Mfr Nara- T7- Newark Airport- Coda Robert- 5-6-04- 00161

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

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Event: Robert "Bob" Coda, Fonner Security Director at Newark Liberty International Airport Type: Interview Date: May 6, 2004 Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan Team: 7 Special Access issues: none Participants (Commission):

Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan

Participants (non-Commission): Coda

Mark Myers, counsel for NYINJ Port Authority and Bob

Location: by conference call from the 9/11 Commission office at GSA Background [U] Bob Coda has been with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey for 20 years, first with operations then with terminal services. In 1987, he joined the Port Authority police unit at Newark. He became supervisor of airport security at Newark in 1995 or 1996, and remained in that job through the end of2003. His basic function was to maintain the airport security program; he managed the security ID office, the airport challenge program, and compliance with FAA rules and regulations. [U] After 9/11, the division added one additional person to the unit. At the end of2003, Coda's title changed to his current designation as manager of airport security. Other positions include the supervisor, and coordinator of access control. Security at Newark International [U] A weakness was the screening process, which was the responsibility of the airlines, not the airport. The existence of different screening companies led to inconsistency between different checkpoints at the airport. United Airlines used Argenbright and Continental Airlines used Haines Security, for instance. Coda wasn't privy to information about the quality of the screening companies' performance, and he didn't really get involved in those operations. [U] Coda's main concern was to insure that the security program at Newark he was responsible for was in compliance with FAA regulations.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED Threat information/

Intelligence

[U] As the airport security director, Coda received information from the Information Circulars (ICs) and Security Directives (SDs) distributed by FAA. He also had direct contact with FAA Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO). He didn't interface much with law enforcement officers, other than the Port Authority police unit at the airport, which was a visible presence. [U] Other than from the FAA, the main opportunity for Coda to receive threat information was in regular security consortium meetings that acted as a forum for free exchange of information. To a limited extent, threat information was shared there, but since this was an open meeting, nothing specific or detailed was presented. [U] Pre-91l1 Coda saw his job as one of compliance with FAA rules, and he felt there was an "invisible wall" between the civilian administration of the airport and the law enforcement side. [U] Coda wasn't aware of the presence of terrorist cells in the vicinity of the airport. Looking back, if the FBI had knowledge about a threat, he thought from a common sense perspective they would have provided the information to the FAA, and then the necessary information would have "trickled down" to the airport operators and the air carriers. [U] Coda was not that he is aware of any pre-91l1 suspicious incidents, such as unauthorized surveillance of the airport. He reported that those types of incidents would be referred to the port authority police at the airport; it was not the civilian authority's responsibility. He further indicated that the port authority police produce a log of all security incidents, and that he would send to the Commission the reports covering 111/01 to 9111/01. [U] Coda stated that Ies and SDs prior to 9/11 were vague and general. It was difficult for the airport to take effective action; "vigilance" was the watchword. The perception was that the FAA was making an effort to keep all parties in the large airport community "in the loop," but it was starting to seem like they were hearing "the same old stuff from the FAA." This in turn led to a reduced sense of urgency. Credentialing

and Airport Access Control

[U] Coda was not aware of any employees at the airport or any individuals that sought employment that were denied because of terrorist affiliation. He indicated that there was no way for the airport to adequately monitor terrorist activity. The airport does the fingerprinting, forwards that to law enforcement, and then receives back from law enforcement whether the individual should be disqualified. What they were looking for was a yes or no determination from the FBI. "If FBI rap-sheets indicate the person shouldn't be employed," the airport would comply. COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED [U] Coda said there are 20,000 employees accessing the airport in the active database. No one in personnel or the TSA is tasked with tracking the persons employed by the airport for relations with a terrorist group. [U] Currently applicants for airport access jobs are required to produce two forms of ID with their applications. In addition, a responsible person must accompany them from the entity who would employ the individual and who will vouch for the need for access. Coda's office does the fingerprinting for all airport applicants. The fingerprints are sent to AAAE. Within 2-3 days, the results are posted on the TSA website. A dedicated person in the management office reviews the results. If the applicant committed a disqualifying crime within the past ten years, he or she is denied employment. Coda's office has to determine whether the information supplied by TSA is disqualifying information on it. The TSA only provides the applicant's law enforcement record. [U] The airport personnel cross checks the applicants name with the stop-list and no-fly list. When an updated list is received, they cross check their list of personnel with it. Once this is accomplished, they send the list to the police. He does not know of any instances of a positive match. [U] Coda believes the move to include fingerprints in background checks was a good one, and much better than the preceding system. Summer of 2001; Knowledge of al Qaeda and Bin Ladin [U] Coda recalled that security concerns that summer were routine. At the Consortia meetings with law enforcement authorities, the FBI, and FAA, nothing about viable threats was reported. Security wasn't beefed up. [U] Coda hadn't heard of al Qaeda until after 9-11. He had heard "a little" about UBL prior to 9/11 from a friend of his in law enforcement. Choice of Newark by Hijackers [U] Coda does not know why they picked one airport over another, other than that he surmises they had to find those that had planes with higher fuel loads. He was not aware of anything in public sources that suggested that Newark, or the other Port Authority airports, was less secure than other airports. On 9/11 [U] On 9111, Coda got to work at 8: 15 AM, and he recalled that it started as a beautiful day weather-wise. His office faces NYC. Shortly thereafter, through his window he saw smoke coming from the World Trade Center, and he thought a fire caused this. The trade center was the home office of the Port Authority. Coda thought it was odd at the time that they did not get a phone call or an explanation from them as to the cause of the fire. At that point, he and his colleagues at the airport were not thinking it was caused by COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED terrorism. Then they saw the second fireball (which was the second plane hitting the south tower), which he thought was an "explosion." That was when people became alarmed. He remembers someone running down the hall with the news that planes had crashed into the trade center. That was when everyone got panicky. [V] Coda then ran down to the police unit at that airport. They were just getting all of the information at that time. He recalled a general atmosphere of "mayhem" at the airport. Once it became known they weren't accidents, Coda said he called an emergency security consortium meeting. The airport was already closed. Around noon, the VAL station manager told him that flight 93 from Newark was one of the hijacked aircraft and she was still gathering information about it. Aviation Security Today [V] Coda thinks that Transportation Security Regulations are written with some degree of interpretation. As mentioned previously, the airport personnel must decide what is a disqualifying event in TSA's background reports on applicants for airport jobs or access. Similarly, on the No Fly and Stop lists, the airport has to crosscheck these TSA supplied lists with their own database information. [V] Though there was no closed circuit television at Newark on 9/11, Continental Airlines now has CCTV installed at their checkpoints. [V] Coda believes that the greater continuity and centralization of checkpoint screening today is an improvement on the fragmented screening in the old system. He is an advocate of centralized and consistent security, implemented identically across the system. [V] Coda thinks that the sharing of intelligence is better today than before, but that there is still a need for better cooperation between law enforcement "uniforms" and aviation security "civilians." (He indicated he hadn't really experienced this problem in the Port Authority.) [V] Coda reported that the Port Authority police have a plan in place to address MANPADS, though he didn't elaborate. [V] Coda believes that TSA should be continuously re-evaluating the fingerprinted individuals (employment and access applicants) with the latest intelligence information. He thinks that such a review can best be done at this point,closer to the intelligence, rather than dispersed among the airports.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

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