Mfr Nara- T7- Tsa- Arroyo Marcus- 10-24-03- 00035

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MEMORANDUM

Hrf- 0 fO n~/I

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Marcus Arroyo, Federal Security Director for TSA at Newark Liberty International Airport

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Type: Interview Date: October 24, 2003 Special Access Information: None Team: 7 Prepared By: Lisa Sullivan Participants (non-Commission): Participants (Commission):

Marcus Arroyo and John Danner, Counsel for TSA

Sam Brinkley, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan

Location: TSA facilities at Newark Airport, Newark, New Jersey Background [U] On 9-11, Arroyo was the Security Division Manager for FAA's Eastern Region. He took this position in 1989. In this position he oversaw 7 states and 64 airports. This included 8 field offices and all (CASFO and CASFU) units. Newark was a CASFU that reported to the N ew York CASFO at JFK Airport. During one period between 1989 and 1995, he went to Brussels and assumed an international role for the FAA (Title?). However, he returned in 1995 and resumed his position as Division Manager for Eastern Region. Arroyo is currently the Federal Security Director for Newark, appointed in July of 2002. The civil aviation security incidents he has responded to included TWA 800, Swiss Air, and Egypt Air. The Security Vectors: [U] Significant elevations of security measures were driven by Security Directives and intelligence. As Arroyo received them, airports responded accordingly. It was the responsibility of Washington to determine potential vulnerabilities. SEAs (special emphasis assessments) focus deliberately on one target area. Throughout the period leading up to 9-11, the annual work plan had a comprehensive (for CAT X airports) inspection plan. [U] SEAs were done at Newark prior to 9-11, particularly testing the checkpoints. Clutter bags were sent through in the morning and the evening, peak and off-peak. The airport has terminals A-C. Each has three "fingers" for a total of 9 checkpoints. The COMMISSION SENSITIVE £8I

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smallest checkpoint has two lanes. Checkpoint 1 in terminal A has three lanes. The terrorists went through this checkpoint. [U] The Newark CAT X inspection occurred in January of 200 1. Any deficiencies that arose from it were met and dealt with continuously. He doesn't have the 'records of Newark's test results. SEA (Security ~

~

Emphasis

Assessments)

Testing

SEA testing including the following areas: 1) Screenin

~2)CAPPSI:

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program of testing consisted of presenting themselves with baggage and a ticket, and "deliberately pressing buttons" to trigger the selection process. 3) Positive Passenger.Bag Match: I '4) Access and Perimeter Control: They did SEAs on access, the airport perimeter, "107/14" doors, and AOA challenges. 5) Small packages and cargo: They would see if the shipper called forpickup and see if all the proper documentation to make pick up for cargo was provided.' Arroyo said that Unabomber-type tactics were perceived as a threat. / Ramsi Yousef and the Blind Sheik operatives were known to be working in the vicinity 1'f the airport. ...:,::'

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~ Generally, the SEAs were systemwide. The focus w~s wherever the,:PAA had a presence, such as at Newark. Ultimately, the FAA would make a trip to Atlantic City and Trenton Mercer to test those airports but Arroyo felt as though the lack ,c'f resources, budgeting and personnel inhibited their testing abilities. / .... :... ~

SEAs were derived from Washington threat information derived from intelligence (that was not necessarily tailored to the individual airp1rt vulnera~,i1ities).

~ There was not much flexibility in the manner in/~hich th~,y:'tested the system. The number of tests conducted at a checkpoint was rigid. Because of this rigidity, agents would be recognized, and testing effectiveness decreased. InArroyo's view, it was a futile effort to continue to do it in that method with ,$0 few resources, The response to poor screening performance was remedial training ../The FAA incorporated more procedures and returned to the checkpoint to help rhe screeners do their job better and get them to search more thoroughly (which he referred to a~,:'t'onthe spot reinforcement training").

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~ As a consequence of the deficiencies founJ Cl:l,:~~iladelphiaAirport and with Argenbright (the screening security company), Arfoyo's security managers focused on background investigations and the required fivp-,year criminal history check. He felt that the system was made more vulnerable by issu~~g:identification badges and giving access to people that have not been fully vetted. ! :':'

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Checkpoints

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was asked about the effectiveness ofcheckpoi~t::~cr~ening. Arroyo cited the civil aviation incident on December 21, 1988 over Lockerbie.Scctland. Since then much progress has been made. In 1999, checkpoint performance w~s,~'tCl effectiveness. He attributes the poor results to an increasingly sophisticated testing regime. The industry's response was that the FAA was not playing fair. Arroyo supported the testin conducted b FAA securit because "no terrorist would 'ever be fair about it."

~AITOYO

jS811 Threat

Image Projection (TlP) ready x-ray scanners were being deployed as a response to the more sophisticated tests of the screening measures. He doesn't remember if this system was deployed in Newark. on 9-11. After PAN AM 103, the use 0 f Thermo Neutron Analysis equipment was broached. FAA had $144 mi1lion to deploy as much equipment as they could. Venders competed for the contract. He didn't know which the best vendor to contract was. Their proposals varied in price.

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~ TIP ready x-rays came later in the deployment scheme. In 1996 they began work on deploying CTX machines. In January of 1997, they got one in the United Terminal. Linda Daschle (short term FAA Administrator) left the FAA right after that. Some time after that, TIP-ready x-ray machines were being deployed. Arroyo felt that the machines weren't ready for "prime time yet." The deployment diminished checkpoint effectiveness and took time to resolve, assuming that they were, in fact, installed and turned on. There were bugs in the system .

Newark [U] In the context of the airports Arroyo was overseeing, it was JFK that seemed the most vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Newark wasn't neglected. There was a supervisor;a secretary, and nine agents dedicated to testing Newark. Arroyo commented that it is never enough. You can always do more with more resources. Newark received its fair share. In genera], he characterized security for his airports as under-resourced. The FSM at Newark on 9/11 was Russell White.

The Threat ~ The primary threat to civil aviation airports was thought to be car bombs. Hijacks were always a possibility and a threat. There was a shortage of Federal Air Marshals. Screening checkpoints always got attention for their poor performance rates. The need to prevent potential hijackings was never compromised because of the need to address another threat vector, according to Arroyo. Arroyo stated that the required testing was always completed. Screener training was reviewed when there was a failure. He, at times, would sit in on GSC training and some PSI (Principle Security Inspector) personnel would come and monitor as well.

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[U] Arroyo was asked if the fines imposed for security failures were effective. Arroyo said a number of fines were issued, and the "industry balked." FAA felt that it was their COMMISSION ~

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE ---&S-tresponsibility to monitor their screening contracts. "It was a struggle" to get the 'airlines to monitor the performance of their own contracted security companies. Station Managers were responsible for this at the airport.

CAPPS I [U] Arroyo was referred to the initial intent of CAPPS I, which, in 1997, required that CAPPS selectees were to be escorted to the checkpoint and their carry-on subject to additional screening. As far as Commission staff can discern, the procedure was terminated with the expiration of the SD dictating it. Arroyo was asked ifhe remembered when they were no longer required to follow this procedure and he said he would look into it, and get back to the Commission. [U] Arroyo added that the procedure of escorting selectees and "dumping their carry-ons at the gate" generated a lot of pushback from the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) and the Justice Department. There was a greater emphasis on 100 percent checked bag screening. The TWA 800 incident gave them the impetus to deploy the EDS machines. [U] Arroyo thought the rationale for the decision on CAPPS consequences was the FAA's focus on combating the threat ofa bomb in a checked bag. "No one was prepared for the suicide hijacker." Hijacking was always thought to involve negotiation, and was dealt with in conflict resolution exercises. Guns were the weapon in the example he cited: a hijacking of a Lufthansa flight out of Frankfurt by Ethiopians in 1992 brought to Kenned y airport in which a gun was used. Intelligence [U] When asked, Arroyo responded that he remembered Pat McDonnell's CD- ROM presentation on intelligence. He was flattered he was asked to review it. He thought the presentation was to produce something to share with the industry at a high level. It was a good start as a way to drive the message home and certainly with the airport managers (Susan Baer did not receive the briefing). He made it a point to share the information he got from the presentation with people under him, because, as he said, "It sensitized my workforce to the seriousness of the threat, to compliment whatever security efforts were already in existence."

.¢On intelligence

dissemination in general, Arroyo said "We wanted more but the analysts had to protect sources," implying that he understood why the information he received was not specific. Arroyo had former NYPD members on his staff, and he was also working with a terrorist task force. He thought the Port Authority police had a good intelligence system. He had a "comfort level" with law enforcement in his area. These other sources led him to conclude that he was never at a "deficit" in terms of intelligence. He agreed with the statement: "If it was to be had, he felt he was getting it." COMMISSION SENSITIVE ..,..SSI

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE SSI [U] There was talk, but no real specific information on Islamic fundamentalists. He went to the trial of the Blind Sheik on the attempted Landmark bombings. After his conviction, the Sheik said something about airports: "People would be coming," or something as obscure. The statement was made in Arabic and translated. Arroyo passed the info on to FAA Headquarters. The transcript of the statement was received through contacts. Normally, he would not have gotten such a transcript. Because the statement was so obscure and indirect, nothing came of it in terms of security precautions. [U] Arroyo never took the posture that Newark was a "stop over" for terrorists. He "hardened Kennedy," as well as all of his other airports, because he thought there was nothing to prevent a terrorist from going through another airport. He wanted to maintain uniformity of airport security. Other airports under his jurisdiction included JPK; Phil.; Dulles; BWI; Pittsburgh; and National. Other Suspicious Activities [U] There was one event that really perplexed him. Down on Broadway Avenue, near the Trade Center, there was a discovery of an obscure briefcase with test objects that the industry used to conduct tests of screening checkpoints. Anyone could buy them from the company the FAA used to produce the items. This discovery occurred in the May July time frame (what year?). Arroyo said it was never determined who the bag belonged to; it might have been an attempt to see what the reaction of the LEO would be to finding the briefcase. Upon hearing about the discovery, Arroyo sent an agent down there wanting to know what it was all about. He's pretty sure he obtained digital pictures. Arroyo realized that the manufacturer that made the test pieces did not put serial numbers on the items. [U] In another instance, two federal protective uniformed officers were eating lunch pre 9-11, when they observed two Middle Easterners taking pictures of the doors and the garage doors of a federal building in lower Manhattan (2600 Federal Plaza). Upon questioning the individuals, they said they wanted to send pictures of skyscrapers to their friends and family in the Midwest. The officers confiscated the camera and let the individuals go. Sometime later the film was developed and it was of the doors and garages; the address the individuals had planned to send the pictures to was for an Arab who worked at a chemical plant, Arroyo said. [U] Arroyo recounted that the airports get their share of "number spotters" (people that scout out the tail numbers of planes at airports as a hobby.) Some airports try to set areas aside for these people. [U] Arroyo was asked if there was a way to report suspicious activity at airports and on aircraft. Arroyo mentioned Tony Affonte, a former airport official who was killed at the WTC and had b~en involved in the Airport Law Enforcement Association. Arroyo said Affonte as particularly vigilant and always shared word of suspicious activity and or "anomalies" with him. He also added that he thought the Port Authority police were pretty good. They took some shots after TWA 800; but they were vigilant. Reports were COMMISSION SENSITIVE -&Sf-

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SS! sent up the chain of command. appropriately disseminated.

He thinks the report of suspicious activities was

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Fort Hamilton shared their intelligence with Arroyo's office. An example of intelligence the Fort would share with the FAA was the method by which weapons were artfully concealed in a book. [U] When asked how much latitude he felt he had to work outside of FAA standards Arroyo said it was not permissible for him to create his own test for checkpoints. Personnel-

Credentialing

[U] Arroyo stated that he received reports when people were denied airport SIDA credentials and would work with the FBI on this issue .

.LS81J He recalled

an instance in which a Flight Standards person knew someone had suspicious Middle Eastern affiliations. "He was suspicious of him so he reported it," Arroyo said. He remembers the reports were passed on to the FBI. In that case, the evidence wasn't sufficient to fire him. FAA had a limited workforce in the geographic area. It was built up at one point, and then pared down with budget cuts. Because he was understaffed he would ask others to be the "ears and eyes" to assist the FAA security inspectors. •

Hi Tech checkpoints ~] Commission staff asked why Newark had no high tech checkpoints whereas Dulles had them on 9-11. Arroyo stated that ITS (International Total Security, Incorporated) was the driver of the high tech checkpoint. It consisted of factors such as putting the cameras in the right position, light illumination, best metal detectors, etc. ITS sold it as a security product for the industry. Funding for Dulles came from MW AA. The Port Authority for NYINJ was the lease holder. It was the decision of the individualleasee whether to put the money up for ITS equipment. [U] In fairness to FAA, whenever rules went to OMB, the discussion of how additional rulemaking would affect ticket prices always took priority. Tom Kelly, the Security Director of ATA prior to Susan Rork, once said (according to Arroyo), that OMB would "Fight you like a junk yard dog," if you do anything to raise the ticket prices. In summation, "if the government wants additional security measures, they should pay for it" was the reigning attitude of the day. High tech checkpoints were a pilot program; it had some grant money.

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Detection

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~ Arroyo said that a 1992 memo went to the 700's indicating that knives were the primary weapon of choice for hijackers. FAA fines to air carriers

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[U] Arroyo said AT A would fight all settlements and negotiate them out. Administrative Law judges had to settle the cases. Some judges weren't sophisticated enough to understand what the FAA was trying to do. "A one hundred thousand dollar case might settle for 10 thousand," Arroyo commented. [U] If screeners failed a test, the screener was fired. "That wasn't the solution," Arroyo thought, "the answer should have been to train you better." At times, the whole security company was fired. Security contracts went to the lowest bidder.

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Safety, Security,

and Efficiency

[U] Flight standards had 350 employees for the eastern region, whereas there were only 72 employees for security. Security made up less than a quarter or the entire workforce. There was no parity between safety and security. Arroyo stated that it was in the industry's self interest to make sure the safety part was adhered to. [U] Arroyo was asked how many air carriers "red teamed" their own checkpoints to improve the effectiveness, and make sure they were getting their money's worth. Arroyo said the carriers left that up to the FAA. Arroyo didn't remember any station managers coming to him about doing their own testing. He said some Station Managers took such initiative, as in Richmond, VA. Summer

of '01

[U] Arroyo was asked ifhe recalled the increased chatter about security threats leading up to 9-11; the presentation made by FAA's office of Civil Aviation Security about increased threat to civil aviation (McDonnell road show); the issuance of IC's highlighting the increased threat; and the NIE stating that the threat to civil aviation security had increased. Arroyo said he remembered the chatter, but that there was nothing on hijacking with box cutters or knives, nothing to heighten the a1ert or to set the magnetometers at a more sensitive level. [U] He recalled that the aviation security level that summer was at "3 plus". The Port

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number. Arroyo said, "The Port Authority maintained it at four until they went broke. It takes a lot of police to maintain that level." ACS-l, Irish Flynn, did not take them to Level 4 after TWA 800. [U] As for the FAA Information Circulars (ICs), Arroyo commented, "you could read them in the USA Today." The SDs had more "punch." [U] Arroyo was asked about the Federal Register changes to FARs 107 and 108 that came out the summer of 2001. Arroyo says the staffing was not increased in response. "You do what ever you can do." Spending on his part was completely off the charts; he was "spending every penny" he got - he felt as though he couldn't ramp it up anymore. The FAA Administrator had already gone into a reserve fund to pay for increases in ACS. Arroyo alerted the airport community and worked with the airport police. Kennedy and Newark were doing extra ramp patrols. (Two Newark officers were killed responding to the WTC.) There was a lot of donated time. Flight standards received criticism because it was a "9-5 operation" whereas that was not the case for FAA security in the Eastern Region. He "stepped up where we could." He found vagrants sleeping, the homeless walking on the ramp. He would personally ride around surveying the airports. Consequently, cargo theft statistics went down as a beneficial byproduct of the increased vigilance. 9-11 [U] On the morning of 9-11, Arroyo was in the office on the second floor of his building. He received the report of a plane hitting the World Trade Center. He thought th immediately of a general aviation flight. He went up to the 5 floor where the command center (in the FAA building at JFK). The monitors were all on. Initially, he was shocked by what they were viewing. Within minutes he saw the second plane hit and he "instinctively knew it was terrorism." He wanted to know if they were coming from his airports. He opened up the "net," and all of the key managers assembled at the New York Center. He started organizing the data. The key managers of his department were stranded at a convention in Canada. [U] All of the screening checkpoints started collecting data. When he received an indication that one of the flights had left Newark, he started pulling the information together for an incident report. He "wanted to know the magnetometer specs and everything else." He said he got "pretty good information pretty fast" on technical questions. Arroyo's

testing of the magnetometers

on 9-11:

[U]An employee he sent to Home Depot came back with every box cutter she could buy. He tested them at the brand new magnetometer in the lobby of the FAA building. [U] As Regional Administrator, he had to meet with citizens who complained about the noise of overhead flights in congested communities. Some people in these communities COMMISSION SENSITIVE ~

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were quote upset and presented a serious threat to the FAA. The regional. office's security was improved because of this threat. (Few lobbies of federal buildings had metal detectors before 9-11, now they all do). ~ CHIA manufactured state of the art metal detectors. He did not want to create a panic at the airport, so he conducted his own test of the metal detector capabilities in his own lobby. Personally, he went through the metal detector. Many of the box cutters he tested "looked like magic markers," he said.l

[U] Staff has asked TSA for copies of the Command Center at the Eastern Region's email

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messages and digital pictures about Arroyo's box cutter test.

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Operations Center [U] Arroyo thought on 9-11 that the news reports were the best source of information, He had each CASFO manager up on the net. The primary net consisted of the national leadership including Monte Belger and Jane Garvey, etc. The Secondary andTertiary nets were up, and he also had a private net talking directly to the CASFOs. /,:/

[UJ Arroyo worked closely with Mark Randol, the CASFO Manager for Dulle,s{~nd Nora Zola his New York CASFO manager at that time. "",/..' ..... i .' The National Net ,

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[U] Arroyo thinks that the FAA had a good system to connect everyone, For instance, the net works in a way that it dials all of your numbers on record until you finally pick up (cell phone, home phone, office desk phone). Reports are made in short bursts. Everyone has to identify themselves. It is orderly. No one dropped.off, but you went on mute unless you had something important to say. Everyone.knew who to listen to; who would

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..-aSI net. The tactical net was also running; that was probably not recorded, he thought. ATC was a big player on the net. The Regional Administrator's office was feeding them. They were there around the clock. Arroyo believed that the primary Net was recorded but the tactical net was not. [U] When the planes came down, he did not think of reverse screening. There was so much going on in the immediate area, in response to the WTC disaster, etc, that he could not have organized a search of deplaning passengers or their planes ifhe wanted to. [U] He never heard that five Middle Easterners fled an airport that day, after all the flights were grounded. AFTER ACTION [U] Arroyo said that an after action report was completed but it took Newark longer to get that done. Russell and Nora did it and forwarded it to Washington. He does not remember seeing it. [U] When asked whey terrorists chose Newark and Dulles, Arroyo responded that "Terrorists were operating in this area. This could have happened anywhere. It is a tragedy they wanted to hit the Trade Center. Their plot was a well executed plan. They wanted fully fueled aircrafts. So why fly from anywhere else?" [U] Arroyo said he does not recall hearing of other plots that were in the offing as of 9-11. [U] Arroyo wanted to mention that vulnerability assessments were done at Newark with the FBI. Newark got a lot of unique attention from theF AA technical center because of its proximity to New York City. Oftentimes, Rand D was tested there. Arroyo felt it was beneficial for his agents to get the exposure. [U] Newark had a good K-9 unit. He said the Port authority was reluctant to participate in K-9 until after TWA 800. Eventually, it became cost prohibitive and not effective to continue the program. Flight Standards/Safety Security overlap [U] Arroyo said that aviation security tabletop exercises were conducted prior to 9-11. A hij ack drill had not been simulated in a long time. Airlines were reluctant to donate an aircraft. [U] Commonly, they responded to disorderly passengers and bomb threats. The Flight standards department dealt with air rage. Arroyo cited an instance in which a stock broker from Connecticut defecated on the food cart of an international flight.

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[U] To support the cases of flight crews and the pilots in such instances, the FAA met with U.S. Attorneys who agreed they would prosecute the cases and support the flight crews. Recommendations [U] Arroyo would like to level out the passenger flows. The industry would fight that. Arroyo went on to say that there are times during the day that the airport IS virtually empty of travelers. Other times, you can't get in the door. He would like to spread out the flow, thereby wait times would be shortened and security scrutiny per passenger increased. "Someone needs to recognize at a high level that this airport is complex. There is a lot of energy wasted on reconfiguring smaller airports," Arroyo said. Continental Airlines just spent millions remodeling and expanding its terminal at Newark, and has reported increased efficiency of 25 percent (the TSA model at Newark). Profiling [U] Newark does not train screeners to profile passengers because, "of the level of intrusion," it requires. Arroyo said, "Unless you walk .around with two inch platform shoes, you won't get that level of discrimination. The El Al (Tel Aviv Airport) operation knows its passengers, so it can get away with it." With respect to the trusted traveler feature, there is always a risk no matter what, but not everyone needs the same scrutiny. [U] Arroyo cited a case at JFK in which an emotionally disturbed person went to the ticket counter and showed his or her gun. Somehow, the person managed to board the airplane and held a gun to the copilot's head. The pilots escaped out the window. After six hours of negotiation, the situation was resolved. He's not sure if a more restrictive checkpoint could have prevented that from happening. [U] He wants the visible presence of a LEO at every checkpoint, but the budget can't afford it. The notion of TSA as a law enforcement agency got push back because of overtime costs. Without the presence of LEO's, Arroyo feels the checkpoint lacks the visible deterrent. [U] Arroyo agreed that security procedures need to vary in pattern so an individual can't tell which lane you are going to go to, be it a high scrutiny lane or not. [U] Arroyo thinks that Immigration and Customs should be tied into the IT systems of aviation security. Security as disruption [U] Arroyo said that the air carriers know that a 747 with 350 passengers requires a certain number of security agents at the checkpoint and they know what time the average passenger will arrive at the airport for the scheduled flight. The carriers have this information in hand, yet they criticize the amount of time it takes passengers to get COMMISSION SENSITIVE <

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through security. It is simple math that if you have three 737s boarding and the checkpoint has two lanes, there will be a bottleneck and a delay. The airport cannot physically put in more lanes. [U] Passengers need to be smarter with what they pack. Some carriers will tum it around and say "you can bring whatever you want to bring on the flight," as a customer service boost to their sales. If passengers use more discretion, then the process will go faster. [U] Arroyo recommends that the Commission look into the five pilot checkpoint . screening pro grams in effect now at chosen airports around the country. What is the real metric of success for Newark at the screener checkpoint? [U] Arroyo says 100 percent is the proper goal. We have to work toward 100 percent resolution. Screeners have to say, I don't know what this is and open up the bag. "Recognize and resolve" needs to be the mantra of screeners.

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