Mfr Nara- T8- Faa- Jackson Jack- 12-31-03- 01160

UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center (ZNY) Type of event: Interview with Jack Jackson, via conference call Date: Monday, December 15, 2003 Special Access Issues: ID Check Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: Ronkonkoma, New York Participants - Non-Commission: Mary M. McCarthy (Office of Regional Counsel, Eastern Region, FAA - One Aviation Plaza, RM 661, Jamaica, NY 11434: P 718-5533259, F 718-995-6699), Mark Depalma (NATCA representative) Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Please refer to the interview recording for further details. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Background: Jackson was working as the Operations Supervisor in Charge of Area E. He gave general supervision to the ATCs. Area E is one of the Oceanic Sectors. On 9/11 it covered, nonradar, the western Carribean down to the San Juan Boundary. It also includes one radar domestic sector between Atlantic City and 30 miles southeast of Kennedy. This was sector 66, the Manta Sector. Manta sectors up to FL 230 and a base, depending on approach control, of 5-7 thousand feet. The position is all out over the water. ODAPS 87 was within Area E, and was being worked at the time of events on 9/11 by Sharon Majeski. 9/11: Jackson noted to Commission staff that he was at the watch desk when he overheard an incoming phone call from Boston Center advising that AA 11 had turned of course and shut off its transponder. They were tracking him as a primary. Jackson does not remember if it was still in ZBW airspace or had already passed towards ZNY. He recalled they also told ZNY watch desk that the flight was presumed a hij ack. Jackson returned to Area E and was informed from the 0 87 position that there was a call from air defense looking for information on AA 11. Majeski did not have information since the flight was not in her zone. Jackson knew because of the conversation at ZNY's watch desk what the air defense call was about. COMMISSION

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UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE The ODAPS 87 position has assumed the task of providing information to air defense on special interest flights coming into the continental United States. The ODAPS position is a supplemental position that simulates where flights may be in conjunction with their situational reports. D 87 and 0 87 are two different positions. 0 87 is equipped with additional tracking capabilities based on computer based simulations that are built off of the progress reports of flights over the ocean. 0 87 bases its simulation from pilot reports that are based on estimates of route, altitude and speed. The D 87 is the manual control position for Sector 87. The D 87 controller is responsible for the aircraft separation. D 87 achieves manual separation standards based from the visual reference provided by 0 87 to D 87. These positions are co-located. There are four D positions and four 0 positions that are compiled in different ways, and Jackson does not recall exactly how they were compiled on 9/11. From Sector 66, a controller has the ability to quickly look at any other radar sector. Sector 66 has both a radar (R) and a radar associate position (RA). Jackson remembered that when Majeski received the phonecall from NEADS it was broadcast over a speaker. Maj eski engaged NEADS in conversation, and Jackson could tell there was some confusion. Commission staff uses an FAA transcript in conjunction with questioning: Huntress received a relatively quick Latitude/Longitude reading for AA 11 from Majeski. Jackson stated that the 0 87 position can pull up data. They put in the call sign AA 11 into her computer, and a data block on AA 11 was established. As far as Jackson knows, this capability is present at all positions. By this point, according to Jackson, the flight was already in R42 airspace. Once a track is established the system correlates that data block throughout the Center's computer system, When a data blockthat is associated to a target is brought up there is usually consistant. In this case, the data block moved along with the target. There is an option on the computer to request the latitude and longitude of any particular point and this option was used by Majeski to pinpoint AA 11, and is the basis for the information she gives to NEADS. According to Commission staff, at roughly 8:53 AM, Jackson passes the information to NEADS of the first impact at the World Trade Center. They had been tracking a primary' target associated with a data block. There were a good number of targets in the air at that time. Jackson could not pick out one target amidst the many that were on the screen.

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Jackson told Commission staff that even though Majeski is not at radar position at 0 87, she has a radar screen to use. Jackson noted that either himself or Majeski gave the number to NEADS for the Watch Desk. Majeski was not a CPCon 9/11, though she COMMISSION

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{JNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE definitely is now. She completed her training on 2-8-02. Jackson noted that she was "certainly" qualified for the position she was at though. At approximately 8:54 AM after Jackson was off the line with NEADS, we went back to the Watch Desk to let them know what had transpired. Martin Rosenberg was walking from the watch desk and told Jackson what had happened. Jackson does not recall going back to the Watch Desk with Rosenberg. Jackson stated that he does not remember how he knew that AA 11 struck the WTC. Majeski explained to Huntress that the flight went into a 'coast" mode. Majeski and Huntress ID get their terminology over the "coast" node Jackson attempted to explain that he could not be certain that the flight that was AA 11 was in fact AA 11, since there were several primary targets on screen. Jackson noted that the speaker at Huntress could speak with the Watch Desk for updates. Thy asked if their was anyone at the military desk number. Jackson noted that they never had the altitude, but could get the latitude and longitude. Further, Majeski 0 87 she could not get radar altitude. Sector 86 was in Area F on 9/11. From the 0 87 position Majeski, Sector 81 in Area F did a flight plan read out on AA 11. They receive calls through Huntress nad make phone calls to specific sectors weathers. Jackson explained that more than likely when Majeski was originally on the phone with NEADS she probably turned and asked him for information. He told her it was primary only, and then she was able to pass a latitude longitude point within 30 seconds. George Leonard noted that Dave Bottiglia began the AA 11 ALPHA track at 8:38:38. VAL 175: Jackson does not recall any conversation about VAL 175 with Huntress ID. Phantom AA 11: Jackson does not recall any reports of AA 11 being in the air after 8:46 AM.

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