8
01/14/2000
482.19375
1
FB8
01/14/2000
3
5
FB8
01/14/2000
7
FB8
01/14/2000
48.2,23125
1
7
FB8
01/14/2000
482J24375
3
1 1 1 1 1
6
482.20625 482,21875
6
FB8
01/14/2000
48218125
2
152 Frequencies for all locations
01/14/2000
Buildout Buildout Deadline Notification 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000 09/14/2000 12/29/2000
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LOCATIONS*]) FREQUENCIES
WPPU442
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Filter Frequencies By Location: j All Locations ~~^\O •
152 Frequencies for all locations 20 Frequencies par Summary Page
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 [Next_> >J (sg = Special Condition
Frequency Loc# Ant#
Define View: General | Buildout | COSER | Emission 1 IRAjC
Freq Station ID Class
482,00625
2
1
1
F B 8
482,01875
1
1
1
F B 8
482,03125
3
1
1
FB8
482.04375
2
1
2
FB8
482.05625
1
1
2 FB8
482,06875
3
1
2
482.08125
2
1
FB8
3F B 8
Units
Paging Rec.
Output Maximum Power ERP 110.000 225.000 110.000 225.000 225.000 110.000 110.000 225.000 110.000 225.000 110.000 110.000
48JLQ9375
1
1
3
FB8
110.000
482.10625
3
1
3
FB8
110.000
482JL.1875
2
1
4F B 8
482J1125
1
1
4 FB8
110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000
482^1437_5
3
1
4
FB8
482,15625
2
1
5
FB8
482^16875
1
1
482;JL8125
2
1
6
FB8
482.19375
1
1
6
FB8
4_82J20625
3
1
5F B 8
482^21875
2
1
7F B 8
482,23125
1
1
7F B 8
482.24375
3
1
5F B 8
6
FB8
152 Frequencies for all locations
110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000 110.000
225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000 225.000
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Public Safety Pool, Trunked License - WPPU442 - NEW YORK, CITY OF
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LOCATIONS |FREQUENCIES|
WPPU442
6 Total Locations 10 Locations per Summary Page
Radio Service
YW - Public Safety Pool, Trunked
Locations Displayed: All | Fixed | Mobile | Itinerant | Temp. Fixed 6.1m
Iscl = Special Condition Location
2.-...Fixed. 3_-_ Fixed 4_-_ Fixed 5 - Fixed § ..- .Temporary Fixed
Transmitter Address /Area of Operation
Status
QUEENS CO 83 88 WOODHAVEN BLVD 40-41-55.4 N, 073-51NEW YORK, NY QUEENS County 15.5 W
P
FDNY RADIO SHOP 48-67 34TH ST NEW YORK, NY QUEENS County
40-44-20.4 N, 073-55-
P
BROOKLYN CO 35 EMPIRE BLVD NEW YORK, NY KINGS County
40-39-49.4 N, 073-57-
1129 E 180TH ST NEW YORK, NY BRONX County
40-50-32.4 N, 073-52-
STATEN ISLAND CO 65 SLOSSON AVE NEW YORK, NY RICHMOND County
40-37-10.4 N, 074-07-
40.0 km radius around centerpoint
40-42-19.0 N, 073-52-
52.5 W P
39.5 W P
29.5 W P
00.5 W 27.0 W
6 Total Locations 10 Locations per Summary Page
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.- INBOX:
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INBOX Empty Trash compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout 130.10;MB / 476.84MB (27.28%)
INBOX: Other Radio Articles (3 of 867)
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Thu, 4 Dec 2003 14:58:58 -0500 j Richard McAllan \ '9-11 Commission NYC'
Part(s): ^2 Boston FDNY In Building Repeater Dec 2003.pdf application/pdf 129.71 KB ^ ^ 3 Communications Failures April 15 1996 NYP.pdf application/pdf 684.63 KB ID •0 4 EMS Ops Order 2002-054 Radios.pdf •§ 5 FDNY Radio Enhancements Feb 2003.pdf
application/pdf 494.13 KB ^J application/pdf 1745.77 KB |^|
<® 1.2 unnamed text/html 1.39 KB (H
Here are some more articles and radio procedures.
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12/4/2003
ULS License - Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WPRI772 - BOSTON, CITY OF Page 1 of 2
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Public Safety Pool, Conventional License - WPRI772 BOSTON, CITY OF QH, New_Search *\e Search Q- Return to Results ffi Printable Page License
ADMIN
^ Reference Copy -y- _Map
Y LOCATIONS YFREQUENCIES]
Call Sign
WPRI772
Radio Service
PW - Public Safety Pool, Conventional
Status
Active
Auth Type
Regular
Grant
10/04/2000
Expiration
10/04/2005
Effective
10/04/2000
Cancellation
Dates
Control Points
1
59 FENWAY, BOSTON, MA P: (617)343-2875
Licensee Licensee ID SGIN
L00077082 bfd
FRN
0004034237 (View Ownership)
Type
Governmental Entity
Licensee BOSTON, CITY OF 59 FENWAY BOSTON, MA 02115 ATTN FIRE DEPT GREG RICHARDSON
P:(617)343-2875 F: (617)353-0884
Contact BAYSTATE COMMUNICATIONS INC
F: (978)664-6769
194 NORTH ST NORTH READING, MA 01864-1313
Land Mobile Data Extended Implementation
Assoc.Call Signs
KGA659
Eligibility 90.20 - THIS IS AN IN HOUSE REPEATER FOR THE FIRE DEPT USE ONLY DURING THE EVENT OF A
http://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsApp/UlsSearch/license.jsp?licKey=1300313
12/4/2003
NEW YORK POST,
SMITH
LENER
YOUNG
*
MONDAY, APRIL 15, 1996
SIEDENBUR6
MCLAUGHLIN
DRENNAN
3
WILLIAMS
DID SNAFUS KILL FIRE HEROES? Communication foul-ups eyed
ByDANJANISON Communication foul-ups have been linked to fires that have killed seven city firefighters over the past two years, The Post has learned. The discovery has sparked deep concern in the Fire Department's ranks — and led to different theories about the cause of the mix-upa — from training problems, to supervi-. sion, to staffing levels on engines. But the latest revelations about events that led up to firefighter James Williams' death in Queens on Jan. 5 add to a pattern of crossed signals and faulty messages, as cited in official reports, and in interviews with a number of sources. These problems — a botched Mayday response, a jammed walkie-talkie frequency, one fire company losing touch with another — cropped up repeatedly among the other factors that varied from one fatal fire to the next.
Stricken Bravest is stable
EXCLUSIVE - Last week, a union official revealed — and inside sources confirmed — that a battalion chief, expected to help supervise .operations at the Queens blaze where Williams died, arrived late. The reason: art aging computer dispatch system had crashed in Brooklyn — the borough from which the chief was assigned — and some fire officers weren't aware the chief hadn't been notified. Uniformed Fire Officers Association President Richard Brower cited a need for "better communications at the fire scene," as well as more rapid response of supervisors and improved training. Whether the chiefs pres-
ence would have changed the outcome is doubtful, insiders say. But iniscoimnunication has loomed larger in other cases: B Months after a backdraft fatally injured Ladder Co. 5 Capt. John Drennan and firefighters Chris Siedenburg and James Young on March 28, 1994, safety officers cited miscommunication between fire companies. The three men were going up a stairway as flames quickly spread through a door, when the fireball struck. The department's safety division cited as one cause- of the tragedy: "There was no communication from [department] members operating on the fire floor to the members of Ladder 5, warning them of rapidly deteriorating conditions." • In the Aug. 7, 1994, fire
that cost the life of Ladder Co. 136 Capt. Wayne Smith, one "indirect" cause was described as, "overwhelming of the portable radio system by radio traffic." . Officials also found that a Mayday transmission . from Smith was heard by 14 firefighters, but that only one reacted. New radio protocols were issued. • "Communication problems" were cited by the Safety Division as an "early" contributing factor in the blaze that killed Ladder Co. 6 Lt George Lener on June 5, 1994. Lener called out a Mayday from a basement at 79 Worth St., but there was noise from machinery working nearby and messages became hard to hear, according to that incir dent report.
A Queens firefighter remained in .stable condition yesterday, a day after suffering crippling chest pains while battling a raging three-alarm, fire at a funeral home. Firefighter Robert Winterfeld, 34, was operating a hose line inside Crowe's Funeral Homes at 107-44 Sutphin Blvd. in Jamaica Saturday morning when he experienced intense chest pains. Winterfeld, an eight-year veteran assigned to Engine Co. 275, was rushed to Mary Immaculate Hospital, where he was visited by Mayor Giuliani and outgoing Fire Commissioner Howard Safir. Four other firefighters suffered minor injuries fighting the blaze. Eric Stirgua Firefighters in the rear of the building called off the response to a Lener"s Mayday, thinking it was from someone else who'd already been located, the report suggests. • Miscommunication may also have been at work in an October 1995 Maze that claimed the life of firefighter Peter Mclaughlin.
Although an internal probe remains incomplete as an arsonist is prosecuted, sources said officers at the scene lost touch with McLaughlin at some point and didn't know his exact location. McLaughlin was found in the. wreckage of a top-floor apartment where a roof and cockloft had collapsed.
BUREAU OF OPERATIONS EMS OPERATIONS ORDER2002-054 Issued Date:
July 30,2002
MOTOROLA XTS 3500R TYPE III PORTABLE RADIO INSTRUCTIONS
1.
GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1
The Department is in the process of issuing new portable radios, the Motorola XTS 3500R Type
2.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MOTOROLA XTS 3500R
2.1
The XTS 3500R Type HI portable radio works similar to the Astro Saber portable radio, currently in use. Below is a diagram identifying controls and features of the Motorola XTS 3500R Type HI portable radio:
m.
Switches, Buttons, Knobs, and Indicators Bicolor LED Indicates the radio's operating status;
\ "Transmitting
\ Red = Channel Busy or Low
Double Blinking Red = Receipt of encrypted audio Blinking Green - Receipt of Individual Call
. Antenna 16-Position Select Knob Selects the operating system (zone) a or specific channel.
Radiates and receives radio-frequency energy.
Microphone Accepts audio.
On/Off /Volume Control Knpb
Speaker ./Emits audio.
Turns the radio on and off and adjusts the volume level.
Push-To-Talk (PTT) Switch Puts the radio in the transmit (send) mode.
Home Key ^ Returns you to the home display.
Arrow Keys C^J (*) Used to scroll through softkeys and lists.
Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) Provides visual information (status Indicator line, plus two display lines with 12 characters maximum on each display line).
Softkeys (bottom two display lines of LCD) Display of radio features controlled by soltkey buttons.
Softkey Buttons Select "softkey" features.
Battery Rechargeable, 7.5Vdc power source.
3 x 4 Alphanumeric Keypad Provides Interface to your radio's features; arranged and functions like a standard telephone keypad.
\ (white transmit
CTTYOF NEW YORK
FIRE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK FIELD COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS FEBRUARY 2003
Nicholas Scoppetta Commissioner
Frank Cruthers Chief of Department
Mail:: INBOX: Comptroller Hevisi's Letter
. ,
/9/11 Personal Privacy
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INBOX: Comptroller Hevisi's Letter (3 of 869) 00
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Delete | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Redirect | Blacklist | Message Source | Resume I Save as | Print Back to INBOX ^ Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 16:29:20-0500 From: Richard McAllan \: '9-11 Commission NYC'
application/pdf 702.1 0 KB l^j application/pdf 273.54 KB ^
^ 4 LA Times Stories on LAPD Radios Aug 2001.pdf application/pdf 960.85 KB fjj$ ^ 5 LAPD Press Release 2001 .pdf ^ 6 No Documents Released per AP Oct 2002.pdf
application/pdf 128.46 KB (^ application/pdf 257.93 KB [U
^ 1 .2 unnamed text/html 2.76 KB (^j Here is the letter that then NYC Comptroller Hevisi wrote to Von Essen concerning his investigation of the purchase of the XTS portable radios.
He said at the time that he was referring his findings to DOI. I have not been able to get a copy of that DOI report but Von Essen claimed in his book that nothing came of these investigations.
The other attachments primarily concern the same sort of digital radio problems—and long delays-experienced in LA when they tried to "upgrade" their radio system.
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12/4/2003
0 '01
12:52
P. 02
COMPTROLLER of THE CITY OF New YORK i CENTHE ST«EET NEW YORK. NY JOOO7-2341 (212) 669-3500 G. HEVESI
,
coMt.TRou.tR
-, , ~nn.
Apnl 3,2001
Hon; Thomas Von Essen Commissioner New York City FJre Department 9 Metrotech Center Brooklyn, NY 11201
Dear Commissioner Von Essen: I am writing to inform you of the results of our inquiry into the circumstances that led up to the purchase by the Fire Department of Motorola XTS 3500 portable radios costing approximately S14 million- Based upon our review of the Motorola contract, discussions with Mororola and the FONY's response to our questions, w« have concluded that: •
The circumstances surrounding the FDNY's use of a S2.9 million sole source contract to purchase S14 million in new radios and reteled equipment raise serious concerns regarding the Department's contracting process;
• The FDNY's approval of ihe XTS 3500 as a substitute for a discontinued model was apparently an attempt to circumvem the City's competitive bidding standards; •
•
•
The FDNY failed to thoroughly test the XTS 3500 UHF Portable Radio prior to its decision to order 3,818 units and related equipment costing approximately $14 million; The information the FONT received from the field after the XTS 3500s were deployed in March 2001 (See attached) would have been obtained in 2000 had proper fold tests, under real fire conditions, been conducted at that time; The FDNY internal controls regarding testing procedures, documentation requirements and approvals were inadequate;
On March 21, 2001, it was reported in the press that a firefighter tan out of oxygen in a burning building. The firefighter's Mayday call for help over the XTS 3500 UHF portable radio failed to transmil,properly. At the subsequent request of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, I ordered an inquiry by my staff into the circumstances leading to the purchase by Jhe FDNY of this model radio, including a survey of other major metropolitan cities. My staff found many problems in the procurement of these radios by the Department, including a failure to adequately test the XTS 3500 UHF portable radio, as well as possible misrepresentations by FDNY staff responsible for obtaining the radios. In addition, the FDNY often offered contradictory or incomplete information in its unsatisfactory attempt to justify this multi-million
Matte Fiem \GVA FscyclW Paow
4 '01
12:53
P. 03
dollar purchase of life saving equipment. The survey of the fire departments of nine major cities found none that used the XTS 3500.J In conducting its inquiry, my Office of Contract Administration has reviewed the subject procurement. The review consisted of an evaluation of the contract documents, queries to and information received from the New York City Fire Department as well as discussions with Motorola. Additionally, we surveyed nine major metropolitan fire departments to determine whether they had experience with the Motorola XTS 3500 UHF portable radio. The survey including Boston and Chicago, which arc the cities that the FPNY's senior leadership indicated to the press were the sites That used this same portable radio.
The revie\ of the procurement found many problems, which left more questions than answers. The survey of the nine cities found -none thauised the XTS 3500 portable radio. The circumstances surrounding the FDKY's use of a S2.9 million sole source contract to purchase $14 million in new radios and related equipment raise serious concerns regarding the contracting process. In 3 997, the FPNY requested that the Department of Citywide Administrative Services ("DCAS") enter into a three year, "sole source" contract with Motorola forproviding "a total of 750radjosl' and associated optional equipment "in the amount not to exceed" S2.8S8.910. At that time, the FDNY stated that it would "... always evaluate new technologies and products.. ." in order to develop future competition. Notwithstanding the contractual limits and the FDNY's representation that it would continue to evaluate new technology to develop future competition, there is no evidence that any such sreps or related evaluation occurred in this insiance. To date the FDNY has not shown that ii conducted any evaluation of the XTS 3500 radio versus other manufactures' radios prior to its decision to purchase the product. Additionally, it is a matter of serious concern that Ihe FDNY used a $2,888,910 contract to purchase, without competition, roughly 4,000 radios, costing over SI4 million- In order to achieve this result, we found that the FDNY circumvented the City's Financial Management System's (FMS) controls through its inappropriate use of purchase orders. If proper procedures had been followed by the FDNY, it is likely ftai this purchase would not have occurred. (It should be noted that we found no evidence of the $33 million Figure which appeared in the press.) The FDKY's approval of the XTS 3500 as a substitute for a discontinued model was apparently an attempt to circumvent the City's competitive bidding standards. The 750 radios specified by the contract fell into five different model configurations: three carried designations indicating that Their use was to be by FDNY personnel engaged in fire fighting, as follows. Saber 1 VHP (1-2.5 watts) Astro Saber 1 VHP (1-5 watts)
52,055 per unit per unit
L 52,425
Los Angeles, Denver, San Francisco, Austin, Philadelphia, Washington, DC, Dcttgjf. Boston and Chicago.
'
flpr
Astro Saber 1 UHF CM ^atts)
""
< $2,425 per unit
Q '01
"~~
12:54
P. 04
, _"]
Tvyo modejs carried a desi^^ioo foroseby the Emergency Medical Services ("EMS"). Saber HI UHF (i -5 watts) Astro Saber HI UHF fl-4 watts)
S3,1S4 per unit 52,748 per unit
As indicated above, the EMS Saber IB UHF model was priced at S3,154 per unit, the most expensive of the five models. The contract contemplated that the FDNY would purchase up to 150 units of any one model configuration. In May 1998, Motorola informed the FDNY thai it was discontinuing one of the models the Saber 1 VHF. The Motorola contract allowed for substitution of an existing radio model with another if the new model was: 1) approved by theFDNY; and 2) offered at no additional cost. We have no evidence that a substitution of the Saber 1 VHF model was contemplated by the FDNY. In February 1999, Motorola informed the FDNY that the Saber III UHF model specified in the contract for EMS use would be discontinued after June 30,1939. Motorola stated that the discontinuance of the EMS radio would have little impact upon the value of the contract because the ihree remaining radio models would "continue to be available to FDNY and EMS for your current radio needs." Therefore, it does not appear that there was any immediate necessity to purchase the XTS 3500. Nevertheless, on November 12, 1999 (see attached), the FDNY wrote to DCAS and represented that it had "tested and evaluated" the new Motorola Model XTS 3500 UHF Portable Radio and approved its substitution for the existing, expensive radio designated for use by EMS. Thereafter, a substitution to the contract was made to allow the purchase of up to one hundred and fifty XTS 3500 UHF radios. The unii cost of ihe XTS 3500 was 53,154 - the same price as the existing EMS radios - for a total expenditure of up to S473,l 00. In December 1999 the FDNY ordered 2,700 XTS 3500 UHFtadios. Sometime in 2000 (FMS records indicate March 2000, while the FDNY indicated October 2000), the FDNY placed orders for an additional 1,118 XTS 3500 UHF radios. The ?ota! cost for the 3,318 XTS 3500 radios and optional equipment was 513,969,142. Ii is not clear from the information provided to us by the Department why these 3,S18 radios were purchased and why the order was so large. As slated above, Motorola had assured the FDNY earlier that the discontinuance of the EMS radio would not impact on the agency's needs because other radios, specified in the contract, were still available. There is a major question, therefore, as to why the FDNY inappropriately used a contractual provision that allows for product substitution in limited circumstances to circumvent the City's competitive bidding statutes.
4 '01
12:55
P. 05
The J?DNY failed to thoroughly test the XTS 3500 UHF Portable Radio prior to its decision to order 3,818 units and related equipment costing approximately SI4 million. Based upon the information provided to the Comptroller's Office by the FDNY and our discussions with Motorola, the XTS 3500 was not adequately tested by the Department prior to, or after, its purchase. Notwithstanding the representations made by the FDNY to DCAS in its November 12,1999 memorandum that it had tested and evaluated the radio, whatever testing procedures were performed by the FDNY prior to purchase were solely technical in nature. They included bench testing, submergibifity testing (which the radios later failed), a voice clarity test, a drop test and features testing. From the information provided by the FDNY to date, we found nothing to prove that the XTS 3500 was adequately field tested. The FDNY attempted to give the impression that the radio was tested in the field. In so doing, the Department represented that it field tested a. VHP, noiaUHF. version of the XTS 3500 and that this testing was under actual fixe conditions at Rescue 2. In the documents provided, however, the FDNY acknowledges that the narrow scope of this testing was limited to testing the new functions of the radio,"... such as,, button placement and features." Additionally, as stated below, no description or documentation was provided to support the statement that the VHP XTS 3500 was tested under actual fire conditions or, if it had been tested, what benefits would be obtained from field testing a different frequency radio. The FDNY did not represent to us, as it has in the press, that the radio was tested at the Fire Academy. According to a Motorola representative, different "iterations" of the XTS 3500 were submitted to the FDNY between December 1999 and the summer of 2000 - afterihe order was piaged. According to that representative, the radios were "technically" tested by the FDNY during that time period. Apparently, that testing found that the radios failed to pass submergibility tests and the first shipment of 2700 XTS 3500 radios all had to be returned to Motorola, Thus it is apparent that even the technical testing of ihe XTS 3500 UHF portable radio prior to the decision to purchase it was based upon inadequate testing or testing of too small a sample of radios. Motorola stated to us that it was not given the go ahead to deliver the final agreed upon XTS 350D iteration until late summer of 2000. That is the unit, which recently failed under real life fire fighting circumstances. The information the FDNY received from the field after the XTS 3500s were deployed in March 2001 (see attached) would have been obtained in 2000 had proper field tests, under real fire conditions, been conducted at that time. My office has obtained documents signed by high ranking officers throughout the City describing various problems with the XTS 3500 radios after they xvere put into service on March 14,2001. Proper fteld testing of the XTS 3500 before deployment to all Firehouses would have likely resulted in the rejection of the unit or would have identified and allowed for correction of
4 '01
12:55
p.06
serious performance flaws. Below are four excerpts from some of those Fire Department documents. 1. "There were numerous transmissions thai didn't reach their intended receiver. I -was receiving a number of transmissiops that stopped in mid sentence. A May Day and Urgent were transmitted at the same time. I was one of two people that I could find that heard the May Day. I didn't receive ihc Urgent. When I transmitted over the HT as to who transmitted the May Day no one answered." • 2. "At an ail hands on third floor of an H type building, there were a few transmissions that were only partially received and some transmissions were garbled. When there ate a few HTs in the same area it seems to exacerbate the problem." 3, "1.) The quality of the digital voice transmission is unacceptable for fireground use. It is nearly impossible to identify a particular firefighter's voice even in good conditions. This is not some luxury or inconvenience problem. It is vitally important to accomplish such things as functional supervision. It is nearly impossible to discern voice inflections, There is abig difference between "stop" and "STOP!!!" It just does not come across in the digital voice encoding. 2.) The delay time from key up to transmit is unacceptable for foreground use. These examples should suffice. Key mike — "STOPJ" — transmission starts Key mike - "MAYDAY!" - transmission starts 3.) The delay of ihe transmitted voice signal is unacceptable for fjreground use. The echo effect caused by the time it takes to encode and decode the digital signal is much more than just "odd" or different. While it would not be noticed in business or police uses where individual radios are operated in locations remote from one another. On the fireground this distracting effect puts one more processing task on the firefighter's brain which should be engaged with more important endeavors," 4. "At a recent operation (Second Alarm Brooklyn Box 2665 on 3/14/01) units operated using the new himdi-lalkie radios. The performance of these new radios ivas less than satisfactory. The quality of communications was simitar to that of a Cellular phone. Some of the problems encountered are as follows. 1) Many messages were distorted to the extent that they were unreadable. 2) It appeared that there were some 'dead spots' as many messages were transmitted but not received. 3) The built-in delay, from transmission to reception, caused minor difficulties when transmitting member was in close proximity to other radios. While transmitting, the member would hear previous portions of his messages, via the surrounding radios.
Rpr
4 '01
12:57
P. 07
4) Too many unnecessary transmissions as a result of all members havbg ladios. Wtu le I agree that every member should have a jadio for safety reasons, I recommend that certain positions, i.e, CAN, IRONS, NOZZLE & BACKUP, only be permitted to make emergency transmissions." The FDNY internal controls regarding testing procedures, documentation requirements and approvals were inadequate. Prior to a purchase of equipment as critical as portable radios for firefighters, there should be an agreed upon testing protocol, adequate documentation of the testing perfotmed and interim and final approvals by the testers and their superiors. In this instance, however, the FDNY has not demonstrated that there were adequate internal controls to ensure that the radios would perform properly. The inadequate "field" testing performed by the FDNY was done using a XTS 3500 VHP radio, not the UHF model that it planned on purchasing. Additionally, according to the Department it issued the VHP model for testing to only one unit (Rescue 2) and has stated fhat it has no documentation regarding what the testing entailed, where it wa$ tested, how many radio(s) %vere involved in the testing, how the radio(s) performed, who tested the radio(s) and whether Rescue 2 was satisfied with the radio's performance. This is an unacceptable methodology for justifying the expenditure of $14 million in public fonds and especially troubling given that the failure of these radios to perform adequately has the potential for causing serious harm to the firefighters who rely on this equipment for their safety. According to press reports, senior FDNY officiafs indicated that the XTS 3500 was in use in Chicago and Boston. Our review of nine municipal frre fighting departments, including Qiicsso and Boston, found Jbar while many use Motorola radios, none use the XTS 3500. Until this matter is satisfactorily resolved, I have ordered that no further payments be made to Motorola by the FDNY. I am forwarding a copy of this letter and enclosures to the Department of Investigation for its review and consideration.
Alan G. Hevesi
AGHyg Enc. ccr Commissioner Edward J. Kuriansky
npr
4 '01
12:58
P. 08
FIRE DEPARTMENT
9 MmoTECH CENTER
BROOKLYN. N.Y. 11201-3557
DONALD Z.STANTON Assistant Fife Commissioner Bureau of Technology Development
Systems
Room 75-R
November 12,1999
TO:
Hairy Heishkowitz Buyer, D.CAS
FROM:
Donald E. Stant Assistant CojnmissiolSZ for Technology Development and Systems, KDNY
SUBJECT: Request for the Substitution of XTS 3500 Portable Radio into Requirements Contract No. 9887218.
FDNY would like lo exercise an existing clause within the current Portable Radio Requirements Contract No. 988721S. This clause, SHOO 117B-ALL located on page B 002, allov/s for the substitution of an existing model radio, with a new model radio,'that has been approved by FDNY and which is to be supplied at no extra cost. FDNY was informed by letter from Motorola that item £2 Portable Radios, Motorola Saber III, Model H99SASPEMS, v/as being discontinued on June 30* 1999- FJDNY icquested and received sample XTS 3500 portable radios from Motorola for FDNY testing. These radios have been tested and evaluated by FDNY. Based upon this testing and evaluation, FDNY requests that DCAS perform the necessary tasks to facilitate the substitution of the existing T SABER III portable radio with &e new XTS 3500 portable radio along with necessary appurtenances. This substitution will be made at no extia cost. Listed below are the new portable radios and appurtenance part numbers along with associated pricing. In some casts, the new appurtenances reflect a decrease in pricing. Please bs advised, we cannot eliminate certain existing appurtenances that are listed on the contract since these items would be required if we were to procure another model radio that remains on the contract. For simplicity sake, I have appended applicable appurtenance line item numbers with the suffix of "a" for those items that need to be'added to the contract. Additionally, those items that will be sahstituied for, in entirely, iwe reflected with the same item number! Obviously, if you want to add these additional items as new item numbers to the end of the contract, leaving all other items as they are, this i's an option as well. In.either case, it is your call as to the best way to modify the contract.
4 '01
DESCRIPTION
QUAN
UO!
12:59
UNIT PRICE
P. 09
EXTENSION
CLASS/ZQjff AWARft 02
rt£M NUMBER: 2. MOTOROLA INC PORTABLE RADIOS; MOTOROLA, XTS 3300. MODEL: H24SDXSPFD
150
EACH S3154.QO S473100.00
TO BE CONFIGURED AS FOLLOWS; A. 1-5 WATTTX.UHF; CLEAR; SPW7AN B. UHF CLEAR; CONVENTIONAL: 450-570 MHz; # Q2« ISP C. TMVffi OUT TIMER; *H9M
D. SOFTWARE/HARDWARE SPJMW99SP
E. FACTORY MUTUAL APPROVED-, «HZZJ F. REMOTE SPEAKER MIC V/ITH
HANG-UP BUTTON IN REAR; gNMN6l93BSPFD01
. 0. H. SHOULDER. STRAP; SXXSPFDNY 1. LEATHER CARRY CASE; eNTN8382FDSP X. K. T-STRAP; #>tTN838JA
L. MDC!200JD;SH939 . M. UWT EVGRAVWG PER FDW SPEC; H353SPZMS
ITEM WJMBtfc 6*. MOTOROLA INC XTS SIWGLE UNTT DESKTOP CHARGER, J HOUR KAPJD CHARGE J75 MOTOROLA* NTNH68
EACH
ITEM NUMBER: 9»- MOTOROLA INC REMOTE SPEAKER MICROPHONE WITH HANG-UF BUTTON
375
EACH 5170.00 . S63750.00
ITEMJWMBER: 11. MOTOROLA WC LEATHER CARRY CASE
75
EACH S4S.4J
$3633.75
rrEMNUNSER: 12. MOTOROLA INC T-STRAP MOTOROLA* NIW385A
15D
EACH SS.10
$765.00
ITEM NUMBER: 13. MOTOROLA INC ULTRA MOH CAPACITY BATTERY XTS 3500 MOTOROLA (5NTN8297
375
EACH
$25873.00
MOTOROLA 2 NMN6193SSPFD01
5107.50
S40312.50
MOTOROLA f NTWJ82F0SP
ITEM NUMBER: J 5. MOTOROLA INC STEEL TIP ANTENNAS MOTOROLA
S69.00
EACH S20.CO
JEI5W.OO
4 '01
12:59
P. 1Q
UOI
UNIT PRICE
EXTENSION
EACH
S40.45
5161.80
EACH
560-00
EACH
S172.2D
5638.80
EACH
520.00
580.00
ITEM NUMBER 2fi. MOTOROLA INC XTS 3500 RADIO SERVICE SOFTWARE MOTOROLA *RVN4l 70 •
EACH
5325.00
51300.00
ITEM NUMBER: 39. MOTOROLA INC SMART RADIO INTERFACE BOX MOTOROLA * RLNt 0 J 5
EACH
$325.00
S975.00
EACH
(S492.00) (S49200.00)
DESCRIPTION
QUAN
FTEM NUMBER: 19. MOTOROLA INC INTERFACE CABLE MOTOROLA* 30-80390848 ITEM NUMBER: 20. MOTOROLA INC INTERFACE CABLE MOTOROLA # 30-8QJ90849 ITEM NUMBER 22. MOTOROLA INC TEST CABLE MOTOROLA? RKN4035 ITEM NUMBER 25. MOTOROLA INC XTS 3500 SERVICE MANUAL MOTOROLA* 6SS1089CSO
IT5M NUMBER: 80. MOTOROLA INC DEL: HARDWARE KEYPAD MOTOROLA *KMC
100
Item number 80 allows for the deletion of the hardware keypad torn the XTS 3500 portable radio. This wiUreswlt in a price decrease of $492.00 per radio. This allowsFDNY to procure a lesser priced radio for personnel notrequiringa hardware keypad. If you require any additions] infonnatiojn, please let me know.
Cc: T.fitzpalrick S. Gregory A, Achilla
Newsday.com: Disaster Foreshadowed
Page 1 of 3
http://www.newsday.com/news/printeditJQn/ny-nyhigh3 1 2440024oct31 .story AMERICA'S ORDEAL
Disaster Foreshadowed Deputy warned of high-rise fires in 1995 article By Graham Rayman STAFF WRITER October 31,2001 In a high-rise building fire, elevators stall or shut down. Fire radios don't function above a certain floor. Fire ladders are too short. Civilians jump to their deaths. Air-conditioning ducts allow the fire to spread. In short, it is extremely difficult to fight a major high-rise fire, particularly one on the upper floors. These conclusions aren't from a report issued since the attack on the World Trade Center. Rather, they were written six years ago by Vincent Dunn, a deputy chief in the New York Fire Department. The 1995 article on high-rise fires in general, which appeared in Fire Engineering magazine, illustrated many of the problems confronted by firefighters six years later on Sept. 11. Dunn, a nationally respected expert on high-rise fires who retired recently after 42 years, also included a warning. "After fighting high-rise fires in midtown Manhattan, New York City, for the past 10 years, it is my opinion that the fire service has been lucky," he wrote. "Despite the limitations in fighting high-rise fires, we have not had a great loss of life or another multifloor high-rise fire." In an interview yesterday, Dunn of Queens said there is nothing wrong with Fire Department tactics in high-rise fires, but he believes firefighter communications in such buildings can be improved and manpower can be added to units in high-rise districts. He also said a lighter weight oxygen mask needs to be developed. "High-rise fires are the biggest challenge in the fire service," he said. As for buildings, Dunn said elevators need to be more reliable, and interior antennas should be added to improve radio transmissions. "The building owners have to prove to their occupants that their buildings are safe," Dunn said yesterday. "No fire safety director is going to be too influential. We have to get the confidence of the people back." Since Sept. 11, fire department officials have said they are re-examining how to fight high-rise fires. The collapses of the Twin Towers have also generated debates in recent weeks over whether to rebuild the enormous structures and how to apply lessons of Sept. 11 in new construction. http://www.newsday.../printstory.jsp?slug=ny%2Dnyhigh312440024oct31§ion=%2Fnews%2Fprinteditio 4/9/2003
Los Angeles Times Site Search Results
http://www.latimes.com/cgi-bin/slwebcli...sc=%27Can%20You%20Hear%20Me%20Now%3P/o27
Thursday, August 2, 2001 Home Edition Section: California Page: B-14 'Can You Hear Me Now?' "Can you hear me? Can you hear me now?" Like someone on a cell phone trying to keep a connection, frustrated Los Angeles police officers now repeatedly ask these questions when their new digital radios fall silent because more than one officer is trying to talk at the same time. Whatever the cause, this problem should be resolved quickly before any breakdown in communications, no matter how briefer rare, allows a tragedy to happen. Los Angeles Police Chief Bernard C. Parks says training will help officers become accustomed to the new radios. Two officers couldn't speak simultaneously on the old radios without breaking up or blocking out most words, but the sputtering signaled that the analog radios remained on. When the Motorola digital radios go quiet some cops think, "My radio's not working." No patrol officer needs that kind of uncertainty. Communication with LAPD helicopters also is a problem. Motorola does not even manufacture a digital radio system for helicopters. The department knew that and turned to a company that specializes in aviation technology, but it will be one or two more months before the equipment arrives. Meanwhile, helicopter pilots rely on a jury-rigged Motorola system. As for the handheld radios, which are also used in squad cars, Los Angeles City Controller Laura Chick wants to see reassurance in writing from the LAPD before she cuts a check for $18,000 owed to Motorola. That is a tiny fraction of the $51-million contract for the system, but her stance sends a message to Motorola and all other companies that do business with the city: Get it right and without delay or wait for your money. Chick's demand also puts the LAPD management on notice. She asks what is taking so long to implement projects paid for by Proposition M, a $235-million bond issue that voters approved in 1992 to provide adequate and reliable emergency radio and 911 telephone communications. During her tenure as chair of the Los Angeles City Council's Public Safety Committee, Chick heard plenty about problems, glitches and delays on the 911 upgrade and installation of new message display terminals in squad cars. The LAPD isn't the only major department with radio problems. In May, the Orange County Grand Jury said that a new police radio system, also made by Motorola, posed a threat to public safety because of faulty transmissions and would cost millions to fix. The grand jurors blamed county government, saying it had failed to provide adequate training to officers and to test the system beforehand and had made decisions that reduced radio coverage. We hope that the LAPD will not suffer lingering problems of this nature. Immediate radio communication is essential. No cop should have to ask another, "Can you hear me now?" j of 2
8/8/01 9:28PM
Los Angeles Times Site Search Results
http://\vww.latimes.com/cgi-bin/slwebcli...o%20Risk%20Seen%20in%20Radio%20G!itches
Wednesday, August 1, 2001 Home Edition Section: California Page: B-4 Los Angeles No Risk Seen in Radio Glitches 1 Police: The LAPD's new digital system is not a threat to public safety, officials say. Devices sometimes don't allow officers to talk to each other.
By: KURT STREETER TIMES STAFF WRITER The problems Los Angeles police officers are experiencing with a new, multimillion-dollar radio system are not creating a threat to public safety, department officials said Tuesday. Dozens of patrolmen and women have complained about the department's new digital radios, which have been installed in the LAPD's roughly 5,000 patrol cars since June. Officers have said that they could not hear or understand those in other patrol cars at times and that communication between department helicopters and patrol cars was often poor. Officers have resorted to using cellular phones and other means of communication. "We are having to work around this one," said Capt. Mike Hillman, who oversees the department's fleet of helicopters. Officers have had to come up with "intermediate solutions," including patching two radios together and then plugging them into the helicopter's console to improve their chances of exchanging information with colleagues on the ground, Hillman said. "It is cumbersome," he said. "In terms of immediate concerns, I would be remiss if I didn't say there were problems. But will it change? Yes." The conversion from the older analog to digital radio systems, part of a massive, $51-million communications upgrade, has become a significant concern to patrol officers and department and union officials as glitches have been reported during the last several months. But department officials also say they expect fewer problems after officers receive more training in how to use the new system. Motorola, the company contracted by the city to provide the radios, has said it is confident that its equipment is reliable.
.of 2
8/8/01 9:27PM
Los Angeles Times Site Search Results
http://www.latimes.com/cgi-bin/slwebcli...APD%20Radios%20Get%20Negative%20Reviews
Tuesday, July 31,2001 Home Edition Section: California Page: B-l New LAPD Radios Get Negative Reviews Communication: Some say poor sound poses a safety risk. The city may withhold payment from the maker, which says police just need to get used to the devices. By: KURT STREETER TIMES STAFF WRITER Los Angeles police officers using a new, $21-million radio system cannot communicate with one another at times, raising safety concerns and questions about the equipment's reliability, department and union officials said Monday. The new equipment, which has been in all squad cars since June, has resulted in technological glitches and confusion among officers who need more training, said Cmdr. Sharon Papa, a Los Angeles Police Department spokeswoman. "We're trying to understand what is going on in the field and make the best decisions on how to fix it," she said. Officials said some officers have complained that they cannot hear anything at times or can barely understand what is being said by someone in another squad car. In addition, communication has been poor between department helicopters and patrol cars, they said. After hearing widespread complaints from officers who are worried that a tragedy will occur because of poor communication, the Police Protective League sent a letter to Chief Bernard C. Parks on Friday, demanding a quick remedy. "This is about the safety of officers on the street," said Ted Hunt, a member of the union's Board of Directors. "They need to figure this one out as quick as possible." City Controller Laura Chick said she is considering withholding payment from Motorola, the company that supplied the equipment, until she is satisfied with the product. "There are some serious problems with the system," said Chick, noting that an $18,000 payment is due soon. "If I am not satisfied Motorola is working to fix them, we are not going to pay. I need to be sure we are getting what we pay for." Motorola spokeswoman Adrienne Dimopoulos said the company is confident its equipment is working properly.
1 of 3
8/8/01 9:30 PM
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LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE Tuesday, July 31, 2001 "ASTRO Digital Technology" Los Angeles: In 1992, the voting Los Angeles public approved a $235 million dollar bond measure. The purpose of the bond measure was to build two new dispatch centers, one in the metropolitan Los Angeles area and the second in the San Fernando Valley, and to replace the Master Radio System. The Master Radio System is a 56 channel Ultra High Frequency (UHF) simulcast system that utilizes Motorola ASTRO digital technology. In 1996, the Department began deployment of the new ASTROs [radios] however, up until recently, these radios were being operated in an analog mode. Over the last several weeks, the Department has completely switched operation from an analog to digital mode. Over the course of the switch, the Department and Motorola have received operational feedback from our patrol officers. Officers have voiced concerns over operational aspects of the radio. Some of the most frequently cited concerns by officers include, the frequent fluctuations in volume levels during radio communications, periodic echoing effects during voice transmissions, degradations during unit-to-unit voice communications in the simplex mode and problems during air-to-ground transmissions. file://C:\Documents and Settings\Richard J McAllanYMy DocumentsXMac F Two Nov 200..ALAPD Radios.ht 4/3/2003
freedomforum.org: Despite promises, few records released from Giuliani archives
Page 1 of 3
Back to document
Despite promises, few records released from Giuliani archives By The Associated Press
10.05.02
NEW YORK — Shortly after Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office in January, he pledged to make accessible thousands of pages of historically important documents that were quietly removed from City Hall by the Giuliani administration. But the Bloomberg administration has released little in response to a months-long effort by the Associated Press to gain access to portions of the Giuliani archives, raising questions about whether the records are truly available to the public. The AP requested copies of all records related to Giuliani's establishment of the Twin Towers Fund, a multimilliondollar charity for the families of Sept. 11 victims, and all documents detailing the administration's response to the anthrax scare that terrified the city last fall. The AP's requests, first made six months ago under the state's Freedom of Information Law, have led to the release of just 13 pages related to the Twin Towers Fund, and a single press release regarding the city's handling of the anthrax scare. Corporation Counsel Michael Cardozo, the city's top lawyer, said the Bloomberg administration complied lawfully with the AP's request, and repeated assurances that the public would be given speedy access to records. "I believe that the public is receiving the same access to the Giuliani records it would have had had the contract with the Giuliani Center not been entered into," Cardozo said. But by contrast, the state Attorney General's office released more than 300 pages of Twin Towers documents generated by the city and filed with the state agency. Those documents were made available by the attorney general within a single business day in response to the AP's request. "The problem was absolutely predictable and now it's all coming true," said Robert Freeman, director of the state Committee on Open Government, the agency that oversees state laws governing access to public records. Mayoral records from the Giuliani administration, the vast majority of which are presumed to be public documents, are no longer in the city's possession. Seven days before Giuliani's term expired, the city agreed to hand over all of the mayor's records to the Rudolph W. Giuliani Center for Urban Affairs, a private organization run by colleagues of the ex-mayor. The agreement, unprecedented in New York City, drew protests from archivists, historians and some public officials who feared that the public would lose access. "I thought it was wrong to keep the documents, and I still think a great error was made," said former Mayor Ed Koch. "A lawsuit should be brought to restore them to the municipal archives." Bloomberg, who has spoken often about the need for "transparency" in government, had assured the public it would have access to the Giuliani records as long as the documents were not personal in nature. http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=17060&printerfriendly=l
11/6/2002
September 28, 1990 JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT NEW UHF RADIO SYSTEM
1.
BACKGROUND The New York City Fire Department is the country's largest fire department comprising over 11,000 uniformed firefighters and fire officers, and over 1,000 civilians. The Department is organized into 12 commands, 49 Battalions, 209 engine companies and 144 ladder companies. There are numerous specialty units such as: Decontamination, Health Services, Thawing Apparatus, Ambulance, Salvage, Brush Fire, Rescue, Searchlight, .Hazardous Material,, Field Communication, Mobile Headquarters, -Mask Service and Marine., (fireboat) . Fire Operations cover the entire 5 borough region,,of' New York City. : y
As an indication of the volume .of fire traffic processed, in 19.89 the Department handled 848,715'calls', of "which 696,339 were alarms received. 'Total fires for that year were 104,626.
.
The present 5 duplex channel••• radio system was configured in .-the early 1960's. Since that . time, no additional .channel capacity has been added. Imminently, the Department will have 2700 mobile units ...on this system. The near future- will see a total of approximately 4200 units, of necessity, ;on;the; same system. .. ;
The City has 5 borough dispatch operations . and one Citywide operation. Because of the channel', scarcity, "5. boroughs must share. "'"""4 channels, with
OVERLOADING OF PRESENT'VHF SYSTEM Presently, the Department must operate with 5 VHF duplex channels and one simplex frequency (for fire ground tactical). By any standard, FCC or operational, this system is severely overloaded. Loading is presently at 450 units per channel, far in excess of the FCC loading standard of 100 units- per channel. After the imminent replacement of obsolete portables with new radios having duplex channel capability, channel loading will increase to 540
/9/11 P e r s o n a l
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application/pdf 559.64 KB
^ 4 McAllan Testimony Excerpt.pdf
application/pdf 424.19 KB
fJ3 5 Problem New Radios Attach 5 Part 1 .pdf
application/pdf 797.73 KB
^ 6 Problem New Radios Attach 5 Part 2.pdf
application/pdf 488.09 KB
"^ 7 Timeline Attach 3.pdf
application/pdf 213.70 KB
12 8 McAllan Testimony April 10 2001 .pdf
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These attachments center around the NYC Council's Oversight April 2001 Hearing concerning the purchase of the Motorola Digital Portable Radios.
To say the least, this was a contentious hearing in which Von Essen tried to defend the purchase of these bad radios. (If you would like to have it, I have a full PDF copy of the transcript of that hearing.)
Key to the radio's failure in the field was the fact that they were programmed to transmit digitally on the fire ground point to point frequencies. (I am not sure on which bandwidth.)
As some of the other attachments to my emails indicate, these same radios were eventually re-programmed to transmit in analog mode in the 154 Mhz range.
Why FDNY and DOITT chose digital point to point is of course a good question which remains unanswered.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?index=l 130
12/4/2003
Louis Vetrone, Counsel to the Committee Andrew Neuman, Legal Daryl Finizio, Policy Analyst Stephen Feger, Finance
Office of Oversight and Investigation: John P. Graham, Deputy Director Erich Giebelhaus Robert Gormley Thomas Rogers Chris Winward
THE COUNCIL BRIEFING PAPER OF THE LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION RICHARD M. WEINBERG, DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL AND OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION CATHERINE McALEVEY, DIRECTOR
COMMITTEE ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES Chair Lawrence A. Warden April 10, 2001 OVERSIGHT: THE PROCUREMENT, DISTRIBUTION AND TESTING OF DIGITAL TWOWAY RADIOS BY THE FIRE DEPARTMENT
Introduction On March 14, 2001, the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) issued new Motorola XTS3500R digital two-way radios (commonly referred to as "handie-talkies") to firefighters throughout the City.' On March 19, 2001, while firefighter Luke Healy was battling a fire in the basement of a home on Myrtle Avenue in Richmond Hill, Queens, his oxygen tank began to expire.2 As Healy attempted to exit the basement, his oxygen tank ran out.3 Initial reports indicated that Healy's seven Mayday calls went unheard by firefighters at the scene and that they were only alerted to his need for assistance after a firefighter at another location, ten blocks away, heard a Mayday call from Healy.4 Subsequently, FDNY documents revealed that Deputy Chief Weinlein, who was at Myrtle Avenue, reported that he and another FDNY official at the scene heard a Mayday, but that when he used the radio to ask who transmitted the Mayday, no one answered. According to Deputy Chief Weinlein, Healy was eventually found by officers who heard his calls for help from the basement, not over the radio.5 On March 21, 2001, the FDNY announced that the following day, the newly issued radios would be recalled from the field with the intention of addressing operational issues with the radios and returning them to service shortly.6
' William Murphy and Melanie Lefkowitz, "Static Over Radios; FDNY Recalls New Models After Firefighter's Close Call," Newsday, March 22, 2001; March 20, 2001 memorandum from FDNY Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro to All Divisions. ~ Herbert Lowe, "Mayor Backs FDNY's Use of Radios," Newsday, March 26, 2001; Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close Call Leads to $4M Radio Recall," Ne\v York Post, March 22, 2001. Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close Call Leads to $4M Radio Recall," New York Post, March 22,2001. 3
Susan Saulny, "In Safety Move, Fire Department Pulls New Radios From Service," New York Times, March 22, 2001. 4
5 March 19, 2001 memorandum from FDNY Deputy Chief Weinlein to Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro regarding "Ht Operations at Box 2-2 9635."
March 20, 2001 memorandum from FDNY Chief of Operations Daniel Nigro to All Divisions; Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
6
Subsequently, it was revealed that during the eight days the new radios were in the field, firefighters experienced numerous problems with them, such as delays in transmission, messages not being received, messages getting cut off, and an echoing effect contributing to poor sound quality. Since the radios were recalled, many conflicting reports have circulated concerning the procurement, testing and distribution of the Motorola digital radios by the Fire Department. With the safety of firefighters as its overriding concern, the Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services plans to address these and other issues that have arisen with respect to these radios at today's hearing.
Procurement of the Motorola XTS3500R Digital Radios Prior to March 14, 2001, the FDNY utilized radios that operated in analog mode7 that it had purchased from Motorola for well over a decade. In 1997, the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), pursuant to the FDNY's request, executed a sole source contract8
7AnaIog and digital radio systems have substantially different transmission characteristics. In an analog radio system, the signal generated by the speaker's voice remains unchanged from the transmitter to the receiving radio. Analog radio operations are generally less expensive to implement, and remain the most widely used communications system. In a digital radio system, a voice frequency is sampled at the transmitter and converted into a digital signal by a voice encoder. Once the digital signal is received, it must be converted again to an analog copy of the original voice. While a digital signal is largely consistent over the entire coverage area, an analog signal grows weaker and noise levels increase the further a receiver is from the point of transmission. Digital systems are capable of superior spectrum efficiency and are said to provide better building penetration. See http://www.mot.com/LMPS/RNSG/conv/tvDes.htrn: See also, Nebraska State Radio Communications Task Force, "Recommendations for a State and Local Government Public Safety Statewide Wireless Communications Infrastructure" January 1, 1999, available at http://www.doc.state.ne.us/radiotf7NRCFinalReport.html
Section 3-05 of the Procurement Policy Board ("PPB") Rules governs the procedures to be used for sole source contracts. Specifically, the rules require that sole source procurements be used only when there is one source for the required goods. In such situations, the accepted price and terms and conditions shall be achieved through negotiation between the agency and the supplier. In determining whether to sole source a contract, the Agency Chief Procurement Officer ("ACCO") shall make a written determination that there is only one source for the required goods. For sole source procurements for goods and services of $10,000 or more, the ACCO is required to include a description of the efforts made to ensure that offers were solicited from other sources, and where applicable, a statement of intended actions to develop competition in the future. A copy of the ACCO's determination must be forwarded to the Comptroller's office within five days of completion. 8
with Motorola9 to purchase a total of 750 radios for a total of approximately $2.9 million.10 According to its terms, the contract could be used by the FDNY to purchase from among three different types of digital radios and two different types of analog radios.11 The contract also included provisions allowing for the substitution of a different radio if it were first approved by the FDNY and were offered at no additional cost. The Procurement Policy Board (PPB) Rules require that an agency give public notice of its intent to enter into sole source negotiations with a supplier. These public notices are published in the City's official newspaper, The City Record. If expressions of interest are received, the agency is required to evaluate them and, if it appears that the goods are available from more than a single source, a solicitation is required to be issued in accordance with Chapter 3 of the PPB Rules. The FDNY provided notice in The City Record on April 25, 1997, that it intended "to enter into Sole Source negotiations with Motorola to purchase VHP Analog Saber I Submersible Radios, UHF Analog Saber II Radios, VHF Astro Digital Capable Saber 1 Submersible Radios, UHF Astro Digital Capable Saber I Submersible Radios, and Astro Digital Capable Saber II Radios; all with spare parts."12 This notice states that "[ajny vendor who is qualified to compete on this procurement is invited to express their interest in writing by 4-30-97."
A review of the VENDEX system reveals that New York City issued 168 contracts and 531 purchase orders to Motorola, with a total value of $167.8 million. 9
10
DCAS Pre-Solicitation Review Report for FDNY Contract With Motorola, IV.C.4.
" According to FDNY officials, the City's Department of Information Technology and Telecommunication (DoITT) had determined that the FDNY should move toward modernization of its radio communications, including the ability to communicate with other City agencies and outside public safety agencies. Interoperability between the FDNY and other agencies is easier to achieve with a digital radio system, n VHF frequency bands for public safety include frequencies between 150-174 megahertz (MHz) while the UHF public safety bands encompass frequencies between 450 - 512 MHz. In general, natural and manmade noise is found at higher levels at lower frequencies. In general, UHF frequencies have shorter wavelengths and better building penetration. See Kathy J. Timel and James W. Hart, P.E. "Understanding Wireless Communications in Public
In its Pre-Solicitation Review Report, dated July 16, 1997, and signed by the FDNY's Agency Chief Contracting Officer (ACCO) Robert L. Scott, the FDNY reported that this procurement "was initially processed under an open market solicitation."
However, because
Motorola was the only bidder that could meet the operational and technical standards, a sole source procurement was sought. In the same document, the FDNY stated that "several manufacturers are developing CAI [Common Air Interface]-compliant products [one of the FDNY's standards], as digital and narrowband operations are being pushed by the FCC [Federal Communications Commission]" and that "[t]he FDNY will always evaluate new technologies and products as they become available." In May 1998, Motorola informed the FDNY that it was discontinuing one of the two analogonly radios included in the 1997 contract - the Saber 1 VHP. In a letter dated February 18, 1999, Motorola informed the FDNY that it was also discontinuing the other analog-only radio in the 1997 contract - the Saber III UHF - and offered to substitute the XTS3500R, which according to Motorola "would provide FDNY/EMSC a radio with greater technical and electrical specifications, analog and digital capability, while reducing the cost to the city." On February 24, 1999, the FDNY sent Motorola a written request for samples of the XTS3500R. Motorola, in a letter to the FDNY dated November 19, 1999, and referencing an earlier telephone conversation, said it "accepts and concurs with the [FDNY's] substitution of the XTS3500R Portable Radio Equipment and Appurtenances" for the discontinued analog radio. Thus, despite its acknowledgment two years earlier that several manufacturers were developing technology that might meet FDNY's CAI specifications, and in apparent disregard of its pledge to evaluate new technologies and products, the
Safety: A Guidebook to Technology, Issues, Planning, and Management," The National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, March 2000, available at http://www.nlectc.org
FDNY appears to have elected to accept a radio representing an entirely new communications technology from Motorola rather than conduct a competitive review of products and prices. Compounding its failure to subject this new communications technology to a competitive procurement process, the FDNY also exceeded the 1997 contract's ceiling on the number of radios to be procured (750 units) and the amount of the contract, $2.9 million. In December 1999, the FDNY ordered 2,700 XTS3500R radios from Motorola, and in 2000, ordered another 1,118 radios. The total cost for the 3,818 radios was approximately $14 million.13'14 There were conflicting media reports attributed to the FDNY concerning the amount of the entire contract to Motorola. Initially, several media sources reported on March 22, 2001, that the Motorola radio contract was worth $4.5 million, according to the FDNY.15 However, subsequent to a conflicting media report concerning the size of the contract, the FDNY adjusted this figure to represent a multi-year contract with Motorola for S33 million.16 The FDNY explained this discrepancy as the result of an error in calculation and "internal confusion" at the FDNY.17 There
13 In a memorandum dated November 12,1999, Donald E. Stanton, the Assistant Fire Commissioner for the FDNY's Bureau of Technology Development and Systems, requested "that DCAS perform the necessary tasks to facilitate the substitution of the existing SABER III portable radio with the new XTS3500R portable radio." It should be noted that in its February 18, 1999, letter informing the FDNY that the SABER III was to be discontinued, Motorola listed the price of the XTS3500R as $3,132. However, in all its memoranda to DCAS, the FDNY lists the price of the XTS3500R as $3,154, the price of the discontinued SABER III. In addition, the Stanton memorandum states that the new radio "is to be supplied at no extra cost." This is technically true, since, in Stanton's memorandum, the XTS3500R is said to be replacing the SABER III portable radio, which Motorola sold to the FDNY for $3,154 per radio. 14 To date, the FDNY has encumbered $13,969,142 for the XTS350CR radios and has paid for $5,858,927 worth of XTS3500R radios and accessories. 15 William Murphy and Melanie Lefkowitz, "Static Over Radios; FDNY Recalls New Models After Firefighter's Close Call," Newsday, March 22, 2001; Susan Saulny, "In Safety Move, Fire Department Pulls New Radios From Service," Mew York Times, March 22, 2001. 16 William K. Rashbaum, "Fire Union Demands Inquiry Into Contract for New Radios," New York Times, March 25, 2001. A report from WNBC-TV that aired on March 23, 2001, initially reported the $33 million figure. A review of contract documents submitted to the Council by DCAS, to date, does not support this $33 million figure, however. 17 William K. Rashbaum, "Fire Union Demands Inquiry Into Contract for New Radios," New York Times, March 25, 2001.
were also conflicting accounts from the FDNY presented in various media outlets concerning the number of radios purchased under the Motorola contract.'8 Testing and Distribution of the Motorola XTS3500R Radios by the FDNY The FDNY reportedly purchased the Motorola XTS3500R (UHF version) digital radios because they would provide better overall quality voice transmission and better radio penetration when used inside buildings.19 Nevertheless, all information provided to date indicates that the XTS3500R's were not adequately tested to ensure that they would meet the FDNY's operational needs, and that FDNY firefighters and officers were not sufficiently trained in operating the new radios. According to the FDNY, prior to placing their order for the new Motorola radios, the Department performed shop testing on the UHF version of the XTS3500R, including receiver and transmitter specifications, submersibility testing of the waterproof characteristics of the radio, a voice clarity test, a drop (shock) test, verification of controls, channels, radio features and accessories, and a battery life test. In addition, the FDNY has indicated that it also performed technical propagation testing and a comparison of VHF versus UHF, and analog versus digital coverage. According to the FDNY, the XTS3500R met these technical specifications. The FDNY has stated that its Rescue 2 unit tested the radios from July 23, 1999, to August 1, 1999. However, although the Rescue 2 unit tested an analog, VHF model of the XTS3500R, the FDNY purchased a digital, UHF model. Thus, the Rescue 2 unit never tested the radios or technology subsequently purchased by FDNY. Furthermore, the FDNY has indicated that Rescue 2
18 Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001; Patrice O'Shaughnessy and Maki Becker, "FDNY in a Radio Daze; Heat Rises as Faulty System Nixed," Daily News, March 25, 2001. 19 Kevin Flynn, "Unions Say Fire Dept. Ignored Concerns Over New Radios," The New York Times, March 31, 2001.
primarily tested the ergonomics of the radios such as button and knob placement, and other features.20 FDNY officials have admitted that Rescue 2 did not generate any written reports concerning the radio testing. Despite the lack of field testing, the FDNY began ordering the digital XTS3500R's (UHF version) in December 1999. According to the FDNY, the original shipment of 2,700 radios was received in January 2000. The FDNY began "shop testing" (lab testing) the radios in February 2000. In March 2000, all of the radios were returned to Motorola after the FDNY detected a problem regarding the submersibility characteristics of the radios. Motorola attempted to solve this problem and re-delivered 100 radios to the FDNY in May 2000. The FDNY found that the problem was not adequately addressed and again returned the radios to Motorola. In July 2000, Motorola reshipped 1,000 radios, with a random sample passing FDNY tests. In October, 2000, FDNY ordered another 418 radios. Between September 2000 and December 2000, Motorola fulfilled the FDNY orders. In January 2001, all radios from the original order and the 418 from the second order were tested for frequency assignment, transmission power output, receiver sensitivity, a vacuum test, and transmitter error. According to FDNY officials, the radios met all specifications, and were accepted for use by the Department. According to conversations with FDNY officials and media reports, approximately 20 of the radios were then "field-tested" at the FDNY Fire Training Academy on Randall's Island between January and February 2001.21 Acknowledging that, as of April 3, 2001, they were still gathering departmental documents related to this alleged testing, FDNY officials were unable to provide Council staff with further details surrounding this alleged testing, such as whether written
20
As a result of the Rescue 2 testing, design changes were implemented by Motorola.
The Fire Academy teaches new firefighters, as well as provides fire companies with continuing education, in the classroom and through simulated fireground training. 21
instructions concerning the scope of testing were provided to training officers; whether written reports were requested of and transmitted by officers; or who decided the radios should be tested at the Fire Academy. Noting that they were collecting documentation as part of their internal investigation, these FDNY officials said that they would have them in time for the City Council's hearing. Pursuant to procedure, the FDNY field-tests products prior to actual purchase. The FDNY has asserted that the XTS3500R radios were field-tested at the Fire Academy, but this was after the FDNY had already accepted delivery of all 3,818 radios. Moreover, representatives of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association (UFOA) state that the radios were not tested at the Fire Academy. Officers at the Academy were told to utilize the hew radios in simulated drills merely to "familiarize" them with the new radios, and that the exercises were not intended to evaluate the radios.22 Nevertheless, problems with the radios were detected through this familiarization. According to the UFOA, an officer told the Assistant Commissioner for the Bureau of Fire Communications, Stephen M. Gregory, on several occasions during the training at the Fire Academy in January and February of 2001 that there were serious flaws in the radios and that "at least one senior department official was aware of the problems since January [2001]."23 According to the UFOA, the officer was told directly by Assistant Commissioner Gregory not to
22
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001.
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001. This article states that several officers reported problems to Assistant Commissioner Gregory. Also in this article, a senior FDNY official is reported to have stated that the problems experienced during the Fire Academy "testing", which Assistant Commissioner Gregory was alerted to, "involved the half-second delays in transmission and echoes that are inherent to the digital technology." Also see Kevin Flynn, "Unions Say Fire Department Ignored Concerns Over New Radios," New York Times, March 31, 2001. 23
10 file a written report of problems observed with the new digital radios, and that the FDNY was already aware of these problems.24 The radios were delivered to FDNY firehouses in February/March 2001. The FDNY put the XTS3500R radios into service on March 14, 2001. According to the FDNY, firefighters and officers received training through an instructional video produced by the FDNY and through at least one visit from a battalion chief to each firehouse. Inasmuch as the video should contain instructions to firefighters and officers on any operational idiosyncrasies inherent to the radios, logically, it should have been produced after field testing. However, the video was produced before the fall of 2000, well before the radios were sent to the Fire Academy. This explains why the instructional video does not mention transmission delays and echoes, or any other problems identified in January and February 2001 at the Fire Academy. According to FDNY officials, within the first few days of the XTS3500R's being put into service, the Department received oral reports from the field of problems with the radios, including reports of messages being "stepped on"25 and messages not being received. Based on these reports, Donald J. Burns, FDNY Citywide Tour Commander, sent a memorandum on March 16, 2001, to all Deputy and Battalion Chiefs directing them to forward a report to the Bureau of Operations, and to provide immediate telephone notification through the chain of command to the Citywide Chief, if they encountered any problems "in the use of the new handie-talkies at fire or other operations." The memorandum further states that "[t]here have been some rumors of problems but there has been NO official notification of any problems." Despite this assertion, there were two March 14, 2001,
24
Ibid.
A term used to describe when several individuals transmit messages concurrently, causing some messages to be interrupted or lost.
25
11 reports £jm Battalion Chiefs of problems encountered with the use of the new radios. Reports of problems were also submitted on March 15, 2001. After the March 16, 2001, memorandum from Donald J. Burns was distributed, numerous written reports were sent to FDNY staff concerning problems encountered in the field with the new XTS3500R's. Reported problems included: • transmitted messages that were never received; • simultaneous transmissions that cancel each other out; • messages "getting cut off;" • slight delays in transmissions; • "transmissions from remote companies are interspersed with fireground transmissions;" • quality of transmissions were better when speaking with personnel not present at the scene of an incident; • "when in close proximity ... a reverberation or echo is experienced"; and • difficulties experienced in discerning voice inflections. According to FDNY officials, after the March 19, 2001, Mayday incident, five Deputy Chiefs convened at the FDNY's training site on Randall's Island on March 20, 2001, to test the radios' reported problems. After testing the radios and experiencing the same or similar problems reported from the field, the Chiefs recommended that the radios be removed from service to address these problems. Subsequently, on March 21, 2001, FDNY Commissioner Thomas Von Essen ordered that the XTS3500R radios be removed from the field the following day.
12
Upon recalling the radios from the field, the FDNY initially stated that the Motorola XTS3500R radios were currently utilized by fire departments in Boston and Chicago.'6 However, as later reported by the media, firefighter unions in Boston and Chicago stated that their departments do not use the same Motorola model.27 In fact, the Boston and Chicago fire departments had considered - and rejected - digital systems, opting instead to continue purchasing analog radios under an analog system.
Mistakes Repeated In 1980, two firefighters died when a safety rope broke at a Manhattan fire. Top fire officials insisted that the rope broke after it was cut on the broken edge of the roof coping. In fact, a subsequent investigation by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) concluded that the Fire Commissioner, Chief of Department, Chief of Training Division, and other chiefs knew for as many as five months before the accident that the rope had repeatedly failed to meet safety standards established by the FDNY and the cordage industry.29 In addition to determining that upper levels of FDNY management actually knew of the rope's substandard
Michele McPhee, "FDNY Chief Says Radios Cost City $33M," Daily News, March 26, 2001; Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
26
27
Michele McPhee, "FDNY Chief Says Radios Cost City S33M," Daily News, March 26, 2001.
28 The Boston Fire Department has confirmed to Council staff that they do not use the XTS3500R as part of their analog radio system. The Chicago Fire Department has confirmed to Council staff that they use an analog version of the XTS3500R, in addition to other analog radios, as part of their analog system. Moreover, while the Baltimore Fire Department does have a digital system in place, it does not use the XTS3500R digital radio. The Philadelphia Fire Department presently has an analog system and will be implementing a digital system in the near future similar to that of the Baltimore Fire Department. Council staff also contacted public safety agencies in a number of other cities and municipalities, including Atlantic City, New Jersey; Hamilton County, Ohio (metropolitan Cincinnati); Traverse City, Michigan (which has a system linking much of northern Michigan); and Boca Raton, Florida. None of these municipalities use the XTS3500R radio.
New York City Department of Investigation, "Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the June 27, 1980, Fire During Which Two Firemen Were Killed During an Attempted Rescue With a Roof Rope," Report 1034/80D, December 1980.
29
13 performance, the DOI report also concluded that the FDNY internal investigation was handled unprofessionally, and that FDNY officials carelessly made inaccurate and unsubstantiated public statements about this incident. A review of the FDNY's procurement, testing, distribution, and recall of the Motorola XTS3500R digital radios reveals that FDNY officials failed to heed the recommendations made by DOI in its 1980 report. Specifically, the FDNY did not follow testing and evaluation protocols established subsequent to the DOI report, including consulting with the fire unions about the testing or introduction of safety equipment. Moreover, following the March 19, 2001, Mayday incident, the FDNY repeatedly released incorrect or incomplete information to the media. Despite this, and the passage of 20 days, there has been no information released by the FDNY from their internal investigation. DOI Recommendation: New FDNY Testing and Evaluation Protocols The safety equipment provided to firefighters is a vital lifeline. Recognizing this, the DOI report made several recommendations concerning the proper evaluation and testing of "newest technologies, as well as routine changes in the standards, usages, and reliability of existing equipment."30 The DOI report recommended that the FDNY create a new bureau whose full-time concern would be to review and evaluate all equipment. Subsequent to the release of the DOI report, the FDNY upgraded its then existing safety unit to form the Safety Division.31 Within the Safety Division of the FDNY is a Research and Development Unit. In March 1983, the FDNY established protocols within the Safety Division for the testing and evaluation of new products with the creation of "All Units Circular (A.U.C.) 273." The
30
Ibid.
31
1981 Preliminary Mayor's Management Report, p. 37.
14 FDNY stated that the purpose of A.U.C. 273 is to "insure that information about new equipment placed in the field for pilot testing is available to all members of the Department.in the event that their operations might involve or be concerned with these programs."32 Under protocols established by A.U.C. 273, before products are purchased by the FDNY, they are distributed in a pilot phase to selected fire units across the City to be tested in actual field conditions. All units across the City are notified of this pilot phase through addenda to A.U.C. 273, not just the fire units that are selected to participate in the pilot-testing phase. Selected fire units then file written reports directly to the Research and Development Unit based upon their experience with a product. Council staff obtained numerous examples of the FDNY's adherence to this protocol, even when there were only slight changes to the specifications of a product currently being used by the FDNY. For example, since October 25, 2000, a new fire hose has been pilot-tested by several FDNY engine companies, with pilot testing scheduled to end on April 15, 2001.33 In this case, fire units are to file reports to Research and Development any time a hose is stretched. A.U.C. addenda for other products reveal varied reporting guidelines. In the case of the XTS3500R radios, there has been no documentation presented by FDNY that indicates that a notice pursuant to A.U.C. 273 protocol was issued at all. The FDNY asserts that actual field tests of the XTS3500R digital radios by units was not possible because the digital radios could not communicate with the analog radios already being used in the field.34 However, the XTS3500R radios could have been tested in field simulation drills that are conducted by multiple units while out of actual field service, such as the FDNY's "Pipeline"
32
FDNY, "Pilot Programs - Equipment/Apparatus," All Units Circular 273, March 29, 1983.
" A.U.C. 273 Addendum #287, October 25, 2000. 34
William Van Auken, "FDNY Pulls Plug on Faulty Radios", The Chief, March 30, 2001.
15 drill, airport drill, Perm Station drill, and other multi-unit drills that are conducted within battalion districts. Additionally, the radios could have been tested prior to purchase under simulated fire conditions at the Fire Academy, as the FDNY claims they subsequently were. DPI Recommendation: Consultation With Fire Unions in Testing of New Products The 1980 DOI report also recommended that fire unions should be fully represented and consulted in the testing and evaluation process of new products, as well as with changes in standards and reliability of existing equipment. Subsequent to the issuance of the DOI report, the FDNY named an eight-member Safety Committee, chaired by the First Deputy Commissioner, with both management and union representation?5 Although union representatives told Council staff that the Safety Committee does not meet on a pre-determined basis, they did say that they are routinely notified and consulted about the testing and evaluation of new products and proposed changes to existing equipment by way of the Safety Committee and in other ways, including the contractually established Labor-Management Committee and other meetings. For instance, when bunker gear was introduced (during which time, the current FDNY Commissioner was then the president of the UFA), the UFOA and UFA report that they were actively involved in the process. In the case of the XTS3500R digital radios, the UFA and the UFOA have stated that fire unions were not consulted at any point in the FDNY's decision to procure the new digital radios, marking a distinct departure from existing FDNY protocols.37
35
1981 Preliminary Mayor's Management Report, p. 37.
36
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001.
37
Ibid.
16
DPI Recommendation; Proper Investigation of Reported Incidents: The DOI report states that the FDNY conducted their investigation of the 1980 rope incident unprofessionally, and noted serious managerial weakness within the FDNY at that time in conducting formal investigations.38 The DOI investigation found in the case of the rope incident that the FDNY had "engaged in a number of actions that raised questions about the competence and objectivity of command investigations conducted internally within the Department."39 The DOI report recommended that a new "emergency response investigative unit" be created within the FDNY to respond to unusual incidents that would be "independent of all intermediate commands," but that the investigative unit should "maintain close working relations with and draw on the expertise of the Inspector General's office, the Fire Marshals and the Office of Legal Affairs."40 This unit would seek, among other things, "to ascertain whether there are any major flaws in the way firefighting practices and equipment are employed so that the loss of life may be prevented in the future."41 The report also stated that "the persons involved in any disaster should be professionally and thoroughly interviewed as soon as possible after an incident occurs."42 DOI concluded that when it was directed to conduct its investigation less than one month after the tragic incident, "individual witness recollections were growing
38
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980, p. 28.
39
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980, p. 3.
40
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980, p. 28.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
17 stale; and various individuals and entities had developed interests in the outcome of the matter that might affect the version of what happened."43 With regard to the FDNY's current internal investigation regarding the procurement, inadequate testing and training, and operational difficulties with the XTS3500R radios, FDNY officials have been reported as saying that their "internal review has first focused on the radios themselves, with the Department questioning Motorola engineers about what problems may exist with the technology."44 This is consistent with UFOA's statement that none of the UFOA members who reported problems with the radios have been interviewed as part of the FDNY's internal investigation.45 It has been 20 days since the FDNY Commissioner's decision to recall the XTS3500R digital radios, and the FDNY has yet to interview key witnesses or release any results of its reported investigation. DPI Finding: Misleading Information In 1980, the DOI report found that the FDNY had released misleading information to the public regarding the rope incident. Similarly, subsequent to the first public reports of problems with the new XTS3500R digital radios, there have been several instances of inaccurate and incomplete information provided by FDNY to the media: > Based upon conversations with the FDNY, many media outlets reported on March 22, 2001, that the FDNY contract for the new digital radios was $4.5 million.46 Another
43
DOI Report, 1034/80D, 1980.
44
William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001.
45
Ibid.
Associated Press, "Fire Department Withdraws New Handheld Radios", published in Stolen Island Advance, March 22, 2001; Susan Saulny, "In Safety Move, Fire Department Pulls New Radios From Service," New York Times, March 22, 2001; William Murphy and Melanie Lefkowitz, "Static Over Radios; FDNY Recalls New Models After Firefighter's Close Call," Newsday, March 22, 2001; Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close 46
18 news story indicated that Motorola and FDNY official, provided a total figure of $18 million to replace the old analog radios.47 In subsequent reports, this figure was adjusted to $33 million for the entire multi-year contract with Motorola, which included all components of the new digital system.48 The FDNY also initially provided incorrect information to media outlets that the Boston and Chicago Fire Departments used the same digital XTS3500R radios being used by the FDNY.49 Boston and Chicago Fire Department officials subsequently denied that they had ever used digital XTS3500R radios,50 and this was later confirmed by Council staff. The FDNY also provided conflicting information about the number of digital radios that were purchased under their Motorola contract and the cost for those radios. On March 22, 2001, several news stories stated that the FDNY had purchased 2,700 new digital XTS3500R radios from Motorola,31 while another news story on the same date put the figure at 4,000 radios.52 The 2,700 figure on the number of radios was then
Call Leads to $4 Million Radio Recall," New York Post, March 22, 2001; Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001. Donna de la Cruz, "Fire Unions: Official Knew of Radio Problems," Associated Press, published in Stolen Island Advance, March 31, 2001.
47
William K. Rashbaum, "Fire Union Demands Inquiry Into Contract for New Radios," New York Times, March 25, 2001; Michele McPhee, "FDNY Chief Says Radios Cost City S33M," Daily News, March 26, 2001; William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001. A report from WNBC-TV that aired on March 23, 2001, was the initial source for the $33 million figure. 48
49
Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
50 Patrice O'Shaughnessy and Maki Becker, "FDNY in a Radio Daze; Heat Rises as Faulty System Nixed," Daily News, March 25, 2001.
Larry Celona and William Neuman, "Firefighter's Close Call Leads to S4M Radio Recall," New York Post, March 22, 2001; Associated Press, "Fire Department Withdraws New Handheld Radios", reported in the Staten Island Advance, March 22, 2001. 51
52
Michele McPhee, "New FDNY Radios Fizzle," Daily News, March 22, 2001.
19 quoted from the FDNY sources in subsequent news stories. Finally, the figure was adjusted to 3,818 radios on March 31, 2001.53 > Finally, the FDNY has also provided the media with misleading information concerning the contents of the instructional video provided to firefighters for the XTS3500R radios. Assistant Commissioner Gregory reportedly stated to a senior FDNY official that problems that had been reported to him during January and February 2001, when the radios were been "tested" at the Fire Academy -- "halfsecond delays in transmission and echoes that are inherent to the digital technology" - were discussed in the XTS3500R instructional training video.54 Council staff reviewed the instructional video, and there is ho mention of transmission delays or echoes.
Kevin Flynn, "Unions Say Fire Department Ignored Concerns Over New Radios" New York Times, March 31, 2001. 53
54 William Van Auken, "UFOA Calls for Von Essen to Quit Fire Department," The Chief, April 6, 2001. This account is also discussed in William Murphy, "Delayed Response: Documents Show FDNY Radio Problems," Newsday, April 9, 2001.
1 2
CITY COUNCIL
3
CITY OF NEW YORK 4 5
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES 6
of the 7
COMMITTEE ON FIRE And CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 9 10 11
April 10, 2001 Start -. 10 : 58 a .m . Races s : 3:05 p . m•
12
City Hall Council Chambers
13
New York, New York
14
B E F O R E : 15
LAWRENCE WARDEN Chairperson,
16 17
COUNCIL MEMBERS: 18 19 20 21
Stanley Michels Victor Robles Walter McCaffrey Ronnie Eldridge Madeline Provenzano James Oddo Kathryn Freed Speaker Peter Vallone
22 23 24 25
LEGAL-EASE COURT REPORTING SERVICES, INC. 217 Broadway Suite 511 New York, New York 10007 (800) 756-3410
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756-3410
1 2 A P P E A R A N C E S 3
4
Thomas Von Essen Commissioner NYC Fire Department
5 6
Daniel Nigro Chief of Operations NYC Fire Department
7 8
Tom Fitzpatrick Deputy Commissioner for Administration NYC Fire Department
9 10
Don Stanton Bureau of Technology Department NYC Fire Department
11 12
Scott Cantone First Deputy Commissioner NYC Department of Citywide Administrative
Services
13 14
Michael Best Director Mayor's Office of Contracts
15 16
Brian Cohen Deputy Commissioner DoITT
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Thomas Manley Firefighter, Sergeant-At-Arms Health and Safety Officer Uniformed Firefighters Association Captain Peter L. Gorman President Uniformed Fire Officers Association Jack Ginty Vice President Uniformed Fire Officers Association
24 25
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A P P E A R A N C E S (CONTINUED)
3
4 5 6 7
Ken Denslow Corporate Vice President/General Manager Northern Sales Division Motorola, Inc. Jeff Parsons Northern Sales Division Manager Motorola, Inc.
8 Jerome Hauer
9 10
Donald Faeth Vice President, EMTs and Paramedics FDNY Local
2507, DC 37 AFSCME
11
12
Richard McAllan Senior New York City EMS Paramedic
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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any questions, but I welcome your testimony, and you
3
can feel assured that we will continue
4
investigation.
our
5
MR. FAETH: Thank you very much.
6
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Mr. Richard
7
McAllan. Welcome back.
8
MR. McALLAN: Thank you.
9
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Okay, you may
10
proceed.
11 12
Just state your name and affiliation for the record.
13
MR. McALLAN: My name is Richard
14
McAllan. I am a senior paramedic, New York City EMS.
15
Currently
16
in the Fire Department. I will be brief, certainly you have
17
heard plenty of speeches about the bidding problems
18
and so on, so they need not be touched on here, with
19
the key exception of the City Council should be
20
aware that the Fire Department has been cutting the
21
New York City EMS budget, and I submit to you that
22
you should be investigating where the Fire
23
Department got the extra $10 million to cover this
24
overage in the purchase of these radios. They have
25
eliminated our specialty units, HASTAC units, they
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have cut our supervisory staff, the paramedic ranks
3
are depleted. They have cut an awful lot of
4
overtime, they are not running full complement of
5
ambulances. I submit to you that they have been
6
doing budget modifications to cover up the $10
7
million overage and that EMS budget has been
8
suffering as a result.
9
SERVICES
As to the radios themselves, it is my
10
opinion that these radios will never be acceptable
11
for emergency use, and just as Mr. Hauer said a
12
minute ago, they inherently have a transmission
13
delay. That is because the signals are processed by
14
an internal processor into a digital system.
15
Everyone says here that they are unacceptable for
16
use on the fireground, I certainly agree with that,
17
but they are deeply unacceptable for use at a police
18
1085 forthwith, at a 1013, at a multiple calls for
19
assistance with EMS units, and for exactly the same
20
reasons, there be multiple portables there, there
21
would be signal delays, there would be technical
22
difficulties with all these portables. If a number
23
of sector cars respond to a particular emergency,
24
the same issue would apply as it would on a
25
fireground, there would be perhaps 10 portables
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there, maybe more, and they would have these same
3
signal delays.
4
So, it is my position that an analog
5
radio is the best radio for emergency use, and what
6
Motorola was saying, that while the firefighters
7
have a 15-year-old radio, well, fine, they want to
8
upgrade the radio, may I recommend the EMS radio,
9
which was purchased by the Health and Hospitals
10
Corporation, the Sabre radio, which was in the
11
Comptroller's report and which is every bit as
12
capable and has been a proven radio for New York
13
City EMS.
14
Then you will see in my testimony
15
there are other issues here that the Fire
16
Commissioner has arbitrarily turned off the mixer on
17
a lot of EMS frequencies, jeopardized our members'
18
safety, because they think it makes dispatch a
19
little better. It comes back to the issue of units
20
stepping on one another because they can't hear each
21
other. It comes back to the issue again of
22
difficulties in communications in the field.
23
My understanding is also they weren't
24
going to give us the police frequencies which are in
25
every EMS portable in this City. I have been
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assaulted in the back of the ambulance. And I got
3
police assistance through the use of portable
4
radios. The NYPD frequencies, and I fought for that
5
20 years ago. We have had police frequencies in our
6
portables for 20 years.
7
SERVICES
First we have police radios, now they
8
are in our technology
advanced, they are in the EMS
9
portable, so if a unit is in trouble, we have had
10
units pinned down by sniper fire, et cetera, if they
11
are in trouble, the New York City EMS units can go
12
on the police frequencies to request
13
assistance.
14
emergency
My understanding of these new radios
15
is we weren't going to have that capability. So
16
there are some very significant issues here that
17
should be addressed by the City Council.
18
think these radios will ever be acceptable for use
19
because of the signal delay, a proper choice for
20
this City and for signal penetration is the 400
21
megahertz analog radios. It is exactly what PD is
22
using and exactly what EMS is using.
23
I don't
When Mr. Hauer says there is some
24
historical accidents on that issue, yes, EMS were
25
given 480 frequencies by the FCC ten years ago
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because our frequencies were overwhelmed,
3
there have been some issues, firefighters used 155
4
megahertz for a number of years.
5
the 480s would probably be a good choice. I don't
6
have any problems with that, but on an analog radio
7
and an analog system.
8 9
SERVICES
and, yes,
Moving them into
So, those are the key issues that I would raise to the City Council and ask you to
10
investigate. And if you will indulge me for just one
11
second? This morning I was at the wake of paramedic
12
Helene Cheynes (phonetic), and she was the first
13
female paramedic in the City of New York Emergency
14
Medical Service, so if I may, I would just like to
15
remember her to the City Council as the pioneer that
16
she was.
17
She graduated as a paramedic, say,
18
1978 or thereabouts, recently retired from EMS.
19
Apparently suffered a heart attack.
20
So, anyway, sir, in conclusion
on the
21
radios, I don't think those radios will be
22
acceptable. I am certainly outraged that the Fire
23
Department would go 410 million overbudget on an
24
unproven radio, jeopardize my members' safety,
25
jeopardize firefighters' safety. Certainly, a
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firefighter that is not getting an adequate supply
3
of oxygen cannot be expected to, you know, react in
4
an appropriate situation here. You have to have a
5
radio that is dependable, you have to have a radio
6
that is certain to work and is not going to step on
7
a mayday or whatever else by some signal delay that
8
is inherent in digital technology.
9
SERVICES
So, I put in my testimony and I am
10
happy to say in the record, I think Commissioner Von
11
Essen should resign, for the $10 million overage and
12
for cutting the EMS budget, and, obviously, being
13
dishonest to everyone involved here. If those radios
14
had gone through a proper approval process, a proper
15
testing process, I don't think that model radio
16
would have been purchased, but certainly he has an
17
obligation to follow the law and to engage in
18
competitive bidding appropriately, like everyone
19
else does in this society and in the City of New
20
York.
21
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Thank you very
22
much for your testimony. Your words will be factored
23
into the Committee's deliberations.
24
MR. McALLAN: Thank you, sir.
25
CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Good seeing you
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again.
3
4 5
MR. McALLAN: Good afternoon.
Thank
you . CHAIRPERSON WARDEN: Barring anyone
6
else to testify for this Committee, I deem this
7
Committee adjourned.
8
(Hearing concluded at 3:05 p.m.)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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1
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CERTIFICATION
3 4
5
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
6
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
}
7 8 9
I, CINDY MILLELOT. a Certified
10
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the
11
State of New York, do hereby certify that the
12
foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the
13
within proceeding.
14
I further certify that I am not
15
related to any of the parties to this action by
16
blood or marriage, and that I am in no way
17
interested in the outcome of this matter.
18 19
'
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
I have hereunto
set my hand this 10th day of April 2001.
20 21 22 23 24
25
CINDY MILLELOT, CSR.
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1 2
C.E.RT.I.F.I.C_AT.I_ON
3 4 5 6 7 S 9
I, CINDY MILLELOT, a Certified Shorthand
10
Reporter and a Notary Public in and for the State of
11
New York, do hereby certify the aforesaid to be a
12
true and accurate copy of the transcription of the
13
audio tapes of this hearing.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
--.
CINDY MILLELOT, CSR. 25
Legal-Ease Court Reporting Services, Inc. (800) 756-3410
FIRE DEPARTMENT 50 11 7IH AVECUK BRDOJviW. TEL ?ll 9W-
1 1220
BATTALION 40
TO:
"Dinid A Nigro
Chief Of Op
FROM:
Vincenx 7. MandaU
Baruliuc Chief
DATE-
March 11, 2001
SUBJECT:
Nsw Hindi-Tiliie
Ax t recent optntiou (Second Ailrm Brooldyo Box 1665 on 3.'l4>01) units operated wing *h* ne
I: ippnred tt*« »)»»•« w«r* some noc received. 3) The built-in deUy, frco: Jriasnii^ion to KCSSUQ^ ciMscd tainor difCcuhici craasmiKiDg member v« in close piojdroi^ to other radioj. Wbil* trtasmtung. tb> ovenibef would he»r previous ponJcxu of bis messages via ihc surroundiai ridtos. 4) Too miay uonec«*»«y trMinuMwns « a rewh of »U roembcw liavjnj ridloj. \VhUe I ajrre t^*t every mftrabtr ihoald h*ve ft ndio for safety rmuus, I recommend tb*t ctrtaiu position*, U. CAN, IRONS, N022LE it BACKUP, only b« permitted to make emergency trioimisjians. Euiicr tfei! day LI 14 wd Batr .40 conducted a check of ths ntw ndioi at tac BtooVlya Ancy Tttsuaal. Tbe reJuIii of tbi? t«t were more than arisfsrtory. Members b pair* bnmcbed out tc; the ftr r«avh« of the buildiaj and were 4ble w wmrtuniaw quke \vell w.-ith z toembcr »a ti* lobby. There WM very little distottion. very few "dead spou" and the bvili b deity (Cd Bflt any prob!«au. As a nutter effect, the dinortioa and "deii spots" only became «vid»nr wkea t trcuoiitttr And rectiver were iojidt ocuupaacien at remote eodj of iHs cxtteo»«ly lar^c buUdi Durieg thij t«»X ai oppose4 w til* Jecood alann,, oaly t\vo rtdioi were in elojso proximity to e«b o:bcr wbea trwuaxJsJoas "were
a2
.
.
.
.
.
.
It is apparent 'hat these radios work very well \vfcwx u&y arc not m clou proximity to one another. Havcver, wkto numerous tadlo* «e in close prcrximity their cpcv»tioa luvy much to bs desired, « coDomuolcattoas become d'utoned wd uardubU.
Disapproved Q
rar D'.visioci 8
I
Groupf
Date
I was the Incident coramancJer at the above m e n t i o n e d 2ns alarm segree t o t a l l y with B . C . M a n d s l a ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s . 1. These new H . T 3 . are' d e f i n a t u l y note power f u l l t h a n the oldeH.Ts. We era m o n i t o r i n g Brooiclyn fires from our office on Staten Island whsich we ware never able to do b e f o r e . This a double edged knife," The down aide is that we are going to h a y * to switch to the s e c o n d a r y tactical f r e q u e n c y more o f t e n a n d this is going to be d i f f i c u l t when members ora b u n K s up 'with m a s k s on and u n a b l e to see frequency number, thay wi. h a v e to do It by feel sod this could lesd errors. 2. We do get f e e d b a c k and in addition there is atransmission d* t h a t causes an echo vhich is confusing. When the officer, especially in engine companies making the initial attack ani the officer is bunchad up with the other firsfightersd near the rxozzl* the echo or f e e d b a c k is transmitted when the o f f i is xmitting. This causo garbled •
3. the channel aelectftr switch is mor* prominent and "more easily turned than the on/off_volvtut.—* — "• — •*•--*• ---• -• • •-•,
tf.
tlioTt! ched , t• h a t is -the channel switch T"~g?r • a c t i v a t e d instead of the on/off volume switch,
To:
08
Battalion
Company
L024 "^^
Wro Manhattan. Date Received
Incident Number
March 17
New York, March IS ^""•"•»• ~ ^^^^™-
0227
Box No.
1 9 0 1 T i m e Received
19Ql ^mmm*
0776
14:00
Location or Addraa* 41 g 42 St
Responded to Signs.
7-5
Received by
adi
4
While ag Due on
Arrived 1st
in _7
ninutea. Assigned
Type of incident
Ordered to return
Members 'relieving
Structural by d-3
to qtra
Time Returned 16:30 Data Returned Maroh 17, 2001 responding
2nd
At Work
02 houra
LT. B R O W N . F T LUCANNI
IT NORTON
FF LCMBARDI
FT ST .JOHN
FF SENTOWSK1
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
30 minute*
REMARKS none
WORK PERFORMED L-24 forced entry to ataira from lobby proceeded to 7 th floor the reported location of fire.on 7th floor found light amok* condition. L-24 roof reported heavy smoke on 8th floor. L-24 and members proceeded to 8th floor where R-lraported fire in suite 811 1-24 forced doors on eighth floor found no additional fire returned to fire door called for line. 1-24 proceeded to stairs twice to locate engines.after 2nd attempt ot gat water L-24 streched house line to fire and put water on fire. L-24 found communications poor and was unable to understand transmissions.Bn.9 relieved L-24 and L-24 took up.
EDWARD BROWN Rank
Lieutenant
Group No.
24
FI IE D E P A R T M E N T ISJE'StST.N.Y. 100J2 TEL. 211 510 4338 FAX2U 355-67''3 CEL9I7 769 0401
BATTALION 8
"Newwik To;
^
Daniel A. Nig i >
Chief of Operations
From:
Thomas P. De.!ingelis
Battalion Chief
Subject:
Problems At 10-76 776 With XTS3500R Haridi T4lkies
Date:
March 19,20(i.
Saturday, 3/17 01,41 E42 St. was the scene of a -76. There was smoke on several floors and the new ha^/di talkies significantly complicated operations The transmissions were garbled at best DC GaMn and I were constantly checking > wth each other to see whether we understood the transmissi ois, and the units were unable to un< erstand our transmissions, We were forctgt to use the floor warden phones foi communications with the Operations Chief. Only due t
Respectfully Submitted,
Battalion Chi ef Group 17 Battalion 8
Examined & Approved:
Q ]
Disapproved
Division Commander: •Divisions
Date
Group
MKti UJsFAKTM'lsNT 91-45 121 ST RICHMOND HEX, NY 11418 TEL 718 476-6283 FAX 718 $50-1504
DIVISIONS
TO:
Daniel Nigro
Chief Of Operations
Frank Cruthers
City Wide Tour Commander Deputy Chief
DATE:
Michael Weinlein '» March 19, 2001
SUBJECT:
Hi Operations At Box 2-2 9635
FROM:
I have just concluded operatamsat box 2-2 3381 and have experienced some difficulties in HT operation. Theire were numerous transmissions that didn't reach their intended receiver. I was receiving & number of transmissions that stopped in mid sentence. A May Day and Urgent were transmitted at the same time, I was one of two people tfcat I could find that heard the May Day. I didn't receive'the Urgent. When I transmitted over the HT as to who transmitted the May Day no one answered. When the member who transmitted the Urgent for fire extending to .the first floor didn't get .a response, he came out of the building and told me in person. When I spoke to Captain DaSilva E305 fee sfeted he said he didn't hear the May Day over the HT but heard the member grving.jt in the .basement He moved in the direction of the source and found Lt. Rigoli in the process of removing FF Healy. Before I arrivcjd at this fire two )me? were stretched. One to the top of the basement stairs and the second to the exterior cefiar entrance (bilko doors). With the first line protecting the interior of the building the battalion elected to- have the second line advance and extinguish the fire. The first due engine had trouble 'receiving HT transmissions to this effect and were attempting to advance down the interior stairs.' We were fortunate that a member who forced the rear door to the first floor had also forced entry to. the bilko doors. He entered the first floor and saw what the first engine was attempting. He was able to tell them that the second engine was advancing from the exterior. This prevented two different lines from advancing in opposition to each other.
After the fire we did a simulation in the street with two HPs in the transmitting mode at the 3ame time. When both HT'.s wre transmitting qntfring ram* atw.^ fl tfrifd HT When I returned
to quarters we. did another more intensive simulatioa with the use of four HT's. This time when HT 1 and 2 were transmitting at me same time, HT 3 heard what HT I was saying and HT 4 heard what HT 2 was saying. In another test HT 3 heard what HT 1 was saying and then midway during the transmission HT 3 heard what HT 2 was transmitting. These observations are very 'disturbiHg in light of having these new HT's being put in service. I have had operations where Acre have been some problems with wmmunications but never have I had a fire where this many transmissions were not received. I am attaching-.ieports from Battalion 50 and 51 and Ladder 143 as to some problems mat they experienced with the HT durfng this operation and over the past few days. I believe some of the problems that Battalion 50 and 51 elude to in their reports can be fixed with training. The echoing and delay may take some time to get used to, but something has to be done when two radios are transmitting at the same time, It could be that die second transmission is being started in the time of the delay in pressing the button and voice being heard. Respectfully submitted,
/*&*4/^wk,
Deputy Chief Div. 13 Gr. 24
FIRE DEPARTMENT 153-lLffiJLLSlDEA.VB JAMAICA, NY 11423 TECT18 m 52*8 FAX 718 358 »903
'*
BA1TALIONM
TO:
Michael Weialain
Deputy Chief
FROM:
James Mara&an
BettslicnCHef
DATE:
C3/I9/CI-
SUBJECT:
Kandi-Talki* Problems
OPS CIRC*
DJVCTRC.*
During the iajt u eek units of Battalion 50 have bad the following problems v/itb. the NcuHandi-Taliies. 1. There hai beea nurc^rowa complaints that messages Kave VQ\t received. I have experienced this proWum as well as Chief Tauber ecd other members.
2. 7 have also experienced messages sddressed to me tist are gctiing cut off. Chisf Tauber has a! so had this happen. 3. Member* ue finding it 4'flfi-culi gauinj; use to the Kalf fi-icond delay ia tn»5saii«sions. PersonaUy I fiel I'm m a Opdjnlla inovic. The lip? are moving aad The vcices are coming afterwards. Seriousiy.-k's extreoaly irritatiog listftninic to your own voice a seccod after you speak. 1 feel members should have ^een trained Lc this :o getth«m use to tfaii delay.
Respectfiilly submitted.
B.C. BATT50 GR.1
LADDER COMPANY 143
1-01-02 Jamaica Avenue Richmond Hill. N.Y. 1141B , T«». 71&-47W294 Fax718-347-5099 i.
To:
Michael C. YVelniein
Division Commander
From:
Paul Dombrowsky
Subjact;
H/T XTS 3SOQR p-ar-formece at Box 2-2 9635
Date:
March 19,2001 .
Captain
L-143
1} L-143 members operating-at this box did not hear Mayday transmission. x
2) 3 transmissions by L-143 Officer to B-51 \wu not responded to. 3; Two indvidual transmlsildns «t the same time ssems to cancel out botn transmissions. 4) Attrw first stages of the firt, djuring myiransmJssions in #2 above. I pfcrcievftd that one irietrb^r operating atlWs fire possibly nad 9 * Swck Button"
Capt P«il bonibro^skyGr.* 24, L- /T?
143
BATTALION CBDDCF.
BN.
GR.
DATE
DIV.
GR.
DATE
DEPUTY CHIEF
IIR-E DEPARTMENT FAX 711
&ATTAIION51
".TO! FROM
fipttalion Qhief
DATE •
>
.
; SUBJECT:. ^
:jPijAin^.gWflj'S^y
Haadi TaMe Radlos >
:' On 3/1^01
alaim. firei acd fbuad ti.ft fbliov^ng problems
'•' 1 . :
w?tet|^?3» of yoiix voice w.nh.a sli^n delay fcekj- transmitted from ettin uasd to h should not be an
othsg ra)S*
...
. .2.
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MKE DEPARTMENT tUraoTicxCwm B-,. —w.N.
To:
All DM*.,** SOC ChitfofOpatsioo*
Dttft:
Mtrtb20,2001 MotoroU XTS3SOO HnuU«.TaUdes
Qpmttoail isiuis iuve DMB nportad ftftrdir j the MotoroU XT93500. Hie caoet t ^fitil r«4k> «4 iifiul rtdto* cn&ot neeiw when two aMfliafcs«c bttag fiffiuhatpuibr tratatod. Two proyrwaunt dwifii will bt toted toiMrfiOTily od rtouM ovcccou this probltnu Ottthu»diy,MirA22, 2001, all imitj wlU rttuni to usins lh«^VHF Hiadk-Tinoiei. Th* prowrdure th»li b« iitobctl X) thtt tacd on March U* to place (he UHF Hindie.rinBalai«vice. Uteilwoch«Bi>ov
Ttnsmliodyi^^ cs*attmJtiiwilt^^
nont of thdf mewtes will b« properly iwcivwi W«it uctil t SMWH* u ooopUirt bcfort yoo tt«i«n* - do not attempt to "tifltoW wiotbw «WIL Tit XTS3500 hu i fretter noge of wnsmtosloa tod li more ifluly tatai*rfhr»wirh oduv otviy opnttionf .
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BA1TALION ONE NEW HI PROBLEM SHEET 2001 DATE PROBLEM 3/14** 3/14* 3/15* 3/15*
RESULT
At \VTC fire: no commo concourse to street. Tuna channel switch instead of volume Battery went dead at an operation. Pick-up distant transmissions.
Relay necessary Vol should be larger knob Need gang charger for BN Confusion
•
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FIRE DEPARTMENT*
3--16.-01
To:
All Deputy and Battalion Chiefs
From:
Donald J. Bums -v4}3
Subject:
New Handi-taikic Radios. (AUC 1 79)
Citywide Tour Commander
If any problems are noted in the use of the new handi-talkies at fire o: other operations, Chief Officers arc to forwafd a report to the Bureau of Operations ASAP. An immediate notification via telephone through the chain of command to the Citywide Chief shall also be made. There have been some rumor* of problems but there has been NO official notification of any problems.
FIRE DEPARTMENT Balttfon 44
To:
Donald J Bain?
Froro:
Roben 3. Btovm
Bahalion Chief
NEWHT'» At on all hand* on tH-rd floor c-1 »a K type building, there \y*re iranssi/'ssions that wae onl,)' p4rt aU;/ r?«jvtd »nd somt tr«a$UuS5i<3tVi n«^ g«tb]ed. When th«e ait a f«\ HTs in ti* sara« area it secmi to «acerfMt« ihe problem.
Rwoecrfuliy Subntitteu.
Hxaonoxed and approved;
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Divisiw 15
Group
Dau
April 10, 2001
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. McALLAN REGARDING IMPROPER PURCHASE OF DEFECTIVE DIGITAL PORTABLE RADIOS BY FDNY BEFORE THE NEWYORK CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES CHAIRED BY COUNCIL MEMBER LAWRENCE WARDEN (D-BX)
It is my pleasure to testify before this Committee once again. With that said, however, the seriousness of this testimony cannot be over emphasized. Portable radios are often the emergency professionals' lifeline for assistance in emergency situations. This faulty Motorola digital radio purchase has finally embroiled the Commissioner in a pork barrel scandal that will surely go down in NYC history. You can tell the seriousness of the scandal when Mayor Rudy Giuliani attacks the Comptroller for exposing this scandal while telling us what a wonderful Commissioner Von Essen has been for this City. Von Essen may be a wonderful guy as Rudy says, but I would venture to say that Rudy's judgment on Von Essen's service as Fire Commissioner has been clouded by Rudy's desire to have yes-men surround him What is clear to your writer is that this scandal only hints at the true extent to which the FDNY Administration has fleeced the taxpayers of this City in this so-called EMS/Fire Merger. As you may recall, Thomas Von Essen served as President of the UFA when then Candidate Rudy Giuliani was running against former Mayor Dinkins in 1993. The UFA put a lot of time and money into this race in support of Rudy's candidacy. Rudy won a narrow victory over Mayor Dinkins in that race. Later, Mayor Giuliani selected Von Essen to replace then Fire Commissioner Howard Safir. I have said before, that in my opinion, that despite Von Essen's labor background, FDNY Commissioner Von Essen has overseen the most destructive administration ever to operate the New York City Emergency Medical Service. Leaving aside
the dual issues of the Fire Administration's arrogance and medical incompetence when it came to NYC EMS operations—what we have exposed now is likely to be the improper diversion of the EMS budget for the purchase of unauthorized and dangerous portable radios. This scandalous purchasing misconduct by FDNY goes a long way to explain why FDNY is bleeding the NYC EMS budget dry.
The Digital Radio Scandal: According to NYC Comptroller Hevesi's press release, this digital radio scandal dates back to 1999. Apparently FDNY has a standard three-year "needs replacement" contract in place for the purchase of replacement FDNY or EMS radios that had been badly damaged and/or lost or stolen. This contract would allow FDNY to purchase up to 750 replacement radios over the three year period at the approximate cost of $3 million dollars. Such a contract, if implemented correctly, is perfectly appropriate under competitive bidding regulations. This needs replacement contract was approved for the purpose of keeping sufficient portables in the field that could operate with the current FDNY and/or EMS analog radio systems.
Almost all of the radio systems currently in use by the New York City Government are analog radio systems. According to Motorola: "In an analog system, voice and signals are sent overthe-air in an unaltered form. Voice communications are heard in the same timetrame over which they were communicated. No compression or digitizing of voice occurs. Although digital has many benefits, analog systems remain the most popular communications system in existence. Motorola is one of the world's largest providers of reliable, analog conventional systems." Motorola goes on to say that: "In digital radio systems, such as with Motorola's ASTRO systems, voice is converted to a digital format before being sent over-the-air. When the digital system reaches the receiving radio, it is converted back to analog so that it is intelligible to the human ear." [See www.Motorola.com for more technical info on these digital capable XTS 3500 UHF Radios.]
But digital and/or trunked [combined radio frequencies] radio systems can pose a lot of technical problems in densely packed urban areas such as ours. Some years ago, EMS attempted to switch the NYC EMS Ambulances to 800 Mhz trunked analog radios. While this trunked 800 Mhz
system is still in use for non-emergency radio transmissions, the use of this "trunked" system for emergency radio transmissions was abandoned long ago. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the 480 Mhz UHF EMS analog systems transmit and/or penetrate better in this high rise packed City. An analog transmission is more likely to reach its destination even if the signal quality is scratchy. Because the digital signal has to be reprocessed by the receiving digital radio's computer, a "broken up" digital transmission is far more likely to deliver no successful transmission at all. By the way, NYPD uses the same kind of 480 Mhz analog radio system for their emergency dispatch operations in NYC. FDNY was utilizing VHP Radios in the 155 Mhz range until this latest digital radio fiasco. FDNY was forced to re-deploy these 155 Mhz radios to their Fire units in the field after the near fatal failure of these UHF Digital Radios. According to Comptroller Hevesi, FDNY has already dumped approximately $14 million dollars down the proverbial FDNY budgetary "black hole" for these defective digital radios. {Approximately 2,700 of these defective digital radios were returned to MotoroJa for repairs after they failed a submergibility test before they ever reached the fire units in the field.)
Hevesi reported that FDNY used a "bait and switch" tactic to purchase 3,818 of these faulty digital radios when Motorola announced that it was discontinuing some older model portables. But as Hevesi pointed out, there was simply no reason for FDNY to switch to untested and unproven digital radios when the same needs replacement contract had other proven Motorola analog portables still available. Hevesi also conducted a survey of nine Fire Departments in other major American cities {including Boston and Chicago} that revealed that these faulty portables were not in use in any of those Departments. [Von Essen had originally said that these digital portables were already in use in Boston and Chicago. Channel 4's Tim Minton showed that to be a lie early on in this scandal.] The Comptroller men called for what the Fire Unions have been calling for all along—proper testing and approval of FDNY's life-saving radio equipment in the future. Clearly the fact that the FDNY Administration would needlessly place our firefighter's lives in jeopardy was the last straw for our brothers and sisters in the fire unions. (These same faulty radios were about to be issued to NYC EMS units as well.}
These Digital Radios Are NOT Acceptable For Emergency Use in NYC: But Von Essen's FDNY Administration is not one to comply with such trifles as the laws of physics or competitive bidding. Obviously digital radios are only useful in a digital radio system. Even if we assume that the technical problems of urban digital radios can be overcome, digital radios serve no purpose unless the entire system can be successfully upgraded to be a dependable digital system. This is apparently where FDNY is getting the extra twenty million dollar cost for their illegal digital radio system. This digital upgrade could take years to accomplish and, if NYC EMS's trunked radio experience is credited, still deliver a radio system that is unacceptable for use in emergency situations. In fact, the Fire Department's Chiefs had already voiced the same types of garbled emergency transmission complaints that the EMS units voiced years ago concerning the trunked 800 Mhz system. According to documents obtained by Comptroller Hevesi, high-ranking Fire Officers had already complained that the technical problems (such as transmission delays and echoes} they found with these digital radios resulted in these digital radios being unacceptable for the all-important fire ground use.
These digital signal delays and other technical problems would also pose unacceptable radio difficulties for the NYPD when they have multiple units responding to a police emergency such as a crime in progress or other emergency call for police assistance. The same technical problems would pose unacceptable radio difficulties for NYC EMS units as well. As far as your writer can tell, FDNY was also planning to eliminate the twenty-year old practice of providing EMS crews with NYPD frequencies in their portables for emergency use when these faulty FDNY digital portables were put into use. The arbitrary removal of these police frequencies shows just how dangerous FDNY can be to the continued safety of the EMS crews in emergency situations. For example, your writer was assaulted in the back of my ambulance some years ago. I was able to get prompt assistance for myself and my partner by the use of the NYPD police radio. All too often, other NYC EMS crews have been shot at and/or have encountered other life-threatening dangers in the performance of their duties. Since NYPD has the best emergency radio coverage in this City, the EMS crews utilize the police radio as the fastest and most dependable way to obtain emergency assistance in this City.
Worse, Von Essen continues to defend the dangerous practice of keeping the EMS units in the dark by turning off the simulcast "mixer" in various parts of this City. Von Essen has publicly defended this "mixer off practice by saying that preventing EMS units from hearing each other's radio transmissions improves response time. Of course, this practice ignores the increased danger to the EMS units should they need emergency assistance and have trouble transmitting to the EMS Dispatcher. Since other units can't hear these transmissions, the EMS units are more likely to be "stepped on" during these and other routine radio transmissions, I have already criticized Von Essen and stated that Von Essen should go into some stinking drug location hallway with an EMS crew and then decide if he wanted his personal safety compromised by his "mixer off or no police radio policy.
This Portable Radio Scandal Has Likely Caused Significant Damage To The EMS Budget: The key question that remains unanswered is where did the FDNY Administration get all that unappropriated money to pour into their digital radio scandal? Well, as we in EMS all know, the only budget that has been ruthlessly cut by the FDNY Administration during these good economic times has been the EMS budget. Therefore, it is not a very big stretch to say that FDNY was raiding the NYC EMS Operations budget for funds to cover up this explosive radio scandal. This certainly could explain why FDNY has cut out such essential EMS functions as the EMS specialty Response Units [HAZTAC] and/or has downsized the EMS supervisory force. The current battle over reasonable accommodations for EMS EMTs and Paramedics could also be laid to FDNY raiding the EMS budget for more "budget modification" money. NYC EMS Paramedic units do not have pulse oximetry or certain other more expensive cardiac arrest medications that have recently been recommended by the American Heart Association. FDNY's "running down" our municipal EMS units could easily be another desperate raid on the EMS budget.
Given FDNY's desperate need to cover up their faulty radio budgetary hole, it is little wonder our NYC EMS Operations are in such deplorable condition under this FDNY Administration.
Von Essen Must Take Responsibility For This Purchasing Scandal And Resign forthwith; We are all fortunate that we did not lose a firefighter in this digital radio scandal. But we came all too close because of the gross misconduct of this City's Fire Administration. Although Hevesi has refrained from using the word corruption in the manipulation of this contract, Hevesi has already proven that FDNY committed numerous Purchase Order violations to spend $ 10 million that was not properly appropriated for these faulty radios. Hevesi has already requested that DOI iavestigate further. But we all know that any DOI investigation of this scandal is likely to he a non-starter in this Administration.
I for one have already strongly criticized Commissioner Von Essen for being a showman in handing out harsh punishments to "NYC EMS workers so that he would look good on the 6 o'clock news. At the same time Von Essen has attacked his critics saying that they have the responsibility to communicate the truth when they criticize the agency. Well, here we are Commissioner— you have been caught in repeated lies and gross misappropriation of City funds in this radio scandal. And whether or not this unconscionable misconduct is the tip of the iceberg or not under your Administration, a proper dose of your own medicine is clearly in order—you should resign your position of trust forthwith. Only then could the NYC Fire Department and NYC EMS that you have so badly damaged even start on the road to recovery.
Respectfully Submitted,
Richnrd Senior NYC EMS Paramedic P.O. Box 478 Bronx, N.Y.
10463
Pager: 1-800-225-0256, Pager ID # 80816
FIRE DEPARTMENT
To:
JohnMoran
Battalion Chief, S.O.C.
From:
James M. Rice
Lieutenant, S.O.C.
Date:
3/16/01
• Subj «{:
Problems With New Portable Radios
As pec our conversation here followj a summary of some of the problems with the new radios. This is in no way complete or comprehensive due to the very short time we have been exposed to this new "improvement". • ! .) The quality of the digital voice transmission is unacceptable for fireground use. It is nearly impossible to identify a particular firefighter's voice even in good conditions. This is not some luxury or inconvenience problem. It is vitally important to accomplish auch things as functional supervision. It is nearly impossible to discern voice inflections. There is a big difference between "stop" and "STOP!!!" It just does not come across "w the digital voice encoding. 2.) The delay time from key up to transmit is unacceptable for fireground use. These examples should suffice. Key mike - "STOP1" - transmission starts Key mike -'MAYDAY!1'--transmission starts 3.) The delay of the transmitted voice signal h unacceptable for fireground use. The echo effect caused by the time it lakes to eucode and decode the digital signal is muc= more Own just "odd" or different. While it would Dot be noticed in business or police uses where iodiyjdual radios arc operated in locations reniotejrojn. one another. On the fireground this distracting effect puts one more processing task on the firefighter's brain which should be engaged with more important endeavors. , J
Respectfully submitted,
Examined and forwarded: I have not had the opportunity to us<: the new handi-talkie* al an all hands or larger incident. However, at a water main break in lower Manhattan yesterday I did encounter some difficulty understanding transmissions on the new radios. Pethaps this difficulty will be alleviated as we gain experience and grow accustomed to the new radios. However. I do feel I.t Rice has valid concerns that should be brought to the administration's attention
Date
DEPARTMENT 10474 FAX 71 W91-7
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Chief Of Operations
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FIRE DEPARTMENT 64-04 SPRINGFIELD BLVD. FLUSHING, NY 113(54 TEL. 718 475-6253 FAX 718 279-3778
BATTALION 53
TO:
Daniel Nigro
Chief Of Operations
FROM:
Stephen Moro
Battalion Chief
DATE:
March 17, 2001
SUBJECT:
New Handle-Talkie Problems Division 14 Circular 3-26
While operating at Queens Box 8550 for a fire in the Afntrak tunnel between Queens and Manhattan at the East River several units experienced problems with the new handie talkie radios. This operation featured numerous handie talkies hi use on the same primary tactical channel in Queens and Manhattan interfering with routine transmissions from across the river from each other necessitating the utilization of the secondary tactical channel Some other problems encountered were: 1. Messages being cut off in the middle of transmissions. 2. Quality of transmission better with units on the other side of river than with units fifty feet or less away. 3. When in close proximity to other units a reverberation or echo is experienced. 4. At times there appeared to be a few seconds delay receiving messages which led to members stepping on each others transmissions.
Respectfully Submitted, Battalion Chief Battalion 53
Examined & Approved [~1 Disapproved Deputy Chief. Division 14
Group 20
n Date
Group #
FIRE DEPARTMENT > METRO TICK CE
BATTALION ONE
To:
Daniel A. Ni*ro
-
From.:
William P. Blalch
Subject:
New HT and MD! Prototype Problems
B>te:
March 18. 20QI
Chiefc!1 Operations Battalion Chief, Bn. i
The attached sheets list some problem* that Battalion 1 his experienced with the new HT$ sod the MDI apparatus touch screen prototype. Respectfully Submitted:
William ?.Biaich BC,BN.-l,Gv. 19
si-.-e, P*-IG Examined & Forwarded: _
Deputy Chief: Division I /
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March 29,1983
PILOT PROGRAMS - EQUIPMENT/APPARATUS
1.
INTRODUCTION The Department's effort to improve safety, efficiency and operating procedures involves the testing and/or pilot programming of new equipment on an extensive and on-going basis. In many cases, except for the firefighters in the units immediately concerned, the members of the Department are unaware of this effort.
2.
OBJECTIVE The purpose of this All Units Circular is to insure that information about new equipment placed in the field for pilot testing is available to all members of the Department in the event that their operations might involve or be concerned with these programs. This Ail Units Circular will also make members aware of the scope of the Department's efforts to obtain the best and safest equipment.
3.
IMPLEMENTATION 3.1
This All Units Circular will be the base document to which addenda will be added for each new pilot program that is introduced into the field.
3.2
The addenda will be numbered consecutively.
3.3
When a pilot program proves an item is successful and it is adopted for use, the addendum will be revoked and the standard documentation will be issued. If the items fail to be successful or useful the addendum will be revoked on a Department Order.
3.4
Periodically an index of current addenda will be issued by the Bureau of Operations.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
. Li J
September 1,2000
KEVLAR SEARCH ROPE
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Kevlar Search Rope
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
September 1,2000
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
September 1,2001
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT: A lightweight Kevlar search rope, 200' long, capable of withstanding high heat. Rope is stored in a highly visible yellow nylon carrying case.
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
6.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM:
Ladder 4, Squad 288, and Rescue 3
To assure rapid tangle free deployment of search rope. 7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
Research & Development
Interim reports due at three-month intervals. R&D Fax (718) 349-1960
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
ft £ I?
. Z
April 3, 2000
CAIRNS "VIPER" THERMAL IMAGING CAMERA
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Cairns "Viper" Thermal Imaging Camera
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
April 3, 2000
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
October 3, 2000
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT: The Caims "Viper" Thermal Imaging Camera allows the user to see objects clearly through smoke and darkness. By looking through the camera, firefighters can spot unseen obstacles, locate victims, and detect the seat and spread of fire. Rescue Company 1 and Squad 270
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
6.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM: Use of the Cairns "Viper" Thermal Imaging Camera will enhance the search and rescue capabilities of the FDNY. The camera is lightweight and portable, not attached to member's equipment and thus it is not restricted to use by only one member at an incident or operation.
7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
The Research and Development Unit.
The company involved is to forward a narrative report to the Research & Development unit with recommendations as to the value of this equipment in its operations. The Caims "Viper" Camera shall be used for drills and any other operations that the Company Commander determines are suitable.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
Rev. 4/25/00
A.U.C. 273 AUUtyNU'UiYl ff
October 25,2000
GLO TEK 75' LIGHTWEIGHT HOSE
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Lightweight 214" hose
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
October 25, 2000
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
April 15, 2001
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT:
A new type lightweight 2Vz inch, 75 foot hose (32 Ibs. with butts). This new hose is 7 Ibs. lighter than our current 2l/z inch, 50 foot hose (39 Ibs. with butts). It is designed to reduce kinks, has a reflective stripe on each length for recognition, and is flame resistant. Engine Company 23
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
6.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM:
Less fatigue to members and less chance of kinking. 7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
The Research and Development Unit.
Reports shall be forwarded to R-&D whenever this hose is stretched. R&D Fax # (718) 349-1960.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
A.U.C. 273 ADDENDUM # 289 January 2,2001
VINDICATOR NOZZLE
1.
TITLE OF PROGRAM:
Vindicator Nozzle
2.
DATE TO BE IMPLEMENTED:
January 15, 2001
3.
DATE TO BE TERMINATED:
July 15, 2001
4.
DESCRIPTION/USE OF EQUIPMENT:
New type solid bore nozzle.
5.
PARTICIPATING UNITS:
Engine Companies 23, 42, 65, 69, 92, 93, 249,255, 275, and 283.
OBJECTIVE/ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF PROGRAM: More gallons per minute on the fire, easier maneuverability, and less fatigue to firefighters. 7.
CONTROL UNIT:
8.
SPECIAL MATTERS:
The Research and Development Unit
Evaluations shall be faxed to R&D whenever this nozzle is used at any operation. R&D Fax #(718) 349-1960.
BY ORDER OF THE FIRE COMMISSIONER AND THE CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT
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