T7 B10 Team 7 Mfrs Arroyo Fdr- 10-24-03 Marcus Arroyo Interview W Notes On Mfr 374

MEMORANDUMJE0RTHE RECORD Event: Marcus Arroyo, FSD for TSA at Newark Liberty International Airport Type: Interview Date: October 24, 2003 Special Access Information: -^^TTi^ Ta^ 3 \_> Team: 7 Prepared By: Lisa Sullivan Participants (non-Commission): Marcus Arroyo and John Danner, Counsel for TSA Participants (Commission): Sam Brinkley, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan Location: TSA facilities at Newark Airport, Newark, New Jersey Background [J J Marcus Arroyo is cuirgntiy the Federal Security Director for Newark appointed in July of 7. Pfiui1 to 4huljK was DivisionfylanageTibr Eastem-Regwn fui T AA. He oversaw f~\~ states and 64 airports. That included 8 field offices and all (CASFO and CASFU) units. I At 9-11, Newark was a CASFU that reported to the New York CASFO at JFK Airport. ^- I He feeM the position since 1989. He went to Brussels and assumed an international role for the FAA (T^B?) at one point and resumed position of Division Manager for Eastern Region for'. Civil aviation security incidents he has responded to: TWA 800 Swiss Air Egypt Air£_ The Security Vectors: \_\ J

Significant elevation of security measures were driven by Security Directives and intelligence. As he received them, airports responded according. It was the responsibility of Washington to determine potential vulnerabilities. SEAs (special emphasis V"' ^assessments) focus deliberately on one target area. Throughout the period leading up to 9.11? the annual work plan had a comprehensive (for CAT X airports) inspection plan.

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SEAs were done at Newark prior to 9-1 l^particularly testing the checkpoints. Clutter bags were sent through in the morning and the evening, peak and off-peak. The airport

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has terminals A-C. Each has three "fingers"; 9 checkpoints. The smallest checkpoint has two lanes. Checkpoint 1 in terminal A has three lanes. The terrorists went through this checkpoint. V \ \ e Newark CAT X inspection occurred in January of 2001. Any deficiencies that arose ^ from it were met and dealt with continuously. itinuously He doesn't have the records of Newark's test results. SEA (Security Emphasis Assessments) Testing f\

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CAPPS I: The program of testing consisted of presenting themselves with baggage and a ticket; "deliberately pressing buttons" to trigger the selection process. L Positive

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4> (Access and Perimeter Control: SEAs on access and perimetekand 107 14 obors. AQA; challenges. ^y^ J \l packages and cargo: they

Generally, the SEAs were system wide. Ffecus_waswherever the FAA had^a-presence, such as at Newark. Ultimately, the FAA would ma^e~^rip4<xAila»ttc-City and Trenton; Mercer to test those airports but Arroyo felt as though the lack of resources, budgeting and personnel inhibited their testing abilities. SEAs were derived from Washington threat information derived from intelligence (that /9/11 Closed was not necessarily tailored to the individual airport vulnerabilities). • bv Statute

Jhere was not much flexibility in the manner in which they tested the system. The umber of tests conducted at a checkpoint was rigid. Because of this rigidity, agents would be recognized, and testing effectiveness decreased. It was a futile effort to continue to do it in that method with few resources. The response to poor screening / performance was remedial training. They incorporated more procedures and returned to the checkpoint to help them, do their job better; get them to search more thoroughly; . which he referred to as ''Sm. the spot reinforcement training."! I were a problem. ' As a consequence of the deficiencies found at Philadelphia Airport and ~.~ _ U-genbright, his security managers focused on background investigations and V"*1-

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five-year criminal history check. He felt that the system was madejpaore vulnerable by issuing identification badges and giving access to people that hawhot been fully vetted. Checkpoints and efficien*{wefe*lw-checkpoints? Regarding ing carry-on bacnaflc^and also the gun§Jbombc, and Arroyo cited the civil aviation incident on December 21, 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland. q/r n Since then much progress has been made. In 1999, checkpoint performance was at| | i s effectiveness. He attributes the poor results to an increasingly sophisticated testing •* regime. The industry's response was that the FAA was not playing fair. Arroyo supported the testing conducted by FAA security because "no terrorist would ever be fair about it." | V \ The results varied form airport to airport.

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TIP ready x-ray scanners were being deployed as a response to the more sophisticated tests of the screening measures. He doesn't remember if it was deployed in Newark on 911. After PAN AM 103, the use of Thermo Neutron Analysis equipment was broached. FAA had $144 million to deploy as much equipment as they could. Venders competed for the contract. He didn't know which was the best vendor to contract^ flheir proposals varied in price. TIP ready x-rays came later in the deployment scheme. In 1996 they began work on deploying CTX machines. In January of 1997, they got one in the United Terminal. Linda Daschle (short term FAA Administrator) left the FAA right after that. Some time after that, Tip-ready x-rays were being deployed. Arroyo felt that the machines weren't ready for "prime time yet". The deployment diminished the effectiveness and took time to resolve; assuming that they were, in fact, installed and turned on. There were bugs in the system. *S* NEWARK ' " in the context ofthe airports he was overseeing, it was JFK that seemed the most vulnerable tp^ terrorist attack. Newark wasn't neglected. There was a supervisor secretary, 9 agents dedicated to testing Newark. It is never enough. You can always do more with more resources. Newark received its fair share. In general, he characterized security for his airports as under-resourced. The Threat

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<\\\y threat to civil aviation was thought to be car bombs. Hijacks were

possibility and a threat. There was a shortage of Federal Air Marshals. Screening checkpoint always got attention for its poor performance rates. The need to prevent potential hijackings was never compromised afthe expense of another threat vector, Arroyo>sa»Ljf^e. testing as=roquattd was always completed jmd the traininareviewed

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—SSLwhen there was a failujer^Fle, at times, would sit in on GSC training." (Principle Security/Inspector) Station personnel would some and mor

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Were fines imposbdfor security failures and other measyrerfaken effective? Arroyo said a number of fines we^e^&sufid^^ndJheJlindusfey^jaKed.'' FAA felt that it was their responsibility to monitor their screening contracts. "It was a struggle" to get the airlines to monitor the performance of their own contracted security companies. Station Managers were responsible for this at the airport.

CAPPS I John Raidt referred Arroyo to the initial intent of CAPPS I, which, in 1997, required that CAPPS selectees were to be escorted to the checkpoint and their carry-on subject to additional screening. As far as he can tell, the procedure was terminated with the expiration of the SD dictating it. John asked if Arroyo remembered when they were no longer required to follow this procedure. Arroyo said he would look into it, and get back to the Commission. Arroyo added that the procedure of escorting selectees and "dumping their carry-ons at the gate" generated a lot of pushback from the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) and the Justice Department. There was a greater emphasis on 100 percent checked bag screening. The TWA 800 incident gave them the impetus to deploy the EDS machines. Arroyo thought the rationale is the FAA's focus on combating the threat of a bomb in a checked bag. "No one was prepared for the suicide hijacker. Hijacking was always thought to involve negotiation; conflict resolution exercises. The guns were the vehicle in the example he cited: a hijacking of a Lufthansa flight out of Frankfurt by Ethiopians in 1992 brought to Kennedy airport in which a gun was used. Intelligence When asked, he responded that he remembered Pat McDonnell's CD- rom presentation on intelligence. He was flattered he was asked to review it. He thought the presentation was to produce something to share with the industry at a high level. It was a good start as a way to drive the message home and certainly with the airport managers (Susan Baer did not receive the briefing). He made it a point to share the information he got from the presentation with people under him, because, as he said, "It sensitized his workforce to the seriousness of the threat; To compliment whatever security efforts already in existence." On intelligence dissemination in general, Arroyo said "We wanted more but the analysts had to protect sources," implying that he understood why the information he received was not specific. Arroyo had former NYPD on his staff, and he was also working with a terrorist task force. He thought the Port Authority police had a good intelligence system. He had a "comfort level" with law enforcement in his area. These other sources led him

to conclude that he was never at a "deficit" in terms of intelligence. He agreed with the statement: "If it was to be had, he felt he was getting it." There was talk, but no real specific information on Islamic fundamentalists. He went to the trial of the Blind Sheik on the attempted Landmark bombings. After his conviction, the Sheik said something about airports: "People would be coming," or something as obscure. The statement was made in Arabic and translated. Arroyo passed the info on to FAA Headquarters. The transcript of the statement was received through contacts. Normally, he would not have gotten such a transcript. Because the statement was so obscure and indirect, nothing came of it in terms of security precautions. f \^

1 ,.\, never took the posture that Newark was a "stop over"-funlike amtnrJe~aTD|u3tes^for *— J terrorists. He "hardened Kennedy," as well as all of his other airports, because he thought there was nothing to prevent a terrorist from going through another airport. He wanted to maintain uniformity of airport security. Other Suspicious Activities

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JThere was one event that really perplexed him. Down on Broadway Avenue, near the '—' Trade Center, there was a discovery of an obscure briefcase with test objects that the t industry used tocimduct tests of screening checkpoints. Any one could buy them from £\the companv^fne FAA^fisedlo^produce the items. This discovery occurred in the May \) July time fVamcXwhat year?).Arroyo said it was never determined who the bag belonged to; might hWe been anjUternpt to see what the reaction of the LEO would be to finding the briefcase! Uponhearing about the discovery, Arroyo sent an agent down there wanting to know what it was all about. He's pretty sure-get digital pictures. Arroyo realized that the manufacturer that made the test pieces aid not put serial numbers on the items. I v. another instance, two federal protective uniformed officers were eating lunch pre 9-11, when they observed two Middle Easterners taking pictures of the doors and the garage doors of a federal building in lower Manhattan f*tf33H*£ay-2
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•89* Authority police i^s pretty good. Took some shots after TWA 800; but they were vigilant. Reports were sent up the chain of command. He thinks the reports^were appropriately disseminated. T brt

Hamilton shared their intelligence with Arroyo'soffice. An example of intelligence the Fort would share with the FAA was. f weapoi^arffiuly concealed in a book. hen asked how much latitude he felt he had to work outside of FAA standardsj^lCJuSf to create his own test for «rfrgrVpnintc;-£bat w?g nr>f per Personnel - Credentialing .He ggWhe reports when people were denied credentials. H& workff with the FBI. ^

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H& recalled an instance in which a Flight Standards person knew someone had suspicious Middle Eastern affiliations. "He was suspicious of him so he reported it," Arroyo said. He remembers the reports were passed on to the FBI. In that case, the evidence wasn't -tfee*«-9e^rley-«anliH''t fire him. FAA had a limited workforce in the geographic area. It ,Vvp>^ was built up at one point, and then pared down with budget cuJs?fH&-wQuld ask others to jir\\ be the "ears and eyes" to assist the FAA security inspectors/while understaffed. Hi-Tech checkpoints Commission staffed asked why Newark had no hi tech checkpoints whereas Dulles had

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ITS (International Total Security, Incorporated) was the driver of the/nigh tech checkpoint. It consisted of factors such as putting the cameras in the right position, light illumination, best metal detectors, etc. ITS sold it as a security product for the industry. Funding for Dulles came from MWAA. PA i&r NY and NJ hats lease holders. It was the decision of the individual leasee to put the money up for ITS' product. In fairness to FAA, whenever rules went to OMB, the discussion of how additional rulemaking would affect ticket prices always took priority. Tom Kelly, the Security Director of ATA prior to Susan O'Roarke, once said (according to Arroyo), that OMB would "Fight you like a junk yard dog," if you do anything to raise the ticket prices. In summation, "if the government wants additional security measures, they should pay for it" (was the reigning attitude of the day). Hi tech checkpoints was a pilot program; it had some grant money. JR: Portlajjd'endDulles had cameras- had a\ecurityfimctidri- showed/wheVe two hat gone through and have the video en really baoWnding; so bacKthat the4creene handling the wands \yere suspected of being a p&fl/of the plot. In\|hi^sense, there~~view of the footage from the cneckpokft cameras at those locations played a significant part in uncovering the terrorist plot.

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Detection Capabilities

FAA fines to air carriers - enforcement

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Arroyo said ATA would fight all settlements and negotiate them out. xtfitemfr. Administrative Law judges had to settle theik. Some judges weren't sophisticated enough to understand what the FAA was trying to do.^3tftjL.!iiWIAB JUmitjiiVCdj jtf\ thousand dollar case might settle for 10 thousand," royo commented. ^~ If screeners failed a test, the screener was fired. "That wasn't the solution," Arroyo thought, "the answer should have been to tram you better." At times, the whole security company was fired. Security contracts went to the lowest bidder. Safety, Security, and Efficiency

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Flight standards had 350 employees for eastern region, whereas there were only 72 employees for security. Security made up less than a quarter or the entire workforce. There was no parity^ j^rcr^\(j oJt=v-JU^S) ru>Jr

cIt was in the industry's self interest to make sure the safety part was adhered to. Sam Brinkley asked how many air carriers "red teamed" their own checkpoints to improve the effectiveness, get their money'sworth? ? ^Arroyo said the carriers left that up to the FAA. Arroyo didn't see-thents-tBk station managers^coming to him about doing their own testing. He said some Station Managers took such initiative, as in Richmond, VA. Summer of'01 <~\

\) \m Brinkley asked Arroyo if he recalled the increased chatter, the-readshosr, some ICs NIE -^Sslk.the threat hadancrease Arroyo said he remembered the chatter, and that there was nothing on hijack with boxcutters or knives; nothing to heighten us, to set the magnetometers at a more sensitive dial.

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1 \ I He recalled that the aviation security level that summer was at "3 plus". The Port — Authority had its own rating levels, which would explain why Baer had a different number. Arroyo said, "The Port Authority maintained it at four until they went broke. It takes a lot of police to maintain that level." ACS-1, Irish Flynn, did not take them to 4 after TWA 800.

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As for we.!€&, Arroyo commented, "you could read them in the USA Today." The SDs had more "punch." they were never diacardod but Etill they lost total control over them •rvhrn thcyTVrnTTrrrnrlnitr)' FA A wm rnrrfhl lint tn onmpromiie sources.

Sam asked about the Federal Register changes to rules 107 and 108 that came out that summer. Arroyo says the staffing was not increased in response. "You do what ever you can do." Spending on his part was completely off the charts, he was "spending every penny he got - he felt as though he couldn't ramp it up anymore - FAA Administrator had already gone into a reserve fund to pay for increases in ACS. Arroyo alerted the airport community and worked with the airport police. Kennedy and Newark were doing T^ti exlEa-Eafflp-pati'ols. (Two Newark officers were killed respondm|[tp""WT€7)-A lot of ^"donated time,-ilight standards received criticism because the£-were1r'9-5 operation" whereas that was not the case for FAA security in Eastern Region. He "Stepped up where they could." He found vagrants sleeping, the homeless walking on the ramp. He would personally ride around surveying the airports. Consequently, cargo theft statistics went down as a beneficial biproduct/^ W*9-11

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n the morning of 9-1 1, he was in the office orfthe second floor of his building. He r" received the report of a plane hitting the Wdnd Trade Center. He thought immediately of , a general aviation flight. He went up to Ihe 5th floor where the command center is (thipn» j the FAA building at JFK). The monitors were all on. Initially, he was shocked by what they were viewing. Within minutest/saw the second plane hit and he "instinctively knew it was terrorism." He wanted to know if they were coming from his airports. He opened up the "net," all of the key managers assembled at the New York Center. He started organizing the data. His key managers of his department were stranded at a convention in Canada. All of the screening checkpoints started collecting data. When he received indication that one of the flights had left Newark, he started pulling the information together for an incident report. He "wanted to know the magnetometer specs and everything else." He said he got "pretty good information pretty fast" on technical questions. Arroyos1 testing of the magnetometers on 9-11: f\ J An employee he sent to Home Depot came back with every box cutter she could buy. He tested them at the brand new magnetometer in the lobby of the FAA building.

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As Regional Administrator, he had to metoUhc^niWrc who complained about the/noise of overhead flights in congested communities. People in the^Jmmunities were SB upset, tey presented a serious threat to the FAA. The regional office's security was improved because of thislEw lobbies of federal buildings had metal detectors before 9-11, now they all do| HIA manufactured state of the art metal detectors. He did not want to create a panic at he airport, so he conducted his own test of the metal detector capabilities in his own lobby. Personally, he went through the metal detector. Many of the boxcutters he tested "looked like magic markers," he said. | ~

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ommand Center email messages and digital pictures - of his box cutter test^ jSkJjrgadon forjt. Those-email^-and. j i j i I i i F» i,J|)i< linl I MI; il the Regional Headquarters. Operations Center Arroyo thought on 9-11 that the news reports were the best source of information. He had each CASFO manager up on the net. The primary net consisted of the national leadership including Monte Belger and Jane Garvey, etc. The Secondary and Tertiary nets were up, and also a private net talking directly to the CASFOs.

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Arjeyo worked closely with Mark Randol, the FSM for Dulles, and Nora ork CASFO manager at that time.

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The National Net

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Arroyo thinks that the FAA had a good system to connect everyone. For instance, the net works in a way that it dials all of your numbers on record until you finally pick up (cell

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r phone, home phone, office desk phone). Reports are made in short bursts. Everyone has \o identify themselves. It is orderly. No one dropped off, but you went on mute unless \u had something important to say. Everyone knew who to listen to; who would have \t information to report. He remembers giving a lot of information over the net. \e tactical net was also running; that was probably not recorded, he thought. ATC was I / V, a big player on the net. The Regional Administrator's office was feeding them. They were there around the clock. A/ \\J\n the planes came down, he did not think of reverse screening. There was so much I—1 s doing on in the immediate area, in response to the WTC disaster, etc, that he could not have organized a search of deplaning passengers or their planes if he wanted to.

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He never heard that five Middle Easterners fled an airport that day, after all the were grounded. AFTER ACTION

Yes, an after action report was completed but it took Newark longer to get that done. Russell and Nora did it and forwarded it to Washington. He does not remember seeing it. \,&M ouJM krw*# ^ \t fte*r why Newark and V&& Dulles? Arroyo* "Terrorists were operating in this area. This could have happened anywhere. It is dy they wanted to hit the Trade Center. Their plot was a well executed plan. They wanted fully fueled aircrafts. So why flv from anywhere else?" cioto Aid ifcio hear of other plots that were in the o

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[ \) Arroyo wanted to mention that vulnerability assessments were done at Newark with the ^~TBI. Newark got a lot of unique attention from the FAA technical center because of its proximity. Oftentimes, R and D was tested there. Arroyo felt it was beneficial for his agents to get the exposure., Newark had a good K-9 unit. He said the Port authority was reluctant to participate in K'—\ 9 until after TWA 800. Eventually, it became cost prohibitive and not effective (to continue the program?). Flight Standards/Safety Security overlap

Arroyo said that aviation security tabletop exercises were conducted prior to 9-11. A hijack drill had not been simulated in a long time. Airlines were reluctant to donate an aircraft.

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ommonly, they responded to disorderly passengers and bomb threats. Flight standards department dealt with air rage. Arroyo cited an instance in which a stock broker from Connecticut defecated on the food cart of an international flight. To support the cases of flight crews and the pilots in such instances, the FAA met with U.S. Attorneys who agreed they would prosecute the cases and support the flight crews

^jOjyfe "K CXAA Recommendations Arroyo would like to level out the pass flows. The industry would fight that. Arroyo went on to say that there are times during the day that the airport is virtually empty of travelers, Other times, you can't get in the door. He woild like to spread out the flow, thereby wait times would be shortened and security scrutiny per passenger increased. "Someone needs to recognize at a high level that this airport is complex. There is a lot of energy wasted on reconfiguratifarl^maller airports. This airport io not tho medal," Arroyo said. Continental Airlines, whpnfjust spent millions remodeling and expanding its terminal at Newark, has reported increased efficiency by 25 percent (the TSA model at Newark).

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Profiling

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I \J -Newark does not train screener to profile passeiigers because, "of the level of intrusion," it requires. Arroyo said, "Unless you walk aromnd with two inch platform shoes, you won't get that level of discrimination. The ]jJL (Tel Aviv Airport) operation knows its passengers, so it can get away with it." The trusted traveler feature - there is always a risk no matter what. Not everyone needs the same scrutiny. The bofffifeeek-- iimvlftg a*vaytofthat ^"doesn't knuw if it will piuviint dumping Ihu aiipuil. DoaH"know it yoii

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Arroyo cited a case at JFK in which an emotionally disturbed person went to the ticket counter and showed his or her gun t«^reF?Somehow, the person/managed to board the airplane and held a gun to the copilot's head. The pilots wS»£out the window. After hours of negotiation, the situation waare solved.^^more restrictive checkpoint could have prevented that from happening* He's not He's irt favor OTa wideThuiiiioiiUil chcckpuint-r~~v_,

\}j He wants the visible presence of a LEO at every checkpoint, but the budget can't affq ^ it. TSA as a law enforcement agency got push back^T-hey-made^ajot of overtime. Without the** presence. Arroyo feels the checkpoint lacks the visible deterrent. ( \)

Hfe agreed that security procedures need to vary in pattern so aindividual can't tell which lane you are going to go to; be it a lane that is under high scrutiny lane, or not.

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noyo thinks that Immigration an security.

should be tied into the IT systems of aviation

Security as disruption Arroyo: Ho suopwUtt tUat a lArrier - tickeTtransaefion tmfc iaA»-air carrier know/that a 747 with 350 passengers needs a certain number of agents and they know what time the average passenaer will arrive a i the airport for the scheduled this information m Iwuilytney criticize the amount of time it takes to get tfa» lingers through security, it-ig-ftiln'ng tnn Inrig, jo. |hf air rar"prs' opiffl*»P—Iis simple math that if you have three 737s boarding and the checkpoint has two lanes, there will be a bottleneck and a delay. The airport cannot physically put f* more lanes.

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assengers need to be smarter with what they pack. Some carriers will turn it around and say "you can bring whatever you want to bring on the flight," as a customer service boost to their sales. If a passenger uses more diligence, then thing will get faster.

U \o recommends that the Commission look into the five pilot programs in effect now L^ "" at chosen airports around the country fBqpbi^ffjT^niiinnad thiaJoo). What is the real metric of success for Newark at the screener checkpoint? ^- *-v I T 7 I Arroyo says 100 percent. Gotta say 100 percent resolution. Gotta say I don't know what '— ""mis is and open it up. "Recognize and resolve" needs to be the mantra of screeners.

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