Mfr Nara- T8- Faa- Lutomski Steve- 9-24-03- 00631

COMMISSION SENSITIVE CLASSIFIED

MEMORA Event: Steve Lutomski, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor Type of event: Interview Date: Wednesday, September 24, 2003 Special Access Issues: none Prepared by: Cate Taylor Team Number: 8 Location: Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center Participants - Non-Commission: Steve Lutomski, Traffic Management Unit Supervisor; Eileen, FAA Counsel Participants - Commission: John Farmer, Dana Hyde, Cate Taylor Background: Lutomski attended the FAA academy in Oklahoma City then started at Indi in 1986 as a Controller in Area 3. Since then, Lutomski has been a Supervisor and Traffic Manager in Area's 2 and 3. Current Duties: Staff of the Traffic Management Unit are responsible for managing the flow of air traffic through the Indi airspace. They provide release times for aircraft to the first tier facilities based on traffic volume and weather. Traffic Managers have direct contact with the control towers and the military for scheduling. There are about 4 to 5 people on the day and night shifts. Every two hours, there are national conference calls with TMU staff from all other Control Centers. Military: The TMU has little contact with NORAD on a daily basis. There may be communication for special interest flights but Lutomski cannot recall. Lutomski has never been part of a SCAT ANA exercise. Post 9/11: Lutomski believes that there have been three main changes since 9/11. First, Workload and paperwork have increased for _VIPflights. With only one day's notice of a high priority flight through Indi' s airspace, Traffic Managers must research the traffic impact. Second, all flights must be monitored before they enter Indi's airspace.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED Third, recognition of the importance of military flights has increased. Day of9/11: Lutomski had the day off on 9/11 but had to come in for a meeting to discuss traffic patterns with other TMU's around the country. He learned about the first WTC crash from CNN and then went to talk with Doug Mollen about the meeting. Mollen told him about the second WTC crash and he went down to the Traffic Management Unit to see how they were handling the situation. On the floor, Lutomski heard about some controllers looking for AA77. Lutomski assumed the Military Operation Specialist position for the day and was on the phone with the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center as they were calling for information on AA 77. Lutomski received a call on the military phone advising that there was a beacon code on a hijacked aircraft heading towards Indi. He entered this code on the screen and saw the beacon ofUAL93. He was able to watch UAL93 slowly descend and circle for about one hour. During this time, he received a phone call from the command center giving the order to ground all flights. Lutomski then walked around and told each area supervisor to tell the controllers to ground all flights. Indi had still not found AA 77 and Lutomski was getting reports of a crash in the Ashland, KY area. Lutomski called American Airlines and was able to receive confirmationthat AA 77 had crashed in the Pentagon. ALNOT: Lutomski informed Commission staff about ALNOT, the Alert Notice. This is a notice put out by the flight data specialist at the control centers to alert other centers of em~rgencles . . Recommendations: Control centers should have a military person on staff to assist in military situations. The MOS staff stationed at Indi post 9/11 were a good resource for Lutomski. Lutomski thought the military was slow to accept responsibility of the airspace on 9/11. With all of their resources and ability, he believes that the military could have sterilized air space sooner.

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