N-6174 Intelligence Circular No. 13 - 18 November 1942.pdf

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Copy, flo.

November 18, 19^2,

INTELLIGENCE CIRCULAR )

No. 13

This circular consists of extracts from reports written "by

United States Military and Naval personnel (or from authori­ tative statements and documents quoted and evaluated by such

personnel) concerning Antiaircraft Artillery. While the in­ formation is considered entirely authentic, it should "be un­ derstood that many excerpts are merely the observations and

opinions of individual United States Army and Naval officers,

or of foreign officers and officials. Attention is also in­ vited to the fact that the date on which each report was writ­ ten appears at the end of the excerpt.

\

The information set forth herein does not modify prescribed

doctrine nor is it intended to be used as instructional matter

in service and troop schools. It is published by the Command­ ing General, Antiaircraft Command, for the information of re­ cipients indicated on the distribution list.

Reproduction of the circular is not authorized and its securi

ty classification is to be maintained.

For the Commanding General:

Classification

J U N i 'j 1945

/L

H. N. HERRICK,

Colonel, C.A.C.*

Chief of Staff

1447

R A Y M STQCjfvjk 'A ''f

1st Ltiaf ^

as

Ass't tSiJJtodiAn

f

TABLES OF

LISTS OF BULLETINS AND CIRCULARS ISSUED

I - ORGANIZATION

II - PERSONNEL

• •

Ammunition

Light Antiaircraft Weapons • . Heavy Antiaircraft Guns • • • « Light Antiaircraft Fire Control Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Control Rockets and Rocket Projectors . Antitank •

Miscellaneous Items

Developments . . . . . . . . .

3) 4)

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) VI VII VIII

Fage

5



P.

F.

P.

P.

P.

P. P. P. . . P,

• • • • •

• • • • •

30 41 47 54 59







68

72

79

86

Page 100

Concepts (re - tactical employment) Concepts (re - technical employment) Concepts (re - siting) • • • • • • Concepts (re - antitank role) • • • Concepts (re - weapons) « • • « • • Operational Practices (A.D.G.B.)* • Operational Practices (mobile), • • Operational Practices (enemy) • • • Antitank. . . . • • . . . . . . • • Lessons arid Trends • • • • • • • •

V - TRAINING



Page 30

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

2)

3

Page 26

. . .

III - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

1)

Page

. . . . . . . . . . .

P. P. P.

100 108 116





P. 122

P. 126

P. 129

P. 147

P. 156

F* 162

P. '173

Page 185

Schools and Courses F» Individual Training . . . . . . . . P. Unit Training P. Training Films F. Training Devices . « » • • • • • • F. Aircraft Recognition Training . . • F.

185 195 199 206 209 213









AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS . t . I J V i V A V fm-% » i a- B

1 1 W 4 n » 1 Pi % V g ? j$ f» I

1 1 . . ' 9 r i r \ 4.i I

OPERATIONS


Page 260

DISTRIBUTION , . . . f f .

-2­

LIST HF INTE3

OFFICE OF % \CBIEF OF 1

ARTILLERY



li >6 ^

Date

Subject Miscellaneous

26 February 19^1

Miscellaneous

9 April119^1

Miscellaneous

19 May 19^1

Miscellaneous

28 July 19^1

25 September 19^1

Barrage Balloons

lU November 19^1

Searchlights

7 February 19^2

Radio Detection

LIST OF INTELLIGENCE CIRCULARS ISSUED BY

HEADQUARTERS ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND

Date

Subject AA in Phillipine Islands (Com­ muniques. from General Wainwright AA in Southwest Pacific (State­ ments of wounded soldiers)

9 April 19^2

19^2

29 April

British AA in Sumatra

18 May 19^2

Miscellaneous

25 May 19^2

British Light AA Regiment in Libya

2 June 19^2

AA Defense of Tobruk April - October i9*a.

Interview with Air Corps officers

from Far East Combat Zone

I - Employment of AA SLfs,

1939-19^2. a Part II - New Methods of Ir^eree

Operational Prdcf

Part

- 3

13 June 19^2

k2

\

yf

•\

~ 8 July 19^2

List of Circulars (cont'd)

•r No.

Subject

Date

9

Miscellaneous

22 July 19^2

10

Performance of USA Coast Artillery Personnel & Equipment in Phillipines

k August 19^2

11

Airdrome Defense

7 September 19^2

12

Part I - British AA Defense Tactics at Tobruk Part II- Training in Japanese Army 22 October 19^2

-

k ­

4

\



I - O R G A N I Z A T I

Editorial Note:

In Great" Britain the Jfe^it-ioal' subdivisions of England, Wales,

Scotland, and Northern ^Ireland; are constituted an Antiair­ craft defense area. Within this area all the antiaircraft

weapons and facilities are under a Command known as the "Anti­ aircraft Command". The Corrimanding General of the Antiaircraft

is a Royal Artilleryman* He has complete command authority

throughout his command, except as it is limited by a coopera­ tive practice called "operational control", briefly described

below. ' Under his Command the area mentioned is divided into

three "Antiaircraft Corps", each comprising a definite geo­ graphical area, and each corps is further divided into two or

more Antiaircraft Divisions, Each divisional command also

comprises a definite geographical area. There are a total of

twelve divisionsc Each divisional command has Antiaircraft

Artillery and Searchlights assigned to it in brigades and regi­ ments which- are under command of the Division Commander. De­ fense Commanders are also sometimes designated for sub-areas

within the division areas but there is no fixed uniformity in

this regard, li/hen a Defense Commander is designated he is re­ sponsible for the Antiaircraft gun defense within his area.

He may control the elements of his command from, or through,

a control post called a "Gun Operations Room".

As mentioned, the Antiaircraft Command functions in a coopera­ tive manner with the Royal Air Force through what is called

"operational control" exercised by the Fighter Command of •

the Royal Air Force. ' That is to say the Fighter Command is

given authority to control the operations of the Antiaircraft

Command and its elements in those respects considered neces­ sary by the Royal Air Force to make the Royal Air Force most

fully effective. In practice this' control' is exercised al­ most entirely through standing operational orders and instruc­ tions issued by the Antiaircraft Command after-consultation'

with arid approval by. the Commanding General of the Fighter

Command of the Royal Air . Force . The only oral command con-'

trol of any practical importance exercised by-the Fighter Cfim­ mand in actual operations, in the case of Antiaircraft •gHpSfyrh

is the'order to withhold fire in certain instances

short intervals of time, when -deemed necessary for .JMtfyp'"' of friendly aircraft. Even in such instances thdf&c%ial Com­ mands are normally issued through Antiaircraftd^^ft^tXe^y' of­ ficers stationed in Royal Air Force Fighter %$pSl3^Jbpera­

-5­



* ** I - ORGANIZi^M||j%

Editorial- fiote (cont'd)

tions^ooms. This exercise of "operational control" by the

Royal Air Force appears to function smoothly; partly, per­ haps, because of the ability of the British to cooperate

easily with.one another, also, perhaps, because of the view­ point of all concerned that the Antiaircraft Command

should retain unity of command with respect to the impor­ tant Artillery functions of: (l) Assignment of Personnel, <

(2) Organization,.(3) Training, (4) Technique, and (5) Tac­ tical dispositions of Antiaircraft units, and yet, at the

same time, should permit the Royal Air Force to have such

control as is necessary to give to the Royal Air Force the

Antiaircraft cooperation and support needed by the Fighter

Command.

As will appear from excerpts herein, there is also mobile

antiaircraft artillery in field force organizations both in

Great Britain and abroad, and there is both mobile and stat­ ic Antiaircraft Artillery in the Harbor Defenses.

In Germany the Antiaircraft Artillery is organized as a

part of the German Air/Force. It is called "FLAK-" (an ab­ breviation for "Flugabwehrkanone" « literally "Antiaircraft

gun"). However, antiaircraft artillery units have been or­ ganized in the German Army in addition to the "Flak" of the

German Air Force..

The REICH and occupied countries are divided into a number

of areas known as' Air Districts (Luftgaue), each of which,

apart from administration, is responsible for the defense

of its territory as far as the German Air Force is concern­ ed. - — T h e Air District Command controls the "permanent"

Flak defenses, fighter units, Observer Corps, Balloon Bar­ rage units and Air Raid Precaution organizations. Its con­ trol of the F3rf%efenses is exercised partly directly arid

partly thr^u^i'lAir Defense Comman$is (Luftverteidigungskom­ mandos).;,. \v^'The Flak organization itself is divided into

Groups ra&cgruppen) and Sub-Groups iplakuntergruppen) on a

territorial basis. — T h e operational'units are the batteries

(Xbteilungen), a variable number of which make up a regi­ nt. It is .thought' -that generally speaking a battery mans the area of af^jbrproup, while a regiment mans that of a Group. JL variable tmmber of regiments go in turn to form a brigadftf^' •—Some Divisional Headquarters are also in

I - ORGANIZATION

Editorial Note (cont'd

existence, there bein,

District. A division presumably commands a liurriberTfori­ gades, but the precise nature of its responsibilities is not

known, The control centre of the Flak defenses in any

area (probably the Flak Group) is thought to operate though

a number of sector controls (probably the.Sub-Groups). it

is assumed that the sector controls are used not only as com­ munication centres, but'also as operational headquarters as,

for fire control (ordering of barrage fire, etc.). De­ tailed information is (not) available regarding the

system of inter-communication, but it is known that particu­ larly close liaison is maintained between the Flak organi­ zation and the Observer. Corps and Radio Detection Finder net­ work, and between Flak and fighter units, The basic Anti­ aircraft defense of a gun defended area is static, guns

usiiaily being in concrete emplacements and hutments being

provided for the personnel. It is known, however, that use

is made of guns on railway mountings and that in some areas

a small proportion of the ordinary defenses is mobile, with

the result that the gun and searchlight densities can be

altered at short notice. It is probable that these mobile

units are chiefly deployed in relation to dummy installa­ tions, with the object of deception as to the actual loca­ tion of the target. It is•->—(quite well established)--r­ that-only the guns on the side of the Gun Defended ..^rea near­ est to the dummy engage•in the early stages of the attack,

or until it is abundantly clear that,the real target has

been identified, and that; in-addition dummy gun flashes

—-(are) used. » Flak maps — ( a r e ) - — • issued

monthly (by the British to)—- show the disposition of guns

-and searchlights in the greater part;of •the REICH and in the

occupied territories of Western Europe. They provide a rough

guide to the relative strength of the defenses in the various

districts. The estimated scale of defense of twelve selected

(Notes .,:Only , .

target areas (in Germany)-— are. given : Berlin is given here.)—- (From M.A. London 46980-London-March

1942. ' • . . ».

Extent of Gun Defended Area

Heavy

Taking the Potsdamer Platz •
approximately '12• miles .to-;the N., E., and S. and 20 miles t6

the W. Includes Potsdam. 240

-7­

^..L^b^^S

*

•. ... • 300

. 125

;•



^ - - ( o n l y ) — - real units of command (among the British

forces) in the War Cabinet, Each of the three Ministries

(War, Admiralty, Air) is separate and there is an en­ tirely separate chain of command within each up to its own

head. — — If air forces are required (by a Commander

in Great Britain) they are arranged for between the Air

Ministry and the Commander-in-Chief, but they are not under

(the latter'a) command. A similar system is in oper­ ation in the Middle East, - — I n the Far East the Commander­ in-Chief is an Air Officer who commands both Army and Royal

Advisory to the

Air Force, but does, not command the Navy, War Cabinet is the Chiefs of Staff Committee, composed of the

Chiefs of Staff of the three Services, This committee meets

daily and arranges for coordination of effort and coopera­ tion between the three Services, Working under the Chiefs

of Staff Committee is the Committee of Imperial Defense* <

M.A.R.4595S-London-23 December 1941

The antiaircraft and field branche's of the Royal Artillery

are sometimes erroneously regarded as being entirely separ­ ate - partly because the technical application of antiair­ craft fire is so different from that of other forms of ar­ tillery fire that it requires special forms of training,

But Antiaircraft Artillery in the British Service is, like

the field branches, an integral part of the Royal Artillery

and therefore for Field Forces it is considered that the

— Commander Royal Artillery (of the-tank force (or-other

formation) — is responsible for advising the commander in

the employment of antiaircraft units and for coordinating all

; the artillery resources, except that where antiaircraft de­ fenses are spread over a large area or are required in con­ junction with-a large air component a special antiaircraft

commander may be appointed.

Army Training Memorandum No. 43

MtA,R,48365-London-llJune 1942

Under the reorganization effective — - 16 June J: and Coast Defense b^ed

e War Office, which is —

^ rectorate of Antiaircraft

"in a new "Directorate of

Royal Artillery."

•'

• M.A.R,48449-London-l6 June 1942

The remaining sections of the'old Directorate of Antiair­ craft —-(and Coast Defense, except AA4 (plans, operations

and intelligence) and AA5 (training) have become part of

the entirely new — - Directorate of Royal Artillery.

The Director of Royal Artillery is responsible- to the Assis­ tant Chief of the Imperial General Staff,

• > Ltr.fm,BAS-9 July 1942.AAC#319.13/AUC-74

"Headquarters Antiaircraft Training Establishments", (un­ der the war office, has under it) Six Antiaircraft Train­ ing Groups, • Each group commands a number of units di­ vided on a geographical basis. These units comprise light,

heavy3"searchlight and "Z" antiaircraft - training regiments,

practice camps, driver training regiments, reserve regiments

and —(Operators Fire Control (Radio Detection Finder)—­ training regiments. They include male, mixed, and auxiliary

territorial service (women)). The Headquarters and Search­ light 'Wing, Shrivenham, the Gunnery and Trials Wings,'Manor­ bier, and the Wireless Wing, -Wafccfiet are directly under the

War Office and do not come under the Antiaircraft Training

Establishments. . . . .

M.A.R.47898-London-14 May 1942

2) Air Defenses of Great Britain

Editorial Note;

^The' overall organizatlon'"tJf the "Air Defenses of Great

Britain" have been described above and In previous Intelli­ gence Bulletins. (See CAC intelligence Bulletins NoTs." 6

and 7)• The following should be: read as supplementing the

information heretofore published on the'subject.

&reat Britain (cont'd)

. .

4 SurTOperations Room is located near • The Sector Opera­ tions Room is under the orders of the Fighter Group,

which exercises operational control. The Fighter Sector is

commanded by the Sector Commander, The duty officer in the

Sector Operations Room is known as the Sector Controller, The Gun Operations Room is under the command of the Officer in

Charge, Gun Operations Room who is responsible — — for the

discipline and training'' of the Gun Operations Room personnel, A continuous watch is kept by an Ahti-aircraft Defense Com­ mander who is not a member of the Gun Operations Room staff

and is stationed at the Gun Operations Room as the represent­ ative of the — Defense Commander to control the fire of the — - antiaircraft Brigades in certain circumstances,

and-by a Gun Control Officer who is a permanent member of the Gun Operations Room staff,

M,A,Rpt.No,44346-London-4 September 1941









is in each relief in each Group Operations Room .

There: (Fighter Command)an Antiaircraft Liaison Officer ,

. Incl. to ltr from B.M.M.-13 September 1941

In addition to the responsibility for the control of Antiair­ craft fire against unseen targets, (vide*. "Instructions for

Recognition betweien British Forces"')* Fighter Group Command**

ers have been authorized to arrange at any time for any Anti­ aircraft guns in their Group areas to withhold fire on enemy

or unidentified aircraft if they' consider the tactical or

weather conditions make this action desirable,

M.A.Ept.No.44514-London-15 September 1941

The term "Operational Command" as —'-(distinguished from "op­ erational control" i s ) — used in -—(connection w i t h ) — the Antiaircraft Command of the Air defenses of Great Britain -T­ to mean the issuance of all orders, instructions, or in­ telligence in connection with: Cfrjk Actual enemy activity'in the area, (b) State of Reajdi?n€sS ai^ hours of manning, (c) Ground Defense m e a s u r e £ n d (d) Recognition and engagement of Targets,

-10­

It functions somewhat as follows:­ (1) The creation of new defenses and the reallocation of

heavy and light antiaircraft guns, Antiaircraft "Z" rocket)

projectors, and searchlights, from one defended area to an­ other can be. ordered by Headquarters, Fighter Command only.'

(2) The redistribution of resources within defended areas

will be ordered by Commanders Antiaircraft Divisions who will

keep •Antiaircraft- Corps, and Antiaircraft Corps will keep An­ tiaircraft Command informed of such action. The Administra­ tive and Signal implications of any redistribution must be

fully considered. * • (3) The reallocation of gun layer stations from one de­ fended area to anoth.ey.,must be approved by Antiaircraft Corps

on authority delegated by. Antiaircraft Command-.

«

(4) For each area or vital point defended by Heavy or

Light Antiaircraft guns or Antiaircraft "Z".projectors, an

Antiaircraft Defensq .Commander is appointed. He exercises

full operational command over all Heavy, Light and Antiair­ craft "Z". defenses of the- areq. or vulnerable point.

(5) Commanders Antiaircraft Divisions appoint Antiaircraft

Defense Commanders .in large Defended Areas. They may dele­ gate authority for the appointment of /antiaircraft Defense

Commanders in small,Defended Areas or at vita-1 points to Com­ manders ^Antiaircraft Brigades. .

(6) The Command post of the fintiaircraft Defense Command­ er is the Gun Operations Room. • ­ (7) -rs— (Antiaircraft Commissioned)-—, members of - — Staffs

are given the following titles: a) -(In Fighter)—- G^oup

Operations Rooms - iintiaircraft Liaison Officers; b) . (In F i g h t e r ) — Sector Operations .Rooms Antiaircraft Liaison Of­ ficers (Guns) or Antiaircraft.Liaison Officers (Searchlights);

p) (In) Gun Operations Rooms. •- Duty Officers,

(s)
and Antiaircraft Liaison Officers (Guns)-in Sector Operations

V

*

I - ORGANIZ^¥o:

2|,| (8) (cont'd)

the Royal Air Force and Gun Operations Rooms. -—(These offi­ c e r s ) - T - are under the control of Commanders, Antiaircraft Div­ isions. (9) .Antiaircraft Liaison Officers (Searchlights)' are Staff

officers to the Sector Searchlight Commander, and, under his

instructions, issue operational orders to the Searchlights in

the Sector.

(10) The Senior Antiaircraft Officer at a (Fighter)—

Group or (Fighter) Sector Headquarters is responsible

to the Commander Antiaircraft Division for the discipline of

all Antiaircraft Members 'of the Operations Rooms Staff.

(11) Duty Officers are appointed to Gun Operations Rooms.

They are Staff officers to the Antiaircraft Defense Commander

and, under his instructions, issue operational orders to the

Heavy, Light and Antiaircraft "Z" Defensesf

(12) Command for training and administrative purposes is ex­ ercised through the normal channels, i.e., divisions, brigades,

regiments, and batteries.

M.A.Rpt.44515-London- 15 September 1941

Antiaircraft Gun Batteries are normally divided into two

classes - Heavy and Light. Heavy batteries are equipped with

4.5" static, 3.7" static, 3.7" mobile or 3" guns. Full es­ tablishments or tables of organization for all these types of

batteries and regimental headquarters —-(have been adopted) . It is probable that for the sake of economy in man poWer in

Heavy Antiaircraft Batteries in 'Air Defenses of Great Britain

-—(tables of organization will, with a few exceptional

cases, be revised so as to provide for .dispersion — ( o f guns)

down to four-rgun sites only. Light .Antiaircraft Batteries

in the -Air Defenses of Great Britain consist of sixteen 40' mm

.Bofors guns. Each .gun detachment is/an entity and guns' are .*

deployed singly. Guns.are controlled manually through open

sights or'by power transmission from a Kerrison predictor. A'

full; team consists of 4 mejguon the gun, 3, on the predictor, 1

on the generator, 2 ammunition numbers and 1 detachment com­ Mfe&MLtion)--- do not allow for so

<%fypt heavy batteries because the vis­ es ting almost entirely eliminates night



-• •

•

" % —

f f

I - ORGANIZATION

2). Air Defenses of Great Britain (cont'd; firing. Of the total of 331 personnel in a light

. - craft battery, 119 are administrative and 212 — • ars«8spera­ .tional. Battery transport is. provided by 1 light car, 1 15­ cwt. lorry for rations and 10 motorcycles, .jnmunition is

brought up by Divisional transport, Tables of organiza­ tion have been adopted, "Zed" Regiments (Antiaircraft Rocket Regiments)—— are now coming into operational use to

man rocket firing equipmentsThe projectors are at present

worked singly in batteries of 64* Experiments have been car­ , ried out in the employment of multi-barrel projectors (2 bar­ rels, 4 barrels, 9 barrels and 20 barrels), and these equip­ ments are now in production. They will be organized into

batteries, some mobile, some static, of 64 2-barrel units, 36

4-barrel units, 12 9-barrel units, or 9 20-barrcl units, Roc­ . ket detachments, with certain exceptions, are organized in^4­ , battery Regiments, 'which are incorporated into the Antiair­ craft Brigades,

M•A,R•43867-London-l August 1941



The-normal heavy antiaircraft gun site (in the Air Defenses

of Great Britain cpnsists of 4 guns, Predictor, Telescope I**

dentification,Height Finder and Gun Layer (Mk I or Mk II)

— , . In LONDON and a. few other large gun defended areas tjiere

. are a. certain number of 8-gun sites, usually controlled by one

predictor. There are also a small number of 6-gun sites and

2-gun sites, the latter majinly at aerodromes. The 5.25 inch

twin equipments, of which there are only three deployed, are

sited singly in the southwest centre and southeast of LONDON.

3-inch guns form part of the defenses of a gun defended area.

The layout of sites will vary with the characteristics of the

'< area.to be defended, the availability of sites, and the avail­ ability of equipment. The spacing between gun sites is-any­ thing from 2500 yards to -6000 yards or more. In all gun de­ fended areas special protection is given to particularly im­ portant areas, such as docks, armament factories etc., prob­ ably entailing a concentration of gun sites around the vital

point with consequent gaps in other parts of the Gun Defended

Area, The gun density aimed at for the protection of a

Vital Point is thirty-six. However, it is rarely possible to

get this density (for more than an) extremely short time.

An aircraft directly approaching at 300 m.p.h. at a height of

20,000 ft. ..cannot be subjected to fire for more than about 50

w

M

'

J

H

V * I• . rel="nofollow">_

I

n (cont'd)

seconds with the limitations of present equipment. The lar­ gest gun density in Air Defenses' of Great Britain is near ,

where the fire of 80 guns can be brought to bear over the

(protected area) when a barrage is fired. With predictor.

following a density of" about 60 guns can be got.-: The second

largest density is at where' a concentration of about

60 guns can be obtained and vdth Predictor following a den­ sity of about 40 is obtainable. • The average density for

smaller gun defended areas such as near - — is from 28 to 40 ,

guns for concentrations and 16 to 32 for predictor-following.

, .

The usual combination of equipments is: . . Guns Number 4*5"

Fuze

Predictor

Limitations

Clockwork

Vickers

25 sees, time of flight, maxi­ mum effective height 29,000 ft.

maximum effective 'slant range

• 10,000 yds.

33 sees, time of flight, maxi­ mum effective height 25,000 ft,

maximum effective slant range

11,000 yds, • .; •

3.7"

4

Clockwork

Sperry

3.7"

4

Powder

operry 33 sees, time of flight, maxi­ mum effective height 25,000 ft.

maximum effective slant range,

10,000 yds.

AUC-33-Lortdon.-February 1942

..There are :at present in Antiaircraft Command, Air Defenses of

Great Britain — — the following heavy and .light antiaircraft

..

guns and antiaircraft searchlights?: ,. -

"

•; •

. -Heavy Antiaircraft guns—--'2268. Light'Antiaircraft g u n s — — 890

Antiaircraft Searchlights—-4400. . :..

There are atrpresent, 50' /antiaircraft Searchlight' Regiments,..

There; were about 70 regiments - — o f which approximately 20

were converted to light antiaircraft artillery.. :; •

.: .&,Wi|6818-London-4 March 1.942

- ORGANIZATION

2) Air Defenses of Great Britain (cont'd)

The War Cabinet last November decided that .the

were to be used in - — Antiaircraft Command to man^Z1* bat­ teries and later heavy anti-aircraft. The. Home(Guar%units

will be separately organized, and they will be operated under

Antiaircraft Command with regular cadres, — - . •

—. M, A»R ,48733-London-6. July 1942

No final provision has been made for the employment of H$>me *

Guards on heavy antiaircraft- gunsites." — - No action will

be taken until the "Z" (rocket batteries) conversion pro­ gram is completes "Z" batteries each require 1,430 Home

Guards. The total program of 85 batteries will, therefore,

require approximately 122,000 Home Guards,- Of this number

12,000 are at present under training, on .an 8-shift basis. It

is proposed that Auxiliary Territorial Services shall take over

•all Operators Fire Control' (Radio Detection Finder) duties in

"Z" Units, where Home Guard are also employed. It is not con­ sidered that Home Guards will be employed in Light Antiaircraft

or searchlight units,

' M.A,R,48657-London-l.July 1942

3) Airdrome Defense

•

»

'

Lt, Col, Sherbrooke (British Army) until recently was

-both the commander of the defense troops of the -.—(Binbrock)—

Airdrome and staff adviser to the Airdrome commander, . He. is

most vehement in his contention that the only way to get the

average Royal Air Force Station commander to.take airdrome de­ fense seriously is to make him responsible for it,' Many of

them have refused to cooperate with the Local Defense Command­ er in such matters as training, arms, equipment, communica­ tions and morale, That his views are considered sound is

reflected in his assignment as Airdrome Defense Officer at

Headquarters Southern Command and Group Defense Officer with

the- jj&tfr- Wing — - under the change • whereby -t— the Royal Air

Force has its own defense force, called the Royal Air- Force ­ Regiment« -This absolves the Army from Airdrome defense ex­ cept for counter-attacking or support missions. It also places

more squarely upon the airdrome commander the responsibility

for his own internal defense,.a matter he was. formerly in­ clined to neglect in the belief that the Army would protect

him. M.AtR.4S045-Lonaon-25 May 1942

- ORGANIZATION

rcraft Regifttenl

^

fioitt British experience that tremendous quan­ light antiaircraft guns are needed both in Great

Britain and the near East. The 40 mm Bofors gun is get­ ting the highest priority in manufacture. • It is consid­ ered essential that each combat division either infantry or

Armored must have — — one, regiment — — ( o f at least)-— forty-

eight guns of this type as an organic unit. It is recom­ mended that the reorganization of Antiaircraft be studied with

a view of making light antiaircraft units organic in the divi­ sion. .

Observor's-report - 10 September 1941-0CCA-/UR

•

r

The light antiaircraft regiment of the British Infantry Div­ ision is contrary to our usual employment of the light anti­ aircraft. It is at all times well up in the division ; .

picture and works hand in glove with the Division. Our method

of assignment of antiaircraft units for the protection of cer­ tain division installations has often resulted in the divi- ,

sion moving and leaving the antiaircraft protecting an empty

field, the division forgetting that it had antiaircraft pro­ tection.

M.A.R.4£217-London-4 June 1942

The antiaircraft regiment in a —-(British) Division 'is to

remain under the Commander of the divisional Royal Artillery.

He — ( w i l l have as his)—— deputy the Lieut. Colonel, com­ manding the'antiaircraft regiment. There is a Second

in Command —-(in the regiment) who attends to administra­ tion and ammunition supply for Antiaircraft units spread over

the Divisional area. •»

.. - M.A.R.4B325-London-9 June 1942

Each —-(British) -armored divisiorknow has its own light

antiaircraft regiment* - — *Jr

&. . BalloCff Notes-AUC-49-March 1942

;/ % V it A

-lfe-'

I - ORGANIZATION

4) Light Antiaircraft Regiments Cc^rW^S

In preparation for ~ — operations (in Libya m

teries (of the 57th Light antiaircraft regiment")

reorganized into four troops of three guns each. -—(Note:

This regiment had the best, record of any like regiment in the

Middle East.) The reorganization was effected with the

primary intention of preventing those, who might be tempted,

from splitting the four gun Troop into two sections of two guns>

which is unsound tactically and administratively. On the other

hand dispersion in the desert necessitates the protection of

a wide area and consequently deployment of light antiaircraft in­ to "penny packets". The new experiment, for this regiment, (the

three gun troop) proved to be successful, both tactically and

administratively, beyond expectations, — - It proved to be more

flexible, a more suitable one officer, command, of sufficient

fire density to act as a deterrent against small scale attack

of a small vulnerable point and to give detachments a feeling

of mutual support whilst permitting the maximum permissible

dispersion of antiaircraft resources amongst the too numerous

•demands. All battery commanders were pleased with the working

of this organization. A suggested layout for three gun

troop is a triangle with sides of 100 to 700 yards, the apex

to the North and the base to the South so that two guns can

include the danger approach direction of the sun in their pri­ ority arc. The experience in Libya justifies a strong recom­ mendation in favor of the suggested reorganization into six-

gun troops each of two sections of three guns. Where a posi­ tive deterrent against attack was required, a minimum of six

guns per vulnerable point was necessary to meet the intensity

of attack to be found in these operations.

M.A.R.2272-Cairo,Egypt-l March 1942

A new (table-of organization)—for a 54 gun — ( L i g h t An­ tiaircraft)-— regiment has been adopted increasing the "number

of guns from 12 to 18 per--battery. Light Antiaircraft Regiment

with an Infantry Division will be comprised *of 3 batteries

each of 18 guns, i.e. 54 guns.

May 1942-AA/64/8-AUC-76

As the production -of 40 mm Bofors materiel' has now- exceeded

giments (cont'd)

battalions of Infantry are being converted to Light Anti­ aircraft Artillery

( r e g i m e n t s ) — T h e Infantry.battal- .

ions have had on the average eighteen months service in

Great Britain and are considered well trained in Infantry

weapons and tactics. They are Considered ideal troops for

conversion to Light Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments for Ser­ vice with Field Forces, The total time involved in the con­ version will be about five months• One month will be spent

in basic antiaircraft technical training at a training center,

one month at a practice camp, two. months at operational sites

in the Air Defenses of Great Britain, and. one month mobile

training with a Brigade at an antiaircraft mobile

training center,

• M,A,R.45892-London-22 December 1941

The 25 Infantry Battalions being converted to Light Antiair­ craft regiments are to be assigned to Corps and Divisions,

M.A.R.46052rLondon*2 January 1942

Question: Where do you consider that cooking should be done

in a divisional light antiaircraft regiment? * •

Answer: The answer (in part) is a small petrol stove

for each detachment . In Air Defenses of Great Brit­ ain cooking has-been usually done by detachment on the. site.

In the desert it has been about 4 miles around a troop layout.

But in other places road distances may be much increased, A

Cooker has been provided and food taken around in hot con­ tainers, (It is believed that) centralized cooking by

troops should be provided but.troops should also be

prepared to cook by detachments ,

. . M,A,R,43856-London-3,l July 1941

'•

5)

Communications The JLa

ofcei^^onal system (of the Antiair­ '"ain)-— is primarily governed by the

'ational system of Fighter Command, A — ­

-IS­

/ 7& * L * t ) & «J — M •, J M rr

Communications fcfer&!d) S-J <~ - "'"Kp^

I - ORGANIZATION 5)

MB ITS :

telephone circuit is provided'^^lfejte'H^&u^pers Royal Air

Force (Fighter) Sector.to the (^un^|emp:on Room."——

Gun Operation Rooms are connected by — teS^Jhone to the gun

stations.

M.A.R, 43868-London-l August 1941

(In the Kir Defenses of Great Britain) regimental and

battery commanders — are not in the intelligence network

that goes from fighter operations rooms to Gun Operations

Rooms and thence direct to firing units.

M,I,D.Rpt.-Uashington-l March 1941

— - Light Antiaircraft Regiments: — — of armored divisions em­ ploy radio for communications.

Balloch Notes AUC-49-March 1942

— — To what extent is radio for communication employed within

the antiaircraft regiment? .To what extent are telephones and

field wire employed?

Answer: —-(Radio n o w ) — is employed from regimental head­ quarters down to batteries in. both Heavy and Light (Mo­ bile Antiaircraft artillery,) ; Telephones and field wire are

issued for use when conditions become static, but are rarely

made use of in mobile exercises as the t,ime during which bat­ teries or troops remain in one position is so short that they

rarely have time to lay line.

.M„A,R•47497-London-21 April 1942

6)

Airborne Antiaircraft

..

• " The British Airborne Division at present is.well

trained except for continuing shortages of essential equip­ ' ment, especially gliders, It is now believed that the Divi­ ' sioiv will be able to operate as a unit early in 1943* (The division includes one Antiaircraft and ^ntitank-Company (24

guns) in each Air Landing Battalion) .

• . „M.A,R.47497-London-21 April 1942

If I|Pf ji

fl

sty'





I - ORGANIZATION

_ 1LS %.;r *

*Antiaircraft Battery of twelve 40 mm. Bofors guns is

contemplated for inclusion in the Air Landing Brigade —-(of

the British Airborne Division.) Several officers in the

division consider that this gun should not be used by the Air­ borne Division but that it shguld be replaced by more 20 ram.

Hispano-Suizas»

M.A.R.47497-London-21 April 1942

The Airborne Division is being slightly altered , (among other things to) place all artillery in the Division

under a regimental headquarters. (and to)—— increase the

light antiaircraft Battery from 12 to 18 Bofors .

M.A.R.48622-London-29 June 1942



7) Concepts

Question: How many Antiaircraft units can be handled by for­ mations without special Commander and Staff?

Answer: (by Army Commander - Great Britain) : A divisional

headquarters can control one light antiaircraft regiment as

maximum. Corps and Army must have a special Antiaircraft Com­ mander. The Antiaircraft Regimental Command can handle one

Regiment. For. more than one regiment a separate Commander and

Staff are necessary. Two or three regiments should be

grouped under a senior Antiaircraft Regimental Commander. The

limiting factor is —-(communications)

M.A.R.45737-London-8 December 1941

antiaircraft Brigades and Regimental organization should

it is suggested, be more flexible, The proposal is to

make all types of antiaircraft Batteries capable of independent

-action and administratively self-supporting; regimental head­ quarters to be trained to command and control up to six anti­ aircraft batteries which may be^^p&cture of heavy antiaircraft,

light antiaircraft, or ^ ^ ^ h i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e r i e s . ,

ift directorate—

,43891-London-2 August 1941

-.20­

It is the opinion of an Army Commander (Great Britain) that:

1) To avoid withdrawing light, Antiaircraft Artillery from

Divisions

(a) One — - Regiment per Corps is essential as Corps

troops in addition to Divisional regiments,

(b) One Regiment is desirable also as .rmy Troops,

2) No centralized control of Light .Jitiaircraft above Div­ ision is practicable in mobile operations,

3) Heavy antiaircraft*should be under Army control,

M.A.R.45737-London-8 December 1941

There should be no separate antiaircraft or antitank defense,

For technical training these elements should be organized

separately, but they should not so operate, They must be

included within the Infantry, Artillery, Engineerj Air,

and other components for operational action, -—(Every ele­ ment of a command,) should have both machine gun and 2­ pounder antiaircraft weapons, There should be no heavy

antiaircraft artillery with the Division, This is an army

job and must be provided from army troops,

General DeGaul M.a.R,42326-London-8 February 1941

8) Miscellaneous Items

There were four (German) panzer armies operating in the

eastern,(Russian) front in 1941. It was revealed that an

Antiaircraft Corps was a part of the command of one of these

armies.

M.A.R.Berlin-l6 September 1941

The following shows the approximate number of antiair­ craft. artillery guns in two of the British theatres of opera­ tion. - —

tr® a

IS a m H l 1 i ff f'J, % m f i f '- I P I f

II

-21­

Middle East

' • , .

324 ^ .

10

70S



M.A.R.4S797-London-9 July 1942

Question: "To what extent are automatic weapons provided for

local protection of other antiaircraft installations (i.e.,

gun, 40 mm. Bofors and searchlights)"? - —

Answer: Each Heavy ,'jrtiaircraft Section (Two guns) is pro­ vided with one light machine gun for its own protection. One

light machine gun is provided for each Light Antiaircraft

Troop of Bofors guns. Each searchlight in iJ.r Defenses of

Great Britain is provided with one light machine gun and one

3-inch Rocket Ir.ojector, single, used only in a light Antiair­ craft role. The antiaircraft light machine guns with Heavy

Antiaircraft guns and Searchlights and the 3-inch single pro­ jector, with Searchlights, M.ve the primary role of defending

the site against low flying or dive bombing attack. Antiair­ craft light machine guns may only be used against ground at­ tack if no air targets are in range. The light machine gun is

considered inadequate . The War Office is considering us­ ing the 20 mm. gun - probably the Sten. The scale (allow­ ance) of 20 mm guns for local protection of antiaircraft guns

will probably be much higher than those given above.

M.A.R.47422-London-21 April 1942

In the Field Forces workings/backwards from the first line, the

Royal Artillery Ordnance Qforps'provides Light iJitiaircraft

.Regimental Ordnance Worksite,p S^srections for light repairs. Be­ hind these are Heavy- \ktiaircraft and Searchlight Ordnance Work­ shop sections and behind thtse come the iirmy Ordnance workshops

and field parks^j^-n^tfi^at the Base is the Base Ordnance and

-22­

I - ORGANIZATION

8) Miscellaneous Items (cont'd)*

r, %

ti I

workshops depot,

M. A .R . 43828-London-30 July 1941

.The new Royal Air Force Command is now being brought into ex­ istence ' (within the Royal lir Force) . The primary func­ tion of the command is to foster the development of all forms

of air cooperation with the P.rmy, — V'ithin the Army Coopera­ tion Command there will be two Royal Air Force groups, one of

which will comprise all the squadrons — - ( o f aircraft def­ initely allocated to the Army in Great Britain. The other

group will comprise the training and development units (in­ cluding those) which assist in the training of antiaircraft

gunners and searchlight crews. The staffs of the three head­ quarters, (i.e. the staffs of the army Cooperation Command,

and of the headquarters of the two Royal Air Force groups) as

.also the officers in the units and squadrons, will be a mix­ ture of Air Force and Army officers.

Ten.Les.Av.Bul.No.14-9 April 1941

(During 1940 2000)-1— soldiers' with' 1000 Light machine guns

were organized to a^siTs.tr in antiaircraft defense of ship­ ping on coastal vessels. ^JI additional 2,000 men were

provided for manning the armaments uf ships in harbors in

Great Britain to relieve the _ crews while in port. —-Then

in February, 1941, 600 men with 300 ..rmy and 300 Naval light

machine guns were provided for vessels plying between the

United Kingdom and West African ports to run as a shuttle ser­ vice. In March, 1941, 300 40 mm. Bofors guns each manned by

a detachment of six men, and 2,500 additional men with 2,500

light machine guns, were provided to extend the antiaircraft

protection to Trans-Atlantic vessels. The west African Ser­ vice -was extended to the Mediterranean and Red Sea Areas, and

the number of light machine guns was increased so that the arm­ ament became one man per light machine gun instead of two men.

In May, 1941, all military personnel employed in th^ antiair­ craft defense of shipping were formed into .four regiments-named

the Maritime Antiaircraft, Royal /u^till^^ljlthree' regiments to

administer and operate the light machine .gunners, the fourth

the Bofors o:unners. .n 1 V V 'vo

T M.A.R.45242-London-4 November 1941

in Antiaircraft organization differs from the British

mentally both in control and organization. It forms an

integral part of the Air "Force and is under the control of the

Air Ministry. The basic mobile or semi-mobile uftit is the gun

Abteilung (equivalent to approximately one and a half British

batteries) (equals about four United States batteries)—­ supported by searchlight, ballo n and transport units. Two or

more Abteilungen of varying types may be regimented together

accoraing to circumstances. Regiments may be grouped into

Brigades and Brigades into Corps. The sub unit of the Abteil­ ung is the TBatterieT (roughly equivalent to two British Troops).

Heavy Abteilungen are mostly organized on a mixed basis com­ posed of:

Three heavy Batterien each of four -88 mm.,guns and two -20

mm. guns.

(105 mm. guns may in some cases replace 88 mm. guns), and

two light Batterien of twelve -2u mm guns and four-60 cm.

searchlights.

Light Abteilungen consist of: '—(three light Batterien of

twelve -20mm guns, or (two light batterien of twelve -20 mm

guns and one batterien of nine 37 mm guns) and one search­ light Batterien of sixteen -60 cm. searchlights.

M..A.R.A3840-London-31 July 1941

— - The German antiaircraft artillery (Flak) is a part of the

German Air Force but during recent months, - — antiaircraft

units have been formed in the German Army proper.

M.A.R.18637-Germany-l6 September 1941

--— The German antiaircraft defense battalions and antiair­ craft defense companies '.are^fc|fantry units and as such belong

to the army proper. Thef^t%e&ps wear the field grey uniform

'Of the army and the id^ritafyingfcolor insignia of the infantry,

which serves to d^^r%itiate them from their .conirades of the

air force - the$*§j^(?3:craft artillery. The antiaircraft de­ 'ense compan^s^ajj^ ^completely motorized and are, therefore,

usually^^il%^n4^especially suitable for rapid employment.

3

f; f- ^ |4

I - ORGANIZATION

i M p i

l l i l i l

W

i % a t J



9) German Antiaircraft (cont'd)

Each company has 12 guns with protective shields mounted on

self-propelled carriages. These weapons are ready for action

at all times. ,

Translation in M.A.R.18254-Berlin,Germany-12 May 1942

Motorized Antiaircraft ba'tt'alions form part of the in­ fantry arm of the German Army. These battalions are equip­ ped with the following weapons:- 20 mm. Antiaircraft and

Antitank guns and 4-barrelled 2 cm* super-heavy machine

guns and 37 mm*dual-purpose antiaircraft-antitank guns.

M.A;R,44063-London-15 August 1941

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

(1)

British Army Organization (Standard Formations)

M.A.R.47103-London-27 March 1942

(2) Organization of the Headquarters of the Antiaircraft Com­ mand; of an Antiaircraft Corps; of an Antiaircraft Division;

and of an Antiaircraft Brigade in Air Defenses of Great Britain.

M.A.R.46867-London-7 March 1942

(3) War Establishments for Ordnance Antiaircraft Workshop

Sections.

M.A.R.2551-Gairo-25 May 1942

ERSONNSL

Government has been making a study of Manpower'

'for some time. There appears to be an acute shortage of Man­ power, Whenever reductions are considered various Commands

such as Balloon Command, Antiaircraft Command, and Coast De­ fense (Artillery) are required to affect a reduction in total

numbers both by reducing the number required for operation

and, by the replacement of men by Home Guards and women,

- •• M.A.R,47635-London-29 April-1942,

The.War Office is pushing recruitment of the Auxiliary Terri­ torial Service, They inten4 to have a force of 250,000 women

of which 10% or about 175,000 will be allotted to the Antiair­ craft Command. At present they are getting about 3000 per

week, but expect this to be increased to 5000 per week shortly.

The primary purpose is to release men in Antiaircraft Defenses

for other duty.

M.A.R.44364-London-5 September 1941.

The Antiaircraft Command has recently decided to employ women

as. an integral part of their batteries to replace men as oper­ ators on instruments such as predictors, heightfinders,

spotters. :The first heavyr antiaircraft battery to be con­ verted to a mixed role, received its female personnel in June

1941* The Auxiliary Territorial Service were given

four weeks1 basic training at an Infantry Training Camp and

four weeks1 technical training at a heavy Auxiliary Territorial

Service specialist training regiment. The whole battery under­ went four weeks'technical training at a heavy (mixed) Antiair­ craft training regiment and then proceeded to practice

camp for four weeks. On arrival at camp (the battery

was) joined by the operators fire control, (Radio Detec­ tion Finder personnel) w&a had been trained at an Operators

(is then

Fire Control training ^egiirfent,, ^ This battery to take) its pla$e, in Air Defenses of Great Britain,

^ v i : . \MVf.R.43941-London-7 August 1941

x

THe%^¥^ower allotted to Antiaircraft Artillery, Antiaircraft

Congand, Air Defenses of Great Britain, was 330,000.. A

reduction of 50,00*0 has been made or a new total of 280,000.

-26­

II - PERSONNEL (cont

_ There have been basically no new alteration^ SW £££ man-power

situation. The release of men from Antiaircraft Commands de­ pends ultimately upon three factors: (1) The Auxiliary Ter­ ritorial Service (women) intake. (2) The number of Home

Guards who can be trained to man 'Z1 and Heavy Antiaircraft

Equipment, (3) The putting into effect of the revised Anti­ aircraft Command War Establishments. These' are gradual

processes and they will not be allowed to interfere with the

number of equipments of all kinds which it is operationally

necessary to man in Antiaircraft Command. Home Guard and Aux­ liary Territorial Service do not count against the man-power

ceiling. - — T h e employment of Auxiliary Territorial Service

reduces the rifle strength available for local protection.

\ M.A.R.47117-London-27 March 1942.

The British eventually expect to have 50$ of the regular

Heavy Antiaircraft batteries in Air Defenses of Great Britain

mixed, (men and women). At present about 30% have been so

converted. The basis of conversion is: all instrument numbers,

all Operators, Fire Control, and certain administrative per­ sonnel are women of the Auxiliary Territorial Service giving

a total of 229 women and 176 men per battery, There are

no operational Auxiliary Territorial Service (women) employed

in light Antiaircraft regiments. Administrative Auxiliary

Territorial Service are employed at battery and regimental

headquarters while units are deployed in a static role on

home service. Auxiliary Territorial Service are employed

on the same basis as for Light Antiaircraft in regular 'Z*

units where Home Guard are also employed. Ultimately they

will be in 85 batteries, It has not been finally decided

whether Auxiliary Territorial Service shall be employed oper­ ationally in searchlight units. They are employed adminis­ tratively on all battery and regimental headquarters. Ten

•experimental searchlight troops will shortly comS"out of

training for trial in an operational role.

M.A.R.48656-London-l July 1942

-—• All antiaircraft personnel have to jji QJiT in,"jp*1AXjlnn^ take

post in complete v & t ' M u r n ' ^ ^ ^

duty. as air sentrft J ^--The^e ^ ^ h o ^ e y e r , jc^rtlldp person­ nel (e,g« "spotters^| frgif g ^ c g ^ ^ M ^ ftx^cfcff performance

-27­

II - PEESO

^fcirP Connection with the actual observation of

""night . For these, night vision tests are es­ sential and should be rigidly enforced to prevent the employ­ ment of individuals whose physical defects make impossible

the efficient performance of duties. The tests should in­ clude not only that for normal visual acuity, but also — ­ (should test) telescopic and stereoscopic performance of

the subject-and be based on a very low contrast aggravated

by glare. No man with visual acuity of less than 6/6 in

either eye should be selected. The tests to be of value must

be simple and not require special apparatus. Pitmans

Night Vision testing apparatus is to be tried in Antiaircraft

Command and — - Training Establishments. To ensure main­ tenance of the required standards, the tests — - should be

carried out by medical officers and repeated at regular in­ tervals .

M.A.R.46668-London-19 February 1942

Regulations for the award of the Gorman Army Antiaircraft

insignia were published in German A m y Special Orders of

August 11, 1941* If members of the — — antiaircraft com­ panies or of the batteries of the antiaircraft artillery have

taken part in assaults, only the assault insignia may be con­ ferred on them for such employment — - . But the. antiaircraft

insignia can also' be awarded to- those who have, already been

decorated with the assault insignia. The assault insignia

referred to in the translation is a special insignia awarded

to German Antiaircraft units which have taken' part' in' the di­ rect attack against the enemy on three separate occasions, no

two of which can occur-on the same day. This Use of the

antiaircraft assault insignia as distinguished from the anti­ aircraft insignia implies the use of antiaircraft artillery

against ground targets in direct•support of other ground ele­ 1 r

ments,; .. -' M.A.R.18636-Berlin~l6 September 1941

Major General W. J. EldridgcVas recently promoted and assigned as Director olf jtolalrcraft and Coast Defense. - —

He is 44 ^ears b M ^ served as a field gunner and on

War.r — — After the War he was de­ -• tl^''Kbyal Air Force for two years and is a quali­

-28­



fied pilot. He is a graduate of the Gunnery Staff^cJbrise

(Field, Coast, and Antiaircraft), was an Instructor, Gunnery

at the School of Antiaircraft Defense, and is a graduate

of the staff College, He was an instructor at the B'oyal Air

Force Staff College (considered an unusual honor for an

Army officer). His work (early in the war) was as G1

(Operations) at the Antiaircraft Command, ..

M.A.R.45981-London-24 December 1941

Three (young) officers of Antiaircraft Command have

recently been promoted to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel,

commanding Antiaircraft Regiments, The (age of the)

youngest was 22 and oldest 24• — o n e was promoted

from the grade of Captain, General Whittaker stated these

officers were exceptionally good, They had been in

the service since the early part of the war,

M.A.R.47352-London~13 April 1942

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

l)

Special Aptitude tests for Antiaircraft Personnel.

M.A.R,46827-London-5 March 1942

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

e production figures of iintiair­ 2 May, 1942) in United Kingdom

craft1 are as follows:

40„mnu 420 1942 May June 440 July 460 480 August October ) November ) 1500 December )

3.7" Mobile 3.7" Static 70 " 75 80 85 300

•

•

•­

1943 -1st hiarter 1500 2nd Quarter •1500 3rd Quarter 1500

"

100 100 100 100 3.00

5.25"



) ) )

Nil

) 1

--

300 300 15

300 300 30

300 300 '45

M.A.R.48245-London-5 June 1942

Question: What is the rate of ammunition consumption per gun

for all types of antiaircraft guns?

Answer? The principle is.to have a large capital reserve,

average capital reserve is 2000 rounds per gun both heavy and

light for Field Forces in Air Defenses of Great Britain

the figure is 1,100 high explosive per heavy and 1*500 per

light gun and in Malta it is 3000 rounds per gun both heavy

and light. In general, overall monthly expenditure is unlike­ ly to exceed 100 rounds per gun for heavy and 50 rounds per

gun for light antiaircraft guns. The Office of Director of

iirtillery, Ministry of Supply advises that their reserve stock

is based on an expenditure per heavy gun per day of 5 rounds

and per light gun per day of 8 rounds* These figures are based

on expenditures in France, in Air Defenses of Great Britain,

with Field Forces, and in ports abroad such as Malta, etc*

M.A*R.44938-London-l6 October 1941

*

ft

*eJ$ Jpjyvcvpr Hcjyaf Artillery, who is charged with mat-

To with Antiaircraft ammunition in.the ( T ar Office)

stated that the expenditure of 3.7 and 4.5 antiaircraft

shell for the period 11 September 1940 to 21 May 1941 for the

-30­

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIP!

l)

Ammunition (cont'd)

t exceed­ antiaircraft activities in Great Brrl ^{jFeiise on

ed) 5 rounds per gun per day. He was ered)

40 mm Bofors ammunition expenditure but I that the expenditure was about the same,

*M.A.R.43492-8 July 1941

The total expenditures

(of Antiaircraft ammunition)

in Great Britain during the- past year have been less than 10/b

of the expenditures for the previous year, even though the to­ tal number of guns.has decidedly increased*

M.A.R.48419-London-15 June 1942

The following data (had been)^— given for the actu­ al weekly average expenditures in the Middle East, in terms

of average (number, of) rounds p.er. gun from January 1st

to April 30, 1942: . , ..

Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery - 19.7 rounds

Light Antiaircraft Artillery - 16.8 rounds

M.A.R.4855 6-London-24 June 1942

1200 rounds per antiaircraft gun were sent (to Iceland)

with the (British) force. In addition to the usual

small arms ammunition carried in trains, two months' sup­ ply at 6,000,000 rounds per month were sent.

N. A *R. 1545-London-lO J.uly 1941

Question: How much ammunition is carried with the antiaircraft

gun battery and with the antiaircraft machine gun battery?

fSBp!^

Answer: ' The allotm^ht of.antiaircraft ammunition for Air Def-

n _i£ - "r>.i/.!ie±. _ »X iitab j static ... j • _ .

enses of G: conditions is: Type 4.5") 3.7") 3 "

H.E. Sharp 20 H.E. 400

-31­

If

|AD . $B>60.

• • IAD­ 620 40 7.00 • (cont'd)

Ill - MATERIEL AND ECUIPk

Mft'd) '

EAD

40 mm

Shrap 40' HIE* 352 A.T. 48

IAD

40

70

500

600



The above is subject to increase under conditions peculiar

to more isolated places such as Orkneys and Shetlands, North­ ern Ireland, Iceland, etc.. The allotment of antiaircraft

ammunition for the Field Forces is as follows:

3d line

Type Per Gun 2d line Echelon

Echelon 3.7" 3" 20 cwt • ' •

-

•



40 mm

60 60

H.E, 154) Shrap 22)

52 H.E. 312 52

Shrap 40 176 H.E. 400 176

A.T. 48 (x) 24 24 . M.A,R,44938-London-15' October

There was a school of thought that at shorter ranges

shrapnel might have a bigger lethal, effect than high explosive.

It was decided,- therefore, that shrapnel should be used

for fuzes 8 and below, This was very complicated,

It is now considered — - doubtful whether, in fact,

shrapnel is as good as high explosive except at Very short

ranges. The ruling has therefore been abolished and shrapnel

is now used only for the engagement.of close and diving tar­ gets,

. M.A,.R#48422-London-15 June 1942

Officers of the Gunnery Division of the British Admiralty are

emphatic in their desire to impress upon" our Navy Department

the disadvantage of attempting to have more than one type of

Antiaircraft projectile supplied \o a gun battery. They hope

that their conclusions based &n/experience in action may be

heeded should an$'*sucb, grqcedtire be contemplated by* our ser­ N•A.R,2715-London-28 November 1941

-32­

Question: V«hat appears to be the relative effectiveness of

high explosive shell, as compared to shrapnel as antiaircraft

ammunition*

Answer: No comparison can be made between the lethal effects

of high explosive and shrapnel shell since they are used in

entirely different roles, Shrapnel is generally used when

firing fuzes not longer than Fuze 4* High explosive shell is

used exclusively for normal engagements* and the'lethal radius

of burst is about 60 feet,

M,A«R•44938-London-15 October 1941

Question: - — "Is there any difference in the visibility

characteristics of high explosive shell and shrapnel,"

Answer: Smoke -effect of shrapnel bursts and high explosive

bursts are very similar but no smoke box is included in the

shrapnel and, therefore, the latter has comparatively little

flash, There is a clear and distinct smoke puff from an

high eocplosive burst which is produced because of the" smoke

box, — - The smoke box contains three peJLlets- of red, phos­ phorous, • Although shrapnel does not contain a smoke box the

pellets are covered with resin to hold them in position and

when the shell explodes the resin is blown out and causes

a definite smoke puff, The smoke from a shrapnel is black­ - er than that from an high explosive., and while clearly visible,

it does not remain-visible for long,

M.A.R.47421-London-l6 .April 1942

All authorities questioned state definitely that high explo­ sives or even semi-armor piercing shell with small high explo­ sives are out for antitank work. Armor piercing solid shot is

being produced for all calibers that are expected to fire

against tanks.

i . . ; Qrd.Int.Bulletin No.18-14 November 1941

ates armor and then explodes. The other type is a high ex­ plosive shell for use against personnel and other targets.

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram-9 May 1941

It has recently been decided to issue a proportion of A,P,

,303 ammunition for use in rifles- and light machine guns J

against lightly armoured cars, gun shields, lorry engines,

and spipers1 loophole plates. This.type of ammunition should

NOT be used against aircraft nor against tanks.

Army Training Memorandum No, 43

In conversation it was brought out that the Germans use

about one (l) armor piercing shell in three (3) in their small

arms antiaircraft weapons,

M.A.R.42249-London-January 29, 1941

(British) Light Antiaircraft Regiments are told to hold 12/o A.F, ammunition, • . Balloch Notes-iJJC-49-March 1942

A further requirement for antiaircraft guns is flashless pro­ pellant,- By night it is especially desirable that the flash

of the guns should not be a sign to the enemy that he should

take evading action by altering course, Flashless propellant

is being introduced as soon as the components can be made avail­ able «

B,E,S,96-Uashington-27 March 1941

It has been repor$4ci t'hift a*.'JSLashless propellant is now

being used by sy^^gsrmari ^avy-Antiaircraft defenses. The

use of th^s tfel^f %)^llant was first reported by the Navy

after German destroyers and its adoption

'purposes is a natural development,

M,a,L,45908-London-18 December 1941

-34­

III - MATERIEL AND

l)

Ammunition (con t M ) o'.;

German radar-controlled antiaircraft T T r ^ ^ ^ c C u r a t e , Brit­ ish Bomber crews are careful while flying over any terri­ tory where there are known to be antiaircraft installations,

the Germans a r e ' — using flashless propelling charges to

avoid giving away the location of antiaircraft units, - —

Air Forces General Information Bulletin No,3-12 August 1942

In considering the production of a -gun to deal with targets

up to 50,000 feet the question was raised of the maximum pres­ sures with the new flashless propellant. He said that this

propellant had not been fired at pressures above about 24

tons per square inch, and he understood that there was a pos­ sibility of abnormally high pressures being realized if it

was fired at a designed pressure exceeding 25 tons per square

inch. It was agreed firing trials with flashless propellant

at this pressure, initially in a Bofors pressure barrel would

be arranged, and, if this was satisfactory, in a 3»7 inch bar­ rel.

L.K.L*Rpt.-13 August 1941

Dummy gun flashes are believed to be in use - — ( b y the Ger­ mans) . They are frequently employed near dummy installa­ tions and may be recognizable by being smaller or of slightly

different colour from real flashes.

Air Ministry Weekly Intelligence Story

Up to 27 May 1942 - No. 143

At 12:30' a.m. today the reporting officer observed* from his

apartment (in Berlin) the test firing of approximately

100 starshells by German antiaircraft artillery,, These.shells

were fired by what was estimated -to be a three-gun 88 mm anti­ aircraft battery. Full illumination required about one half

of a second to develop and remained for an average period of

thirty seconds. The total amount of light given off by 36

shells when grouped close together appeared -to be somewhat

less than that given off • by the' full,; mocti, The -color given

off was white. During the ^e^^e^i|an^night fliers were

. y i t p j L l i v v I t i C U .

-35­

H I - MATEHIEL ,.ND EQU;

1) A

vicinity, although none - appeared to be illu­ the starshells, The test observed early this

forning suggests that these shells ( m a y ) — be used to help

the antiaircraft to locate hostile planes whose position has

been approximately determined by either sound or electrical

means (or) it is possible that (the) starshells may

(be used to) assist night fighters in locating hostile

bombers,

M,A,R,18546-Berlin, Germany-5 August 1941

Question: The British get a smoke puff from their high ex­ plosive burst, '.hat is used for smoke producing element?

iinswer: The smoke producing element consists of red phos-'

phorus, amorphous Grade I mixed with five percent mineral red

jelly which is pressed in suitable moulds to form pellets un­ der such a load as will give the required density, There

is no smoke box included in the 40 mm, shell since no atten­ tion is paid to the burst at the position of self-destruction,

M.A.R.44186-London-23 August 1941

British 3 inch high explosive bursts are at least a hundred

and probably a thousand times, as bright as the American T.N.T,

bursts without phosphorus and five times as bright as Venus

when bursting at slant ranges of approximately 6000 yards.

This is'definitely due in all probability to the presence of

the phosphorus smoke box in the British shells, — - Several

British i^rmy officers have stated that the 3,7-inch shell

bursts-(H,E,) are visible for distances of 30 miles, 'This'is

based on observations of the antiaircraft barrage at Bristol

and Southampton from known distances*

M.A.R»46014-Lcndon-29 December 1941

A pilot officer, Royal Air - For qo, ^wlk has been on 15 bombing

flights to various points? and \ ^ f & H in the recent day­ light raid on the F r e n ^ ^ % t %ays : that German antiaircraft

fire almost invarlab^«iJI5s behind the plane and gradually

approaches nea^r^ljiiW9is initially good in height and direction.

-36­

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPA l i i •. 8 1)

?

Ammunition (cont'd)

|

M

®



The pilot, at night, can see the bursts behind him in a mir­ ror and keeps on his course until the bursts begin to be close

. when he changes course. In daytime, it is almost impossible

to see the bursts.

N.A.R.l68-London-29 January 1941

Within the pa^t six weeks, the Germans have begun to use a

new type of antiaircraft shell which, upon bursting, distri­ butes incendiary fragments similar to an incendiary bomb.

These are more feared by the pilots than the ordinary

high explosive shell because (l) a hit does not result in a

simple and perhaps non-vital puncture as with the shell splint­ er but may set the plane on fire, and (2) the range of the or­ dinary high explosive fragment is 50 to 70 yards while the

range of the incendiary elements is (thought to be) about 150 yards from the point of burst. This special shell is

used in combination with the ordinary high explosive so that

the pilot, followed by a succession of bursts does not know

when an incendiary shell will be used and cannot wait as long

as formerly to change course. Bomber losses have been greater

since this shell has been used,

' N«A.R,l"68-London-29 January 1941

A number of fuzes that may give greater freedom from fuze

lead errors, or greater accuracy, or greater rate of fire

are in production'or under development.

1) Clockwork fuzes are replacing the powder fuze, which

requires correction for atmospheric conditions and tempera­ ture, and is subject to deterioration. They go to 43 seconds

tLme of flight, as against 24 seconds with the existing powder

fuze, apd so enable us to use the full, range of our guns (sub­ ject to predictor limitations): and the mean error of fuze

time is .08 second, as against ,.2 second with the powder fuze.

There is little or no doubt that the Germans use a clockwork

fuze. - wem

5 - 11 i 1 *

2). Time and percussion fu£e fpP und£r design, to replace

existing heavy Antiaircraft time fuzes". It increases the

-37­



Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT

1)

Ammunition (cont'd)

Wa^h^ngtori

t '^^photography of antiaircraft shell

e-Theodolite, a development of the Re­ ory, Kodak, Ltd., I'Theelstone, Middlesex.

M.A.R.44198-London-25 August 1941

One case of a failure .occurred with 40 mm. gun due to muz­ zle, cover not being removed. The round exploded at the muz­ zle. No member of the gun section was injured but a civil­ ian workman nearby was.

M.A.R.43331-London-25 June 1941

In the middle east where the 3.7" antiaircraft guns are

placed in the desert, several premature explosions have oc­ curred, causing damage to gun, viz; barrel to bulge. No one

has been killed. Guns are kept loaded and it is believed

that sand had accumulated in the bore when the gun was fired

and as the projectile moved forward, a mass was formed caus­ ing the shell to explode prematurely. The Director of Ar­ tillery, Ministry of Supply, advised, if guns were to be kept

loaded, to place a thin piece of paper or cloth over the

muzzle so that sand could not get into bore and to fire the

projectile through the thin piece of paper or cloth.

Ord.Int.Bulletin No.18-14 November 1941

There have been at least twelve accidents with the 40 mm

Bofors gun ammunition due to prematures in the bore. Several

cases have occurred in which the barrel was bulged and fir­ ing was stopped. No one has been injured. Many other cases

have been reported after firing has ceased and in some cases

when the gun was in for repairs and it was found that the

firing lands were flat, . This type has occurred both in Great

Britain and in the M i d d ^ p ^ % t , It is believed that ammuni­ tion is at fault di^e %>%P%3»rienced personnel (in factories).

It is believed tha|%he caiis^is in the fuse and not the igni­ ter but t^e ^ieg'^ee^Sl plroe has not been determined. This

. aramunitiort^liasSwedish Percussion Fuze DA No,250 Mark i/L

(larval T m j ^ t f s h have a Fuze Percussion DA 251 Mark i/L

JNFIS-4T

^

• •fJr*t

* # rf ct r 4

* # f? Y * d

a

Oi

J



III - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

l)

Ammunition (cont'd)

(now obsolescent; and a Mark Il/L. This latter fuze has

been used only on a trial basis and no operational firing

has been conducted, but so fat* no trouble has been exper­ ienced, The DA 251 MK Il/L fuze is being manufactured in

Canada,

M.A,R,43381-Lo ndon-25 June 1941

At approximately 0415 hours on 19,4,41 a land mine fell ap­ proximately 10 yards from the gun pit and 20 yards from

the "on site" magazine of a 3.7-inch Antiaircraft gun site. .

On this gun pit 27 rounds of "ready for use" ammunition were

hurled about, being badly damaged. 132 rounds in boxes in

the recesses were also damaged by the blast which tore off

both the steel doors of the gun pits, and in addition either

tore off or badly buckled the steel recess doors, Ammunition

in No, 4 gun pit was spattered with clay, but was otherwise

undamaged as was also the case on the remainder of the guns.

The "on site" magazine was badly damaged by the explosion,

blast blowing out the complete front wall and also — dam­ aging the other walls. The stocks inside were moved out of

position. No rounds, either on the gun pits or in the maga­ zine exploded as a result of the mine,

• " British Ordnance Bd-13l/PX-August 1941

2)

Light Antiaircraft Weapons

Characteristics of British Light Antiaircraft Guns

Equipment

40 m m .

Muzzle Velocity (ft.per sec.)

2790-

IliffLi

Vickers Mk VIII Twin.

2200

1 3 v

Vickers Mk

VIII single.

2200

2

D.A, and tracer. D.'A. vind .tracer. D . A . and tracer Self-destroying "SelfVdestroying Self-destroying 5 to 6 sees. 5 to 6 sees. 5 to 6 sees.

(cont'd)

-41- *



Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT

40 mm.

Vickers Mk Vickers Mk

VIII Twin. VIII single.

120

240

Maximum.slant range (yds) 3200 (present ammunition)

2500

2500

8500

6200

6200

Maximum Quadrant Elevation 8500

6200

6'200

Rate of fire, (rounds per

equipment)

Maximum effective Height (ft)

(present ammunition)

Method of control

120

Predictor Forward Forward or ForArea Sight . Area Sight

ward Area

Sight

AUC-33-February 1942

The 40 mm. was selected —--(by the British)—- after exten­ sive trials with lower calibres against modern aircraft as the

lightest high explosive projectile which is likely to give

lethal effect (ranging from immediate crash to failure to re­ turn to base). f It was later married to the No. 3 predictor

with magslip transmission of power control in order to in­ crease the chance Of hitting against - — aircraft operating

down to (about) 500 feet at 400 m.p.h. - speeds which

defeat the possibility of accurate following of dials by hand

operation. The accuracy of following is such that the maxi­ mum rate of fire is now usually slowed down to half speed to

increase steadiness of gun platform, and to assist accurate

observation of tracer path,,

5S-112-Washington-31 March 1941

-42­



III - M'TERIEL AND EQUIPMENT " ^ &

h

A'i i 9 ^ ij^ % 2) Light Antiaircraft Weapons (contrd)* i J ^ l , # r*'

vfcfM • '

In the organization of the British armored Divide

a regiment of Bofors (2-pdrs.) (in France)—

used as antiaircraft weapons. —-All officers who commanded

such units in France were outspoken in their confidence in

the weapon and stressed the number of dive bombers shot down

by it. Based upon their experience in France, when they

v.<ere subjected to dive bombing and had little or no air sup­ port of their own, they are convinced that this type of fire

is (necessary) not only to destroy hostile aircraft, but

also to maintain the morale of their own troops.

M.A.R.42l84-London-22 January 1941

The Mark I Bofors is considered more adaptable for use in com­ bined operations (than the Mark II.). The Mark II is 2 , 2"

longer and has only 7" clearance while the Mark I has 18" clear­ ance. The Mk I is "sprung" and has a better "tow" rod making

it easier to handle. For early antiaircraft support of

assault battalions in combined operations these advantages and

disadvantages are (considered to be) of primary importance.

— - The Mark II does not have sufficient clearance to get over

wire obstruction nor to go up banks or beaches and over

very rough ground. All Mark ^ Bofors are earmarked for as­ sault brigades in combined operations. Mark I Bofors can

be easily loaded in and unloaded from Mechanical Landing Craft

and Tank Landing Craft whereas difficulty is experienced

with the Mark II Bofors.

M.A.Rf47576-London-27 April 1942

In the Self-Fropelled'Morris Mounting,-40 mm. Bofors, there

are two vehicles,"one for the gun and one for the predictor".

The Morris predictor vehicle engine will furnish the power for

the predictor.

M.A.R.47757-London-6 May 1942

Set forth below are particulars of the British 20 mm. Antiair­ craft Sten Gun. The* (design of t h i s ) — Polish Sten

was put forward by the Polish Design Group working with the

Chief Superintendent, Armament Design^ Jiteshunt (England)

-43­

.



Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

2)

Light Antiaircraft Weapons (cont'd)

• 1 J/' O K

11) ,

>r

.,. r

P1** $ &&

gis i| ing planned. The initial order is

This weapon will take the place

craft Equipment now in the hands of

units.

Polish Sten,

Particulars Vieight of complete gun

121 lbs,

Weight of barrel only

29Jibs,

Overall length of gun ' Overall length of barrel Total number of parts

7* -1 3/4

57"

108

M,A.R.46924-London-12 March 1942

British are developing two mobile mounts for 20 mm. guns, the

Airborne Division model and the Vauxhall all purpose universal

model. The.latter will probably be adopted for universal use

as it fits all 20 mm. guns and can be used for terrestial and

antiaircraft targets. ­ M.A,R,48524-London-22 June 1942

The 2 cm, is the main *—(German light antiaircraft)

armament although the 3.7 cm. (1.45 in.) is also met with

in considerable numbers. Other weapons in service are the 4 cm.

(1.57 in.) and the 4.7 cm. (1*85 in.). A 5 cm. (1.97 in^h)

"Flak' 41" is very recent introduction on which-no details are

as yet available, • :

Air Min. Weekly Int. Summary Up to 27 May 1942-#143.

A new four-barrel German antiaircraft gun of 3.7 cm. calibre

• ----- has become the standard equipment of the recently founded

....antiaircraft units of the German Army (as distinguished

from the FLAK of the Geri|a#^-i.ir Force)——.,. The Germans, claim

... v .that this n^w proved^a-very useful weapon against

•

~ '

, ;

Paraphrase-17 September 1941

ILL - MATERIEL AND ECJXJIPMENT

2)

/./jU M

Light Antiaircraft Weapons (coni^d)

- — The German four-barrelled — * Ani itank Flak­ ierling 38 consists of four 2 cm. l^fKr It may

be employed either against ground or aerial f f - it

••hormllly

is normally transported on a trailer—-* The fired with its mounting on the ground and with the trailer re­ moved. It can, however,-be fired from the trailer. A trav­ erse of only 10° at top elevation is possible in this posi­ tion. —' Two foot-levers operate the trigger mechanism. Each

foot-lever actuates the triggers of two diametrically opposite

guns (i.e. the top left and bottom right and top right and

bottom .left). This .arrangement'provides uninterrupted contin­ uous fire. Vihile .two guns are firing, the magazines of the

other two can be changed. When both levers are operated all

four guns fire simultaneously. Should there be a stoppage

on one or more guns the remaining guns can continue fire.

Provision is also made for single-shot or continuous fire on

each weapon. The sight used against aerial targets is the

Flakvisier 40, which is thought to be a course- and speed sight

similar to the Flakvisier 35. A telescopic sight is fitted

for engagement of grounci targets and armored fighting vehicles,

•• . ' • '13/ATK-.AL-M. 1.10-War- Office-1 April 1942

The Germans employ two self-propelled gun mounts for 20 mm

Antiaircraft/Antitank guns;- and one self-propelled mount for

3"7 mm Antiaircraft/Antitank guns.

M.A.R.4250-Bern-l May 1942

The 5 cm. (1,97-in.) antiaircraft gun (5 cm. Flak 41) is

the latest German antiaircraft gun to be brought into Service.

It is apparently an automatic weapon with increased fire pow­ er and range. It is produced in either a mobile(on trailer

204) or static version. No other details are known yet, The

Germans have evidently found the need for a mobile antiaircraft

gun of calibre between their 3.7 cm. (l.45-in) and 8.8 cm.

(3.46-in.) antiaircraft guns. The Czech 4.7 cm. (1.85-in.)

gun has never been•brought into service in any numbers, having

apparently proved a failure, 5 cm. is a German calibre and

therefore a logical choice for the new antiaircraft gun. No

doubt, as with all mobile German antiaircraft: guns, it has

also been designed for use agaijast armored fighting vehicles.

1 M

SJ

T

III - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

2)

Light antiaircraft Weapons (cont'd)

The 5 cm. Flak of urse not be confused with the 5

cm. antitank jjuj jfcym. Pak 38), which is an antitank gun pure

Tech. Rpt.No.66-V/ar Office-7 March 1942

A 3»2 cm. Automatic twin-barrel gun is reported to be in pro­ duction (in Germany) . There is some d'ubt as to its ul­ timate. employment, whether as a dual-purpose antiaircraft/anti­ tank gun or as a tank gun -—(but) a further report states

that a pair of guns is mounted on a stand, so that there- are

four barrels to a stand. In this form it will probably be used

as an antiaircraft equipment. . G.S.I.-G.H.Q,,M.E.F. Tech. Int. Summary

Cairo, Egypt-18 August 1941

The Maximum effective ceiling of the —<•(German) light an­ tiaircraft guns is based on the time of burning of the tracer

and self-destroying element, but owing to the limitation of

the fire control methods, accuracy falls off at the end of the

flat trajectory; this means th:jt in actual fact effective en­ gagements are unlikely above 3,500 ft, with the 2 cm., 6,000­ 7,000 ft., with the 3.7 cm..,, and 8,000 ft. with the 4 and 4.7 cm.

Air Min, Weekly Int. Summary up to 27 May 1942-#143

antiaircraft gun (Scotti) together with the

The 2-cm. . 2-cm, antiaircraft — ( B r e d a ) gun, is the standard light an­ tiaircraft equipment in the Italian Army. Particulars are:

' 2720 f/s

Muzzle velocity , . Maximum Horizontal range 5900 yds.

Maximum effective ceiling 7000 ft.

Theoretical rate of fire 250 r.p.m.

Practical rate of fire 12Q r.p.m.

Length of bore 70 cals.

:

Weight in action 501. lbs. Maximum elevation • 85°

,. -10°

Maximum depression • . ..... 'Maximum traverse ',360°

.Weight of projectile, , .275 lbs. '• .:

Type of shell ".i-'^^V . H.E V tracer.

' Type of f u z e ^ * •:.'. Super sensitive percus­ •• • ' • sion self-destroying.

Sig^ta^ .^v••.. :x. ., v -Course .and speed.

-x. Incg.,^1 to Ltr.45783/SAG/jit-ll December 1941

wK '

.

-46­

.

.

.

.

.. _



Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT

2)

Light antiaircraft Weap >ns (cont'd)

P r m

(The captured Italian)—* 20 ram* BREDA antiaircraft/anti­ tank gun % s J>lf |he:*whole ironed' a satisfactory weapon from the mechanical poiSfe ^ k i Q &ut from certain recurrent defects and has not proved a cfoMpMe success in desert warfare, owing to its predisposition to stoppages caus­ ed by dust and sand/ The telescopic sight originally fit­ ted, is not suited for tho type of targets normally engaged, and experience has proved that an open sight is preferable. Various designs have been made, and it is hoped'to come to a final decision in the immediate future* The traversing gear is very low geared, and it has been found better to declutch and traverse bv movement of the layer's seat. M.A,R.2457-Cairo, Egypt-28 April 1942

(The Captured Italian) 20 mm. ISOTTA FRASCHINI antiair­ craft gun — - has proved much more satisfactory than the — ­ (captured) BREDA, and has not the tendency to stoppages

caused by dust and sand. The elevating and traversing gears

are more robust. This equipment has required very little

workshop maintenance. The 20 ram. high explosive shell has

very little splinter effeat. Aircraft have repeatedly been

hit without bringing them down. It is generally accepted

that at least two 20 mm. guns to one BOFORS 40 mm. are re­ quired to defend locality. The 20 mm. is more comparable

to a heavy machine gun. Although the rate of fire is greater

than the 40 ram gun the maximum vertical range is about 7,000

feet the remaining velocity at this height being considerably

less than the 40 mm. Tracer is easy to observe at all ranges.

(The gun is fitted with a) course and speed sight

(but no useable sample, has been obtained) . The small open

sight was not an efficient substitute. The alternative solu­ ti®n which was in use (around Tobruk was) to construct

a forward area sight on the lines of the BOFORS 40 mm. ele­ vation layers "clock" sight. Two of these were put in use

and proved satisfactory (as substitutes)•»—.

M.A.R.2457-Cairo,Egypt-28 April 1942

3) -Heavy antiaircraft Guns

. |% . v

V .

Characteristics x>f British Heavy'Antiaircraft Guns:

Equipment

I- o. *** Muzzle Velocity (f/s)

inch 4.5 inch 3.7 inch (twin) (4.45 ins.)

2600 2400 2600

3 inch

2000



H I - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

3)

Heavv Affair emit W a n s (c ont1 d)

* && V " V. • * Vi VJiflK •25 inch 4«5 inch 3.7 inqh (4.45 ins.)

3 inch

Projectile (lbs)

55'

28

It.

Nominal "Lethal " Ra'dius" (ft.) '\

90

60

45

8

10

16

4

" * •

Rate of Fire 16 (rds. per two-guns)

Maximum slant range

(yards)

Powder fuze not used Clockwork f u z e - — 18000 Maximum height (feet) . Powder fuze Clockwork fuze

not used 45000

Vickers Predictor- 38000 Sperry •Predictor— not used *

Maximum quadrant

elevation

not used

16000

not used' 40000 29060

25000

70° ;

10500 15000

28000

8000

not used.. _

21000

36060

not used

29000 25000

. 17000 not used

80c

80

80 319.13/AUC-33-February 1942

; '

t

The British 3.7 inch gun has - — been under test by the

United -States Army. Cables indicate that the tests were suc­ cessful, but tnat the 90 'mm. was already tooled up for pro-^

duction. The comparative operational data of the two

equipment's are:

British 3.7" U.S. 90. mm..

Shell weight Maximum ceiling Rate of fire A * %

'

2'8 lbs 21 lbs.

T' V.%,000 ft. 34,000 ft.

12 r.p.m. • 18 r.p.m,

-113-Washington-31 March 1941

ng to')-— information

(from the Middle East)

zczmmzm.

III - MATERIEL AND EQUIIMENT

3)

Heavy Antiaircraft Guns (cont'd)

regarding the 3.7" (approximately 94 .mm) antiaircraft gun

with Matador tractor and the gun layer (set*^™ has

crossed any ground that can be crossed .by wheeled/motor

transport. This applied both t!o rotoiiides<&jfg%cwid and to'

loose sand. Speed of 10 miles per hour '(has- been) at­ tained across desert. The equipment including predictor was

not affected by sand getting into the works. Levelling of

the equipment in rough ground presented no serious difficul­ ties, The 3.7" was on one occasion eight miles southwest of

Gambut sited on the escarpment to cover the Trlgh Capuzzo and

engage motor transport columns. No difficulty was experienced

in training the guns onto the road. Guns had been "winched"

up to the escarpment. The battery Commander who gave the in­ formation was enthusiastic about the equipment generally. — ­ The gun laying set accompanied the battery and worked satis­ factorily under the same conditions,

M.A.R.43068-London-23 May 1941

• -:'' ;'

The (3.7" antiaircraft)— gun stood up well to the travel­ ling conditions experienced in the — ( M i d d l e East)-*— desert,

the.heavy springing together with the big tires showed to '

great advantage, - — F o u r 3.7 inch guns took part in an — ­ advance of the Armored Division over extremely severe country,

•

M. A. R, 43 565-London-ll July 1941

The 4.5" — ( 4 . 4 5 i n c h ) — antiaircraft gun of Naval type with

pedestal mounting, fires a 56 pound projectile»to the same

range-as the 3.7" antiaircraft mobile gun firing a 28 pound

projectile, Detailed characteristics are:

4,45 Caliber, inches : Muzzle velocity, feet per second (new 2490 f/s) 2350

Barrel length, calibers (approx.)43

Weight of projectile, pounds — . 56

Range, horizontal, yards—20,500 Range, vertical, yards —13,500 Time to 15,000 ft. 45°E, seconds-^ 11.93 The 4.5" antiaircraft gun is fundamentally a Naval type

1

o X S I ^ I t I I



Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

3)

Heavy Antiaircraft Guns (cont'd)

and is so used, Its. function as Army materiel is- fixed de- :

.it applied to the Navy mounting and

fense. 'The consisting of two '2MV sled bodies is intended to facilitate

movJLn^%he gun to z jz'vftcrete emplacement but is not intended

" - * a mobile materiel.

V " M.A.R.39971-London-27 February 1939

The British Navy has recently turned over to. the Army three

double'mountings, 5.25" guns for'use in Air Defenses of Great

Britain. The Army is going into production of the. 5*25" mount

ing which is to be used in a dual antiaircraft - coast de»­ fense role. The muzzle velocity is about 2875 feet per second.

• There will be no production model and the Army will go

directly into production of about 200. The project will ulti

mately call for about 400-500 for antiaircraft*

M.A.R.43940-London-8 August 1941

The 5.25-inch (British)-— Coast Artillery - Antiair­ craft Dual Role (anti-ship and antiaircraft) equipments to be

known as the "Mounting 5.25-inch Antiaircraft Mark IB" is

expected to - — start coming from production early next year.

It is to be mounted in a concrete emplacement and is hydraul­ ically- operated. It is capable of all round traverse and ele­ vations between minus 5 and plus 70 degrees. The general

policy will be to install these dual role guns at ports where

long range close defense against ships is required, and the

scale of air attack justifies supplementary, heavy antiair­ craft cover. • M.A.R.48228-London-4 June 1942

The standard major caliber German' antiaircraft gun is the 88

mm weapon. Xhere is also a 105 mm gun, some 127 mm.guns, and

a few last two are naval pieces installed

,s. These are all German guns. In aadi­ some captured materiel in use.

M.A\R*.18739-Ber 1 in-3 November 1941



Ill - MATERIEL AI® 3)

JENT



fj B J|jf f ® af Ji 5 r'T7 m

Heavy . n t i ^ a f t Guns, (cont'd) V- o •

. ,

It has been definitely established Isrftwo standard

German guns-are in service on railway.mountings, — 7 ­ They are the 8,8 cm. (3.46-in.) and 10.5 cm. (4.14-in) a n ­ tiaircraft guns.

Extracts from Summary of Technical Reports

No. 66-War Office-? March 1942.

The 8.8 cm. (3.46 in.) is the main German heavy antiair­ craft weapon; the 10.5 cm. (4,14 in) is also in use and is

likely to be deployed in increasing numbers in the future,

since it is being produced on a high priority basis. The

maximum effective ceilings - — are given as: 8.8 cm. - 34,770

ft., 10.5 cm, - 37,000 ft., and 15 cm. - 40/45,000 ft., it (

should be appreciated that these ceilings ar.e based only on

the ability of the equipment to- fire .one r^und at the heights

in question — - .

M.A.R.46980-London-17 March 1942

A-document captured in the Middle East reveals that the

German 88 mm. antiaircraft gun has now been provided with

a self-propelled mounting in the form of a 12-ton semi-track­ ed tractor armoured in,front. At the.back of the chassis is

a platform on to which the gun mounting is built, an ammunition

box holding 18 rounds is provided, The gun can also be fired

off its whells when carried on a special tractor drawn trailer.

M.A,L.47191-London-l April 1942

The (German) 8.8 cm,•antiaircraft gun 18 on self-pro­ pelled carriage is a very effective weapon and possesses

great mobility, For this reason it is used against forti­ fied gun*positions and other strong objectives.- It is also

capable"of operations against tanks at considerable range,

- — I t is used against medium and heavy tanks. Both armour­ piercing and high explosive, shells are used as ammunition. —

Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT

3)

Heavy Antiaircraft^

(cont'd)

The self-pr^e|l^jl''| ri^ge is a 12 ton tractor armoured in

front ^ A t^e %&strl. e chassis' forms a platform, into

w h i c h f o r the gun is- built, The mod-

antiaircraft gun 18 on special trailer 201

li tractor is used in the same way as the self-pro-

LeS carriage. Detailed instructions for the use by the

British of captured 88 mm guns are available,

Incl•#7-M.A•R•245 7-Cairo,Egypt-27 July 1941.

The German antiaircraft artillery has approximately 800 guns

in the defense of Hamburg, I estimate that 200 of them are

20 mm cannon, 250:are 37 mm cannon, 12-(3 batteries) are the

new 15©'mm heavy guns, and that the-remaining --'•(guns are)—

88 -mm and 105 mm, • '- •

M.A»R,185 67-Berlin,Germany-13 August 1941

Fire control equipment is located on the top of one building

in the Tiergarten, Berlin, near the zoo, and the guns (88 mm)

are located on another building several hundred ,rards away.

The guns are using flashless powder which is hardly discern-

able even at our close range (about 690-700 yards),

M.A.R,18567-Berlin, Germany-13 August 1941

The equipment under report-consists of five static 102 mm

heavy dual purpose antiaircraft guns captured from the Ital­ ians and used at Tobruk, Four — - were put into action —

The hard wearing qualities of the metal in the gun barrels are

very noticeable. The guns had fired a largfe/number of rounds

in enemy hands and then were left derelict for a long period

without attention. They have since fired eight hundred rounds

per gun (approximate) w ^ k very little sign of wear, For

a heavy gun the traye^ing%nd elevating gear is very easy

and extremely rapid in spilte of rust. The automatic breech

mechanism is ext^sfel^ efficient, The ramming device is

clumsy but e^sy^tS-xjiand load even at quadrant elevation of

over 60 d f ^ ^ s , ^ *

Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

3)

Heavy Antiaircraft Guns (cont'd)

sin si

r. ss a m Sk Particulars•of the gun I i I

Muzzle velocity Maximum horizontal range Maximum vertical range Maximum depression Maximum elevation Recoil Buffer capacity Breech mechanism Fuze setter

ond

14,425 yards

31,000 feet

10°

'



70°

Maximum 14" • Average 12"

7,875 pints

Semi-automatic, sliding

vertically,

mechanical

Incl,#1-M. A. L,45783-SAG/j it-11 December 1941

The Russians are equipped with the following' Antiaircraft Materiel: l) 20-mm Oerlikon and Rheinmetall antiaircraft guns; 2) 20-mm, antiaircraft and antitank gun;. 3) 37-mm * Vickers antiaircraft gun; 4) 40-mm, Vickers antiaircraft gun; 5) 45-mm. antiaircraft gun (ho details available); 6) 75-mm French antiaircraft gun; 7) 76-mm, antiaircraft gun model 1931; 8) 76-mm, antiaircraft gun model 1928; 9) 76-mm. anti­ aircraft gun model 1914-1915; i o ) 88-mm, antiaircraft gun; 11) 105-mm. antiaircraft gun model 1934; 12) 13.2-mm, antiair­ craft machine gun model Hotchkiss; 14) 12,7-mm, antiaircraft machine gun. Approximate total quantities are;

-A .

a) heavy calibers (over 100 mm.) = 8,000 guns

b) medium calibers • • * 6,000 guns

c) small calibers r 4,000 guns

M,A,R,427-Helsinki-10 October 1941

It is known that ammunition for the following heavy French an­ tiaircraft weapons is being manufactured in France for German

account. Large quantities are involved. -—• It is evident

that these weapons are being, or may be used in the future by

the German Amy- on a considerable' scale:-'­ 1 C r I t ? I*

J S J a 1

Ul • *

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

3)

Heavy Antiaircraft Guns (cont'd)

75-mm. model 36:

mg

rate of fire

2620 16000 25000 20

f/s

yds

ft.

r.p.m.

75-mm. model 33 J

Muzzle velocity

Maximum horizontal range

Effective ceiling

Practical rate of fire

2460 f/s 15200 yds. 22000 ft. 20 r.p.m.

90-mm. model 39:

Muzzle velocity

2675 f/s

Maximum horizontal range

18600'yds.

Effective ceiling

27000 ft. :

Practical rate of fire

15-r.p.m. Incl.#1-M.A.L45783-SAG/j it-11 December 1941

4)

Light Antiaircraft Fire Control

The four systems of fire control for 40 mm. Bofors Anti­ aircraft Guns is (l) No. 3 Predictor; - (2) .Stiffkey Stick;

(3) Forward Area Sight; (4) Joystick .

M.A.R.47306-London-7 April 1942

Characteristics of the British Light Antiaircraft Predictor

(No.3) (Kerrison) are:

Maximum time of flight

3 sees.

Maximum effective slant range

2000yds.

Maximum effective height^

5500 ft. .:



A.A.C.#319•13/AUC-33

-54­



(without pre­

(1) Open Sights (Forward- Area Sight)- •

(2) Reflector Sights

(3) Sight Correctors

Optical Sights are under investigation for small

arms. A pilot model is at. the School of Antiaircraft De­ fense for study in conjunction with Admiralty Research

Laboratory System of one-man control.

Reflector (sights including Royal Air Force designs)

are being examined. - — A reflector sight is no more

nor less than a substitute for an open sight. The general

advantage of a reflector sight as against an open sight is

that the layer having picked up the target with both eyes open,

can bring the window with the luminous laying mark up on to the

target without having to take his eyes off the latter and can

still keep both eyes open when completing his lay. A further

advantage is that the layer- sees both target ojid laying mark

in the same focal plane.

—r-(One form of) mechanical sight corrector -—(is the

Stiffkey Stick) . Its chief feature is that it does not

keep the two sights parallel. It, therefore, requires dif­ ferent forms of open,sight, for the two layers and would neces­ sitate two different graticules If it (were to be)used

to control reflector sights. This feature also makes it

inapplicable (in its present form) to the control of a

single sight —-(on a power controlled gun operated by-one

man) • A Stiffkey Stick designed for use with one-man con­ trol has been made up however by 1st antiaircraft-division

and is.being tried at School of-Antiaircraft Defense and a

favorable report (upon it) has recently been submitted

by the School of Antiaircraft Defense. (Another form of

sight corrector (Vector sight control) is that of the)

Chief Superintendent Armament Design — . -This works from

different data to those - supplied to the Stiffkey Stick. It

keeps both sights.parallel during operation and is, therefore,

workable with two identical open or reflector sights which have

a single laying mark or with a single si^ht and one-man mount­ ing control. — - After comparative trials, including the firing

of 100 rounds with each type, the School of Antiaircraft De­ fense has decided that the Stiffkey Stick was preferable

(to the other type) for the following reasons:

-55­

Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT

4)

Light Antiaircraft-Fire Control (cont'd)

(1) I t ^ s f ^ f i ^ * ^ e ' ^ d teach.

( • A s ; % orr^^at^ie thinks is the correct number

tt>r can c oncentrate on clock hour until

^ a plus, br a minus. (The Vector Sight oper­ las to think of clock hour and course angle at the same

time).

(3) If the course angle is small, the Vector Sight Opera­ tor tends to alter the speed when altering clock hour.

(4) Having set too fast a speed, the Vector Sight operator

has to switch from an acute approach course to an acute reced­ ing course angle and while concentrating on this he fails to

maintain correct clock hour.

Requirements for a sight-setting gear to actuate, sights pro­ vided with a single laying mark can best be met by a modifi­ cation of the Stiffkey Stick (that of the 1st Antiaircraft

Division) than by the adoption of the — - other design. The

general construction of the Stiffkey Stick needed going over

to make it strong enuugh to stand service use and'traveling.

It should be capable of being folded back.

M,A.R.48324-1 ondon-9 June 1942

Captain Jump is the officer who devised the Stiffkey Stick,

He is an Instructor in Gunnery at Stiffkey Practice Camp,

The idea, he states, had been prevalent for about twelve

years and he had been Instructor in Heavy Antiaircraft and

on going to a Light Antiaircraft Practice Camp he believed

he could aevise something that would give greater accuracy

than the Forward area. Sight. With the advice of Colonel

Gordon, Camp Commander, he was able to turn out the Stiffkey

Stick, i—-'("Stiffkey" is the name of an ancient village ~in

England) ,

M.A,R.47445-London-17 April 1942

"There (has been printed a ) - - training pamphlet entitled

"The Stiffkey Stick and How to Use It." This pamphlet gives

detailed working instmfjWLpns with diagrams,

^ • WJot.es on Middle East-22 July 1941

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPiffiN1 4)



Light Antiaircraft

Two coincidence type range-finders of 70 cm.(27.56 in*) base

length are used by German Machine Gun and mortar detachments

and with the machine gun 34 for antiaircraft fire.

Particulars are:' • .* ,

Base length of instrument Magnification Range •

-

70 x 11 200 (219

cm. (27.56 in.)

- 10,000 metres

- 10,936 yards)

Width of field of view at 1,000 metres (1093 yards.)

Range-finder 14 Range-finder 34

.72 metres (78 3/4 yards)

'62 metres (67 3/4 yards)

Coincidence is made by means of turning the working head.

— - A sight is fitted to enable the-range-taker to get on the

target quickly. A sling is used to carry the range-finder

when it is not in its case. a stand is employed when us­ ing the range-finder in the prone position • It may be fit­ ted- to the shoulder harness when the rangetaker is sitting,

. kneeling or standing, particularly agairist siir targets.

.The harness is used when range-taking in the sitting, kneeling

or:standing positions. For antiaircraft fire with machine

guns and rifles, the range-taker merely observes when the tar­ get comes into effective range' and when it goes out again.

The range .-scale is first set at 1200 metres (4036 ft.). t The

range-taker gets on target over the sight. . If the,target is

at a greater range than 1200 metres, the upper (inverted)

image will be to the right -of the lower (upright) image.

When the two images are one above the other, the target is

nearing the effective range of the machine gun. Up to cross­ ing point the upper image moves from right to left. After

crossing point it-meves back from left to right, and when the

upper (inverted) image is back*to the right of the lower (up­ right), image, the target is-again out of range of machine gun

fire.

— -M.A.R,48340-London-ll June 1942

— - Much of the success obtained by -^-^ll^G^^ri^mth)-*-­ the 2 cm. (0.79 inch) and 3-7^$.(^^Jrlbll)* » i t a k guns is to be attributed ic^ which

-57­



Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

tiaircraft Fire Control (cont'd) .

| r type-with a data.calculating mech­ ^has a pointer at its base which an

operator points parallel to the direction of the target's

flight. The gun commander estimates the speed of the target

and calls it to a second -perator who sets the value on one

of the discs. The range-taker provides the slant range, which

is also set in. The value of the sight depends on the

skill of the operators and on the ranges furnished. T-ach gun

crew has a range-taker, equipped with the stereoscopic 1 metre

(39.37 inch) base range-finder, with which he is able to read

ranges from a minimum of 800 feet to 26,200 feet. The range-

taker "calls off slant ranges'in even hundreds of metres every

few seconds. Great stress is laid on the training..of these

operators. (Samples of the sight, have been captured by

the British and full details are available in British reports)

M.I.lMJar 0ffice-2 .March 1942-131/APW

The Linealvisier 21 is alternative sight to Flakvisiers 35, 38

and 40 on the 2 cm. (0.79-inch) Flak 30, 2 cm. Flak 38 and 2 cm.

Flakvierling 38 .(Antiaircraft) guns respectively. It can

be used against air targets and against moving or fixed land

and sea targets. It may be described as a mechanical sight,,

the sighting line running from the. backsight through the appro­ priate speed graduation on an adjustable foresight, to the

target.' 'Range, course of target, speed of target, angle of

dive or climb, and tangent elevation (super-elevation) for the

range concerned are taken 'into account.

Operational limitations.of the sight are as 1 ~> H o w s

Speed'of target: 24 m.p.h-335 m.p.h

Range for Antiaircraft fire.; 328 ft,-5,428 ft.. .

Range for land and sea targets: 109 yds.-1,750 yds.

Angle of dive or climb: No limits,

M.A,R,47835-London-ll May 1942

n f «1. v "5 —'

''iit^'febUi^^^a^ Speed sight-(Flakvisier) is fitted

I V M

-58­

-(to the Ger­

M t § III - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT"'

4)



Light Antiaircraft Fire Contr

man.light antiaircraft weapons;

in e

­

sight is of the reflecting mirror type with'

mechanism for working out deflections, the data'

being slant-range, speed and course* The slant-range is

obtained from a portable 1 metre (39.37 inch) or 1,5 metre

(60 inch) base range-finder, one equipment being provided

for each gun.

Air Min. Weekly Int. Summary Up to 27 May 1942-#143

There is a course and speed sight used with the Italian 20

mm. (.79 inch) antiaircraft/antitank gun - Model 35. It al­ lows for range, course of target, speed of target, and cor­ rections in azimuth and elevati n, from observation of tracer.

It can be used both against air targets, and moving or fixed

land and sea targets. Operational limits of the sight are:­ Target Speed (land targets) 0-100 km./hour (0-62 m.p.h.)

Target Speed (A.A,targets) 300-550 km./hour (186-342 m.p.h

Range (land targets) 5500 metres (6015 yards)

Range (A.A. targets) 3000 metres (9840 feet)

Incl.1-M.A.R.48341-London-23 May 1942

5) Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Control

Characteristics' of Equipment

(British Heavy Antiaircraft predictors)—

Vickers for 5.25"

Maximum Time of Flight (sees)

Maximum Height (feet) Time from "on target" to "predictor Steady"

33 38000

Vickers for 4.5" and 3.7"

25

Time from "predictor 15 sees. Steady" to first round. M

" 7 feK? M f*

w/? &

10 sees,

15 sees.

15 sees.

15 sees.

M ®

33

25000

29000

10 sees.

Sperry for

4.5" and 3.7"

Ff

*

Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIP MENT

ire Control (cont'd)

for

Method of Prediction

.

v

Vickers fur Sperry for

4.5" and'3.7" 4.5" and 3.7".

Ifeasures the rates of change of Determines the

bearing and arfgle of sight to - Cartesian caor-»

the target, calculates the def- dinates of the

lections required and provides target, measures

the ballistic data required, the .rate of

» ' change of these

co-urdinates,

calculates the

coordinates of

the future posi­ tion and provides

the ballistic da­ ta required,

319.13AuC-33-February 1942

Characteristics of heavy antiaircraft radio equipment:

Equipment

GL I'

Maximum slant range (yds)

Average error of slant range-

GL II

50,000

30,000

75 yds. up to 14,000 yds, 350 yds fr ,<m 14,000 to 30,000 yds

65 yds up to 14,000

'yds.

250 yds from 14,000

to 32,000 yds.

500 yds from 30,000

to 50,000 yds

Minimum Angle of Sight

15°

15°

Maximum Angle of Sight

45° i

45

Average Error

1,2Q



Bearings obtainable

from 10° Angle of Sight to 60° Angle of Sight bMffII ft j I A l j w Ir i^ U &fc>Et»

0

'

•9

10 single of Sight

40° Angle of Sight

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQtl]

5)

Heavy Antiaircraft Fiii^Cpntrol (cont'd)

JSL J& M

Equipment

' ifaP-

GL II

Average Error # Both GL I and II require a mat, unleljs^op a quite exceptional

site.

319.13/AUC^3-February 1942

England for

(J.) . The first Canadian GL III has arrived in trial. It is a 9.7 cm. set incorporating a Zone position indi­ cator early warning device and 'putter on'. Range at present,

17,000 yds., but it is expected that this will be increased in

later production by 50$. Being a beam instrument it is not sub­ ject to the limitations of angle of GL I and II, and will go

down to 5° angle of sight and up to the zeniths it has much

greater freedom from interference; and it does not require a

mat, and is therefore much more mobile. Accuracy in bearing

and angle about 20', in range 60 yds. Preliminary trials give

data that, when fed through a Vickers predictor, give a mean

error of 150 yds,, as against nearly 300 yds. with GL II and

more than 330 yds. with GL I. " •

(2) The English GL III (10.7 cm.) has been designed and un­ dergone trials. Range of.the order of 30,000 yds. Accuracy

in bearing and angle 101 to 20', Its qualities are otherwise

similar to those of the Canadian model, but it does not incor­ porate a 'putter on 1 , and will require an expurgated GL or

possibly a pack set for that purpose,

319.13/AUC-33-February 1942

Experiments have been carried out on the unmodified Sperry

Predictor in order>to test its accuracy when fed with infor­ mation through a. gun layer receiver, as in unseen target, oper­ ation. Preliminary experiments have been performed on the

predictor only, £he information being fed in directly in the

form of present bearing and ground or slant range. This

allowed the personnel to /gain experience in operation, and

it tested the methods of recording employed, and acted as

background against which the experiments with'Gun Laying

Radio Detection Finder may be set.

-61­



I

III - MATERIEL

Aflfciainrsi'i UTOControl (cont1 d)

re^Test courses were all straight line courses in which

the target was assumed to be travelling with a constant

speed at a constant height. They were fed into the predictor

in the ..following manner. The three following methods of

feeding in each coarse were adopted, (a) Present bearing

and ground range were fed in directly to the predictor, .

The prediction errors observed, both lateral and in range,

were about 70 yards. They were substantially the same over

the whole course., (b) Fresent bearing was fed in directly,

and slant range was fed in through the height computer, i,e,

the usual procedure for an unseen target was adopted,

With this method the prediction errors-were distinctly

greater, owing to the inaccuracies introduced by the extra

operations of following the height curve on the computer and

matching the angle of sight pointer,-(c) Present bearing and

slant range were fed into the gun layer receiver through a

Bedfprd trainer. This simulates a target, and is used to

give a. break on the cathode ray tube which is followed by the

Gun Layer bearing and slant range operators.

About 20 seconds was required for the predictor to become

steady after starting each run. Thereafter, the errors were,

on the whole, as likely to be positive as -negative, i,e, no

systematic errors were observed. The prediction errors fell

during the first few series of runs, as the team became more

adept at t'he necessary manipulations, and the conclusions

stated in this report are based on the results obtained after

a steady state had been reached. For those runs during

which the present bearing on the predictor has been, recorded,

it was possible to calculate the errors, not only in. the

present bearing at any moment, but in the rate of change of

bearing. It was found that the error in the future position

was closely correlated with the error in the bearing rate.

It ...is .to be expcctcd that the magnitude of the prediction

.. error due to this source should.be'very nearly equal to the

..... error in the rate of change of bearing multiplied by the time

of flight,

319.13/AUC-33-February 1942

-(The British'use a stallations,) ~ Eft

FV 1% ^tek

di£ife1§ Sperry Predictor in some in­ modification is to be able

-62­

Ill - MnTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

Heavy Antiaircraft Fire ,.0'ontr^ (;Cont! d)

£ id' jk W jM

the tar­ to utilise average values of e

get, determined over a relatively long

stead of the instantaneous values 6rdinar rfy

N/S and E/Vr rate shafts (X and Y shafts) coming

sent position dumaresq are disconnected betv/een the

and the differentials at which the wind displacements, ftx and

W are added to X ..and Y. The ends of the shafts connected to

tKe differentials are clamped..; The target speed is then set

in on'the dials associated with the wind displacement dials,

as if a static test was being applied. If the bearing and

range handles are stationary, the predictor will evaluate a

future position, corresponding to the present position set in,

and determined by the target speed set on the dials. If the

handles are now turned, the future'position will move in con­ formity with the movement of the present position, but the

deflections will be quite unaffected by the rates at which the

handles are turned. Standard test courses have been put

through the modified pr_uictor in the way described for

the unmodified predictor. In every respect, the modified

predictor behaved in the manner expected? Provided that the

correct target speed was set in, the future position is only

in error, at any moment, by amount equal to the error in

the present position.

A.A.C.No.319.13/AUC-53

5)

The British have/for sometime, realized the importance of

making a fuze lead correction either at the predictor or

at the gun. The fuze to the future position as' taken from

the predictor is not the fuze to the future position when th'e

projectile bursts. This is due t'o dead time involved pri*.

narily in loading the projectile.-'— Until such time as a

fuze lead dead time is incorporated in predictors or directors

as I understand is being incorporated in our latest Sperry

Director or in the fuze setter as is being done by the Brit­ ish in their Molina No. 11 Fuze Setter, a fuze lead should be.

predicted so that our antiaircraft fire, particular for the

first few rounds before evasive action.is taken, may be as

accurately determined as is possible

1 li.A.R.46728-London-25 February 1942

\y}n .

.

•

.

"i ' . •• - 1 ' ' • - , ..<; •

2 sj i t

•

• 4 fe-i % *BHf «

i

' " .

...

I

" ^ M i s J ^ I

&i

i



Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Control (cont'd)

(M M uu fk>wk ifal *N »> iw,. ibeen taken as to — — whether

td should be given by a device in­ as in the design proposed by — —

tegral Molins or whether fuze lead should be'allowed fir in a

"fuze lead indicator", a device whigh would — - g i v e

this correction before the fuze data reaches the fuze setter.

It has been decided that the'Molins Fuze Setter No, 11

(less integral fuze lead assessment gear)'with Automatic

Loading System and a Fuze Lead Indicator will be adopted,

The Fuze Lead Indicator, composed.chiefly of parts from Ker­ rison No, 3 Predictor, has been adopted as a device for mak­ ing fuze lead assessment and incorporation of fuze factor

correction. The Fuze Lead Indicator-will be in addition

to the predictor (director). It requires one man to'operate

and one is to be used for a battery of four guns,

M. A'.R.47426-London-l6 April 1942 <

The British have developed an Open Sight for use'with 3*7-in,

antiaircraft gun for antiaircraft role (particularly dive

bombing) and for an antitank role. The Open Sights are

link-sights, designed-to move in parallel with the gun, piv­ oting about an axis near the layers head. For the antiair­ craft role, the foresights are designed to give right and

left and up and down deflections of 2g° and 5°. For the an­ titank role a clicker is provided on the lateral J-jind sight

giving left and right displacements of 1°, 1\ , while a

false zero wire on the elevation sight gives -—(tangent ele­ vation (super-elevation) for 800 yards at angle of sight

0°, This will-permit constant antitank laying on the

center wires of the foresight«' • M.,a,R,46999-London-18 March 1942 ; :

Experiences w i t h fire control instruments for heavy an­ tiaircraft units in the Middle East have shown that the

methods of housing instruments while travellin g were unsat­ isfactory, Special provision must-be made to insure that

each fixed in its travelling position*

p M g ^ w - S T h t ^ t e r i a n c e Engineer (Instruments) on the

fe Headquarters was invaluable,

-64­

£j £ . ' Jjf

te A? W *f £? / f j Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Control^

III - MATERIEL AND EQUIFME 5)

^



He .visited every position and inspected 0Lsm^ment at

least once a week, and minor faults were d i s c ^ e ^ W and rec­ tified before they.had a chance to develop into major, faults

and breakdowns. • •

M.A.R.43473-London-3 July 1941

It can be assumed that in general the Germans employ

the same principles of fire control as we do and experience

the same difficulties. With regard to their instruments, it

is thought that, whereas their predictor is of much the same

efficiency as ours, their visual height finding equipment

may be more advanced. Though reports have been received for

some time past that the Germans have been experimenting with

an instrument corresponding to our Radio Detection set, no

conclusive evidence has been received that it is as yet in

general use thus presupposing extensive employment of sound

location methods.

Air Tactics-13 May 1941

German Heavy Antiaircraft guns -are generally controlled by a

"Kommanderogerat" which is a combination of a course and

speed predictor ana a 4-metre base stereoscopic height

finder. It is not unlikely that some elements of err~r are

eliminated by the use of this equipment, since the data pro- •

duced by the height-finder is fed directly into the predictor.

A subsidiary predictor (Kommandohifsgerat) is also in use.

It employs the angular velocity principle akin to the vic­ kers and obtains heights from a separate 4-metre base height-

finder. Although in many cases sound locators probablys

provide the data for "unseen" fire, a radiolocation instru­ ... ••

ment, similar in principle to the British gun layer is known to have, been developed and is presumably replacing pre­ vious equipment as- far as production allows.

Air Min. Weekly Int. Summary Up to 27 May 1942-^143

• . A •• ' • • - , 71 > 6 "

lit" , v „ . .. * Art ' , . , . -r- There is now available a provisional description of

the German Carl Zeiss Jena Fredict&r^ -type KDO - Ger, 35 for

S8 mm. Flak. — — The instrument' and sttmof are 'housed in a ro—

' #



A

J Control (cont1 d)

bust two wheeled trailer, consisting of three compartments.

The centre compartment is fitted with a heavy sliding plat­ form to which the predictor is clamped during transit. The

two side com; artments are of equal dimension, one houses the

instrument stand, the other being available for-boxes, spare

parts, etc, ---- It is estimated that the operators required

are as follows:

Layer for Bearing

Layer for Elevation

Range operator

Rate setter for Bearing

Rate setter for elevation

Rate setter for range

Reader for Future bearing

Reader for Future elevation

Reader for Future Fuze,

The*predictor appears to operate on similar formulae to

that employed with the No, 3 (Kerrison) Predictor,

but with additional mechanism to obtain future Fuze. The method of obtaining a steady rate of change (by fitting fly­ wheels to the main handwheels) is very satisfactory, and

could be incorporated with advantage in the design of the

(British) Predictor Antiaircraft No. 1,

M.A,R.2476-Cairo,Egypt-2 May 1942



(There is now available a) Provisional Description of

the (German) Carl Zeiss Jena Predictor, Type KDO ­ German (36 stw B) for 88 mm. Flak. The instrument con­ sists of a main pedistal provided with three levelling feet,

ancjl two suspension arms which enable the instrument to be

raised and secured to the front and rear carriages when trav­ elling, — It is estimated that eleven operators are requir­ ed,

(Layer for elevation) (tracks target) . • •

Layer for Bearjjig: -—(tracks target) .

Range taker: (operates the stereoscopic range-finder) •

Ground range operator?-*-*p"4turns * nand^heel)---,

Course beariag turns handwheel) ,

hQr4zoJtdPsR|e4 opeir^voiw (sets a pointer) ,

n Qp&rntor,' — (sets angle of sight scales)­ •; operator, (matches pointers)-—.

Vk '^'^pirsl^or for Da ana Rf arm, — ( o p e r a t e s two handwheels) ,

> 6 "

0 & ff III - MTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT i y , j f /f f | .

5)

Heavy Antiaircraft Fire Contrdiif^^nt^d'^

Fuze drum operator, (turns a1 handwhSfetO"

Quadrant Elevation'Drum operator, (turns

wheel)

,



The -•— instrument is designed to obtain three main, values

i.e.,. Future Angle of Sight, Future Ground Range and deflection

in azimuth. A system of telephone communication between the

various operators of the predictor arid also between predictor

and gun is provided. Lines from a main connector box (fitted

to the predictor) lead to four sockets on the instrument and

through the multi-core cable to the sockets provided on the

gun. Each socket is designed to receive plugs for two head

and breast sets.

M.A.R.2476-Cairo,Egypt-2 May 1942

The British have in England one German Auxiliary Pre* dictor No.35 (Antiaircraft) captured in the Middle East. The effieiency of the instrument depends very largely.on reg­ ular and steady "work by the predictor crew, careful reading of dials and transmission of data to guns by telephone. It - — has low weight (about 400 lbs), and- probably low.cost. Neither wind nor displacement corrections are taken Into ac­ count, The distance between predictor and height finder should not be over 10 meters. It is not possible to ensure that.the same target will be engaged. It is an angular rates instrument which determines the future position, by adding or subtracting deflections. Bearing, quadrant elevation, and fuze setting are found. The instrument is used with the 8.8 cm. Antiaircraft gun. The normal electrical predictor for this gun is the —(German) Predictor No. 3 6 . • M.A.R.475 70-London-27 April 1942

The telescopic sight for the 8.8 cm. antiaircraft-gun 18 is an

antiaircraft telescopic sight 20. Its elevation (range) - drum

has been modifiedtin its upper part and graduated in metres.

When the Reflection? and rjmge drums are at zero the aim­ ing line of the sig^ht both vertically and horizontally are par­ allel to the axis of fe,|b^rrelJu '^pcef/however, the tele*

scppic sight is 71.5 o» to'"'tM cm. below the

barrel t'he aiming point on the ta#g<5t. Ji$st M w a y s be taken,

rather low and to the right if direct h9fs^*iVe to be register­ ed. The telescopic sight is carried in a special case fit­ ted to the carriage mounting,

Incl.#7-M.A.R,2457-Cairo,Egypt-27 July 1941

-67­

6)

y D EQUIFMT^T ' .

tjy • •\ ^

Rockets an&^bcket ivrojemtors ~

- The shortage of ifa^gLr craft guns and. the difficulty of

the antiaircraft problem (pltis the push of Mr. Churchill)

have stimulated the development of rocket gunnery .

Rocket gunnery was discredited by over enthusiasm at first —

A number of different types of rockets are now in use or un­ derway. One of these, a 3 inch, has approximately the

characteristics of a 3 inch gun, having a similar ceiling and

maximum range. A lethal radius of 25 yards in claimed

for the 3" rocket burst, with some effectiveness up to 50

yards. Differing figures are given for its pattern size, — ­ —-(The pattern size is large' due in part to the flimsy

projector; but it is cheap ana easily m?de and there is a

great deficiency in guns,

N,A,R.Ser,M-1:X-29-Great Britain-3 July 1941

The Dir'ector of Antiaircraft has stated that the Rocket pro­ jector was being developed to produce a large concentration

of fire economically' at considerable heights. Experiments

were being made to produce approximately one hundred bar­ rels firing into a 300 yard square.

iVi •rt, R,45840-London-13 December 1941

Three types of rockets were fired in Great Britain at a re­ cent demonstration;

(1) Called the proximity rocket which detonates from light

action and contains no fuse in the ordinary sense,

(2) A similar rocket with a time fuze on its nose and which

detonates when a setting pldced on the fuze is reached, i.e,,

5, 10, ,159 or 20 seconds,

(3) A rocket projectile which contains a parachute and wire

cables, '.hen this rocket detonates, the parachute is released

and carries a steel cable With it in its slow descent to the

ground.

M,A,43510-London-8 July 1941

" Rocket Projector fires a rocket which leaves the pro-

at a velocity of 200 feet per second. The wind

ect on the rocket in the initial stages

arsnunition is 6 ft, 4 in. long and the

w

III - MATERIEL AND 6)

MM J*

i L AJ?

E ^ U I P ^ N T ^ / l * / ^

Rockets and Rocket Projectors

dJff'J^ if%

shells weight 18 lbs,, containing 4i l b s T h e

lateral radiusrof the shell is 65 ft. The projectors are

fired in batteries of 64 which produce a cube in the sky of

800 feet sides and the lateral effect inside the .cube Is

likely to.be increased from 65 feet to 100 feet or even great­ er, At a quadrant elevation of 70 degrees the rocket rises

to 22,000 feet; at-maximum quadrant elevation (super-elevation)

74 degrees, and longest fuze, 30 seconds, the maximum height

is 19,000 feet.. Maximum horizontal range is. 13,000 ycirds.

Maximum range to burst, 30 second fuze, 7,125. yards. Time of

Flight: Quadrant elevation (super-elevation) for 16,000 feet

height and range 6800 yards - 23 seconds, 'Cordite is com­ pletely burned out in lg seconds, the rocket has thrn reach­ ed its maximum velocity of. 1500, feet per second. The average

velocity up to 6000 feet is 1200 feet per second, The remain­ ing velocity after 20 seconds at quadrant elevation' (super­ elevation) of:

.• . . 34tdegrees is 800 ft, per second

72 degrees is 475 ft, per second

M.A,R.43380-London-24 June

. 1941 Five salvos of eight 3" high explosive rockets, fitted with

the photoelectric proximity fuze, were fired at a Queen Bee

which was. dived, at the battery projector. One salvo was wide

•of- the target. The target crashed as a result of the damage

receive.d from the burst on the target from the last salvo,

, •••• N.A.R,Ser,#l827-London-8 August 1941

> 6 "

It is calculated -r—(by the Ballistics Committee, British

Ministry of> S u p p l y ) — that for a target, at height of 15,Q0O

ft. and angle of sight of 40°, a 4 gun antiaircraft -battery

requires to fire about 12,000 rounds per. aircraft casualty

in the case a^the 4,5 in. gun; and that' the' rocket "battery

requires abuft^j^gQpQ- rounds per casualty. This — - is in

s u b s t a n t i a l a n early estimate, given to the •

War Office jHf lygQ^-i ^.'s use of the weapon was in­ itiated. — 5 - On tftr%sls; of. thesf ,%fr*$>retical calculations,

it appears that, round i h e # ] f M | is about 30$ as

effective as the 3.7 inch gun^*»<£ l | £ ^ ^ # f e c t i v e as the

4,5 inch gun, rocket battery of 6 p r o j e c t o r s is,



H I - MATERIEL AND EQUIFI-ENT

s and Rocket Projectors (cont'd)

<|bf^c*^,ife®iivalent to about 5' 'four gun batteries O F T I W 5.7 or 2j batteries of the 4.5 inch gun. With the lateW'Slprovement s, the 4 gun battery of 3.7 inch guns is expected to be some 6 times as effective as the 64­ barrel rocket battery,, the greater effect of avoiding action for reduced prediction errors (for the guns)—— being
The British VJar Office policy how is to c oncentrate on the

production of twin projectors as they are to be the main

Rocket weapon in service for antiaircraft projectors. There

will be in addition, however,' -'—"(a certain number of) 9

barrel projectors obtained from the Navy - — The design of

the 4-barrel projector is being Completed but it is not at

present intended to put this type in production. The British,

in addition, are calling for a design and prototype of an

8-barrel projector to meet possible further requirements.

Production and development of photoelectric fuzes have now

stopped, - — Developments'on the'rocket are proceeding on

the condenser pistol and the radio prdximity fuze. The form­ er will be of particular value for multi-barrel projectors as

it will eliminate the necessity for the loading of pre-set

f u z e s .

' M»a.R.47227-London-3 April 1942

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

6) Rockets and Rocket Projectors (cont'd)

veloped: • (1) A 4-barrelled Projector mounted on a 40 mm. Mk.II •

platform.

(2) A 9-barrelled Projector on a converted 3" 20-cwt. mo­ bile mounting. . ..

These equipments are to be used against,both low and high fly­ ing targets and the 9-barrel equipment may eventually be pre­ dictor controlled. md'/'

319.WAUC-12-23 August 1941

The rocket projectile and a ^.Ajiii M r e | a-j^j^.

lP^

- - - - carrying . a parachute . impressed me and I think most.of the observers as

very practical thing. They fired approximately fif£y£

these r ckets' at one time. Two duds and about three tftc ^

partially failed to open were noted. The rest of them fu

tioned. The proximity fuse did not impress me and in talki

to many of the British • fficers I gained the impression that

they also doubted its practicability value. It is affected

by"light" changes and if one projectile in the salvo deto­ nates it will normally set off most of the -other rockets. The

rocket contained a self-destroying element which functioned

around 30 seconds. I feel that the rocket projectile--fired

in salvo with a time fuse has distinct possibilities both

for use on the ground and for use on ships. -—(U.S. Ord­ nance Officer) • • •

. M,A•R # 43 510-London-8 July 1941

The most promising (antiaircraft wire-shell so far de­ veloped is) one for combating night bombers is the 3" rock­ et with ceiling of 15,000 to 20,000 feet carrying a wire-para­ chute-bomb filled head. This is still under construction and

proof, but is essentially similar to the 7" Unrotated Projector

(Rocket) Mk, I heac

N,A.R,Ser ,#534-London-31 March 1941

v? m

v 1 rn

The .effect of wind on tY\e rocket is much-greater than on a ­ shell. As the rocket leaves the :rails at such a low velocity

A • i. a

C ' /

> 6 "

P^JjjeCtors (cont'd)

greatest-effect during the first 30 feet

light» For example - — figures show that for a 30.

ft./sec. wind at an angle of 45 degrees line of flight the

error*in quadrant elevation (super-elevatiun) amounts to

550 feet and the bearing e|*ror to 1000 feet. •

M.A.R.43380-London-25 June 1941

A test ( is to be held) to see "K" type ammu­ nition fired from Rocket projectors . It is propos­ ed to fire "K" type ammunition, and fly a "Queen Bee"

through it to see the effect, "K" type appears a pos­ sible solution to the saturation (or mass) raid,

M.A.R.38425-London-l6 June 1942

The development of antiaircraft Rockets for firing on ,air

targets has been an outstanding development by the British,

In the only service test of these rockets (on which).——

the writer was able to get data, the results were — - ex-.:

cellent - — , Two hostile enemy planes were shot down out

of four attempts. It is believed that if the bombing of

England, especially London, is resumed — that rockets will

play .an important part'in the British defense. (it is

rec .mmended)— that the development of antiaircraft rock­ ets be given immediate consideration particularly for the

purpose of the antiaircraft defense of permanent instal­ lations sufeh as'bases, '

Final Report-10 December 1941

> 6 "

7)

Antitank

•

_

• oi

The. requirement for a t a n k — " ( o r antitank)-— high-velocity

gun is ability to penet^tS^^enemy armour and kill qr

disable the crew JnsiSe. velocity is required - —

but a large jpr.^ctile is rlo#iessential for killing or

disabling^-© indeed, the smaller the projectile and

that can be made effective the bet-

the/an^llfcrV tn^y gun rounds can be carried, .and the turret -ring

rf^tSjfe^case of the tank gun.)-— can be kept within ,

Ill ­ 7)

MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENTV' .ntitank (c-

- reasonable dim' s in the do­ v^lopmeftt of super-— high vePjeii _ 'h muzzle velocity in the range from 4,000 -'6,000;f./s. At such muzzle velocities it is claimed that breaking'up of •••shot does not >

occur and.shooting is therefore - — materially facilitated.

The Germans have produced a 25/20 mm, super high velocity

antitank gun, built on the Gerlich principle, -i.e., with a

tapered barrel, u captured specimen of this gun with a part­ ly-worn barrel proved to have a muzzle velocity of over 4,000

,f./s. and penetrated 80 mm, cast armour at normal at 100 yards.

With a new barrel, the muzzle velocity is reputed to be over

6,000 f./s. • , It is considered therefore that intensive

research and development alt^ng the lines of super high velo­ city weapons is the correct procedure f or future tank .weapons

rather than the orthodox line of increased size and weight.

Note: The development of super-high-velocity guns is — •

of equal interest to the antiaircraft artillery .for'an­ other reason (i.e. to shorten the time of .flight.) -•:

M.A.R>44884-London-ll October 1941

Penetration characteristics of the -3»7-inch heavy antiair­ craft gun as an antitank weapon has not been obtained,: ; It.

is stated (however by the British) that the armor

piercing shot furnished for the weapon will go through any

heavy armor it .is likely to meet,

M.A,R. 45265-London-6 November 1941

The 2-pdr. is the standard British tank .and antitank gun. Its

performance is well known and so far has been adequate.to en­ gage all German .tanks encountered. The 'Germans are, :h'owever,

steadily armouring up their tanks and either the performance

of the 2-pdr, must be improved or it must be -—(supple­ mented by another more) effective weapon.,. • The 6-pdr. has

been designed and. is now being produced. . It is a most

effective gun capable of dealing with armour,.LU®.to 85 mm. -or

more. Its chief disadvantages are t h ^ p i e c e and

its consequent in-board length ^d^Ehe size 5f£tae round which

required 3J times as mufihi s t • room as the*2-pdr. round,

* f&f.%%iiyA;R^^4S84-London-ll October 1941

f -73­

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENTV'

IflL FOriM^ $a|3.\l[lsl^ltwo-r-pounders (such as 40 mm Bofors)

alSjfrn^fc J&i^c^, were*reported after Dunkirk..—For example, a

: G^msfejftOTk* deliberately invited fire at long range and while

Several guns were*firing-at it the rest of the tanks'came

around the back of the other guns and shot them up. Again

the Germans invited fire at long range to disclose positions

and sent Infantry around to mop up, Failures in general

were due to faulty siting, — - having too few,guns, not hav­ ing guns properly defiladed, and disclosing positions too soor,

—-(If a maximum of 600 yards was taken with the two pounder,

success was obtained by the weapon.) In Greece by those

who used it at shorter ranges and in defiladed positions — ­ it never failed to stop its tank. They fired from ground or

portee, digging the vehicle in as far as possible. One round

nearly always stopped the tank, but one or two more rounds

usually had to be put in to a stopped tank - otherwise the

survivors of the crew came out with grenades and tommy guns

and were dangerous,

M.A.R.45417 -London-17 November 1941

— 48 rounds of armor piercing shot are supplied — — ( b y

the. British- to each light antiaircraft 40 mm; gun for its secondary or antitank .role. Due to the shape of the

projectile the penetration is not quite)-— as good as

that obtained with the 2-pounder antitank gun. At a 30° an­ gle of impact, 40 mm. of armor ist penetrated,

M.A.R,45365-London-6 November 1941

The 40 mm. Bofors antiaircraft gun was fired'against

mechanized targets with l) the Kerrison predictor, 2) the

Forward Area sight, 3) the Forward Area sight•and "Stiffkey

Stick." "The firing at "Automatic" at Armored Fighting Ve*

hides was spectacular, (Thi,s me'thod of fire would rapidly ex­ haust 'the supplies of Semi- Aymor SMLercing and- Armor Piercing

normally carried but where n&nerqft targets present themselves

and SLmmunition has been dumped, this method of fire may be ­ very effective.)-— It,is recommended that all No. 3 pre­ dictor^(KerMs6p) %^- Toe — - modified to give 5° depression

ansttCmie^ ^i"tji*tfte McCurdy Sight, ,

^ '' M.A.R.45028-London-22 October 1941

-74­



Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

7)

Antitank (cont'd)

Small arms weapons such as the British Bren

caliber .303, will not penetrate the German tank but they

should be used to make the tanks close down. Fire should

be directed against vision slits, periscopes and the junc­ tion between the turret and the hull. (The Boyes)

caliber.55 antitank rifle at 150 yards will penetrate

25 mm. of armor. It ,—- will — p e n e t r a t e German armored

vehicles up to the medium tank at ranges up to 150

yards. M.A.R.45265-London-6 November 1941

To enable them to be employed against Armored force ver

hicles,all light antiaircraft predictors are to be mod­ ified to allow of depression of the telescopes to - 4 decrees.

This modification in no way affects the use of the predictor

in its antiaircraft role, but merely necessitates a differ­ ent test for tangent elevation. This is required because

direct laying for elevation is to be employed against armor­ ed force vehicles since it has been found that this method

of laying is the most satisfactory in view of the slow rates

of change of elevation involved in the engagement of this

type of target.

M.A.L.47191-Lonaon-l April 1942

Question: If the predictor is in action should tanks be

engaged with the predictor or with the forward area sight?

Answer; If the predictor is warmed up and tank targets can

be taken under fire .by that method without delay, the predic­ tor should be used. But if the predictor is'not warmed up .

and in action the forward area sight -with the "Stiffkey Stick"

: . - .• ' •

should be used, . . M-..A.R.45028-Lohdon-22 October 1941

The same principle-as on the new 3.7"-Open Sights of applying

small antitank deflections by an external movement of the

hind sight, is being adopted Sajfc the 40 mm.' The existing For­ ward Area Sights are to be modfiiet^. sh ^jh^tAtlfe lateral hind

of up to a

sights can be displaced ^bjy th£ maximum deflection V f or left*in 15* clicks. . The cam

> 6 "

Ill - MATERIEL AND TOTFJFKT

"on1 "rae^eT'Cicsu'Tllna sight is to be.modified and marked so as

to give-the appropriate tangent elevation (super-elevation)-—

adjustment, at zero angle of sight - — , for ranges between

300- yards and 9o0 yards inclusive in steps of 200 yards, re­ taining the existing ''line upM and antiaircraft "far" posi­ tions o

Weapon Apt.by .D,A.A. &..C,D.-May 1942-13/AUC-71

—(Mechanized) targets can only be recognised exactly during

the morning and evening —-(in the Libyan desert) • In

the middle of the day the light is so dazzling owing to the

heat, that all outlines are completely blurred and distorted.

Tanks appear like bushes, bushes like tanks, and so oh, and '

much practice is needed. . M• A-, R • 46863-London-3 March 1942

Firing trials were held - — in October to decide on the effec­ tiveness of the British 6 pounder tank gun firing high

explosive ammunition against antitank gun positions and

personnel in slit trenchc§, It is undoubtedly effective

against personnel in slit trenches,

M.A.L.46l65-London-9 January 1942

During 1940, the standard antitank caliber in the German

Army was 37 mm. In 1941,: the standard antitank caliber — ­ was increased to 50 mm, although,-of course^ the 37 mm is

still being used. According to our information, even the.,

high velocity 50 mm gun will not stop ail Russian tf*nks so

the need of a larger caliber is obvious and probably ex­ plains the first employment^ of major caliber antiaircraft

artillery (88 mm) so far forward, — - A picture, taken from

an illustrated German magazine shows a large antiaircraft

gun (estimated to be 105 mm) with a protecting shield,

The shield is open at the top to permit the gun to be.ele­ vated to its maximum election (85 degrees),

M.A,R•18637-J^erlin,Germany-l6 September 1941

0k \

a

-76­



Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

7)

Antitank (cont'd)

M _ m <1%



A captured document reveals that the Germai fVJ ChFi

their designation of the. antitank gun from Panze£a£>we

—-('Antitank Cannon) to-Panzer j-agerkanone (Tank hi

C a n n o n ) T h e abbreviation remains the same — t "Pak". The

document further states that (.German) antitank, equip­ ment will be classified in future as follows:- l) Light

antitank guns: - calibres up to and including 3.7 cm, — — 2)

Medium antitank guns - calibres frum 3.7 cm, to V.4. cm.

— - 3) Heavy antitank guns - calibres from 7.5 cm.

. M.I.10 War Office-8 September 1941-13/ATK-S

The German 88 mm. gun is fitted with a telescopic sight adapt­ able for the engagement of ground targets, the lat­ est type of which is the telescopic sight.20E <.. It weighs

10 lbs. and is a monocular type with a magnification of four

and a field of view of 17.5°. The graticule is made-with

two cross lines interrupted at the centre, an arrange­ ment which is usual in German instruments. There is a range

drum graduated in 100 metres.from 0 to.9400 metres and a

tangent elevation (superelevation) drum graduated in l/l6°

from 0° to 12°, There are also lateral.and vertical deflec­ tion drums. For antitank use the lateral and vertical de~

flection drums are set to cero. .

The War Office, London-17 July 1942-13/AUC-75

Enclosed is a cartridge of .the Russian Antitank, rifle, *

'(7.62 mm. caliber) which is now being adopted by. the Ger­ mans. The barrel is reported to have a length of 1,^00 mm.

and the muzzle velocity is 1,350 meters per second, (about

4390 • ft/sec). The gun-is neither semi-automatic nor auto­ matic but has an ordinary clip of 5 .cartridges. In tests

the> projectile has penetrated an armor. plate- of 22.5 to 23

mow -at an angle of impact.of 45°, The tests .and .experiments

carried- out by the Finns have been hampered by. the shortage

••' of armor plates. . . . . ; •

; M.tA .JR-, 497rHelsinki-31 January 1942

'•'• -v. .

Editor's Note: .Cartridgl .'is 0n 'ff^ija*£r4nance Department

^•mM-^jfif x J ; & t f

rjri ^ * % t ' yy

Ill - MATERIEL ANDEQUIFMENTV'

-a ­ ti^ink. (^ont'td^H

W s made on a' captured) GERMAN Mark IV Tank (show

that it is) completely vulnerable both in front and broad­ side o n ^ o the BRITISH 2-pdr. (like the 40 mm. Bofors) .

Antitank Gun. Shots fired at a range of 500 yards with

the target broadside went right through the GERMAN tank

and penetrated the far side. Six shots - — fired against the

40 mm. band of armour plate in the centre of the hull pen­ etrated and three also went through the 20 mm. plate on the

far side of the hull. -The other three struck the gun or the

gun mounting inside the turret and broke up. The gun crew .

would certainly have been casualties. . At 700 yards range,

all shots penetrated the 20 mm. plate on both sides of the hull.

They also penetrated the 40 mm, plate and penetrated to a

depth of 10 to 15 mm, on the far side of the hull before

breaking up. At 1100 yards range, all shots penetrated both

the 20 and 40 mm, plate but did not all go through the far side

of the tank, Two tests were made firing at the tank head-on at

a range of 500 yards. Three shots were fired at the thick

double plate in front of the auxiliary gunner; all went right

through it. Three shots were fired at the thick single plate

in front of the driver's seat. Two of these went right through

and one just failed to go right through,

G.H.Q,,M,E,Technical Int, Summary-30 June 1941-Cairo,Egypt

The armour and armaments of the German Mk. Ill tank are as

follows:

The armour (all welded) is 30 mm, all round, except the top

of the rear engine compartment, which is 20 mm. Extra 40 mm,

plate is bolted on the front of the gun mounting, and extra

30 mm, plate .on the front of the superstructure, whjLch pro­ jects upwards to protect the turret joint; The armour is

half V jointed, which produces a tendency for it to split, on

the impact of a shell, along the jointsf

The Armament is one 50 mm, rapid fire cannon in.the power or

hand operated turret with all-round traverse; one: co-axial

SPANDAU 7,91 mm. light machine-gun; and one independent SPANDAU

7*91 mm, light machine gun mounted in the hull superstructure

on the right of the driver, firing forward* .Numbers of each

•type of the German tanks hatfe.been knocked out in LIBYA and in

GREECF*;hy a variety of methods, and penetration performances

of BRITISH weapons against these tanks have been very good.

'» vA V t 4

-78­

III - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

7)

Antitank (cont'd)

As usual, the myth of GERMAN invincibAar^r$na"

submitted to the cold light of engineering ra^i^..

sorry exhibition.

' Incl.l-M.A,R.2457~Egypt-8 May 1941

8) Miscellaneous Items

Drawings of Antiaircraft artillery Emplacements, Laj^out, and

Command Posts, show a 40-foot tower for 40 mm Mk.III equip­ ment, designed for use at such vulnerable points as factories,

railroad centers, edge of woods, etc., where due to height of

buildings and trees, it is necessary when siting guns close

in to have height, so that field of fire may be obtained*

They have been designed to give a better field of fire when

sighted close to or in vicinity of high buildings. The Brit­ ish started using them at the beginning of the War and then :.

stopped. Lately there has been quite a number put up. The

Germans are (said to be) using numbers of similar

towers*. . M.A•R.45048-London-22 October 1941

Steel towers are being constructed in sections of 5 feet

to permit (the erection of towers) .of variable heights,

10,15, or 20 feet. Stability ^fixing trials of towers up to

25 feet have been carried out with satisfactory results

and further trials to 35 feet are to be made. The towers

are bolted together and not rivited permitting their being

dismantled and re-erectad elsewhere. For the same reason the

lower' part of the tower should not be bricked up. v ••

M.A.R.47449-London-18 April 1942

A new type of British lower has been designed which will provide a more suitable platform for sea gun positions.

The nevi,.tfjvpr consists of a grid carrying a tower on

four legs whiM1,fy^l| f h U g ^ i ^ e ^ ^ w i l l be lifted by "cam­ s'it$, £nd g^ttom. These

els", towed; ^ ** w

FAS

$

$ *

i£

> 6 "

$ ]P 1 1



H I - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

8)

Miscellaneous Items (cont'd)

towers are expected to come forward from production in approx­ imately six * — will replace the PHIL­ qgrdqse iiniJt will be used only in

o m r j S ^ i^ity where the site is sheltered

orm will remain steady. There are two types,

one a combined Heavy Antiaircraft and Light Antiaircraft and

Searchlight 7-tower layout and the other a 2-tower Light An­ tiaircraft and Searchlight layuut, A similar tower is

available for inland use for the mounting of antiaircraft

guns to raise them up to obtain clear fields of fire,

M.A,R.46667-London~19 February 1942

Sea f o r t s — - have been designed (by the British) to

carry 3.7" antiaircraft guns as their main armament and Bo­ fors guns, as their secondary armament together with radio-

location apparatus, predictors, height finders and in some

cases, searchlights. The (construction) principle a^

dopted is to build the structure with its armament, electric

generating plant, equipment and accommodation in a waterfront

building yard and then to. tow it out and ground it at the

site selected on the sea bottom in a depth of water varying

from 3 to 7 fathoms, In all cases the forts are designed

so that when they float out from the building yard they are

complete in every detail and ready to go into action immedi­ ately after grounding,

. Incl.1-M.A»R•47109-London-27 March 1942

The following are.the estimated penetration figures for fire

from aircraft diving at the target with weapons stated:

20 mm. OERLIKON

15 mm. Machine cannon with ball

Gun 151 with arammunition,

mour Piercing ammunition

Homo-Hard Plate Concrete

Gravel Earth

3/8"

23"

45"

30"'

G.H.Q.,Middle East Forces-Technical Intl.

Summary-28 February 1942-Cairo, Egypt,

> 6 "

I N - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

;

*M

•

- ':

ft •: '

4 -V « -i ' A? j^ft*

One troop of the Battery (Light Antiaircraft^'-*^- mjjjk fit­ ted with, shields. Time after time those shields'-prpved their

value,t saving casualties and giving increased confiednce to'

the. detachment, especially when under machine gun fire, from

tanks. Although there is an increased weight on the suspen­ sion springs, no breakdowns occurred during five weeks fight­ ing, and these guns (with shields) could move as fast as any

: •. «' • •

of the others. . , . Appendix "C"-M.A.R.47438-London-17 April 1942

8)

'

Miscellaneous Items (cont'd)

Shields have now been approved for Guns/40 mm, antiaircraft,

mobile. - These consist of two thicknesses of 6 mm D.I.* plate

separated by a lg" gap.

AtJC-Notes April 1942

Question: What armor protection do the British provide

crews on Heavy Antiaircraft guns?

Answer: No armpr protection is provided for heavy antiair­ craft guns. The 4,5-inch hsis a shield but this is a weather

shield only. Concrete and sand bag protection is afforded

on static sites. The field gun pits and Command Posts

are, where possible, countersunk and strengthened.

M.A.R,47594-London-27 April 1942

— — The standard German anti-personnel bomb which' can

be expected in all tneatres of war against troops' in the —

open --- has the following characteristics :' Length of bomb 1' 3" • ' •; "

• Diameter of bomb . . 3 l/4"

. . 9"

Length of tail *** j?' ^ ^

Diameter of tail | / : r Length overall fa •' - ' i ' w f l l ^ ^ .

. Wall thickness ^'kmfrM'i.X

I Weight of T.N.T, filling '

Ij \ . Total weight 12 kgs, (26i

> 6 "



Ill - MTERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

,8) Miscellaneous J ^ ^ a ^cHft'd)

f llllJ^ H l ^ W l r W s U ^ a r e Panted aark grey. The

t \\ d w a j u g gfel&A&SsistSs of a nose (percussion) fuze — — and

W ® %. v game which butts up against a short compressed T.N.T.

exploder which in turn butts up against a long compressed

TvN.T. exploder: at the far end of the system'is a phosphor­ us and max smoke-producing pellet, the object of which'pre­ sumably is to-ensure quick location of the burst from the

air. This firing system' forms a central column running

through the bomb and is surrounded by a main T',N,T, charge

and the J" thick bomb casing. The casing is said to give

a fragmentation of one splinter per square metre at a radius

of 25 metres around the point of explosion: i.e, approxi­ mately 700 fragments. The charge weight ratio of the bomb

is ten, These bombs are carried in the aircraft in

clusters.of five in a specially designed carrier, - — '

Summary of Technical Reports Regarding Weapons

M.I.10 - Uar Office, 8 September 1941-319,13/ATK-S

— - A further report has been received on the small anti­ personnel bombs (S.D.2) used by the Germans for low-level

attacks on easily damaged targets. The S.D, 2, bomb weighs

about 4i-lbs. when ready for release. Its height of re­ lease is between 15 and 175 feet, but it can be dropped

from any height and will not detonate until the aircraft is

out of range of the splinters. The fuze can be set either

to give detonation lj to 2\ sees, after release, or in such

a manner that the bomb detonates-on impact if the height of

release is greater than about 75 feet, or after a small de­ lay if it is less, Detonation in the air may occur if

the height of release considerably exceeds 175 feet. An un­ exploded S,D, 2. Bomb should always be regarded with suspi­ cion, it may be in an extremely sensitive condition and the

slightest shift in its position may cause It to explode,

M,A.R,47285-London-7 April 1942

—-(The Germans employ Rawing-stick booby trap dropped

from vehicles or f rdm (Ag k A which)--- consists of an alu­ minum cylinder^ painte^ y^yjow and walls 0.1 cm, thick, It

contains 0.15 Kg>; hlgfi"explosives as a block filling. In

the top of "±kd}:Biliing are three black powder pellets, "C"

\ v- , 4 '

> 6 "

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENTV'

8)

Miscellaneous Items (cont'd)

partly embedded in the ma?if filing. Tl^e top of the bomb

i's fivetted to the body, and carries the ignition mechan­ ism, ' On unscrewing the cap a short length sef-1 cord (5 cm.)

is seen attached at one end to a disc in .thoj cap,, and at

the other end to a loop in the friction-wire-—rjlf/the

cap if pulled more than 5 cm,, the friction-wire.fcai^ses'

the 'friction composition to ignite the pellet "B" and so

fire the compressed pellets "C". ».hen found complete the

bombs are harmless. If found-with the cap unscrewed the

cord should be cut and the cap replaced to protect the fric­ tion wire. The cap should not be unscrewed/ as the safety

margin of 5 cm, of cord is very small, — ­ G,H,Q*,M.E-,Technical Intl. Summary

30 June 1941-Cairo,Egypt

A booby trap, found in the Barcia area, had the form of a

single-earphone head set, which exploded when the nickel-

plated screw at the back of the earpiece was unscrewed. It

may have been intended to explode when the current was ap­ plied as in normal iise. The charge was' sufficient to blow

off the victim1 s hand almost completely. It was not passi­ ble- to reconstruct the device, but it is believed to be of

Italian origin, . :

Incl.#2-48559-20 June 1942-A.A.C.319.13/AUF-29

The British have used neither half-tracked nor tracked ve­ hicles for gun traction for a number of years. They were

unsatisfactory as their road speed was very limited and the

The. 6-wheeled­ driving tracks and suspension unreliable, vehicle to which overall chains could be fitted to the. 4 1

rear driving wheels at will displaced the half track vehi^

and the'6-wheeled vehicle is itself now being displaced

by the 4-wheeled* 2-wheel-drive vehicle,

' ' M.A.R.44550-London-17 September 1941

For convoy driving the British have adopted and are instal­ .^ota^^i^iht,

ling — a small standard. Light similar which is fastened under the bsp<j$ $hd£ ajb •

of the rear point of the floor or^Hfe ^Npi ' * - 11

-83­



Ill - MATERIEL AND^-^J]

a ffk Q-'-} « i v ..

Milqel%Lrieou.3 Itemj^'

BS directly on the center rear of the rear axle housing.

At 'this point on the rear axle housing a large white circle

is painted with ordinary paint. V/hen the light is lit at

night it is invisible to any aviator excepting to one hedge

hopping frqm the immediate Tear, and on the other hand it is

clearly Visible to the following convoy vehicle for long

distances, even in bad weather, dusty roads, etc.

M,A.R.4203S-Lond'on-27 December 1940

(Keeler "Jim Crow")—- spectacles and goggles are used to

a great' extent in Great Britain to assist spotting and iden­ tification of aircraft. Full protection is claimed against

harmful ultra violet and infra red radiation.

M.A.L.#45062-London-23 October 1941

—-(.AS a result of tests) the —-(British) Airborne-

Division is being furnished with night binoculars.. They -give

very little magnification (2j power) but.have very good light

gathering properties. On a completely dark night they give

no help but in conditions of dusk or moonlight they give con­ siderable advantage and enable objects to be made out dis­ tinctly at two or three times the range which is possible

with the naked eye. They have a wide field of vision.

M.A.R.48544-London-23 June 1942

The British Battle Dress is an extremely satisfactory type

of uniform for wear — - ( i n Great Britain.) It. is suffi­ ciently thick to give warmth, it is loose to enable an ex­ cellent freedom of muscular movement, it is treated to re­ sist gas attacks and'is somewhat waterproof, For use in

the damp Cold of England it appears more satisfactory than

our field uniform. - —

"

L.46325-London-29 January 1942

British ha^e/a new signal pistol, now replacing the Very

jfe' T&'fe. vV, V*

vk f*. r.sit * ^

' -84r

Ill - MATERIEL \ND EQUIPMENT

8)

Miscellaneous Items (con'

t Xi 'if up g.

pistol. Being of dull finished stee^ 4 % ^hould^t^jglint in

-

the sunlight as did the brass portions or'tjie .Very j

It weighs slightly over two pounds and is carried

in.a. canvas holster . It is issued to various 1

irig:

Total.

Remarks

Light .antiaircraft Regiment

Royal Artillery

39

13 per Battel-y

Heavy .jntiaircraft Regiment

Royal Artillery

12

4 per Battery

M.A.R.45640-London-8De cember 1941

An example of the'V?LKST AGEN or "Peoples Car" has been cap­ tured by the British . The engine is a four-cylinder air-

cooled type, with twin horizontally opposed cylinders, and

is mounted at the rear of the chassis, The estimated . —

rated horsepower was reported'as'9 "horsepower with a prob­ able maximum brake horsepower of'30 at 3500 r.p.m. The sus­ pension is independent, of the Auto-Union type, giving very

good riding for so small a vehicle over rough terrain. The

transmission is of standard type, from engine to rear axle,

and there are four forward speeds and one reverse gear, CON­ TINENTAL tyres are fitted, the dimensions being 8.00 x 12.

They have no tyre treads, but smooth surfaces. The petrol

tank is mounted in fround and the feed to the engine is by a

suction pump in the rear engine compartment,

""• * Incl,5-M,A.R,2457-Egypt-10 July 1941

(The German)Volkswagen r-,cross-country car is replac­ ing motor cycles which have proved inefficient. It will go :

through anything except shifting sand dunes. Desert sand";'

causes wear on stub axles and frame'heads after 125/180

miles, , Selector forks ana .-clutches are weak, Distribu­ tor, and rear dynamo bearing are not dust proof,;

ji;A.^4686^|.Qndon-3 March 1942

> 6 "



Ill - MATERIEL \ND EQUIPMENT

8)

Miscellaneous Itemsffa'r

A Germn^c^fcfcok%cnpt3LuSel\SJ' Libya which is thought to have

be Larked fbp%.. Giinnery

xTcer — - was found to contain the

^.th^t" p^sonne 1 concerned with artillery directors

Quipped with non-magnetic gas mask respirator

ers, German service containers heretofore captur­ ed have been made uf tin plate. An exception is one recent­ ly found made of an aluminum alloy • It may be that the alloy-containers are intended for personnel using mag**

netic compasses or similar apparatus.

Technical reports-ATK/S-London-3 September 1941



A captured GERMAN Document contains an Army Order of 10

April 1941 announcing the introduction of protective EAR*

PLUGS for men with perforated ear-drums. The plugs will

protect such men from the effect which may arise from the

entry of gases through.the acoustic passage. They will be

packed in boxes which will be carried at the bottom of the

respirator haversack, and will be issued to all soldiers

with'perforated ear-drums,

G.H,Q,,M.E,F.Technical Int, Summary

Cairo,Egypt-15 September, 1942,

9)

Developments



Army requirement, an igniter

to meet 1 —-(a British) tracer for the 40 mm high explosive shell, to give 12 sec­ onds time of burning has been successfully developed.

BAS- ashington, D, C.-22 April 1942

The Air Staff are of the opinion that by the end of 1941 a

limited number of aircraft will have a. ceiling of 40,000

feet and over and that this cy towards high altitude

performance will increase •guable that aircraft at

these altitudes can £ave litt] :le ( 10 influence on the oper­ ations of a or against targets of small "propor­ tions,. Nevertheless^ Altitude flying is one way whereby

' defense, and in conditions such as

the atiaKjfifr wa&j&ffyijfe

an ^attack on a city»be enabled to deliver his bombs to ad­ vantage. For this reason heavy antiaircraft1 artillery must

be prepared .to meet the contingency of very high altitude

flying in the defense of large areas. The technical disad­ vantage of the, defense lies in the inevitable increase in the

period of prediction due to longer times of flight..' As against

this, aircraft at such altitudes are limited in regards to ma**

neuverability,and further, the radius of lethal effect of the

shell is Increased owing to the rarity of the atmosphere.

The problem is being approached in two ways: l) scaling up v

of the existing predicting apparatus so as to take advantage

of the full range of present equipment; 2) the design of more

powerful guns. Superior ballistic performances can be obtain­ ed by increases in muzzle velocity and better flighting prop­ erties of the shell. A possible line of research is the

Genrlich choke bore principle, thus ensuring better sealing

of the projectile in the bore and correspondingly higher muz—

zle velocities for a given pressure,- This principle is be­ ing investigated, but it must be realised that hitherto the

principle has been applied only to small -bore equipments and

even so only to a limited extent, "

BES- Rpt,#95-Washirtgton-27 March 1941

Interest in high-Velocity guns has been given impetus by the

discovery of the •—- German tapered barrel high-velocity

28-20, mm. antitank gun. — - The surprising feature of. this

gun is the. high-penetrative power of its projectile. The

core;of the projectile is made of tungsten carbide, a mate­ rial . whose specific gravity is nearly double that of steel.

This bullet has penetrated three inches of homogeneous ar**

mor;and although it was stated that the results are in accord­ ance with the predictions from the DeMarre formula, the great

penetrating power of very dense, high-velocity projectiles

has not hitherto been experimentally verified, at.least by

the British. It was stated that'the tungsten carbide :

breaks up on penetration (it even breaks up when fired into

sawdust) but that a large number of small high-yeioc
particles are sprayed behind the plate which wyuldtie'<Je|d-/ ^

1y inside a tank. The antidote for this projectile',isvioib- i J

v .<;' ® pP* & & ft

> 6 "

je^^Jfcpifi&nts (cont'd)

viously divided armor, the first plate to break the projec­ tile and the second to stop the fragments. It is of intei^

est to note that the shield for the German gun is composed

of two parallel plates separated by an inch or so, indicat­ ing that the Germans designed the gun shield to resist the

same type of projectile as the gun itself fires.

The thought of using a coned bore is of course not new,

and the British have studied the matter intermittently in

past years. At present, development w r k is proceeding on

two such rifles; one with a barrel tapered from ,685 to

,532 inches, both somewhat smaller than the German 28/20

mm, — —

London-October 1941-AUC-13/ARP-21

General Staff specifications for a high altitude gun

require a maximum height of 50,000 feet, the last round

to be fired at future angle of sight of 65 degrees, the

first round at future angle of sight of 55 degrees giving

at least 20 seconds time of engagement at approaching tar­ get of 400 mi/hr, Two solutions are under development.

One solution is a 3*7 inch caliber to fit existing 4,5

inch jacket and mounting to give 3400 ft/sec, muzzle velo­ city with a 28 lb, shell. This gives a 22 second engagement

of target at 45,000 feet with a 40 second fuze .and a new

predictor of 19 seconds at 40,000 feet with existing Vick­ ers predictor which has 30 second fuze limitation, — The

second solution is the 5,25 inch caliber existing.Naval gun

with increased muzzle velocity of 2900 ft/sec. with 80'lb,

shell giving ^21 second engagement of target .at 45,000 feet

with .40 second fuze and new, predictor or 16 seconds time: of

engagement at 40,000 feet with existing Vickers predictor,

...... ...

. M.a,R,43093-London-2 June "1941

An interim solution for the high-level heavy-antiaircraft j

gun — - is 3,7 inch calibre-—(gun with)-— a muzzle velo­ city of 3,4QO f«s,, to be used invbne present — 4,5 inch

S PI\ " £*

III - MATERIEL AND EOUIFMMlff 9)

:

Developments (cont' d) " " *

1

•n fe

* ll I

antiaircraft mounting. Pilot barrels are in course of manu­ facture.

Bulletin on antiaircraft Development for

North Americain Bureau-AUC-20-Dec ,18-1941

Design of antiaircraft weapon for attack of high flying

aircraft, quick firing 5•25"/ It was desired to have a

muzzle velocity of 2900 feet second to give a ceiling de«­ finffd by an engagement time of 20 seconds with 40 seconds . '

prediction for 45,700 feet. To get this Muzzle velocity it

was necessary to increase the length of cartridge. It has

been docided not to do this due to necessary changes in de­ sign of mountings which has already commenced. Present muz­ zle velocity is 2870 ft/sec., however with a J worn gun on

which range tables are based, the muzzle velocity is re-,

duced to 2625 ft/««G. which will reduce. the ceiling to

44, 300 feet and the chance of hitting by about 5 percent.

— . > M. A . R.45271-London-6 November 1941

The 5.25y gun has been designed and is in production.

It will fire an 80 lb. shell with"a muzzle velocity of 2875

ft./sec, 'lethal radius' 150 ft, as compared with 90 ft, for

4.5" and 60 ft, for 3,7", It"will give engagements up to

45,000 ft, and slant range 18,000 yards with 40 seconds, or

up to 40,000 ft. and slant range 16,000 yards with 30 sec­ onds time of flight,

•• ' : A, A• C..£319,13/AUC-33

information has been obtained on the progress of Work -on •'•

gun design being conducted by Lt. Colonel Probert at Wool-'

wich Arsenal, - — Gun design drawings increasing-the-cham­ ber capacity for the 3.7" Mark VI — to clLmn,, an

^-Vduction)

increase of 40 cu. in. (have "beerf approved , The ordnance Board haS" concurred -—.jin -driving

: 4 ; band (and cartridge-case)—- designs f ; • ' . '•"

, \ N,A. R,979-London-21 April 1942

-89­

Earn % S ) feiUiPMENT

1 «

« ft W

i^p&ents (cont'd)

trials have taken place with two types of (3*7 inch anti­ aircraft) gun; one (Mk V) with an orthodox banded pro­ jectile, the other (Mk VI) with a projectile having an addi­ tional forward band (Probert design) • The Mark V

showed that wear was severe, both at the commencement of ri­ fling and at the muzzle. This indicated that the muzzle velo­ city would be expected to fall from 3,400 ft./sec., the de­ signed muzzle velocity, to 3,000 ft./sec. very rapidly, after

which the gun would be useless for the high ceiling require­ ment. With the Hark VI gun, the wear at the commencement of

rifling was very much less, with no trace at the muzzle after

80 rounds.

BAS-T»ashington, D. G.-22 April 1942

The British have standardized the 3.7" Mk. VI Antiaircraft

•gun (Probert design) employing a forward banded shell for

production. The prototype of this velocity weapon, af-_

ter 468 rounds, is maintaining a muzzle velocity of 3360 ft.

sees. .The fired shell still has stability and uniformity in

muzzle velocity equal or better than at the commencement of

the test of this weapon, according to test results. The

3.7" Mk. V Antiaircraft gun (orthodox design) with muzzle

velocity of 3460 ft. sec. had an accuracy life of 81 rounds.

• . M.A.R•48724-London-6 July 1942

The 5«25 inch antiaircraft gun — - will probably.be redesign­ ed to take -7—^a projectile —^(having an additional forward

band) following the success of this type with the 3.7 in.

Mk VI £un.—*(with the Mk VI gun (3400 ft/sec. muzzle velo­ city) using this type of projectile the wear at the commence­ ment of rifling was ( s l i g h t ) — n o trace at the muz­ zle after 80 rounds) .

- Bui. on A.A.De'v^ f^j^ jtforth American Bureau

\r • • r f The War Offioe.^nd Antiaircraft Command insist on haying a

•-

..

,

•

.

•

•

*

"

• -90­

-

­

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENT 9)

V

'



Developments (cont'd)

,. ' . .

f $ OFSk „

ft J 8 Mm*

mobile, intermediate altitude/ antiaijrcrajft' *mn®| .3 ing^ ^.ortvdn

mounting with a rate ,of Afytjjf Jpsgj­ ing of 20,000 feet, ana a time orix¥g£rti jgjp jfo.11$ iecirjls.

. M.A.R, 44477-London-ll SeptJn.felj^41

A twin 6-pr. gun —-(about 57 mm.) to deal with targets up

to 15,000 feet, above Bofors ceiling of 4,000 ft., is being de**

veloped as an intermediary between Heavy and Light Antiaircraft,

M.A.R.45840-Lohdon-13 December 1941

A twin-barrelled 6-pr. semi-automatic field equipment is in

course of development, with a muzzle velocity of 3,100 ft./sec.,

for the engagement of aircraft up to the 15,000 ft. level.

This is an interim stage towards the development of a fully-

automatic 6-pr. equipment for field use. — ­ Bulletin on A,A. Development for North Ameri­ can Bureau-13/AUC-20-18 December 1941

The Bofors Company (in Sweden)—- has designed a new 57 mm.

antiaircraft gun with many new features. To date only a

pilot model consisting of the barrel, breech mechanism, re­ coil and elevating systems, and the auto-loading mechanism,

has been completed. Tests, have been in progress since July ,:v

and will, be completed shortly. Pilot model's of mounts are

being made and all tests are expected, to be completed by No**

ve&ber, 1942. Production is not expected to begin- before No*

vmber,1943 • Th$ company does not desire to license the manu­ facture of any portions of the design before all tests are

completed. •• •

.. ' *... . ; M.,A.R, 1421-Stockholm-30 October 1941

The Bofors munitions plant,—(in Sweden)—••- has re^e

gun quantity production-of pme^fE^fii mSuj&fcjffil 'J^e

antiaircraft gun which was bre^i^^ljfi afc akrmvift.

aircraft gun. This gun andM>fe|i^| 'fa-iT'^^M Wdfefifcd

dard. — - The carriage is designedfor high-speed towing be­

-91­

I*1 Developments (cont'd)

hind a truck or other prime mover. It is equipped with bal­ loon tires, individual wheel suspension, and hydraulic brakes

on the rear wheels which may be' operated from the towing ve­ hicle. The wheels are eccentrically mounted with re-»

spect to the axles — ( s o that) a rotation of the axles

raises or lowers the frame. This movement is accomplished

by lowering a barrel brace 1 —— fixed to the rear* axle

(which causes) a system of cables inside the main frame

members (to effect) a simultaneous rotation of the front

and rear axles, "Coil springs' ihsirie the main frame members

counterbalance the weight and assist in lowering or raising

the carriage. The mount is levelled by means of four adjust­ able ground plates which are attached at the extremities of

the main frame and the outriggers, and which are operated

through cranks and quick-action screw jacks. Two anchor pins

at-each end of the main frame and one pin at the end of each

outrigger may be Slowered until their points touch the ground

before the frame' is lowered so that when the carriage is low­ ered all pins are forced'into the ground or penetration of

the pins Can be secured by driving in with sledges. The en­ tire operation of going into (firing position) requires

less than one minute,

M,A.R,1340-Slockholm-3! January 1941

The mobile predictor is probably the Kommandohilfagerat (aux­ iliary mechanical predictor) admirably suited for mobile oper­ ations due to its weight (4 cfwt.), design for ease of pro­ duction and simplicity, and does not need any electrical

£tjuipment,) It is sometimes used with the 8.8 cm multT-pur­ pose gunf In addition to indirect fire the Germans, are' us-'.*<

ing both predictor control and fire from an observation post

for the engagement of tanks and ground targets, In our

Report No. 47570, we described'the German auxiliary mechan­ ical predictor. In our report No, 48983-we recommended that

we develop a mechanical preda&t&Awithout any electrical

equipment for our mobile antia*iy?raft guns as an auxiliary

director. If we a^e"'to havo^k'Jiignly mobile multi-purpose

gun, I consider.this very essential,

:' ^ % f % %

t\

* * M,A.R.49094-London-25 July 1942

„

Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIFMENTV'

9)

Developments (cont'd)

i

Mjji •• '

^ *

•



The British are going to use Belr^eigpj

(U.S.A.) Electrical predictors; and delrwrifcs .^.re­ early in 1943, for bath 5.25 inch and 3.7

Antiaircraft Equipments (High altitude Antiaircraft

' M.A.R.47733-London-5 May 1942

A number of improved predictors are in production or* under

design.

1) Vickers predictor re-designed to accept changing

height up to rates of change of 400 ft./sec. Pilot model

is ready for trial.

2) Sperry predictor re-designed to accept changing height.

Pilot model has undergone "trials.

3) A mechanical predictor that will accept curved course

and changing height, and will go to 45 seconds time of

flight, is under design^

4) - — Electrical predictor that will accept changing

height, and will go to 45 seconds time of flight. Pilot

model has given' accuracy superior to any existing mechani­ cal predictor when fed with perfect voltages. A certain •

aJnount of re-design is necessary.

r '5) Electrical predictor that will accept changihg height .

and Will go to 45 seconds time of flight is under develop­ ment « ..

A 'Naval Close Range' Pre'di'ct'or has been designed and the

pilot model is under trial. It will be the fire control

instrument for the 6 pr. gun (about 57 mm.) . It

makes use. of visual bearing ana angle,, and 10 cm. radio

range, the aerial being mounted on top of. the predictor,

and can cop>e with diving targets, the equations being based

on' the rates of'change of bearing, angle and range 4

A.A.C.//319.13/AUC-33

Trials are in progress to eStablis^if a No. 1 predictor

can accurately control four 40-np ™ + u „ re­ transmission unit. A small cor bSfif

made in the predictor to compen this

trial is successful, it is intended to use

equipments with Vickers predictors in an intermediate,'role

-93­

9)

Developments (cont'd)

for the engagement of targets at height levels up to about

12,000 ft. 40-mm. ammunition with 12 seconds self-detftruc­ tiun time i's under de'sign for this purpose,

' M,A.L.47191-London-l April 1942

• •

Report on antiaircraft Defense of Malta

stated that

Antiaircraft instruments \/ere highly sensitive to bomb blast

and that predictors have been found to need extra

protection against splinters. The Ministry of Supply are

now investigating' the question of providing splinter proof

shields for the top of predictors.

M.A.R.48475-London-18 June 1942

With 400 m.p.h. targets and rate of fire approximately 120

rounds per minute, the problem of accurate gunnery (for

the automatic weapons) at the higher levels (and longer

time of flight than 3-sec.) depends entirely on the devel­ opment of a new predictor incorporating range measurements.

Therefore, the first priority -—(has been)-— given to de*

veloping a fire control system based on a 10-sec. time of

flight. ' M.A,R,43460-London-3 July 1941

Trials of the suitability of search light control (Radio

Detection Finder) for fire control purposes are in progress.

1) for heavy antiaircraft*guns with Vickers predictors;

2) for 3" 20-cwt. guns with Vickers predictor against

divebombing•attack•at night;

3) for 40 mm guns with Vickers predictor against targets

at intermediate heights.

, M,A,L.47191-London-l April 1942

Ah experimental model — ( o f a 40 mm Bofors antiaircraft

gun) was seen, which was intended for ofce-man.operation

with direct sighting when — - the preciictoriis not available

On this model, the gunner i|£ts on a.s'm^l%P|t which moves

y. •

<«



Ill - MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT

9)

Developments (cont'd)

with the gun. In front of him is a

trol lever which is connected through maf

draulic valves controlling movements of the guft.*

the near end of the lever to the right (i.e.pointing

front of the lever to the left) causes the gun to traverse

right. Similarly, elevating the lever depresses, while de­ pressing the lever elevates, the gun. The movements are

thus similar to pointing a cane at an object.

There is a straight line relationship between the amount

of control displacement and the speed of traverse of ele­ vation. The maximum speed of the traverse is ap roximately

24°/sec0

N*A.Re864-8 April 1942-AAC#319.13l/AWG

Mr. Thress —-(ll.St Army Ordnance)' states it is his opin­ ion that several of the important objects to be consider­ ed in the design of a secondary fire control system are;

(l) Reduction of .the time from traveling position to tar­ get engagement^ (2) Reliability, (3) Simplicity. Because

of these factorss -the inclusion of power control, such as

the joystick, seems to him. a step in the wrong direction.

He thinks a secondary system that'would eliminate the neces­ sity for a-generator, junction box, cables and like gear

• a

would be the one desired'and, therefore, suggests mounted on car­ predictor, -—(similar to. the • Kerrison) riagd which will give the required deflections and be used

with manual control.: The predictor should not have .

more than J of the volume of the; No. '3> isince the trans­ mitters, 'telescopes and drives, aided-tracking mechanisms,

torque' amplifiers or power follow-ups and related parts

such as differentials, shafts, bearing-,• etc•, would not be

requited. The actual computing elements of the No. 3 could

(he ;thinks)—— be simplified and made smaller and with but

a small sacrifice of accuracy* - ­ M.A.R.48324-London-9 June 1942

Antiaircraft tajiks are required for the protection of tank

units0 Experience in thfiTjiiddle East and accounts of the

Russo-German campaign sh$|jf air attack on telnks was in­ creased, is',3Jicreasing^^4'^f^(^th0>tahk point, of view),

ought'to be diminished. N^ improvised.br half-time methods,

will suffice to deal with the 'ac&l§ of attack envisaged and

•

'

-.95-

^

if K

9)

Developments (cont'd)

the development 'of antiaircraft tanks capable of moving with

the forward .echelons is essential. The British are evolving

a power-operated mounting containing two 15 mm. Besas and

two 7.93 Besas to the light tank Mark VI at home and 0.5"

Vickers are being similarly fitted to light tanks in the

Middle East,

Incl,4-M*^*R«44884~London October 1941

(Tentative conclusions have been reached as a result of

a British survey) of the best type of controls for use

on antiaircraft tanks, (It is recognized that) an­ tiaircraft tanks will ordinarily have to engage high speed

aircraft at low altitudes and short ranges. This requires

a gun mounting capable of very high (laying) speeds

— - I t has been suggested that (speeds)-— up to 90 de­ grees per second may (havt to be used) • It then be­ comes imperative that the means of controlling the gun be

improved, It is clear that the effective laying speed

of existing gun mountings is limited by the difficulty of

ce-ordinating head, eye and hand movements. This cu-ordi­ nati^n could be greatly simplified by controls which make

use of some familiar co-ordinated aiming movement, such as

the use of field glasses or the aiming of a fowling piece.

Controls embodying these principles should be developed as

soon as possible, — - l.ork along this line is — - in pro­ gress, In — existing controls the range of muscular

movement is but a fraction of what might be employed — - .

-The gunner should be placed, in the axis of rotation of the

turret to minimise the disturbing effects of acceleration.

The limited space available in a tank will almost certainly

make it necessary for one man to have entire control of the

aiming and firing of the. guns, - — He^ should have — - auto­ matic devices for the estimation of the range, speed and'

direction of . target, aircraft, and for applying the neces«»

aaiy correction to the sights. No existing predictor

seems suitable for tank use. ^.11 are large, require sev­ eral men to- operate .would be..difficult to protect with arm-

our and are not highly a c c u r t h e use'of a pre*

d&ctor is essential if accurate af)^iaij®raft fire --(of the.

heavier weapons,):-—is to -be ^obtairied,' A predictor' 'is of

little valu^yrho^ever, unle.ss the individuals who operate it

are caj^^^of r falltmiiig the target accurately,. This means

^

-96­

• •• £ i m f i

$

III - MATERIEL \ND EQUIPMENT

9)

Si

Developments (cont'd)

that the principles outlined above are equally applicable to

the controls of the predictor itself.

N.A.R.864-8 April 1942

Question: - — Describe any developments in the nature of a self-

propelled mount for the 40-mm, Bofors Antiaircraft gun, - — .

Answer: Preliminary cross country trials, of a. self-propelled

•• 40-mm equipment on a long Field Artillery Tractor

and (of a self-propelled) predictor on a similar ve­ hicle have been satisfactory. Both vehicles are still under

trial ana details as to design such as the jacking, the

slewing handle and the carriage of spare,barrels and parts

are being cleared. The suggestion is to incorporate the Ad­ miralty Research Labortory joystick, if found satisfactory,

as a secondary method of fire control.

M.A.R.47595-27 April 1942-London

B I B L I-O.G.R A P H Y

1) Progress report on Development of Electric Fuze Setting De­ vices.

M.A.Rf4&486-London-19 June 1942

2) Trials of T-17 Sperry Predictor :

• • *M,A.R.4785 6-London-12 May 1942

3) Antiaircraft Machine Gun'Self-Destroying Fuzes.

" N.A.R.1517-London-27 December 1940

4) Particulars of the 20 mm'Sten Gun*

M.A.R.44898-Lpn£on-13 October 1941

and M.A.R.46924-Lon"don-12 March 1942

5) Antiaircraft Gunnery ^servations at Sea-.

•Lqndqn-14 January 1941

1 Li I B®I M "$» §f

y af 1 :siM S % w jj ml j* a •

. ^ • ' • M y g i

i r f f

8 1 SJ. jfl I I p t l r ^ T g E E V ^ fjpqpKl i l l l k s L o i J i l i 1T t u



bibliography (Oont d)

6)

Navy Antiaircraft Fire Control Table ("Flessey")

N.^.R;.2740-London-2 December 1941

7) Tachymetric. System.1 Predictor '"or High Altitude Guns

M•A, R.43939-London-7 August 1941

8) Development of High Altitude Antiaircraft Gun and Equip­ ment. ' • "

: . .. . M.A.R%43713-London-21 July 1941

9) Army Tachymetric System No. 1 Predictor, Army Simpli­ fied Model,

• N. A . R.15 50-London-ll July 1942

10) Tachymetric System (TS l) Predictor for high altitude

Antiaircraft Guns.

M.A.R.43094-London-27 May ,1941

11) Remote Control of 3.7" Antiaircraft Gun on Ilk'II Mount-

ing,4

M.A.R.42983-London-12 May 1941

12) Remote Control of 3.7" Sun (British) on Mk II Mount­ ing.

M.^.R.44304-London-30 august 1941

13) Demonstration uf Chemical warfare Rocket Projector

Weapons,

M.A.R.45996-London-19 December 10

December 1941

14) 'Airdrome Parachute Barrage

M.A.R. 43152-London-3 June 1941

15) During Target for Testing of Radio Froximity Fuzes,

N.A.R.2500-London-28 October 1941

16) Predictor Experiments accuracy Tests.

M.A*L.44863-London-101October 1941-131/ZW

-

-

17) Translation of Handbook ©rathe-German 2 cm four-bar­ relled ^tl£ir£ra£t .Gun L16unl3nftg (detailed descriptions with

•r^x^YY^ m ** *

i l M L V p W

T

..

. -98­

> 6 "

»A.A.'C.#319 • 131/AVJP

T

H I - MATERIEL AND EQUIP

Bibliography (cont'd)

18) Report on User Opinions of the Sp&rrjf AHt^fraraft Pre­ dictor. * • £ jr* M M

M. A • R. 4193 5-London- 2 Deo%bg#L940

19) Projector Antiaircraft.3-inch Single'with Technical

Data ana Handbooks and References to Technical Papers.

. M. v.R.-131/ADJ-London-7 November 1941

20) Direct vs Rate Control Matching on Angle of Sight

pointers in No. 2 Predictor.

M.A.R.45992-London-26 December 1941

21) Improvised .\ntiaircraft and Antitank guns for Brit­ ish Armored Cars,

M • A. R. 1826-Cairo-r 14 May 1941

22) * Spark photography of bullets Striking Light Armor

M.A.R,46513-London-7 February 1942

23)

Color Bursts of Antiaircraft Fir

M. A.R, 43l72-London-8 June 1941—131/NW

1•

L

ILP

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

)

Concepts (re - tactical employment)

In an operation involving an Army, it might be expect­ ed that Army Headquarters would itself take responsibility

for the initial deployment of the greater part of the antiair

craft resources during the apy roach march. This can be done'

by using Army antiaircraft up to a certain stated line and

allocating specific tasks to be undertaken from Corps anti­ aircraft resources in the "Corps" areas. It can be antici­ pated that this will still leave the C.;rps with a certain

amount of Antiaircraft available for its own use. This plan

will allow the Army Headquarters to do the maximum coordi­ nation possible and at the same time give some latitude to '

the Corps, who will possess loc.al knowledge not available to

the Army, The Light Antiaircraft of the Divisions should

not be called upon to undertake Corps t-'.sks, but should be

used when necessary to cover the localities where its own

Divisional Units are concentrated. This met'hod will enable

the fighting Division to arrive in its deployment area com­ plete with its own antiaircraft which wuuld be immediately

available for its many tasks within the Divisional Area, The

danger must be avoided of the Division having to do rapid

deployment without th§ services of much of its own light

antiaircraft, - — the - latter .liavin g been dispersed in action

over a large area. If it is accepted that Army should be

responsible for co-ordination of most of the initial lay­ out diring the approach march then the question of march

tables must be considered. It may be necessary to fit Army

and Corps Antiaircraft into Corps and Divisional March tab­ bies respectively, lie should then get the situation of a

Corps Regiment commencing the Approach March well forward

in a Divisional March Table, This Corps Antiaircraft would

then be dropped off in successive stages of the march, leav­ ing the divisional antiaircraft available for the final de­ ployment. As the corps antiaircraft will all have been

dropped off during the approach the Division will not be

hampered by any additional troops and the Divisions might

expect to be self-contained with only their own Light Anti­ aircraft Regiments, at a time prior to the Divisional de­ ployment,

British Brigade Commander-ii.A.R.46090-London-5 January 1942

It is understood that at least one Armored Divisi n has is­ sued instructions that light antiaircraft guns will have

8 m

I? - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE l)

^/ff §

i? & h '•

f#V # '

Concepts (re'- tactical employment) (coni^d*)

'V

priority of movement on roads. This is taken t o m ^ a r ^ ^ t

antiaircraft troops are permitted to take advantage-^^ta'cH

" tical gaps between units in order to move from one task to

another. This seems very desirable and i't is suggested

should be common practice.

Incl,l-M.A.R.48ll8-London-2£ May 1942

The division commander is responsible (for the selection

• of m i s s i o n s ) — T h e commander of Royal Artillery (for

the'division)-— and the Light Antiaircraft regimental com­ mander will discuss the tasks. The division commander does

not always have time and has to delegate the selection of

tasks but (cannot delegate)— the responsibility. A

good many division commanders delegate the selection of tasks.

Attack by low flying airplanes is an important pro­ blem for the division commander,

'•M. A,R. 43986-London-ll August 1941

It was agreed (in- discussions at the School of Artillery)

• generally that.thei.Officerin Charge of the light Antiaircraft

Regiment should make recommendations to Division Commander.

He should have expert knowledge and from a study of maps and

aerial photographs he should know the number of guns requir­ •ed for' a given.task. The division commander or the sup­ port commander may designate:in some cases the number of guns

or

for a particular task. There should be a 1 (Battery) more designated as reserve at a-place where it can move to

critical points* If it cannot move then don't hold a reserve,

If it remains in reserve on wheels fire'power is lost and it

is preferred that all be in a position to fire. Another method

'fee to have a liberal allotment of Bofors to a/par*

tiftUlar task and " then withdraw 25 percent for a new task.

Commanders should always keep the subject of a reserve in

mind and see that withdrawal does not cause a.cap causing a

dangerous situation at a particular vital point. Don't keep

antiaircraft .artillery on wheels. Its- reserve should be in

position with ability to.switch craft defense. The

question of how you are going t^j^omrtmkn a reserve is

very important one,. w#2irJ

August 1941

-'. M• a , R. -101­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - tactical employment) (cont'd)

—-- Cooperation between light -antiaircraft regimental com­ manders and the staffs - — ( o f the formation)-— to which

they are assigned. It is necessary that all understand char­ acteristics and limitations of light antiaircraft artillery

and t ,at antiaircraft commanders be familiar with units in

the divisions with which'they are affiliated and with their

employment so that there will be cooperation in the field.

Again it is necessary to point out that wireless sets

should be furnished light antiaircraft units so they can

listen in* This set has a small range but by listening in

it will give antiaircraft commanders the local picture.

As soon as antiaircraft units arrive the antiaircraft com­ manders must learn the technique of other units• ^The first

step in this is keeping in touch with these units.

K.u.R.43986-London-ll august 1941

The light Antiaircraft Regiment should attend all division

exercises. Invite Division Staff and other officers to all

antiaircraft exercises. There must be a team ana it is dif­ ficult to settle down until this is done and the regiment

trained as a part of the division.

M.A.R.43986-Londo n-11 ioigust 1941

— — The Division Commander should state order,, of priority,

say vulnerable points or vulnerable areas. He should,list

(or his staff should list them for him) all such vulnerable

points or areas. They might be -divided into first and sec­ ondary priorities, then the light antiaircraft guns could be

placed with those of;first priority in so far as resources

permitted, and the remainder of resources, if any, spread

among those that were left. The problem of how vital cer­ tain targets are, is a matter for the Divisional Colander

to decide. The division commander-and —-(Divisional

Commander of Royal Artillery)— should not make the final

decision as to allotment of numbers of guns. The division

commander or the Commartder of Royal Artillery for -him should

order certain vital .po^t, r vital areas defended and the

Light Antiaircrafct$#d|fSme commander should allot the

guns. division commander directs the

r y as to intensity of fire and kind

- 102 ­

IV

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - tactical employment)

of fire, not the number of guns. In „ ...

ision commander should talk o.f the degre4'j0f $

he desires, then it is up to the Light Antiaircraft

mental commander to advise him. Defense in dept

is essential for protection but it is also essential

to give the troops morale effect. Ultimately someone will

demand it to hearten .the Infantry. The division commander

has to make that decision and regardless of the number need­ ed for vital points in the rear areas, he has to think of

the morale effect of his troops.

.M.A.R.43672-London-lB July

' • • ' 1941

Antiaircraft protection - — ( o f the division) should be

furnished for morale effect only even if it —<•—(should do

no)-— particular good —-(for anything) other than —

morale• • '.

M.A.R.43986-London7ll August 1941

The light antiaircraft artillery should remain under cen­ tralized control as long as possible and should be central­ ized again as soon as the situation permits. (However)— even when units of the Antiaircraft Regiment Are decentral­ ized to sub-units of the division it is still often possible

for the Regimental Commander Of the tight Antiaircraft Regi­ ment to get about and be of considerable assistance in the

general coordination of antiaircraft protection of the divi­ sions area. * ', ­ M.A.R.43271-London-18 June 1941

> 6 "

The importance of antiaircraft defense of-any major landing

attempt has been realized; ,-—'. The light antiaircraft role

is'to act partly, with m^/'in'itial assault troops in order

to cover the beaches '.to act as follow-up troops

on aerodrome defense, 4 Ily M^npt/proposed that Heavy Anti­ aircraft shall be landed in fl'rfet%ave.

. / -Balft(^ofc^|UC-49-March 1942



IV- T A C T I O S ^ t t t s l c ^ N I I * iftfaM l)

•

"

T



Concepts (re - tacticar®employment) (cont'd)

The Germans —-(are believed to) have given to their

divisions heavy antiaircraft and searchlights. They recog*

riiae this as a necessity. If we -—(the British) have only

light antiaircraft Bofors, it is adequate. Targets can be

bombed from higher altitudes. (Heavy Antiaircraft)

is considered an essential.complement and as soon as avail­ able will become a part of the division or allotted from the

Army. The -Regimental Staff or the Division Staff will

have an-Antiaircraft Qfficer competent to handle Heavy An­ tiaircraft and Searchlights.when allotted.

M.A.R.43936-London-ll august 1941

> 6 "

The — - 57th Light Antiaircraft regiment which had the

best record of any like regiment in the Middle East en­ gaged in duels with 780 aircraft: in 187 engagements prior

to March 1942. It — provided the only antiaircraft- protec­ tion for a large and widely scattered Division. In addition,

during the second period and part of the third period, the

Regiment -—(had to release) two troops which were perman­ ently employed in protecting Corps Advance Landing Ground.

These could never be spared by the Division. Whilst the

air superiority of the Royal Air Force (at that time)—­ restricted enemy air activity to the minimum ana the Division

was without one of its Infantry Brigades, the'numerous tasks re­ quested of the Regiment during the third period drained its

resources considerably and if more;enemy aircraft had been

available the Regiment would have been hard pressed to ren­ der efficient antiaircraft protection. Many vulnerable units

and collections of motor transport had no antiaircraft pro­ tection beyond their ..own. small .arms fire. Brigade columns

were often spread over ground four miles square and whilst

requiring protection for headquarters and motor transport,

Brigades also called upon battery to provide portection for

striking columns, Field Artillery positions and Brigade "B"

Echelons,.. . The-Advance Division Headquarters column could

not be adequately protected under desert conditions with less

than six guns, .On the other hand,, aalls were made on the

Regiment to provide the necessary protection for the Supply

defiles and Rear Division

Columru _Division 'JB'V Echelon, — HeadqtA|rtp^|^ .tjit^u^gua^an^fed '-air superiority, or the

c e r t a o p p o s e d a .spaLf%ir force which should

J u r t f c H

fjj

IV - TACTICS ,'iND TECHBIRRA

1)

Concepts (re - tactical employment

.



be the exception today, it is felt that ade&are^'antiaircraft

protection of a complete Division cannot be m^fetained with

less than a minimum of four Batterys, each of 12 guns, whilst;

the ideal strength, and organization is four Batterys, each of

18 guns. One Battery is necessary for each Brigade Group

and the fourth Battery is required as a "swinger" Battery under

the Command of the Regimental Commander and available for all

those other tasks, for which protection of a Brigade Group .

at present must be sacrificed and administration complicated,

(Note: It is to be noted that the British light antiair­ craft regiment does not employ ,50 caliber machine guns with the

Bofors guns as"does the United States separate battalion.)­ M. A .R ,-2272-Cairo, Egypt-1 March 1942

The British consider that a fire unit to give protection , to a vulnerable point against low flying airplanes should consist of a troop of six 40 mm Bofors, A troop (of light antiaircraft) divided into two sections of three . guns each gives a deterrent effect rather than prutec­ tion. The Germans are —-(believed to be)—- using a mini- . mum of six light antiaircraft guns at vulnerable points. The British some time aga decided to use a minimum of six 40 mm guns in defense of airdromes and other vital points. — the ideal is to select 9 vulnerable points (equivalent to the 9 troops in a regiment) for protection when. 1 regiment is available.) M.A.R.48325~London-9 June 1942

Troops, are most vulnerable on the move. The light antiair­ craft unit is very mobile, is independent of small .units,

and is equipped for long periods of dutyj^jft should .be pre­ pared-to fire all day and to m ve all — The light;,..'

antiaircraft regiment must be trained id feed and'

look out for itself,. It is the most ais Lt in the

division. Officers, non-commissioned offic

must be able to -act independently and therefo;

-105-

x

/

y

BiMf|

*

i# J ^ #

I pf $ If

* IV ­ l)

Concepts

tac^t^sr?.1<*' employment) (cont'd)

gree of training is essential among the junior ranks.

We can and must be hard on the men in a light antiaircraft

unit as they have to man the guns during the day and move

at night. During the day one man should always be at the

gun as spotter, the others ma,Tr be around sleeping or stand­ ing by depending on the degree of the alert. In my Awn regi­ ment we did it for three weeks in France and it was not too

bad, - — In training there are four things to stress:

1) subordinates should be informed of the. situation

2) orders must be clear as to task

3) means (must be firnished)—- to carry out" the task

.. /(.) there must be no interference afterwards ,

K.A.R,43877-London-1 august 1941

A British Light Antiaircraft Regiment of 54 Bofors 40 mm

guns can provide some protection for a maximum of 18 Vulner­ able points, A section of 3 guns is tne minimum -—(which

should be) provid'ed for any one point. — - nhen the vul­ nerable point is large or very important at least 6 should

be allotted. Light Antiaircraft should be allotted to cover

vital points as ordered by the division commander in order

of priority. The Infantry require antiaircraft protection

.. only while digging in. Artillery always require protection

and the medium artillery especially should be high in the

order of priority. Sections of 3 guns must be sited in a

triangle to be mutually supporting against dive bombing at­ tacks -—(out of the sun.) A distance of 1000 yards to

700 yards between guns Is recommended. Light antiaircraft

are very effective against tanks at ranges of 400 yards or

less but they should not be sited as part of the anti-tank

defence of the positions. They have no shield, are a very

large target, and should fire at tanks for their own

protection. They should be dug in.but are difficult to car*

mouflage as they must be ready at 5 seconds notice to fire.

Their protection lies in the. provision of a large number

of alternative positions. Once spotted they .should move at

once,., N ' . .... ....... _." ' . .. "." M,A,R.2.49-India-12 June 1942

The real |rM?l |Bi fthe dive bomber is. th^lfighter airplane

8? % t ;.. % *i • •

• El | !

f i J? •'<> - • i S&a k ii A^Q^, i. u



IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re-tactical employmer^ Jn^nt! d)

as the lessons from Crete clearly indicate. We had no fighters

there. .The fighter airdrome is therefore the first priority

for antiaircraft defense.. It takes a minimum of 24 Bofors

guns to give real protection from low flying airplanes at

such vulnerable point.

BES-333-6 May 1942

Since task commanders may have little experience in the hand­ ling of light antiaircraft, the light antiaircraft commander

must be prepared to advise the task commander on the

best use of the light antiaircraft guns, and in techni­ cal matters, in connection with employment and siting. In or­ der to do this he must keep himself fully in touch with the

tactical situation. Much care and foresight is* neces­ sary in advising on the number of guns to be:allotted to var­ ious tasks and in deciding on the relative importance of the

numerous calls which are likely to be made on the light an­ tiaircraft defenses. There is a tendency to place light an­ tiaircraft batteries indiscriminately under command of.lower

units from the outset. Generally speaking, the command of

light antiaircraft artillery should be centralized as long

as possible otherwise guns may be employed in the defense

of points of minor importance, while points which*are really

vital to the.operation afe a whole are'left without adequate

defense. Briefly,k the tasks.for which light antiaircraft

defense is required arc as follows:­ 1) To provide protection during'the concentration of the

force. This includes places of landing, disembarkation, de­ 4 training or de-bussing. ­ 2) The protection of the formation during the approach

march. This is described in manuals as the protection of

defiles. There is much loose thinking as to what consti­ tutes a defile. From the antiaircraft point of view a defile

can be defined as a point where effective enemy air attack

will result in thfr obstruction of the forward movement of the

wheeled traffic formation. There is a tendency auto­ matically to. as a defile. This cannot be

decided without iffi/cjpmisjKinc^. It may often be that a par­ ticular bridge, -ruction, or the topography

of the surrounding counf^/yei&o: ftfe ^jnost difficult target

to bomb whereas a village oir tp^Jgt^y^^^^he road in ques­

j

f

fA

l)

K

a



p ^ ^ k ^ f ^ o y m e n t ) ( cont'd )

tion where no alternative route exists and where the destruc­ tion of houses along the road would make a most effective

block. Such a place would thereofre be a defile of far

greater importance from the antiaircraft defense point of

view than the bridge, again a stretch of road merely be­ cause it is narrow and enclosed on either side cannot be con­ sidered as a defile for the protection of which light anti­ aircraft guns should be allotted. A troop (3 or 4 guns) can

cover about 500 yards only of road and it is not sound to

squander light antiaircraft defense in this way. Vehicles

moving at open spacing, say 10 or 15 vehicles to the mile a­ long a road do not present a target worth bombing. If on the

other hand that stretch of road was enclosed on one side by

a canal bank, the breaking of; which wuuld cause it to be

flooded, then it may well be.; considered a defile of major

importance,

3)- T'Jhen the force is deployed, the protection of troops

in the front line, forward aerodromes, formation Headquarters

and vulnerable dumps.

The Divisional light antiaircraft regiment may be called upon

to act in all or several of these roles simultaneously and

to make up for the shortage of guns they must attain a very

high degree of mobility. Training must be dune with this ob­ ject in view. That is to say every possible source of delay

in the passage of orders, reconnoitering of positions and com­ ing in and out of action must be cut out. This will only be

done if every man in the unit is imbued with the urge to "get

a move on". Since light .ntiaircraft units are not generally

required in action at night, most moves will take place, in

the dark. Night moves must therefore take a prior place in

all training programmes, . •

M,A, R,44570-London-19 September 1941

l)

Concepts (cont'd)

(re - technical employment)

Brief Note on the Concepts, Evolution of the Close Range An­ tiaircraft System Comprising the No. 3 Predictor and. the Re­ motely Controlled Bofors 40 mm Gun,: (By Col, Kerrison)

Practically all previous attempts at .fire control systems

...for ,303." and,5" aut^^'LLgr»\i^pons, single-barrelled or mul­ ge antiaircraft work, both in

M yg J P ki 8

IV - TACTICS AND TECHMCUE

% A I t <1

...

l)

Concepts (re - technical emprovpent) J(j^riteki)

England and abroad, had been confined to' the use of sights

on the mounting, or to hosepipe fire with tracer ammunition.

An exception was the system aeveloped in U.S.A. which

it is understood has since been abandoned. In England,

after a great deal of experience with various forms of course

and speed targets, and ellipse, or forward area sights, it

was finally decided that hosepipe firing was the most effec­ tive form of control for automatic weapons of .303" or .5" .

calibre. Hosepipe' control, however, is effective only at

short ranges and demands to the full extent the high rate of

fire of which these equipments are capable,

With the ad6ption of the 40 mm(Bofors) single-barrel equip­ ment for close range anti-aircraft work, the question had to

be reviewed, as the rate of fire, 120 rounds per minute,.and

the longer ranges, up to 2000 yards, with consequent longer

times of flight, made it likely that hosepipe control^would

be ineffective. Firing trials confirmed this. —<• Firing re­ sults were not satisfactory, and the rate-of hitting was small

or almost negligible even when an 8 ft. x 40 ft. flag target

was towed at a known speed, on a known course past the guns,

the speed being about 100 miles per hour, and the minimum

range about 800 yards,

.One of the reasons for this failure was the difficulty the

layers found.in laying accurately while the gun was firing.

It was, therefore, suggested that better results might be

•••obtained by using a director, or predictor, just behind the

gun, and laying the gun by follow-the-pointer methods. The

underlying idea was, the predictor being off the mounting,

could be laid steadily and accurately. It was decided, there­ fore, to press on with the development of such.a predictor,

to discard the Bofors course and speed sights,.and pending

the completion of the'predictor project, to mount forward

- area (ellipse) sights on the mounting. Should the predictor

prove successful, these forward area sights would form an emer­ • geney method of control.

— - The "first 'model produced incorporated not only automatic

.prediction, but also means putting on arbitrary,deflect

^tjfan or spotting correcti^y^jso ,t
indicating present

as a. predictor, or s i m p l y o r •; . position of target plus mean? ffig*deflections or

•spotting corrections, A Vickers^fe sifeAe^arrel 2-pdr,

equipment was fitted with follow-the^|Mfe]ri
trials using both the above methods

as a sight plus arbitrary corrections," it gave ^ e m M ^ / t ^ c h

f

:<JT|% ^^JpleHNiQUE

ffyyi ®

'Sy "Concepts (re - technical employment) (cont'd)

A

the same as with, sights on the mounting. Used as a pre­ dictor, about of hits were obtained, this being a marked

improvement • With both methods the very much improved

smoothness of pattern in the sky was most noticeable, fully

justifying the idea of using, predictor control. Having,

achieved this smoothness of pattern, it became possible to

see an effect hitherto obscured b-> the difficulty of di­ rect laying at the guns. This effect was the very defi­ nite reaction time of the follow-the-pointers layers to

any correction or change in smooth conditions. This lag

often meant that the control officer, having applied a cor­ rection and not seeing instant result in the sky, applied

more. By that time the layer had reacted with the result

that there was a tendency to oscillate about the target.

Thus it was abundantly clear that to get the full value

from predictor control, the gun must be remotely controll­ ed from the predictor, giving instaneous and.accurate reac­ tion to whatever was happening at the predictor. Accord­ ingly the project was widened to include a predictor re­ motely controlling a gun. The Bofors gun was selected for

the experiment, '

Coming now to the underlying principles of the system, it

is necessary to point out there are two distinct lines of

approach to the problem of obtaining direct hits on low-fly­ ing aircraft. One line of approach is to use amulti-bar­ relled weapon with a high rate of fire, a pattern, close" or

dispersed, and some form of control consistent with the pat­ tern area, and then to produce a certain shot density.in the

sky in the region of the target and to rely on a proportion

of the round hitting... * The other line of approach is to treat

the problem as the precision one of aiming each round to hit,

i,e#, treating the rounds as individual events1and not as an

aggregate yielding some average density over an area in.the

sky,- The latter line of approach was adopted, --- The Admir­ alty Research Laboratory system of remote control used in

the Navy for the remote control of searchlights was fitted

to the gun and give an accuracy of laying of 1 minute of"arc

at speeds -up to 20°/second in azimuth and 16°/s.econd in ele­ vation, As the ballistic 50$ zone of the gun at 2000 yards

was about 1,6 minutes, .this performance' gave a satisfactory

combination,

Coming to the was noccssary in order to make

full use of the at^^^lRtrolled gun to have some means

of followirig^^u^tel%aKd above all smoothly, targets pas­

%

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - technical employment) (cont'd)

sing at angular velocities up to 20°/second (equivalent to/

a 400 m.p.h. target crossing at a^ground range of 600 yards;,

or 300 m.p.h, at 450 yards).

This portion of the problem was solved by using the system

of aided laying which had been under investigation at Ad­ miralty Research Laboratory for some time. It is a combi­ nation of direct laying and velocity controlled laying, the

essential feature being the combination of the two in such

a proportion that the errors in rate determination are ac­ ceptable while the system is sufficiently'damped by the di­ rect portion to eliminate any tendency to oscillate about the ,

target's position. Smooth and accurate laying at all speeds

up to 20°/second was possible, and at the same time yielded

automatically a measure 'of the angular velocities of the

target in azimuth and in elevation. The basis was thus laid

for a tachymetric system.

The next point was the necessity for quickness in op­ eration. The traversing gear was designed so that it could

be disengaged and the predictor slewed by hand, whilst still

leaving the control transmitters in gear so that lining-up

with-the gun was not lost. The predictor can be turned

through 360° in about 2 to 3. seconds..

Once target is picked up the system of laying enables lay­ ers .to be following steadily in about .2 seconds* The total

time from "Alarm" to' "Ready to Fire" is between 4 and 6 sec­ onds. In this time the gun has been slewed and clutched in

to control, . During firing trials, the fact emerged that though the gun

Could.fire at 120 rounds per minute, the ,time to first hit,

which is the time measure of the weapons efficiency, was

just as short if single-shot firing about 60 rounds per min­ ute was employed. At 120 rounds per minute the brain

does not seem to react quickly enough to deal with each sep­ arate shot, and the feeling that shots are crowding in quick­ er than one can deal with them tends to produce.flurry and un­ steadiness . At 60 rounds per minute the brain can deal com­ fortably with individual shots, and the whole procedure'- Is

one of calm and deliberation rather than rush and bustle.

This point, was brought to the notice* of.the Naval Antiair­ craft Experimental Staff, and they.^have- /p^U^e carried out

and arrived quite indep^^&iy^iat thi^same con­ trials . clusion, vviz/ < that tracer fired at mcf^iyMn ^Ipir®

faster than the brain Can cope with.; • For^^H&^.^I&D^

ons such as 0.5" calibre this of course does noWfojAgtJ

the rate of fire should be reduced, but that the proj56#i

of tracer to non-tracer should be such that the tracer a

-111­



IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

Itl A 5 &

Clg j$Jpjjperah|

-— ^ _

technipal Employment) (cont'd)

at, about 1 rouncl per %<§(&i

M.A.R.44296-London-30 August 1941

The forms of fire that have been tried in the operations

In Libya November 1941 - January 1>42 include single shot,

bursts of automatic fire, continuous auto, and continuous

auto followed by single shot. Single shot appeared to be

more accurate but did not have the same effect of shaking

pilot as auto, and ground troops complained that guns were

"not trying" when single shot was used. Bursts of auto were

discontinued because it was noticeable that whereas the in­ itial rounds were near the target, the remainder of the bursts

was behind, probably due to the layers' natural reaction to

a burst of fire in the path of the enemy aircraft tending to

stop him laying ahead continuously. In using continuous auto

the heavy expenditure of ammunition and overheating of bar­ rels are important factors, particularly as there is a .ten-

den cy to fire too.long at receding targets which were often

being fired at wh^n beyond the self-destructinn range of the

shell. The best answer to minimise these disadvantages and,

at the same time, shake the morale of the pilots whilst main­ taining that of our troops, is a combination -of auto and sin­ gle shot. It is considered that fire should be opened on ap­ proaching bombers at 3 >000 yards slant range at auto , and at

single shot from the crossing point onwards, fire ceasing at

1,500 yards slant range,

BES-333-6 May 1942

The Bofors equipment was designed .to deal with low flying

and close targets, hence its sights are constructed and lined

up for a range of 1500 yards and the shell is self-destroy­ ing at approximately 3500 yards slant range. The normal

teaching is that fire must be held.until the enemy aircraft

reached 1500 yards with Forward Area Sights and 2000 yards

with Predictors, In a forward division area, where.there is

no heavy antiaircraft, Bofors provide the main antiaircraft-

defense and must open fire at longer ranges. Harassing fire

at long ranges on approaching bombers by light antiaircraft

- 112­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - technical employment

meet with considerable success. In such citfe^rS^pes fire,

should be opened at 3*000 yards on approachin^^^ers, be

they Stukas or any other type. With sights set at .15.00 yds.

deflections will be insufficient. To remedy this'ineffective

long range shooting, one battery is now trained to apply'

extra elevation and add a proportionally increased deflec­ tion.—

BES-333-6 Hay 1942

Methods of fire control by predictor and forward area sights

should make use of predictors' to engage, targets at opening

range of 2000 yards and forward area sights at.opening

range of 1000 yards. Harassing fire may be opened up to

3000 yards in exceptional c a s e s . — ­ M.A.R.43585-London-ll July 1941

The technique to be adopted must depend on the task

and the particular conditions at the time. In many cases

it will be essential to attack the enemy before he has re­ leased his bombs in order to prevent as much damage as pos­ sible. being done to the objective being protected. Consid­ eration must also* be given to the morale effect on other

troops of not firing on enemy aircraft until after their

attack has been completed,

M.A.R.43&42-London-30 July 1941

The presence of•Heavy .Antiaircraft guns in the forward .Area

and the sight of hostile aircraft being engaged at great

heights (even if not brought down) does more than anything

else to preserve the morale of attacking troops. This as­ pect has manifested itself igf alj, operations and is therefore

stressed.

^-London-15 July 1941

There is a. high percentage of duds among

ect

LCM'ICSj AM) TECHNIQUE

' M M. I B ^ ­ r t f"i ® • '*mffiBk•

kiJCSnc^pts'Hre - technical^eraplovment) (cont'd)

i ** * § , ••

of the anti-materlei* bUmb as very localized and little ef­ fect is felt by personnel standing only 30 yards away. The

whistle attached to some bombs is not terrifying; it helps

one to .judge where the bomb is going to fall. Improved

fire aisipline — ( w i t h heavy Antiaircraft guns) is

essential. The general tendency is to open fire at extreme

range with rates unbalanced, and to continue shooting even

though the aircraft is taking avoiding action, v'here suc­ cess has been attained it has been the result of careful

preparation and accurate balancing of instruments, and of

with-holding fire until the target was well within range,

reliance being placed on an effective first burst. After

the first burst, the avoiding action taken by the aircraft

makes further fire ineffective until a fresh attack is made.

M.A.R.43154-London-3 June 1941

Marshal Barrett commanded the British Air Forces in France,

. He was particularly decided about the effect of small

arms and 2-pdr. antiaircraft fire from the ground, if de­ livered by determined" soldiers. — In speaking of his own

experience-when he despatched a squadron of 16 light bombers

to attack a German "Panzer" Division, nc said that he lost

11 of the 16 from antiaircraft small arms fire.r— The anti­ aircraft weapons of the Germans were mounted on every third

or fourth vehicle and dispersed throughout the column in

such a manner that the squadron wa.s under continuous fire

during its attack.:— He is of the opinion that the materiel

damage done by dive bombers is not as great as the psycholog­ ical effect on soldiers lacking battle experience. He said

he observed many men deserting their weapons and fleeing

from their assigned positions, even when the German bombing

planes came over.and merely filled the air with noises with

their sirens and klaxons. He told me one occasion when

troops guarding one of his air fields with Bren guns on an­ tiaircraft mounts shot down 8 out of 14 German dive bombers

after his men were convinced that, all they had to do was to

remain at their posts and shoot their weapons.

M.A.R.42254-London-29 January 1941

The story of the antiaircraft defence of TOBRUK is of great

interest and teac^g^jaany lessons, the chief of which is the

import^ne-^ ^of ^ilAin^lback at the dive bomber.

% V ' Vit ^ % M.A.R,48025-London-22 May 1942

U

-114­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - technical employment) (cont'd)

A mistaken idea that small arms fire is ineffective against aeroplanes should be dispelled. All troops shMld b^r.trained to fire at planes with all weapons which are cajpableWoi^fRing­ ing fire upon them. Troops should understand that # of small arms fire is seldom noted by the troops on the ' £f & ground. However, the experience of pilots who fly through :Y if small arms fire has indicated that such fire distracts their attention, keeps them at a higher altitude, and does a certain amount of damage to the plane, While a plane may not be brought down, there are certain repairs which must be made when the plane, returns to its base, and even the time consumed in repair­ ing the damage done justifies the expenditure in ammunition. Furthermore, the morale factor is considerably enhanced if the soldier understands that his small arms weapon is having a definite effect on the plane. M.A,R.45154-London-7 January 1942

The tactical use of light antiaircraft guns such as the 40

mm Bofors falls generally into two general classifications,

use in a fixed position such as we might.call "rear area

defense^' and use with the mobile field forces or "forward

area defense". There can be no clean cut separation of

these.two uses and the same equipment must in most cases be

used under both conditions. However, British experience

both in England and abroad clearly indicate that although

the use of a predictor and power controlled gun will give

best results, some other means of getting into action quick­ er and without the use of electricity, must be developed,

M,A.R,44280-London-29 August 1941

The predictor in its 3**ton lorry accomplished batteries and

troops but it was considered as worth-while putting into

action only if the troop expected to remain six hours or

more, Bofors were sometimes fired off their wheels; this

has some deterrent effect, ana might well be the best meth­ od for a troop moving with an armored brigade,

M.A.R,4=>94S-London-22 December 1941

Future developments for the gun batte^/W^ll Include,, con­

-

5­

&.MD TECHNIQUE '

J f j ® Concept^"'.(rtl'S technical employment) (cor.t1 d)

tinuous preai^ion from gun layer-Mark III data, and the

use of the Molrftj^fuze setter and loader. Irediction er­ rors from production,guij. Mark III are not known,

but from the perforrr^^e^e&^a prototype the number of

rounds per casualty is <$g|miated at 1,400 for the 3•7" gun

and 700 for the 4.5" gun under certain target conditions

mentioned in above report. With the Moli.is fuze setter and

loader a rate of fire of one round-per gun every 3 seconds

is anticipated. In addition to above developments the ad- =

vent automatic following plus controlled fragmentation will

increase the effectiveness of gun fire against high level

bombing attack,

M.A,R.47251-If>ndon-6 April 1942

Unless air superiority is complete it is e ssential to be in

place for operations by dawn so as to set tip a partial air

defense before discovery by the enemy air forces, If the

force is properly secured, i.e.,' slit trench _s for troops,

dispersion of units, antiaircraft in positS.on, the heaviest

air attack will fail to break the grip of the armoured

brigades on an area, During one day the 7th Armoured Divi­ sion Headquarters was divs bombed 17 times and machine gun­ ned from the air 18 times. Trior to these attacks however,

slit trenches had been dug; entirely due to their use there

were NO casualties. Slit trenches are indispensable and

must be dug at every halt. Individual slit Frenches are

about two feet wide, six long and three deep* Except for

a direct, hit, slit trenches, offer complete security from .

light bombs and machine gunning. . Air. sentries are absolute­ ly essential. Slit trenches without air sentries are worth­ less. One detachment of six, not posting an »iir sentry lost

four killed and two wounded. There is not time to get into

slit trenches unless a warning is sounded.

BES-117-V.ashington D.C.-gapril 1941

Concepts (cont'd) (re - siting)

£re is never sufficient mobile light antiaircraft. It is

iMj&ujkb to make a plan. List all places, even up to 40

might be considered vulnerable.

Go oyer it again

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - siting) (cont'd)

placing them in order of priority, then take w t q j

or 16 depending on number of troops available• V^

points are dumps, railheads, refilling points, hea

ters, units, etc. The initial dispositions (are^<

paratively)-— easy. They can be made to fit in march

tables and then to fall out at the designated time/

M.A.R.43877-London-l August 1941

An enterprising hostile air force will soon discover the

limitations of Light Antiaircraft Defen'se."

M.A.R.43 617-London-15 July 1942

No form of defense can remain active onee: it has. been

spotted by enemy air. To prevent antiaircraft defense

being spotted, arcs of fire may have to be sacrificed.

Dummy, alternate and silent positions must be extensively

used. All weapons must be sited inside an Infantry de­ fensive system or, failing this, some other arrangement made

for their local defense, — - The German counter-battcry

work was mainly in the form of heavy dive bombing attacks.

It is necessary for the British to give antiaircraft pro­ tection for their Artillery to which in the past they have

given very little thought.

M.iuR,45948-Lontion-22 December 1941

Great stress is being — — paid to camouflage,and conceal­ ment. — - B o f o r s guns are not easy to pick up if properly

camouflaged but once you open fire the enemy knows where

you are. Therefore it is necessary to haye about three

alternate positions to move to. The movement must be made

at the first opportunity'after firing,

BES-333-6 May 1942

Question: Is concealment of g: of fire? " :

*tance than.field

rjiswerj ' —-(by five Army Commanders, Air4 Great Britain)

- 117­



1) Cone eptl

1

'

^

(.eontr d>* >?/]t

. r if F a

1) Good camouflage gives concealment .and field of fire

prior to opening of fire. Once the gun has fired conceal­ ment is lost; to regain it an alternative position must be

occupied,

2) Yes.

3) Yes. - — In mobile operations concealment by change

of position.

4) No, In mobile operations arc of fire predominates.

If time permits, re-adjut positions to improve conceal­ ment .

5) Depends on circumstances. YES, if Antiaircraft de­ fenses are inadequate. NO, if air superiority has been

g ;ined.

M. A . R45737-London-8 December 1941

v;e have previously insisted on a field of fire of 360 de­ grees of at least 500 yards to nearset cover. Ue should

have conccalcd sites on edge of woods or hedge'with at

least 180 degrees field of fire except the dead area nec­ essary over the predictor. Bofors can then be sited in

both roles. As now sited (with)-— 360 degrees field

of. fire, the question of the antitank role is out of the

question.

M.A.R.43672-London-18 July 1941

Light antiaircraft guns sited to protect forward troops

should be defiladed from front, concealed from ground and

air observation, and sited within infantry localities.

*»11 guns must obtain some measure of concealment therefore

necessary to sacrifice part of arc. They should be sited

to cover all likely lines of approach. To avoid neutrali­ sation, guns may have to remain silent until attack aevelops.

Proportion to remain silent must be laid down "in orders. Alter­ native positions.must be selected ana moves must be coor­ dinated by troop commanders to ensure that all guns are not

out of action at same time. In cases i.rhcre moves are quick

and frequent it may be necessary to keep predictors.concen­ trated at battery headquartvrs and shoot with forward area

sights. Light antiaircr ould be sited with antitank

field of fire fox^s^f^^-BxSe waiere this does not inter­ * % t HI Q

i f 3-1 • -118­

IV - TaCTICS m l)

TECHNIQUE



Concepts (re - siting)

fere' with primary role

• * f?

nt'd)

fj GJ

defense.

VI• xv .R.46618-Lorid Jp-16 February 1942

.'1 v v JJ

..

-

^

^

^

/

The primary role of Light Antiaircraft Guns is defar$®j

gainst low-flying aircraft. They must therefore be sited,

so that they can carry out this role. Ideally, this demands

an all round arc of fire, with a clear field of fire down

to one degree of elevation, but considerations of conceal­ ment must be given full weight when siting guns. Provided

an adequate field of fire, coordinated with that of the other

guns of the layout, is achieved, it is of greater im­ portance that guns should be concealed than that they should

have a 360 degree arc of fire. The secondary role of light

Antiaircraft guns is defense against tanks, -Where more than

-one position exists from which the primary antiaircraft role,

can be carried out, that position- which is best suited for

antitank defense should be selected. In cases where it is

not possible to carry out antitank role from the antiair­ craft position, alternative antitank positions should be se­ lected to which the gun can be moved quickly if required.

M.A,R.47640-London-29 April 1942

- — There is a dead arc of 70° firing- over the Kerrison

predictor. Crete experiences Indicate that cover and con­ cealment are essential. We can't expect a smaller arc,

therefore.the position coulc be placed near trees, A posi­ tion should be chosen which is-difficult to see in an ae­ rial photo, T«»e cannot avoid tracks in going into position

but it is necessary that we break up the trodden grass im­ mediately thereafter and then enforce strict tract discip­ line , . when grass is down only will it show white in aerial

• photographs. ' ' -: '' \ 'M• A«R•43986~London-ll August 1941

The dead arc due to the predictor hlsl^een defined by School

of antiaircraft Artillery as follows: - The /gun must not be

J& t-W w

-119- '

­

' * VfejWJb



fired within 35° in azimuth of a line from the center of

the gun to the center of the predictor except at an ele­ vation of more than 30° ab ;ve the line gun to predictor

telescopes. When the preaictor is not manned the gun must

not be fired within 10° of any part of the predictor.

M.A.R.48265-London-6 June 1942

It is emphasized that while any detached antiaircraft troop

or section is temporarily under the direct command of the

unit it Is covering, the final select! ns of positions must,

be left to the ; antiaircraft Commander on the spot, after he

has been told the vulnerable point he is to defend, In

certain instances (in Cvrenaice) it was found that

Light Antiaircraft guns had been badly sited under or­ ders of someone not best qualified to site antiaircraft guns.

It is again emphasized that, except in real emergency Light

Antiaircraft Batteries should not be split below troops of

three guns.

M.A.R.43617-London-15 July 1941

Troop commanders must coordinate the siting of their guns

as a whole (considering) the dead angle of the weapon

(position of predictor), otherwise there may be gaps in the

dfefonse. JX gun once spotted by hostile aircraft yill have to mwve, therefore each gun ^commander must. select an

alternative position within —.-(about) .400 yards, — ­ • . M .a ,R,4327.1-London-i8 June 1941

More than one 'alternate position is .necessary,- Shift every

time the occupied position is bombed. Self-propelled-Bo­ fors is again-the answer. It.can drive 400 yards quickly

and the (time required would be) short, - — The time

element in moving Bofors at present (is too great,)

M.A.R.43986-Londo n-11 August 1941

—-(It is agreed that several)--- dummy positions — ­ should be constructed (In*th4 vicinity of each antiair­ rflfCti

' W m f&ving one position, it

IV - TACTICS ,'JJD TECHNIQITE

l)

Concepts (re - siting) (cont'd)

should be left as though occupied, with a dummy gun«and jp

predictor in position. The policy being taught now whe#^

enroute to a new position is not to h,ld up occupation o

the position waiting for a careful reconnaissance, but to

go into a position selected hastily from a map if neces­ sary. This position to be Worked on like a regular position

as soon as the gun and predictor are ready to fire* Mean­ while a careful reconnaissance, can be made and the gun

moved* The policy of selecti -n of positions, therefore,

(appears to cJLl for selection of positions allowing)—­ low angle all round fire and of obtaining protection by

having many alternate and dummy positions. It is believed

by most of the officers on gun sites visited that the

men are better satisfied if they are continually moving

and building new positions,, especially if they have a good

"housekeeping" position near where they can move to when

the weather becomes so severe as to preclude an attack.

It is believed also that the m .re practice is going into

and out of position the better able the gun crew will be

to meet a mobile situation. Speed and exact procedure for

all members of the crews is required and this can only be

acquired by much' practice.

M•A.K.44280-London-29 August 1941

The light antiaircraft guns should never be placed too close

to the vulnerable point being protected as the smoke of

bombs prohibit the sighting of guns. They should be placed

about -800 yards\ — - outside vf the vulnerable point. If.

guns are- defending a point all may be placed on the perimeter,

or all but one oh the perimeter, and one close in to deal with

dive bombers. It is difficult to sight light antiaircraft

guns for both low level bombing and dive bombing. It will

be necessary to shift the guns to meet the tactics of the

enemy low flying planes,

M.^R.43585-Londcn-ll July 1941

I s Within forty eight hours our antfa^b£a£ SfyOf Crete

were out. In defense of our airdrome

around the perimeter of our main airfieldsJ

earthwork protect!.n and good fields of fire but^HD

to the antiaircraft defenses,- The whole German Air

-121­

(cont'd)

was available In this attack, ours was not, There is no

parallel to this case, not even in an attempted invasion of

(England) , Our Bofors were blasted to pieces, Had

some of the Bofors been available away from the perimeter

of the airdrome the airdromes would have survived much longer

and would have taken more of the enemy. It is also most

essential that we have alternate positions (about 3) for

each Bofors gun. The only Bofors to survive in Crete had

a large number of alternate positions and when it fired at

one attack it changed its position, in other words it had

alternate positions and made use of them,

M.A.R.43663-London-17 July 1941

There Is a tendency to site light antiaircraft guns too

close to the vulnerable point. The danger from this is

that a low flying attack when the visibility is poor, may

be able to release its bombs before the gun is on target

and ready to fire, ——The Troop Commander must take care

to co-ordinate the predictor dead, arcs and dead arcs which

arise from the need of giving concealment, when siting

light antiaircraft guns for the defense of vital points,

Alternative positions must be reconnoitred at the

very earliest opportunity by the Troop Commander and their

position and the routes to them must be known by sub-sec­ tions. The move to alternative positions must be-ordered

and co-ordinated by the Troop Commander so that guns are

not all oiit of action at the same time and that gaps are

not left in the defense. Light antiaircraft guns must rely

on concealment and rapid moves to alternative positions for

their self-preservation.

M.A.R,44570-London-19 September 1941

1)

Concepts (cont'd)

(re - antitank role)

For defense against dive bombers or low flying airplanes

the - — operations during the.- evacuation at Dunkirk —

showed the effectiveness and necessity^.large numbers of

automatic weapons, the essential feature m defense against

M M W *

- 122 -

_ .. ...

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE l)

Concepts (re - antitank role) (cont'd)

u.. -v

| I9 v^C.j **

dive bombing and low air attacks is the greatest possible

volume of fire. Four inch and larger guns against air­ craft of the lowflying class are ineffective. Despite

nundreds of bombing attempts, the disproportionately small

losses in ships and personnel is ascribed to the effective­ ness of the small multiple-mount-automatic-antiaircraft­ weapon,

N.A.R.ser.#37-London-12 June 1940

We —-(the conference) consider the BofOrs to be an ex­ cellent gun which has been designed for ranges of about

800 and 3000 yards. At shorter ranges, the low rate of

fire makes the chance of obtaining a direct hit very low.

It is probable that low flying attacks will be made when

possible from behind cover of hills and woods.

M.A*R.48463-Londan-17 June 1942

(In a) conference with on his return from Java

he told of seeing United States markings on Japanese

airplanes in one instance. Japanese airplanes called in

on bomber frequency and identified themselves as American

airplanes. There were no ground guns available for the

protection of airdromes. He believes the .50 caliber

ground machine gun will eliminate low flying ground straf­ ing.

AAC No.319.132l/F

The director of Antiaircraft pointed out that the Oer­ likon 20 mm. gun would not be available for a long time.

The problem of the immediate future was to cover

field and medium artillery regiments on the road. The

infantry should be able to cover themselves with their ex­ isting ,303 weapons they requirefi^jAgk suggested that some

form of light machine* gun locat^/^n'|l//f^^pr cycle sidecar,

Concepts (re - antitank role) (cont'd)

to move up and down the column, might be a (practical)— solution. The problem was not only one of defiles which

should be protected by Bofors .guns, but of the protection

of-columns against machine-gunning from the air on open

stretches of road. Training, made more difficult by a

shortage of tracer, must be considered. , M.A.R.45840-London-13 December 1941



Both in Greece and Crete the enemy made deliberate attacks

on both heavy and light antiaircraft gun positions.. Middle

East points out the difficulty of protecting heavy antiair­ craft guns. or put the heavy antiaircraft guns in tanks.

M.A.R.43845-London-30 July 1941

In order to work in really close support of armored-

force vehicles the light antiaircraft would have to be on

the move. Bofors must be stationary to fire. It there­ fore follows that for a greater part of the time, the Bo­ fors would be ineffective, and in addition liable to capture

unless escorted. If and when Bofors were fitted into a self-

propelled and armored vehicle then their work with armored •

force vehicle on the move must be reviewed. The light an­ tiaircraft regiment at present is concerned with (protec­ tion of advancing columns from attack in defiles and when.

passing through areas suitable for low flying attack) .

M.A.R.435S5-London-ll July 1941

Light antiaircraft should be well forward to help ..consoli­ date positions. Indian troops held with ease against It­ alian counter. (in North Africa) attack but when air

attack was put on they had nothing to hit back with. Self-

propelled light antiaircraft with light armor is the answer.

ii.A.R.43986-London-ll August 1941

^'^^acks in the Mediterranean have shown that a

> 6 "



IV - TACTICS "UD TECHNIQUE

l)

Concepts (re - antitank role) (cont'd)

& sr one-man control system is necessary in order to obtain;'the f fi

essential element of great speed in gettin g on the target,'. '

This applies to both long-range and close-range antiaircraft'-1"

guns. The use of an open sight and the control of both

train and elevation of the director or mount by single

operator - — with tracers should be used. Using a clutch '

to engage or disengage the one-man control, the separate

pointer and trainer system would be retained for other forms

of attackj The above recommendation of the British Fleet

for a one-man control system was concurred in by the anti­ aircraft officer.

N,A.R,Ser.#ONI F-l 42-41-London-14 March 1941

*

"

«

*

Some form of shield for protection against machine gun fire

of gun detaciiments of both heavy and light antiaircraft"

equipments* (especially the latter) would seem very

desirable^ — — The shield might be fitted to the mounting

where the slight extra weight would be more than amply re­ paid by the moral effect produced. Alternatively, it might

be preferable to have an all round fpenf capable of being

carried in sections and quickly assembled. The height of

the 'pen' should he that of the predictor telescope for com­ mand posts and gun layer's eyes for gun detachments, It could be quickly dismantled if guns were required to engage

targets below angle' of sight zero* . '

M,AkR,4383B-London-30 July 1941

The British are discussing whether it is worth while devot­ ing any more effort to the use and development of Rockets . as antiaircraft weapons , There is general agreemerit that all future developments within sight f a v o r the gun rel­ atively to the Rockets* These include the Introduction of Guh Layer Mk, III; of the Molins fuze setting, leading to a greater rate of fire; percussion fuzes with a consequent large increase in the number of rounds fired per minute is likely to increase by a large factj hance of bringing an aircraft' down in a single enga< ' M,A.J

-125­



IV - TACTICS AND^I^KIgllE^

1)

C a r t t A ^ (r^-^rvtltank role) (cont'd)

IflSu^k^ns, antiaircraft weapons, artillery, tanks and mo**

tol^tfticles were captured from time to time throughout the

Syrian operations, and in a majority of the cases were used

by. the Australian forces. Malor — knew of no previous

training in the use of captured weapons being given jto the

Australian Corps. However, he is very convinced that splen­ did use may be rrfade of captured weapons — : - f He stated that

. there was no —~r difficulty in teaching a machine-gunner, al­ ready qualified with his own weapon, to handle a captured

weapon. He said that It would be of value .to have avail­ able elementary handbooks of foreign Weapons in the division

echelon, • :" M;A.R146l54-London-7 January 1942

1)

Concepts (cont'd) (re - weapons)

.

It was the general consensus of opinion (at a conference of

commanders) that the light antiaircraft regimental -commander

could not be held responsible for covering any possible line

of tank approach.. There should be no such commitment. If

a good antiaircraft site is available that will also afford

antitank protection then that site should be selected. The

lessons from Greece, Crete, and the Middle East indicate that

it is necessary that alternate positions (at least

three) be reconnoitered and selected and that once the Bo­ fors have fired they should be moved to one of the alter­ nate positions to prevent -annihilation. The alternate pos­ itions might not be good antitank sites and for that

reason there should be no dual role assigned. The primary

— - role is that of antiaircraft and the light antiaircraft

commander should not be responsible for any antitank de­ fense. He will of course give any antitank protection he

can from any site occupied which permits the firing of

guns for antitank purposes,

M.At.R.43678-London-18 July 1941

^

The Bofors hav^,.^nsid^rs^e power-.against tanks. There is

a good deal ^"Uork be done oh drill for: Bofc-rs in

an antdJ^ajffi^ x^f-Js- -There* is more to it than switching the

gun £o a tank. Spotters for tanks are neces­ M.A.R.43986-London-ll August 1941





IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE ^

1)

Concepts (re - weapons) (cont'd)

Question: In siting Bofors guns, how much consideration

should be given to their anti-tank capabilities?

Discussion: For different situations there will be differ­ ent solutions. In Crete it was totally unnecessary to think

of tanks. A heavy tank attack is generally accompanied by

a heavy air attack (both coming) together. It will

be- necessary to decide which is the primary role at that

particular time. The real primary role is antiaircraft. If

we can find a good antiaircraft and antitank site combined

then select that site* Bofors should not be counted on as

an antitank weapon but if the tanks get there, then -—(the

Bofors) become vital for all. In one place in France

we had a tank attack without dive bombers. In that case

Bofors could be used against them. In another village in

France we had a low level bombing attack (without tanks,

but we had) no Bofors. In that case they could have

been used to great advantage against their primary tar­ get. But light antiaircraft. Bofors cannot undertake both

an antiaircraft and antitank role, We should concentrate

on alternate antiaircraft sites, all combined with antitank

if practicable,

M.*.R,43672-London-18 July 1941.

We can't have an antitank role which would leave antiair­ craft defense of units or installations open to attack.

However on reconnaissances, keep in mind the selection of

antitank positions. It may be possible that one of the al­ ternate antiaircraft positions will be good for antitank de­ fense. A No.18 wireless set is necessary to obtain infor­ mation as to tank assembling or attacking. We also will

have to make minor adjustments of the sight to fit it for

an antitank role.

M.A.R.4^672-London-l8 July 1941

One of the.conclusions reached ty

of the employment of antiair*

year 1940 was that this type of aM.llI

creasingly against ground targets. Antiaircraft fire is

very accurate at short ranges because of its high muzzle ve­ locity. Because of the ease of mechanical manipulation and

- 127 ­

m tAcllCS''^JfetPiNIQUE

1\

Joncepts (re - weapons) (contM')

accurate and rapid methods ,of fire control, it is very efr

fective against enemy tanks. With special projectiles, it

is deadly against fortifications. German Commanders .are

using it to an increasing* extent for direct support,

.' . . M.A,R, 18637-Berlin,Germany-l6 September 1941

The C-in-C, Home Forces'alio- stated that those handling

antiaircraft units must not get too antitank minded as.

there was a tendency among some Commanders'to shove the

antiaircraft units too often in a primary role of antitank

when their primary role was antiaircraft.

. M.A.R,48325-London-9 June 1942

(A report from British General Headquarters - Middle

East states:) "Antiaircraft guns should on no account

be considered as dual purpose weapons." My conversation

with antiaircraft officers in the field fails to support

this statement. Believe it is biased by branch conscious­ ness. Concensus of opinion by those -most experienced is

that all antiaircraft guns should be able to engage tanks

.and that all antitank weapons should be able to engage air­ craft, In this opinion I strongly concur.

M. iuR•2359-Cairo,Egypt-2 *pril 1942

Through personal observation in the field (in the Mid­ dle East) . I wish to emphasize the extreme importance

of organic antiaircraft units within the Armored and Inf­ antry Divisions. Dual purpose antitank antiaircraft weap­ ons should be developed, x N;,,R,2368-Cairo,Egypt-4April 1942

Two new German antiaircraft guns are — — t h e ' 4 barrelled

2 cm gun and the 5 cm antiaircraft- gun. Both these guns

as well as all German antiaircraft guns are fitted for en­ gaging land targets .^.lle^^i^^ly aiii convinced Germans are

- 128..- ; .

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES I j| | FL 1

l)

1 u: £ f| ^ Concepts (re - weapolfeqlx 1[cctafc1 &) & « w

£ • 1 |

** • *

entirely sound *in developing dual purpose gun -—(although

some British officers)-— claim the German has ruined good

antiaircraft guns by making them dual purpose'* With the

industrial genius peculiar to America there can be no rea­ son why all* our antiaircraft guns are not fitted to•engage

tanks.

M,A,R*25£9-Cairo,Egypt-l6 May 1942

Nearly all German Antiaircraft Guns are capable of both

Antiaircraft and Antitank roles. i7e can never hope to have

either enough Antiaircraft Guns or enough Antitank Guns.

Brigadier Revell-Smith states that all the guns'we can get

should be capable of both roles when employed .with the Field

Army and that if this is agreed we must be prepared to ac­ cept some lesser degree of instrumental perfection until

such time as these instruments are less bulky and are built

to withstand ttte rigours of climate, travel and movement.

M.A.R.4356l-London-ll July 1941

An antitank unit shooting down roads will not live. A de­ filaded site must be selected. An antitank gun with flash-

less ammunition and a good trained crew, will give a good

account of itself. The C-in-C, Home Forces directed in

future exercises that umpires report any unit which takes

up a non-defiladed site.

M. A • R •48325-London-9 June 1942

2)

Operational Practices (A.D.G.B.)

Every Gun Defended Area in the Air Defenses of Great Brit­ ain has ah Antiaircraft Defense Commander who is respon­ sible'for the control and direction of the ground defenses

when his gun defended area is attacked from the air. In

the gun defended ai-ea there is a Gun Operations Room that

acts as a centre for collecting p n r L T i A r t f

Against seen targets direct control!''jjrf^fpic

commander is not exercised, each aile

to fight its own battle, With sS^i^lr^t^fhe mairTfunc­

- 129 ­

IV - TACTICS *ND TECHNIQUE

i €% I f f

^ A a t s L r C x ^ltic4s|(4fl|G#BO

(cont'd)



U r 'l^^jfela^ (jyF\>pirationSr 'Rooms are to give early warning and

to act as an information centre for the help of gun sites®

Early warning 'of approaching enemy aircraft is sent to the

gun sites from gun operations rooms* With seen targets the

gun layer is used at the heavy antiaircraft gun. The

target is seen by personnel on the gun site through the

Identification Telescope. Thp predictor and height-finder

are put on to target, the aircraft identified, the height

taken and set into the predictor and fire is opened when

the predictor is steady and the target within range. It

takes about 45 seconds from 'target seen' to the time the

guns fire the first round*. The Predictor transmits contin­ uously future bearing, future quadrant elevation and fuze

to the guns. Two of the layers on the guns match bearing

and quadrant elevation pointers, and the third follows the

fuze transmitted —-(and makes necessary allowances for

dead time,)-—. With seen targets fire control is quite

straightforward, all sites being equipped with a predictor

and using it to control the fire of the guns.

With unseen targets the,data is obtained from gun layer

I or II and wherever possible it is fed into the predictor.

The gun layer data, however, is not quite good enough to

allow normal operation at the Fredictor; there are two

types of gun layer and errors in rates of change of the

present position. It has been found that when the error

in the present position is at a minimum the error in rates

is at a maximum and vice versa. It has been found impos­ sible to smooth out these rate errors that are of a sin­ usoidal character, within a period (less than) about

20 seconds* In august.'40 the gun layer I had just made its

appearance on a few gun sites, its primary object being to

put the Predictor on target for visual shooting before the

target could be seen with the naked eye. In September '40

it was used to control -unseen fire, but with no means of

obtaining height. The elevation Finding attachment was

then devised that enabled spot readings of Angle of site

( A / s ) to be taken and these combined with spot readings of

slant.range gave heights to within about 600 - 1000 ft* A

height computer gear was fitted to predictors so that con­ tinuous slant range was fed into.one side, height curves

were followed with a pointer and continuous angle of sight

was generated the other side* This was the method used to

control fire wj^hpgtflLLayer I data. However, the inaccur­ acies^f^i^lTaXe^cfe'lp. soon showed that it was not pos­

- 130 ­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQ

2)

iism m #

# f* A #

f Operational Practices (A.D.G.B,; (T&nt d) * '

sibleto balance either the Vickers or Sperry Freaictors

with such data and other methods:of controlling fire were

devised. The limitations of the gun layer at that time

(e.g. bearings only up to about 4.0° angle of sight) add­ ed further support to. the. policy'of ceasing to use gun

layer data for the direct control of the predictor. Plot­ ting methods were introduced, and the following method was

developed. Only a very small proportion of the gun sites

were equipped with gun layer and the sites in.every gun

defended area were grouped into groups of 4 to 8 sites,

each group being allotted a Master Site that had a gun

This site plotted the ground cijurse of a target

v layer. at 10 second intervals.for a period of 50 seconds, meaned

the course, measured the -distance covered during that

period, extrapolated the meaned course, predicted a point

on the extrapolated course and predicted the time that the

target should arrive at the point'. The point, height of

the target and time were telephoned to the. other sites in

the group who fired at the time appropriate to the time

of flight from their positions. This method was known as

Predicted Map Square Concentrations or Fredicted Concen­ trations, The overall time taken was of the order of 2

minutes during which the target must fly straight, at a.

constant height and speed. The method was obviously

..crude and a temporary expedient, A semi-automatic Plot­ ter' has since been devised that works on the same prin­ ciple but'gives very much better results, the plan posi­ tion of the target being shown by a continuously*moving

spot of light on a sheet of ground glass. The target is

plotted for 50 seconds and the speed measured: a prediction

is made that the target will cut an arc of a certain ground

range from the site,, all points on this arc requiring the

same ballistic data, except bearing. All that remains is to

give the bearing at the last possible moment, which.can be

by observing the spot of light, and the time'to.' order

fire, which is got from the speed of the.target and the

time of flight of the shell. This method is applicable to

the single, site only, but.Is has a few great advantages over

other.methods, predictor control included, The range and

height are only limited by. the g^ fuze targets,

flying erratic courses can be er if^iot with

..great, accuracy and a picture of

iour of.the target is displayed fojf

cer - a 'picture that he cannot get from the'

Whilst these plotting methods were being devised^

veloped, the gun layer I equipment was being improved, mat^

•'-131­

2)

Operational Practices (AfD,G,B.) (cont'd)

.:

had been devised and.put up and gun layer II had begun to

make its appearance'. This led to feverish investigations

into how to make the gun layer I and II control predictors

»; >

with reasonable accuracy. ./,,...• . : The solution for the Sperry Predictor was found some

time before that of the Vickers. The Sperry Fredictor de­ termines the cartesian co-ordinates of the target, meas­ ures the rate of change of these co-ordinates ar^d calcu­ lates the future position by mechanically balancing the

equations involved. It is a highly sensitive instrument

and any variations in the rates unbalance it immediately;

and with gun layer data it was practically never balanced*

This difficulty was overcome by cutting the mechanism so

that the' predictor did not measure the rates, plotting sep­ arately on a semi-automatic plotter for rates and setting

them into the predictor. . Constant rates were thus given to

the predictor that followed the present position as given

by gun layer and the future position was only in error by

the amount of error in the present position (provided the

rates set in were accurate). To get sufficiently accurate

rates the course of a target must be plotted for 50 sec­ onds, they must be measured, set into the predictor and the

procedure thereafter is the same as for visual shooting.

The overall time required for th^s is of the order of two

minutes from the start of plotting to the first round, dur­ ing which the target must fly a constant height^ course

and speed, .To enable this method to be applied a special

clutch (X tsclutch) has to be made and fitted to the pre­ dictor.

The Vickers predictor proved a harder nut to crack as it

measures the movements of the target by the angular rates

method and the rates generated by the gun layer are sub­ ject to errors that prodijce gross errors in the predicted

position, The method adopted is to instruct the later­ al rate setter (whose normal duty is to balance the later­ al deflection set divided,by the time of flight balances

the rate of change of bearing generated by the bearing

layer) to ignore fluctuations in rate .generated by the

bearing layer and never to decrease the lateral deflection

before crossing point and never to-increase the lateral de-

flection/after. crossi^a-coint.. This drill requires consid­ erable i n t e L l i j g U n d e r s t a n d i n g of the tendencies of

defleiti^l^ph^b^ig the. lateral rate setter, but .has

, I iml^Jli

- 132 ­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational Practices (A.D.G,

been found to be quite practicable in the field. The pro-'"**

cedure is known as smoothing of the lateral deflections

and in laboratory tests it has proved unexpectedly success­ ful, quite often the error in the predicted position be­ ing less than the error in the present position. •

It is now laid down in air defenses of Great Britain that

whenever possible predictor control using gun layer data

will be used for the control of guns against unseen targets.

Where this is not possible semi-automatic plotter control

will be used (if an semi-automatic plotter is not available

manual plotting- control): if neither of these methods is

possible, due to overcrowding of the gun layer time base

or to other reasons, concentrations directed centrally

from gun operations room will be fired, the data being ob­ tained from whatever source is. available.-(a particular gun

layer might be working satisfactorily, a ground control in­ terception R.D*F. equipment might be available to give

rough data, or Observer Corps plot might be the only source

from which information is available), Predictor Control

has only become a reasonable proposition during the last

three months or so, Until November 19, 1941 it was not

possible to obtain accurate bearings with gun laj^er I or

II at over 45^ angle of sight which greatly restricted the

sone of engagement with predictor control• Modifications

to both the sets now enable oearings to be got up to 60°

angle of sight increasing the sone of engagement by an a­ raouni the order of 30/ O . a.A.C.#319.13/AUC-33

The responsibility for engaging any seen target rests upon

the Gun Position Officer in charge of the gun site. He

is responsible for opening fire, and for the number of

rounds fired. The following rules have therefore been laid

down to enable him. to accept this responsibility. Any air­ craft clearly recognized by appearance or actions to be hos­ tile is to be engaged, and certain listed acts are consid-'

ered to be hostile. The method of engaging a seen target

is left to the discretion of the-j^rk Position Officer, to

engage by the most suitable of tffeji^ar^f^^hode force.

There are no restrictions upon tJjj^umb^r if jr^uSSs:fwfr3?c')3»^ ,

Gun Position Officer may fire at^f mS^Jt^gftl ]

that "Mass" fi.re against a seen target is reitTiJt^'^jU

rounds per gun, but "Mass" fire may be repeated should c i i "

133 ^

•

I--.

Tg,

IV - TACTION, M D '^.CMintfe

T<

*

Practices (A.D.0,3.) (cont'd)

istarices warrant it, Should there be.a choice of seen

targets a gun position officer-opens fire at those targets with­ in his priority zone. — Flares - — ( a r e ) - — engaged by 3.7"

and 3" guns, provided the angle of sight is not less than

10 degrees. Parachute mines will be engaged by all types

of heavy Antiaircraft guns, by antiaircraft Lewis guns,

and by rifles, down to a height of 350 feet, provided the

angle of sight is not less than 10 degrees. Fire Is dis­ continued against any aircraft attacked by British, fighters,

as soon as the latter are seen to be closing to attack. In

deciding the moment to cease f i r e , — - the - — time of

flight must be remembered. - — Fire (is not o p e n e d ) —

upon any unseen target unless gun operations room has' pre­ viously given permission to do so.

M.A.R,43640-London-15 July 1941

With heavy antiaircraft guns five methods of engagement

of unseen targets are used by the British - — :

1) Continuous following of gun layer data using Vickers

Predictor

2) Continuous following of gun layer data using Sperry

Predictor

3) Plotting Control - Back Timing.using Semi-Automatic

Plotter ...

4) Plotting Control - Forward Timing using Manual plot­ ter - —

5) Zone Concentrations, (Barrages)

The methods of engagement normally employed by heavy anti­ aircraft guns are those detailed in paragraph 1 — — above.

Normally Zone Concentrations are only fired in cases

when individual control has broken down. They are normally

controlled from a gun operation room and are directed at a

poi,nt in space. This method allows of a simplified drill

being used and is considered to be more effective than

would be the case if an attempt were made to spread bursts

over a.volumejpf space, '

M.A,3*47006-London-10 March 1942

*V >

The . fo^lQwir^Sfethod of Fire Control are authorized in Air

Defettjfe'-a£ £reat Britain for the engagement of unseen targets

^ "^antiaircraft.. guns:

- 134 ­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE 2)

M, ® AI

Operational Practices (A.D,Gt.B.(contfc

(1)



Fredictor Control:

a) Predictor Antiaircraft b) Predictor Antiaircraft c) Predictor Antiaircraft ed ) with GL/EF.

d) Fredictor Antiaircraft

No. 1 (modified) with GL/EF.

No. 1 (modified; with GL II.

No. 2 (modified and amputat­ No. 2 (modified and amputat­

ed ) with GL II.

(2) Hotting Control:

a) EF of b)' c) EF or

Back Timing, using Semi-Automatic Flotter with GL/

GL II.

Slant range timing

Forward Timing, using Manual Plotting Board with GL/

GL II.

(3) .Concentrations:

a; Zone B

b) Anti-Minelaying Barrages

c) Prepared, Geographical Barrages, as authorized in M.

A.A.D. Vol. 1 Part I Pamphlet No. 10, Appendix E for use

against seen, targets-,

(4)

Special Procedures:

a) Predictor Control: Predictor. Antiaircraft No* 2

(modified), with GL II,

at the discretion of Brigade Com­ manders where Vickers Predictors are not available, pending

the of amputation b)fitting Flotting Control: clutches.

1. Vertical Screen, in areas as already authorized by

Antiaircraft Command.

, 2 . Spider, in. 6 iuitiaircraft Division area,

.c); Concentrations: Block Control, in 3 Antiaircraft

Corps .area. • . :

whenever, possible Predictor Control Ibul^with GL/EF

•amputated Sperry Predictors will bg^mp^Jed^in/preference $

to Vickers Fredictors. Hotting C W & P o d U M f a ^ I g v ^ en-^

gagement of targets that do not come within rangi w

tors, ana where .gun layer data is only available-from another

site. Zone Concentrations are fired only when local Predic­

- 135­

•

v

v. i

JTip Mp' ^aKraQUE •

P I ? ® f fe^f'i1^*

'4 Operational Fractices (A.D:G;B;) (cont'd)

tor or Plotting Control cannot be employed. When Zone Con­ centrations are employed they supersede local control

and every available gun is br6ught to bear, except any guhs

engaged in firing by Predictor Control.

Incl.-M.A.R.47006-London-January 1942-131/APE

Plotting control is a poor second to Predictor Control, 70%

of the Heavy Antiaircraft sites in Air Defenses of Great Brit­ ain are now equipped for Fredictor Control, This will

shortly be increased to 85%* It is essential that gun sites

should so far as possible be left to fight their own inde­ pendent batvies without interference from Gun Operations

Room or the distraction of being called on for plots or in­ formation while they are in action, With this in view the

Antiaircraft Command has legislated for control of the 15%

of Heavy Antiaircraft sites that cannot take Gun Layer I

or Gun Layer II by (the use of searchlight control (R.

D.F. equipment)) where that is practicable, and other­ wise by Semi-Automatic Plotting Control exercised from

a distant plotting room sited alongside a Gun Layer sta­ tion that will normally be at another gun site. Organiza­ tions will take necessary action'for independent control of*

all Heavy Antiaircraft sites by these methods. If jam­ ming of Gun Layer Equipments takes place it must be ex­ pected that it will be carried out with Teutonic thorough­ ness, and that all gun layer stations over a wide area will

be rendered inoperative. Should that take place resort

must be had to zone concentrations directed from Gun Opera­ tions Room or sub-gun operatluns rooms. It is not to be

expected that Gun Layer plbts will often be available for

fire control in these circumstances, ahd the data avail­ able for fire control in these circum'stances, and the data

available will generally be inadequate, and may often'be

no more than Observer Corps plots and the location of fires.

It is therefore essential that Wherever possible gun opera­ tion rooms should receive direct information from Observer

Corps. Centers and from the. Local Fire Service.

M.A.R.47067-London-24 March 1942

$)ly a variation of ground locators

•„ V .

v. ,­ >, V «
X a W'J*

- 136 ­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE ^

2)

ti

*

a

Operational Practices (A.D.G.B.) (cont'S)

m

«

# if K

(R.D.F.) Central Control-. The principle and most

important difference is that.instead of endeavouring to

engage the enemy in any 1,000.metre map square, determin­ ed by estimating his future course, attempt is made to

engage him in a pre-determined 1,000 metre map square over

which reasonable gun density is certain* For this pur­ pose, belts or BLOCKS of 1,000 metre squares are arranged

around and through the Gun Defended Area, and when the en­ emy is plotted as flying towards one of these sectors fire

will be brought to bear on that sector by all guns detailed

to it. .

M.A.R«43646-Londori-l6 July 1941

Method of determining tine at which to fire when using man­ ual plotting —

(1) Back Timing. - This method is used where the .position

of the target is obtained continuously, as in the semi-auto­ matic plotter. The distance travelled by the target during

the time of flight (plus an allowance for firing delay) is

obtained proportionally from the time base.

(2) Slant Range Timing.- This "method is also designed

to. minimize errors in the time base. It can be used with

manual plotting but is more complicated to apply than the

back-timing method. The present position is found in the

same way as for back-timing. The slant range to the pres­ ent position is then calculated from the ground range and

height... The order "Fire" is ^iven when this ra.nge' appears

on the range receiver dial.

(3) Forward Timing - This is the simplest method used

with manual plotting, u stop-watch is started on the time

signal for the last plot -of the time base, as notified by

the Tactical Commanding Officer, who reports "-Zero Coming", ­ The Tactical Commanding Officer must decide what forward

time is necessary having regard to the drill time and the

probable time of flight, e.g.,60 seconds. The time of

flight plus allowance for firing delay, e.g. 20 seconds is

deducted from this time, and the order "Fire" is given,

when the difference in time, in this seconds, is

shown on the stopwatch. ..fter the fi&M&Aiftkjtes l>een

fired, the Tactical Commanding Office^^frlpart Jt<eg* ^

Coming" before any 10 second time signal?. ¥ fjgfi pi

that the order "Fire" is passed by as few persoJfaf .'5 sible. The Tactical Commanding Officer's Assistant W J ?

- 137 ­



IV - ThCTICS,INDTECHNIQUE

2)

V

Operational Practices (.i.D.G.B.) (cont'd)

holds the'stop-watch and orders "Fire" direct to the guns,

||if l&dmmuhicg^tions are available.

1 W i U y Q * " 'W

M • ^,47006-LondOn-January 1942

• . '

•

*

•

-'

*

••

•

In his major night attacks on towns in the Midlands and •••

South of England in 1^41 the tactics employed by the enemy

havp been first, to drop flares to ring the targets, sec­ ondly, to follow the flares with a considerable number of

incendiary bombs .which start fir.es. in the target area, and

then to bomb the area, defined by the fires with hi^h explo­ sive bombs. The intention in instituting what is sometimes

known as the "BLITZ BARRAGE" is to endeavor to place

A

a barrage belt around the area! marked by the fires. . major conflagration caused by incendiary bombs, in any part

of the Gun Zone is reported immediately to the Gun Operations

Room • By using cross bearings, the iintiaircraft Defense

Commander locates the area.affected and plots.it or'some

part of it, as a 1,000 meters square. Having determined

the KEI SQUARE, he broadcasts the coordinates of it, Control

Officers (by use of) griddea traces (and) grid- ­ ded boards (together with other certain devices, auto­ matically obtain what are called) BLITZ BARRAGE SECTORS.

The warning that (the Blitz Bar; age)--r- may be em­ ployed -—(is) broadcast • The order - — ( i s ) — — re­ peated and a period of not less than three minutes (is)—* allowed to elapse in order to give Control Officers time .; to place, the templates on their griddea boards and to num­ ber off the squares which form the barrage sectors. .Method of fire (is)—• by order from — ( t h e gun operations room) without a time count. khen fire is ordered, •A two rounds per gun.—-(are) fired as quickly as possible. All gUns within fuze range of the sector ordered par* ti«ipate,fuze range being determined from the graphic range tables. • , 'a a' ••• ' • ' M.A.R»43650-London-l6 July 1941

•, .

The resul^%foc . f m o n t h s for night fire are:-:

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE 2)

1 1 11ffS I

Ipf I

Operational Practices (Aw.§.B.) (cont'd) <

"Birds" •-

Month

8 6i 17i 11 16

September October November December January Total

~~59

Rounds per bird 19,200 16,700 7,270 16,900 4,090 10,800

--— The fire control methods that gave these results were

a mixture of map square and predictor firing.

Incl##l-M.^.L.44864-10 October 1941

(Despite many failures) the faith in concentrations

of fire was not diminished, and a further important argu­ ment in their favor was put forward, that a large number

of shell bursting at the. same time round the target would

be a far greater deterrent than the same number -of bursts

spread over a period of time. During the last few months,

however, much has been learned about the merits and demer­ its of the present methods of fire control against unseen

targets, about the chances of destroying aircraft, and about

the avoiding action taken by the enemy. It has betln found

that only a small fraction of enemy aircraft jink when fired

at. It has been calculated that even if in the future most

enemy aircraft jink after the first salve the errors with

predicted concentrations are such that the chance of hit­ ting with one salvo from a 4-gun site using predictor con­ trol is as great as with 24 guns firing a Zone concen­ * With the improvement in equipment now avail­ tration. able and chances of hitting it is (clear)-—

that wherever possible predictor control would be employed,

that satellites should do their own plotting and prediction,

and that the only circumstances in which concentrations of

fire from sites "are justified is -when gun layers break down

owing to overcrowding of the Cathode Ray tubes.

M.A.R•47006-London-18 March 1942

There^ are* two main methods of fire cont

aircraft equipment:

- 139 ­

Practices (A,D.G,B.) (cont'd)

Predictor Control. ,

2) Forward Area Sight (F.n.S,) Control. The Fredictor used, the No, 3 (or Kerrison) Predictor, pro­ duces extremely accurate results up to about 3 seconds time of flight. This predictor is intended to provide a means of laying so that rounds can be guided precisely on the tar­ get by altering the lay. It therefore depends for success on observing single rounds and correcting on the observations made. The predictor provides the future quadrant elevation and bearing in terms of the range set (an approximation is used that time, of flight is. directly proportional to range). No. 1 of the predictor detachment estimates what range the target will be at* in, say, 5 seconds time and sets this range into the predictor. 'Fire is opened immediately and the target flies into the line of fire. If the range set is too small the rounds will be observed to cross the tar­ get's path astern of the target; if the range set is too great the rounds will be observed to cross the target's path ahead of the target and will be obscured by the target. Corrections to the range set into the predictor are made accordingly, so that an engagement is a series of static predictions based on the movement of the target and a series of estimated future ranges. Continuous corrections to lay for line and elevation are made by the layers on the pre­ dictor and aided laying is provided to give greater accuracy in laying. The guns are power controlled from the predic­ tor and thus all human errors in laying at the gun are el­ iminated. This method of control is by far the most ac­ curate method of control of light antiaircraft guns and is the primary method in Air Defenses of Great Britain, but its use is limited by the fact that the approximations in the equations only hold true for short times of flighty, that correction of aim by observation of tracer.is not practicable except for times of flight of 3 seconds or'less, and that a supply or power is required that is normally sup­ plied by a generator.that is not.always ready started up in time :or the engagement of snap targets. The secondary method of control Forward Area Sight Control. This meth­ od is direct the target by layers on the gun, the def 1 ectior^^elja'gje'it.^ma ted. by another member of the detach­ ment ^^orders*'3|itfii'*'to the lAy£rs. The deflections are ieli^GScQTcling to the course and speed of the target

1

v;

."ons made from observations of the tracer, With

^\rea Sight Control automatic fire is normal* •(

is.to be supplemented and improved b- the use of the.

- 140 ­

fV-TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

Operational Pracfci) Stiffkey Stick de;

/.BiG.B.) \(ctant!<

iftjL** A %y ed elsewhere.;

«* A.A.C.#319.13/AUC-33'

The object of Rocket Projectors is to place a large

number of bursts in the sky as simultaneously as possible.

With direct predicted fire it is not often possible to fire

more than one salvo from one Battery at a target. The

equipment, however, is very suitable for firing barrages

and concentrations for deterrent effect, as considerable

fire can be obtained with comparatively few personnel (each

single projector requires a detachment of 2 men compared

with 10 for a heavy antiaircraft gun). The method of fire

control is to plot the course of a.target for 50 seconds,

measure the speed, select a point of engagement and fire

at the time appropriate to the time of flight. This takes

a matter of 70 - 100 seconds during which the target must

fly at a constant height, course and speed. At present

about 15 out of the 53 batteries deployed are equipped with

gun layer to obtain data for plotting and firing, the remain­ ing 35 receiving data from a gun layer on an adjacent heavy

antiaircraft site. Eventually all Z Antiaircraft (Rock­ et) sites will have their own gun layers. When concen­ trations are fired they are directed centrally from gun '

operations rooms from the best information available.——

A. A. C. #319 •13/AUC-33

Z ("Zed") Antiaircraft Batteries (Rocket Batteries)

engage high level targets by Plotting Control, and targets

diving at the Battery position by Visual Control. When a Z

Antiaircraft Battery is not equipped with a Semi-Automatic

Plotter,, control is by manual plotting from gun laying R.D.F.

data. When a Z Antiaircraft Battery has a Semi-Automatic

Plotter, the Plotter is fed with gun laying data from the Z

Antiaircraft Battery Gun Layer or from a Gun Layer at a heavy

antiaircraft site. In the latter case the Z Antiaircraft Plot

ting Room is at the heavy antiaircraft site. Drills for

Z Antiaircraft Battery Control with a Semi-Automatic Plotter

will be issued as Appendix. B to this Instruction, and the '

necessary equipment will be issued in due course. Until

this equipment is available Z A n t i a i r c ^ ^ l ^ ^ l i e ^ w ^ h ^ |

-la-

'uli^Uiiw

IV - TACTICS AND

A P l f e

1f?t I

t>.Q..Bj (cont'd)

Plotters may „use any systems of Semi-Auto­ matic Plotting Control .that they have devised,

M.A.R.47006-London-January 1942

hll light antiaircraft layouts are for multiples of

one, two, or more, complete troops (of three guns or

four guns each depending on the -table or organization in

effect) . All emplacements for light antiaircraft equip­ ments — - arc constructed to enable guns- to shoot down to

zero degrees. In cases Where ,guns are sited on eminen­ ces it — — is'necessary for them to be able to shoot at

angles of depression in order to engage aircraft flying low

over the Vulnerable Point. The inner - — side of the angle,

subtended by. the dead arc (of the gun) will norr

mally be tangential to the perimeter of the vulnerable area

thus allowing guns to fire directly over the vulnerable area

or point, ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS are selected — . I/here

main positions have been constructed more or less along the

perimeter.—-(of the vulnerable area)-—• use is made of

alternative positions to get depth, - — Light Antiaircraft

dummy positions are constructed at all vulnerable points,

as materiel and labor permit, though airdromes have first

priority. These dummy positions are made realistic enough

to deceive both visual and photographic reconnaissance.

They — • are sited in consultation with Local Defense Com­ manders in order to avoid attracting bombing on to Infantry

defense pcffta.

M,.i.R*44496-Londori-15 September 1941

The principles upon which .British Light ;urtiaircraft layouts

are. based are laid down in — - "Manual Antiaircraft Defense"

In order to prevent the neutralization of •..all the defenses

by preliminary bombing, the principle of,-defense; in depth .

is as important in the defense of an airdrome or other vul­ nerable. point* as .in anything else, Therefore guns will NOT

be sited merely alpng the perimeter of the airdrome or ot­ her vulnerable poi ^area where the number of guns, per­ mit, and partial1i are reinforcing guns are deployed,,

c.raft guns will be sited out to

irus from' the perimeter.

M.A.R,44496-Lonaon-l$ September 1941

V A u

- 142 ­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE ^

2)

Operational Practices (A.D^G.B*) .(cont*d)­

In my visits to various•antiaircraft heavy. gun sitesrin

Great Britain I fpund that .they are .all of — f a substantial­ ly) - — u n i f o r m - c j Emplacement

has been superseded by — J ' h ^ ' f u r ^ ,are spaced

about 150 feet apart. — A t t a c h e d .'to this repcSr are draw­ ings of Static Heavy Antiaircraft Gun Emplacement 3 •7"/

4.5" — . • .

M. A .R •44887-London-ll October 1941

Light antiaircraft guns are used in the air defenses of

Great Britain to protect specified small vital points

against low flying attacks. Two forms of low flying at­ tacks are encountered, i.e. low level flying attacks and

dive bombing attacks, - The principles upon which-light an- *•

tiaircraft guns are sited are:

(1) All round defense against both level and dive attacks,

(2) Maximum field of view, .

(3) Maximum volume of fire to be brought to bear on the

target before it releases its bombs,

(4) Engagement of all targets* which,, either simultaneous­ ly or in succession, approach the defended area, - ­ (5) Provision of early warning.;

(6) Element of surprise should be present-and sites moved

periodically, ••=-,-. The gun density is obv-rously, the maximum available.

A-. A .C. ^319.13/^iyC-33.-London-February 1942

The principles upon which Heavy antiaircraft layouts are

based- are- laid down in the Manual ..intiaircraft Defense —

The speed and height of enemy aircraft are taken as

300 m.p.h, and 20,000 feet respectively. Four-gun sites

are normal in all gun defended areas, including

aerodromes, The policy is that all gun positions will •

eventually be equipped with gun layer and therefore all posi­ tions should either be -suitable for gun layer or such that

a gun layer can be sited within 500 yards. Owing to the

"effect of blast, — - in static defenses huts are —

mally not sited nearer than i^nsf91 maximum distance is - — • 40(|j j ^ d ^ * -4- il|L iW&vimisS

•sited that they can engage ^ e l ^ ^ i & e l fi^jMiilic:

- 143 ­



TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

v. Operational Practices (A.D.Q.B.) (cont'd)

.

|.At airdromes•all guns must be So sited that they can en-

preferably by direct,- otherwise by indirect fire,

enfemy ..aircraft which may land on the aerodrome or other

levoi;,yg,round within range, For each mobile Heavy idi­ tiaiixafaft site, several alternative positions are select­ ed* In^the use of these alternative positions, CONCEAL­ MENT ,'- @Ven at the sacrifice of some all-round field of

fire - is ' (considered)—T the basis of success. No pro­ tective worft^is^—^done on these positions; platforms

are selected Ind then some natural cover and minimum provi­ sion for accesshare all that are required, A11 arrangements

(are)-— made'for-occupying these ...positions, which • —

are occupied from time to time at the discretion of Anti­ aircraft Defense Commanders* T&/.CK DISCIPLINE is of the ut­ most importance to guard against giving away alternative

positions. All vacant'—- as distinguished from alter­ native heavy antiaircraft sites are maintained as dum­ my positions. Where materials and labor permit, further

dummy positions are built#. Local defense commanders

are alwa s to be. consulted with'regard to the,siting of

these dummy positions so that they do not attract bombing

on t.o Infantry Defense Posts. The best dummy positions of

all will —r- are the main gun sites with dummy guns install­ ed, after alternative positions have been occupied, •—­ MAIN POSITIONS must rely on protection as opposed to

concealment. Therefore protection is made —r(as nearly)

100$ effective (as. possible)—-. All. walls, whether

concrete or sandbagged, are earthed up,

M.A.R.44496-London-15 September 1941

where circumstances permit, manning and standing down

is ordered in four stages as indicated below:

; Executive Order , Circumstances . Acti.on •"Stand by"



This is in the nature of a Gun. Position Of-

Warning order at. the dis- fi.cers telephon­ . creation of . the. A.A.D.C.- ists ' and lookouts

. but would normally be t-o be especially

given-when Enemy aircraft, alert. Gun Layer

are within 75 miles of Stations and Com­ the•Defended.Area or Vit- mand Posts to be

al Point. fully manned. No.3

Predictors to be

started.

-144­

IV - TACTICS >IND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational Practices (A.D.G.B.) (cont!

Executive Order

Circumstances

Action

"Take Posts"

At.the discretion of A.Ai Gun& to be fully

D.C., but would normally v man

be given when Enemy air­ craft are within 55 miles

of the Defended Area or

Vi.tal Point.

"Stand Easy"

No immediate action antie- All numbers will

pated* . remain ready in

gun and Command

Post shelters.

"Stand Down"

No Enemy aircraft reported All Detachments

within 75 miles of the De- break off, leav­ fended Area or Vital Point.ing normal look-

o its and tele­ phonists,

: M.A,R.44523-London-l6 September 1941

The layout of the heavy antiaircraft defenses of a partic­ ular area in the Air Defens'es of Great Britain are based

on the following principles:

(1) Heavy guns form the framework of the defense*

(2) A11 round defense must be provided wherever possible.

(3) Before aircraft reach the line" of bomb release they

must be subjected to the maximum volume of fire, (The line

of bomb release, depends, of course, On the target height,

speed and direction of approach),

(4) Defenses should be sited in depth wherever sufficient

equipment is available^

taneously or in

(5) 'ill targets, whether approaching succession, must be capable of being er^

at the ex­ (6) Vital, points are given maximum pi a whole,

pense of lesser gun densities over the ar^ d Areas

The layouts of nearly all the larger Gun speed 300

are now based on target height 20,000 feetSj miles per hour,

uary 1942

A.a•C.J!19•13/AUC-33-Lond2 The drawings of the Layout" for AntiaircralJ^efejise of

-145­

IV

TiXTI&^Jm TaCHNIQUP*„

.? k

2) Operational i r act^efif"'. D. G. B.) (cont'd)

a certain Ordnance Depot in Great Britain shows that

4 Heavy antiaircraft Guns and 8 Bofors are provided,

M.A.R.4666l-London-19 February 1942

32 single type rocket projectors are being installed at

Gibraltar for antiaircraft barrage work. The barrage at

present is put up by the antiaircraft guns. The barrage is

a very important part of the night antiaircraft defense of

Gibraltar since' the searchlights cannot be placed out far

enough from the objective to insure pick up of planes be­ fore they reach the bomb release line.

.••-'• M.A.R.14-Gibraltar-16 March 1942

It has been calculated that the average speed of bombers

crossing the South Coast of England on night raids over

land during April and May was 180/190 m.p.h. on the way in

and 230/240 m.p.h. on the' way out", the average heights be­ ing 15,000 - 16,000 feet and 13,000/14,000 feet respective­ ly.

A.A.C.#319 #13/AUC-13-23 .ugust 1941

Experienced — German Air Force — — prisoners say

. antiair­ that there has been a great improvement in craft fire by night.' since September, 1940. — T h e y

all respect antiaircraft fire by day — - . -hen crews

have made a number of War flights, they tend to become

over-confident and rarely taict •avoiding action when heavy

antiaircraft fire is encountered. Many consider that

the best tactics are to fly straight on', as fast as pos­ sible, and thus leave the danger area at the'earliest pos- .

sible moment, Others continue to fly on their.course tak­ ing mild evasive action. —

M.A.R.43892-London-5 August 1941

aircraft generally fly at heights between about

Normally the angle of sight never

-146­

A *•;••• -T."!

IV - TACTICS .iND TECHNIQUE

%

/
2)

Operational Fractices (A.D.G.B.) C k o n t p l *

minations reaches a value at which reasonably acculfete t ^ f the can be made by Gun Layer Ivik. I or II, The The target at beginning of engagements m st be e supplying British are trying to discover the best metho range to the predictor. It is believed that a method of

range.control - magslip transmitters geared suitably to the

ground range screw of the Range-height Conversion Unit An­ tiaircraft No. 1 (associated with the Semi-automatic Plot­ t e r ' s the best approach to the problem, Magslip receivers

are fitted to the ground range, dials of the. predictor. By

following slant range at the conversion unit, ground range

is transmitted to the predictor,

. M.A.R .4763 6-1ondon-29 April 1942

ItTiere loss of static equipment cannot be avoided cer­ tain important parts of guns, instruments etc.,

are not allowed to fall into enemy hands, — It is essen­ tial that the same parts are removed in each case so as

to prevent the completion of other equipments by the enemy.

It is a point of honour that antiaircraft guns are fought

to the bitter end and are then prevented (at all costs)

from being captured, '

Fighting Book Instructions

^• •

,

k.A.R.48083-London-27 iviay 1942

The increased effectiveness of German antiAircraft gun and

searchlight defenses, which have been reported several times

from this office, have'been such that the antiaircraft Com­ mand have, flown y/ithin the last few weeks on bomber aircraft

making attacks against targets deep into Germany, Their



3 jY RK 9 d$ £j; l ,St

.

'

IBM t ' V

IV - ^ i & S ^ S ; jND TECHNIQUE •

2)

Operatiunal f rSctiq^^Mobile) (cont'd)

by Middle East in their report (on experiences to

June 1941) • Throughout these operations the necessity

for light antiaircraft protection'for the field artillery

area and the forward troops has been stressed. For the

protection of aerodromes at least one battery of light an- ­ tiaircraft - — ( 1 2 -40 mm Bofors) per aerodrome was es­ sential to adequately defend the aerodrome* In both .

Greece and Crete the enemy made deliberate attacks on both

heavy and light antiaircraft gun positions, -r—. Some Bofors

were needed for the protection of the heavy antiaircraft

guns.The enemy has appreciated the fact that the light

antiaircraft guns have engaged a diver only until he has

released his bombs and then change onto another diver com­ ing down to attack. The result is that when a formation of

10 or more are attacking, the first 3 or 4 return on com­ pletion of their dive and attack the light antiaircraft

guns with machine gun fire. Dive bombers invariably

machine gun as they dive and ammunition in the pits has fre­ quently been hit. To prevent charges being ignited either

by incendiary bullets piercing the case or by the primers

being struck, rounds arc placed under cover in the pits.

If rounds are placed with the (nose of the projectile)—

facing in to the centre of the pit, casualties to the de­ tachment are avoided .as, if the charges are ignited, the

cartridge cases do not blow off among the detachment. It

is the practice to erect Command I ost i rotection to the

height of eyepieces of the predictor and height finder.

Walls if of sandbags are 5-ft. thick, or if of drums

filled with stones, 2 drums thick at the bottom and one at

the top. Fredictor cables — - are covered with sandbags

or ammunition boxes filled with stones.

Extracts from (British) Middle East Re­ port (to London) on Experience in Em­ :. > ployment of antiaircraft Units (June 1941)

The general principles affecting' employment of antiaircraft

^^-t^^lery^in mobile operations were, well exemplified

f

A|ej| &|ent operations in CY^.JC.'i. The fact that there

As f ^ J f e f "front' line" was ajaSi clearly emphasized. & so the Jtiaircraft Units were absorb­ ed into theand role or pl-Otetst^s^ines of were communications »

Both heavy light a.ntiaircraft units used, with sue—

-14B­



IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational I ractices (Mobility (c.6nt,M)

m g new in

cess, ag-inst .ground targets. Ther^w^s $ e their

this, but care had to be taken not tOcorapgg in

primary antiaircraft role. The average^ the desert, of heavy antiaircraft units 5 mph,

and they could not keep up with light raobil umns.

It was therefore often necessary for Light Antiaircraft

Units in the "Battle Zone" to engage aircraft at greater

heights (6,000/7,000 ft) than is normally the case.

Incl. to M.^.R,2353-Cairo-November 1941 to

January 1942- A.C#319.131/ASA-l

Light antiaircraft was deployed as early as possible,

(in Cyrcnaica) in its normal role in priorities

decided by (the Task) Force Commander, This was usu­ ally:

(1) Supply Forts

(2) Royal .ir Force Landing Grounds

(3) Inland Supply and ammunition dumps

(4) Headquarters

(5) Convoy Routes

In general there were sufficient light antiaircraft re­ sources to give thin protection to all the above but as

regards.(5) above the resources only allowed the 'picket- .

ing' of selected,'bottle n e c k s l o a d i n g and unloading

points, etc. For long convoys where 'leap-frogging' was

not possible, light antiaircraft accompanied the con­ voy, head and tail. The speed with which the Bofors can

be brought into action and if necessary fired off it?

wheels afforded — - some protection.

M. M. . R. 43617-rLona on-15 July 1941

Instances occurred of' Bofors firing heir^wheels in

order to drive.ofi'»enemy aircraft. On ©Cc^ion two

bombers coming straight up the road with t:% bomb­ ing a halted Australian convoy, were engageULb ie.-Bofors

firing off their wheels and were driven off.

• . .M.A.R.43845-Ajondon-

Difficulty was experienced (in the Middle.EastT­ in observing the tracer owin^ to the dust, flame, and s

-149­

f'" tm My
$ f jp ^ •

&(&i&S/AND TECHNIQUE

J;: ^ . • • >) OperationM" lattices (>>pbfle) (cont'd)

> •:

This trouble was overcome to some extent by Nos. 1 and

10 each standing by one of the layers and guiding them ­ with taps - on the right and left shoulder of the layer

for direction, and on the neck and waist of the layer for

elevation,; • :

M.A.R.43842-London-30 July 1941

(In the middle east) spotters have been found to be

invaluable, V/ith a large number of enema planes in the

sky at once, three spotters were necessary, of whom one

concerned himslef solely with fighters and bombers on the

. .

gun-site. • M. A.R.43842-Loncon-30 July 1941

It is reported that during a recent fighter/bomber op­ eration against MAZINGAR3E, enemy antiaircraft fire appear­ ed to be directed at the fighter escort rather than the

bombers. It is likely that this may have been done with

the intention of making the fighter squadrons break forma­ tions, so that-they had some difficulty in keeping with the

bombers, which were thereby exposed to fighter attack.

' •Incl. "B" to M* A.L.44935-London-ll October ,1941

Question: Vhat methods are .used-to identify"friendly air­ craft in time to prevent receiving friendly fire? If more

than one method is used, which of these appear to be the

more practical under various situations?

answer: Approach corridors, pyrotechnics, code signals

and identification friend-or-foe radar equipment-.

A, A • C. t£319 • 1321/F

For attacking motor transport convoys from the air, a

ground level attack from astern has been found to be the

_best opening attack (from the Air Force viewpoint) .

?th«scg^voy stops, attacks from the beam have best ef-

I J! fs £nk*r V®* s> nm^

iS

*

kI LMIE-'

-150­

IV - ThCTICS ,IND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational Irac'tices (Mobile) (coring;

feet; in convoy attacks, surprise is neck's d a dive

from 13,000 feet or.above usually attains :owledge of

the position, speed, and method of defense of -.the convoy

is most valuable if an effective attack is to De planned.

Air Information Bulletin NO.2-13/.ARM-33-2

Information of the experiences of antiaircraft units

in the Middle East indicate that enemy tactics have

consisted chiefly of dive-bombing, low level bombing, machine

gunning and reconnaissance. There has been very

little high level bombing. The most noticeable feature has

been the increasing height from which dive-bombing (Stukas).

have made their attacks on each successive raid, and the

comparatively shallow' dives made.when faced with light an­ tiaircraft fire.

Incl.l to M.A,R.46476-London-30 January 1942

The only weapons smaller than the 40 mm Bofors employed in

Antiaircraft Defense by the British are Lewis and Bren guns

and a few Oerlikon and Hispanos at airdromes, Lewis guns

and Bren are controlled by Hosepipe methods and Oerlikon

by Forward Area Sight or Hosepipe, At Tobruk one captured

Breda 20 mm was used at each Heavy gun site for local pro*­ tection.' 1 ' M.A.R.47593-London-27 April 1942

(Royal Air Force pilots are advised that) the diffi­ culties in antiaircraft gunnery are increased to such an

extent that•accurate fire is almonqt impossible if aircraft:­ (l) Change height — This necessiJfjfafrB^different data

being put into the predictor and thelfcjjp're. -slows up the rate

of fire.

(2) Jink to right or left — This assumption

of straight flight In predictor,

(3) Change speed — This also upsets one^ on m

predictor,'­ (4) Fly at staggered heights — This makes

more difficult for the Gun Laying set ta pick up1



fV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

"^Operational Practices (Mobile) (cont'd)

tai%e€ SfajtiChaving picked,it up to continue to follow the

same target^ Jn additior)/ in visual shooting, it makes it

most uncertain tha£ predictor operators are laying on

the same target as thatviT)n which the Heightfinder has taken

a 'height. . *

British Air Ministry-21 May 1941-OCCA 319-131/OG

During recent raids on Kiel, a number of crews who made

gliding approaches reported that they were not engaged by

Flak or by Searchlight. Some were engaged after they had

dropped their bombs but three aircraft which glided in, one

from 21,000 ft. down to 13,000 ft., one from 20,000 ft.

down to 16,000 ft., and one from 17,000 ft. down to 14,000

ft., obtained complete immunity. Experience indicates that

when several aircraft are over a target at the same time,

ground defenses are likely to concentrate on those aircraft

which, by flying steadily, make prediction easier. Aircraft

with engines throttled back, changing height and speed con­ -

tinually are difficult to follow, and may often escape at*

tention in such circumstances.

Technical Services Memo.#6-23 April 1941-OCCA#319.131/LF

- — Orders had laid down maximum range at 1,500 yards for

engagement of planes in Crete by light Antiaircraft weapons.

— — If.this order had not been in force a lot more planes

could have been engaged because the heavy antiaircraft guns

were put out of action early in the battle. After that,

enemy planes, which seemed to know the maximum range at

which Bofors were opening up, used to circle round out of

range and come down to attack objectives one at a time,

. . .. M.A.R. 43842-Londo.n-30 July 1941

— — It has been the experience at Tobruk that — — there is

a critical moment in a dive bombing attack on a heavy an­ tiaircraft site when the first dive bomber is at about 4,000

feet, A ferocious burst of fire will cause a premature re­ ^ lease of bombs with corresponding loss, of effect and will

£i£vrn following aircraft.

Incl.BES-333-6 May 1942

i u L i | 4 vv..*i,

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational Practices (Mobile) (cont'd)

"Deterrent fire" is vigorous fire at long range, Se-^

signed to br~ak. up the enemy formations and to cause thf

to release, their bombs prematurely (ana therefore probab]

short of the .target). This policy is of ten. far. more ef­ fective than holding the fire in order to use more accurate

methods in attempting to single out one aircraft for the

individual bag - possibly after he has already done the dam­ age. Examples are as follows:­ (1) "The Porcupine" formation adopted by gun positions

when attacked heavily from all angles; all guns point out­ wards and fire over 65 degrees,

(2) Light antiaircraft engaging dive-bombers; all guns

face away from the vulnerable area when awaiting a.ttack;

those on the near side of the target open to give maximum

volume of fire at long range. The guns on the far side then

swing round to engage the attackers with accurate predictor

metlods as they flatten out, T*ith U is one method of fire,

over 60 Stukas were definitely destroyed by the light anti­ aircraft defences at Tobruk between April and October,

Army Training Memorandum No, 43

Question: (In North Africa) how are Army Support air­ craft directed on to targets, and how long did it take from

calling upon them until the attack took place?

Answer: Close support bombing does not appear to have been

carried out closer than 10 miles ahead of our forward troops.

The selected target was in the hands of Headquarters, The

demand for close support was theoretical as in this country ­ the demand going through the normal channels to the aerodrome

where the pilots were immediately briefed, Meanwhile the

demand was reported to advance battle Hea^uart^rs, •who de­ cided whether the demand was, in fact, met*

M.A ,R,48227-^5%>n--C>June 1942

From experience gained'in TOBRUK and in the W^^gfi -ues

ert the construction of a number of realistic pJpJAions,,

in the neighborhood of each light antiaircraft positi^J*' ^ ^ and their manning by a dummy flash firing party, makes 4me

selection of the target difficult for the Stuka formation,

-153­



:cs AND TECHNIQUE

I I oJfra&oll^

(cont'd)



Irfel

as the Stuka c!lv£s ashes or dust clouds raised by

real or dummy light antiaircraft positions. Personnel

at guns must be provided with slit tronches.

Incl, 1-M. A.R, 2354-22 February 1942-a- A. C.,7-319.131/^RY

The 4th /Antiaircraft Brigade at Tobruk without air

support has had considerable success in dealing with Ger­ man air attacks great use has been made of camouflage

and of dummy batteries which are attacked by the Germans

as frequently as the real batteries. Dummy men are placed

around the dummy batteries and captured Italian hand gre­ nades- buried in dust are fired to deceive the German

aviators. The batteries were frequently replaced by dum­ mies especially after an attack. Emplacements wero made

as small as possible so as to give- all possible lateral pro­ tection. A direct hit ivas usually required to put a battery

out of action, bofors and machine guns protected the 3*7

inch batteries from dive bombers,

N.a•R.Ser.#-F01:X-18-18 July 1941

Question: What is the limit of dispersion of light antiair­ craft? Can guns sited in pairs be taken as the minimum, or

three? If sited in pairs, how far apart should they be?

i' •

Answer: Middle East favor three.

Question? For the protection of Artillery areas is it best

to site guns close in for dive-bombers or in a square 1,000

yards apart?

Answer: Sited in triangular formation - sides of triangle

880 yards to-1,000 yards.

M.A.R.48227-London-4 June 1942

The- digging in by troops referred to consisted of narrow,

shallow trenches in the greater number of cases. Troops

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational Practices (Mobile) (cont^dfe - 1

both in Lybia and Crete habitually dug this

after each halt for protection against fighter aVia'tic^n,' as

well as against enemy ground fires.

Fm. U .S. Military Observer Singapore,S.S.

Rpt.No.48- 1 September 1941

(in northern Africa in Bivouac areas) adjacent tents

were from 100 to 20o yards apart ana the earth from the in­ terior excavated to a depth so that personnel could sleep be­ *low ground level. The efficiency of this method where cover

is lacking, in preventing personnel losses from air bombing,

is well established. Protection to vehicular vital parts

(engine, differential) was also provided by parking the vehi­ cles in a ditch of approximately "V" shape.

Rpt.-BES-353-T<'»ashington-24 July 1942

Reconnaissance for Light Antiaircraft (Bofors) sites must

take, into consideration the possibility of a secondary anti­ tank role. The troop commander is the only one that

can judge the moment to abandon the primary role (antiair­ craft) for the secondary role (antitank). Light Antiair­ craft guns must be in position to engage enemy tanks when

they come within 800 yards range,

M.A.R.48325-London-ll June 1942

Army Training Memorandum, # 43•

The clipping of Armour Piercing with High Explosive in the

proportion of one to one (for use against tanks)-— was

the most successful method used. Tracer aids laying against

tanks at close ranges and in addition, it is considered,

has considerable effect on the morale of the tank opera­ tors, On one ocassion, a troop being attacked by tanks,

ran out of armour piercing and continued with high explo­ sive only, which not only held off the tanks but assisted in

driving them off.

•333-6 May 1942

IV - TACTIC

2)

»»

(Enemy)

Operational Practices (

The source (of this information) stated that German

antiaircraft officers had explained (to him) that

British bombers were flying into Germany in two. formations

on the same course. The first'formation with the smaller

number of planes came over at about 15,000 feet while the

larger formation came over at about 22,000 feet. The

antiaircraft officers stated they had no difficulty taking

the lower formation under fire, but that they were having

difficulty operating .against the higher unit.

M.A.R.18080-Berlin,Germany-17 March 1941

Gliding approaches made by a large number of aircraft

over Berlin nave been engaged by flak in most cases. Over

other targets, however, gliding approaches have met with

more success and have often attracted very little flak.

This points to the fact that in the first instance, methods

of detection other than sound are being used (by the

Germans) against which gliding approaches are ineffec­ tive, It seems'therefore, that although gliding approaches

are likely to be effective in most areas, they should not

be relied on to give immunity from flak, particularly over

the most important and heavily defended targets.

Air Information Bulletin No. 2-13/ARM-33-2

-:— The tendency to revert to a more or loss regular dispo­ sition of heavy gun positions throughout a target area

(.in German territory) has be n further observed in recent

months, and has been accompanied by a considerable increase

in "continuous following" and "predicted concentrations" at

the expense of barrage fire. This may to some extent be

related, especially in the case of more inland targets,

to a .weakening of the defenses, since an effective bar­ rage is more likely to be put up where equipment is plenti­ ful. . It may also be considered to provide further pre­ sumptive evidence in favor of some improved means of fire

control, though there is as yet no definite information

-156r­

a

•4k /.:•, n Af IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE 2)

^ ^

Operational Practices,(Enemy) (cont'd)



I

tnat a form of gun layer is being used,

M;A.R.4'6l30-London-9 January 19

Light (Antiaircraft) guns are in almost all cases

sited by the Germans close to or at vulnerable

points. In densely populated sections, and in wooded areas,

where flak is necessary, towers have been built above the

height t>Y local objects in order to obtain a 360° traverse.

At important industrial areas, 20-mm. flak are mounted'

on the roofs of many 'buildings, Numerous new types of

flak towers' have been observed in use and under construc­ tion, Some of these are platforms set upon iron uprights

which are, in turn, set in concrete blocks. Other more

heavily constructed towers include provision for accommoda­ tion of the gun crews and some contain public air raid

shelters in their bases. Photographs and ground reports of

Berlin show massive six-storied, steel and concrete

armoured towers, A moveable light tower, eight

meters high, constructed of 20-mm, steel tubes has been

reported. These tubes are said to be of standard pattern,

and for issue to light Flak units as required,

• }a.A.R,46l30-London-9 January 1942

Except over the Channel ports there would appear to have

been a considerable decrease recently in the volume of

light Flak fire. There is, however, no evidence to show

that light guns have been withdrawn'from target areas with­ in Germany for use elsewhere. It is thought more probable that new operational instructions governing opening ranges have been issued,. In the past the smaller caliber light

guns have- not hesitated to open fire at random over the '

vulnerable point or in the approximate direction of an air­ craft even though the aircraft may have been as much as

3,000 ft, above their maximum effective ceiling. In re­ cent weeks, however, the majority of the fire has been

directed at the apex of "cones" of searchlight beams or up the beams themselves, and* then only when the target' has

been well within range^

kR,47110-xJondon-27 March 1942 " ** ft v * t, 'h

& ff







Iliirsi is

fcS-*' S I

i .. ; R rs A: .-4%Hft.%

:

rT F

•' 'f J

IV ­ 2)

Operational Iractices (Enemy) (cont'd)

By day the use by the Germans of course and speed sight

enable fire to be opened with light antiaircraft weapons

with reasonable accuracy after which corrections are made

by observation of tracer. The light guns are highly ma­ neuverable •and can engage targets almost immediately they

come in view and in range; they rely for their effect large­ ly- on rate and volume of fire, but against low-flying tar­ gets, i,e., at heights below about 1,500 ft., they have

proved exceedingly accurate, fit very low level, i.e., 0-50

ft., accuracy is likely to be considerably reduced, owing

to probable limitation of field of view, with consequent

restricted time of engagement; this disadvantage, however,

is offset to some extent where guns are mounted on towers.

By night method of engagement (of illuminated targets) is

similar to that employed by day, though it is probable that

greater reliance is placed on observation of tracer. Against

"unseen" targets light Flak fire is little more than a de­ terrent, as there are no instruments for"unseen" firing of

light guns. Guns are sometimes sited close to searchlights,

from which it is thought some data may be obtained, to en­ able the target to be followed at least approximately. To

heighten the deterrent effect resort is often had to'moving

or rotating the barrel whilst firing. Fixed or curtain bar­ rages are occasionally fired by day or by night over small

vulnerable points such as ships or on likely lines of ap­ proach. '

Air Min. Weekly Int. Summary Up to 27 May 1942-#143

As a general rule German light guns are sited in threes in

the form of a triangle, though in areas where the defenses

are limited they are occasionally sighted singly. They are

often mounted on the roofs of factories, or other buildings,

or on special Flak towers. These are usually constructed

of wood set in concrete foundations, though a mobile type

consisting of light steel tubes has also been reported; they

may be anything up to 75 ft; in height. 'The siting of guns

on t o w e r s ^ v e r y widespread, ensures a good field

« ofiqfltefi and 'if^re&uently adopted amongst trees where there

t

H^

Hi. VTIV

.

• -158­

iy'' • y <

IV - TACTICS ;IND TECHNIQUE

2)

Operational Practices (Enemy) (cont'd)

is the added advantage of relative concealment.

Air Min. Weekly Int. Summary Up to 27 Maj

German training manuals lay it down that for defense against

low-flying and dive-bombing attack armoured columns must

march in extended order and use their rifles, machine guns

and super-heavy machine guns. Light antiaircraft artillery

may «also be distributed throughout the column by troops or

even by single guns,

.M.A.R,44063-London-15 august 1941

It is laid down in German training manuals that the speed of

armoured columns makes it impossible for antiaircraft bat­ teries to "leap-frog", ,'intiaircraft batteries are, however,

employed to defend assembly areas, embussing and debussing

points, bridges, defiles etc,

M.A.R.44063-London-15 august 1941

The Germanspossible because of the great air superiority

which has characterised their previous c mpaigns, have not paid great attention to concealment from air observa­ tion. There is evidence that serious attention is now

being paid to this matter, (In Libya armored fighting

vehicles) and (Motor transport) are painted a

light khaki "desert-colour", and disruptive colouring is

not used. , Grease mixed with sand is also smeared oh vehi­ cles to obtain exact conformity with the colour of the sur­ rounding ground. Guns are painted yellow, and no partic­ ular ' care is taken to conceal them, although the sun-cov­ ers provided for all guns help to conceal the outline. Nets

exist, but they are very seldom usedy Smoke is employed

frequently —-(armoured vehicles whiSh)-— #i£hdraw under

its cover.

Incl.5-M,A,R,2457-Egypt^fi) July 1941



- TACTICS M D

E

^atiohat '"Practices (Enemy) (cent' d)

tan' fighters painted very dark green on top, very

light gray under the fuselage, with yellow wing tips and

nose, have been very difficult to detect, for they blend

well with the sea. Enemy markings are sometimes surround­ ed by distinct circles, giving a first impression of be­ ing British, Many of the Me-109's are camouflaged a dark

red and black and have black crosses in red circles.

Air Information Bulletin No,2-13/ARM-33-2

Reports from Middle East state that about 30-40 Ju.88s, or

Ju.87s., with an escort of about 10 Me,109s, are often em­ ployed in attacks. Formations generally approach at

between 14,000 - 17,000 feet and dive out of the sun. The

Ju. 88s, generally dive at an angle of about 50/60 degrees,

but the Ju. 87s, always at angles of between 70/80 degrees.

T u"hen antiaircraft .'ire is intense, aircraft maintain a good

interval and very few dive through the barrage, but release

their bombs from about 500 feet above it, with consequent

loss of accuracy. Occasionally, when the antiaircraft fire

has been less intense, attack has been made by four air­ craft at a time in single line. After pulling out, the air­ craft generally fly away very low, sometimes at an altitude

of only 100 fe^.t. This is done to reduce casualties, Ocr­ casionally, attacks have been preceded by high level bomb­ ing by Ju.88s, approaching from the opposite direction,

with the obvious intention of distracting attention from

the dive bombing attack. Light antiaircr ft fire, particu­ larly Bofors, has been most effective against dive bombers

especially when the aircraft is about to pull out of the

dive. Aircraft have also been engaged during this period,

it has often caused pilots to take evasive action, and' ac­ curate bombing is tnereby rendered impossible.

M.A.L.47191-London-l' April 1942

Direct attack on heavy antiaircraft four-gun sites (have been) met (effectively at Tobruk) by pointing the

guns to all four quarters and maintaining rapid rate of

fire at 65 degrees quadrant elevation and at fuzes 2, 3, &

4. Incl .-BES-333-6 May 1942



IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

2)

v

Operational Practices (Enemy) (cont'^i) £

% V ^

S.

(At Tobruk) reconnaissances were nearly Always,

ried out by M.E. 110's at 25>000 ft. On one occasion

reconnaissance machine (Me:110) was shot down at 23,00(5^t.

InCl.-BES-333-6 May 1942

(In the North African desert a somewhat) new tech­ nique was developed in enemy air attack against our troops

and motor transport. Fighters approached the area in

loose "V" formation' at heights between 8000 and 12000 ft-.

If dropping bombs (about 40-100 lb), the attack was deliv­ ered with a moderate dive down to 3000 to 6000 ft, each

aircraft diving independently on the target area. When

machine gunning, which form of attack often followed the

bombing, the attacking aircraft circled the objective in

a wide sweep and .then, with a shallow dive 'and boost down

to between 3000 and 100 ft., delivered a short burst on

the target, quickly raising and jinking. The aircraft

having delivered its attack again joins the circus of cir­ cling fighters at 3000-4000 ft, height and returns to re­ peat the attack. Aircraft adopting this technique are dif­ ficult to engage with antiaircraft fire due to the speed

at which the attack is delivered, the continuous avoiding

action and the fact that they take advantage of dust storms.

The best way of meeting the problem lies in the training

of detachments, particularly in applying larger deflections

and ^in cultivating a rapidity of action and quick thinking

corresponding with the increased speed of the diving fighter

over the bomber.

M.A.L.48l65-London-2 June 1942

—-(in^North Africa)-— German airplanes in ground strafing

attacks paid particular attention to staff vehicles (Ford

station wagons) and trucks hauling water; In areas within

range of German light bombardment, British convoys moved

with 100-200 yards between vehicles, aa^jajf x — vehicles

carry troops there was One man detail^^.^ entry.

R. #BES-3 53-Washingfeg^ $JLy 1942

-161­

w TaCTJCS ;VND; -TECH:TIQUE

2) 'Operational Practices (Enemy) (cont'd)­ Captured Instructions for use of the German BZA-1 dive

bomb sight contain the following paragraph:

, "If a ..number (of) oives are carried out immediate­ ly following one another, the aircraft must not be climbed

in spirals after a dive and then dived again immediately,

as the gyroscope will be set incorrectly. 'Mist climbing

fly on long straight stretches or in a straight course for

five to ten minutes before the new dive, so that the gyro­ scope can recover itself. In the event of antiaircraft

fire, however, the pilot may curve immediately before the

dive. This curve should not, if possible, be continued for

more than five minutes," The necessity for this long

straight run between dives means th-1 the bomber must

either mak§ himself a good steady target for five to ten

minutes, or abandon hope of precision bombing after his

first dive. The BZA-1 sight has so far only been found

on the Junkers 88, but it is probably also used on the Ju.87,

M..i,L,47191-London-l April 1942

3)

Antitank



In selecting the firing position — - ( o f the German 88 mm


satisfied as far as possible,

(1) The 'vngle of impact should not be less than 60°.

(The loophole must be visible),

(2) The range should generally not exceed 1000 metres,

(3) There must be an adequate downward slope in the gun

lever. The wheels.nearer the enemy must be lower (The gun

lever varies from - 3° to - 15° from the horizontal of the

muzzle),

(4) It should be a concealed position as near to the tar­ get as possible. (More accurate fire). This is an aid in

achieving a maximum surprise effect when opening fire. The

field of fire must, wherever necessary, be prepared by saw­ ing through trees and branches. Careful note must be taken

of the height of the muzzle from the ground.

(5). The lanes of approach and withdrawal to and from the

assemble point must b e as firm, level and wide as possible,

- Inc 1, , R. 245 7-Cairo, Egypt-27 July 1941

-162­

-

••••-•­

IV - T:\CTICS :ND TECHNIQUE 3)

?

Antitank ( c o n t ' d ) ,



-

f*".. >

The attachment of antiaircraft unit^to the Field Hclce Oft*' t w in



the forefront of an advance in order to ptrfo^m theJaual

antitank and antiaircraft role is now an established fea­ ture of German policy. These tactics were very much in ev­ idence in the Battle of France, and have been developed

during subsequent campaigns. It was of interest to note

that approximately 40% of a recent consignment of 88 rim,

ammunition was antitank.

A . A, C, ;/319.13/aUC-13-23 August 1941

In the Russian Campaign, against - — strong armor­ ed forces, large air combat forces, and very numerous for­ tifications, the missions executed by the (German)—­ antiaircraft artillery in assisting and supporting the Army

have been especially important and difficult. Its main

missions consisted in combating aerial targets,

But the antiaircraft artillery has also been the insepar­ able companion of the points of the advancing columns. It

has not only given them the necessary artillery protection

against air raids and tank attacks, but has often quickly

attacked ancl destroyed by means 'of its direct fire, large

concrete dugouts &nd other obstacles, otrong concrete

dugouts have succumbed to it, (It was in Russia)

that German iintiaircraft artillery was first employed in

this manner. Thus an Arm which was at first assigned only

defensive missions, has been converted by means of suitable

training and experience into a unique weapon of attack.

C-5195-17 October 1941-German

Germans attack with their tanks closely supported by their

Mk, IV tanks with 7*5 mm, guns firing high explosives and

armor-piercing, and by 50 mm, antitank guns in positions

on the ground. The latter have proved effective against

British tanks at 2000 yards (type not stated). The attack

is also accompanied with 88 mm, guns which knocked out

British ;Infantry Tanks at 1500 yardsfc The .Germans tend

to hold off the heavier weapons andrhocJ^er armor until a

T1J^y—consistently

favorable opportunity arrivesf attacked in Middle East in the ev he^sun behind

them. In addition to the traditional

-163­

IV - T VCTICS AND TECHNIQUE

3)

Antitank (contldX-- ^ gf

amsi^i i t ,

i out ^of "the -sun, this has the added advantage of giving

\ 1ifieoi'^bhc battlefield Shitfing the night for recovery — - of

|J5I equipment .

M. A. R.45966-I,ondon-23 December 1941

From a captured German document entitled "Organization

uf Defense" — it appears that.the German builds his de­ fense about his basic weapon usually in 88 ram. antitank gun

if possible. He aoes not fit the weapons into a preconceiv­ ed defensive lay-out. To insure readiness for action liv­ ing quarters and fighting quarters are combined. Dummy

positions are (considered) essential, and mining

is all important.

M.A.R.2327-Cairo,Egypt-23 March 1942

From study of the German•"Tactical handbook for the

troop Commander"— used extensively by German junior offi­ cers ana from observation in Germany of its application

the following practices have become well established •

(1) The use of German antiaircraft materiel for antitank

purposes (in Poland, on the Western Front ana in Russia.)

(2) The use of light and medium antiaircraft automatic

cannons against machine-gun nests (in Russia).

(3) The use of antiaircraft searchlights for illumination

of hostile planes, hampering the orientation of hostile

plane crews, and for deception as to location of ground ob­ jectives.

(4) Use of antiaircraft guns for defense of artillery.

(5) Similarity between German and American methods for

attaining information of enemy air operations.

(6) Consistent with German doctrine, emphasis is placed

upon harmonious cooperation between antiaircraft units and

the arms of the army.

(7) — The altitudes (or slant ranges) of responsibility

for defense by the different antiaircraft weapons against

enemy aerial attack,.

Special Rpt.#6-Bad Hauheim, Germany-24 March 1942

-164­

IV - TaCTICS -.ND TECHNIQUE

3)

.antitank (cont'd)

A captured document gives the following instructions for

the operational employment of (the German 88 mm. anti­ aircraft gun) in an antitank role,

(1) The assembly point should not be more than 200 metres

(219 yards) from the gun position sclected,

(2) The gun position should be chosen in the light of the

following considerations:­ a) Angle of impa'ct should be between 30 degrees and nor­ mal.

b)' The range should not be more than 1,000 metres (1,100

yards).

c) The gun must be sited on a downward slope with the

wheels nearest the enemy loWer, (Arc of fire varies between

- 3 degrees and -}- 15 degrees from the horizontal).

d) It should be a concealed position as near to the tar­ get as possible. The field of fire must be prepared, where

necessary, by the removal of trees and branches.

e) The approaches to and .from the assembly point should

be as firm, level and broad as possible. Trees up to"5.9"

by the self propelled mounting. The jack arms must not be

let down till all narrow points on the road from assembly

point to gun position have been negotiated. Both in advance

and withdrawal the barrel and .shield must be pointed towards

the enemy,

(3) In firing the gun from the self-propelled and trail­ er mountings, the beet position for opening fire is with

the barrel parallel or at 45 degrees to the carriage. Re­ coil caused by firing at right angles to the carriage makes

the carriage sway. Care should, therefore, be taken to se­ lect as level an emplacement as possible. When firing at

this angle, the crew have to hold on. tightly to the carriage.

In the case of the trailer mounting, Nos, 1 and 2 of the

,gun crew have to be strapped on firmly.

Note by British Observer: The German regard the 8.8 cm.

antiaircraft gun as their most effective antitank weapon.

Little is known of trailer No. 201 except that it is on

four pneumatic tyred wheels, with twin tyres on the rear

wheels, and is fitted with a deep shield* There is no indi­ cation that it is possible to employ in its anti­ aircraft role, either on the self-pr .ng or

from the trailer," without removing the?

M.A.L.4719.1-Lo'

- -165­

IV - TACTICS AN£ Tffi&feQUE

(cu^-M)

* — This^epqrt forwards a study on the Development of

Germaft Defensive Fractice in Libya, It contains valuable

data. The German definition of defense is that: "The ob­ ject of the defense is to wear down an attack before a

counterattack, generally with armored troops" and it is

believed that so long as the defender thinks in terms of.

ability to ward off (attack) and then deal blows

there is no danger in a defensive role, nother ob­ servation is that in defensive warfare 60$ is with the

spade, 30$ with field glasses, only 10$ with the gun,

(However)— most important data contained in the study

is an account of 83 mm. antiaircraft guns used against

tanks. In June 1941 one battery Knocked out 92 armored

vehicles, of which 82 were tanks. The 88 mm. guns destroy­ ed 1 tank for each 20 shells fired, ^t another point four

88 mm. guns knocked out 14 tanks, 8 armored cars. 1.1 an­ other point four 88mm. guns were attacked by 70 tanks; 11

tanks were knocked out, the remainder forced to retire.

There are numerous other instances of extremely effective

work of the 88 mm. antiaircraft gun against tanks. Out

of 137 tank casualties in the 1st Army Tank Brigade 25/b

were from mines, 75$ were from guns. Until British learn

how to neutralize the 88 mm, antiaircraft gun they must

expect heavy tank casualties, • M.a.R•2481-Cairo,Egypt-3 May 1942

During the campaign in i oland and on the Western Front,

the 37 mm. gun was the principal German antitank weapon.

In Russia, the 50-mm, weapon is replacing the 37-mm. anti­ tank gun and 37-mm, gun in the Kark III tank, as rapidly

as material becomes available. Even the 50-mm. gun is not

• sufficiently effective against the largest Russian tanks,

therefore a more powerful weapon is needed. Large caliber

antiaircraft guns ar^^JJmfor this purpose. TP/hen the air

is relatively aircraft, the 88-mm. guns form

the backbone o f d e f e n s e . For this r,.. son,-the

German practifj^ ^"""ass^&iing an antiaircraft corps to a Pan­ zer army^<©je^V^s»feful purpose in giving great defensive

fire ^ow1|vvt||5^^&rong offensive force,

e^*i.I.S.,War Departm'ent-13 August 1942-13/AUW-5

h,

^

:

ivW*

-166­

IV - T .CTICS AND TECHNIQITE

: - 4 8 £% 1 i p i y r i 1* W

n

-i ? ' 3 i

* * I§

3) Antitank (cont'd)

The Red Army antiaircraft artillery has learned to com­ bat tanks as well as planes• Dual purpose antiaircraft guns

make good antitank guns because of their high muzzle, velo­ city, high cyclic rate of fire, and 360° traverse. "In the

first six months of the war Red .army antiaircraft artillery

fired in self defense at enemy tanks when they broke through

to the battery positions. Gradually the antiaircraft a.r­ tUlery'became an organic part of the antitank defensive

system. In numerous instances Soviet antiaircraft guns suc­ cessfully repulsed attacks of large German tank units. "The

antiaircraft units learned that most tactical operations

seem to eiviue themselves into two phases. In the first,

army artillery concentrates heavy fire on enemy tanks be­ fore they can jump off. It then lays down a screen of fire

to prevent the enemy tanks approaching our forward line of

defense and breaking up our infantry formations. this

time the antiaircraft units are busily engaged in repelling

the attacks of enemy aircraft, particularly dive bombers,

which attempt to open the way for. the tanks. "In the sec­ ond phase, after enemy tanks have broken into the initial

line of defense or deeper, the enemy aviation generally

shifts its attack to counter-attacking or reserve units. •

In this comparative lull antiaircraft guns fire at the Ger­ man tanks by direct laying: the more point blank the range,

the more effective the fire. "It is remembered, however,

that the prime function of .antiaircraft artillery is against

planes, but in areas where-there is insufficient antitank

artillery, antiaircraft guns must be employed to drive off

tanks which approach the battery positions or threaten to

break up the battle formations of our troops. "In order to

successfully combat enemy mechanized forces the antiair­ craft artillery must prepare its antitank defense in advance.

'•.Tien the guns go into position they must .be ready to open

fire against attacking tanks immediately. To establish such

a system it is necessary to:

(1) make a complete study of the surrounding terrain, par­ ticularly as regards possible tank approaches\

(2) determine the sector of fire for each gun, including

ranges to key reference points;

(3) build the minimum amount of field fortifications nec­ essary.

(4) establish special antitank observation points.

All antiaircraft personnel not working at .the guns during a

IV - T . C m | N M ! M Q ! i E

3)|l^titank ^oorit * d)

''

^

.­

tank attack take up positions in the vicinity and use hand

grenades, gasoline bottles, or armor-piercing bullets a­ gainst the enemy tanks."

Ii,A,R,2141-Kuibyshev-24 June 1942

Question: ire antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons

expected to perform anti-mechanized missions? If so, what

special equipment and training is provided? --'hat is the

3ritish doctrine in .reference to this subject?"

iinswer: The accepted principle is that antiaircraft guns

both heavy and light antiaircraft normally have a primary

antiaircraft r.ole. It is however recognized that they have

a secondary antitank role and that there may be occasions

on which they may be allotted a primary antitank role where

the tank threat warrants it, It is also an accepted prin­ ciple that any antiaircraft gun will fire upon any enemy

tank which is within 600 yards of the gun position. No

special equipment other than armor-piercing shot is issued

for antitank engagements; modifications are however made to

the sighting arrangements • Training in an antitank role

is given special attention and allotments are made to anti­ aircraft units on antitank ranges,

::.u.R*47482-Lonaon-20 *.pril 1942

From many experiences (in the African desert)

tj-iere can be no doubt as to the effectiveness of the 40-m/m

Bofors gun firing armour piercing ammunition against armour­ ed vehicles at ranges of 400 yards or less. The v-^lue of

the gun for thickening antitank defenses in rear of the main

antitank defense is recognized by column commanders and com­ manders of defensive-positions,. If there is a tendency to

consider this. role -of primary importance, then — - antiair­ craft Commanders must be jafl^rir^d to stress the importance

of the Antiaircraft rolrfiS^th- t the «un should nn all but

exceptional circumsi^^Bfb^^ted with this role in view.

Further e v i d e n c * the "'sO'uacmess of clipping armour pierc­ ing with h^n^xj^os.'iy^s* (for action against tanks has

siting a 40-mm gun for antitank de­

-168­

IV - ThCTICS,INDTECHNIQUE

3)

antitank (cont'd)

fense, it was found desirable, when^feTL possible, to keep

the gun concealed by a crest or piuf^^i^^a^way that the .

position could .not be observed by

$$$ within range of the guns, ,T here tnia im^Qf time and ground permits the personnel dust $ in trenches, if possible, and spring tft their • gun' as t M

tanks come into range, M

ill M.A,L.48l65-London-2 June 1942 *

The guns (of one light antiaircraft regiment) were

used in an antitank role on two occasions (in the Mi dole-

East) .

(1) ihen one section was given the task of covering the

withdrawal of Toeiforce In tiie Merd javoun Sector and

(2) "when one Troop was ordered, to provide primarily anti­ tank defense over a period of 48 hours during the auvance

on Damascus,

On both occasions the use of the guns in this role met with

considerable success. In (l) two medium tanks were engaged

with the solid antitank ammunition, and, the gun scoring

direct hits, disabled the tanks which were subsequently de­ stroyed, In (2) three tanks were engaged oh each of two oc­ casions a t about 1000 yards range and. driven 'off. In both

cases the counter fire of the tanks was ineffective. The

danger of regarding the light antiaircraft Bofors gun as a

dual purpose weapon tended to be overlooked,

Incl,-BES-333-6 May 1942

Question: Do the British believe that jay armor protection

is necessary for the crews of their antitank guns?

Answer: Yes, The British believe that antitank gun crews

must be protected from small arms fire. The 2-pdr, and 6­ pdr, antitank guns have such armor protection on the front

and flanks. The top edge of the armor plate of the 6-pdr,

gun is cut in a wavy patternJas. an aid in concealment. It

is not known at this date wl^^j type t^f prote^i ^n will.be

used on 'the finally acceptecP#e|.f--pro^l Ivf

M. ..A.454^7-10^0:^19 I^vs

-1.69­



• TACTICS AND TEC HI

ivntitank

* u;

Tha

that ^ t h Heavy .jitiair craft and Light jjrti aircraft

suited to engage ground targets (such as Armor­ 7g Vehicle's etc.) needs no elaboration. This pos­ role must however be viewed in* its true perspective

and antiaircraft guns should nn no account be considered as

dual purpose weapons, for the reasons that:

(1) Antiaircraft artillery is neither trained, equipped

not organized for a Field Vrtillery role (the 3.7-inch anti­ aircraft gun has no greater range than the 4.5-inch Field

gun),

(2) The siting of antiaircraft guns for employment in this

secondary role may compromise their siting for their primary

role of defense against air attack which may develop in a

matter of seconds.

M.A,R.436l7-London-15 July 1941

No one special unit should be charged with the laying of

antitank mines, but all troops of the combat arms and appro­ priate services should be thoroughly trained in this phase

of antitank aefense. There shuuld be an organic supply of

mines in each unit,

C-5195-Grerman-17 October 1941

after a tank is stopped by gun fire another hit should be

obtained to insure disabling the crew. Many crews of disa­ bled tanks in France captured antitank guns.

Final report on Temporary Duty in England as an .uatitank

Observer.- Received G-2: 22 October 1941.

Question: Is any development taking place.in Great Britain

on a light, his^lfprale-velocity antitank rifle for issue

to Infantry^/&%^%2%" and Coast Artillery for locaJ: se­ curity? - V ^ / V v ­ naw

i^./^tfelopment of this kind is taking place. The

gun will be dual purpose,

M.A.R;45457~London-18 November 1941

-170­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

3)

Antitank (cont'd)

^_

rSmwEr soi- |

: attack wherp

I O w ­ J

*

Answer': Yes. It is the consensus of all observers in the

antitank group that the British have succeeded in indoctri­ nating soldiers with the feeling that tank attacks can be

stopped. This has been accomplished by explaining the "net"

defensive system to every individual soldier. Each one's

part in the coordinated defense is understood - for instance

the front line infantryman understands that he is to dig

himself in; remain as inconspicuous as possible; take a lim­ ited toll of individual tanks with antitank rifles, grenades

etc., as these targets of opportunity present themselves;

and remain in position to fight the accompanying .enemy in­ fantry, Each antitank gunner realizes the part his gun is

to play, where the other guns are located, how they are coor

dinated and has confid.ence that his gun will destroy tanks,

The taxtical knowledge of junior officers and non-commission

ed officers of small units, is superior. The intensive,

realistic training undergone by each unit, without regard

to ordinary peace-time safety precautions, has had a great

deal to do in building the confidence of the officers and

men in the capabilities of their weapons. The British of­ ficer and soldier has — — the "will to fight" and has con­ fidence that he can repel any attack which may be launched

against him in the modern mechanical way.

M,A,R.45457-TLondon-19 November 1941

The War .Office has instructed Army Commanders at home and

overseas'to change the point of aim for antitank ana other

field guns firing against tanks to the centre of visible

mass (both for elevation and for linej , This conforms

to Royal Armoured Corps practice,

M. ,.Rt4b852-London-6 March 1942

In the engagement of ground targets in Libya by antiaircraft

units it was stressed at all times.that'air tar

has priority but that gun position officers

powers of .decision to cease fire if engaging gr

and revert to Priority Role.

M . A . R . ^ R ^ L

Single^shot, using armor piercing, is extremely effective

when tanks, are attacking singly and provided fire is held

until they are within range (500 yards). Similarly, it is

very effective if tanks, moving in line, can be engaged

from a flank. On the other hand, wheretanks are attacking

in a mass (and head on) rapid fire with high explosive proves

the greatest deterrent and, in many cases, (will divert the

attack)

appendix "C " -M. A. R.47438-Lon< i . o n - 1 7 .-prii 1942

Ouestion:

Is dust a serious handicap to antitank shooting?"

Answer: Yes, It is important not to get the first round'

minus unless a r^und is fired \dth the object of screening

the target,

M. A. R.48227-London-4 June'1942

There were many occasions (in the operations in Libya in

November-January 1942) on which, owing to breaks through

and counter attacks by enemy armored fighting vehicles, an­ tiaircraft units were used in their secondary role of anti­ tank, There were, however, no occasions on which antiair­ craft were deliberately pulled out of their antiaircraft

role for use against tanks. On several occasions heavy an­ tiaircraft was used wit a. success in a Field ^irtillery role

against an enemy aerodrome in harassing fire an*, counter

battery, In engagement against tanks the following points

in connection with light antiaircraft are of interest:­ (1) a useful rule of thumb measure for deciding priorities

of antiaircraft and antitank roles for light antiaircraft

was found to be. thus,:

. t Antiaircraft ijatitank

Light antiaircraft^ witra Divisions 50$ $0%

* Forward Army 15% 25%

# —-yfth Rear ^rrny 90$ 10%

(2) The i^'ort^n$e of holding light anti aircraft fire

against Ge-^afr^^y.'fll and Mark IV tanks until they were

within e. At ranges of. ..over 1,000 yards armor

pierc" 'from Bofors failed, to pierce, and. were seen

on on to bounce off the front of the tank. On the

tanks engaged within 500 yards- were penetrated

-172­

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

3)

Ant it ank (c ont'd)

by armor piercing shell, even in the turret,

(3) Alternate armor piercing and high explosive were used

and found to give excellent results,. Tracer of the High Ex­ plosive was found to give confidence to our own Infantry and

to shake the determination of the enemy tank crews, Dur­ ing the enemy preparations for attack it was essential that

Bofors guns should remain silent, and should be protected by

gun pits', slit trenches or Sangers. The Bofors is a very

conspicuous weapon, and its protection offers considerable

difficulty. It is again stressed that a shield- to give

protection against small arms fire would, be of the greatest

benefit.

BES-333-6 Kay 1942

4)

Lessons and Trends

During lulls it is best not to leave a shell in a hot gun,

A shell may exude TNT and also get stuck in the bore, pos­ sibly causing damage when the gun is again fired. This is

now a British Fleet general order,

American Legation-Cairo,Egypt-18 October 1940

In thirteen weeks (during the autumn of 1940) the

British Antiaircraft gunners destroyed 357 bombers and

fighters, The greatest altitude,, of record, from which

a plane was shot down was a Messerschmitt 109 fighter,

at something over 26,000 feet, approximately twice as many

bombers as fighters have been destroyed by antiaircraft

fire. In addition to verified destructions there were

many aircraft "winged". This is proved.by the number

of bodies of German airmen and wreckage of aircraft washed

ashore'on the English coast. Examination showed that

many of them were victims of antiaircraft fire. In addition

to breaking up enemy aircraft formations and keeping them

above precision range antiaircraft fire has prdven of tre­ mendous value to•British fighter pilots in pointing out to

them the position .and direction of enemy planes which

would not otherwise (have been) located by tj^e

.. R.41810-Lond op­

* -173­

f\



IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

-OF

4)

Lessons ar^T^rids (coi^t'i)

Pb%d aerial target is obviously the best

% x o u n d for training with live ammunition. It

swever, the very serious fault of giving.an entirely

^false impression of the very quick mental reaction and light­ ning physical action which has to take pla.ce in the snap

engagement of enemy aircraft travelling at some 300 m.p.h.

in and out of low clouds. Brigacier Revell-Smith stated

it was of the utmost importance to counteract this false

lesson of the sleeve.

M. .ft. 43393~London-24 June 1941'

Aerodromes being enemy ma.in objectives must be organized for

all round defense (including Fill Boxes) specially as para­ chutists may drop behind defenses. Defenses including ar­ tillery must be in depth. irtillery in sites with cover

have proved more useful than those in open with all round

field of fire, all ranks of all arms must be armed with

rifles ana bayonets and high proportion of tommy guns to

protect themselves xnd in the case of artillery, their guns,

By day it should be easy to deal with parachutists but it

must be remembered that parachutists may land at night and

secure an aerodrome. Main problem is tc deal with enemy

air borne troops ana as it is impossible to be strong every­ where there must be strong mobile reserves centrally placed

preferably with tanks. Defense must be offensive. Immedi­ ate action by mobile reserves are essential to prevent

enemy settling down, and in order to secure quick action

good system of intercommunication is vital. Delay 'may al­ low enemy air to prevent movement. During bombing phase

antiaircraft and light machine guns should remain silent

unless required to protect own aircraft on ground, iuatiair­ craft layout should incluae dummy antiaircraft guns rind al­ ternative positions. Fositions of antiaircraft guns should

be continually changed. Arrangements must be made quickly

to render ae^ouromes liable to attack temporarily unfit for

landing. Equally important to quick ..action of mobile reserve

is position of fighter airc^f^teupport, the existence of

which might prevent any^ir^b^rWllancling from succeeding, or

at least reduce eneriy, effort l|^£guing are interim lessons

which may be n^d^ie-d as result of views of special inter­ service:|ire^iijkt^ operations,

%

k k

Ministry-14'June 1941-OCCA 319.131/OG

B,A.C. Technical Services memorandum No,8

-174­

IV - TACTICS . iJD TECHNIQUE

4)

Lessons and Trends (cont'd)

Dive bombers invariably machine gun as they dive and ammu­ nition in the pits has frequently been hit. To prevent

charges being ignited either by .incendiary bullets piercing

the case or by the primers being struck rounds should be

placed unuer cover in the pits. If rounds are placed with

the fuzes facing in to the centre of the pit casualties to

the etachment are avoided as, if the charges are ignited

the cartridge cases do.not blow off the shells am6ng the

detachment.

Command lost irotection should be the(height of eyepieces

of the predictor and height finder. 1 "alls if of sandbags

must be 5-feet thick or if of drums filled with stones, 2

drums thick at the bottom and. one at the top. — - All walls

of pits should- be as close to the as is practicable to

avoid unnecessary casualties from machine gun fire. Pre­ dictor cables should be covered" with sandbags or ammunition

boxes filled with stones.

M. .R.43S45-Loncon-30 July 1941

The German armed Forces organize task forces or teams to

accomplish assigned missions, .:lien a leader is assigned a

mission and has betn given the means to accomplish it, he

can use the means to accomplish his mission. There­ fore, we see -»—• antiaircraft guns performing infantry weap­ on, artillery and antitank assignments, antiaircraft mate­ riel is very effective with the field forces because of

its mobility, the short time required for. it to go into ac­ tion, the accuracy ana high rate of its fire, its high muz­ zle velocity, and its general all-round adaptability. There

is a trend toward the use of antiaircraft artillery as the

direct sup ort artillery in the German army, Antiaircraft

fire "Control methods are being, extended to other types of

artillery. From the results which the Germans claim

for the anti-drcr ft artillery assigned' to their Field

Forces, following are, the deduced missions:

(1) Antiaircraft defense

(2) antitank missions

(3) Counterbattery

,ir IV - T.£TIC£

TSCHNIQTJB*

*

trends ^(cont'd)

*ning the detection of unexplodcd bombs, it is important

To secure prompt and accurate reports of the bombs and other

missiles which do not explode. Bombs which do not explode

may be genuine duds or may be fitted with delayed action fuses

A bomb v/hich explodes \ hen it falls may or may not pene­ trate the ground. A' delayed action or a dud bomb is almost

certain to do so, The diameter of the entry hole will

vary according to the size of the bomb. Its shape Is roughly

circular, subject on soft ground, to the effects of "splash"

as is described below. Thus a 100-lb, bomb normally has an

entry hole of between 8 in, and 12 in. in diameter, a 500-lb,

bomb a hole between 12 in, and 18 in, in diameter, a 1,000 .

lb, a hole exceeding 28 in, in diameter measured below any

surface orator effect. Depth of penetration. The depth

to which a bomb penetrates varies considerably according to

(a), the height from which it is dropped, (b) whether the

bomb strikes any objects before ^entering the ground, and. (c)

the nature of.the surface and the subsoil. Depths of pene­ tration are in ascending order in the following grounds:

rock, gravel, compact sand, shingle, chalk, dry clay, wet

clay. The heavier the bomb the deeper it penetrates. For

example, a 2,000-lb. bomb in wet clay went 40 feet deep.

path of a bomb in the ground. The path also varies con­ siderably according to the surface and subsoil. The hole

made by the bamb usually starts slanting away from the ver*

tical,and continues straight for some distance. In some

cases it "jinks" sideways so that the bomb may finally come

to rest some feet from a line drawn vertically through the

entry hole. Shells fired by our antiaircraft guns sometimes

fail to explode, and, if they penetrate the ground, make

holes of le'ss that six inches in diameter. There is no dan­ ger if the shells are allowed to remain untouched. Antiair­ craft shells coming to rest on the surface are similarly

harmless unless tampered with, and suitable precautions

should be taken, e.g., bv^ft^veririg them with sandbags, to

prevent unauthorized ii^rerference..

^fe~300-Washington, D.C.-27 October 1941

*

r •The Director Antiaircraft has stated that — — a good

warning sys%?mbenefits all forms of antiaircraft Defense,

by cut-y^k down tension and allowing a minimum number of

men J^^gl Kept permanently on watch. In the field, a lower

of warning) 'must be accepted as the distri­

-176­

IV - ThCTICS,INDTECHNIQUE

A) '

v

Lessons and'Trends (ccnt'd) " i mi?,

' I . \ h p :, i f,1

bution of warning information,.was not as easy as ini>the

ic defense system, Radio-Location was taking'the' place of

the old system of many visual observer posts. Development

was - going on in obtaining range, bearing and angle of eleva­ tion with greater accuracy. In the field two conditions

existed' ­ (1) Fluid condition in front, where Corps and Divisions

were concerned with providing antiaircraft defense for the

army on the move.

(2) More permanent condition further back, at bases and

on lines of communication where a co-ordinated system of

antiaircraft defense coula be established.

The command in the field of the main bulk of the antiair­ craft artillery should be centralized under an antiair­ craft Commander (assisting the field commander) .

Defense of units on the march from .surprise low-flying

attack with cannon and machine gun is a formidable problem.

If no warning system exists, light antiaircraft guns (Bofors)

cannot be deployed in time irom the column. An inter­ mediate weapon between the .303 and the 40 mm. is. required,

and the 20 mm, Oerlikon was being developed for this purpose,

but would not be available during the summer 1942. (Note:

The British do not use the .50 .caliber antiaircraft machine

gun) .

M,A.R.45S40-London-13 December 1941

(The following is quoted from a German Army Corps order)

' claimed to have been captured by the Russians . "Dur­ ing the past two months it has been found necessary to use

heavy bombers with planes of comparatively low speed and •

maneuverability in coordination with attacking ground troops.

It has been found that our loss of planes from small arms

ground fire has been exceptional high, The reas$>n,

lies in the well organized Soviet antiaircraft fire. Our

aviation units have made the following observations:

Soviet ground units attacked b y our aviation

open fire on our p3_anes with rifles and other infantry weap­ ons, The probability of hits on'a- small target from fire

widely distributed on the"ground is very great.

"(2) Upon being attacked, Soviet cavalrymen dismount

fire from a standing position with their rifles

the saddles. The infantry men lie on thfeir bat

Ik 1 6 V* ® I

IV - TACT:

Trends (cont'd)

3) Mortar fire is also used* I do not point this out

as an example to be followed bub to point out that the Soviets

use all weapons ,found with ground troops to' fire on aircraft.

"(4) The Soviets place, light and medium antiaircraft ar~

tillery transported on sleds, at the head of the columns.

"(5) Four barreled machine guns which are well camou­ flaged are brought into action suddenly. They are often

used to protect advanced headquarters and airdromes,

it Our units must be able to combat enemy pianos with

all types of small arms in a similar manner. That this is

possible can be seen from an incident which took place on

January 24, 1942 with the 24th Tank Corps, when a Soviet

plane was knocked down with an automatic pistol. In connec­ tion with this , our leading units should be clearly marked

with signal panels. Poor marking of our own lines might

be harmful to our planes. Bombers must not fly low over

their targets; otherwise they will be subjected to a concent

trated fire."

For the Corps Commander

/s/ FIEBIG

Chief of 'Staff Gutner"

M.A.R.2049-Kuibyshe v-21 March 1942

The enemy will always be seeking to find the weak spots in

the antiaircraft defenses, and therefore all ingenuity pos­ sible is needed to keep him guessing. Here are some of the

ways in which surprise was developed at Tobruk from obser­ vation of German bombing methods and by intelligent antici­ pation :­ (1) Changing methods of fire control — Various types of

barrages were improvised to deal with various types of at­ tack, e.g., a special arrangement with searchlights counter­ ed, aircraft attemptingf^t^mine the harbour by night. As

soon as the enemy ap^parap^o be able to locate the edge of

a barrage, it was*%l*t <>r ecnr

(2) Frequent Waltera^^on of lay-out — This creates sur­ prise by thp "reach" depth, and disposition of the

defense;,Ai^y,so pl&ys on the enemy's nerves by keeping him

guessijig^her^Jtfie guns will be next time.

[ar'ia'feLon of the density.of fire — From silence to

leJ^^fexvity to mislead attacking aircraft.

-178­

I? - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

4)

— Lessons and Trends (cont'd)

» - |i kk* Jk

_



(4) Use of alternative positions and camouflage

The antiaircraft gun by the nature of its role is extrel

ly liable to attract attention to itself, with serious- con­ sequence. The bomber will tend to attack previously known

gun positions and any fresh ones it.can locate. Deception

by the antiaircraft defense is, therefore, very important,

though it is not easy to practice it. The following expedi­ ents were adopted at Tobruk apart from those enumerated

above:­ (1) Pxtensive use was made, of dummy gun positions; these

were provided with portable dunmy equipment and "smoke and

flash" apparatus. These positions w. re also used in con­ junction with the alternative positions. When properly in­ stalled, these portable dummies may deceive even photo­ graphic reconnaissance, and they can be readily adapted to

any nature of country. A stuka pilot attacks what he sees,

and if he sees a dust cloud with flashes coming out of it

he often takes it for an antiaircraft position. In August,

40 Ju. 87s. and 88s attacked five heavy antiaircraft gun

sites; but, as three of the heavy antiaircraft sites were

dummies, and tho other two defended themselves with only

half their guns, the harbour barrage suffered little..

(2) Normal camouflage methods, that is,-painting, fitting

into the existing ground plan, or simulation of other ob­ jects.

(3) Appointment of special officers to organize the car •

mouflageparticularly of new sites,

(4) Study of survival — Many examples occured of 30

or 40 bomb craters within 100 yards of the gun position.

All guns pits were therefore counter-sunk to give maximum

protection, and constructed or strengthed to stand up to

1,000 lb. bombs within 10 yards of them, '."here this work

was skimped, casualties increased.

Army Training Memorandum No, 43 .

Anything moving is easy to see, as a pilot is constantly

looking for moving objects — . Anything stationary is

comparatively difficult to distinguish, Many good camou­ flaged position;? are given away by mgr^lookirig_up. The

white of the skin is easily seen if

for anything concealed.

Air Forces General Information Bulletin No.3-12 August' 1942

-179­

IV - TACTICS AND TE 3H

4)

Lessons

ja^cbnt1 d)

3«£$Ch Unrot^&d Projectile Rocket Projectors are inaccu­ chances of hitting with high explosives are

s m & y ^ The heavy gun is always infinitely the hetter weap­ on. Deterrent effect of the 3-inch Unrotated Projectile

Rocket is great, however, and they are extremely useful

for boosting up defenses especially when barrage is neces­ sary. The new type "K" of ammunition appears to be a pos­ sible solution to the saturation raid.

M.A.R.48431-London-16 June 1942

The British fire prepared to resort to a form of barrage

fire at definite points (and Not areas) in case their gun

layer tube becomes so cluttered up that it will be impos­ sible to obtain data on any particular aircraft in a "sat­ uration" or "mass" raid. The data is worked out purely

from the map, the range tables and estimated heights based

on the best information available. If, at any time, a gun

layer can get a target on which it can do continuous follow­ ing, that site will automatically engage, that target as

opposed to joining in the barrage.

M.A.R.48420-London-15 June 1942

Some of the apparent trends for the 40 mm. antiaircraft gun

are :­ (1) The "Stiffkey" Stick (a mechanical sight corrector)

is in production. — —

(2) The self-propelled antiaircraft mounts will be used

for antitank role as well . The United States practice

of using telescope will be followed.

(3). No predictors will be used in Division Artillery of

Home Forces,

(4) The predictors may be eliminated from use with all

self-propelled mounts due tdJ^Uieir causing an increased length

of time to go into action*

,-vA*. .R.4870S-London-3 July 1942

Japanese a»ti:

f^nel bombs

-180­

(in Rangoon)

(the 50 lb.

IV - TACTICS AMD TECHNIQUE 4)

J ,p • Jf Lessons and Trends (cont'd:]

<
^ ^ I P f f

*

type) were devastating in their effect upon people in

the open, but practically instantaneous, and upon detonat­ ing, the bombs sent a flat come of splinters from knee height

to chest height for 50 to 60 yards with deadly effect. Some

splinters took higher trajectory and were lethal to distances

as great as 300 yards. In one location, where many slit

trenches had been provided, frightened (civilians)

fled from the trenches where they had been safe, and as a

result, suffered frightful casualtiese — ­ Informational Intelligence Summary No.19

. April 27, 1942 - A.A.C.#319.13/AUH-19

It has been shown by Professor Blackett, and the results

of trials have supported his theory, that high velocity auto­ matic light antiaircraft guns firing a percussion fuze at

120 rounds per minute should be several times more effective

against aircraft at heights of 10,000 to 16,000 ft. than

3.7" guns firing a time fuze at 12 rounds per minute. The

self-destroying time of existing 40 mm. ammunition, which

is designed only for use against low flying targets, is 5

to 6 seconds. To enable the 40 mm. gun to be used in an

intermediate role for lethal effect against targets up to

10,000 or 12,,000 ft,, with visual control by day and search­ light control (Elsie) by night, and for deterrent effect

against targets up to 16,000 ft. by night, ammunition with

bright tracer burning for 12 seconds is under design. The

Germans make extensive use of Light Antiaircraft guns fir­ ing bright tracer for deterrent effect against targets up

to 13,000 to 14,000 ft. by night, but it is considered

doubtful whether they have developed the use .of Light Anti­ aircraft guns fired in an intermediate role for lethal ef­ fect.

'

:.•

A. A. C. #319.13/AUC-33 J anuary 1942

In rocky country, where pickets cannot be driven in, pre­ dictor control— of the Bofors guns has not be eg

V 1 i?*

«* n *

-181­

IV - TACTICS AND TEC

4

%

W Jkd trends \(conttJ3)

l e — - as'the gun mounting is apt to "slew" during firing,

thus' putting the predictor out of line with the gun.

Incl.-BES-333-6 May 1942

When (light antiaircraft) guns have been sited on dusty

or sandy ground it has been found impossible to lay stead­ ily or accurately on targets at automatic fire due to the

continuous cloud of dust or sand obscuring the view.

Incl.-3ES-333-6 May 1942

A large number of misfires occurred in Middle East which are

believed to have been largely due to faulty primers, other

possible sources of error having been eliminated as far as

possible. There were cases of misfires being due to feed

cylinders becoming tight caused by sand, and one case of a

broken pin securing firing hole bush. By actuating the fir­ ing mechanism with a forward movement of the loading lever,

it has usually (not always) been found that the round will

fire the second time. This procedure not only saves the

delay in following the drill book misfire procedure, but

enables the gun to continue to engage the target. It is

recommended that this should be introduced into the drill

book as the first action to be tak^n on "misfire".

Incl.-BES~333-6 May 1942

The predictor No. 3 is an admirable instrument in hands

of a well trained detachment but takes a considerable time

to establish a reputation for efficiency. If issued to

partially trained troops they may lose confidence in it and

revert to the Forward Area Sight.

Inc1.-BES-333-6 May 1942

At Munster (29 Januar craft were unable they were not e

A

y of the attacking air­ get owing to cloud and

5r searchlights. A single

IV - TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

4)

Lessons and Trends (cont'd)

aircraft, arriving over the area about one hour after the

main body, was immediately heavily engaged and was able to

drop bombs in the centre of the gun defended area as indi­ cated by gun flashes*

Hq Ji.A,Command"Glenthorn",3tanmore,Middx.

28 February 1942-A. A. C.#319.131/ANX

The Chief Instructor for antiaircraft artillery at Malta

has stated:-— "T,vhen a fort is receiving heavy and contin­ uous air attacks, in order to keep a foui' gun heavy anti­ aircraft battery in action one needs an extra gun detach­ ment and a second complete command post, officers and all".

M. A • R,23-Gibraltar-12 May 1942

B I B I

I O G R A P H Y

(l) Antiaircraft Command (Air Defenses of Great Britain)

Standing Operation Instructions.

a) No. 3 - Procedure to be used in operations rooms.

b) No. 4 - Measurement of Cloud Base,

c) No. 5 - Survey of Heavy Antiaircraft Gun Sites.

d) No. ? - Engagement of Unseen Targets.

e) No.13 - Issue and Security of Aircraft Recognition

Signals

f) No.20 - Engagement of Targets by Z.A.A, (Rocket) Bat

teries,

g) No.21 - (Appendix J) Zone Concentrations using man­ ual1 plotting board or semi-automatic plotter,

h) No.22 - Supply of meteorological reporvts to antiair­ craft gun sites ,< - " • '

i) No.30 - Manning and state of readiness of light an­ tiaircraft guns.

j)

No.31 - Ammunition,

k) No,33 l) No,36 m) No.38 Stations'.

n) No.41 o) 'No.45

- Royal Air Firce Night Operations.

- Engagement of Seen Targets,

- Action on receipt of 'Stand to' and 'Action

- Ground Defense

- -antiaircraft Cooperation with^-­ ft

IV - TACTICS AND TECHN:

- Operational Command

-^'Ko. 52 - States of Readiness

r) No. 54 - Gun Operations Rooms

s) No. 55 - Fighter Nights

A,A.C•319•131/VG

(2) Engagement'of Unseen Targets.

Incl.#1-AAC. 319.131/APE

(3) British Close Support Bombing Directive.

M.I.D,-/ATX-19 June 1941

(4) Antiaircraft Artillery Emplacements, Layouts and Com­ mand Posts - Drawings,

M.A.R.456l8-I,ondon-3 December 1941

(5v) The German Motorized army - translation of a confiden­ tial French general staff study (Vichy),

M.a.R.25360-W-Vichy-3 April 1942-132/BV

(6) 48th Antiaircraft Brigade Standing Orders (Air De*»

fenses Great Britain).

M.A.R.48081-London-30 April 1942

(7) Manuals of Antiaircraft Defense (British) - Pmploy­ ment and Gunnery.

November 1941-13l/XU

(8) 48th Antiaircraft Brigade Operation Instructions

(Fighting Book Instructions).

M.A.R.48264-ijondon-6 June 1942

(9) Organization of Gun Defended Areas for Fire Against

Unseen Targets, '

Incl.6-M.A,L.46140-131/VG

V - TRAINING

l)

Schools and Courses

Great Britain because of its small size, has a great advar

tage compared with our army schools. (Officers) :

short courses may be given without an officer's losing more

than two days in travel plus the time actually spent with a

course, The general theory (of officers courses)

requires that students be potential instructors, and that prior

to attending the school they be well acquainted with their

train him to

own and their juniors! duties. The schools master his own job better and to bccome a better teacher for

those junior to him. The majority of courses are short and

intense, normally lasting for periods of two or three weeks.

Hence the courses do not cripple combat organizations, after

short courses officers return to their original units and

duty.

M.A.R.46395-London-29 January 1942

The Commandant of the Royal Artillery School, Larkhill, has

a great influence on the technical training of units, through­ out Great Britain • This he accomplishes by means of semi­ annual conferences attended by all senior artillerymen,

by the teachings of the school, by training pamphlets, and

perhaps most important by Instructors of Gunnery. The

Corps of Instr ctors of gunnery is a pool under the control

of the Commandant, School of artillery. In addition to

those instructors employed on the School staff, others are

detailed as instructors at practice camps and with'units.

The Instructors are rotated on these duties to insure that

current thought and procedure is spread throughout the ser­ vice, The term "I,G." (Instructor of Gunnery) is

greatly respected throughout•the British Army; qualified

instructors have the letters "I.G," printed after their

names in the Army List, ana senior commanders are proud of

the "I.G." after their names. The School also instructs a

group of senior enlisted men in a Gunnery Staff Course, and

those selected from this course become Assistant Instruc­ tors of Gunnery. This "A*I,G,", as the name implies, assists

the Instructors of Gunnery in the^classroom and in the field.

In general, the "A.I.G." is thfe .eip|]@
ance *.nd service of the piece Jf flES^

V I V O L

-185­

ichools and Courses (cont'd)

men and giving them high non-commissioned ratings, they procure

personnel who make excellent instructors for officer and non­ commissioned classes for units, and at the same time a very val­ uable assistant to the Instructor.

M.A.R.46395-London-29 January 1942

An assembly of all commanders of Army, Corps and Divisional

Artillery is held at the School of -.rtillery, Larkhill, twice

each year. At this confercnce a kind of critique of the past

six months' effort is conducted, policies and plans for the

future arc outlined. New developments in equipment are demon­ strated. ^nd proposals for changes in equipment and technique

are discussed.

M.A.R,45840-London-13 December 1941

Due to the recent addition of a Light anti-aircraft regiment

to each Division it has been considered essential to institute

courses for Regimental Commanders'and Staff Officers of these

Regiments, to teach their tactical handling. The course will

be conducted at the School of Royal Artillery, Larkhill.

i,uA.R.43005-London-l6 May 1941

The following new courses have just been established - —

at. the school of Royal Artillery, Larkhill, for training

of Officers of both Artillery and Infantry in the handling of

light antiaircraft units being assigned to tactical organi­ zations of the Field Army.

(l) For Antiaircraft Officers.

Regimental commanders and battery commanders of light anti­ aircraft regiments of the Royal Artillery (40 mm Bofors) ear­ marked for employment with divisions of the Field Army will

attend course of two-weeks •'du&aki.on covering the general pic­ ture of organization, adminltstA t ion and handling of forma­ tion of the Field Army and i o ^ employment of the light anti­ , aircraft regiments in the .deferent phases of battle; size

of class 20 officers. *

Antiaircraft

-186­

V - TRAINING

l)

Schools and Courses (cont'd)

Regimental Commanders of Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments, anc

Commanders and Staff of divisions and brigades will attend

courses together at Larkhill covering the handling of Light

Anti-Aircraft Artillery from the point of view of divisions

and brigades. This is a short course of four days, 18 offi­ cers per class, 12 light antiaircraft regimental commanders

and 6 brigade or division commanders or staff officers of

formations to which some of the antiaircraft officers belong,

}H,A•R•42798-Londo n-18 April 1941

A course was attended at the School of Artillery, Larkhill,

from July 7 to 11 inclusive, for Regimental Commanders of

Light Antiaircraft Regiments, Royal Artillery, and Comman­ ders and Staffs of Formations to which they belong. Its

purpose was to teach the handling of Light antiaircraft

Artillery from the point of view of Divisions and Brigades,

It is designed for 20 officers and is intended to give offi­ cers a general picture of the organization, administration,

and handling of formations of field army and to show how

Light .intiaircraft Regiments should be employed during dif­ ferent phases of battle. The course was conducted by lec­ tures, demonstrations, problems, and discussions. The class

was divided into six syndicates (groups of four members ex­ cept one of five) representing the Formations or Divisions

to which the units and staffs were assigned for the solution

of problems and presentation of views. The conduct of the

course was excellent,

' M,AiR.43660-London-17 July 1941

At the final session of the Larkhill course for iintiaircraft

Regimental Commanders, etc., one of the Directing Staff very

ably summed up the conclusions arrived at during the course.

I.hen he finished, criticism, comment and suggestions were

called for. The class concurred in his summary — which

was an accurate presentation of the composite, in fact prac­ tically unanimous, conclusions of the Staff and students as

I had noted them throughout the course, • ^

M... R.43269-London-16 Jnn«f: 1941-*;,

-187­

JBELJSSEL.

V - TRAINING

\

w



JchpolC^an^ Qpura|'|^UIt1 d)

,, ,,.. „ry sre
'taken out of the War office ana placed under a Major

General with headquarters at Windsor, This headquarters

(Antiaircraft training establishments - AATE) has a complete

training staff including several officers of the Auxiliary-

Territorial Service (women), which service is now to fur­ nish part of the personnel to man the antiaircraft defenses

of Great Britain, This headquarters has no administrative

or operational functions. Under this headquarters comes

the School for antiaircraft defense commanded by a Briga­ dier with headquarters at Shrivenhara, This school consists

of three separate units or wings, Gunnery, Searchlight and

Wireless, The Officer Candidates Training Units for Anti­ aircraft, commanded by a Brigadier with headquarters at

Shrivenham, comes under Antiaircraft training establishments,

M.A,R.A4205-London-25 August 1941

The School for Antiaircraft Defense with headquarters at

Shrivenham is commanded by a Brigadier ana consists of

three schools or wings. Each wing has a commandant and a

senior instructor of gunnery. The Gunnery Wing at kanoroier

on the south Wales coast, handles all instruction of both

light and heavy Antiaircraft guns with some instruction in

use of Giln Layer and Unrotated Projectiles (Rockets). The

Searchlight Vang is located at Shrivenham and handles all

instruction on searchlights and searchlight control. The

operational side of Visual Indicating Equipment and Radio

Searchlight Control Equipment . (Elsie)-— is also taught.

The wireless Wing is located at Watchet and teaches the

technical side of all Antiaircraft radio detection equipment.

The courses at the Gunnery Wing in general fall into two

groups:

(1) War .Gunnery courses of approximately three months

including the 3.7 inch gun, Sperry Predictor and height-

finding, 3 inch and 4.5 inch guns, Vickers Predictor, Light

Antiaircraft gunnery and equipment and General Subjects

such as Tactics, Unrotated Projectiles, Target practice

firing, etc. One week's leave. is»gr%rted in the middle of

v \% rel="nofollow">

the course, t (2) Refresher courses -on spedl^wsftjects given to all

ranks as the occasiprjf&emand§. *lhese courses are usually

T.

i\;

"

-188­

•V - TRAINING

l)

Schools and Courses (cont'd)

of two or three weeks' duration and are intended primarily

to bring officers up to date on latest methods and equip­ ment so they can act as unit instructors when they return

to their organizations.

M.A•R.44125-London-20 August 1941

In order to reduce the large number of officers found un­ suitable for training when examined at the School

of Antiaircraft Defense, Wireless Wing, Ratchet, a pro­ cedure has been prescribed for the pre-selection — of

officers for training as Instructors Fire Control. Officers

on prepared lists are interviewed at suitable cen­ ters by qualified instructors fire control under ar­ rangements made — - with Field Commanders. Inter­ viewing officers select candidates in accordance with the

following instructions:

(1) Candidates should not be of higher rank than Captain.

(2) They should (except in very exceptional circumstances

as to suitability) be not older than 35 years of age.

(3) They should, if possible, have a sound working know­ ledge of electricity and magnetism, mathematics and elements

of trigonometry. A knowledge of radio is desirable but not

absolutely essential.

Interviewing officers report on candidates to Commands

.classifying them into four - — categories:

(l) Those with sufficient up-to-date knowledge to pass

an immediate examination in the — — (subject listed in

a syllabus) and to undertake an immediate War Special

Wireless Course.

.(2) Those fit to undertake "A" after a period of pri­ vate study of one month.

(3) Those considered likely to be suitable to undertake

"A" after basic courses in not more than two (subjects)

•(4) Those unsuitable,

k.A.R.4676l-London-27 February 1942

The —The all

headquarters of the Antiaircraft officer Cadet Training

School is located-at a regular army post near •

cadets are housed in permanent modern barracks (with

modern conveniences) . The school is commanded by a

V - TRAILING

l)

i Schools -and courses&(cont'd)

Brigadier who Jiafc a complete administrative staff* Each

V - ;]unit Ijtas; ^lieutenant Colonel in command with a staff for

- adpu^tistration as well as a chief instructor who is in gen­ eral charge of training. A unit usually consists of an

administrative battery and four training batteries. Two of

the units at the school are for basic training and one

for technical training. A training battery is commanded by

a Major who has a Captain for administration and five or six

Capt .ins or Lieutenants and six or more Non-commissioned Offi­ cers as instructors. The training batteries are charged

with the administration of the cadets during their entire five

months of training. The intake to the training batteries is

not constant but an attempt is made to keep cadets entering

each battery at the rate of forty per month giving a

strength of two.hundred cadets per battery at all times. The

battery conducts basic training the first two months and

again the fifth month. Instruction during the third and

fourth month is given by one of the technical batteries. The

total number of cadets that can be conveniently handled by

all three units at one time is sixteen hundred. Cadets

receive training only on the one phase of Antiaircraft which

they have been with as enlisted men, unless their qualificat­ i o n s are such as to recommend that they be trained in

another phase. Physical training and massed games are

stressed as this subject is considered of prime importance

on gun sites in Great Britain. Infantry training, weapons

and minor tactics receives much attention because the school,

including cadets, has a permanent defensive area to man. It

was stated to me by several instructors that probably not

over 25% of the cadets have had sufficient mathematical

training to grasp ballistics and gunnery and therefore most

of this type of instruction had to be simple and practical.

All candidates for commision come from the ranks and regu­ lations lay down certain necessary qualifications such as

length of service and educational qualifications. However

neither of these regulations are strictly followed. Leader­ ship is considered the most important qualification. The

principle objective of the school is to teach leadership and

make each cadet a qualified instructor in his assigned phase

of anti-aircraft. The Britisi^gpadmit that specializing in

one of the three phases of^ l^tMtcraft at this stage of

training of an officer,i# able but they feel that

time and the need for.jurdb&J^icers is so important that

•V - TRAINING

l)

Schools and courses (cont'd)

they must train them in this manner, TK| i-schoOl-at^era^s^'ll

1 to bring the cadets gradually up to th| ^|atus of | |

by using them as non-commissioned offi'fcj#:g ^uring £ ^ $

the second, third and fourth months aria as officers the

fifth month. During the first four months the cadets eat

in messes run by regular soldiers just the same as battery

messes. The fifth Month the mess is run more as an offi­ cers mess, with waitresses and complete table service. The

method of selection of candidates for the school is, first

selection by regimental comm-nders, then by a regimental

board of officers, then by a divisional board. This lat­ ter board has the chief function of trying to keep up the

standards between candidates from different regiments.

According to the school this doesn't always work as some

regiments and divisions always send in good candidates

while others send in poor ones. The school can turn them

back at any time but recently has not turned back over 5%

apparently because of the dearth of good material and need

for junior officers. Observer's comment: The system of

teaching cadets to be instructors is excellent. 2nd lieu­ tenants going out to antiaircr ft organizations in the field

must know all the details possible about their equipment

and drill. However in such technical work as antiaircraft

and with technique and tactics (and materiel) changing

as rapidly as the-y are, it is believed essential that all

officers should be well grounded in fundamentals and as

little dependent on rule of thumb methods as possible,

M.A.R • 44170-London-2.2 August 1941

The Antiaircraft Command in Air Defense Great Britain ob­ tains an allotment from the War Office for students to

attend the following courses. The Antiaircraft Command

then sub-allots vacancies except for those conducted for

training of tradesmen (which is allotted directly to Anti­ aircraft Units by the War Office),

(1) School of Antiaircraft Defense, ­ a) Gunnery (Wing) Course

b) Searchlight (Wing) Course

c) Wireless (Wing) Course

(2) Royal Ordnance Factory Course (40 mm. Equipment) ­ (3) Cooks Course

i U

-191­

u

•>«*

*

ffi" .I

V - TRAINING i)

a m

4 Is*

V*

& 100% Irind(cou5ses"(cont' d)

fj-kih) v Coarse

Physical. Training Courses Course,

Passive Air Defense Course

Camouflage Course

Staff Course (Camberby)

School of Administration

(10) Intelligence Course

(11) Training of Tradesmen

(12) Course at Army School of Hygiene.

Antiaircraft Command itself conducts the following schools;

U ) staff Duties

( 2 ) Recognition of Aircraft (3) Mreless

(4) Dive-bombing

M.A.R.46712-London-23 February 1942

The Antiaircraft Command Recognition School was formed in

England in February 1940 with the object of training

unit instructors in Recognition of Aircraft. The school

now takes seventy students (26 officers ana 44 non-com­ missioned officers) per course, the instructional staff con­ sisting of four officers, including the chief instructor

and commandant Major. In addition ,there is an adjutant

and usual administrat ive pers onnel, the school being a self-

contained unit. At present a number of vacancies on each

course .are allotted to T.ar Office for Field Army personnel,

end at various times members of the Navy, Royal Air Force

Royal Observer Corps and Civil Defense Forces have attended

the school,

M.A.R,47328-London-10 • April .1942.

Eafih Antiaircraft Division has Divisional Schools composed

of several wings, including Heavy and Light Antiaircraft,

Searchlight, I.ireless, Motor Transportation, Physical Train­ ing, Aircraft Recognition, Tactical Training, Passive Air

Defense, and others. Certain, Divisional Schools are

also designated as Corps S .ings, and in a particular

Corps, the Corps-will pntf ourses for that School

V - TRAINING

l)

Schools and courses (cont'd)

"wfcJ'lvtSSj i

T

""or .ing.

M.A.R.46711-London-23 February 1942

There are attached hereto typical syllabi for Gunnery, Search­ light, Gun Layer, Physical Training, and General Duties lings

(Schools) as conducted in an Antiaircraft. Division in Anti­ aircraft Command of Air Defenses of Great Britain, The vari­ ous Antiaircraft Divisional Schools all carry out slightly

different courses depending upon the state of training of

Units in the Division. ?

M. A .R, 4732.7-London-10 April 1942

The principal object of the Gunnery and Searchlight Wings

of Antiaircraft Divisional Schools is to train unit

instructors. In addition to imparting technical knowledge,

therefore, courses at these Schools are designed to teach

students

(1) How to instruct

(2) How to organize training.

^ M.A *R.46958-Incl .Vl-London-319.131/APN

No establishment is authorized for antiaircraft Brigade

Schools. They may be organized on an unofficial basis as

considered necessary by Corps Commanders.

" M.A.R.46958-Incl.#l-London-319.131/APN

At Larkhill in June 1942 (the Artillery School) the

sj ectators were enabled to examine the new 17 pounder Anti­ tank gun, which appeared to be a very formidable weapon.and

should provide an adequate answer as far as performance is

concerned, in penetration of armour. Several rounds

were fired at a stationary hull-down- tank target cat a

range of 1200 yards, also several rounds at a small house

target at a range of 1500 yards. It was particularly notice-

cable the shortness of the«time the. shell took to arrive at

-193­

T'

i

, ,;

m.

iff V - TRAINING l)

""

-

,



Schools and courses (cont'd)

the target, this being due to the relatively high muzzle veloc­ ity of this gun. The results appeared to be very good, in­ dicating that the gun at this range was extremely accurate.

BES-350-Hashington, D.C.-27 June 1942

In demonstration No. 8, at Larkhill in June 1942 at the

Artillery School a Bofors 20 mm. light antiaircraft gun was

shown in an antitank role, engaging (a moving tank tar­ get) . On the first run the target was engaged by pre­ dictor control, using single shots. Results were only fair­ ly accurate ana the rate of fire was comparatively slow. On

the second run the crew engaged the target with forward area

sights which had been developed by the School of iartillery,

again using single shots. Much better results and a higher

rate of fire were obtained in this way. at the final run

the gun crew engaged the target with automatic fire, again

using the forward area sights, A very high rate of fire

and, talcing all things into consideration, very good shooting,

was carried out by the detachment. It was pointed out to

the spectators that the crews of the Bofors used in Demon­ stration No. 8 were not specially picked and had not used

this equipment in this role prior to 2 days before the

demonstration.

BES-350-TWashington, D.C.-27 June 1942

16 officers from Antiaircraft Command were selected from a

number of volunteers in November 1941, as air Observers to

be attached to Bomber Command. In order that they should

not be merely "passengers" but should be capable of taking

their part as operational members of air crews, it was

decided that they should be trained as air gunners, and

fly as front gunners. The selected candidates were given

one week's course at School, antiaircraft Defense, (Search­ light Wing) Shrivenham, and then a 3 weeks' course at an

Officer Training Unit of Bomber Command, after v/hich they

were attached to a Bomber Group. — ( U p to 27 January

24 reports had been submitted by the*se officers of flights

over enemy territory)--—.

a M.A.R.46431-London^c February 1942 FX . A. ,«. 14 V -'

- 194 ­

V - TRAINING

2)

Individual Training

4

The policy for training individuals of all ranks in tb

Antiaircraft Command Great Brit in is:

First: To ensure that each Officer and man has the

necessary elementary military training to fit

him to take his place in the unit as a soldier.

Second: To ensure that each Officer and man is brought

speedily to the required standard of efficiency

in his particular role according to the units

establishment.

Third: To maintain the standard of performance of each

individual by constant exercising and testing

at his primary role.

Fourth: To train each individual gradually in a secondary

role. In the case of non-commissioned officers

and officers this is the role of the next

senior in rank. •

M.A.d.46958-Incl.#l-London-319.131/APN

General reports on courses from a variety of Schools,

including the General Headquarters Battle School, all

emhpasize the low standard of physical fitness of Officer

and Non-commissioned Officer students. These reports state

that, as a general rule, this lack of physical fitness

applies more to junior than senior officers. Leaders must,

of course, be even more fit than their men, and this is,

therefore, a matter which•clearly requires further attend

tion, -*• M. A . R. 48014-London-22 May 1942,'

The degree of success a unit or formation achieves in

battle depends above all else upon the will to win. There

is a time in all battles when the men on both sides are

exhausted« It is the man who can hold on longest and who

fights with the gre-test determination who will w i n T h e

will to win'requires constant attention. It is. made up

of many factors, two of the most important being Physical

Fitness and Confidence irffffig^rps we use. Physical fit­ ness is difficult to j^tJfriaatinn is-the enemy

of physical fitness ana9'MBiSU &.

- 195 ­

-41M

U1M

V ­ 2)

Individual Training (cont'd)

the more need there is for training. The knowledge that

we (New Zealand division in North Africa) could move, long

distances and fight at night proved to be of the greatest

assistance in all our planning and gave us a great feeling

of confidence when carrying out our operations. In Africa

in the move North to cut the fortress line and in the bat­ tles around Tobruk, wherever we used our pace of 40 miles

in 24 hours combined with movement at night, we always

caught the enemy unprepared. Success was immediate and

casualties often extremely light.

AAG #319.131/AZN

Teach your officers and men to think for themselves one

jump ahead of the game. Slackness, lethargy must be jumped,

on. Explain to all ranks that we are up against a cunning

and ruthless foe and that to beat him requires greater

cunning on our part. Let the men know all the time what

you are doing.

M.A.R.4S277-London-8 June 1942

In British antiaircraft Regiments (Heavy and Light),

basic recruit training, la.sts one month, then three

months are allotted for 'specialist' training as either

drivers, gunners, specialists etc., after which recruit

proceeds to unit for a further five months collective train­ ing on the basis of four days a week collective and two

days individual and maintenance; recruits may then be con­ sidered as trained fighting men.

Incl.#7-M ^.R.45572-London-28 November 1941

(Combat Security Training) cannot be overstressed.

During a German reconnaissance in force on September 15,

an armored car regimental commander was forced to abandon

his armored car because, of mech$ difficulties, In

it the Germans found most of t h ^ tions orders, instruc­ tions, and codes which were in then on the Western

- 196­

M. A. R.2008-Cairo,Egypt-10 October 1941

The (British) are equipping (dive bombing)

planes with sirens and klaxons. The Commanding General

of the Home Forces and other high commanders are anxious

to have these planes dive on their troops in their normal

training, but up to the present time they have not been

able to make these arrangements, almost without exception,

they feel that this should be done until the ground soldier

becomes accustomed to the din and noise.

M.A,R.42254-London-29 January 1941

Fifteen antiaircraft officers from Antiaircraft Command,

Air Defense of Great Britain, are sent for one week's duty

with armored units to obtain knowledge of armored force

vehicles. This is considered essential so that officers of

antiaircraft units which have a dual antiaircraft and anti­ tank role may familiarize themselves with tanks to include

characteristics^ capabilities, limitations, and tactical

use. These officers will ultimately have service with

Field Forces overseas.

M.A,R.45947-London-22 December 1941

The testing of all "other ranks" (enlisted personnel) in

Elementary Training in Protection against Gas ordered in

antiaircraft Command Training Instruction No. 9 has now

been completed. The proportion of failures in the results ;

so far reported indicates an immediate task of some5magni­ tude, if heavy gas casualties are to be avoidad3 The con­ tinued elementary training,. ana subsequent retching of

those who have failed will therefore take precedence over

all other forms of gas training. This elementary train­ ing" will be selective ana will be directed to the.particu­ lar weakness manifested by each individual during the test.

No failures in the Inspection Tests and Standard Tests can

be accepted, Withholding of proficiency pay from soldiers

who fail in these sections through lack of application will

V - TRAINING

.J iiJ: .1 . •' Vjt /

Individual Trkining^.cont1 d)

it'i pi £ < ** • i "»i •*

therefore Be tne normal sequel.

Incl•#10-M.A.Ltr•A7759-London-28 April 1942

2)

The following suggestions are made regarding dark adaptation

of personnel:

(1) T'hen action is expected, accommodation lighting

should be dimmed.

(2) The period of handing over duties in darkness should

be not less than 15 minutes.

(3) During intervals in action (e.g. on "Stand at Ease")

detachments should not go into any artificially lighted

place,

(4) All gun and searchlight detachments must be continu­ ally exercised in periods of inactivity at taking post and

moving about in complete darkness.

(5) Personnel whose duties involve the actual observa­ tion of targets by night should be fully pre-adapted before

action by wearing pre-adaptation goggles at least 45 min­ utes before assuming duty.

(6) If it is inevitable that a man must enter a brightly

lit room during night operations, a useful measure of dark

adaptation may be retained by keeping one eye closed during

the period of exposure to the bright light.

The following suggestions are made regarding conservation*

of night vision:

(1) For the comfortable use of brightly illuminated in­ struments in the dark, some men may require to use tinted

glasses these should be available for issue to those

desiring them,

(2) Personnel operating instruments should be instructed

to close their eyes momentarily when guns are fired. The

introduction of flashless propellant for heavy antiaircraft

guns will greatly reduce this difficulty.

(3) Screening from direct flash or glare by parapets or

canvas should be developed l°ca.Lkv wherever practicable and

found necessary in respect, ^J^^Tsonnel under paragraph b

above,'

%% V |

(4) Projector s^oTtfri&fiuallyoperated search­ lights- gho^lid l^v^^omm^'^Sm of "blinker" goggles so that

virhen \ th^J^Jplrent' end of the beam the base of

the , be afti" is,W* ,.ofe ac&ii^ cf.

... '

, •

-198­

V - TRAINING

2)

Ss>

Individual Training (cont'd)

(5) The be'st optical instruments should be reserve*

personnel whose duties involve actual observation of t<

by night, and stands, steadies, or control pillars d.eve

oped for all binoculars and telescopes.

(6) Staring should be avoided when looking into the dark

for objects, since these are best seen when the eye is

looking a little (10°) to side of the object to be viewed.

If illuminated instruments must be referred to during this

procedure they also should not be stared at. • M.A.R.46668-London-19 February 1942

The United States Technical Training Command (of the

Army ir Forces) is introducing in its courses, thorough

training in the reading of blinker light Morse code. Based

on careful studies of the ground-air communications facili­ ties in all present and possible theaters of operations,

the Directorate of Communications has concluded that such

training is absolutely essential, and that all air crews

should be able to read Morse Code by blinker lights at a

rate of not less than five words a minute. The efficient

radio operator can take about 30 words of Morse Code a min­ ute, but the same operator,' switching over to sight from

hearing, may be able to'take only two words a minute by

blinker lights. It is a proven fact that efficient opera­ tions depend on efficient communications from ground-to

air, and vice versa, - In instances where this cannot be

supplied by radio, the blinker light system comes to the

rescue. Inability of a fighter crew to read blinker light

signals.from the ground fast enough, could easily cause

failure to intercept a flight of bombers in time to pre­ vent serious damage. One needs but little imagination to

think of countless examples, a little practice with blinker

lights by our air crews in the field* is good insurance

against a day of emergency.

Air Forces General Information Bulle­ tin IJo.3-12 august 1942

3)

Unit Training

%$' / 'r;

The organization of Training insideJintjEaircraft unit



V « TRAIN,

in p w % fv ;A S% w,

r I a)

v ,;>

IS n & "U * is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer. Methods

may vary in different units according to circumstances and

the fullest latitude is to be given to Commanding Officers

in the organisation of the training in their commands,

It is of the greatest importance that the best use be made

of the time that is available for training on site.

Training sessions, and especially those carried out on sites,

are .short and are held as far as possible at regular

hours. A man who has done only 30 minutes really good

training on his site ends the day,feeling that he has

done a better day's work than a man who has hung about for

2 hours listening to something v/hich he has heard many

times before.

Incl.#1-M.A.R.469 58-London-319.13l/APN

British training regiments specialize either as Antiaircraft

Searchlight, Heavy Antiaircraft Gun, Light Antiaircraft Gun

or Antiaircraft Rocket regiments. Recently there were

in Great Britain,

9 - Heavy intiaircraft training regiments

8 - Light Antiaircraft tra.in.ing regiments

13 - antiaircraft Searchlight training regiments

5 ~ Antiaircraft Rocket (U.P.) training regiments

There are a total of (about 16) practice camps in Great

Britain. Some are for Heavy antiaircraft Guns and

others are for Light Antiaircraft Guns. At present all Anti­ aircraft Rocket firing is done at Heavy Antiaircraft Gun

practic camps. All of the practice camps are small areas

on the coast where antiaircraft firing can be done over the

water. Cooperative air squadrons are located near all the

camps and frequently on the same reservation. The camps

have commandants, Instructors in Gunnery, (both commissioned

non-commissioned) administrative staffs and some per­ manent personnel for maintenance of the camp and equipment.

The camps are also used by operational batteries, re­ lieved from active gun sites to freshen up and fire target

practices. Searchlight practice is conducted at training

regiment stations, rather than at the practice camps.

Recruits are received and processed by the training regiments.

During their first month training is-dte«voted almost exclu­ sively to basic training such drill and physical

V - TRAINING

3)

Unit Training (contfd)

training. The second month is devoted to persorMgl se^e^

tion tests and technical training in the phase of Antiair­ craft to which the new battery is assigned. Each map

must become expert in at least one position during this

month. This training of recruits is under the perman­ ent instruction staff. At the same time the cadre from

an active battery, — - undergoes a refresher course in tech­ nical duties. The recruits and. the cadre are wedded

at the end of the first month the cadre going most of

the instruction under close supervision of the permanent staff.

M.A.R.43660-London-17 June 1941

The British place great stress on having well disciplined

and trained soldiers. From personal observation, I believe

the average British Antiaircraft soldiers, individually and

as a team have a high state of discipline and training.

They are alert during training and training inspections.

Each soldier does his utmost to make a good impression.

However, in my opinion, during gun drill there is too much

noise too much sounding off. The British quote Lt. Gen.

L. J. McNair, U.S. Army, as stating after the recent maneuvers

of the 2d and 3d armies that ,"there is no question many of

the. weaknesses developed on these maneuvers are repeated

again for lack of discipline." and they add comments to the

effect that the sentimental dreams of a "Democratic" army

do not produce an effective .army.

M.a.R.466.92-Lon j.on-21 February 1942

I was attached to tiie Headquarters of the V Corps in

Great Britain — for maneuvers for the period 28 Sep­ tember to -1— 3 October 1941. I believe that both offi­ cers and other ranks arc in excellent physical condition,

sturdy and tough, well trained, smart, serious, interested

and enthusiastic, The movement on the 29 September from

its concentration area to its objective, was speedy, orderly,

and well conducted. — It reached its objective, a dis­ tance of 70 miles in a little over 12 hours, half in darkness.­ Camouflage nets were used on vehicles as 'soon as a

halt was made. The vehicle density/if! daylight was from 12

-201­

• Unit Train,ir% (cont'd)

\t \\

'

&

t o w S Vehicles to the mile. The columns travelled about

15 miles in the hour. This exercise offered the first

opportunity for Antiaircraft regiments in the Corps and

its affiliated Divisions to function with their units.

This has been due to lack of motor vehicles and guns and

to need of available guns in the Air Defense of Great Britain,

No qualified antiaircraft officer was oh the staff of the

Commander of the Royal Artillery of the Corps, nor of

the Division Commanders. The regimental antiaircraft Com­ mander, at no time, was asked for advice. He received orders

as to v.hat he was to protect and as to the number of guns

to be put at each place.

M.A.R.45427-London-17 November 1941

The British Division Commander has on his staff a staff

officer for physical training, a (pth Antiaircraft divi­ sion) member of the Army Physical Training Corps, He

is charged with the organization and supervision of physi­ cal training within the division and operation of the divi­ sional physical training - — school. Physical training

is required to be conducted daily for at least 30 minutes.

This training embraces boxing, wrestling, unarmed obstacle-

training, swimming, athletics ana games as well as physical

exercises. Each regiment has a regimental officer in charge

of physical training and games whose job it is to supervise

and organize the program within the regiment assisted by the

batter*/ sports officers. Football, cricket, boxing, cross-

country, and other matches are arranged between regiments,

batteries and even individual sites. Regiments often con­ duct their own football and other leagues. A large number

of matches of all kinds are played during the season with

other service teams and with civilian clubs.

I .A.R.43363-London-25 June 1941

The subjects "Night Operations, £ir%indedhess, and battle

efficiency", are most important .^i^S^mve been previously

emphasized in our cables and repoi^ -^^ Unless Tin! prsthey +.h<=>vare



.stressed in the training of our its efficiency will be

disastrously reduced. v.iierever j;e are without air superiority

;*

^iSBsefctiit

- 202 ­

V - TRAINING

3)

Unit Training (cont'd)

all movements are regulated to night operations.

M•A.R•2008-Cairo,Egypt-10 October 1941

Much stress is placed on anti-gas training in all units in

the Air Defense of Great Britain, This was especially noted

on my visit to the headquarters of the 5th Division and of

all subordinate units of this division from June 2 - 5 inclu­ sive, It is standing orders that gas masks will be inspected

and tested regularly, that gas mask h versacks be kept clean,

and that all ranks wear respirators while performing their

normal duties from 15:00 to 15:30 hours on Monday of each

'week. The air sentry, however, will not wear his respirator

during this period but will make up the practice drill so

missed, immediately his tour of duty as air sentry is finished.

The gas masks of the men are stored in a recess at the gun

sites so th. t in answer to a warning day or night the men

will have their gas masks at the site and not left in the

bunk house,

M.A * R.43374-London-25 June 1941

Recent operations'have again emphasized the importance of

preparation and attention to detail in the embarkation of

antiaircraft units required for immediate and rapid deploy­ ment, The following points are stressed:

(1) I articular care is-necessary to ensure correct res­ ervation of space for antiaircraft units embarking last

especially with regard to equipment. On two recent occa­ sions a miscalculation resulted in "shut outs".

(2) The early disembarkation of Workshops section is most

desirable in order to ensure and effect repairs to damage to

equipment that has occurred during the voyage.

(3) Where possible the "flight" containing antiaircraft

units should be preceded by an antiaircraft Reconnaissance

party of sufficient strength of complete reconnaissance

of the proposed "layout" and to provide guides for the Anti­ aircraft units on disembarkation,

(4) The presence of a Staff Officer with Antiaircraft

experience at the ports of embarkation and debarkation is

V - TRAILING

3)

li^g Unit Train:;

\cron0i)

of consMsrabl^ .i/tlue and an officer from each antiaircraft

unit ^Lfttjiid•^f&ere possible supervise the stowing, etc., of

unitsf\$giu%pfocnt and accompany it.

V M,A.R.43615-15 July 1941

The results of field checks in Antiaircraft Command confirm

the experience gained at practice camps that only a minority

of detachments can be considered capable of ensuring that

their equipment is correctly lined up. It dors not appear

to be sufficiently ap reciated that an accurate line-up is

essential if full value is to be obtained from the use of

the Kerrison predictor. The object of lining up is to en­ sure that all rounds will pass as close as possible to the

intersection of the cross-wires in the layers' telescopes.

However good the laying, continuous line of sight rounds will

not be achieved unless all .avoidable sources of error in

lining up have been removed. The fact that an ^rror for line

will result in an apparent elevation error on a crossing tar­ get is not sufficiently appreciated. This is shown in Figs.

1 and 2, representing the appearance of tracer for a target

with an angle of sight at the crossing point of about 30°,

Fig. 1 snows the target approaching the crossing point as

seen.by No. 3 and Fig. 2 the same target receding. The con­ tinuous line snows the tracer resulting, from a correct line

up, and the dotted line the tracer from a bad line up for

line (gun lined up to the left, tracer passing through point

A) and a good line up for elevation.

HiCh

y r \

\

(2) -204­

•V - TRAINING

3)

Unit Training (cont'd)

- A a

a !

p i p

In Fig. 1 the tracer is low ancTin Fig. 2 high.

3 on the predictor can correct for constant elevation errors,

he cannot be expected to produce many line of sight rounds

if he is correcting his lay (through no fault of his own)

first for low aind then for high rounds on the same target.

Incl.#3-M.A.R.46598-London-AAC 319.131/APN

It has been noted that units 'equipped with the No. 3 Predic­ tor tend to neglect, the use of forward area sights in their

training. It must be realised that it is as vital-for these

units as for those without the Predictor to ensure

that all their detachments are properly trained in forward

area sight shooting. The noticeable lack of pre-theatre training in this regard cannot oe attributed to

lack of equipment. • Gun detachments should at least have

beui taught:

(1) The appearance of tracer

(2) Deflections

(3) Application of deflections (using model forward area

sights)

In some cases the selection- of personnel (within the de­ tachment) is bad. In many cases, very much better re­ sults could be obtained from the same men by a more intelli­ gent selection of personnel for the various duties".

British Antiaircraft Training Pamphlet-QC-29 July 1942

(There are)—- three men on watch at a 40 mm Bofors gun

position and there are three watches. One man per watch can

easily be trained to make proper deflections ana the- three

men on watch can fire the gun with the Stiffkey Stick where­ as normally only one man per detachment is qualified- to make

deflection adjustments with the Kerrison predictor and it

cannot go into action without remainder of crew being alerted

which requires warning and time. In the first target prac­ tice with a towed sleeve and with two recruit trainers,

using the Stiffkey Stick three hits were obtained out

of seventy rounds. Component trained men o n S t i f f k e y '

Sticks can be turned out in two weeks of technical trai|iingt>

with fifty rounds of firing. In Practice u

1

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?.a hws vt



V - TRAINING

%— •

3)

a m ^

U n % gaining (cont'd)

targets and the Stiffkey .Stick 30 percent line of sight

rounds -—(were obtained with recruit layers) •

M. A. R.474A5~London-17 April 1942

4)

Training Films

During the early period of the present war, British Army

Training Films were produced by a variety of Army organiza­ tions. This system proved inefficient, and in March,

1942, all training film production was placed under the con­ trol of the Directorate of Army Kinematography• This

Directorate has improved both the quality and the quan­ tity of British Training Films. It has eliminated much

confusion and duplication of effort. In the British Army,

training films are considered an essential part.of training;

they save time and standardize the most efficient training

methods. They are a compulsory part of the military training

program. One hundred .and sixty-nine films are now in use

and one hundred and eight films are either in production or

are being prepared for immediate production.

M.A.R.48126-London-29 Kay 1942

The following is a partial list of pertinent training films

published or to be published by the British war Office.

ANTIAIRCRAFT

Recognition of Aircraft - British Machines (1940) (Sound)

Part 0* Introduction - Farts of aircraft.

Part 1. Spitfires and Hurricanes.

Part 2. Defiants.

Fart 3* Blenheim Fighter Bomber and Blenheim IV Bomber.

Part 4. (1941) Hampden, Wellington and Hudson.

Fart 5. (1941) Miitley and Botha,

Guns Part Fart Part

3.7 1, 2, 3.

inch (1940) (Sound)

Breech Mechanism,

Recoil System, *

Recoil System - control. ^


-206­



V - TRAINING

4)

Training Films (cont'd)

Guns Fart Fart Part Part

4.5 inch (1940) (Sound)

1. General Description.

2 and 3. Examination of Equipment and duties of No. 1.

4 and 5. Preparing for action. .

6. Engaging a target.

Height Finding - Principles of (1940) (Sound)

Height Finding - Conversion Gears (1940) (Sound)

Mechanical Part 1. Fart 2. Part 3P Fart 4.

Maths. (1940) Antiaircraft Instruments. (Sound) Addition and Subtraction, Multiplication and division. Solution of triangles. "Memory", Explains graphic range tables and three dimensional cams.

Fredictors - the No. 1 (1941) (Sound)

Fredictors - the No. 2 (1941) (Sound)

Predictors - The Sperry (1940) (Sound)

Fart 1, Examination of equipment.

Fart 2, Tests and adjustments,

Fredictors - The Vickers (1940) (Sound) Part 1, Examination of equipment.

. Part 2. Tests and adjustments.



Range-finders - the U.B.7. (1940) (Sound)

Part 1. General principles.

Part 2. Examination and operation of equipment.

Fart 3. Tests and adjustments.

Anti-gas Equipment (1939) (Sound) use of:

Part 1. Personal anti-gas equipment.

Part 2. Individual gas detectors.

Part 3, Gas alarm and protection against burns, « Part 4. Gas ground detectors, and gas warning signs.

Anti-Gas Equipment for Antiaircraft Units. (Sound)

Anti-Gas Training (1941)

(Sound)





4)

Training M ^ l * ^

CQNCEALME!

Camouflage

f

**

m " ranks, (1941) (Sound)

Camouflage for officers. (1941)

T^'XS

Friend of Foe (1941) (Sound)

Fart 1. Recognition of British armored fighting vehicles.

Fart 2. » » »» » » »

Tactics - Light Tanks (1939; (Sound)

Part 1, Illustrates principles of tank tactics.-Diagram­ matic,

Fart 2, Suggested ways of de-ling with tactical situations.

Forcing a crossing and penetrating antitank gun

screen, -—

k.A,R,42863-London-28 April 1941

All matters pertaining to British films are now being handled

by the Assistant Military Attache (Signal Corps)© — - The

present arrangement is for all films produced in the future

to be forwarded to Washington through the British Purchasing

Mission, Some recent films are:

Description

Recognition of Aircraft In 7 parts, from .iir Minis­ try Film - British Aircraft,

Aircraft Recognition

New Series British and.

German.

Security

Pictures to make troops

security-minded.

The Louse

Decontamination of person,

E f f ^ b ^ c f lice as regards

Antiaircraft Gunnery «

How ^o^ackle the Job,

.#t j.

Antiaircraft Gunner,

All about Dials.,

Light Antiai

Aided Laying,

-208­

1 V - TRAINING

4)

'Training Films (cont'd)

Heavy and Light iintiaircraft Gunnery

Handling Hanai/heels,

Antiaircraft Gunnery

Do's and Dont's for Anti­ aircraft Gunners.

Antiaircraft Gunnery and Ground Locators

How to see in the Dark.

Mosquitoes and Malaria

Demonstration of preventive

equipment•

k,A,R.46047-London-31 December .1941

Nine reels of a (training film entitled "Eye Shooting')

used for training (Nava,l) ratings to fire Antiaircraft

guns were shown (recently)-— by the Gunnery School Offi­ cer at Halifax. The film is in technicolor and clever-ly

utilizes animated drawings and photographs to teach the prop­ er estimation of "Angle of Approach" of an attacking plane,

and the amount of "Aim Off" or lead necessary to use with

open sights. The film should be very worthwhile in train­ ing, particularly in impressing on -the mind the very brief

time available for aiming and firing.

N.A.R.Ser.ll63-41-0ttawa-9 December 1941

5)

Training Devices

The first test runs on the recently completed 20~foot dome

for training merchant ship and navy close-range antiair­ craft gunners were held'recently at H.M.S. ana were com­ pletely successful. This report contains a brief descrip­ tion of the device. Airplane attacks filmed from models of

German airplanes are projected on the dome surface and the

plane is followed, by-means of open sights, by the gun's

crew being trained. Sound effects for plane and gun are

used to increase, the realism of -the attack. 32 domes are

now being built in this country, four of which are to be ­ shipped to Canada.

Antiaircraft Trainir

Ser.IV-C anadiaf

V - TRAD ING 5)

„ V

Training i \ Devices 'A ^4 cent' d)

V

The R^fe. *SC5hadian Navy is to receive from the United King­ dom five of the apparatus known as the British admiralty

Close Range Antiaircraft Dome Teachers. The British Ad­ miralty states that the Dome Teacher is a great advance on

other types of teachers and is particularly useful for

antiaircraft machine gunners and others operating guns up

to two pounders.

N .A »R,Ser«544-41-0ttawa-29 August 1941

The dome (for the Dome Training devices) has been

erected in the form of a hollow half hemisphere. The Base

of the dome is a hollow half cylinder 20' in radius, 5' ­ high. On the base, without any break in continuity,

(rests the) half hemisphere, 20' radius, A motion

picture projection of a dive-bomber is used as a target.

The gun-pointer aims at the target through a standard open

or wheel-type sight which has a yellow ray-filter in front

of it. The instructor looks through a check sight and ob­ serves a yellow dot which shows the actual point of aim of

the gun-pointer. The dot and the cross wire of light are

invisible to the gun pointer because of the yellow ray

filter.

N,A.R.Ser,ll62-41-0ttawa-9 December 1941

The Navy Dome Trainer is considered by the British Army

to be of immense value in training antiaircraft Units.

The Army is redesigning it for Army use and will purchase

16, It is an indoor teacher which in effect provides

a substitute for aircraft cooperation. Its objects are:

to provide practical aiming instruction in eye shooting

for. the crews of close range Antiaircraft weapons, and

simultaneously to give training in fire discipline; to

provide realistic practice in engaging fast enemy aircraft;

to accustom personnel to the general conditions of dive

bombing attacks in so far as noise psychological reac­ p mentally prepared

tion are concerned so that they wp sonnel aware of the

to meet this form of attack; tp'4"® attacking aircraft

extreme ly short t ime during 'which

V - TRAINING

5)

Training Devices (cont'd)

can be engaged by the close range antiaircraft weapons and

to provide verified aiming' practice.

K.A.R.45118-London-28 October 1941

Dome Teachers will not be generally available to

Antiaircraft Command (Great Britain) for several months,

The Navy have proved very willing to allow antiaircraft

Command courses to use the teacher when they do not require

it themselves. The Royal Air Force are1 a'^so erecting some

at various airdromes. Although the layout ana deflections

are not strictly correct for the 40 mm, guns, the errors

involved are not large.

M. .R.47406-London-15 April 1942 .

A device called a dive bomber simulator has been designed

in Great Britain which is intended to simulate an ap­ proaching dive-bomber for antiaircraft target practice. It

is intended for dripping from an aircraft flying at 12,000

ft. and functions as follows. On release, a Bickford delay

is initiated, which burns while the simulator is dropping

from 12,000 ft. to approximately 10,000 ft. At this height

the delay ignites either a flare or smoke candle (according

to the type of simulator used) which continues to burn while

the simulator falls to approximately 3,000 ft. During this

burning, a second length of Bickford delay burns and con­ tinues until the simulator reaches a height of about 2,000

ft., when a bursting charge ivs ignited to break up the con- •

tainer so that no heavy 'parts remain to fall on personnel

below. "

24 November 1941-AAC 319.13/AUC-16

On December 3, 4, 1941, Commander observed the oper­ ation of a Delamere & Williams Antiaircraft Training Device

installed at the Gunnery School Halifax, Nova Scotia.—

The purpose of the device is to train an antiaircraft gun-

pointer to aim and fire a stream of'tracer-like projectiles

V - TRAINING

5)

Training Devices (cont'd)

at miniature airplane targets, which move in a path either

like that of a dive bomber or a low level bomber. Mini­ ature targets one-fiftieth of full size are used

and the muzzle velocity of the pellet projectiles is like­ wise reduced to one-fiftieth actual velocity. Successive

attacks by the target airplane are at 9 second intervals.

The time during which the gun pointer can fire is about lj

seconds. Targets are scale models of Junkers 37, Stuka

Bombers, one-fiftieth full size, cast brass. The radius

of pull-out is calculated for a maximum speed of 350 m.p.h.,

a minimum of 250 m.p.h., and usual speed of 274 m.p.h.,

which corresponds to a pull of b G on the pilot. To simu­ late an attack by a low level bomber, the stationary can be

rotated through 90 and locked, thus giving a horizontal

approach toward the .gun pointer.

N.A.R.Ser.1154-41-0tt awa-9 December 1941

Question: How are radio controlled aerial targets employed

in training: that is, types of courses and types of maneuver?

Answeri (l) Queen Bee aircraft can fly on any course within

effective fuze range of heavy antiaircraft guns subject to.

a maximum ceiling limitation of approximately 12,000 feet

and speeds within 80-120 miles per hour.

(2) Within limitations in (l) above, the Queen Bee air­ craft have the following advantages in particular over towed

targets.

(a) Can simulate direct approaching and receding-targets

' (during a level flight).

(b) Can simulate avoiding action.

(3) Firing against Queen Bee aircraft, therefore, repre­ sents final stage in h e v y antiaircraft training at praetice

camps, since it enables sections to exercise tactical control

of fire.

M.e.R.45623-1ondon-1 December 1941

I was very much impressed with two (British) training devices believe they would be of value J.aflbffllLindoor



V - TRAINING

5)

Training Devices (cont'd)

training of our ;*ntiaircraft Automatic Weapons per?

They are the Holywood Range for teaching the

vation of Tracer and the adjustment of lay for crossing

targets with the No.,3 Predictor and the Slaymaker Tutor

for teaching Course Angle, Deflections, and Observation of

Tracer.

M.u.R.46763-London-27 February 1942

The Westex photographic mobile recording outfit is a great

step forward in recording. Eleven magslip dials can be

photographed every four seconds and the complete story of

a practice run can be built up. ­ Notes-AUC 49- March 1942

The Admiralty has perfected a simple type of minature

glider for use as a target for Antiaireraft machine-gun

training. It has a wing span of 6' and a length of about

4'6n. It is constructed of very light materials, and is

weatherproofed by dope and varnish.- The glider achieves

an air speed of 25 m.p.h. It flies .in a circle, whose

radius is adjustable to some extent. The glider is winched

on launching in much the same way as a kite, until, at an

altitude of 150 or 200 feet, it is released from its tow­ line for free flight, A good percentage of target flights

has been obtained fair weather,

N.A.R.Ser,980-London-21 April 1942

6)

aircraft Recognition Training

One great trouble is in identification of airplanes.. In one case, one of our own airplanes was brought down 150 yards in front of the gun and of our'own infantry. Every­ one at the time thought it was a German plane. Our Infan­ try even cheered. It appeared to be a 1, 2, 3 attack with 4 Me 109's chasing a Spitfire and it was the Spitfire that was brought down. It happened and it will happen again. The sergeant (detachment commander) made the decision. His brigadier told him in the above casg ft^ Sf'^. right and just to try to be more careful, in the f Jtfe'e^/Mj^hti^Jication

- 213 ­

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V - TRAINING 1 6)

Aircra%" ^6bgnition Training (cont'd)

is most important.

Brigadier Rev.Smith—M.A.R.43877-London-l August 1941

In one portion of the battle in Libya on 28 May 1942

the medium (U.S.) tanks moved forward on a line until

within approximately 2000 yards from the enemy where they

halted and exchanged fire. 15 minutes later the first sup­ porting artillery began to register on the enemy position.

At this time I could clearly see the enemy dismounted, artil­ lery men at their guns. 30 minutes later the supporting

artillery came down with an excellent barrage and the medi­ um tanks moved forward to attack. My observation was

somewhat hampered by having my command car fired on alter­ nately by the British and German tanks, with the air arm

dropping a load of bombs for good measure. As the attack

neared its objective the Royal Air Force came over in what

appeared to be excellent air support and Captain. Ahee and

myself were loud in its praise until after the action when

the British reported to us that they had been the ones

subjected to the attack.

M.A.R,25 80-Cairo, Egypt-4 June 1942

Owing to the large amount of air traffic in the neighbour­ hood of aerodromes, antiaircraft uriits deployed for their

protection should pay most particular attention to the prob­ lem of recognition of enemy aircraft. Not infrequently

enemy aircraft follow closely behind our own aircraft and

in consequence may be plotted as friendly. Alternatively,

friendly the hostile plots get temporarily interchanged

and therefore unremitting watchfulness on the part of look­ outs is essential. Recognition of unseen aircraft at

night by engine sound is often possible, but considerable

practice and experience is required. The recognition is

therefore normally negative i.e. all friendly aircraft usu­ ally operating at night are recognised as such; a stranger

is suspected as hostile. In order to be able to distin­ guish aircraft by sound, it is important for lookouts.to

place themselves in such a position"'tha? they are screened

t\

from the noise of aircraft "runriingviip' heir'engines on

•-V­ L4 ­

V - TRAINING

6)

Aircraft Recognition Training (cont'd)

the aerodrome*

A.A.G.#319 *13/AUC-10-17 July 1941

Pilots should be required to recognize friendly tanks and

guns to the same extent that ground personnel are required

to recognize aircraft types,

M,A.R.45966-London-23 December 1941

In recognition problem (in the .^frican desert at times)

was particularly difficult, especially during the period

following several enemy fighter attacks when our own

fighters follow over the same area flying low. Complaints

were that our light antiaircraft had, on occasions, engaged

our own aircraft. The cLosest, co-operation by Royal Air

Force is necessary if such instances are to be avoided, and

pilots must conform with local flying orders both as regards

behavior and use of recognition signals,

M.A.L.4&l65-London-2 June 1942

From the commencement of, and throughout the campaign, in.

Libya Light Antiaircraft were forbidden to open fire on air­ craft unless they were definitely recognized as hostile or

committed a hostile act, Such orders required that detach­ ment commanders should be absolutely certain of their rec­ ognition in order that fire could be opened before hostile

action was taken and bombs dropped. The problem of recogni­ tion was, however, facilitated by the following circum­ stances: • ' (1) The general wide field of view in the desert.

(2) The almost complete lack of our bombing aircraft

over the forward areas during the third period,

(3) Fnemy aircraft when approaching the Vulnerable Foint

were in tight formation, whilst friendly patrols were always

in loose formation and

(4) Ju 87, Ju 88 and MI 110 were easily identified.

The Me 109F, being .similar to the Hurricane, was difficult

to distinguish. Had these been extensively employed in really

low level ground straffing attacks they would have been missed



- TRAINING 6)

, .

JW­

Aircraft Recognitio^JJi^ning (cont'd)

V a C i ^

too often ^v^ng to uncertainty in identification, with the

consequ^&t'result that sooner or later Hurricanes would have

been fired on when flyipg low. r — Probability of the enemy

not employing single ongii.e aircraft for the extensive low

level attacks cannot be accepted, and consequently the Impor­ tance of restrictions being placed on low flying by the Royal

Air Forcej in any future operation is still imperative.

Other arms arc prone to fire not o.ly at absurdly long ranges,

but often at our own aircraft. It is suggested that where

Bofors are present, small arms .fire should be held until the

Bofors open fire and to cease fire when they cease.

M.A.R.2272-Cairo,Egypt-l March 1942

The following extract is from a letter addressed to Command

dant,Antiaircraft Command Recognition School by the Second

in Command of a Regiment about to go abroad, who wanted some

assistance in Recognition Training.

"If there is general advice you can give me on this subject

which now becomes of far greater importance to us, it would

be much appreciated.".

This amazing statement shows an utter lack of appreciation

of the importance of the subject. Recognizing the enemy is

just as essential in this country as overseas, and training

in recognition must be vigorously carried out.

M.A.R.48265-London-6 June 1942

The training of light antiaircraft detachments in recogni­ tion of aircraft do«s not ap ear quite so insoluble now. A

school was established recently at a large Air Transport

Auxiliary ferry aerodrome which has been putting through about

one hundred antiaircraft artillerymen a week. In the course of

the week they see nearly every operational British type and are

able to inspect them at close quarters; and by arrangement with

Farnborough spend a day seeing German types in the air and on

the ground. By emphasizing the practical rather than the theo­ retical aspect of identification and by concentrating on the

psychological side of making (.very man really keen on aircraft

a remarkably improved standard of recognition on sites obtained.

.#319.13/AUC-39

7

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V - TRAINING

6)

.* j! i N•a —L- & fa 4' ­

Antiaircraft Recognition Training (cont'd)

The basis of training is by models, epidiascopes, etc. Any-

kind of analysis system is considered dangerous. Films are

particularly useful and a new up to date series is being

produced,

A.A.C.#319.13/AUC-13-23 August 1941

The Royal Air Force has developed a method of producing air­ craft recognition material photographically through use of

accurate, scale models of enemy aircr ft. This system em­ braces three steps: (a) consolidation of available infor­ mation on an enemy aircraft; (b) building the model, and

(c) photographing it in the desired position. More satis­ factory recognition material is said to be obtainable in

this way than by dependence upon chance photographs during

combat or reconnaissance.

M,A.R.46049-1ondon-7 January 1942

The only successful method of identification of aircraft is

by familiarity with the types in service, The means of

r achieving this is b repeated instruction. Training films

have been issued (and they are helpful) but it has

been found that they are of greater value if shown subse­ quent to lectures and other instruction. The most impor­ tant fact is that lectures must be 'given by trained experts

in the subject, A lecturer who has had no basic grounding

in his subject, or who does not have all the facts at his

finger tips, usually does more harm than good, ,

It is considered that the best method of training person­ nel in aircraft recognition is to deal with the subject ~ —

in short periods Of instruction at regular intervals,

One of the outstanding feature's is that if the subject is

put forward to the men in an interesting manner by an in­ structor who is obviously an expert and enthusiastic,

there is a very great incentive to spare time to study..

A certain amount of equipment in the form of models, sil­ houettes, photo-graphs, etc., is required for use of the

instructor, as he must capture the students', interest at

once. • . The whole basis of recognition traiftiff^ js^bound up in the

- 217 ­



%V % % f V' %

f-

Q N & *%

V - TX-JNIK

6) xtircra

cognition Training (cont'd)

Tact thqt the time taken to identify a 'plane under operation­ al conditions must be cut' down to a minimum. It is the over­ looking of this point v/hich has often resulted in (train­ ing) methods being tried v/hich are in practice of little

value. In order to introduce method into the training of

personnel the question (has-been) reviewed on the fol­ lowing lines:­ It was found that although numerous people could identify

aircraft correctly in a very short time, they were at a loss

to explain how they could do it. On investigation, it was

at once noticed that they had been interested in aircraft

previously, and had become so familiar with the 'planes,

that they could tell them on sight. This held good (sim­ ilarly) for motorists who are able to spot.cars on the

road as a result of seeing them frequently. It was obvious

therefore that training should be devised to produce this

complete familarity which brings about almost immediate or

"sub-conscious" recognition. Other methods had to be dis­ carded because they did not fulfil the conditions required.

Many people have tried to introduce analysis system to

differentiate between various types of aircraft, ana al­ though these may have a certain value for elementary train­ ing, it is most important that under no circumstances should

they be used for operational work. They do not pro­ duce an answer in a- sufficiently short time to satisfy the

first essential. They have to be altered to include new

types, which may have very far reaching effects on the con­ clusions reached at the analysis. And since the a­ nalysis consists of dividing aircr ft into t^pes by means of

constructional features, the whole system will' collapse if

the original dividing feature is not visible in the first

view obtained. There is also the very serious'objection

that the system gives the temptation to carry a.reference

sheet in the pocket and this may leave the person concerned

without help, either during darkness or when the sheet has

been mislaid. In succession to the analysis system, it has

been suggested that the plane should be reviewed or inspect­ ed in a set sequence, e.g. wings, engine, fuselage, tail.

This may lead, 'where the first feature isifcindistinct, to

time being wasted on -that feature, wji^n tn'^L ' plane could be

identified by its general appearance ,vyls|[aMpr6m the'indis­ tinct feature. The meteod of Jfedentifi&%ton by familiarity

does not confine the spottegf^to feature. In some

V - TRAINING

6)

Aircraft Recognition Training (cont'd)

cases the aircraft can be recognised by the 'sit' in the

air alone, without the other features being discernible.

Nor does it confine him to any one view or position. If

he is familiar with the aircraft he will spot it from any

angle. The most obvious method of attaining this ob­ ject would be to let all necessary personnel see the actual

aircraft in flight until the required standard was reached.

This hov.ever is impossible, as even if we could collect a

complete set of all our own aircraft types in one place, the

provision of hostile types for practice would present diffi­ culty, The system of making up "flying circuses" by the

Royal Air Force has been helpful, but has very definite lim­ itations in view of the organization involved to give a com­ paratively small section of the people concerned a view of

the 'planes in flight. Luckily all these disadvantages

can be overcome, by the use of scale models. If a scale

model is made so that it is accurate for appearance in out­ line at any angle from a short distance (small details are

not necessary) then it can be used for training in a very

satisfactory manner. Thus a l/72nd scale model viewed at a

distance of 100 yards is equiv ilent to seeing the real air­ craft at a range of 7,200 yards or 21,600 ft. The ad­ vantages of the models are:­ (1) That it is easier to provide a complete set of mod­ els to units for training in comparison with arranging for

the real 'planes to be flying for training purposes in vari­ ous area, thus tying up numbers of operational aircraft.

(2) The training can be carried out irrespective of

weather conditions for flying and observation, since obvi­ ously an aircraft flying at a low height, does not present

the difficulty of recognition at long range. Using models

the training can be graded to suit the standard of the per­ sonnel under instructions.

(3) The training can be carried out to suit the programme

of the unit for time, since it is under its own control, and

does not involve arrangements with other units.

(4) The training can be concentrated on any particular

aircraft required under unit arrangements and can be repeat­ ed as and when required without the necessity of co-ordina­ tion with other units.

It is useless, however, to leave personnel to study the

models unaiaed or without directing their efforts. They

must be shown the difference between the various^ t^'ps^?

%J>I j

V - TRAINING 6)

ft% •

P ^ H* ,



Aircraft R^co^nit,! oji' Tr^ itoMg (cont'd)

til they knowNyp.!1 the details of their appearance. For this

purpose large scale silhouettes are required. By means of

these the shapes of various parts of the different 'planes

are pointed out and thus impressed on the mind. To supple­ ment the silhouettes, which are flat and only two dimension­ al, sheets of photographs are alscr necessary, especially if

* they can be used with an epidiascope, for spotting practice

on various types of 'plane. They provide a compact means

of providing the 'rep. tition' necessary to achieve complete

familiarity. The main point to watch in the arrangement of

training is that the interest of the stud; nts must be arous­ ed. It is !due to this interest, that many people without

special training became so conversant with aircraft types

that "spotting" or recognition came so quickly and accu­ rately. Some simple explanation of the "how -and why" of

aircraft, and short talks on the structure and operation

of controls etc. (should be given in order to give the

spotter background to which to pin the appearance of the

plane) . This will enable him to follow up his instruc­ tion by reading at'least semi-technical descriptions in trade

journals, etc.

Spare time activities should be encouraged by the use of

silhouette playing cards. Visits to aerodromes (to

view aircraft on the ground and in the air) have excel­ lent interest (and instruction) value if used to sup­ plement other training. (AS an original form of training

observation of planes on the ground is not so good because

planes are not seen in correct perspective.)

It is considered that with the forms of equipment at pres­ ent available, complete training by familiarity can be car­ ried out satisfactorily. — ­ . '. 1'. A. R.47328-A » a. Command School of

Instruction, Buckhurst Park, Withy­ ham, Tunbridge Wells,-6 M- rch 1-941

'It has been proposed by Commander in Chief Home Forces that

non-antiaircraft units, excepting-their.antiaircraft elements,

shall not be taught recognition to any. definite standard but

shall be taught to "aim at and swing with any aircraft not

identified as friendly, and open fire hostile act is

committed, or hostile marking become. visibJk. The policy

with regard.to training and nr •-•vision af ^tiprcerial is now be­

V - TRAINING

6)

Aircraft Recognition Training (cont'd)

ing worked out on these lines*

A.A.C.#319.13/AUC-64-Sundry Notes April 1942

As a result of my experience as Executive Officer of the III

Army Aircraft Warning Service during 1940 Maneuvers in United

States and from official report of the Fort Bragg Exercises

in Eastern North Carolina in 1938 and from talks with various

British officers during the past fifteen months as to the

keen eyesight and hearing of certain types of people, I firm­ ly believe that we should organize a Corps of Antiaircraft

Observers or Spotters for duty with Antiaircraft Units from

specially selected personnel and give them a thorough course

in aircraft recognition. Recognition of aircraft by antiair­ craft personnel, is becoming increasingly more important

and certainly more difficult. The observers, who would be

Experts, the same as we have Electricians, Master Gunners,

etc., would habitually do duty as antiaircraft iirtillery

Spotters ana could advise the officer or Non-commissioned

officer in charge of antiaircraft units, whose responsibility

it is to protect or assist in protecting his vulnerable point

Area by gun fire, in determining when an airplane, by its ap­ pearance and action, was friendly or enemy. I am sure that

with specially selected men who are well trained to actually

do the spotting and give advice that the officer .or non-com­ missioned officer in charge ^of an antiaircraft "gun or guns

will be able to make his decision quicker and with more con­ fidence, thereby increasing the effectiveness of our anti­ aircraft artillery.

M.A.R.49094-London-25 July 1942

'BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1)

Umbrella type dive bombing target,

' M*.A.R,44419-London-9 September 1941-131/XG

(2) Tactics and. Technique of Engagement of Ground Targets

and water-borne Targets by Antiaircraft Artillery.

T ar Department Circular (Trainma^ Ntt.

(3)

Antiaircraft TrainingHevices. I fc

"" ' ' ' ft M.A.R^5T^London-April 1942

- 221­

V - TRAINING

Bibliography (cont'd)

A

^

>

1



(4) Courses at liilit^V-'fpli'yg^FScience (formerly at

Woolwich). •

M * , ,R.47022-London-March 1942

(5) Hunt Aircraft Recognition and Range Teacher (Mobile

model)•

M.A.R.48427-London-June 1942

(o) British Syllabus of Training for Antiaircraft Artil­ lery during long Voyages

M.A.R.46726-London-131/AOZ

(7)

British Army From (List with copies of the forms)

February 1942

(8) The Eyeshooting locket Book (British guide for crews

of Antiaircraft weapons).

N.A.R.606-12 March 1942

(9)

Silhouettes of Japanese Aircraft.

k.ii.R.46008-London-December 1941

(10) British Middle East Training Pamphlets

A. A.C.#319.131/XU

<

(11) British Antiaircraft Training Instructions Serial I,

II, III, and IV.

A.A.C.#319.131/XU-30-1941

(12) The Stiffkey Stick and How to use it.

A.A.C.#319.131/XU-34-May 1941

(13) Notes on training in Aircraft recognition (includes

detailed descriptions of American, British and German planes)

A. A. C. #319*131/ ARL

(14) British Training Documents Issued in ';|||J^tern Desert

Concerning Employment of American Tanks. ^.

v. A'.R^503-Sa^^"May 1942.

< .

(15) Aircraft Recognition British Manual, Ftirt I 1941.

A.A.C.^3#U31/Xl>r35-19 March 1941

(16) Aircraft recognitionj^Jhe Mih'dfen Tester.

^ ^^4.R.47742-London-May 1942

V - TRAINING

Bibliography (cont'd)

"

/i



*

v (17) List of draining Films for Identification of Ai

craft.

War Department Circular No.28

• . (18) Artillery System of measurement of angles — Italy,

Germany, France and United States.

M,A.R,2204-Egypt-9 February 1942

(19) "Antiaircraft Training Instruction" pamphlet serial

IV - Canadian reprint.

A.A.C.#319.13l/X-May 1942

(20) "Training in the Navy in•Aircraft Recognition " - Ad­ miralty Famphlet.

N,A.R.241-London-29 January 1942

(21) Irojector Drill for Projector Antiaircraft 3-inch

Single 1941.

M.A.R.43562-London-14 July 1941

(22) "Training appropriations for local purchases by

Antiaircraft organizations".

M.,i.R.45433-London-18 November 1941

(23) Pamphlet entitled "Instruction for installing Dome

Antiaircraft Teachers".

N.A.R.1120-London-4 May 1942

(24) gun.

Cross levelling drill, Q.F. 3.7 Inch Antiaircraft

M.A.L.45341-/iiFF-12 November 1941

(25) Instructions 14-8077, "The Sperry Antiaircraft Pre­ dictor" - Antiaircraft publications .M.A.London#457l6-6 M.A.R.45716-London-6 December 1941

Descriptive Notes on the Predictor Antiaircraft No.

I Vickers Type 1941.

M.A.L.457l6-London-28 May 1941

Vertical Deflections — Bofors 40 mm. Mks. I, II,

and III. Lateral Reflections - Bofors 40 mm. wks» I, II,

and III. —

M.ii..R.457l6-Lonaon-6 December 1941



j|

V - TRAINING

1

V, -! Nfc, i:;, 1% t 3

Bibliography (cont'i)

(25)

(contM)



Clock Hour, Bofors 40 mm, Mks. I, II, and III. —

M,A.L.4571b~London-6 Decmember 1941

VI « AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (British)

Direct command of all forces concerned with the ac

defenses of the United Kingdom is held by an-Air 0:

the Commander in Chief, Fighter Command, Royal Air

The principal forces whose primary mission is to provide

air defense of the United Kingdom are the Fighter Command

aircraft and crews of the Royal Air Force the Balloon Bar­ rage units of the Royal Air Force, the; Royal Artillery's '

Antiaircraft artillery and searchlight units, and the Ob*

server Corps. As the active defense of factorios is inte­ grally incorporated into the active defense of the entire

country, units of all of the above forces may he involved

in defense of factories. See M.A. London Report No.41591.

No fighters are given a specific mission of protecting an

individual factory. Because of tho relatively 3mall size

of the British Isles, fighters are used to ongago any en­ emy at any time. Because of tho pressing shortage of guns,

antiaircraft artillory is not extensively used for the pro­ tection of specific factorios. --- Balloon barrages are tho

most frequent type of defense given factorios. - — Balloon

barrages have boon found to bo quite effective in protect­ ing factories from dive-bombing attacks. The Observer Corps

--- is concerned with factory defense only in-so-far as the

general scheme for tho discovery and tracking of enemy

planes and tho raid warning system applies to tho country

as a whole. It appears — ( t o this observer)— that the

centralization of the command of all forces having to do

with activo air dofonso is proper.

M.A.R.43122-London-29 May 19^1

An interesting, foature of tho Fighter Command was tho >

splendid .cooperative spirit which existed between the Royal

Air Force and tho antiaircraft artillery. — He, informed

us that, as an army officcr, he was charged with training,

feeding, housing, etc. all antiaircraft artillery, but

that for operational purposes, he served directly under the

Air Chief Marshall commanding tho Fighter Command. He

7 stated that the antiaircraft artillery was a part of the

Air Defenses of Great Britain, tho most important constituent

of which was the Royal Air Force and that in order properly

to coordinate his part of tho Air Defense his forces, must

necossarily operate under the commander, in general/charge of

.the Air Defenses; — While visiting the dug-out of a Bat­ tery commander — the Battery command me that a

k v " -225­

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- AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd)

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"flash"- had just "been received JroBi«ttierTighter Command that

— BriMgli fl^tera ,Hero- 6t^ng into the London area In

pursuitfe
after that "flash" was received, antiaircraft fire in the

Lcfridonarea ceased. --- A few minutes later it was resumed

when the "flash" from the Fighter Command stated that the

British fighters had left the area.

: " Incl.#l-A.A.C.#319.131/IE

Fighter Command operations room is about 35 feet square.

There is a gallery about 8 feet high running around the

room and overlooking a platform with a large (about 25 ft x

20 ft.) map of England, — . This map is marked off into

squares with coordinates and group zone and sector "bounda­ ries marked on it. There is also shown one north-south and

three east-west lanes, each about 20 miles wide, in which

friendly bombers must fly. Around the map board sit plot-

ters^..with .telephone headsets connected to Command, Groups

and Observer Corps headquarters. Every hostile or doubtful

aircraft or formation is plotted on the map as soon as re­ ported. Each raid is given a number. Plotting is done by

colorod tabs — indicating the location, direction and num­ ber of enemy raiders. — No plotting tabs --- represent

information more than 15 minutes old. "Tellers", on raised

seats on side of and overlooking the big map, with telephone

head-sets, report direct to Fighter Groups every change of

situation* as shown on the map, so that Group operation

maps are kept up to the minute with that of Command Head­ quarters. On the raised gallery the Operations Officer over

looks the large map and all the other maps or charts. He

has direct telephonic connections with the Commander in

Chief, Fighter Command, who in turn has direct, connections

with Fighter Groups, Coastal Command, Admiralty and Bomber

Command. Working with Operations Officor ore Admiralty and

Civil Air liaison officers.

M.A.R.40506-London-23 October 1939

The Antiaircraft Artillery headquarters, under the com­ mand of Lt. General Pile is located in the vicinity of the

Fighter Command headquarters. The Antiaircraft Artillery

in England, Scotland and Ireland consists of seven Antiair­ craft Divisions, oach Division of 5Qj0tX&men, which will bo

organized into three Corps. The main^wkon is the 3.7 inch

gun which has a maximum range of ab^^^O,000 feot, and is

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd)

credited with firing effectively at 28,000 feet.

From an operational point of view, the outstanding fea^

ture of the British Antiaircraft Artillery was the wny in

which it was effectively tied in with the Fighter Command,

in order to get Immediate action in cooperation therewith

in withholding its fire, opening fire, or in changing from

one condition to another in any particular section.

The British Antiaircraft authorities are going ahead in

the development and construction of bigger guns for their

large cities that will be able to fire effectively to 40,000

feet and above will, of necessity, have pressure cabins —

that will be very vulnerable — to shell fragments.

Observations on trip to England-15 December 1940

The Sector Operations Room — ( o f one of the Fighter Com­ mand Sectors)— has been moved — ( t o a school building) — .

— There are two operations rooms, one large room for the

Royal Air Force operations and one somewhat smaller for

the — Antiaircraft Brigade - Gun Layer Plotting Room. —

The gun layer Plotting Room had a large map of southern

England. There was a control officer and an enlisted assis­ tant, four women plotters; and one woman switchboard operator,

also one woman tracer who makes a record of the courses flown

by enemy planes and plotted from information received from

the gun layers. Gun layers are linked to plotters by tele­ phone, each plotter having from ono to three gun layers. —

Plotters use head and breast telephone sets. The gun layer

Control Officer, uses a head and breast set with ono earpiece

for communicating with the batteries and a hand microphone

for dealing with Royal Air Force plotter or sector control

officer. An antiaircraft liaison officer is on duty con­ stantly in the sector operations room and in telephonic com­ munication with the gun layer control officer and he keeps

in constant and close touch with the whole tactical situa­ tion, i.e. general course of raids, position of fighter air­ craft, etc. and it is his duty to anticipate the requirements

of the Sector Control and thus render the maximum assistance

to the Royal Air Force in the interception and destruction

of hostile aircraft. Normally the senior antiaircraft offi­ cer of the watch or on occasions the sector antiaircraft liai­ son officer is the gun layer control officer.

'

M.A.R.43391-London-26 June 1941

-227­

- AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cop&Vd). " """

>,

— ( i n general in the) - cbmaunications for aaf^antiaircraft

division * — in the Air Defenses, of'Great Britain. — Tho

commercial telephone lines are U3ed. Where they are not

available field wire is used, units connecting to the near­ est — commercial line. When communications were first

organized the lines were all routed into the city or main

switchboards. — Whon the cities were bombed communications

were disrupted. It is now tho practice to use lines going

around the cities so that communications are intact. No

trouble has been experienced since this practice was adopted.

M.A.R.43371-London-25 June 19^1

The communications — to and from a gun operations room in

the Air Defenses of Great Britain are as follows:

Gun Operations Room to Royal Air Force Group Operations

Room: Two way - receives from the Group Operations Room

plots of enemy aircraft and friendly aircraft (except fight­ ers) and gives to the Group Operations Room, plots and in­ formation about enemy aircraft, as required.

Gun Operations Room to Royal Air Force Sector Operations

Room: Two way - receives from Sector Operations Room, plots

and. information of friendly fighters and enemy aircraft not

.shown by Group Operations Room and gives to Sector Operations

Room, plots and information about enemy aircraft, as required.

Gun Operations Room to Balloon Barrage Controller; gives

plots of aircraft, as required; requests grounding and close-

hauling of balloons; gives warnings of impending low flying

attacks..

Gun Operations Room to Fire Service; receives information

from Fire Service of fires in gun defended areas so' that

particular areas can be given special protection.

Gun Operations Room to sub-Gun Operations Room: Two tele­ phone lines and one wireless link; gives to.sub-Gun Opera­ tions Room general information and particular directions and

receives from sub-Gun Operations Room plots of aircraft and

other.information such as Intelligence.

Sub-Gun Operations Room to Gun sites: Lines to those gun

sites detailed to give plots of enemy aircraft two lines;

one for receiving the plots from-the site, the other for

giving general information and particular plots and receiv­ ing information and intelligence. To otheri£te3 there is

one line for receiving and giving partic^jbld^lots, general

information and intelligence. At the-^uV^Qii^/w^erations Room

there is a switchboard that enables any ou4 .jfjdfe to be •

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd)

W d J

switched through to all the other sites in the

to direct a concentration should that method of conti

"be necossary.

A.A.C. #319.13/AUC-33-January 19^2.

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Plotter To R.A.F Sector

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To 2 R.A,­ F.Sectorg

Sector Aerodrome

To ­ Gun : Stations (

Operators

.Microphone Table

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Recorder

To Exchange

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Gun Control Naval ­ Lia- !• Officer I§on Office*­

DAIS 4 1 \

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Ufeftitw^­ VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (Cont'd)

Tho lethal radius of "burst of the British antiaircraft equip­ ments is taken as follows:

3-inch - 30 feet

3.7-inch - 60 feet (static and mobile).

k.5-inch - 90 feet

The above figures, it is believed, give a good indication'

of tho effectiveness of the three types of heavy antiair­ craft' guns. For the defense of a permanent vulnerable area

with static defenses it is felt that 4.5-inch guns are the

most desirable with 3.7-inch mobile available to augment tho

defenses of ono area or another in a mobile role. The Brit­ ish do not hesitate to move mobile regiments to areas they

consider are likely to be attacked or areas over which oneray

airplanes fly to attack other areas or what may bo consider­ ed as likely lines of approach.

M.A.P,.49026-London-22 July 19^2

Since tho start of hostilities enemy radio weather reports

have been received and readily broken down for use. Those

reports are of the greatest importance for successful oper­ ations over the continent, as very meagre and unreliable

forecasts would otherwiso result. The Germans have continu­ ally broadcast their weather by radio extending their net

to tho occupicd countries. , — Tho codes used have

broken down by the British. Sometimes thoy break them

by working back from a known synoptic.situation. • In other

cases the Germane havo v.ory foolishly sent out the weather

of a clear station such as Horta in the Azores. — The codcs

are changed rather infrequently. There is apparently no

schedule. Thoy change when they think it has been broken.

When they do change it is sometimes as long as two woeks be­ fore it is completely broken. During that period English

weather maps are very incomplete. Italian weather reports

have been easier to break down than the German. At the de­ coding desk a secret Italian code book was seen which may

explain the facility with which their weather code is broken.

Another factor which "has made Axis weather, easy to break Is

that the Italians havo not been changing their code at the ,

same time as tho Germans. Since thoy rebroadcast German

weather, it has often been just a matter of about two hours

to broak down tho Germans code. Ifo^ntly a change of

code was .made simultaneously and -e ono i dor able time to

break.

' '^?7-London-3 May 19^1

"232"

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd)

After Dunkerque the army was unable to defend all the air­ dromes. The Royal Air Force contemplated its own defense

"but found in "actuality the number of men required far sur

passed the original plans. — M a n y army officers felt that

airdrome defense interfered with raising an army, that many

"battalions scattered around the British Isles were restrict­ ed to individual training and accomplished little in ad­ vanced or organizational training. —

• BES-1^5-Washington,D.C.-lV May 19^1

— A f t e r much agitation in the press and in Parliament,

tho entire system of aerodrome defense has "been rehashed.

The Air Ministry has formed the Royal Air Force Regiment

(Corps) from existing ground defense personnel, which will

"be augmented "by transfer and recruiting. - The Royal Air

Force Regiments.are to provide the "hard core" of local

defense and trains other Royal Air Force station personnel,

who. are now to "be armed. A Major General — has "been loaned

"by the Army to the Air Ministry as Commandant, Royal Air

Force Regiment. He is responsible for the organization and

assignment of units of tho Royal Air Force Regiment, and

for the training of the Regiment, and advises on the train­ ing and dispositions of all Royal Air Force personnel for

aerodrome defense. In addition, he is to be Director of

Aerodrome Defense, Air Ministry. — Army Area Commanders

— retain the general responsibility for the defense of

their areas, including aerodromes therein. Royal Air Force

Station Commanders now command all personnel on their sta­ tions and are responsible for local aerodrome defense

against air attack, dir landing on or near their stations,

and ground attack. Antiaircraft guns remain under the com­ mand of Air Defense'of Great Britain and under operational

control of Fighter Command.

.....

M.A.R.46660-London-March 19^2

Tho amount and type of defense of an airdrome will depend

upon the distance the field is from the front and the effi­ ciency of the warning system. A standard defense system

cannot be applied to all airdromes, as the ones in the

combat area will require more, and those further behind the

lines — less, defense. —

The types of armed defense may

(l) A standing patrol in the at

- 233 ­

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British). (egnVd)

(2) drome. (3) (4) (5) (6)

A patrol.j&tggid^^i; warning on the air­

'anti^ircraft" a'6signed to ..field,.

Squadron personnel manning light machine guns.

Rockets. •• A balloon barrage.



(1) A standing patrol over the airdrome is probably the

best means of defense. However, this is too expensive in

man hours, equipment and fuel. — The real need for a

standing p a t r o l . — is when squadrons are working out of

an advanced field. There should be a patrol over the field,

whilo the planes are landing, being refueled, roarmed, tak­ ing off or until all aircraft are dispersed about the field.

(2) There should be a flight standing by during daylight

on the field at all airdromes that are within reach of en­ emy attack. The pilots may be on any of several stages of

call up — to sitting in planes, ready -to start engines to

take off. This will dopond upon the tine element and effi­ ciency of the warning system. - —

(3) At all airdromes or groups of airdromes sufficient

arcy antiaircraft .equipment should bo stationed.' In vicini­ ties where large scale, often repeated attacks are made, it

is impossible to have too much. Tho antiaircraft personnel

should be at stand by guns from ono half hour before dawn to

two hours after, and from two hours before sunset to one half

hour after, as these are the best times for surprise'attacks.

(4) While at all fields it is desirable to have army anti­ aircraft stationed, this is'Sometimes impossible or the anti­ aircraft will not arrive until the outfits havo boon at the

station for some time. Therefore, it.,is desirable for the

squadron to have its own antiaircraft machine guns for de­ fense against straffing. '•

(5) At valuable a i r d r o m e s ' r o c k e t projectors may be

placed around the circumference of the field. These will be

placed especially in places giving best moans -of approach

to- ground straffing planes. They can be electrically con­ trolled at a center point, preferably near operations and

— discharged in the path of straffing planes as they start

their approach on the field.

(6) The balloon barrage has — been, adequately covered

by observers in England,

*ton,D.C.-9 October 1941

• : / , . ;, BES-25I1

Airdrome Defense Ar^aig^ents' £&d 'Tactics as now conceived

-234-

- <-'

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British)

by the British include a defense-in-depth syotem>

Defended Localities characterized by field

-works plaiined

for mutual support and fire coverage. — Great emphasis

is laid on camouflage and concealment of such field worl

with preparation of alternative positions. Dummy air­ planes and dummy antiaircraft with flash equipment may "be

employed to mislead attackers, and the effort is to conceal

many of the true defense positions for surprise counter-at­ tack at a favorable moment. An adequate Mobile Reserve is

considered a prime necessity. It is asserted that the im­ portance of mobility, in case of ground attack, cannot be

overstressed; that static defense alone can never succeed;

and that the smaller the force in relation to its task, the

greater is the need for some portion of it to be mobile and

ready to take offensive action. It is felt there should be

no attempt to "ring" the airdrome with a series of defended

localities. Concealment is of more importance than an ex­ tensive field of fire, but each defended locality should

be so sited that fire can be developed in all directions.

The total defense system must be capable of effective action

upward, outward, and inward. —

In general, Defended Localities should comprise a number

of dug-in section posts, more or less elaborate, as facil­ ities may allow and the individual case demand. These range

in character from. Command Posts or Battle Headquarters with

deep shelters for telephone switchboards, map tables, runners,

and limited sleeping quarters, to mere slit trenches. Con­ crete or brick pillboxes may be employed sparingly as ma­ chine gun emplacements, ammunition or ration storage, or

communication centers. For all such works, the utmost con­ cealment is an absolute essential. Track discipline, strin­ gent fire control, and prevention of all movement during in­ itial stages of the attack must be- enforced, to prevent the

positions becoming known to the enemy before he is commit­ ted to the ground. The Mobile Reserve, a highly important

component of the defense, should be located in well conceal­ ed positions, where it will not suffer from preliminary

bombardments of the static defenses. It consists of such

light tanks, armored vehicles, troop carriers, motorcycles,

etc., as are available'. It is a striking force for use

against enemy concentrations which' may threaten the airdrome

from a-position where the attack cannot be engaged effec­ tively by the static defenses; for counter-attack on vital

part's of the static defense overrun by the enemy;- and for

swift descent on parachutists and a|Mfir-borne troops at

kv"-235­

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (British) (cont'd.)

:-> . the

41MB,, I

:

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Informational Intelligence Summary No. J5

6 July 19^2-A,A.C .#319.13/AUZ-35

a 41

- — The best areas for air landings — ( o n a certain British

defended island)--- have been .systematically obstructed. One

or noro of the following methods has been used*.

(l) Protected landing grounds, beyond runways, and satel­ .

lites -. concrete filled.tor barrele. . (2) Unguarded areas suitable for landing either with

a) Hummocks of earth irregularly spotted at about 50

feet intervals. Earth is excavated to about 10 - 12 inches

from a circular area and thrown into center.

b) Double Furrows spaced at about 100.yard intervals

and 200 yards long arranged checkerboard fashion. The Royal

Air Force would like continuous ditohos at. 100 .yards, at

least 3 feet wide and 2 deep, but this — has been out

of the question. About 50 square mileB of possible landing

grounds have beon obstructed in.one or other of those fash­ ions. .

M.A.R.2014-Cairo,5 November 19^1

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German)

The basic defense of the German Gun Defended areas is static,

guns usually being.in concrete emplacements and hutments be­ ing provided for the personnel. It is known, however, that

use is made of guns on railway mountings and that in some

areas a; small proportion of the ordinary defences is mobile,

with the result that the gun and searchlight densities cah

be altered at short notice. It is probable that thesk mobile

units are chiefly deployed in relation to dummy installations,

with the object, of deception as to tho actual location of the

target.- In a gun defended area heavy guns are generally sited

in the outskirts with a bias in favour of.the' ejected lines

of; approach and with a certain number of positions in the

town itself where suitable locations are available. Light

guns-are concentrated at particularly vulnerable points,

such as factories, docks, etc., and, are qccasi.onally sited

on likely lines of. approach, along canals, rivers or arte­ rial roads. The disposition of defencc-s round an'isolated

vulnerable, point presents', a special problem which varies

•a% i %V • - A,

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'

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VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German) (cont'd)

with the particular nature of the target. Aero&rpmos, for"

example, are provided with lavish protection — eight' or

possibly 12 heavy guns and 12 to 30 light guns; tho heaVy

guns are usually sighted no nearer than 2,000 yards and

the majority of light guns no nearer than 500 yards from

the perimeter.

Air Min. Weekly Int. Summary up to 27 May 19^2-#143

Thero are three German airdromes in occupied France

with the following antiaircraft defenses:

Airdrome Heavy Antiaircraft Light Antiaircraft

Guns Guns 1 12 42 2 8 30

3

8

27

In addition, there are several antiaircraft searchlights

In one of our previous reports, we "brought out that the mini­ mum scale of light antiaircraft guns used by Germans in de­ fense of airdromes was twenty-seven. —

M.A. R. 46684-London-20 February 19*1-2

There wore two raids by the Royal Air Force on (Berlin

o n ) — the night mentioned; ono lasting from 9:10 - 11:25 p.m.

and the other from 2:30 - 4:30 a.m. ---. The most important

observation that was made during the air raids was that the

characteristics of the antiaircraft defenses of Berlin were

changed entirely between the two raids. During the first

raid, British action seomod to be concentrated to the north­ west (dummy objective area) and to the•southeast (Potsdam

area). Several planes flew over the ciity at fairly low

altitudes and could be distinctly heard in spite of the

wind and gusts of rain. Not a single battery in the city

opened fire even though one plane dropped a salvo of bombs

in the Tiorgarten - Zoo area just north of our observation

post. Ono piano flew over the entire city from southeast

to northwest at a reasonably low altitude. Not a round was

fired until the plane reached the critical zone around the

dummy objectives about 20 miles northwest of the center of

Berlin when there was a violent artillery reaction.

Ill ere is no evidence of the use of night fighters during

either of tho two attacks. The defensive system was

changed entirely during the seqoii%r^,id. The batteries in

the city itself opened fire fr/ n ^ targets within

- 237­

—

'

.

IP

—



'H ^' • "I > % L i W VI DEFENSE SYSTEMS- (German) (cont'd) % «'s 0* -i'-; ^ The battery on the two towors in the zoo used flahsless powder that made the discharges barely visi­ ble at our observation post which is only'about 650 yards distant. — It isvlikely that all batteries in the city use flashless powder in order to conceal their location. With the low clouds reflecting the flash of the discharge, the firing of the batteries located in the rings about the city could, be seen for many miles. .The use of flashless powder for the batteries in the city and tho use of non­ flashless powder for batteries outside the city suggests another method of creating deception. From our reconnaissances, we have learned that gun bat­ teries are rathor evenly distributed throughout the city as well as in three rings about the city. The batteries in tho city and on the two inner rings are about 5*000 meters apart. With this arrangement, it would be very easy to change the apparent location of the rings of bat­ teries. The mobile defense force can be used :to make such a change seem more realistic. By Varying the use of flashless and non-flashless powder, the confusion for the at­ tacking formations can be increased. — M.A.E.18753-Berlin,Germany-10 November 19^1

During the British and Russian air raids during the month

of August, 19^1 — ( i t was evident t h a t ) — tho heavy Ger­ man Antiaircraft Artillery — had increased its fire pow­ er considerably..- — It was noted that the guns of some

of the batteries had been increased in number from four to

six. —

. " .» M. A. R.18592-Berlin,Germany-28 August 19^1

- — A new antiaircraft tower is boing constructed at'Ges­ undbrunnen in north Berlin. It is said that this tower is

part of a general system of Flak towers being constructed

in tho city. The average distance between towors is about

6,000 meters-. There are really two towers in oach instal­ lation, one of which has the fire control apparatus mounted

on the top thereof and the other with the four:guns on

each corner of the top. —

M.A.R.18808-Berlin-28 November 19^1.

Further details — - of the Flak Tqwe a

w •

, . *

i *

Berlin give

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German) (contM)

the dimensions of those towers as 250-ft. square arJff&ore

than 100-ft. high, each with a slightly smaller rectangu­ lar satellite tower at about 350 yards distance. On each

large tower, 4 heavy and 12 light guns and what appears

to. he a radiolocation instrument. Apart from the value

of those massive towers as Flak positions, It is thought

that they may "be part of the Control system. Berlin's

defences as a w h o l e — ( o r e estimated t o ) — amount to:­ 2^0 Heavy guns

300 Light guns

125 Searchlights.

These cover on area approximately 12 miles to the North,

East and South, and 20 miles to the west to include Pots-

dam.

Incl. #1-M. A. R. -London-30 January 19^2

The Berlin municipal area proper extends almost 20 kilo­ meters from N to S and about 16 kilometers W to E. —

For the past year Flak towers have been erected. The two

most outstanding ones are in tho TIergarten. These are

very massive towers, built of steel and concrete. --- The

special construction of these towers, among other things

with embrasures and armored doors pointing downward make

them appear also useable for other purposes in connection

with an infantry action. —

134/FQ-Germany-6 February 19^2

V

'i

i

\

In Berlin, in the Tiergarten and in the Friedrichshain,

there are two concrete towers approximately 250 feet square

and more than 100 feet high, each with a slightly smaller

rectangular "satellite" tower at about 350 yards distance.

On each main tower k heavy and 12 light guns are mounted,

while on the "satellites" are k light guns and what appears

to be a radiolocation instrument. Apart from the value of

these towers as Flak positions, it is thought they may poss­ ibly be part of the control system.

M.A.L.4698^BfWLon-17 March 19^2

I

In Eierlin, in the Tiergarten and in the Fr iedrichshain,

there are two concrete towers approximately 250 feet'square

and more than 100 feet high, each with a slightly smaller •

rectangular "satellite" tower at about 350 yards distance.

On each main tower b heavy and 12 light guns are mounted,

while on the "satellites" are 4 'light guns and what appears

to "be a radiolocation instrument. Apart from the value of

. these towers as Flak positions,, it is thought they may poss­ ibly be x>art of the control svateutw

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German), CeontM)

tfee'-'I'slands. of Aldorney

A recent repprt pn the defences and Guernsey - - - (now held tile Germans)— shows that

these two islands are" sua^prisingly well defended. Tho

small island of A^fiferney has a complete mixed antiaircraft

Abteilung, comprising twelve heavy and thirty light anti­ aircraft guns, as well as four heavy coast defense guns

(with two more emplacements under construction), numerous

pill-"boxes and machine gun emplacements, and a most exten­ sive system of wire entanglements over the entire."island.

The larger island of Guernsey has at least twenty-eight

heavy and.fourteen light antiaircraft guns in seven posi­ tions, and nine coast defence "batteries. Crews of air­ craft which have flown over the Islands on recent nights

have reported — heavy flak "unseen target" fire, appar­ ently predictor controlled from Guernsey and Jersey.

M.A.R.47285-London-7 April 1942

The Germans have a general warning net. — The aircraft

warning service (Flugmeldedienst) net covers the entire

area of Germany and occupied territories. Observation

stations are about ten kilometers (6.25 miles) apart.

These observation stations warn their centrals who In

turn warn neighbouring centrals. Tho centrals plot the

course of the enemy aircraft from reports from their ob­ servation stations and transmit the information to the

antiaircraft artillery, pursuit aviation, and other warning

contrals. — The German antiaircraft artillery also has

its own local intelligence system. —

M.A.R.18739-Berlin-5 November 1941

In Berlin a small lake in the western part of the city,

has been entirely covered with a superstructure to mako it

blend with the buildings and the park in that, vicinity.

This region had suffered considerably during earlier raids.

Military objectives in that area include an important radio

tower (Funkturm) and the immediate vicinity ab'out the base

thereof have been disguised with netting and artificial

trees and other vegetation. The most important distin­ guishing landmark in Berlin is tho wide avenue running .

east and west through the cityj|^ttlMjalled the "Axis." —

During recent weeks an overhecu| c-av^r of wire netting inter

woven with greon materials to-rqse^fl e vegetation has cov­ ered one half of the.avenue ext^Kfing from the Victory Monu

^ - > >

k

v " -242­

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (German) (cont'd)

ment for a distance of approximately 600 meters. — The

paved surfaces of the vide avenue itself havo "been sprayed

a dark green color to blend with the trees in the Tier­ garten — . It is evident that the air raid protection

organizations are endeavoring to break up the straight

line which runs through the city and which can so readily

be seen from the air at night. The tower of the Reichstag

- — which was formerly painted a bright gold color, has

now been painted a dull gray. On the outskirts of the city

the paved surface of the Reichsautobahnen have been spray-,

ed with a dull colored creosote mixutre to prevent light

rofloction. — Local air raid defense organizations are

carrying out a wide spread camouflage program to mako it ,

difficult for onomy flyors to orient themselves and thus

locate important military objectives. — False installa-.

tions have — boon — erected outside of the city of Ber­ lin, particularly in tho west, to resomblo distinguishing

landmarks which are in the city itself. —

M.A.R.18507-Berlin-22 July 19^1

The German air raid protection organizations ("Luftschultz")

have been working intensively in improving passive defense

measures in and about tho city. Work along tho Axis indi­ cates that the entire section of the avenue which runs east

and west through the "Tiergarten" is to be camouflaged. —

M.A.R.18592-Berlin-28 August 19>1

Charlottenburger-chausee, main oast-west highway running

wost from tho Bradenburger through the Tiergarten on to

Potsdam, has — boon heavily camouflaged with heavy net­ ting supported by stool posts, in turn coverod with green

material. Real tree-tops are set in this material at irregu­ lar Intervals and small scaffoldings to represent bushes

are constructed above the netting. This camouflaging ex­ tended as far as tho Grosse Stern, where preparations were

being made to camouflage tho large statue in its center and

to continue the camouflage along the Charlottenburger-chau­ see.~ Source had heard report that whole waterway system

Wannseo-Havel-Tegelsoe has been duplicated a considerable

distance west of tho city. --'­ M.I.D.-New York-R.1911-1 Novei

- 243 ­

f f1 • _

VI - AIR D t e N S E SYSTEMS (Miscellaneous)

The harbor ---(at Murmansk)-— |p?#lgpcted with antiair­ craft; each dock has two guns, "believed to

"be the Oerlickon type, which are "by gun crews twenty-

four hours a day. The air patrol of the harbor is con­ stant and the morale of the people on shore, who seem to-,

be very friendly and choerful, Is good. --­ Incl.#I-Rpt. -Conditions Existing at Murmansk

9 June 19^2-Serial JJO.M+22-AAC-I35/BK

On March 5., 19^1 the following brief official announcement

was made in Rome. "The antiaircraft protection of the

country has been transferred from the Ministry of War to

th'e Ministry of Interior". 'Initially the ground defense

against aircraft was entrusted to the Fascist Militia. The

Militia proved to be very ineffective in its efforts and to

increase its efficiency the antiaircraft miiitia units were

placed under the Ministry of War. There was a great deal

of friction between the Army and Militia units and the

antiaircraft defenses suffered accordingly, — In Rome to

date people were reported to have boon killed by antiair­ craft fire, although no bombs have been dropped and prob­ ably no enemy aircraft have flown over the city. The Ital­ ians describe antiaircraft as the "sutarchic" arm because

as they say, all the guns are Italian, all the officers

are Italian, all.the men are Italian, all the shells are

Italian and all the casualties have been Italian. The

transfer of the antiaircraft protection to the Ministry of

Interior will remove some of the friction between the Army

and the Militia, but most observers — fail to see how

the — change can serve to increase the effectiveness of ­ the defense against --- enemy — aircraft. •'

M. A. R. 17836-Rome, Italy-11 March 19^2

'

In,the Air Defense Warning System --- the observers at the

outlying stations perform their duties in a most commend- .

able manner. They are particularly good at accurate iden­ tification by typo and number, even at night and during

overcast weather. They are extremely reliable, and de­ spite constant air raids, on only one occasion, two years

ago, did enemy aircraft come in unwarned. --- Since near­ ly all Japanese air fields are in occupied China it has

been possible to use spies who contact the warning net as

soon as the enemy makes preparations for a raid. — The

I 8

jR O C ^ ' g i T f

l | 'ii V fe I

it

VI - AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (Miscellaneous)

warning net usually goes into operation when enemy planes

prepare to leave their field. This information Is radioed

by spies. Planes are under observation by distant stations

which operate a North-South and East-West telephone net

corresponding to grids on the master defense chartf — At

a distance of 15 minutes flying time, an emergency signal

is given, at which time all movement stops, dugouts ard

closed, and ground defenses go into action. An air force-

cooperation net is maintained at all times for identifica­ tion of friendly aircraft. At the- time the emergency alarm

is given, the intelligence personnel can usually predict

the arrival of enemy aircraft within one minute. —

M.A.R.#16-China-September 19UI

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

(l)* Page 5 - Inclosure #1 - The Kutonase Anti-Balloon

Device.

A.A.C.#319.13/AUF-11

-245­

w

The concept

of the operation was highly imaginative, daringly new. Com­ bat elements drawn from Central' Europe moved with precision

into funnel shaped Greece. Here they re-formed, took shape

as a balanced force, were given wings. The operation had

the movement, rhythm, harmony of a master's organ composi­ tion." On 20 May and succeeding days this force soared

through space; its elements broke over Crete in thundering

crescendos - all stops out. For the first time in history

air-borne troops, supplied and supported b~ air, landed in

the face of an enemy, defeated him* For the first time an

air force defeated a first-rate Navy, inflicted such stag­ gering losses that, the fleet was ordered back to Alexandria

three days after the battle started. In the spring of 1941

the British forces in Middle East were spread too thin.

With inadequate means to justify the expedition^ Great Britiaj

made a valiant attempt to carry the war from Africa to

Europe* In Greece this attempt failed. Lack of sea trans­ port and force of naval circumstances dictated that evacues

from Greece be taken to Crete rather than Egypto At Crete,

with time and means limited, defenses were stiffened, but

effective preliminary and superb hand to hand fight­ ing were not enougha Crete fell because the British had

no air power to oppose the German air invasion, Soon

after dawn 20 May the Luftwaffe struck the Kaleme-Canea

area in Crete. The objective was to silence antiaircraft

batteries and to prevent use of roads between Suda and

Maleme. At Maleme the attack was especially heavy. The

New Zealand 22nd Battlaion gurdir g Maleme airdrome was

heavily bombarded and machine gunned for ninety minutes

bv Ju 87's, Ju 88's, Me 109's, Me 110's. Intensity was so

terrific that everyone was dri.en to slit trenches; some

participants claim the severity of the attack exceeded the

heaviest artillery preparations of the Viorld War. Before

the dense cloud resulting from this attack lifted, fifty

gliders had landed in the dry river bed directly in front

and to the west of the 22nd Battalion. - — The big scale

Blitz was an awful spectacle. General Freyberg relates how

he stood on a hill watching the attack over Maleme enthralled

by the magnitude of the operation. While he was watch­ ing the bombers he suddenly became aware of the great throb­ bing, or overtone, during the moments of comparative quiet.

Looking to sea he saw hundreds of planes, tier upon tier,

slow moving troop car-

P had been expecting. They

- 246­

VII - OPERATIONS

(cont'd)



/;

circled counter.clock-wise over Maleme airdrome and'w the«, J* SIZI only 200 feet above the ground, as if by magic white

suddenly appeared beneath the planes. Colored clouds oj

parachutists floated slowly to earth* The dry stream banks

afforded shelter, to the glider-borne troops who landed there.

Fully armed and organized as combat teams, troops poured out

of gliders, took up positions facing the 22nd Battalion so

as to cover their parachutists landing west of the stream

bed* Flying at low altitude in circles whose center, was

about a half mile west of the 22'nd Battalion position, Nazi

fighters covered the descent of the parachutists b'r contin­ uous muraerous straffing of ground troops, Most of 'the para­ chutists who landed near defending troops ware killed. Some

who landed on the Maieme-Canoa road interrupted communica­ tions, On the airdrome defending troops were overwhelmed

by parachutists who, with stores and equipment, actually

landed on top of them. To the eafet and west of the airdrome

Ju 52's crash-landed on the beaches, disgorged troops. The

eastern group threatened the rear of the 22nd Battalion; »

the western group joined those in the wadi. The wadi troops

„ formed the nucleus of the forces which eventually captured

J '

the island, The day of bitter fighting was replete with intense bom­ bardment and straffing. The New" Zealanders made eight suc­ cessful bayonet charges; murderous air attacks froced them

to relinquish their gains.. During the night, the 22nd Bat­ talion withdrew a half mile to the e'ast, Maleme airdrome,

however, was still held under.artillery and machine gun-fire,

Thursday 22nd - Day 3 - at dawn two. battalions of the New

Zealand Division attacked with bayonett, reached Maleme air­ drome, The fierceness of the fighting was not surpassed by

anything the participating officers had seen at Gallapoli or

in France in the first World War. But during daylight no

troops cuuld hold the airdrome. Under the murderous fire'

power, which four hundred .unopposed fighters delivered,

troops were dive bombed and machine gunned off the airdrome,

driven back, held in cover positions, On the Akrotiri

Peninsula eleven gliders landed soon after dawn. These

troops, as well as those who landed about Suda Bay, attacked

antiaircraft..gun crews. Few antiaircraft gunners had rifles;

their losses were heavy," Throughout entire day air- !

borne troops^ poured in, quickly builjfing resh formidable ° ! "' 1 r **

smonstrated

forces* The" operations^ about Crete&pi'' .thftut fighter

the complete inability of a fleet to ejfis *|ority,

support in waters over which the enemy he if

-247­

VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd)

**



^ i % \

dn

e %effectiverfeas^ Naval

Antiaircraft

% Shadov#1|>|t Mfe screen of the .magical Radio Detection Finder

gave aj^Je warning. Qf^thfe approach of aircraft. Yet through­ out the:. aciibrf^bur American Naval Observer had knowledge of

only two planes shot down Q.Sy cable No. 1950 B.F.F.); our

iunerican vVar correspondent on the Valiant off Kythera Straits

saw only seven shot down (Appendix 1, page 5J• In some cases

of major damage or sinking the air attack had been of such

intensity and duration and the naval barrages put up had % ,

been so wasteful and ineffective that the vessels were out

of ammunition long before the bombing ceased. Saturday 24th

- Day 5 - The German intensified his air attacks, strength­ ened his forces with fresh, newly arrived airborne troops,

prepared to attack the New Zealand position. All British

troops were very tired. Fighting had been savage; man to ,

man British forces were superior. But unfortunately this

was not a man to man battle. Air support gave the German

tremendous advantage. At eight in the evening the Ger- *

man broke trhrough the New Zealand position, captured Gala-.

tos;the tired 18th and 20th Battalions counter-attacked with

the bayonet, retook the village, General Freyberg rates this

bayonet attack one of the great efforts of the Crete defense.

It is reported that Germans have erected a joint German-New

Zealand memorial at Galatos. So far astheroism is con­ cerned possibly there are no more valiant deeds in British

history than those of the Navy in attempting to supply, de­ fend and evacuate Crete. But the fact that in eight days

the Nazi attack drove the'Navy to Egypt, forced an evacua­ tion -which left more than half the -arrison behind, testi­ fies to the total inability of a Navy to operate in waters

ove. which the enemy controls the air.

Because the German attack was successful one is likeljr to

gather the impression that there had been little antiair­ craft fire to be silenced. About the two by six mile

horse-shoe shaped Suda Bay the British placed four batteries,

each with four 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns; five sections

each with two 3-inch antiaircraft guns; 16 Bofors; two. 50­ caliber four barrel machine guns and a number of ,303-cali­ ber machine guns (Map LA)* In speit of this impressive

air defense Suda Bay was untenable for vessels. At Maleme

airdrome two 3-inch antiaircraft, guns, 10 Bofors, were put

out of action quickly on.the 20th, At Heraklion airdrome

wer e four 3-inch antiaircraft guns* 10 Bofors, 2 Pom Poms, ­ Each airdrome had about foriy machine guns. Retimo had no

antiaircraft protection exbepWiachine guns. No complete

data is available showingHtf(e vlabses antiaircraft guns in­ flicted. Lieuteneat-. Hugh.e'$^v$j|Jpommanded the Bofors at

VII - OPERATIONS (contld)

of re­ Suda Bay, reports hits wore nume] l|pt down,

ports available discloses only a few 'pi^jei kMcsni%On

On 10 May a Bofors shot down two bombers the 16th antiaircraft at Heraklion shot down

ana destroyed three Others, Anti air craft fire, on

drove off thirty 109's from Mai e •.. e airdrome- and snoi

one Do 17. -.On the.18th ^antiaircraft shot down one, plane,

the 20th at Heraklion antiaircraft shot down sixteen.out Of

130 troop carriers. Due to extraordinary battle confusion

no list-of-planes shot down after the 20th exists, — ­ That sites for airdromes must be selected with a view to

•I-heir defense against air and land attacks and that, at. air­ dromes of importance, defenses must be prepared as thoroughly

as-are modern.harbor defenses, That based on the experience

of-the British during the Crete operation it is clear that

no island, or canal, or strategic area can be considered secure

unt.il all bases within effective Air Force range .can be' denied

the enemy,

M.A.R,19B7-Cairo, Egypt-8 September 1941 '

The.two Antiaircraft Regiments employed inoperations in

Cyreniaca (early in 1941) were-each provided with a

workshop (R.A.O.C.) ;

vis; 51 Heavy Antiaircraft Workshop section

13 Light Antiaircraft Workshop section

Owing to the large area and the necessary tactical grouping

of Heavy and Light Antiaircraft guns, each Section had to be

responsible for both types of gun in a-certain area, (The

Light Antiaircraft Guns included 40 mm, Bofors and 20

mm* Bredas), In fact at one stage it was necessary to

split the Heavy Antiaircraft Workshop Section into parts.

M.A,R,43463-London-5 July 1941

During the period 11 A p r i ^ , 2 4 fy^J-941, (forty-seven)—

dive bombing attacks wereCtade on the T ^ r ^ area. Apart

from damaging shipping tfie-amount o M ( ^ a f | 4one — ( w a s

inconsequential) in proportion to'* the" weight • of'^e^rt-r.

tacks. This was not due to lack.of determined spir^forJ^ljie

part of the attack but to the deterrent effect" of thi

and Light Antiaircraft fire offered by the defense^ ^ A M b f

959 dive bomber aircraft which attacked during the period

11 April to 27 June 1941, fifty-five were destroyed forcer-,

tain by antiaircraft fire* — Of 47 attacks, eleven includ­

-249­

VII - OPERATIONS(contM)f^MlIIM ed deliberate afl^^q^s^oa.'Heavy Antiaircraft Gun Sites. This

is apart from nuirterpus 'machine gun attacks made by Ju 87s and

fighters on Light "Antiaircraft Positions during the"dive

bombing attachs. Some gun sections showed high morale and

good training and were able to withstand Stuka attacks and

turn the attacks into routs. Other sections by a lower stand­ ard' of training, a lack of ."quick-thinking" by their officers

and Nos. 1, and carelessness in providing proper protection

failed initially in driving off the enemy. The enemy gave

these latter positions little rest. A crucial moment in a

dive bombing attack on a Heavy gun site is when - — ( i t must

be decided whether-or not) the personnel — shall take

cover. - — The first dive bomber may be above the gun sec­ tion — - at 4000 feet. A ferocious burst of fire at this

moment from the guns will make hi71 release his bombs prema­ turely and make his successors pause in their attack. Com­ plete silence at this moment if the section goes to ground

will probably - — allow every Stuka in the formation to

pick the arm position as a mark and come-down to 500

feet. Then, and only then, will guns and command, posts be

damaged and personnel killed. Experience has indicated

that if the section fights and fights for all it is worth

a single bomb may hit a gun pit but it will be rare.

Heavy gun positions should be four gun stations if they are

to protect themselves effectively against Stuka attacks./

Stuka attacks can usually be divided into.either:

(1) Direct attack on gun positions from several directions

at once.

(2) A neutralizing attack on a gun position to prevent its

giving protection to some neighboring vulnerable area which is

also being attacke.d. r

The light Antiaircraft in Tobruk has been singled cut for iso­ lated attacks on their gun positions by individual aircraft.

But there have been no concerted attacks on them by fighters.

The reason for this is that guns in the perimeter are well

camouflaged and often moved, and planes dare not fly low over

the harbor, vvhen isolated attacks have occured de­ tachments have acquitted themselves well. It is agreed that

these-detachments -—.would fight better if an arrored shield

"were "provided:for them and if dummy guns — - are emplaoed

to draw —-(the enemy fire)—-£tfote; The British were:not

equipped with .50 caliber ad^kmcraft'machine guns.) ­ " % M ,1^74-London-11 September 1941

>

~

V



In more tJ^i^.onV ca^j Bofors were used to cover the rear sub­ -25O­

f ^ M l

VII - OPERATIONS (contM)

„

I

I

k

M

formations of withdrawing columns, They ha

mainly in an antitank role. The ground on their line •

of withdrawal was on occasions badly cut up and resulted

in guns being "bogged", and overrun by enemy armored forcp

vehicles. This resulted in losses of antiaircraft equip­ ment which could ill be spared, .

Experience in Employment of AA units in Middle East

Supplement to Rpt.#4 (Part - I)

On the 5th of December the 7th Brigade, motorized, was form­ ing to continue its advance when the Brigade.group was at­ tacked from the. rear b; seven Messerschmidt M-llOs flying

at not over a hundred feet. The planes flew completely

over our formation, machine gunning and firing cannon. The

drivers and other personnel ran from their vehicles and lay

flat on the ground. Two men were killed and eight wounded

in the attack, many vehicles were hit, two bullets went

through the Brigadier's car, but all vehicles ere able to

continue in the column. This was the first experience of

the Brigade in this form of attack. rJe had no slit trenches

as we were not in a camp area and fire was not, on this oc­ casion, returned from the ground. After this the Brigade was

straffed from the air and dived bombed a number of times.%

Slit trenches uug at least, ten yards, from the vehicles pro­ vided almost perfect protection. A dive bombing attack

provides the best instructions that can be given of the

necessity for digging. The Brigade now automatically digs

in at every halt of any duration. The trench need not be

deep, just enough that the body of the man is below the sur­ face of the ground. After the first attack, all low eleva­ tion and dive bombing attacks were replied to be Bren guns .

mounted for antiaircraft fire, by Bofors antiaircraft, and'

by the men firing rifles from slit trenches. "Almost always

the Brigade brought down at least one of the attacking planes.

Casualties were negligible - — . The most disagreeable form

of attack from the viewpoint of.ground troops.is the machine

gun attack. Low flying planes and dive bombers can be shot

down by•a sufficient.volume of small arms fire and.the morale

effect of-replying by fire to such attacks is of great impor­ tance, If our training does not now require that-slit trenches

be dug" habitually at the halt it should be required.

•• * M. A.R. 21A0-Cairo, Egypt-11 January 1942 •

During • the whole of the .per^d i^f-^frjjm ^tS|.,27%Decembei

-251­

VII - OPERATIONS

the 57th Light Mt^^rcraft Regiment in the middle east

wa§, -actively er^Jaged in its —-- pursuit,of aerial targets,;

and, hac^ duels with no less that 7B'0 aircraft in 187 engage­ ment^, -Tfle attacks were malnlr delivered on motor trans­ port concentrations but division Headquarters was a partic­ ular objective of the Ju 87* One of the most noticeable

features of these duels was the extreme respect with which

the bomber treated "f.la'k" his approach being at greater

heights and his dive shallower on each successive occasion.

There can be no doubt that the Light Antiaircraft complete­ ly spoilt his aim and helped to maintain the morale of the

ground troops. The majority of this fire was outside nor­ mal Bofors range but it served its purpose. Eighteen enemy

aircraft were destroyed by the Regiment during the period,

Unfortunately no Me 109F's were bagged. These fleet

"birc.sn give little opportunity for practice,

M..i.a .2272-Cairo Egypt-1 March 1942

On une occasion the enemy used a captured Hurricane to

lead a force of fighters and bombers which attacked one

of our (British) landing grounds. The Hurricane

approached the aerodrome at a low altitude with its wheels,

down. On another occasion an attack on a formation Battle

Headquarters was preceded by a reconnaissance by an old

type of craft which circled slowly as though about to land,

but made off as soon as light antiaircraft opened fire.

No,47074-23 March 1942-AAC#319.13/AUF~15

On 28 January, "A" Troop of the 57th Light Antiaircraft Regiment was part of a mobile column south of Bengazi mov­ ing along the main road towards Bengazi, H. spotter on one of the guns suddenl" observed a Me 110 flying fast down the road towards them at a height of approximately 50 feet.. He ' gave the warning, and the gun was dropped into action. The Me 110 was now almost on JLOP of the gun and there was np time to unload any a m m u n i t ^ n W ^ m the Tractor, There were, how­ ever, seven round^fb^^aci^/jki the auto-loader and No. 8 ­ the layer f o r N o , 4 - the firing number ­ leaped te t^irv^^ijiwns, No. 7 - the layer for line - had not yet ^et to his seat and so No, 10, as the Me, llQC^El^shfedfoJ&^machine-gunning at a range of not more than

ifeom the gun, pulled the gun onto the target with

^eVt^LV^i'sing lever and ordered "Fire." The fifth round-

plane full in the fuselage and brought it in flames

- 252 ­

VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd)

" •"



to the ground. Meanwhile, the other two guns were engagim

a second. Me 110 which had appeared, and drove it away. A

few minutes later, a force of fourteen Stukas and eight Me

109s, flew over the column and wore engaged "by the Bofors.

One Stuka crashed within a few yards of a gun; another was

hit and crashed 3 miles to the South, the latter "being con­ firmed "by the Battery Command 'of 31 Forward Battery Royal

Artillery. In these three engagements the troop expended

113 rounds of ammunition. Their "bagtfasfour Stukas, one

Me 110, and one CR 42. All these (destroyed enemy)-­ planes were seen on the ground.

M.A.L.48165-London-2 June 1942

---(The South African Division u s e d ) — the town of Mersa

Matruh — ( i n North A f r i c a ) — very little — for shelter,

the unit preferring to use open and less conspicuous areas.

The relatively few casualties in spite of numerous Axis air

"bombings attests to the soundness of this course of action;

BES-353-Waahington-24 July 1942

Heavy Gun Positions have not so far as known "been directly -:

attacked in Great Britain — . Several gun positions

have been hit by bombs at night but this is thought to have

been — - by chance. Recently the fir3t Womens Auxiliary

Territorial Service casualty occurred on a Mixed Heavy An­ tiaircraft Gun Site. The conduct of the remainder of the

ATC crew was gratifying, another ATS took tho place of

the casualty and the firing continued.

M.A.R.47594-London-27 April 1942

During an attack on one of our aerodromes at night an

enemy aircraft flashed its landing light several times • — .

It then approached as if to land but at about 50 feet

opened fire at the aerodrome floodlight and then attacked a

Hurricane circling the aerodrome.

BAC Technical Services Memo. #8

21-May 194l-OCjA#|§3j,13l/OG

Total numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed or d

tiaircraft fire to 6 June 1942 ---on the Air Defen

Great Britain have been:­

- 253 ­

BSUs&ign *

CAT. 1. 629

CAT. 2. CAT. 3.

206 274 M.A.L.48364-6 June 1942

— ( i n Great Britain)--?- the antiaircraft defense of

has --- "been largely taken over "by rockets (80 to 100

single projectors). In one attack on this place in May two

salvos from tho — ( R o c k e t ) — "batteries "brought down two

planes at night.

N.A.R.Ser.M-l:X-29-Great Britain-3 July 1941

During recent air attacks over Berlin and its suburbs,

cloud "banks have "been seen to form and "blanket whole areas.

It was particularly marked in the early morning of one at­ tack, — - When the British attacked two airplane factories

at Oranidriburg Worth of Berlin. When the air attack first

appeared a light thin cloud layer at an altitude of about

500 feet was noticed. As time passed, the cloud layer

grew denser and after a half hour tho cloud bank was quite

thick and extended fVom the ground up to a thousand foet.

Except over Oranienburg, the sky was quite clear. The

only other information available is that the artificial

smoke is quite expensive, — an admission that such a

means exists.

M.A.R.17694-Berlin,Germany-8 November 1940

Billancourt — (Renault works near P a r i s ) — had not a

single antiaircraft gun or searchlight for its defense.

With the result that the Royal Air Force was able to de­ stroy its target with unhurried and devastating accuracy.

Unopposed by gunfire, untroubled by searchlight beams, the

bombers were able to fly as low as a thousand feet over

their objective. The situation was aptly summed up by a

remark from Royal Air Force sources — "you don't real­ ize the value of Ack Ack until thore isn't any".

' M.A.L.47190-London-1 April 1942

A Wellington bomber on.$ -n%ght mission struck by antiair­ craft fire.'"iras inspected on. tho ground the next morning

ft England)--. The pilot stated that he was flying

- 254­



VII - OPERATIONS (contld)

at 19>000 feet over a solid overcast, when the^

of antiaircraft fire was so close that the plane*%<

small splinters, These did superficial damage oni;

A B-17 "bomber conducting a daylight raid on Brest

ing at 27,000 foet when i,t was fired on "by ant i aircraft^

Tho "bursts we're correct for altitude "but fell about 700

yards short. —

• M. A. R.44060-London-15 August 1941

One aircraft when at 18,000 feet within 5 miles of the Dutch

coast, abeerved one large Flak burst dead ahead at 20,000

feet. Feathered sparks resembling those of a rocket fell

from the burst. Some 5 seconds later, a parachute flare

appeared dead.ahead and accurate for height.., Tho interfer­ ence was that the flare was fired from a Heavy.Antiaircraft

gun to indicate to night fighters the point where the air­ craft crossed the coast.

Hq. A. A. Command -" G-lenthorn", Stonmore,Middx. -28 February 1942

Camouflage -- During a, recent daylight sweep, a number of

Mo. 109fs were encountered camouflaged white underneath.

This —(tended to)--- make'them invisible from about 1,000

feet below.

Incl. #1-M. A. R.44495-London-13 September 19^1

Normal enemy tactics — ( a t Malta between Pecember and May

19^2 h a v o ) — consisted mainly of mass attacks at regular in­ tervals by day. Every morning, mid-dhy and.;Evening he would

send over up to 75 wingers. The Ju.88s apprptched at from

18,000 to 12,000 feet, shallow diving to \6,<500,J5pet, while

the Ju.87s employed steep dives often feirfti one objec­ tive while the main attack was aimed at a secon< e enemy

made skilful use of cloud and evasive action ter

escorts were always employed.. Direct attacks e .on:

antiaircraft gun positions, but if fire was maiii^a; small

casualties and little damage to equipment was experi

A system of rest rosters insuring that every j&m

hours.ponsecutive sleep and one hot meal per 24 ho e-

suited in the personnel standing the strain well.

M.A.R.48205-London-4 June 19^2

-255­

VII - OPERATIONS (cont

— A Germair Iceland on l4th May was identified

as Focke Motors wore unusually quiet. - —

It is " t e t a S t e v ^ d ^ — the plane was.equipped with a new

>e of silencer.

V ' " Rpt.No.64i G-2, War Department, 16 May 1942

— ( O n the evacuation of Penang "by the British)-— six-inch

guns were wrecked by exploding gelignite in chambers. —

One gun inspected, subsequently had top half of chamber from

cone seating to beginning of rifling completely blown away

together with breech carrier, top and side of shields, dials,

telescope brackets and cams.- — • Guns in view of enemy on

mainland and explosion might have drawn premature attention ­ to evacuation. Breech screws and threads burred and broken

with slodges, and breeches then jammed home. Detachable

small parts of breeches were removed and thrown Into sea.

Sights, instruments, dials, switches, etc. wore smashed and .

buffers emptied. Engines having been drained of oil, pumps

were filled with sand and engines run until they seized. All

breakable parts of engines and Coast Artillery Searchlights

wore removed to a distance and thrown into s e a . —

BAS-Washington, D. C.-22 April 1942

For the blinding of the Antiaircraft batteries the Russian

— fighters have been spraying a smoke producing liquid.

Rpt.#443-Helsinki,Finland-22 October 1941

Antiaircraft artillery today shot down one hoavy Japanese-

bomber at an altitude of 27300 feet. ..­ Wainwright—Phillipines-30 March 1942

The enemy- continues to bomb Corregidor and rear areas of

Bataan with flights of two planes. An air raid alarm, No.

Il6> -on Corregidor which tooki^lace.at 5:00 P.M. was imme­ diately ended by both apprc^llmg heavy bombers being shot

down. — . .

..Wal*iwri^ht-31 March 1942-1321/K

T ~ %

*

'

against the harbor defenses (of }^-^4ijring -£¥fe past 24 hours. Enemy bombs against

the ^S^bqra defgraces were ineffective because accuracy of

-256­



VII - OPERATIONS (cont'd)

the harbour defense antiaircraft

to fly above 27 thousand feet

No.

The Japanese avoided damaging the runways at Midway. If

they had been bombed it would have added greatly to our op­ erational difficulties.

Informational Intelligence Summary No., b-2

11 July 19^2-AAC#31'9.13 /AUZ-42

---(in the Midway a c t i o n ) — we were at a medium altitude

because of clouds and antiaircraft was soon spitting at us.

It was more accurate than we expected and many of our planes

were bounced around, but none was seriously damaged. We

picked the biggest Japanese carrier and headed for it. : The

minute our bomb-bays opened, the ack ack started coming up.

It was fine shooting, and the Japs must have good range,

finders because the first shots were right at our altitude.

Even in the midst of the attack ve had time to chuckle at

our bombardier, who remarked over the planes radio: "My

that antiaircraft looks beautiful through this telescope".

It looked beautiful, all right, but it also looked danger­ ous . —

Air Corps Colonel - Army Navy Register-13 June 19^2

Among Japanese attacks on airdromes., the following methods

have "been noted:

(1) Fighter forces, after a low-level strafing attack,,

withdraw by flying on at low level. One fighter remains

behind at 12,000 to 18,000 feet, circling to observe re- .

suits. Soon after, a second attack is made, probably guid­ ed by details obtained during the first attack.

(2) In attacks by several flights, one or more flights

came in at low level, strafing, while one or more flights

: : remained behind at 16,000 to 20,000 foot. These dived at

' high speed on planes trying to get off the airdrome.

(3) On one occasion a flight of Japanese planes five

minutes away from a United States field called in on the

radio in perfect English: "Nine American pursuit planes

approaching Field from the east," then came down — they

looked much like our At-6fs -- and attacked.

- (4) A few Japanese planes draw antiaircraft fire and

searchlights overhead, whereupon a singie plane-comes 'in )

at zero altitude with navigation lights on and wheels down,

At.

VII * OPERATIONS (cont'd)*/^

and strafes the ^^drCaa^* This is followed "by clinfb at

full "boost int^tTten&a^est cloud.

s ' v%JnformatIonal Intelligence Summary No.35

% y^ 6 July 19^2 -A. A. C. #319.13/AUZ-35

— f i r s t Japanese air raid on Darwin Australia)-—

signal^Hs received from'Bathurst Island Mission Station - —

(at 9:^5 a.m.)-— reporting largo numbers of aircraft fly­ ing south — ( e l e v e n ) — P40 Fighters took off shortly after.

— Antiaircraft Batteries engaged the first formation of

27 "bombers, — which approached at about 13,000 to 15,000

feet flying in perfect formation in groups of 9 i.e» 3 V's

of 3 to each flight. First bombs fell — ( a t 10:04 a.m.) —

each group of 9 dropping their bombs together (bombs could

be seen distinctly as they left the aircraft) these bombs

probably fell in the Harbour, one stick cutting the shore

leg of the wharf. Ei'om this time until 1220 Light bombs

were falling continuously, dive bombers peeling off and at­ tacking ships at anchor from about 200 feet. Fighters after

dispersing of P^O's flew low over streets and houses machine

gunning everything that offered a target. At about this time

5 very hbavy bombs thought to be 1,000 lbs. each were dropped

— all these made craters about 15 feet deep by 35 feet

across — Tho dive bombers were particularly efficient in

their attacks on the ships, dropping their bombs as low as

200 feet. — ( A t 11:55 a.m. — 27. twin-engined bombers flew

over from the NW at about 15,000 feet, Antiaircraft Batteries

went into action. This force flew in formation but there is

some doubt as to whether they were in flights of 9 or a "Doub

le VIC" formation. This raid was confined to the Royal Aus­ tralian Air Forces Aerodrome. — Accounts differ widely —

(but it)-— is probable that the correct figures ---(for the

1st attack)—- were as follows:

Heavy Bombers bO '

Dive Bombers 30

Type "0" Fighters 18

• Rpt. of First Air Raid on Darwin

23 February 1942-AAC#319.13l/APM

B I B L I 0. G E A P H Y

^

(l) Antiaircraft Defense of Tobruk Fortress - (l April to

V.



1

VII - OPERATIONS

,

^



Bibliography (cont'd)

10 October 19^1) (Published in full in A.A.Command Intelli­ gence Circular No.6.)

M.A.R.23&L-Cairo-2 April 19^2

(2) Experience in Employment of Antiaircraft Units in Mid­ dle East. M.A.R.2357 and 2$59-Cairo-2 April 19k2 (3) (Intelligence Circular No. 10) Performance of United

States Army Coast Artillery Personnel and Equipment in the

Manila - Bataan Military Campaign.

AAC#319.132l/Z

D I S T R I B U T I

1 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, W.D. General Staff

2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D. General Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, W.D. Genoral Staff

3 4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, W.D. General Staff

Commanding General, Army Air Forces

5 6 Commanding General, Services of Supply

7-16 Commanding General, Army Ground Forces

17-21 Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command

22-26 Commanding General, Western Defense Command

27-29 Commanding General, Central Defense Command

30-32 Commanding General, Southern Defense Command

33 Chief Signal Officer

3^ Chief of Engineers

35 Chief of Ordnance

36-UO Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

41-45 Commanding General, Carribean Defense Command

46-48 Commanding General, Alaska Defense Command

49-50 Commanding General, Greenland Base Command

51-52 Commanding General, U.S. Forcos in Iceland

53-5*1­ Commanding General, Bermuda Base Command

55 Chief of Chemical Warfare Service

56 Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy

57 Commandant, Command & General Staff School

58-60 Commanding General, American Forces in the Far East

Commanding General, Headquarters Antiaircraft Command 61-68 69-fo Commanding General, AATC, Fort Bliss, Texas

Commanding General, AATC, Fort Sheridan, Illinois

n-n 73-7^ Commanding General, AATC, Camp Davis, Worth Carolina

Commanding General, AATC, Camp Edwards, Massachusetts 75-76 Commanding General, AATC, Carrp Hulen, Texas

77-78 Commanding General, AATC, Camp Stewart, Georgia

79-80 Commanding General, AATC, Camp Haan, California

81-82 Commanding General, AARTC, Fort Eustis, Virginia

83-84 Commanding General, AARTC, Camp Callan, California

85-86 Commanding General, AARTC, Camp Wallace, Texas

87-88 Commanding General, BBTC, Camp Tyson, Tennessee

89-91 President, AA Board

92-93 Commandant, AA Artillery Schooj

9^-100 File

101-150

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