Northern Ireland Reconciliation: Alliance's Role

University of Dublin Trinity College Irish School of Ecumenics

The Contribution of The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland to Reconciliation By Brian Robert Eggins This dissertation has been submitted for the degree of Master in Philosophy (Reconciliation Studies) University of Dublin September 2003

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Declaration I certify that this dissertation, submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of M. Phil. (Reconciliation Studies), has not been submitted for a degree at any other university and that it is entirely my own work. I agree that the library may lend or copy the dissertation upon request.

Signed

Date

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Acknowledgements

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I would like to thank Dr. Joe Liechty for supervising this dissertation and for introducing me to the (for me) novel fields of social science, combined with theology and history required for Reconciliation Studies. I am also grateful to the other academic staff at ISE, David Tombs and Cecelia Clegg, and the staff who led our 2002 Summer School in Dublin, Professor John D’Arcy May, Wilhelm Verwoerd and others and inspired us so much in this diverse field. The other students on this course too were vital to the inspiration, growth and maturing in relationships developed on the course. Thanks too to the administrative staff at ISE, particularly Caroline and Karen for their cheerful help and encouragement. Thanks to Chris brown and the staff at the Linen Hall Library for their assistance. I want to give particular thanks to Allan Leonard in the Alliance Party for giving me a copy of his M.A. thesis and for discussions with him about our work. Thanks also to Stephen Farry, Steven Alexander and other staff at Alliance Party Headquarters for their help and encouragement. Then I must especially thank Alliance Party Deputy Leader Eileen Bell, former Deputy Leader Seamus Close, former Presidents Addie Morrow, Philip McGarry and Jim Hendron and Rev Timothy Kinahan for giving me their time to be interviewed. I also thank all those Alliance Candidates, Council members and ISE Reconciliation Studies students who answered my questionnaire. I particularly want to thank my wife Chrissie for her regular encouragement and for proof reading the dissertation.

Abstract

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The Contribution of The Alliance Party to Reconciliation By Brian Robert Eggins

The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland was established in 1970 as a moderate political party for people of any religion or none. This thesis considers the political achievements of the Party and its decline. It analyses the Party’s claim to be a nonsectarian party of reconciliation and examines the Party’s future role. A questionnaire of members of the Party’s Council and Assembly election candidates showed that people thought that the Party’s main achievements were in talks processes and in elected assemblies. The major causes for its decline were peoples’ commitment to their own community and loss of Catholic votes. The best future options were to combat sectarianism and cross-community work. Achievements include using balance of power positions to ensure councils share out top posts and involvement in talks and assemblies. Achievements of Alliance people in the wider community are briefly presented. The party’s declining electoral fortunes are discussed in the light of political events including its own changing policies and those of other parties. The entry of Sinn Féin into politics resulted in a declining share of Catholic votes. Other issues discussed are leadership and use of the media. The thesis shows that the Alliance Party is a party of reconciliation committed to combating sectarianism. A much higher proportion of Alliance people claim no religious commitment than in the community as a whole. A secular liberal tendency in the party has sectarian connotations. The Alliance Party must clarify its identity and accept the identities of the nationalist and unionist groups. The party should seek a ‘social transformation’ role to diminish sectarianism and increase cross-community activity. Alliance will have to accept the consociation model of democracy for the Assembly and establish its own political space.

Table of Contents

4

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 1. INTRODUCTION

1

a. QUESTIONNAIRE

5

2.1 Details of Questionnaire

5

2.2 Results of Questionnaire

7

b. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE PARTY

15

c. Use of balance of power positions

15

d. Spin-off achievements

18

v. Fair employment vi. Integrated education

18 19

vii. Community Relations Council

20

viii. European influence

20

ix. Honour and awards

21

j. Involvement in talks processes

21

k. Contribution to elected assemblies and conventions

28

l. THE DECLINE OF THE ALLIANCE PARTY

32

m. Decline in votes

32

n. Westminster representation

36

o. Leadership problems

37

p. Too middle class, poor appeal in nationalist areas

39

q. Ambivalence of and changes in Unionist Party Policies and Alliance Party Policies. r. Poor media presentation.

40 43

s. RECONCILIATION AND SECTARIANISM IN THE ALLIANCE PARTY

47 5

t. Alliance as the Party of Reconciliation

47

u. Party principles and policies regarding sectarianism

52

v. Religious attitudes in the Alliance Party

56

w. THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE ALLIANCE PARTY

61

x. Introduction

61

y. Ethnic and etatic identities

61

6.3

Combating sectarianism

70

6.4 Cross-community politics 6.5 A future role in the Assembly

71 74

CONCLUSION

76

BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX 5. Alliance Party Principles 6. Chronology of Alliance Party 7. Party Leaders 8. Assembly/Convention/Negotiating Forum Members 9. Some mayors and deputy mayors

Glossary AIA AP (APNI)

-

Anglo-Irish Agreement Alliance Party of Northern Ireland = Alliance Party

6

AV CRC DL DUP ELDR FEA FEC FF FG GB GFA IRA LD L’Derry MLA NILP NIO NIWC OBE PD PR PSNI PUP RUC SDLP SF STV UDA UDP UK UUP UVF UWC WP

-

Alternative Vote Community Relations Council Democratic Left Democratic Unionist Party European Association of Liberal and Democratic Parties Fair Employment Agency Fair Employment Commission Fianna Fail Fine Gael Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) Good Friday Agreement = Belfast Agreement = the Agreement Irish Republican Army Liberal Democrats Derry/Londonderry Member of the Legislative Assembly Northern Ireland Labour Party Northern Ireland Office Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition Order of the British Empire Progressive Democrats Proportional Representation Police Service of Northern Ireland Progressive Unionist Party – linked to UVF Royal Ulster Constabulary Social Democratic and Labour Party Sinn Féin – linked to IRA Single Transferable Vote Ulster Defence Association Ulster Democratic Party – linked to UDA United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Ulster Unionist Party Ulster Volunteer Force Ulster Workers Council Workers Party

Chapter 1. Introduction The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) (henceforth referred to as the Alliance Party) was founded in 1970 to be a non-sectarian political party of reconciliation in Northern Ireland1. It aimed to attract moderates of any religious persuasion or none.

1

Sydney Elliott and William D. Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1968 – 2000 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001),

7

Following Northern Irish Prime Minister Terence O’Neill’s speech ‘Ulster at the cross-roads’ in 1968, two new movements grew up. One was the Civil Rights movement and the other was the New Ulster Movement (NUM). The Alliance party was formed in 1970 from the NUM. From the beginning it was guided by a set of principles 2. The first concerned a commitment to the union and to a devolved government. The second says that ‘Our primary objective is to heal the bitter divisions in our community by ensuring’: - Equality, elimination of discrimination, injustice and prejudice, ‘Highest standards of democracy’ and ‘complete and effective participation in government by all people3. The third principle relates to ‘economic dogma’ and the fourth to ‘universal respect for the law. The first party leader was Phelim O’Neill MP, a moderate unionist. Two more Stormont MPs, unionist Bertie McConnell and nationalist Tom Gormley joined the party. Oliver Napier took over as party leader in 1972, following prorogation of the Stormont Parliament and the institution of direct rule from Westminster. Members of the party have always participated in meetings with British and Irish government ministers and the various talks processes. The first electoral opportunities were the Local Government and the Assembly elections of 1973. Sixty-three Alliance councillors were elected to local councils, and eight to the Assembly. Oliver Napier along with Bob Cooper became ministers in the short-lived power-sharing Assembly of 1973 – 1974.

2

‘Statement of Principles upon which the Alliance Party was founded on April 21 1970’ in Constitution and Rules, 1970, 20. 3 The full text is shown in the Appendix.

8

The party participated in all the subsequent elections at local, Assembly, Westminster and European level, though they were unsuccessful in the Westminster and European elections. Through holding the balance of power Alliance was able to exert its influence to obtain top posts on many local councils and to encourage them to share responsibilities among the parties represented. For example in 1975, 1976 and 1978 there were Alliance Mayors of Derry, North Down and Belfast respectively and many more subsequently. The party’s highest success were the local government elections of 1977, when they won 70 seats and the 1982 Assembly at which they had ten representatives. Then followed a general decline in fortunes, reaching a nadir of six Assembly seats in 1998 from 6.5 per cent of votes and 28 local council seats with 5.2 per cent of the votes in 2001. However, like the Liberals/Liberal Democrats in Great Britain, their political influence far outweighed their electoral strength. Many of the ideas from their 1988 policy document Governing with Consent were used in the Good Friday Agreement. Unfortunately Alliance representatives were so active striving for the success of the Agreement that they did not achieve a good ‘political space’ for themselves in the Assembly. No substantial book has been published about the Alliance Party, though several theses have been written. The earliest of these was Brian Wilson’s M.Sc. for Strathclyde University in 19754. Then in 1993 Erwann Bodilis wrote an M.A. thesis for Universite de Bretagne Occidentale5. More recently was Allan Leonard’s M.A. thesis for University College Dublin in

4

Brian Wilson, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland: A Study of a Bi-Confessional Party (MSc thesis, Strathclyde University, 1975). 5 Erwann Bodilis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 1970 – 1993: Twenty Years of Comiat for Peace and Progress (MA thesis, Universite de Bretagne Occidentale, 1994).

9

19996. Maria Ericson wrote a Ph.D. thesis comparing the Northern Ireland situation with that in South Africa and made considerable reference to the Alliance Party7. There is an account of the Alliance Party and some of its principal activists in political analysts’ Elliott and Flackes Northern Ireland Political Directory8. Historians Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie’s Chronology of the Troubles 9 also records the main activities and includes many references to the involvement of the Alliance Party. The other main source of material is through the party itself. A party newspaper, Alliance News, has been published at regular intervals since 1970 (originally monthly, now approximately quarterly). I have also had access to a number of internal party documents. I myself have been an active member of the party since 1972. Thus much of the material in this thesis is based on my own ‘Participant-Observation Studies’ as John Whyte 10 calls them. I have served on the party Council and Executive from time to time as well as other committees. Wherever possible I have confirmed my observations by reference to published historical material and from the Alliance Party’s own publications and documents. I have carried out a short questionnaire addressing the main issues of this thesis, presented in chapter 2 and referred to throughout the rest of the work. In addition I have interviewed a number of key activists in the party. 6

Allan Leonard, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society (MA thesis, University College Dublin, 1999). 7 Maria Ericson, Reconciliation and the Search for a Shared Moral Landscape – an Exploration based upon a study of Northern Ireland and South Africa, (PhD thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 2001). 8 Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory. 9 Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland 1968 – 1999: A Chronology of the Troubles (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 1999). 10 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 12.

10

The aim of this dissertation is to examine the performance of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland since its foundation in 1970 with regard to its claim to be anti-sectarian and the ‘party of reconciliation’. I will consider the achievements of the Alliance Party in chapter 3 and show how the Party has contributed to the formation of power–sharing Assemblies and other crosscommunity developments. Internal and external reasons for its decline will be addressed in chapter 4. The claim of the party to be reconciling and nonsectarian and its attitude to religion will be analysed in chapter 5, using the results of an internal questionnaire from 199811, my new questionnaire and selected interviews. Finally I will assess the possible future roles for the Alliance Party in chapter 6. A background chronology of the Alliance Party from 1969 to 2003 is given in the appendix, together with the text of the Party Principles and a list of party leaders and some mayors and council chairs.

Chapter 1. Introduction The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) (henceforth referred to as the Alliance Party) was founded in 1970 to be a non-sectarian political party

11

Members Questionnaire – Alliance Party Council Report 1998.

11

of reconciliation in Northern Ireland12. It aimed to attract moderates of any religious persuasion or none. Following Northern Irish Prime Minister Terence O’Neill’s speech ‘Ulster at the cross-roads’ in 1968, two new movements grew up. One was the Civil Rights movement and the other was the New Ulster Movement (NUM). The Alliance party was formed in 1970 from the NUM. From the beginning it was guided by a set of principles13. The first concerned a commitment to the union and to a devolved government. The second says that ‘Our primary objective is to heal the bitter divisions in our community by ensuring’: - Equality, elimination of discrimination, injustice and prejudice, ‘Highest standards of democracy’ and ‘complete and effective participation in government by all people14. The third principle relates to ‘economic dogma’ and the fourth to ‘universal respect for the law. The first party leader was Phelim O’Neill MP, a moderate unionist. Two more Stormont MPs, unionist Bertie McConnell and nationalist Tom Gormley joined the party. Oliver Napier took over as party leader in 1972, following prorogation of the Stormont Parliament and the institution of direct rule from Westminster. Members of the party have always participated in meetings with British and Irish government ministers and the various talks processes. The first electoral opportunities were the Local Government and the Assembly elections of 1973. Sixty-three Alliance councillors were elected to local councils, and eight to the Assembly. Oliver Napier along with Bob 12

Sydney Elliott and William D. Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1968 – 2000 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001), 13 ‘Statement of Principles upon which the Alliance Party was founded on April 21 1970’ in Constitution and Rules, 1970, 20. 14 The full text is shown in the Appendix.

12

Cooper became ministers in the short-lived power-sharing Assembly of 1973 – 1974. The party participated in all the subsequent elections at local, Assembly, Westminster and European level, though they were unsuccessful in the Westminster and European elections. Through holding the balance of power Alliance was able to exert its influence to obtain top posts on many local councils and to encourage them to share responsibilities among the parties represented. For example in 1975, 1976 and 1978 there were Alliance Mayors of Derry, North Down and Belfast respectively and many more subsequently. The party’s highest success were the local government elections of 1977, when they won 70 seats and the 1982 Assembly at which they had ten representatives. Then followed a general decline in fortunes, reaching a nadir of six Assembly seats in 1998 from 6.5 per cent of votes and 28 local council seats with 5.2 per cent of the votes in 2001. However, like the Liberals/Liberal Democrats in Great Britain, their political influence far outweighed their electoral strength. Many of the ideas from their 1988 policy document Governing with Consent were used in the Good Friday Agreement. Unfortunately Alliance representatives were so active striving for the success of the Agreement that they did not achieve a good ‘political space’ for themselves in the Assembly. No substantial book has been published about the Alliance Party, though several theses have been written. The earliest of these was Brian Wilson’s M.Sc. for Strathclyde University in 197515. Then in 1993 Erwann

15

Brian Wilson, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland: A Study of a Bi-Confessional Party (MSc thesis, Strathclyde University, 1975).

13

Bodilis wrote an M.A. thesis for Universite de Bretagne Occidentale16. More recently was Allan Leonard’s M.A. thesis for University College Dublin in 199917. Maria Ericson wrote a Ph.D. thesis in 2001 comparing the Northern Ireland situation with that in South Africa and made considerable reference to the Alliance Party18. There is an account of the Alliance Party and some of its principal activists in political analysts’ Elliott and Flackes Northern Ireland Political Directory19. Historians Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie’s Chronology of the Troubles 20 also records the main activities and includes many references to the involvement of the Alliance Party. The other main source of material is through the party itself. A party newspaper, Alliance News, has been published at regular intervals since 1970 (originally monthly, now approximately quarterly). I have also had access to a number of internal party documents. I myself have been an active member of the party since 1972. Thus much of the material in this thesis is based on my own ‘Participant-Observation Studies’ as John Whyte21 calls them. I have served on the party Council and Executive from time to time as well as other committees. Wherever possible I have confirmed my observations by reference to published historical material and from the Alliance Party’s own publications and documents.

16

Erwann Bodilis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 1970 – 1993: Twenty Years of Comiat for Peace and Progress (MA thesis, Universite de Bretagne Occidentale, 1994). 17 Allan Leonard, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society (MA thesis, University College Dublin, 1999). 18 Maria Ericson, Reconciliation and the Search for a Shared Moral Landscape – an Exploration based upon a study of Northern Ireland and South Africa, (PhD thesis, Lund University, Sweden, 2001). 19 Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory. 20 Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland 1968 – 1999: A Chronology of the Troubles (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 1999). 21 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 12.

14

I have carried out a short questionnaire addressing the main issues of this thesis, presented in chapter 2 and referred to throughout the rest of the work. In addition I have interviewed a number of key activists in the party. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the performance of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland since its foundation in 1970 with regard to its claim to be anti-sectarian and the ‘party of reconciliation’. I will consider the achievements of the Alliance Party in chapter 3 and show how the Party has contributed to the formation of power–sharing Assemblies and other crosscommunity developments. Internal and external reasons for its decline will be addressed in chapter 4. The claim of the party to be reconciling and nonsectarian and its attitude to religion will be analysed in chapter 5, using the results of an internal questionnaire from 199822, my new questionnaire and selected interviews. Finally I will assess the possible future roles for the Alliance Party in chapter 6. A background chronology of the Alliance Party from 1969 to 2003 is given in the appendix, together with the text of the Party Principles and a list of party leaders and some mayors and council chairs.

22

Members Questionnaire – Alliance Party Council Report 1998.

15

Chapter 2. Questionnaire 2.1 Details of the questionnaire The aim of the questionnaire was first to determine the spread of religious attitudes among Alliance Party members, then to find out those members’ ideas about the achievements, failings and future of the Party. The questionnaire was organised in four stages. A pilot test (QE1) was carried out with one individual Alliance Party member. This appeared satisfactory so it was repeated with the 21 Alliance Party candidates for the postponed Assembly Elections. This time most of the respondents did not complete the questionnaire in the manner intended. The Questionnaire was then modified (QE2) using response criteria from a previous Alliance Party Questionnaire23. This was distributed to Alliance Party Council members at a Council meeting. This Questionnaire was also distributed to members of the Irish School of Ecumenics (ISE) Reconciliation Studies Class 2003, who would not necessarily be Alliance Party members, but would be sympathetic. This time the responses did fit the intention. The questionnaire was in four parts. There was an initial identifier, based on that used by Bodilis24 enquiring about things such as religious allegiance, age, occupation and involvement in the Alliance Party (Q0). The next question (Q1) asked about the achievements of the Alliance Party, the third about the reasons for its relative decline of the party in recent years (Q2), and the final part asked where the party should go now (Q3). Respondents were given a number of choices for each of questions Q1 – Q3, and were asked to 23

Alliance party, Members Questionnaire - Council Report, 1998. Erwann Bodilis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 1970 – 1993: Twenty Years of Comiat for Peace and progress (MA thesis: Universite de Bretagne Occidentale, 1994), 99. 24

16

grade each option on a scale of 1 to 5. Space was given for people to write in their own additional points and comments. Results from the questionnaire are shown in the Tables 2.2.2 (1 – 3). In all questionnaires the responses were converted into numerical scores. In QE2 the meaning of each number was made clearer thus: 1 = not at all; 2 = indifferent; 3 = agree a little; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree. From these indications the following scoring was applied: Table 2.1.1 Scoring for QE2 responses Response 1 2 3 4 5

Score -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5

In order to make the QE1 responses, for which most people listed the options in rank order of preference, comparable with those for QE2 the following scores were applied:

Table 2.1.2 Scoring for QE1 responses. Response

Score

1

1.5

2

1.5

17

3

1

4

1

5

1

6+

0.5

The number of respondents was divided into the total score for each question in each section and then the rank order for each was noted. Because of the variations in the scoring system between candidates and others, and the sample size, the relative rank orders are probably of more significance, and are more meaningful than the actual scores. A further set of Tables 2.2.3 (1 – 3) shows the responses divided between Protestants (P), Catholics(C) and no religion (N). 2.2 Discussion of results Among both the candidates and the council members the highest scores were firstly for (1f) – ‘involvement in talks processes’ and secondly (1e) – ‘involvement in assemblies’ and thirdly (1d) – ‘contributions to Northern Ireland policies’. These points were also highly rated by ISE students, with (1d) being ranked first. To some extent these items overlap and are dependent on each other. Unlike some other parties, Alliance has always been prepared to participate in discussions with other parties, has always participated in Assemblies and would appear to have made significant contributions way above the party strength in those Assemblies. Thus effectiveness in the talks

18

processes implies a major contribution to policies, and success in the Assemblies implies helping to carry out those policies. Alliance Councillors being made mayor, chair or deputy mayor or chair of District Councils (1b), rates only seventh in the questionnaire. However these items are easy to quantify and can often be related to, and be seen to result from balance of power positions (1c) in Local Councils. In discussion with Allan Leonard25, it might be that many people in the party are not aware of the significance of these successes. Outsiders are more aware of them. The importance of personal achievements by individuals (1g), described in Chapter 3, is well appreciated by the Candidates and by ISE students, but less so by the Council members. Involvement with the Liberal democrats and the European Liberal grouping ELDR receives a fairly low rating by Council members and even lower by ISE students though higher among Candidates, perhaps reflecting the parochialism of Northern Ireland politics. The issues of the Alliance Party trying to help the Unionists, in (1i) by re-designating as ‘unionist’ to help re-elect Trimble and Mallon as First and Deputy First Ministers and by refraining from standing in certain seats in the Westminster General Election of 2001 promoted a range of reactions, in that there were several negative responses to both these items. Nevertheless, despite the negative scores, both events were given favourable ratings. (1i) received the highest rating of fourth among the Council members and first equal among ISE students, (the QE1 questionnaire for candidates did not include questions (1i) or (1j)). Question (1j), declining to stand in certain seats was less well thought of, despite the fact that in two cases the desired result was 25

Allan Leonard, private discussion, 9th June 2003.

19

obtained. In North Down Alliance votes lent to UUP facilitated the defeat of Bob McCartney (UKU) to be replaced by Silvia Hermon (UUP). Similarly in Upper Bann Alliance votes lent to David Trimble undoubtedly helped him to avoid defeat by the DUP candidate26. On item (1i) there were 5 votes against, which if removed would have brought this item up to third position from fourth. Item (1j) was less favoured and even ignoring the four negative responses; it is only brought up from ninth to eighth position. When we consider the reasons for Alliance Party failure or declining success, two items are outstanding. Way above everything else is given (2j) –‘people’s loyalty to their own community’. This scored 1.2 with Council members and 1.63 with Candidates. ISE students ranked this item second (0.8). Next was (2c) - ‘poor appeal in nationalist areas, decline in vote’. This scored 0.82 with members and 1.13 with Candidates, and ranked fourth equal with ISE students (0.8). It is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The third item was (1e) – ‘failure to obtain a Westminster seat’ (also ranked third by ISE students). A major reason for this was the voting system of Westminster, first past the post, as discussed in Chapter 4, yet (2d)- ‘problems of voting systems’ received a low response (eighth and ninth and ninth equal). The emergence of the Women’s Coalition received a moderate response fourth and fifth (ninth equal for ISE students). This only applied in the 1998 Assembly election in which the Women’s Coalition obtained two seats; one in North

26

Martin Melaugh and Fionnuala McKenna and, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rw2001.htp accessed on 10 June 2003.

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Down where Alliance usually obtained two seats27 and in one in South Belfast where Alliance should have at least one seat, sometimes two28. Poor media presentation came a qualified fourth among members but only ninth among candidates. This may have been due to different interpretations of the question. Many members, especially candidates, would be well aware of the high quality and high frequency of preparation of press releases29, but the delivery by the media is often grudging as discussed in Chapter 4. Members, not involved in these preparations and outsiders such as the ISE Students, who ranked this item first, would mainly see the results from observing the delivery by the media. The effects of Alliance’s support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), which was universally vilified by all unionist parties, did not receive a very high rating – fourth among candidates, sixth among members and eighth for ISE students. Very few blamed leadership and middle class appeal, though some blamed changes in UUP policies. The future role of the Alliance Party comes through very clearly. No one thinks that APNI’s work is completed despite Sir Oliver Napier’s reported comment that the Agreement ‘was everything I had worked for’ 30. The overwhelming majority of both candidates and members give first choice to (3c) – ‘Combating sectarianism’ and a close second to (3b) – ‘cross-community politics’. The next priority is to ‘revise the operation of the assembly and 27

McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/ election/as1998.http, accessed 30 May 2003. 28 Ibid. 29 For example Deputy Leader, Eileen Bell deposited 115 press releases in the Alliance Box No. 4 in the Linenhall Library, ‘Northern Ireland Political Collection’. 30 Oliver Napier quoted in Allan Leonard, MA thesis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society, (Dublin: University College Dublin, 1999), 49.

21

Executive’, followed by (3h) – ‘being a stand alone third party’. Relatively low priority was given to (3 g) – ‘acting as a ‘bridge party’ between the other parties’, which is strange in view of the high preference for ‘cross-community politics’. These last two options were included in view of Allan Leonard’s conclusion to his thesis31. No one suggests merging with other anti-sectarian centre parties, though there is firm support for improving relations with the Women’s Coalition. The answers were also analysed by religion of respondent, P = protestant, C = Catholic and N = None. These data are shown in Table 2.2.3 (1 – 3) for each of the three sets of questions. The only striking variation is that Protestants gave much more emphasis to the achievement of ‘mayoralties etc’ (score 0.89 rank 3=) than either Catholics (0.57 rank 7) or None (0.45 rank 9). However for ‘Balance of power achievements’ (which in my analysis would often include mayoralties etc), the scores were the other way round. Protestants had a score of 0.77 (rank 6), whereas Catholics scored 1.5, (rank 1) and None scored 0.95 (rank 2). The other variations are probably not significant and are due to the sample size and normal variations.

Table 2.2.1 Q 0 Distribution by Religion Religion P Cof I P Pres. P Meth. P Other 31

Number 6 10 2 2

Ibid. 23 – 29.

22

Total P RC None

20 7 11

Table 2.2.2(1). Alliance Contributions to Reconciliation

Council Members 24 Candidates 9 Score

1a Electoral results 1b Mayors etc 1c Balance of Power Achievements 1d Contributions to Northern Ireland policies 1e Involvement in Assemblies 1f Involvement in various talks processes 1g Personal success of individuals 1h Involvement with Lib. Dem. and ELD 1i Changing designations of some MLAs to ‘U’ 1j Not standing in N Down Table 2.2.2(2).

Ranking

ISE Students 5

Score Ranking Score Ranking

0.438 0.667 0.813

10 7 3=

0.33 0.5 0.89

7 6 4

0.2 0.6 0.7

10 5= 3=

0.813

3=

1.

3

0.5

7=

1.063

2

1.11

2=

0.7

3=

1.104

1

1.4

2=

0.5

7

0.689

6

1.56

1

0.9

1

0.625

8

0.667

5

0.4

9

0.729

5

N/A

N/A

0.8

2

0.5

9

N/A

N/A

0.6

5=

Question 2 Problems in the Alliance Party Reasons for Decline in Council Members Candidates 8 ISE Students 5 25 Alliance Party Votes Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 0.32 10 0.625 4= 0.8 3= 2a Leadership problems 0.44 7 0.875 3 0.6 5 2b Appeal to middle class =

2c Poor appeal in nationalists areas 2d Problems of voting systems 2e Failure to obtain Westminster seat 2f Emergence of the Women’s Coalition

0.82

2

1.125

2

1

2

0.34

9

0.19

10

0.4

8

0.74

3

0.688

8

0.5

5=

0.58

5

0.56

6

0.15

10

23

2g Effect of change in UUP policies 2h Support for Anglo-Irish Agreement. 2i Poor Media Presentation 2j People’s loyalty to their own community

0.44

7

0.625

4=

0.5

6=

0.52

6

0.125

9

0.2

9

0.6

4

0.5

7

0.8

3

1.2

1

1.625

1

1.3

1

=

Table 2.2.2(3). Question 3 Future Role of the Alliance Party Future Roles of Council Candidates 8 ISE Students 4 Alliance Party Members 25 Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking -0.32 8 -0.12 8 0.2 6 3a None – APNI’s work is 5 completed 1.46 1 1 4 1.1 1 3b Cross-community politics 1.38 2 1.625 1 1 2 3c Combating sectarianism 0.6 5 0.438 6 0.8 3 3d Relationship with other (centre) parties 0.96 3 1.19 3 0.5 4 3e Revising the operation of the Assembly and Executive -0.16 7 0.19 7 0.1 7 3f Should merge with other anti-sectarian centre parties 0.52 6 0.5 5 0.3 5 3g Acting as a “bridge party” between the other parties 0.68 4 1.313 2 -0.2 8 3h Being a “stand alone third party” Table 2.2.3 (1). Q1 Achievements of the Alliance Party Alliance Contributions Protestants 17 Catholics 7 Non-religious to Reconciliation 10 Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 0.47 9 0.643 8 0.25 10 1a Electoral results 0.89 3= 0.571 7 0.45 9 1b Mayors etc 0.77 6 1.5 1 0.95 2= 1c Balance of Power Achievements 0.89 3= 0.928 3= 0.95 2= 1d Contributions to Northern Ireland policies 1.28 1= 1.357 2 1.1 1= 1e Involvement in Assemblies 1.28 1= 0.928 3= 0.7 6= 1f Involvement in various

24

talks processes 1g Personal success of individuals 1h Involvement with Lib. Dem. and ELD 1i Changing designations of some MLAs to ‘U’ 1j Not standing in N Down

0.81

5

0.714

5=

0.7

6=

0.44

10

0.714

5=

0.8

4=

0.62

7

0.714

5=

0.8

4=

0.56

8

0.0

10

0.65

8

Table 2.2.3 (2). Question 2 Problems in the Alliance Party Reasons for Decline in Protestants 14 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 2g 2h 2i 2j

Alliance Party Votes Leadership problems Appeal to middle class Poor appeal in nationalists areas Problems of voting systems Failure to obtain Westminster seat Emergence of the Women’s Coalition Effect of change in UUP policies Support for Anglo-Irish Agreement. Poor Media Presentation People’s loyalty to their own community

Catholics 6

Non-religious 10 Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 0.607 0.357 0.679

4 9 2=

0.75 0.83 1.33

4 3 1

0.35 0.8 1.2

9 6 2

0.25

10

0.17

9=

0.25

10

0.679

2=

0.33

6=

1.1

3

0.5

7=

0.33

6=

1.05

4

0.571

5=

0.25

8

0.45

8

0.5

7=

0.17

9

0.5

7

0.571 1.43

5= 1

0.58 1.0

5 2

0.85 1.4

5 1

Table 2.2.3 (3). Question 3 Future Role of the Alliance Party Future Roles of Alliance Protestants 15 Catholics 6 Non-religious Party 12 Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking -0.27 8 -0.33 8 0 7 3a None – APNI’s work is completed 1.53 1 1.5 2 1.71 1= 3b Cross-community politics 1.27 2 1.83 1 1.71 1= 3c Combating sectarianism 0.53 5 0.583 4= 0.583 6 3d Relationship with other (centre) parties 4 1.17 3 1.125 3 3e Revising the operation of 0.967

25

the Assembly and Executive 3f Should merge with other anti-sectarian centre parties 3g Acting as a “bridge party” between the other parties 3h Being a “stand alone third party”

0.233

7

0.17

7

-0.37 5

8

0.30

6

0.417

6

0.917

4

1.067

3

0.583

4=

0.625

5

Chapter 3. Contributions of the Alliance Party 3.1 Use of Balance of Power Despite the questionnaire results I consider that the political success of the Alliance Party has largely been through its use of ‘balance of power’ situations. This is not unusual in countries that have some form of proportional representation in their elections as in most European countries. From the beginning they had the advantage of a proportional representation system using the single transferable vote (STV). Thomas Hare invented this system32 in the 19th century. It was used in both the Irish

32

Electoral Reform Society, http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/ers/history.htm accessed on 26 May 2003

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Free State (now the Republic of Ireland) and in Northern Ireland immediately after partition in 1921 until 192933. After the British Government took over from Stormont in 1972 with ‘direct rule’, new electoral boundaries were established for local government with 26 District Councils. STV was reintroduced for all elections except for Westminster for which the first past the post system was retained as in the rest of the UK.34 At their first local government elections in 1973 the Alliance Party obtained 13.7 per cent of the vote and won 63 local government seats35. In L’Derry Alliance won four seats and held the balance of power between the unionists and the nationalists (mainly SDLP), and thus Alliance was able to secure the post of the first non-unionist Mayor of L’Derry, Councillor, Ivor Canavan in 1975 36. Subsequently the nationalists obtained an overall majority in L’Derry, and at the 1977 elections Alliance only had two Council seats, both of which they lost in 1981 37. However the tradition of sharing power, initiated by Alliance, has continued in Derry, the top two posts being rotated between all the parties including Sinn Fein and the Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)38. Similarly in 1974 Alliance Councillor John Hadden was elected as Chair of Omagh District Council, as the three Alliance Councillors held the balance of power39, in 1975 Roy Hawthorne became Chair of Castlereagh40, former Stormont MP Tom Gormley became Vice-Chair of Strabane41 and in 1976 the blind former 33

J. Knight and N. Baxter-Moore, Northern Ireland Elections of the Twenties (The Arthur McDougal Fund, 1972), 13 – 15. 34 Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland 1968 – 1999 - A Chronology of the Troubles (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 1999), 48 – 51, 63. 35 Ibid. 64. 36 Alliance News, 5 (6) (July 1975), 6. 37 Sidney Elliot and William D Flackes, “Election Results” in Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1968 – 2000, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001), 523 – 604. 38 Colin Knox and Padraic Quirk, ‘’Responsibility Sharing’ in Northern Ireland Local Government’, http://wwww.ccruni.gov.uk/research/uu/knox94.htm 39 Alliance News, 4 (10) (July 1974), 4. 40 Ibid., (July 1975), 1. 41 Ibid.

27

Stormont MP Bertie McConnell became Mayor of North Down Council42. (A table of other mayoral and similar posts achieved by Alliance Councillors is given in the Appendix). The quality of the Alliance Party candidates was generally much higher than that of other parties43 – with some notable exceptions especially in the SDLP. Thus the good councillors quickly established a personal reputation, ensuring their reelection, often coming top of the poll. In 1977 the Alliance vote for local government increased to 14.4 per cent giving them 70 seats, including thirteen on Belfast City Council44. This was not quite a balance of power position, but they were able to have David Cook elected as first non-unionist Lord Mayor of Belfast City in 197845. Although the Alliance vote subsequently declined, the nationalist vote increased over the years, so that in 1997 Alliance again held the balance of power on Belfast City Council.46 The unionists were totally against any form of power sharing with nationalists, particularly Sinn Fein, but Alliance were able to use their balance of power to elect the first nationalist Lord Mayor for Belfast, Alban McGuinness of SDLP47, then another Alliance Lord Mayor, David Alderdice48. They also forced through a motion for the proportional distribution of committee chair and deputy chairs, against the opposition of the unionists49

42

Ibid. (June 1976), 7. This can be seen in the ‘level of education’ and ‘occupational status’ tables in Moxon-Browne’s survey comparing Alliance Party supporters with all respondents in Edward Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1983), 47. 44 Martin McKenna and Fionnula Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rd1977.htm accessed on 26 May 2003. 45 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 129. 46 McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/rd1997 accessed on 26 May 2003. 47 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 342. 48 Ibid. 366. 49 Alliance News, (May/August 1999), 10. 43

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In 2001 the number of Alliance Councillors on Belfast City Council was reduced to three, but they still held the balance of power50. There was much pressure on them to elect the first Sinn Fein Lord Mayor as Sinn Fein were now the largest party on the council51. They decided not to do this in 2001, but by 2002 the IRA had made two acts of decommissioning,52 so Alliance decided to support Alex Maskey of Sinn Fein for Lord Mayor (along with SDLP of course) 53. The unionists tried not to recognise this appointment and refused to appoint a unionist deputy mayor. In June 2003 Alliance’s slim balance of power was used again to elect SDLP’s Martin Morgan as Lord Mayor against both UUP and DUP candidates. Margaret Crooks of the UUP was elected as deputy Mayor with the votes of the AP, SDLP, SF and UUP.54 Alliance has never been very close to having a candidate elected to Westminster (because there is no PR system), though they regularly contest them55. This point is discussed further in Chapter 4. In 2001 the pro-Agreement UUP were under much pressure from DUP for Westminster seats. Indeed they lost two seats to DUP and one to Sinn Fein. So Alliance decided not to put up a candidate in North Down, one of its better areas56. The effect was that Lady Silvia Herman (wife of former chief constable, Sir John Herman), won the seat from sitting MP Robert McCartney, leader of the UK Unionists and opposed to the Belfast Agreement. In addition they refrained from standing in Upper Bann against First Minister David Trimble, MP, leader of the

50

McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rd2001.htm accessed on 26 May 2003. 51 Philip McGarry thought that Alliance should have acted sooner to facilitate a Sinn Fein Lord Mayor, Interview, 20 June 2003. 52 McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/ira231001.htm accessed on 26 May 2003 53 ‘Alliance Backs Sinn Fein for Lord Mayor’, Alliance News, (May/June 2000), 2 and ‘Maskey is Lord Mayor’, Alliance News, (May/August 2002), 4 – 5. 54 Barry McCaffrey, Irish News, (3 June 2003), 1. 55 See further analysis in Chapter 4. 56 ‘Election Results’, Alliance News, (May/August 2001), 6 – 7.

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UUP57. Trimble retained his seat, which he might have lost, if Alliance had not “lent” him their votes58. The dramatic intervention of Alliance MLAs in the Assembly to assist the reelection of the first and Deputy First Ministers in November 2001 could be regarded as an achievement or as a failure to seize an opportunity. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

3.2 Spin-off achievements. Personal achievements of individual Alliance Party members was most highly rated by those outside the Party, that is ISE students and by Candidates, but less so (sixth) by Council members. 3.2.1 Fair Employment. Despite relatively modest electoral achievements, the quality and fairness of many leading Alliance Party members meant that they were selected to carry out prominent cross-community tasks in Northern Ireland. The earliest of these was the appointment of Bob Cooper to be head of the newly formed Fair Employment Agency in 197659 and subsequently in 1990 he continued to head the Fair Employment Commission60.

3.2.2 Integrated Education61. The Catholic Church had its own school system to which all Catholic parents were expected to send their children. The state school system thus became the Protestant system, by default. There was considerable interest in establishing an integrated system to which both Catholics and Protestants could 57

Ibid. Ibid. Alliance also stood down in North Belfast, Newry and Mourne and West Tyrone to assist proAgreement candidates who were not however elected. 59 Sidney Elliott and William D. Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1968 – 2000 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001), 216. 60 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of Northern Ireland, 216. 61 Cecil Linehan, ‘Integrated Education: A Historical Perspective’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/northernireland/learning/history/stateapart/agreement/reconciliation/support/rec2 _CO31.shtm accessed on 26 August 2003. 58

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attend, particularly among Alliance Party members. There were several articles on the subject in Alliance News in 197362. An article in Alliance 1974 describes a de facto integrated school in Sion Mills, which had 90 per cent, support across the community63. A movement was set up called ‘All Children Together’ 64 to work for this aim. Many Alliance Party members were involved in this movement, in particular Cecilia Linehan and Muriel Prichard65. There was considerable objection to this from both the Protestant and the Catholic Churches. Lord Henry Dunleath was a local councillor for North Down, and was elected to the Assembly in 1973, and the Convention in 1975. He put a bill through the House of Lords to facilitate the establishment of integrated schools in 197766. As a result Lagan College, the first integrated secondary school, was established in 198167. Integrated education is popular with the general public and the demand outstrips the supply. Alliance President Colm Cavanagh is a member of the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education and recently reported that government finance is now available for Strangford Integrated College and Oakwood Integrated primary School68. He also reported that The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition and the Progressive Unionist Party (linked to the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer Force) now officially support integrated education 69. There are now 35 integrated schools in Northern Ireland and the Alliance Party would like to see 10% of children in integrated schools by 201070.

62

Bill Barbour, “Integrated Education”, Alliance, September 1973, 7; follow up articles in October p. 7 and a letter from Cecilia Linehan about a workshop on integrated education in November p.2. 63 Alliance News (August 1974), 2. 64 Eric Gallagher and Stanley Worrall, Christians in Ulster 1968 – 1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 162 65 Patricia Mallon interviewed on 30 May 2003. 66 Gallagher and Worrall, Christians in Ulster, 162 and Alliance News, (June 1977), 8. 67 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the troubles, 156. 68 Colm Cavanagh, Alliance News, (January/February 1999), 10. 69 Colm Cavanagh, Alliance News, (January/February 1999), 10. 70 William Graham, “Alliance Leader warns of political stagnation”, Irish News, (3rd June 2003), 8.

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3.2.3 Community Relations Council. This was originally established in 1969 as the Community Relations Commission71 but was disbanded by the British Government. It was re-established in 199072. Will Glendinning a very active and successful Alliance Councillor held a seat on Belfast City Council for Lower Falls in West Belfast as well as a seat for West Belfast in the 1982 Assembly73. After the demise of this Assembly he could not obtain employment again as a teacher. He eventually joined the revived Community Relations Council as Development Officer 74 and rose to become its Chief Executive.

3.2.4 European Influence. Despite the relatively poor performance in European elections, the Alliance Party is very pro-Europe. They joined the European group of liberal and democratic parties in 1984 (ELDR)75 that includes the British Liberal Democrats and the Irish Progressive Democrats (PDs), who are considered to be ‘sister parties’. Alliance Members have served on the Executive of the ELDR 76 and the Party regularly sends delegates to their conferences. Members of the Liberal Democrats (LDs), and the PDs regularly attend Alliance Annual Party Conferences and Alliance representatives attend LD and PD Conferences. Usually the LD spokesman on Northern Ireland is in regular contact.

71

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of Northern Ireland, 23 – 24. Rupert Taylor, ‘Northern Ireland: Consociation or Social Transformation?’ in John McGarry (Ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World, 43. 73 McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/rl1977 and http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/ra1982. 74 Martin Melaugh, ‘Central Community Relations Unit’, http://www.ccru.gov.uk/ accessed on 12 August 2003. 75 ‘Alliance Becomes 13th Member of the Federation European Liberals and Democrats’, Alliance News (February 1984), 1. 76 For example, John Alderdice is Treasurer of The ELDR bureau (Alliance News, (November/December 1998), 3) and Sean Neeson was a Vice-President of Liberal International and John Alderdice is deputy President (Alliance News, (November/December 2000), 6). 72

32

Former Party Leader, John Cushnahan, is now an MEP for the Fine Gael Party in the Irish Republic77.

3.2.5

Honours and awards. Alliance Party members have received a number of

Honours. Former Stormont MP, Bertie McConnell (who was blind), received an OBE in 1977 having been Mayor of North Down in 1976 and a Member of the 1973 Assembly and the 1975 Convention78. Former Party Leader Oliver Napier was awarded a knighthood in August 198579 and in 1998 Robert Cooper also was made a knight80. Seamus Close received an OBE in 1997 for being the first Catholic Mayor of Lisburn81. In August1996 Dr John Alderdice, then Leader of the Party was made a life peer . Other Alliance people to be honoured include Cecilia Linehan for her work with All Children Together; author Harry Barton was made an OBE in 198583. Former Assemblyman Hugh Wilson was made a Freeman of the Borough of Larne in he same year84. Cllr David Alderdice was awarded an OBE in 199985. 82

3.3 Involvement in talks processes. The Alliance Party has been involved in all the many talks processes since 1972. This item was given the highest rating in the questionnaire by Council members and was rated second by Candidates and ISE students. During many of these one or more parties absented themselves for a variety of political reasons. However the Alliance Party very rarely, if ever did that. The first major conference after the prorogation of 77

Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 155. Alliance News, (July 1977), 1. 79 Alliance News, (August 1985), 1. 80 Northern Ireland Information Service, Birthday Honours List 1998, www.nics.gov.uk/nio/press/1998/ accessed 12 August 2003. 81 Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 207, 82 Ibid., 155 and Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 332. 83 Alliance News, (December 1985), 5. 84 Alliance News, (November 1985), 7. 85 Northern Ireland Information Service, Birthday Honours List 1999, www.nics.gov.uk/nio/press/1998/ accessed 12 August 2003. 78

33

the Stormont Parliament in 1972 was held at Darlington on 25 September 197286. Only the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Alliance Party (AP) and the Labour Party (NILP) attended. SDLP and DUP refused to attend. While no agreed conclusions were reached the British Government put forward a discussion paper, The Future of Northern Ireland, and then a Government White Paper, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. Only the Alliance Party fully supported this paper. SDLP gave it qualified support. Unionist Leader Brian Faulkner fudged the key issue of power sharing to obtain the support of the UUP. The DUP and Vanguard rejected it. However it led to a Northern Ireland Constitution Bill and a Northern Ireland Assembly Bill, and on 28 May 1973 elections were held for the proposed Assembly. The Assembly started meeting on 31st July. A series of talks between the Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, with the UUP, AP and SDLP, were held between 5 and 16th October to discuss the formation of a power-sharing Executive, which was formed on 21 November and included two Alliance members (one nonvoting). However the issue of the ‘Council of Ireland’ had not been settled. So another conference was held at Sunningdale with the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, the Irish Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave and other ministers. There were six UUP, six SDLP and three Alliance delegates. Oliver Napier, leader of the Alliance laid down the precondition that the Alliance Party would not agree to Council of Ireland ‘which in any way undermines Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom’.87 Although the Council of Ireland was agreed, different parties had different perceptions of it. The unionists considered it as an advisory body whereas the SDLP thought it was the route to a united Ireland. After the meeting on 28 December Napier asked through a letter in the Irish Times, ‘Do you really want a Council of Ireland. . , The Council of Ireland hangs by a thread . . If you do nothing in the next few weeks, 86 87

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of Northern Ireland, 55. Quoted in Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of Northern Ireland, 71.

34

history will judge you and its judgement will be harsh and unforgiving’.88 Before the Council of Ireland could be phased in from 22 May 1974, there had been a general election in which anti-power sharing unionists won eleven of the twelve Westminster. The Ulster Workers strike followed and led to the resignation of the Chief Executive, Brian Faulkner and his unionist colleagues on 28 May. On 4 July the government produced another White Paper Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention followed in February 1975 by a discussion paper, The Government of Northern Ireland: A Society Divided. The Convention was set, the members elected, but the majority, rejected power sharing and the Council of Ireland. It was not till 1979 that further talks were held with the new Secretary of State, Humphrey Atkins, in Margaret Thatcher’s new Conservative Government. The socalled ‘Atkins talks’ were based on a new government paper, The Government of Ireland: A working paper for discussion. In January 1980 the talks were formalised into a Constitutional Conference. The talks drifted on with little enthusiasm, sometimes boycotted by the UUP, sometimes by the DUP. Even the SDLP had to be facilitated with parallel talks. Only the Alliance Party attended throughout. By March there was no agreement. So in July a Government discussion papers The Government of Ireland: Proposals for further Discussion was tabled but there was still little enthusiasm. Then came the IRA hunger strikes, which distracted everyone’s attention. After the death of Bobby Sands on 5 May, at the Local government elections on 20 May the Alliance Party was ‘rewarded’ for their persistence with a decline in votes to 8.9 per cent and 38 seats (down from 70 in 1977). In July Atkins suggested setting up an Advisory committee of 50 elected representatives, but received no support. More 88

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 76.

35

hunger strikers died and more joined the strike. James Prior replaced Atkins. Eventually the hunger strike ended after some concessions. At this point Sinn Féin decided to contest all elections in Northern Ireland. IRA man Danny Morrison made the famous statement ‘with a ballot paper in one hand and an armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland’89. This changed the electoral equation henceforth. In April 1982 Prior introduced a White paper, Northern Ireland: A Framework for Devolution, involving ‘rolling devolution’90. It received only limited support. As usual only the Alliance party was enthusiastic. The plan went ahead and Assembly elections were held in October91. Sinn Féin won 5 seats with 10.1 per cent of the vote and SDLP 14 seats with 18.8 per cent. Surprisingly Alliance won 10 seats with 9.3 per cent. SF and SDLP refused to take their seats, so devolution could not ‘roll’. The Assembly operated a series of scrutiny committees in which Alliance played a substantial role, including acting as an effective opposition in the absence of nationalists. Meanwhile in March 1983 the Dublin government together with SDLP set up the New Ireland Forum92. The Alliance, UUP, and DUP refused invitations, but there were unofficial observers who reported the happenings. SF was excluded. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had her first meeting with Garret Fitzgerald in November. The Forum reported in May 198493. However following a two day Anglo-Irish summit meeting at Chequers, a new statement emerged and Thatcher dramatically rejected the three main Forum proposals94. In the local government elections in May 1985 SF won 59 seats with 11.8 per cent of vote. The Alliance vote fell again to 7.1 per cent yielding 34 seats. Then on 15 89

Quoted in Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of Northern Ireland, 160. Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 164. 91 Ibid., 166 – 167. 92 Ibid., 170. 93 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 179. 94 Ibid., 185. 90

36

November the two premiers signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement over the heads of the politicians95. This introduced an ‘Inter-Governmental Consultative Conference’ serviced by a secretariat at Maryfield near Belfast. It effectively ruled out a united Ireland, except with the consent of a majority in the North. It encouraged crosscommunity devolution. After a long debate the Alliance Party Council overwhelmingly (137 to 2) agreed to support the AIA96. But the unionist reaction was vitriolic. The unionist opposition resulted in boycotts of meetings with NIO ministers, boycotts of normal council business, rallies and riots for a period of several years97. There were no more talks during this period. Violence escalated on both sides. Loyalists attacked the RUC98. On December 5 Dec the Unionists set up Grand Committee of Assembly to the examine effects of the AIA, so on 6 Dec the Alliance withdrew from the Assembly, effectively ending it. There were a few attempts to suggest new talks, but little happened. Then at the 1987 general Election the Alliance vote went up to 10 per cent, with John Alderdice doing particularly well in East Belfast99. Later he became party leader100. In 1988 Alliance produced its major policy document, Governing with Consent, which influenced its input to talks over the next few years 101. Unfortunately some of the policies were rather dated102 and did not give Alliance as much leverage as before. In January 1988 the significant private talks between Gerry Adams of SF and John Hume of SDLP began103. In 1989 Peter Brooke took over from Tom King104 and 95

Ibid., 189 – 191. Alliance News, (December 1985), 1. 97 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 189 – 194, 98 Ibid., 199. 99 Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 155. 100 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 209. 101 Alliance Party, Governing with Consent (Belfast: Alliance Party, 1988). 102 Leonard, M.A. thesis, 41. 103 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 212. 104 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 227. 96

37

tried to have ‘talks about talks’ in the gaps between meetings of the Anglo-Irish InterGovernmental Conference105. In November 1990 Brooke made a groundbreaking speech in which he said that Britain has ‘no strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’106. In 1991 things gathered pace with new proposals for talks involving three strands: strand one- devolution, strand two - north-south relations and strand three British-Irish relations. There were some meetings to discuss strand one and many arguments107. Then in April 1992 Sir Patrick Mayhew replaced Brooke108. There was a strand two meeting on 19 June and then on 30 June a meeting of Mayhew, Andrews, Paisley and Alderdice. It was claimed109 that Mayhew supported AP/UP proposals for a committee structure devolution (as in Governing with Consent). Following further talks in the autumn around strands one and two, some of which are boycotted by the DUP, the UUP had ‘a change of heart’110. Their proposals now included power sharing and an Irish dimension, while the SDLP line softened its aim from complete unity to joint authority. There were many attempts to set up talks processes, with little results. When talks did eventually get under way, it was decided to have a negotiating forum to which delegates would be elected. The Alliance Party did less well this time with 6.5 per cent of the vote and seven seats out of a total of 108.111 The basic model of a power sharing Assembly being considered could have been taken straight out of the Alliance Party document, Governing with Consent112. Although Alliance played a major part in these negotiations to reach the Agreement, which all participants eventually signed113, they were left without major influence in the new Assembly. Allan Leonard has presented the role of Alliance in these discussions114. I will summarise his conclusions.

105

Ibid., 230. Ibid., 242. 107 Ibid., 246, 250. 108 Ibid., 258. 109 Ibid., 261. 110 Ibid., 262. 111 Melaugh, Martin and McKenna, Fionnuala, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ra1998.htm. 112 Alliance Party, Governing with Consent (Belfast: Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, 1988). 113 The DUP did not sign as they refused to participate in the negotiations with Sinn Féin. 106

38

The role taken upon themselves by Alliance was essentially to smooth the process so as to encourage its success. Position Papers were regularly presented by Alliance, but with its small representation, most of the work was between the larger parties, UUP and SDLP with major attempts to include SF. Alliance had a ‘policing role’ to ensure the rigorous upholding of the Mitchell Principles, against a use or threat of the use of force. ‘Alliance tabled indictments against the UUP and DUP for their actions at Drumcree in July 1996; against the UDP for a breach of cease-fire in January 1998 and against Sinn Fein for a breach of the IRA cease-fire in February 1998’115. Leonard notes that ‘while Alliance was thanked privately, it was not thanked publicly, either by the other parties or the governments’116. Clearly Alliance ‘was willing to sacrifice popularity, for the sake of . . long term interests of society’. The second role was that of a ‘weathervane’, that is to signal whether a proposal by one party was likely to be acceptable across he board117. This included actually rejecting the ‘Mitchell draft’, because though Alliance could have accepted it they felt that it ‘could not be sold to unionists’ because of the wording about northsouth relations. This resulted in Monica McWilliams, leader of the Women’s Coalition accusing Alliance of ‘being a Unionist party, by providing political cover to the UUP’118. Apparently nationalists did not need such cover and were well able to defend themselves. The third role was ‘making political space for “Others”119. Regretfully Alliance could not oppose the idea of ‘unionist’ and ‘nationalist’ designations for voting purposes in the Assembly, but would not accept either designation for itself. Alliance attributes the achievement of the allocation of the designation ‘Other’ to its direct appeal [by John Alderdice] to the British Prime Minister’120. In general the compromises Alliance were making were approved by 87% of Alliance supporters according to ‘an opinion poll taken towards the conclusion of the Multi-Party Talks’121. The fourth contribution was to obtain agreement for the electoral system to be used in Assembly elections. The Alliance suggestion of eighteen six-member constituencies prevailed. Members were to be elected by STV with no ‘top up’ as suggested by the NIWC. In retrospect Alliance might have fared better, electorally with a top-up system122.

3.4 Contribution to elected assemblies and conventions. 114

Allan Leonard, MA thesis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society, (Dublin: University College Dublin, 1999), 50 –59. 115 Allan Leonard, MA thesis, 53 - 54. 116 Ibid., 53 117 Ibid., 54 – 55. 118 Allan Leonard, M.A. thesis., 55. 119 Ibid., 55 – 56. 120 Ibid., 56 -58. 121 Ibid., 56. 122 Ibid., 57.

39

This item was rated second by Council members and Candidates and third by ISE students. The Alliance Party have participated in three elected Assemblies, also in a Constitutional Convention and in the Negotiating Forum prior to the Good Friday Agreement. The first was the 1973 – 1974 power-sharing Assembly123 to which Alliance had eight Assemblymen elected.124 The Party had played a major part in setting up this Assembly (see section 3.3). An Executive was set up in which Oliver Napier was the Minister of Law Reform. Robert Cooper held the non-voting post of Minister of Manpower Services125. This Assembly was very short lived and its demise led to the 1975 – 1976 Constitutional Convention in which the Alliance Party again had eight representatives elected.126 There was then a gap till the 1982 – 1986 Assembly based on James Prior’s principle of rolling devolution. Despite receiving a similar share of the vote (9.3 per cent) Alliance had ten Assemblymen elected127. Because both SF and SDLP refused to take their seats, the Alliance Members had a very influential part to play. Often they acted as the opposition to the majority of unionists128. There was never any actual power sharing, so scrutiny committees were set up instead, in which the posts were shared proportionally between the political groups. John Cushnahan was Chair of the Education Committee, Sean Neeson was Deputy Speaker and Will Glendinning was vice-Chair of Environment. Once again this Assembly collapsed, this time due to the Alliance Party walking out when the Unionist groups tried to turn it into an anti-Anglo-Irish Agreement debating forum129. Owing to the negative reactions of the Unionist parties to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, there were no more serious attempts to set up a devolved assembly till the mid 1990s. Following the Good Friday Agreement, elections to the new Assembly took place in 1998. Alliance obtained 6.5 per cent of the vote but only six seats 130. Elliott and Flackes comment that ‘The Assembly elections in June ought to have been good for Alliance since so much of the new institutions reflected party views’131. 123

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 67 – 90. Nicholas Whyte, ‘Northern Ireland Assembly Elections’, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa73.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2003 125 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 70. 126 Nicholas Whyte, ‘Northern Ireland Assembly Elections’, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fc75.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2003 127 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 167. 128 Paul Tilson, ‘Assembly Report’ Alliance News (January/February 2000), 6 – 7. 129 Alliance News (December 1985), 3. 130 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 369 – 370. 131 Elliott and Flackes Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 155. 124

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The Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) were, Lord John Alderdice, Eileen Bell, Sean Neeson, Seamus Close, David Ford and Kieran McCarthy. This left them without enough seats to qualify for a place in the Executive, elected by the d’Hondt method. Contrary to Alliance policies the division of the Assembly was based on sectarian lines. Lord Alderdice became the Speaker of the Assembly132. Despite having no Executive seat the Alliance MLAs often acted as a ‘constructive opposition’,133 attempting to moderate the procedures in the Executive and its committees. They also served very actively on a number of the committees. Prominent in these roles was the Public Accounts Committee, in which Seamus Close134 was very active and vociferous in regularly and effectively drawing attention to deficiencies in the financial procedures – particularly in the Northern Ireland Tourist Board, the Education and Library Boards and the Assembly itself. Alliance Party Deputy Leader and former MLA Eileen Bell135 was a member of the Committee of the Centre which oversees the work of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister – she told them that they ‘must deal with sectarianism on the streets. . they have not really done that’ and ‘promote community relations and equality for all’. ‘We have made a difference in committees’. ‘I was one the first persons to put forward the idea of a children’s commissioner . . .we set up the children’s committee we now have a very good man in this post’. We have also done a lot of work on the periphery of the health service such as MENCAP, children with behavioural problems such as autism’ Eileen Bell and others constantly pressured the Assembly on the issues of community relations. The Alliance group voted against the Programme of Government because it lacked concern for sectarianism ‘in ours schools, in our offices and on our streets’. She twice submitted press releases, complaining about deficiencies in the Assembly’s Executive programme. She emphasised three areas, inequality, community relations and the ‘inability to recognise that our society is made up of more than two communities’.136 She said, One of the main weaknesses of the programme is the continued assumption that we live in a two-community society and that diversity should still be regarded as the difference between the unionist and nationalist; between Catholic and Protestant. She repeated these complaints in another press release in September 2002,137 saying that the Executive had ignored community relations. Alliance MLAs were also the original proposers of the International Monitoring Body (IMB), which is a matter of great controversy within the UUP.

132

Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 156. Eileen Bell, Interview, Belfast 26 August 2003. 134 Seamus Close, Interview, Belfast, 24 June 2003. 135 Eileen Bell, Interview, Stormont, 26 August 2003. 136 Eileen Bell, MLA, Press Release, 13 November 2001. 137 Eileen Bell, MLA, Press Release 24 September 2002. 133

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Eileen said that some people referred to the Alliance Party as ‘The conscience of Northern Ireland’138.

Chapter 4. The Decline of the Alliance Party 4.1 Decline in votes The Alliance Party’s initial electoral performance was perhaps more modest than the Party expected139. Following the initial electoral successes of the 1970s there was a general decline in electoral performance, apart from a partial recovery from 1987 to 1993. The decline started with the local government election in 1981, during the IRA hunger strikes. The vote dropped to 8.9 per cent giving 38 seats140. Even so at the Assembly elections in the following year, the vote held up at 9.3 per cent, and due to the vagaries of the STV system produced 10 Assembly seats141. From then on the vote in both local government and Assembly elections declined to between 5 and 7 per cent. 138

Eileen Bell, Interview, Stormont, 26 August, 2003. Jack Smith, Alliance News, (September 1972), 7; Allan Leonard, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society (MA thesis: University College Dublin, 1999), 33. 140 Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland 1968 – 1999 - A Chronology of the Troubles, (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 1999), 151. 141 Ibid., 166 – 167. 139

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It is instructive to look at opinion polls, mostly published in the Belfast Telegraph or in Fortnight from time to time. Generally the opinion polls overestimate the likely Alliance Party vote. For example in a survey conducted by Edward Moxon Browne142 in 1979 in response to the question, ‘which of the parties do you feel closest to?’ Alliance received 19.5 per cent (compared with 11.9 per cent un the Westminster election that year), more than SDLP with 17.1 per cent (18.2 per cent in the election) and DUP with 11.8 per cent (10.2 per cent in the election) and second to Official Unionists with 39.4 per cent (36.6 per cent in the election). This effect is shown very well in Figure 4.1 taken from Whyte’s book143. This suggests that while many people are in principle in favour of a cross-community political party, the position at election times hardens. The people become more polarised. This is probably due to fear of what might happen if they desert their traditional political party, i.e. ‘community loyalty’. In my questionnaire (see chapter 2), when asked to rate factors contributing to the decline in Alliance Party votes, ‘community loyalty’ received the highest response scores of from all respondents. Many of these situations depend on the political climate at the time and were beyond the control of the party. The Bobby Sands by-election in 1981 signalled the entry of Sinn Fein into electoral politics. Frank Wright comments that ‘A more certain way [than the hunger strike issue] to polarise people round their own experiences of violence would be hard to devise’144. No doubt the SDLP felt threatened and the Alliance Party began to lose the support of some moderate nationalists. From being abstentionist, more nationalists and republicans began to vote, and the electoral fortunes of both SDLP and SF were to rise. Despite a relatively high profile in the Assembly, at the 1985 Local 142

Edward Moxon-Browne, ‘Queen’s University Group Survey 1979’ quoted in Denis Barritt, Northern Ireland: A Problem to Every Solution (London: Quaker Peace and Service, 1982), 132. 143 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 5. 144 Frank Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987), 244 and 246.

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Government elections the Alliance vote fell further to 7.1 per cent giving them only 34 seats. The next significant event was the Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed in 1985. The unionist parties united in bitter opposition. So when the Unionist MPs all resigned to fight by-elections opposing the Agreement (‘Ulster Says No’) in January 1986, the Alliance vote dwindled to 32,095 votes145. As the steam went out of the ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign, there was a partial recovery in Alliance fortunes, with General Election votes up to 10 per cent in 1987 and a recovery of local government seats up to 44 in 1993 from 7.6 per cent of votes146. Philip McGarry said that ‘Alliance Party psephologists think that moderate Unionists agreed with the Alliance Party’s support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and so the Alliance vote recovered’147. Most interestingly, as negotiations developed towards the Good Friday Agreement, the shape of the Agreement was in many respects identical to the Alliance Party’s Governing With Consent document148. So why did the Alliance Party’s vote not recover? In fact the polarisation that had squeezed the Alliance Party still existed. There is evidence that, despite the Agreement, Catholics and Protestants were more divided than ever149. SDLP were even more concerned about the threat to their vote from Sinn Fein and the Unionists were concerned about having their former enemies Sinn Fein sharing power in government with them. During the negotiations, while the Alliance Party negotiators did as much as they could to facilitate the production of an overall

145

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 197. Ibid., 208 and 273. 147 Interview with Philip McGarry, 20 June 2003. 148 Alliance Party, Governing with Consent (Belfast: Alliance Party, 1988). 149 Donald L. Horowitz, ‘The Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear Consociational and Risky’ in John McGarry, Northern Ireland and the Divided World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 102. 146

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agreement, they did not have the electoral strength to negotiate a sound position for themselves within the Agreement.150 The Alliance Party vote continued to decline to 6.5 per cent in the Assembly Elections of 1998,151 2.1 per cent in the European Elections of 1999152 and 5.1 per cent in the 2001 Local Government elections yielding 28 seats 153, with only 3 Alliance Councillors on Belfast City Council, which still gave them the balance of power in Belfast. Unfortunately for Alliance the 6.5 per cent of the vote resulted in only 6 Assembly seats154, which was insufficient to obtain a place in the Executive. This was a disaster. Had the STV transfers gone more favourably, as in 1982, there might have been enough votes to yield 7 or 8 seats out of 108? According to the d’Hondt method155, Alliance would have needed 8 seats to obtain a place in the 10-member executive.

4.2 The voting system While the STV method of proportional representation has served centre minority parties well at times, the amount of cross community vote transfers was never large. Horowitz156 argues that in a multi-seat constituency each tribe tends to transfer their votes between members of their own side, a few will transfer to the middle, but very few across to the other community. He points out that in the

150

Philip McGarry, interview 20 June 2003. Fionnuala McKenna and Martin Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ra1998.http, accessed 30 May 2003. 152 Ibid., http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/re1999.htm, accessed on 30 May 2003 153 Ibid., http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rd2001.htm, accessed on 30May 2003 154 Ibid., http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ra1998.htm, accessed on 30 May 2003. 155 Remy Horton, 2002, d’Hondt PR calculator, http://www.compulink.co.uk/~broadway/pr95/, accessed on 16 July 2003. Sidney Elliott, ‘The d’Hondt System Explained’ (BBC News Online: Events: Northern Ireland: Focus, 28 November 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/northern_ireland/ accessed on 16 July 2003. 156 Horrowitz, ‘The Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear Consociational and Risky’, 98 – 100. 151

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Assembly elections of 1998, 90 out of the 108 MLAs were elected on first preference votes. Horowitz suggests that an incentive is needed to encourage people to vote across the community157 such as the Alternate Vote (AV) system. In this system there is one seat per constituency, as in the classic Westminster system. But one still marks one’s ballot paper with preferences, 1, 2, 3, etc. To be elected a candidate must receive or acquire 50 per cent +1 of the votes. As with STV, if the candidate is not elected on the first count, the candidate with the lowest vote is eliminated and her/his votes are redistributed according to the second preference. This procedure continues until a candidate has 50 per cent + 1 votes or until there are only two candidates left, in which case the one with the highest vote wins. The voter knows that someone must be elected. If it is not his favoured candidate then it will be someone from another party, maybe from the other tribe. Thus he/she cannot put another of his own party as second choice, but must make the next worst choice, which is likely to be a moderate or centre party candidate. So how might Alliance Party candidates fare? In general it does not sound as favourable as the STV system, where the quota needed to be elected will be 16.67 per cent in a five-seat constituency. However in a by-election to replace one councillor, the voting system is nominally STV, but is in effect the same as AV. Alliance has had some surprising victories in by-elections. In 27 by-election situations between 1973 and 1986, Alliance won five seats, two unopposed but three by the AV method. In February 1975 Hilditch won a seat in Carrickfergus Area B with a first count 37 per cent winning on the second count158. Louise Devlin won a seat in North Down in December 1976 in a straight fight with a unionist, gaining 51 per cent 157 158

Ibid. 92 – 95. Alliance News (February 1975), 1.

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vote159. Then in Derry City in February 1979, Arthur Barr obtained 31 per cent and went on to win the seat160. Over most of these by-elections, even where the Alliance candidate did not win, the Alliance vote was usually increased compared with the original election161. One can see that Alliance generally has done better in these by-elections with AV than in the original election with STV. However other factors need to be considered. In by-elections the turnout is usually much lower, and the party workers would make a big effort to get out the Alliance vote. One cannot in fact draw any firm conclusion about the advantage of AV, except that Alliance fares quite well. 4.2 Westminster representation One major disappointment for the Alliance Party has been their failure to win a seat in Westminster. When asked in the questionnaire to rate the importance of the failure to win a Westminster seat to the decline of Alliance, both candidates and council members rank this third. In 1972 after the Stormont Government was prorogued, one existing Unionist MP, Stratton Mills, switched to the Alliance Party. However he soon lost his seat at the next General Election in February 1974. Of more value was the presence of Lord Henry Dunleath, a hereditary peer, in the House of Lords. The closest the Alliance Party came to winning a seat in the Commons, was in 1979 when Oliver Napier came a close third (15,066) behind Peter Robinson (15,994) and Bill Craig (15,930) in East Belfast. Usually the unionist parties avoided competing with each other and splitting the vote. Napier might have won that election, but for George Chambers of the Northern Ireland Labour Party standing, as he took 1982 votes which might otherwise have gone to Napier to put him in front162. In fact over the whole of Northern Ireland in that election the DUP obtained less votes (10.2 per cent) than Alliance (11.9 per cent) and yet obtained three seats compared with none for Alliance. The electorate perceived this as a failure. David Ford made an analysis of these voting figures. By grouping seats into three areas with six seats in each he showed that if the STV proportional representation system had been used, the Alliance Party would have won two Westminster seats163. After the death of Lord Henry Dunleath, Dr John Alderdice was made a life peer in 1996 at the instigation of the Liberal Democrat Party in Great Britain164, having come second with 29.8 per cent of the vote in East Belfast in the 1992 General 159

Ibid., (November 1976), 1. Ibid., (February 1979), 8. 161 Data was obtained from issues of Alliance News over this period. 162 McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ rw1979.htm, accessed on 30 May 2003. 163 David Ford, Alliance News, (July 1983), 6. 164 Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 332 160

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Election165. His peerage was very useful for the Party, though was considered rather a ‘fix’ by the other politicians in the North. 4.3 Leadership problems Oliver Napier and John Cushnahan were good leaders, though they both lacked charisma on the media. John Alderdice, the first Protestant Leader had much more presence. He only joined the party in 1978 and he had never won an election when he became leader, though he obtained a higher vote than Oliver Napier in East Belfast at the 1987 Westminster General Election. Fergus Pyle writing in the Irish Times166 noted that he made ‘no secret of his [religious] affiliations’. His father was a Presbyterian Minister. Pyle hints that maybe that was why he attracted a higher vote than Catholic Oliver Napier. Certainly he tended to lean towards the unionists more than his predecessors. He incurred great expense for the Party in the 1998 Assembly Elections and delivered a very poor electoral performance of 6.5 per cent with only 6 seats, which was insufficient to qualify for a seat in the Executive. Immediately following the election he resigned and was quickly appointed as Speaker for the new Assembly167. This raised much controversy, as another Alliance MLA, Seamus Close, had understood that he was to be nominated to be Speaker. Sean Neeson took over as Party Leader in 1998168. He had been an excellent Councillor in Carrickfergus. He was the first Catholic Mayor in that borough, a position he held twice169. He had also been Chair of the Party and had polled well for East Antrim in Westminster elections170. But he was less successful as Party Leader. He stood for the Party in the European Election in 1999 and obtained only 2.1 per cent of the vote171. Then he failed to be selected by his East Antrim constituency as candidate for the next Westminster general election in 2001. He resigned form the leadership, which then passed to David Ford, the second Protestant leader172. David Ford performs extremely well on the media and so far is an excellent party leader. In fact both candidates and council members ranked the problem of leadership lowest in their priorities in the questionnaire. 4.4 Too middle class, poor appeal in nationalist areas The Alliance Party has suffered because it is regarded as being too middle class173. This is well demonstrated in Moxon-Browne’s survey174. Wright also refers to 165

McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ rw1992.htm, accessed on 25 May 2003. 166 Fergus Pyle, Irish Times, 5 October 1987. 167 Elliott, Sidney and Flackes, William D., Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1968 – 2000, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001), 156. 168 Ibid., 159. 169 Ibid. 170 McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ rw1992.htm, accessed on 25 May 2003 171 Ibid., http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/re1999.htm, accessed on 30 May 2003 172 ‘Ford New Leader’, Alliance News (September/October 2001), 1 and 3. 173 Brendan O’Leary, ‘The British-Irish Agreement’ in John McGarry (ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World, 74. 174 Edward Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1983), 67.

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this middle class issue175. Some Councillors have been elected in working class areas, but this support has usually diminished once those individuals have stood down. In the Questionnaire neither candidates nor council members ranked the middle class problem very highly. In the early days before SDLP became so well organised, Alliance had a reasonable impact in Catholic areas, particularly in areas such as East Antrim and East Belfast, where few nationalist candidates stood. However with the rise and success of Sinn Fein, SDLP have been putting more and more candidates in these areas and achieving success at the expense of Alliance. With the advent of free education more SDLP supporters obtained professional jobs and many of them have moved into more middle class areas and threatened the Alliance vote there too. At the same time the SDLP vote has declined in some working-class areas of West Belfast, to be overtaken by Sinn Fein. While the above factors have been outside the control of Alliance, one persistent problem has been the tendency for Alliance to be seen as a ‘unionist party with a small u’176. There is much evidence supporting this view177, though in principle it is not intended178. A members Questionnaire conducted through the party council asked how members saw themselves in ‘the Nationalist-Unionist Spectrum’, on a rating of 0 to 10, 0 being the nationalist end and 10 being the unionist end, so 5 was the centre. Average scores were for self, 5.64, for the party, 5.71 and the ideal, 5.39. In a third question members were invited to grade various ‘Buzz-Words’ to describe Alliance on a score of 1 to 5, with 1 = not at all, 2 = indifferent, 3 = little support, 4 = support, 5 = strong support. The average score for ‘u’ ‘Unionist’ was 2.30, which is 175

Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis, 246. Pauline Noblett, Secretary of Jordanstown Alliance Branch, at a branch committee meeting in 1998. 177 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 21 – 22, 73. 178 Allan Leonard, MA thesis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society, (Dublin: University College Dublin, 1999), 1, 22 – 26; Philip McGarry, The President’s Review (Belfast: The Alliance Party, 1998), 21. 176

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between indifferent and little support. ‘Centre’ received a score of 4.12. Thus the conclusion was that A plurality of party members sees themselves in the absolute centre of this spectrum. There is however a considerable number with mild unionist leanings, but not a majority. Soft nationalists are few in number179. The Alliance Party leadership still appears more sympathetic with the Unionist party’s problems over the failure of the IRA to decommission its weapons than with SDLP standing up for the democratic rights of elected Sinn Fein members. For example in 1995 the Alliance Party stated, The continued existence of illegal weapons undermines the peace process by perpetuating community fears of a return to violence, and casting doubt upon the real intentions of those who say that they have given up violence180. Both candidates and council members rate the problem of the decline in nationalists votes most highly, next to ‘Loyalty to person’s own community’, which received the highest concern. Of course it is the aim of the Alliance Party to break down these community divisions, which makes it a chicken and egg situation.

4.6 Ambivalence of and Changes in Unionist Party Policies and Alliance Party Policies. Following the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement and the Convention that followed, many unionists turned their ideas away from a devolved parliament towards greater integration within the United Kingdom181. This was driven largely by two

179

Alliance Party, Members Questionnaire: Council Report (Belfast: Alliance Party, 1998). Alliance Party, Submission to the International Body on Decommissioning (Belfast: Alliance Party Headquarters, Dec 1995), 3 quoted in Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘Northern Ireland and Lebanon’ in John McGarry (ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World, 259 – 260. 181 Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis, 242. 180

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unionist MPs, Unionist Party Leader James Molyneux182 and Enoch Powell, who came to Northern Ireland from the Conservative party and won the Westminster seat in South Down as a Unionist in the October 1974 election 183. In 1987 Unionist thought swung back towards devolution, and integrationist QC Robert McCartney was expelled from the Unionist party, whereupon he set up his own UK Unionist Party and held the Westminster seat of North Down from 1995 – 2001. The only effect of this policy change within Unionism was to slow down moves towards another attempt at devolution. In fact this was probably as much to do with unionists disenchantment with the Anglo-Irish Agreement as with policy changes. It might be considered that the Alliance Party’s reluctant support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed in 1985 by British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher and the Irish Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald without any consultation with the people or parties in Northern Ireland, would have damaged moderate unionists’ support for Alliance. In fact the Alliance vote made a partial recovery so that in the 1987 Westminster election Alliance polled 10 per cent (compared with 8 per cent in 1983) and then in the 1993 Local Government election they polled 7.6 per cent and gained 44 Council seats compared with 34 in 1985. Former Party President and Belfast City Councillor, Philip McGarry184 suggested that moderate unionists disapproved of the abstentionist behaviour of unionists following the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In fact some Alliance Councillors, particularly Addie Morrow in Castlereagh, Seamus Close in Lisburn and David Cook in Belfast took successful court action against the unionists and forced them to resume normal operations of Local Councils185. 182

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 136. McKenna and Melaugh, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/rw1974.http, accessed on 30 May 2003. 184 Philip McGarry, Interview, 20th June 2003. 185 Addie Morrow, Interview, 30 May 2003 and Seamus Close, Interview, 24 June 2003. 183

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There is an ambivalence in the Alliance Party’s own policies which has not helped its relationship with other parties. This is described in Allan Leonard’s thesis186. Leonard discusses two alternative models that Alliance people have for their party. These he calls ‘civic liberalism’ and ‘bridge building’. Civic liberalism appears to be equated with a ‘third tradition’ model. In this model the political aim is to integrate Northern Ireland as a single community with a grand coalition government with weighted majority voting (as proposed in the recent Alliance Review of Assembly Designation and Voting System187). It represents the views of Sir Oliver Napier, ‘As peace begins slowly to emerge, the third tradition will begin to show the authentic voice of Northern Ireland’188 and of Addie Morrow following the tradition of the united Irishmen, ‘My background was never unionist. [It] comes from home rule’ 189. Des Keenan said of the two traditional factional communities, ‘It is better to forget them and to remember only the third tradition, that of decent Irishmen, Catholic and Protestant, who worked together for their mutual benefit’190. Civic liberalism deems ‘unionism and nationalism as incompatible ethno-nationalisms, and therefore ultimately irreconcilable’, but ‘moderate unionists and moderate nationalists do not see themselves as sectarian’191. The alternative ‘bridge building’ approach accepts the continued existence of the two communities and the need to accommodate both. ‘Alliance bridge builders are those who are more inclined to assist unionist and nationalist politicians to find common ground’192. The Alliance Party is then what Horowitz calls a multi-ethnic

186

Leonard, M.A. thesis, 21 – 31. Alliance Party, Review of Assembly Designation and Voting System, (Belfast: Alliance Party, November 2001), 6 – 8. 188 Oliver Napier 1977 quoted in Leonard, M.A. thesis, 24. 189 Addie Morrow, Interview Belfast date? 190 Des Keenan, Alliance News, (1977) quoted in Leonard, M.A. thesis, 25. 191 Leonard, M.A. thesis, 31. 192 Ibid., 27. 187

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party193. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 this is largely the role Alliance has been playing in negotiations. However as Leonard remarks, ‘there is no guarantee that the electorate will sufficiently endorse such a reconciliation project’. He goes on to say, ‘the danger to both ‘civic liberalism’ and ‘bridge building’ is power sharing with segmental autonomy, under which neither a ‘bridge building’ nor a ‘civic liberal’ party is required’194. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.

4.5 Poor media presentation. In the twentieth and twenty first centuries mass communication – newspapers, radio, TV etc have become very important modes of communication, compared with speeches to an audience, posters, leaflets and door knocking. But the purveyors of the media have much control and hence much responsibility for the content and quality of what is presented. They think of themselves as having to be entertaining rather than just informing and educating. Items they cover have to be interesting and different. That means that they tend to concentrate on the negative rather than the positive, the controversial rather than the common sense. This tends to play into the hands of extremist politicians and especially terrorists. The media consider that their audience would prefer to hear about a murder or a riot than to hear about good works. A party that has a paramilitary wing makes better news copy than a moderate party presenting good sense. When Mr Paisley threw snowballs at the visiting Irish Taoiseach’s car that was news195. When he was sent to jail for ‘unlawful assembly’ that was news196. It is difficult for a moderate person or party to present their views in a way that appeals to 193

Donald Horowitz, ‘The Agreement: Consociational, Risky’ in John McGarry, (ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World – Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 96. 194 Leonard, M.A. thesis, 31. 195 Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1. 196 Ed Moloney and Andy Pollock, Paisley (Swords, Co Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd, 1986), 134 – 135.

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the primitive emotions. Yet that is the way many people (especially unionists) vote – out of the primitive instinct of fear. Thus there are often successful attempts by political parties to present their more extreme views at election time, thus polarising the community even further, and squeezing out the moderate view. Even some reputable books, such as the readable Endgame in Ireland197, hardly mention the Alliance Party, though others such as Whyte’s Interpreting Northern Ireland198 McGarry’s Northern Ireland and the Divided World199 and Wright’s Northern Ireland: a Comparative Analysis200 give a fair coverage of the contribution of the Alliance Party. Too often interviewers are intimidated by extremist politicians and are not prepared to face them down and challenge them hard enough. In interviews with moderate politicians it is often the politician who is intimidated by the interviewer, because he/she is too polite. An example in spring of 2003 was on BBC TV’s Hearts and Minds201. The presenter, Noel Thompson was interviewing Councillors Jim Rodgers and David Alderdice about Sinn Fein’s first Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey, whose term of office was to end the following week. Rodgers, whose party had refused to endorse Maskey, as Lord Mayor was belligerent, unrepentant and aggressive whereas Alderdice was mild, polite, and almost repentant, being aware of the controversy within the Alliance Party over their decision, Rodgers said that the Alliance Party would suffer for it at the next election. Alderdice, already aware of this possibility, trod very carefully. Thus the more extreme person came over more

197

Eamon Maillie and David McKittrick, Endgame in Ireland (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2001), 250 (One reference to Lord Alderdice). 198 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) (12 references to Alliance). 199 McGarry, John (Ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World – Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). (15 references to Alliance). 200 Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis, 155, 237, 242 – 250. 201 BBC TV Hearts and Minds 7.30 pm, 29 May 2003.

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powerfully than the moderate person. To become newsworthy and be interviewed someone must have something different or radical to present. In 1976/77 the marches by the peace people’s was newsworthy, made good TV coverage and hence gave a platform for moderate opinions202. Views expressing opposition to another group’s opinions or activities can be newsworthy. It is hard for moderates to make the vitriolic attacks on others that become newsworthy – if they do they lose their credibility as moderates. The Alliance Party seeks to present real policies about real bread and butter issues. So what does the Alliance Party have to do to make news? Most recently getting Sinn Fein’s Alex Maskey elected mayor of Belfast was news. But will that be good news for the Alliance Party? Will more people vote Alliance as a result or less? The Alliance Party deluges the media with press releases203, but many of them are ignored, as they do not make exciting news! In favourable times very hard working Alliance Party councillors do have a personal impact204 – but that generates votes primarily for the person, rather than the party. One can trace this tendency of ignoring moderates through history. Frank Wright205 described some moderate groups, such as James McKnight and Charles Gavan Duffy and the Young Irelanders who tried ‘to make a trans-sectarian alliance work’, in the nineteenth century. Wright points out that groups such as this rarely receive a mention in mainstream history books. In an article commenting on Wright’s 202

Bew and Gillespie, A Chronology of the Troubles, 114, 116 – 117, 125. Alliance Party Deputy Leader Eileen Bell deposited a folder of about 115 press releases issued in 1999 – 2000 in the Linen Hall Library. Alliance Press Officer Stephen Alexander gave me a CD-ROM containing 15 – 20 press releases per month with a total of 324 in 2001. 204 For example in the South Belfast News (23 August 2003) Alliance Councillor and Assembly candidate, Geraldine Rice has three articles; one a ‘Political Platform’ about Planners (with a photograph), one about cars involved in robberies (with another photograph) and one about speeding. In addition Alliance Councillor Michael Long has a piece about the Robinson Leisure Centre (with a photograph). 205 Frank Wright, ‘Reconciling the Histories of Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland’ in Joe Liechty and Allan Falconer (eds.) Reconciling Memories (Blackrock, Co Dublin: The Columba Press, 2nd Edition 1998), 128 – 148. 203

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work, historian, Joe Liechty makes reference to another little known moderate, Whitley Stokes, who writing in 1799 after the failure of the 1798 United Irishmen’s rebellion, said that ‘the only hope for peace in Ireland is mutual forgiveness’ in his Pamphlet: Projects for Re-establishing the Internal Peace and Tranquillity of Ireland206. H.D. Inglis writing in 1834 wrote that ‘a moderate party is steadily growing in Ireland’207. So what happened to it? There was one period ‘in the 1950s when the BBC was following a policy of bringing both sides together. This meant that the positive aspects of community relations were emphasised and the negative underplayed’208. Perhaps if this policy had operated during the present troubles, the Alliance Party would have received more media coverage. 206

Joe Liechty ‘History and Reconciliation’, in Alan D. Falconer and Joe Liechty, (eds.) Reconciling Memories, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2nd edition 1998).152 – 163. 207 H.D.Inglis, Ireland in 1834 quoted by Des Keenan, Alliance News, (1977)?? 208 Rex Cathcart, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924 – 1984 (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1984), 263, quoted in John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 123.

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Chapter 5. Reconciliation and Sectarianism in the Alliance Party 5.1 Alliance as the Party of Reconciliation The Oxford Dictionary209 defines reconciliation as, ‘Make friendly again after an estrangement’. A better summary definition might be, ‘re-establishing a relationship in which both sides accept that despite recognised differences they belong together’210. It is thus a process not an event. As historian Joe Liechty says, it involves ‘a set of interlocking dynamics’211. Liechty212 expresses it as the bringing together of four elements: ‘forgiving’, ‘repenting’, ‘truth seeking’ and ‘justice seeking’. Reconciliation is often presented in theological terms 213. However it has to be applied in many situations not specifically religious. Theologian John D’Arcy May214 recognises that reconciliation is ‘at the same time personal and political’. South African peacemaker Wilhelm Verwoerd, grandson of Henrik Verwoerd, who initiated apartheid, considers that reconciliation in the political sphere might be considered either as friendship, or as tolerance 215. I think this goes too far, and so does the Alliance Party216, though tolerance might be a stage in the process. Liechty and Clegg

209

H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler (eds.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), 1015. 210 Based on Byron Bland’s definition in Rev Byron Bland, ‘The Post-troubles Troubles: The Politics of Reconciliation in Northern Ireland’, unpublished paper, 2001. 211 Joe Liechty, ISE Lecture,’ Theology and Dynamics of Reconciliation’, session IV, 24 October 2001. 212 Ibid. 213 For example 2 Corinthians 5: 17 – 19. (All Biblical quotations are taken from the The Holy Bible. New International Version (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1988)). 214 John D’Arcy May, ‘A Rationale for Reconciliation’, Uniting Church Studies, 7 (1) (2001), 1-13. 215 Wilhelm J. Vervoerd, ‘Towards the Truth about the TRC: A Response to Key Moral Criticisms of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, Religion and Theology, 6 (1999), 303 – 324. 216 Alliance Party, Building a United Community (Belfast: Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, 2003), 12.

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suggest that ‘Tolerance is a useful tool for resisting sectarianism, but not sufficient on its own’217. The Alliance Party certainly sees itself as a party of reconciliation. Though the word is not used in the Party Principles218, they spell out aims that are about reconciliation, for example, the principles speak of ‘healing divisions’, ‘eliminating prejudice’ and ‘appreciating the beliefs and fears of others’. 1972 William McComish219 writing in Alliance News refers to Alliance as ‘the party of reconciliation’. The leading article in Alliance News October 1979220 is headed ‘Reconciliation is the Word’ and favourably compares statements made by Pope John-Paul II on his visit to Drogheda221 with Alliance Party principles. His Holiness said, Never think you are betraying your own community by seeking to understand and respect and accept those of a different tradition. You will serve your own tradition best by working for reconciliation with others222. In 1984 Charles Kinahan, a Party President, in a letter to Alliance News223 said, ‘RECONCILIATION [his capitals], that one big word epitomises the Alliance message’. In 2003 in the document Building a United Community224 the Party sees the need for reconciliation as a Community Relations initiative225. The document goes on to say, 217

Joe Liechty and Cecelia Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001), 158. Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, ‘Statement of Principles upon which the Alliance Party was founded on April 21, 1970’ in Alliance Party Constitution and Rules (Belfast: Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, 1970, revised 1974 and 1995), 20. 219 William A McComish, ‘Christianity and Alliance’, Alliance News, (July 1972), 5. 220 Alliance News, (October 1979), 1, 3. 221 ‘Address of Pope John Paul II at Drogheda, 29 September 1979’ in The Pope in Ireland – Addresses and Homilies (Dublin: Veritas, 1979), 16 – 25. 222 Ibid. 23. 223 Charles Kinahan, ‘Letter to editor’, Alliance News, (May 1984), 5. 224 Alliance Party, Building a United Community, 10. 225 Gillian Robinson, Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey 1989 – 1996 (Belfast: CCRU, 1998), http://www.ccruni.gov.uk/research/nisas/robinson.htm, quoted in Building a United Community, 10. 218

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Individual citizens are of equal worth. [they] have different needs, individuals need to have a shared sense of identity and values, plus a common sense of belonging and destiny. Society needs to be cohesive as well as respectful of diversity. Section 3.3.1 refers to an open and free society, where we are all equal citizens: not a society where we merely tolerate difference, but rather a society where we celebrate diversity and cherish individuality226. There are dangers in claiming the high moral ground of being ‘the party of reconciliation’. It smacks of arrogance. Addie Morrow227 agreed with me that McComish goes too far when he said ‘I believe that the Alliance Party embodies the Christian message of reconciliation’ and ‘that the Alliance Party, the party of reconciliation is the only political party which can be supported by anyone calling himself “Christian”’228. He may make such a statement for himself, which I personally agree with, but his blanket application to all Christians is a sectarian remark that is contrary to a reconciliation process. Rather than just take prima facie statements that the Alliance Party is a party of reconciliation, we should analyse how the Alliance Party stands up in practice to the various elements of reconciliation. If we consider Liechty’s four limbs of reconciliation; ‘forgiving’, ‘repenting’, ‘truth seeking’ and ‘justice seeking’229, we can apply four ‘tests’ and then see whether the ‘fruits of reconciliation’ ‘peace, trust, hope, confidence and togetherness’ are evident. Is Alliance a forgiving party? Unfortunately forgiveness is not generally much in evidence between opposing political parties. Whitley Stokes, writing in 1799 226

Alliance Party, Building a United Community, 12. Addie Morrow, interview 30 May 2003. 228 McComish, ‘Christianity and Alliance’, 5. 229 Liechty, ISE Lecture, ‘Theology and Dynamics of Reconciliation’, session IV, 24 October 2001. 227

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said, ‘the only hope for peace in Ireland is mutual forgiveness’230. However, while recognising the wrongs done by others to society, Alliance have in effect expressed a de facto forgiveness in that they continue to work together with members of all other parties, including Sinn Fein to forward the political process. Alliance, Sinn Fein and SDLP have clearly acted in this way by becoming involved with their political opponents in power sharing exercises. The most dramatic, recent such event by the Alliance Party was surely the decision by the three Belfast City Councillors to vote for Sinn Fein Councillor Alex Maskey as Lord Mayor231. That act of forgiveness took a great deal of courage and heart-searching and did not have the approval of all the Party members outside the City Council232. When it comes to repentance, political parties are generally very slow to admit to their mistakes. They are too ready to blame others. There have certainly been moves from members of Sinn Fein to apologise, such as a statement by Martin McGuinness233 and another from the IRA in their May 2003 statement234. At the time of the formation of the Alliance Party, those who left either the Unionist Party or a Nationalist Party to join Alliance were in effect admitting the wrongs inflicted by the Unionists in the old Stormont Government, or realising that there is a better way forward than working exclusively for nationalist aims. Those pioneers of the New Ulster Movement and founders of the Alliance Party were certainly expressing remorse for past wrongs and aiming to make restitution for them. In a radically new 230

Whitley Stokes, Projects for Re-establishing the Internal Peace and Tranquillity of Ireland (Dublin, 1799), 44, quoted in Joe Liechty, “History and Reconciliation: Frank Wright, Whitley Stokes, and the Vortex of Antagonism” in Alan D Falconer and Joe Liechty, Reconciling Memories, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2nd edition 1998), 160. 231 Belfast City Council, www.belfastcity.gov.uk/alexmaskey.htm, Accessed on 3 June 2003. 232 Addie Morrow confirmed that there had been a small number of resignations from the party over this issue. (Addie Morrow interview on 30 May 2003). 233 Referring to the Enniskillen Remembrance Day Bomb, Martin McGuinness, admitted that ‘they [unionists] have been hurt by me and they have been hurt by republicans down the years. There is no question. . it is time to bring it all to an end’, (Radio 5 interview reported in Sunday Times 5 August 2001). 234 ‘IRA Statement of May 6’ Irish News (7 May 2003), 6.

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party they were certainly changing their attitudes and behaviour, in that new members accept those same attitudes they are embracing those acts of repentance. The Alliance Party would certainly approve of truth seeking at every level. It is also totally behind justice, (Principle no. 4235) though it is not clear how they define justice. The party’s attitude to justice can be demonstrated from the Party Leader’s speech to Conference in April 2003236. He was talking about how to deal with ‘On the Runs’ – ‘fugitives from justice’ who are wanted by the police for prosecution for terrorist activities and persons already convicted who have escaped from custody. David Ford said that they should be treated in the same way as those prisoners who were released under the terms of the Agreement237. Justice must be seen to be done and in any resolution they might be released on licence rather than given amnesty. The concerns of the victims should be taken into account and also of those who have been exiled by paramilitary threats. These threats must be lifted. That shows an evenhanded approach to justice applicable to all including the ‘legitimate forces of the state [who] must obey the law themselves’. In the South African ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ the search for truth was often balanced against the application of retributive justice. Currently the Alliance Party is sceptical about a similar process for Northern Ireland.238 Reconciling attitudes and acts can also be judged by their ultimate ‘fruits’, to use a word from scripture239. Does the party aim to produce results such as ‘peace, trust, hope, confidence and togetherness’ indicated by Liechty240 and Lederach241 as fruits of reconciliation? Certainly Alliance has been involved in many peace 235

Alliance Party, ‘Statement of Principles’. 20. David Ford, ‘Party Leader’s Speech to Conference 2003’, Alliance, (March and April 2003), 8 – 9. 237 The Agreement, (Belfast: The Governments of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland of Ireland, 1998), 25. 238 ‘A Truth Commission for Northern Ireland?’ ITV “Insight” programme, 11 April 2002. 239 ‘You will know them by their fruits’, Matt. 7: 20. 240 Liechty, ISE Lecture, ‘Theology and Dynamics of Reconciliation’, session IV, 24 October 2001. 241 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace, xvi. 236

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processes. Many Alliance members and supporters went on the peace marches initiated by Nobel Peace Prize winners Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan in 1976/77242. John Paul Lederach says, ‘Trust’ is the ‘fruit’ that is most lacking in ‘statist’ negotiations243. The Alliance Party generally engenders trust, as members have been given important cross-community posts, as described in Chapter 3.3. The British government certainly shows trust by making these appointments and the vast majority of people trust them to act fairly. However Frank Wright suggests, The best service the British could do for the people in Ireland is to make it possible for the different national groups to recognise the validity of each others mutual mistrust. Only when that is possible is it also possible to create trust244. Perhaps the Alliance party should take on this task themselves? They should be in a better position than the British to understand the issues of mutual mistrust from within the state. Alliance is ever full of hope that its influence will lead to a peaceful state denuded of discrimination and inequality, as described in Principles 2 and 4245.

5.2 Party principles and policies regarding sectarianism The Alliance Party was founded on the basis that, ‘our primary objective is to heal the bitter divisions in our community by ensuring: - (c) The elimination of prejudice by a just and liberal appreciation of the beliefs and fears of different members of the community,’246. 242

Eric Gallagher and Stanley Worrall, Christians in Ulster 1968 – 1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 177 – 181. 243 Lederach, Building Peace, xvi. 244 Frank Wright, ‘Reconciling the Histories of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland’ in Falconer, Alan D., and Liechty, Joe, Reconciling Memories, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2nd edition 1998), 136. 245 Alliance Party, ‘Statement of principles’, 20. 246 Ibid. 20

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In a survey of attitudes by about 300 party members247 one question asks for their attitude to ‘Buzz-words to describe Alliance’ on a scale of 1 to 5. The buzzwords ‘Non-Sectarian’, ‘Anti-Sectarian’ and ‘Cross-Community’ had high ratings of 4.64, 4.43 and 4.43 respectively. These are the highest rating of the twelve ‘buzz-words’ in that questionnaire. Clearly most Alliance party members consider themselves to be non-sectarian, and a large majority say they are anti-sectarian. Many also consider themselves to be ‘cross-community’. There is a small but significant minority of respondents who rejects or is indifferent to these terms. Of course many people filling in such questionnaires might put in replies that they think they ought to put. In their book, “Moving Beyond Sectarianism”, Joe Liechty and Cecelia Clegg discuss definitions of sectarianism248. In summary they say, Sectarianism. . is a system of attitudes, actions, beliefs and structures. . at personal, communal and institutional levels. . .which always involves religion and typically involves a negative mixing of religion and politics . . . which arises as a distorted expression of positive, human needs especially for belonging, identity, and the free expression of difference. . . and is expressed in destructive patterns of overlooking others. . .belittling, dehumanising, or demonising others, justifying or collaborating in the domination of others. Physically or verbally intimidating or attacking others. Thus they consider that an act can be sectarian if presented in a certain way. A factual statement of belief or membership of an organisation that potentially promotes sectarian ideas need not be sectarian. Allan Leonard in his MA thesis about the Alliance Party asks ‘if anyone who supports the Union or a united Ireland is sectarian’249. The answer is that they are only sectarian in that thy act in a sectarian

247

Alliance Party, Members Questionnaire - Council Report, 1998. Liechty and Clegg, ‘What is Sectarianism? A working definition’, in Moving Beyond Sectarianism, 102 – 147. 249 Allan Leonard, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society (MA thesis: University College Dublin, 1999), 1. 248

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manner. Holding particular political views is not itself sectarian 250. After the Agreement Referendum and Assembly elections, Party Leader Sean Neeson suggested, ‘Moderate unionism and moderate nationalism are enjoying a honeymoon, but they still represent sectarian politics and institutionalise a divided society’251. The Alliance Party policy paper on Community Relations has a section on sectarianism252. Sectarianism is combined with racism and defined in this paper as ‘Racism, sectarianism and other forms of prejudice are about institutionalising difference and putting people into boxes’. The Alliance Party says that These differences are often imagined or constructed rather than real or substantive, and that they are present not only in working class communities or at interface areas but also in the leafy suburbs and down at the golf club. Rather sectarian attitudes are prevalent and persistent throughout Northern Ireland society253. The document is strongly critical of the constant division of the people of Northern

Ireland

into

‘two

communities’

thus

ignoring

cross-community

relationships, ‘you are identified by the Community in to which you were born’254. The definition of sectarianism says that it always involves religion255. The Alliance Party Principles256 refer to beliefs of others, which has the same meaning. It is interesting to consider the comments of Liechty and Clegg about nonsectarian and anti-sectarian categories, Non-sectarianism judges sectarianism to be a problem and probably an evil. It responds by working around it. Certain topics in religion and politics are avoided in mixed settings. The weakness of this 250

Liechty and Clegg, Beyond Sectarianism, 149 – 150. Sean Neeson, Alliance News (September/November 1998) 252 Alliance Party, Community Relations, 5. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid. 255 Liechty and Clegg, Moving beyond Sectarianism, 28 – 29. 256 Alliance Party, ‘Statement of Principles’, 20. 251

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position shows up when a crisis makes sectarianism unavoidable. Cordial avoidance can become wary, suspicious avoidance257. So I must ask if there is sectarianism within the Alliance Party or between the Alliance Party and its members and those of other persuasions. In Alliance Party circles generally, I would say that religion is rarely discussed. The perceived religious affiliation of most members is generally known by the usual signals. However there is not usually a problem if people do discuss their church activities. Sometimes the time given to church activities might conflict with demands from the party for political activities. However, Addie Morrow in his interview told me a story, in which a senior member of the party, a lapsed Catholic, berated another senior party member who is a practising Catholic. The one said something to the effect that no enlightened person believes in religion in this day and age. The other was apparently quite upset. This type of situation is well described by Liechty and Clegg as involving ‘secular liberalism . . . often antagonistic with the churches’258. But one might ask how Alliance people cope in wider society. I think generally Alliance people will name and confront sectarianism in a positive manner, but maybe not always. Liechty and Clegg also criticise anti-sectarianism259, in that, ‘When sectarianism encounters difference, that encounter often runs in a sequence something like this:

Encounter – judge – condemn – reject – demonise –

separation/antagonism’, I suggest that when post-sectarianism encounters difference it should go like this: Encounter - listen – observe - accept – celebrate – togetherness/friendship. This is a sequence parallel to that for the dynamics of sectarianism. While this does not 257

Liechty and Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism, 24 – 26. Ibid. 151. 259 Ibid. 258

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normally cause a problem within Alliance, it is likely that when others from sectarian groups encounter Alliance opposition to sectarianism (or even indifference) it creates an antagonism towards the Alliance Party and its members 260. This is particularly true in times of increased polarisation of the political groups. This does not mean that one has to agree totally with the difference. The acceptance is the acceptance of the others’ right to hold that position. The celebration is a rejoicing in the fact of difference, and that one can accept and befriend the other person with their differences. Even in the very anti-catholic and penal law times of the 18th century, the evangelist and originator of Methodism John Wesley in his ‘Letter to a Roman Catholic’ (1759)261 states that ‘even if we cannot as yet think alike in all things, at least we can love alike’.

5.3 Religious attitudes in the Alliance Party The basic premise of the Alliance Party is that its members will be from any and all religious persuasions or none. This is shown in Principles 2 (c) and 4 262. Various opinion polls have estimated the religious breakdown of Alliance members and supporters. In a survey of 1992 Evans and Duffy263 give a table of the religious affiliation of party supporters in Northern Ireland (A summary of all these data is given in Table 5.1 below). For the Alliance Party there are 50.2 per cent Protestant, 31.2 per cent Catholic and 18.7 per cent who state no religion (sample size not 260

An example in August 2003 is that two Alliance Councillors had windows broken because they publicly opposed sectarian paramilitary flags and emblems see Stephen Farry, ‘Blowing in the Wind – the search for an answer to flags’, Alliance News, (July/August 2003), 4 – 5. 261 Burch, Samuel and Reynolds, Gerry (Eds.), John Wesley: A Letter to a Roman Catholic (Belfast: Cornerstone Community and Clonard Monastery, 1987), 8. 262 Alliance Party, ‘Statement of Principles’, 20. 263 G. Evans and M. Duffy, ‘Beyond the Sectarian Divide: The Social Bases and Political Consequences of Nationalist and Unionist Party Competition in Northern Ireland’, British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997) 47 – 81, Quoted in Michael Keating, ‘Northern Ireland and the Basque Country’ in John McGarry (ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 189.

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known).

An earlier survey by Moxon-Browne in 1978264 found 50.5 per cent

Protestant, 40.5 per cent Catholic and 9.0 per cent no religion (sample size 1277). Bodilis in his MA thesis of 1993 on a sample of 51, gives figures of 50.9 per cent Protestant, 25.5 per cent Catholic and 23.5 per cent no religion The net proportion of Catholics would be 38 per cent in Evans and Duffy’s survey, compared with the 1991 Census figure of 38.4 per cent (stated) or 41.5 per cent (estimated) 265, which is perhaps surprising, as Alliance appears to draw most of its supporters from largely Protestant areas. Significantly in those areas the SDLP often did not have a candidate, and so Catholics, having no other party to vote for, tended to vote Alliance. However since the emergence of Sinn Fein as an electoral force, SDLP has fielded more candidates in these areas in addition to Sinn Fein, with a corresponding decline in Alliance votes. It is interesting that the proportion of Alliance supporters giving ‘No religion’ is much higher than for any other named party. For UUP the ‘No religion’ proportion is 7.1 per cent, for DUP, 10.4 per cent, for SF, 5.2 per cent and for SDLP, 2.9 per cent. There is a category of ‘Other’, which registers 22.1 per cent ‘No religion’266. The breakdown of people into Catholics and Protestants in national census data has been criticised by Alliance, who would prefer there to be no mention of religion. In their document Building a United Community they point out that in the 2001 census 14 per cent of the population do not describe themselves as either Protestant or Catholic267. Alliance is critical of attempts by the census analysers to put some of these persons into a category, using other signals from other information in the census return. 264

Edward Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot, Hants: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1983), 65. 265 Conflict Archive on the Internet Project, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/popul.htm#cath. 266 Evans and Duffy, G. Evans and M. Duffy, ‘Beyond the Sectarian Divide: The Social Bases and Political Consequences of Nationalist and Unionist Party Competition in Northern Ireland’, British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997) 47 – 81. 267 Alliance Party, Building a United Community, 9.

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Generally speaking religion is not an issue in Alliance. Many members are active church - goers and workers, though some are not. In a survey of 54 Alliance Party election candidates, E Bodilis found that 24 attended church once a week, 8 more often 12 less often and 10 never268. In my own questionnaire, there were 38 Respondents, consisting of 6 Church of Ireland (15.8 per cent), 10 Presbyterian (37.0 per cent), 2 Methodist (5.3 per cent), 2 Other (5.3 per cent), 7 Catholics (18.4 per cent) and 11 None (28.9 per cent). In this small sample there were more of no religious persuasion and less Catholics than in other surveys. Most of the Christians attended church once a week or more often. Two Protestants and one Catholic said they never attended.

Table 5.1 Religious affiliations of Alliance Party Members compared with Population. MoxonBrowne 1978

Protesta nt Catholi c None

Evans and Duffy 1992

5 0.5

5 0.2

4 0.5

5

3

Population Census 1991

5

2

5 2.9

1 8.4

2 3.5

work

2.6

5.5 1

8.7

Current 2003

0.9

1.2 9.

0

Bodilis 1993

3 8.4

2 8.9

1 4.0

As far as I am aware there was not usually any conscious decision to split posts equally between Catholics and Protestants. However there is a belief that in the Leadership election in 1987 with Catholic (Seamus Close) and a Protestant (John Alderdice) candidates, that voting Council members preferred the Protestant, because the previous three leaders had all been Catholics269. There have now been three 268

Erwann Bodilis, MA thesis, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 1970 – 1993: Twenty Years of Comiat for Peace and progress, (Universite de Bretagne Occidentale, 1994), 100. 269 Seamus Close, interview 24 June 2003.

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Catholic Party Leaders and two Protestants. Generally the Deputy Leader would be from the other persuasion. It was a perceived initial aim of the Alliance Party to negate the religious differences between Protestants and Catholics in politics. Thus for the 1973 Local government and Assembly elections, Oliver Napier, a Catholic, stood in East Belfast (a largely Protestant area) and Robert Cooper, a Protestant, stood West Belfast (a largely Catholic area – except it includes the Shankill a very Protestant area). Both were elected, though not easily, Napier on the eighteenth count and Cooper on the twelfth count270. Over time Oliver Napier gained a personal reputation and easily held the East Belfast seat. Cooper held West Belfast in the Convention election on the eighth count271 and after Bob had taken on the Fair Employment post, Will Glendinning (another Protestant) held the seat in the 1982 Assembly election, again on the eighth count272. He also held a Council seat for Lower Falls 273 – a very Catholic area. Do Alliance people pay too little attention to religion, when it is such a defining issue for most other parties? Does their non-sectarian, non-religious stance ‘get up the noses’ of some people? Does the Alliance Party’s claim to be ‘the party of reconciliation’ smack of putting themselves on a pedestal, of being ‘holier than thou’? Both Seamus Close and Philip McGarry274 agreed that this was probably the case. People are generally emotionally alienated by such attitudes from people who claim to be ‘born again Christians’ suggesting that they are better than everyone else. They quickly call it hypocrisy. Is it not sectarian to set oneself apart from others as being non-sectarian or anti-sectarian? Joe Liechty when discussing the problem of religion and conflict suggests that there are three ways in which people deal with this problem. One is to ignore it, saying ‘help! we’re secular’ and the ‘world is becoming more secular: it will go away’. In any case the conflicts are really about something else275. Newly elected Party Leader John Alderdice stated that ‘the real division is not between protestant and catholic or unionists and nationalist, but between those for and those against the democratic process’276. 270

Fionnuala McKenna and Martin Melaugh, ‘The Northern Ireland Conflict Archive’, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/ra1973, accessed on 26 May 2003. 271 Ibid. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/rcc1975, accessed on 26 May 2003. 272 Ibid. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/election/ra1982, accessed on 26 May 2003. 273 Elliott and Flackes, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 266 – 267. 274 Seamus Close, interview 24 June 2003; Philip McGarry, interview 20 June 2003. 275 Joe Liechty, ‘Religion and Conflict: The Work of Marc Gopin’ ISE Lecture notes 12 February 2003. 276 Fergus Pyle, Irish Times, 5 October 1987.

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The next is to ‘suppress it, or at least control it’ 277; the third is to ‘deny there is a problem’. However Orthodox Jewish Rabbi and conflict resolution practitioner, Marc Gopin is clear that ‘religion will not go away, it must be dealt with creatively’ 278. He suggests that two very different scenarios are possible ‘from the human interaction with traditional religion’. ‘Religion is one of the most salient phenomena that will cause massive violence in the next century’ or ‘religion will play a critical role in constructing a global community of shared moral commitments and vision’279. He goes on to say, Never before in history have so many leaders [Ghandi, King, the Dalai Lama, Tutu] and adherents been inspired to work for a truly inclusive vision that is multicultural and multireligious. If the world of thoughtful people is open to the infinite hermeneutic variability of religious traditions, one may discover, in the most surprising places of the religious world, the basis for a future that allows for co-existence between religious and secular people globally and even for a shared vision of a civil society280. Marc Gopin gave a lecture in Belfast to a mixed audience and was amazed at the positive response.281 277

Liechty, ‘Religion and Conflict’, 12 February 2003, 1. Ibid. 279 Marc Gopin, ‘Alternative Global Futures in the Balance’ in Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4. 280 Ibid., 4 – 6. 281 Ibid., 7. 278

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Chapter 6. The way forward for the Alliance Party. 6.1 Introduction. The main suggestions for the future of the Alliance Party from the questionnaire were involvement in cross-community politics and combating sectarianism. People were less positive about the party’s identity as a ‘third’ t

tradition party also suggested by Leonard. The reviews of party policy in recent

y

years, particularly the President’s Review followed by the Strategic Plan for

2

2000 to 2002 dealt largely with the minutiae of party organisation. A brief section defines the party’s vision statement:

c

The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland’s vision is of a permanently peaceful, stable and truly democratic society, which cherishes diversity and is committed to human rights, equality of citizenship and social justice. The party’s more recent paper on community relations deals more fully

w

with the party’s identity and with sectarianism. Identity is a key issue in a society like Northern Ireland and impinges on other issues. I will therefore begin with an analysis of the nature of identity and then see how it applies to the Alliance party.

6.2 Ethnic and etatic identities. 71

T

There are, according to Liechty and Schöpflin, two relevant identities: ethnic and etatic. With Liechty we define ethnicity, not in terms of bloodlines, the myth of common decent, but in terms of ‘reproduced culture’. The ‘shared memories of family-like relationships and bonds’ must be taken seriously. Humans are ‘hard-wired’ to socially construct ‘ethnic identities’. These identities are not rigid but can and will develop and change. The ‘etatic identity’ is the state to which we give allegiance. Schöpflin says,

o

usually the one dominant ethnic group imposes its ethnic vision on the state to create an etatic identity and this is then imposed in turn on all the ethnic groups in that territory. It is not easy to separate the two in the Northern Ireland situation. Frank Wright considers Northern Ireland to be a ‘ethnic frontier

s

society’, in which the dominant metropolitan power has the legitimacy of government and a monopoly of violence and retribution. The law is theirs and one should identify with law and state. The Alliance Party does identify with law and state. Their fourth principle says that

o

We firmly believe that without universal respect for the law of the land and the authorities appointed to enforce it, there can be no measurable progress. Equal justice will be guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their political or religious persuasion. 72

There are many examples of their adherence to this principle, such as their a

attitude to decommissioning and their role as ‘police’ in the multi-party talks. However in an ‘ethnic frontier society’ there will be those who deny the legitimacy of the state and therefore the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of violence. Sooner or later they will oppose that state legitimacy in order to try to

e

establish what Schöpflin calls their own ‘community of moral worth’, which is necessary for their own ‘cultural reproduction’. There will be what René Girard

c

calls ‘mimetic rivalry’ and ‘mimetic desire’, leading to representative violence against so called ‘legitimate targets’. In the case of Irish Republicans the forces of the state and their agents become legitimate targets. Mimetically in parallel with the state forces, so called ‘loyalist’ paramilitary groups evolve to institute ‘representative violence’ in response. Their so-called ‘legitimate targets’ are Irish Catholics. Thus spreads fear and suspicion out of proportion to the actual violence. There are now what Wright calls ‘mutual deterrence communities’. He describes a ‘vortex of antagonism’, which is very hard to break. The most significant in a vortex of antagonism are those who can both threaten violence and control the threat simultaneously. Wright also says, this process only looks irrational to someone at a 73

V

distance from it. Seen from within, each escalation of rivalry generates excellent reasons for the next escalation. Violence always generates reasons for itself. Moderates such as the Alliance Party must ‘understand and respect those excellent reasons, but never to take them at face value or as necessary and

s

sufficient’. The best that can be achieved is a ‘tranquillity of mutual deterrence’. But this is not peace. In Northern Ireland one of the most hopeful signs is the good relationship between London and Dublin, which has grown out of the AngloIrish Agreement of 1985. Britain takes both its historical quasi-colonial role

a

and its current role seriously, including the role of Dublin as a rival metropolis .

L

Liechty also considers that the role of Christianity has been a restraining one, despite the churches’ many failures. Wright argues the need to create political structures equidistant from the local situation, such as ‘something approaching joint sovereignty of Britain and the Irish Republic’ if legitimacy is to be

a

accepted by all parties. Perhaps that is the role of the Good Friday Agreement. Unfortunately a large section of the unionist community and a small section of the nationalist community, despite the referendum and elections, dispute the legitimacy of the Agreement. Even within the nationalist community Sinn Fein do not yet accept the legitimacy of the new Police Service of Northern Ireland 74

(PSNI) as representing the ‘monopoly of violence’. Frantz Fanon made a similar general analysis in 1963. In a discussion of colonisation and decolonisation he noted that The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil.

t

Thus we are trapped in a ‘them and us’ dichotomy. Each side sees the o

other as absolutely wrong. Thus Ian Paisley (following the Presbyterian Westminster

C

Confession of Faith) demonises the Pope as the ‘anti-Christ’ and with it the Roman Catholic Church. Members of the Orange Order must ‘strenuously oppose the fatal errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome. .’, to quote the standards of the Orange

O

Order. This demonisation has become part of Ulster Protestant mythology. Conversely the Irish Republicans demonise Britain as the evil coloniser who must be removed. A number of opinion polls have asked about identity. It would appear from the opinion polls in Table 6.1 below that there is little difference between the commitment of nationalists to the identity ‘Irish’ and that of unionists to the identity

‘

‘British’. In a survey of identities academics Karen Trew and Cate Cox found that professional people in the nationalist community tended to favour the identity ‘Irish’ 75

o

of which they were ‘very proud’ though ‘not rewarded’, whereas working class people favoured the identity ‘Catholic’, of which they also were ‘very proud’ and ‘rewarded’. They are united through the community of the Catholic Church. What seems clear is that nationalists have least problem in defining their ethnic identity as ‘Irish’ – which usually means ‘Irish Catholic’ or just ‘Catholic’, though their perceived or stated etatic identity is more variable (Table 6.1). Trew and Cox found that only twenty-seven per cent of ‘Protestants’ said that religion was very important’. Sometimes they call themselves British, which is why they attach so much importance to the union with Britain, though they do not have the same high ‘cognitive commitment’ to being ‘Protestant’ as Irish Catholics do to being ‘Catholics’. Sometimes they see themselves as ‘Ulster’, some times ‘Northern Irish’ occasionally even ‘Irish’. The proliferation of protestant religious denominations means that they do not have a unifying church community. Unionists are more aware of what they are not. They are not part of the Irish Catholic community. They are ‘protestant’, though ‘protestant’ can mean just ‘not catholic’, and may not even mean ‘Christian’ in the pure sense. DUP M.P. Gregory Campbell revealed an interesting insight into this problem when he attended, by invitation, the West Belfast Festival – a mainly nationalist event. He remarked on the high self-confidence of the people there in contrast to the relatively low self-esteem of his own community, and doubted that the DUP would 76

have the courage to invite a leading member of Sinn Féin, such as Gerry Adams to a s

similar event in his community.

Table 6.1 P

Etatic (National) Identities

Protestant-unionistCatholic-nationalistIdentityRose 1968Moxon-Browne

1968Moxon-Browne

1978Smith

1986Rose 1978Smith

1986Irish2083766961British39676515159Ulster322014561British/Irish634687Northern IrishN/AN/A11N/AN/A20

John Whyte provides an excellent account of national identities according to s

survey reports. He gives in three tables the results of three surveys, so one can see the changes over time. I have combined these tables into one for comparison. In Smith’s 1986 survey the option ‘Northern Irish’ was introduced. This identity appealed to 11 per cent of Protestants and 20 per cent of Catholics, in contrast to Trew who says that one third of Catholics and one third of Protestants favoured identification with ‘Northern Irish’. This identity had a lower ‘cognitive commitment’ than other

i

I

W

identities. It is also the identity preferred by the Alliance Party. Interestingly Whyte shows in his Table 4.7 that the proportion of Protestants identifying with Alliance in 1978 was 13 per cent and of Catholics, 21 per cent, mirroring the numbers identifying with the identity ‘Northern Irish’ in 1986.There is 77

considerable overlap in these preferences. The term ‘Northern Irish’ has an appeal to quite a section of both Protestants and Catholics. Conceivably the 11 per cent Protestants and 20 per cent of Catholics who use that term might be Alliance supporters. A mistake Alliance has made is to try to push everybody into the ‘Northern Ireland’ category. Clearly Alliance people are Catholic, Protestant, another religion or of no religion. Within the party all are equally valid and acceptable. But following the Agreement, it is clear that for the foreseeable future there will continue to be a large number of Protestants who wish to be distinct from Catholics and vice-versa. In trying to establish its own identity, Alliance must accept the other divisions, respect them and try to work with both of them. Its own identity is clearly ‘Northern Irish’ with emphasis on the acceptability of all religions or none. The Alliance Party is much more in tune with the ideas of social transformation than of consociation. Rupert Taylor gives an excellent account o

of the contrast between these two approaches. Introducing them he points out how the South African move from apartheid to multi-cultural democracy resulted from the innovative action of an ever-increasing network of progressive movements, institutions, non-governmental organisations and 78

e

associations (churches, trade unions, civics, women’s groups) engaged in a ‘war of position’ against apartheid rule. They achieved ‘consensual democracy’ not ‘consociational democracy’. The difference in Northern Ireland is that there is not yet enough groundswell to break down the religious apartheid. Hence the state has to do with consociational democracy for the time being. However Taylor shows that ‘outside the formal political arena. . the number and quality of concrete cross-community contacts appears to be

i

increasing’. He points to mixed marriages up to ten per cent from one per cent

,s

since the war, cross community housing projects, inter-schools contacts. He

a

also points out that there are now twenty-eight integrated schools compared with ten in 1990 and that both universities are non-sectarian. Taylor says that many sociologists ignore the presence of 5,000 voluntary and community groups, with a per annum turnover of £400 million, equivalent to 6 percent of the gross domestic product. There are 65,000 volunteers and 30,000 paid workers, representing 5 per cent of the work force. Many of the brightest talents have gone to the voluntary sector rather than to formal politics. Taylor also refers to ‘noteworthy bodies’ such as Corrymela

a

and the Community Relations Council, the Opsahl Commission and 79

D

J

Democratic Dialogue. John McGarry discusses the concepts of ‘Civic Nationalism’. McGarry defines three varieties of civic nationalism. The first is Civic (Irish) Nationalism, the second is Civic Unionism and the third is Social Transformation or ‘Bottom-Up’ Civic Nationalism. John McGarry says,

l

Transformers are sceptical of the integrating capabilities of political institutions, even those with consociational (power sharing) . . . are likely to be dominated by sectarian elites. Social transformation is a prerequisite for social integration. It needs policies to promote social integration, increased public expenditure to tackle the material basis of sectarian identities. It ‘is popular with intellectuals on the left, including the Alliance Party, Democratic Left, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition and the Labour Party’. McGarry says that ‘neither the first or second version have any cross-community appeal or is likely to develop one’ and that ‘both the first and second are unrealistic and unfair. The third is merely

u

unrealistic’. Yet with Lederach I think transformation is what must be tried and the Alliance party have the vision to do it. As Sean Neeson said, ‘This Party is not about managing Northern Ireland’s problems; it is about transforming

t

them’. That transformation must involve cross-community politics and ‘moving beyond sectarianism’. 80

6.3 Combating sectarianism In the questionnaire, ‘combating sectarianism’ was the second major choice for Protestants and first for Catholics and first equal for None. Council members rated it second, but candidates ranked it as first choice. Similarly ISE students rated it their second priority. The differences are insignificant. Sectarianism is the biggest plague in our communities in Northern Ireland. It poisons all our relationships with others. Until it is overcome there will not be permanent peace and harmony in this state. Combating sectarianism is a major process. It needs to begin by more people becoming educated about the nature of sectarianism. This problem has not been systematically addressed until recently. The book Moving Beyond Sectarianism b

by Liechty and Clegg is a seminal work in this area and has been briefly discussed in Chapter 4. It has resulted in a series of spin-off work- books aimed

a

at different age groups. Alliance members would need to become more familiar with this material. They could liaise with people working in these areas at the Irish School of Ecumenics or the CRC. Sectarian issues can only be countered by personal encounters. This involves working in groups with people from other parties. Well-read and trained Alliance party members would be competent to lead these dialogue groups. It is an educational process that 81

involves people changing their perceptions of each other. One cannot change people by preaching at them. They need to be allowed to see for themselves that there is a better way of relating to people with different views, particularly religious views.

It is or should be a major concern of the Assembly as

discussed in Chapter 3 .4. Combating sectarianism is a major aspect of ‘conflict transformation’. John Paul Lederach describes ‘Conflict transformation’ in his various publications, particularly in Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in D

Divided Societies. He suggests in his introduction that ‘I believe that the natures and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the need for a set

o

of concepts and approaches that go beyond the traditional statist diplomacy’ . Lederach’s idea is that rather than just addressing problems of conflict to resolve them, one must address the relationships between the protagonists. The resulting change in relational attitudes may lead people to view the problem in different ways and hence perhaps circumvent the conflict. It requires a willingness of the people involved to change their attitudes.

6.4 Cross-community politics One of the major suggestions from respondents to the questionnaire was that the Alliance Party should engage in cross-community politics. The Council 82

members and ISE students made this their first choice whereas Candidates made it their fourth choice Looking at party members only across the religious divide a similar picture was observed. Protestants and None put it first and for Catholics it was second. There is no significant difference between these responses. The basic principle of the Alliance Party was to include people of both t

the Catholic and Protestant community and of other religions or of no religion . It was considered that it was sufficient to obtain equal rights and opportunities

f

for both Catholics and Protestants within the United Kingdom. The party has been largely sensitive to the unionist political position. However it formerly attracted votes from Catholics who were sympathetic to the cross-community

d

dimension or who had no nationalist candidate to vote for. Insufficient attention was given to the deeper aspirations of the Catholic community for Irish unity.

E

Even increased relations with the Republic were not encouraged, because Alliance knew that it would not go down well with the Unionists. The Alliance Party needs to appreciate much more the aspirations of nationalists and understand the overall benefits to all the people of Ireland of strong north-south relations. Then they will be in a better position to explain those advantages to unionists from a centrist neutral viewpoint. 83

The Alliance Party must stand alone in offering an alternative to sectarian voting. It has played a valuable part in bringing the Northern Ireland people to negotiate their own future and has played a crucial if unsung part in obtaining the Belfast Agreement. It is essential that it survive, though with increased polarisation it could possibly be further decimated at the next election. If the other ‘pro-Agreement’ parties and the two governments are serious about implementing the spirit of the Agreement, they should be prepared to encourage those who would wish to vote for a non-sectarian party. If the arrangements for strengthening the influence of the ‘Other’ bloc’s votes, as suggested in the next section, are made it will act as an incentive to moderate people to vote for parties in the ‘Other’ group. A strong representation from s

C

such parties acts as a catalyst to promote the aims of the Agreement. Church of Ireland priest, the Reverend Timothy Kinahan, suggested that the Alliance Party’s strength is in local councils and interacting with ‘grass roots’ people where Councillors and their workers can actively work across the

c

communities and practise ‘moving beyond sectarianism’. Lederach’s model for building peace involves the interaction of people at all levels of society, not just the top echelon involved in statist diplomacy, but also the grass-roots community workers and especially the middle range (professional) leadership 84

p

f

people. Journalist Peter Walker confirmed this when he wrote in Fortnight, Real peace needs people based initiatives designed to promote peace. . .. It can only be realised when diversity is respected . . .. Localised problem solving efforts, involving ordinary people, are more likely to lead to genuine improvements in community relations than imposed solutions coming top-down from an outside elite. Another mode of operation suggested by Leonard for the Alliance Party

i

is for it to act as a ‘bridge’ between the other parties . In 1992 the Alliance Party had its logo redesigned and the result was that the form of the ‘A’ was

d

deliberately in the form of a bridge. This option was not particularly favoured in the questionnaire. Candidates ranked it fifth with Alliance being a ‘third’ party as third preference. Council members ranked it sixth with the ‘third party’ option as fourth. Of course during the Forum negotiations, Alliance’s major

r

role was to act as a bridge between the parties. Personally I think Alliance would need to be a ‘bridge’ in order to carry out a role combating sectarianism. However a party has to have sufficient electoral strength as a stand-alone party before it has the opportunity to act as a bridge. I doubt if the party will disappear despite a comment by the Editor of

N

the Belfast Newsletter. It will still have a meaningful role in local government, but it is vital that it attempts to enhance its appeal for the next Assembly elections, and seek to increase its representation. 85

6.5 A future role in the Assembly During the negotiating period the Alliance Party was so busy helping everybody else to reach an agreement that they gave insufficient attention to t

their own position. They agreed to a system in which ‘sufficient consensus’ was required on certain issues but only between the Unionist and Nationalist blocks. The only contribution the centre parties had in voting was to the total

v

vote. Alliance has been trying to have this situation rectified. At the Alliance Party annual Conference in April 2000 an Emergency Motion that ‘Conference calls upon the government to amend those sections of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 that discriminate against designated ‘other’ in the assembly’ was proposed by Deputy Leader, Seamus Close who said, ‘The cross community voting in the Assembly should be amended so that a majority of nationalists plus others and a majority of unionists plus others is required. This would not only be good for Alliance, but it would also be good for the whole country as the vote of extremists on each side would be minimised’.

v

The motion was passed, but the government did not respond, so there was a 86

crisis in November 2001, when a vote was needed to restore Trimble and Mallon as First and Deputy First Ministers. The requirement was for an overall majority and a 50 per cent majority in both the ‘Nationalists’ bloc and the ‘Unionists’ bloc. The Unionist vote was deficient due to the resignation of Peter Weir and Pauline Armitage from the UUP group. The overall vote on 2 November was 70.6 per cent in favour, but only 49.2 per cent from the unionists. In order to rectify this Alliance MLAs were pressurised to ‘redesignate’ three of their number as ‘unionists’. This was against their previously agreed policy, and Seamus Close was totally against this procedure. However pressure from Downing Street persuaded them to redesignate on this one occasion.

So the vote on 6 November was 70.7 per cent in favour

including now 51.7 per cent of ‘unionists’. Before the vote Seamus Close said,

o

if Tony Blair was on his knees in this room at this moment there would not be a snowball’s chance in hell of me changing my designation . . . . It was the best opportunity in the history of the Alliance Party to stand and say no!.

Immediately after this the party had a detailed review of the voting p

procedure. This showed that if a weighted majority of 65 per cent had been used it would have made little difference to the results of 39 votes in the 87

Assembly, apart from 5 to do with standing orders and 3 others. The review c

considers various other options. It rejects Close’s idea that votes of ‘Others’ should be counted with both ‘Unionists’ and ‘Nationalists’ and the idea that ‘Others’ should be a distinct bloc on a par with ‘Unionists’ and ‘Nationalists’ as this would make the votes of ‘Others’ of more value than the rest. This latter

i

idea is briefly mentioned by John McGarry who qualifies it in a footnote, that ‘there would have to be appropriate safeguards here to prevent rejectionist unionists or nationalists registering as ‘others’ in order to prevent the passage

o

of legislation’. Whatever is decided the votes of ‘Others’ must count as much as the votes of ‘Unionists’ and ‘Nationalists’ and the ‘Others’ bloc should have the same status as the these groups, perhaps even a guaranteed Executive seat.

88

Conclusion. There is ample evidence to show that the Alliance party is a party of reconciliation. It has made contributions to the Northern Ireland ‘peace process’ that far outweigh its electoral strength. However in trying too hard to assist others to make the Good Friday Agreement, it has lost its own ‘political space’. It needs to make more effort to understand the mutual mistrust between the unionist and nationalist communities and thence help them to understand G

each other. The 1988 policy document Governing with Consent lacks a full appreciation of Catholic/nationalist concerns, which has been part of the cause of the loss of Catholic support. This should be corrected in the current review of

p

party policy. 89

While there is scant evidence for much sectarianism within the party, apart from isolated incidents, the concern among some party members to b

be outside religious issues is tending to drive the party into a ‘secular liberal’ position, which can appear to be ‘exclusion’ to others. Party members should value and respect the religious convictions of others both within and outside the party, so that it can truly ‘embrace’ people of different religious persuasions and

n

none.

19,674 words

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The Alliance Party’s Strategic Plan 2000 – 2002 (Belfast: Alliance Party, 1999). The Agreement, Belfast, 1998. Barritt, Denis, Northern Ireland: A Problem to Every Solution (London: Quaker Peace and Service, 1982). Belfast City Council, www.belfastcity.gov.uk/alexmaskey.htm. Bew, Paul and Gillespie, Gordon, Northern Ireland 1968 – 1999: A Chronology of the Troubles (Dublin: Gill and McMillan, 1999). Bodilis, Erwann, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 1970 – 1993: Twenty Years of Comiat for Peace and progress (MA thesis: Universite de Bretagne Occidentale, 1994). Boraine, Alex, A Country Unmasked, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Burch, Samuel and Reynolds, Gerry (Eds.), John Wesley: A Letter to a Roman Catholic (Belfast: Cornerstone Community and Clonard Monastery, 1987). Cathcart, Rex, The Most Contrary Region: The BBC in Northern Ireland 1924 – 1984 (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1984). Coleman, Paul in Enright, Richard D. and North, Joanna (eds.), Exploring Forgiveness, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1998). Community Relations Unit, A Shared Future – A Consultation Paper on Improving Relations in Northern Ireland, January 2003 (Belfast: Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2003). Conflict Archive on the Internet Project, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/popul.htm#cath. The Confession of Faith, (Belfast: Graham and Heslip, 1933). Darby, John, Northern Ireland: Managing Difference (London: Minority Right Group, 1995).

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Dewar, W. M., Why Orangeism? (Belfast: Grand Lodge of Ireland, 1959). Electoral Reform Society, http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/ers/history.htm Elliott, Sidney, ‘The d’Hondt System Explained’ (BBC News Online: Events: Northern Ireland: Focus, 28 November 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/northern_ireland/ Elliott, Sidney and Flackes, William D, Northern Ireland Political Directory, 1968 – 2000 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2001). Ericson, Maria Reconciliation and the Search for a Shared Moral Landscape – an exploration based upon a study of Northern Ireland and South Africa (PhD thesis: Lund University, Sweden, 2001). Evans, G. and Duffy, M., ‘Beyond the Sectarian Divide: The Social Bases and Political Consequences of Nationalist and Unionist Party Competition in Northern Ireland’, British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997) 47 – 81. Falconer, Alan D., and Liechty, Joe, Reconciling Memories, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2nd edition 1998). Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (trans. By Constance Farrington), (New York: Grove Press, 1963). Fisher, R. J., ‘John Burton, Controlled Communication to Analytic Problem Solving’ in Interface Conflict Resolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 30. Frameworks for the Future, HMSO, Belfast, 1995. Gallagher, A., ‘Dealing with Conflict: Schools in Northern Ireland’, Multicultural Teaching, 13(3), (1994), 13. Gallagher, Eric and Worrall, Stanley, Christians in Ulster 1968 – 1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). Girard, René, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore and London: 1981).

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Gopin, Marc, ‘Alternative Global Futures in the Balance’ in Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Hadden, T., Irwin, C. and Boal, F., ‘Separation or Sharing? The People’s Choice’, Fortnight, 356 (December 1996) Supplement. Haddick-Flynn, Kevin, Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1999). Horton, Remy, 2002, ‘d’Hondt PR calculator’, http://www.compulink.co.uk/~broadway/pr95/ It’s Time for Tomorrow Together, (Alliance Party Manifesto 1998). Knight, J. and Baxter-Moore, N., Northern Ireland Elections of the Twenties (The Arthur McDougal Fund, 1972). Knox, Colin and Quirk, Padraic, ‘Responsibility Sharing’ in Northern Ireland Local Government’, http://wwww.ccruni.gov.uk/research/uu/knox94.htm Lederach, John Paul, Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington D C: USA Institute of Peace Studies, 1997). Leonard, Allan, The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Power Sharing in a Divided Society (MA thesis: University College Dublin, 1999). Liechty, Joseph and Clegg, Cecilia, Moving Beyond Sectarianism (Dublin: Columba Press, 2001). Liechty, Joe ‘History and Reconciliation’, in Falconer, Alan D and Liechty, Joe, (eds.) Reconciling Memories, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2nd edition 1998). Liechty, Joe, ISE Lecture, ‘Theology and Dynamics of Reconciliation’ October 2001. Liechty, Joe, ‘Religion and Conflict: The Work of Marc Gopin’ ISE Lecture notes 12 February 2003.

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Mallie, Eamonn and McKittrick, David, Endgame in Ireland (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2001). McGarry, John (Ed.), Northern Ireland and the Divided World – Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan, Explaining Northern Ireland (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). McGarry, Philip, The President’s Review (Belfast: Alliance Party, 1998). May, John D’Arcy, ‘A Rationale for Reconciliation’, Uniting Church Studies, 7 (1) (2001), 1-13. Melaugh, Martin, ‘Central Community Relations Unit’, http://www.ccru.gov.uk/ Melaugh, Martin and McKenna, Fionnuala, The Northern Ireland Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/ira231001.htm. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/porgan.htm. Moloney, Ed and Pollock, Andy, Paisley (Swords, Co Dublin: Poolbeg Press Ltd, 1986). Moody, T. W. and Martin, F. X., The Course of Irish History (Cork: Mercier Press, 1967). Moxon-Browne, Edward, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1983). Mulholland, Marc, The Longest War: 1971 – (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Naylor, Yvonne, Moving Beyond Sectarianism: A Resource for Young Adults (Belfast: Irish School of Ecumenics, 2001).

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Naylor, Yvonne, Who We Are: Dealing with Difference (Belfast: Irish School of Ecumenics, 2003). Neeson, Sean, People First, (Belfast: Alliance Party, 1999). Northern Ireland Information Service, Birthday Honours List 1998, www.nics.gov.uk/ nio/press/1998/ Pollak, Andy (ed.) The Opshal Report: A Citizens’ Inquiry (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1992). The Pope in Ireland – Addresses and Homilies (Dublin: Veritas, 1979). Robinson, Gillian, Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey 1989 – 1996 (Belfast: CCRU, 1998), http://www.ccruni.gov.uk/research/nisas/robinson.htm. Rose, Richard, Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective (London: Faber and Faber, 1971). Sands, Craig, Moving Beyond Sectarianism: A Resource for Adult Education (Belfast: Irish School of Ecumenics, 2001). Schöpflin, George, ‘Civil Society, Ethnicity and the State: a threefold relationship’, Paper delivered to Conference, ‘Civil Society in Austria’ Vienna, 20 – 21 June 1997, http://www.ssees.ac.uk/index.htm. Smith, David J., Equality and Inequality in Northern Ireland, Pt. 3, Perceptions and Views (PSI Occasional Papers No. 39 (London: Political Studies Institute, 1987). Trew, Karen and Cox, Cate, ‘Dimensions of Social Identity in Northern Ireland’ http://www.ccruni.gov.uk/research/qub/trew95.htm. Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness, (London, Sydney, Auckland, Johannesburg: Rider, 1999). Verwoerd, Wilhelm J., ‘Towards the Truth about the TRC: A Response to Key Moral Criticisms of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, Religion and Theology, 6 (1999), 303 – 324.

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Whyte, John, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). Whyte, Nicholas, ‘Northern Ireland Assembly Elections’, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa73.htm. Wilson, Brian The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland: A Study of a Bi-Confessional Party (MSc, Strathclyde University, 1975). Wright, Frank, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987). Wright, Frank, ‘Reconciling the Histories of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland’ in Falconer, Alan D., and Liechty, Joe, Reconciling Memories, (Dublin: Columba Press, 2nd edition 1998), 128 – 148.

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APPENDIX

97

APPENDIX A. Statement of principles upon which the Alliance Party was founded on April 21, 1970. 1. We support the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. We know that the overwhelming majority of our people share this belief and that provocative debate about it has been the primary cause of all our most fundamental troubles. The union is in the best economic and social interest of all citizens of the state. It also implies British standards of democracy and social justice, which will be energetically secured and steadfastly upheld. We are firmly committed to the principle of devolved government and would not support any attempt to suspend or dissolve the Northern Ireland parliament. 2. Our primary aim is to heal the bitter divisions in our community by ensuring:(a) Equality of citizenship and of human dignity; (b) The rooting out of discrimination and injustices; (c) The elimination of prejudice by a just and liberal appreciation of the beliefs and fears of different members of the community; (d) Equality of social, economic and educational opportunities; (e) Highest standards of democracy at both parliamentary and local government levels; (f) Complete and effective participation in our political, governmental and public life at all levels by people drawn from both sides of our present 98

religious divide. 3. Our economic policies will not be shackled by any economic dogmas, whether socialist or conservative. The Alliance Party will never accept any such socioeconomic allegiance. Nor is there any intention or desire whatsoever to affiliate with any other party. 4. We firmly believe that without universal respect for the law of the land and the authorities appointed to enforce it, there can be no measurable progress. We, therefore, intend to secure the rapid achievement of such respect and the absolutely equal enforcement of the law without fear or favour, in every part of the state. Equal justice will be guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their political or religious persuasion.

B. Chronology of the Alliance Party 1969 Ulster at the crossroads speech by Terence O’Neill 1969 New Ulster Movement 1970 Formation of Alliance Party 1970 Phelim O’Neill MP as Leader 1972 Oliver Napier becomes Leader. 1972 Involvement in talks at Darlington 1973 First elections: Local Government 13.3 per cent, 63 seats 1973 Assembly Elections 9.3 per cent, 8 seats/78 1973 Sunningdale talks about the Council of Ireland 1973 Power-sharing Executive set up with Oliver Napier and Bob Cooper as Alliance Members 1974 Westminster Elections 99

1974 Ivor Canavan First Alliance Mayor of Derry 1974 UWC strike and fall of executive. 1975 Convention Elections 9.8 per cent, 8 seats/78 1976 Peace People. 1976 Bertie McConnell is Mayor of North Down. 1977 Local government elections – best result 14.4 per cent, 70 seats 1978 Lord Henry Dunleath’s Bill passed to set up integrated education. 1978 David Cook, Lord Mayor of Belfast 1979 Westminster elections Alliance 11.9 per cent (more than DUP). 1979 First European elections – Oliver Napier gets 6.8 per cent. 1980 Atkins talks, 1981 Hunger strikes in Maze prison. Hunger striker Bobby Sands wins byelection for Fermanagh/South Tyrone. 1981 Local government elections Alliance 8.9 per cent, 38 seats 1982 Prior “Rolling devolution” 1982 Assembly elections – Alliance 9.3 per cent best Assembly result, 10 seats/78. John Cushnahan is Chair of Education Committee SDLP and SF refuse to take their seats, as there is no ‘Irish dimension’ 1984 New Ireland Forum – Alliance decline to attend. 1984 European elections David Cook – 5.0 per cent 1984 John Cushnahan becomes party leader 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement – supported by Alliance 1985 Local government elections Alliance 7.1 per cent, 34 seats 1986 Alliance withdraws from Assembly, which then folds. 1987 Successful High Court actions by Alliance members against Castlereagh, Belfast and Lisburn Councils, to resume normal business. 1987 Westminster General Election Alliance 10 per cent. 1987 John Alderdice becomes party leader. 1988 Alliance document ‘Governing with Consent’ 1988 ‘Secret’ Talks at Duisburg – UUP, DUP, SDLP, and APNI. 1988 Forum for Peace and Reconciliation Alliance attends. 1989 Local Government elections Alliance 6.9 per cent, 38 seats 1989 European elections John Alderdice – 5.2 per cent 1990 Brooke/Mayhew talks 1992 Westminster General Election Alliance 8.7 per cent 1993 Local Government elections: Alliance 7.6 per cent, 44 seats 1993 Downing Street Declaration. 1994 Framework Document and peace negotiations 1994 European elections Mary Clarke-Glass obtains 4.1 per cent 100

1994 First IRA cease-fire 1996 Election for negotiating Forum Alliance 6.5 per cent, 7 seats 1997 Westminster General Election Labour wins. Alliance 8.0 per cent 1997 Local government elections 6.6 per cent, 41 seats 1998 Good Friday Agreement 71 per cent YES votes in north 94 per cent YES in south. 1998 Assembly elections Alliance 6.5 per cent, 6 seats 1998 Lord Alderdice resigns from Party leadership 1998 Sean Neeson becomes Party Leader 1998 Lord Alderdice becomes Speaker of new Assembly 1999 David Alderdice becomes Lord Mayor of Belfast 1999 European elections Neeson 2.1% 2001 Local Government elections Alliance 5.3 per cent, 28 seats 2001 Westminster General Election Alliance does not stand in North Down, South Antrim and Upper Bann 3.6 per cent. 2001 Three Alliance MLAs redesignate to ‘unionist’ to ensure re-election of Trimble and Mallon as First and Deputy First Ministers. 2001 David Ford becomes party leader. 2003 Alliance launches policy paper on Community Relations, ‘Building a United Community’.

C. Alliance Party Leaders 1970 – 1972 1972 - 1984 1984 - 1987 1987 – 1998 1998 - 2001 2001  present

Phelim O’Neill MP Sir Oliver Napier John Cushnahan Lord John Alderdice Sean Neeson David Ford

D. Assembly/Convention/Negotiating Forum Members 1973/4 Assembly: Oliver Napier, Robert Cooper, Derek Crothers, Basil Glass, Hugh Wilson, Lord Henry Dunleath, Bertie McConnell, Jim Hendron 101

1975 Convention: Oliver Napier, Robert Cooper, Charles Kinahan, Basil Glass, Hugh Wilson, Lord Henry Dunleath, Bertie McConnell, Jim Hendron. 1982/86 Assembly: Oliver Napier, Lord Henry Dunleath, Will Glendinning, Paul Maguire, Gordon Mawhinney, David Cook, Seamus Close, John Cushnahan, Addie Morrow, Sean Neeson. 1997/98 Negotiating Forum: John Alderdice, David Ford, Sean Neeson, Eileen Bell, Kieran McCarthy, Seamus Close, Steve McBride. 1998/2003 Assembly: John Alderdice, David Ford, Sean Neeson, Eileen Bell, Kieran McCarthy, Seamus Close, E. List of some Alliance Mayors (Chairs) and Deputy Mayors (Deputy Chairs). 1974 Ivor Canavan (Deputy Mayor) Derry 1975 Ivor Canavan – Mayor of Derry AP balance of power 1976 Bertie McConnell – Mayor of North Down. 1977 Rowan Hamilton – Chair of Down 1977 Billy Kelly (Deputy Mayor) – Larne AP largest party 1977 Roy Hawthorne (Deputy Mayor) – Carrickfergus AP largest party 1977 Jack Elliott (Deputy Mayor) – Newtownabbey 1977 Michael McVerry (Deputy Chair) – Newry and Mourne 1977 Brian English (Deputy Mayor) - Craigavon 1978 David Cook – Lord Mayor of Belfast 1st non-unionist Mayor 1974 Tom Gormley (Deputy Chair) – Strabane 1974 John Hadden – Chair of Omagh AP hold balance of power 1979 Keith Jones (Deputy Mayor) – North Down Anne Gormley (Deputy Chair) – Omagh 197? Pat McCudden (Deputy Mayor) – Newtownabbey 1999 Jim Rooney (Deputy Mayor) - Newtownabbey 1979 Bill Matthews - Mayor of Coleraine 1983 Jim McBriar - Mayor of Ards Stewart Dickson - Mayor of Carrickfergus 1993 Sean Neeson - Mayor of Carrickfergus 1st Catholic Mayor 1999 Janet Crampsey- Mayor of Carrickfergus 102

Seamus Close – Mayor of Lisburn 2002 Betty Campbell – Mayor of Lisburn 1998 David Alderdice – Lord Mayor of Belfast 1999 Marsden Fitzsimons – Mayor of North Down 2002 Stephen Farry (Deputy Mayor) – North Down 2003 Anne Wilson – Mayor of North Down

1st Catholic Mayor AP hold balance of power

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