Mfr Nara- T7- Massport- Kinton Tom- 11-6-03- 00662

COMMISSION SENSITIVE ~

MEMORANADUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Tom Kinton

HFfZ

()~f)n

(!)

Type: Interview Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan and Bill Johnstone Team: 7 Date: November 6, 2003 Participants (non Commission): Tom Kinton, MASSPORT; Chris Moore, Counsel for rvIASSPORT; John Alteri, Counsel for MASSPORT Participants (Commission):

Bill Johnstone, John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan

Location: Goodwin Proctor LLP, 1 Exchange Place, Boston, MA Background [U] Kinton is Director of Aviation for Massport, which includes responsibility for Logan Airport, Hanscom Field and Worchester Regional Airport. He has been with Massport for 27 Yz years, all in aviation. He served as the building control supervisor, manager of building maintenance, director of airport facilities, director of operations (1988 - 1992), and director of aviation (1993 - present). He was Acting CEO for the authority from October 2001 till April 2002. He stepped up to this last post "with a lot of pride" in a time of need; "It was trying times." [U] Massport is a-multipurpose port authority covering bridges, maritime facilities (including containerized cargo and cruise ships), several airports, and a development department that handles properties around the waterfront. Those are the 4 primary operating departments managed by the authority (including legal, labor relations, and human resources staff), with a chief executive officer who reports to the Board of Directors. The Governor appoints the Board to 7 year terms (staggered). Kinton's immediate supervisor is the CEO. Security at Logan Airport Prior to 9/11 [U] Kinton reported that Logan met the federal standards (FAR, certification requirements) by which it was governed, and in many ways, exceeded those' requirements, which Kinton saw as a minimum standard. He cited as examples of Logan's leadership its requirement for finger-printing for those seeking access badges prior to the federal requirement for the same, its hiring of more canine teams (for COMMISSION SENSITIVE S8I e

1

I9V

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

-sss-

detection of explosives) than required), and its development of a "laser" team of 5 or 6 state police officers with a specific assignment to check airport security (via ill checks, SIDA challenges, door checks, etc.). This last was in place by 1999. Finally, though more a safety than security matter, the fire department was required to have a volume of foam and water triple the federal standard and to able to get to the end of the furthest runway in 2 minutes or less. [U] Kinton and the other airport officials wanted to be leaders in the field, and to go over and beyond the minimum required by the federal government. He felt like he always had good support from the Executive Director and the Board to do so. [U] Kinton reported he got along very well with Federal officials, including the Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) at Logan, and the Federal Security Manager (FSM) at Logan. He was aware that there were some "issues" between certain CASFO officials and the FSM. Security Threats [SSij Mr. Kinton reported receiving "broad based" threat reports, with nothing specific to Logan, or to a particular methodology or group. They developed "Go Teams" to learn lessons from specific safety and security incidents around the world, with a mandate to "picture the accident at Logan" and come back with recommendations. He indicated they sent a team to France after the Air France hijacking. Joe Lawless went on that trip to learn as much as he could about storming the aircraft. For instance the stairs used to get in the plane must be adjusted depending on number of people in the plane and how much fuel it has on board. [U] Kinton indicated that the State Police, the FAA and sometimes the FBI were the main sources of intelligence. The Director of Public Safety for the airport (Joe Lawless prior to 9/11) oversaw the state police at the airport and anything that came to him from that source would be communicated to Kinton. FAA threat reporting came from various intelligence sources, including the FBI but there were times the FBI approached Logan .directly. When something significant happened with respect to security, Kinton felt that he wouldn't have to wait for a staff meeting or anything like that because Lawless notified him right away when it was something he needed to know. [U] With respect to information on the terrorist threat, the FBI approached Massport about members of Ham as and Hezbollah working at Logan for Massport and an airline, as well as about a cab driver at the Airport associated with the Cole bombing . ..'~. Kinton recalled that the FAA (in the form of the CASFO or FSM) came to him five or less times pre-9-11 and provided him with general threat information he had to read in their presence and sign for. He assumed Joe Lawless was given the same information. None of it concerned specific threats, and it was mostly about overseas threats. He recalled references to al Qaeda, but not to the possibilityof suicide hijackings or aircraft as weapons. He had no recollection of the 2000-2001 Pat McDonnell CD-ROM COMMISSION SENSITIVE -S£.!-

2

•

COMMISSION SENSITIVE ~gI presentation on the terrorist threat to civil aviation. The FAA presentations didn't require Massport to take any actions, but Kinton was told not to share the information. He was concerned because "information sharing is absolutely critical to the people on the front line in the war on terrorism." Security

Vulnerabilities

[U] Kinton received reports on security vulnerabilities at Logan from Joe Lawless (and through him, the State Police), the CASFO, the FSM, occasional Joint Vulnerability Assessments by the FBI and FAA, and possibly an assessment from the military some time ago. The main issues generally involved insuring that\

I

9/11 Closed by Statute

I

Checkpoint screening

•

[UJ Kinton was frustrated by headline reports in the Boston Globe in the late 1990s, based on FOIA filings for FAA checkpoint screening test results. He felt it was "ludicrous that we undress ourselves in the public arena" with respect to security vulnerabilities. He had to go before the Boston media and explain that Massport was not in control of checkpoint security. [U] After the Globe stories, Mr. Kinton recalled discussions with Joe Lawless about Lawless's plan to test checkpoints. However, according to Kinton, the plan "never got off the ground." While Kinton thought it was worthy of further discussion, there were concerns, especially about Massport's lack of authority with respect to the checkpoints. The division of responsibilities was long-established and there were good reasons. For example, the airlines didn't need to know how much foam and water Massport has arranged with the fire department to bring to the middle of the runway. [U] Kinton indicated that he wasn't holding the conversations with the FAA about rolling out such a program of testing. That was being done by Lawless. Before the program could proceed any further it needed the approval of Massport CEO Buckingham as well as the Board. Prior to that, the Lawless plan was raised at a LAMeD meeting of stakeholders at which both the air carriers and the FAA expressed objections.

•

[U] Shortly after the LAMeO meeting, the Lawless testing plan was discussed at a Massport senior staff meeting, which Kinton missed. He was represented by Ed Freni who reported to him that the plan was not approved. Kinton understood that the program was not necessarily rejected but that it was clear that the details needed to be worked out (including liability issues) before it could be seriously considered for im~lementation, Furthermore, the testing would have been fod ' ~ land not about the kind of weapons used on 9/11. Apparently, there were no mmutes)p' 'en. [U] Kinton recalled that Logan was to be involved with the F AA,.iri' a joint testing pilot

program, but he didn't remember anyMOU on the subject.'

COMMISSION SENSITIVE SS! 9/11 Closed

3 by Statute

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

-ssi, Security Resource Issues [U] Mr. Kinton thought that security camera coverage at the airport was important. Camera installation was included in many of the new construction projects at Logan. The newest garage had surveillance cameras installed as did the new international gateway. Kinton did not recall any details about surveillance camera proposals not being funded, nor a study of the need for such equipment. After 9-11 Massport "rushed out" and did the checkpoints and the cameras have subsequently been used effectively to decide whether or not to dump a concourse or go looking for a specific individual who has breached security. In Kinton's view, the cameras can also act as a deterrent. He did recall a discussion of a CCTV program throughout the airport. This was a larger program, related to access issues, but it was not funded pre-9/11. [U] Kinton stated that as of 9/11, Logan was in the midst of a $4 billion dollar rebuilding of the airport. He "absolutely" felt the airport got what it needed with respect to security, such as more cruisers, K9 teams, and a weapons of mass destruction training program. There was never a period when security received inadequate support. Safety and security was always at the top of the mission list. [U] The airport had a five-year rolling capital improvements budget for major infrastructure, including such items as bomb trailers and robots, dive team truck, snow plows, and CCTV. There was also an annual operating budget, which funded security items like the Laser team, and travel for the Go Team. Lawless and the other senior airport staff were given an annual performance appraisal which listed "5 or 6" priority goals and objectives for that year. CTI Audits [U] Kinton cited the CTI security audit as a good example of something in the budget which was funded out of Lawless' department. Kinton didn't recall whose idea it was, but thought it was a smart thing to do. The purpose of the audit was to do a security risk analysis at all Massport properties and to determine what could be done to improve security. He recalled that pre-9111 Lawless shared with him a memo he sent to Buckingham on security threats. Kinton also saw the final CTI report on portals, which he thought thorough and professional, prior to 9/11, but he didn't have any interaction with the larger CTI audit at that time. [U] Kinton reported that he saw a "first draft" of the larger CTI security audit while he was serving as Acting CEO after 9/11. He indicated that it was customary for such reports to go through multiple drafts before the final version was produced. When he saw the draft, he was "outraged." While approximately 52 pages (which constituted the bulk of the report) were done professionally, neither he, nor his deputy (Freni) nor CEO Buckingham had been interviewed or asked to participate and the editorializing by a "junior" CTI person was inflammatory and untrue. (Kinton never received an explanation as to why he wasn't interviewed.) In consequence, Kinton took his complaint to the president of CTI, stating "you can write what ever you want to write but COMMISSION SENSITIVE .~

4

COMMISSION SENSITIVE '$1-.

you better talk to the right people." Subsequent drafts were produced and the final report was much more professional, in Kinton's view. [U] A report by Israeli security expert Rafi Ron was done in conjunction with the CTI audit. That report was designed to add the international angle (post-9-11) to cover all perspectives. The two reports are used as today as guides for Massport security efforts. After media accounts critical of the final CTI report appeared, Len Limmer, who had worked previously with Rafi Ron, was brought in to provide an independent summary of the CTI audit and the process by which it was produced. Limmer produced a final three page summation to satisfy the Board's concerns about what the press was saying. [U] Kinton believes that the Lawless memo to Buckingham (on the security threat to Logan) was the basis for contracting with CTI for the security audit and the results of that audit and the Rafi Ron report were the roadmap for the later improvements. Kinton also felt that the Carter Commission report recommendations were useful. The Day of September 11,2001 [U] On 9/11, Kinton reported that he was in Montreal; at the Airport Conference International conference with most of his counterparts from the major airports. He was in the exhibit hall that morning and at around 8:20 AM he spoke with his deputy, Ed Frenhi, who reported that everything was okay in Boston. While eating breakfast shortly thereafter he heard someone say that a small aircraft had hit a building in New York City He had Sam Slimor of his staff call Logan Operations, and Kinton was told that "they want you right away." The report from Logan Tower was that "all hell's breaking loose;" a plane had hit the World trade Center and American Flight 11 from Logan had been hij acked, but it was not clear whether it was the plane which hit the WTC. [U] Kinton then called the office and Lawless was already there in the conference room with Frenhi and they were telling him what was going on. They were planning on calling the FAA and Air Traffic Control to get any more available information. He didn't recall being told about any communications with American Airlines. He told them he would return right away. He went back to his hotel, where he saw the CNN footage of the second plane hitting the WTC. He was back on the phone to his office and his secretary told him Logan was being closed down, so he rented a car to return. He spoke with Lawless who confirmed that Flight #11 had hit the WTC, and Kinton then directed Lawless to open the Emergency Operations Center. Subsequently, he got confirmation on UAL #175 and he heard reports on the radio about an aircraft heading toward the Capitol, the Pentagon being in flames, and that there may have been a third plane hijacked out of Boston. His feeling was "we are under attack." [U] He was met by a State trooper at the Vermont border and got an escort to Concord, New Hampshire from where he flew back to Boston. Shortly after crossing into Vermont, he heard reports that the suspect Delta fight had landed safely in Cleveland and that the WTC had collapsed. He arrived in Boston at 1:45 PM and went immediately to the Emergency Operations Center. Lawless and Freni gave him a briefing which COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

'-s-st-

5

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 'SSIincluded information on the discovery of Atta's rental car at Logan, and on the call from the American flight to a Supervisor in Boston which had reported that box cutters had been used, that a passenger arid crew members had been stabbed, and that the aircraft was flying too low and too fast over New York City. The call apparently had continued right up to the point of impact. He also learned that an American crew member had made calls to Dallas, and that calls were made from UAL #175 to Chicago. [U] Kinton learned that flight manuals and the Koran were found in Atta's bag that didn't make his flight from Portland. With regard to the Atta car, Kinton was informed that a passenger that left Logan in the morning had called back to report a suspicious incident in the parking lot. This report led the airport authorities to the discovery of the car. Later in the day he saw the manifest for AAL #11 and the names of the hijackers "jumped out at you" in hindsight, especially the AAdvantage member who was in First Class. The Hijackings and Terrorism [U] With what he learned upon his return to Boston, Kinton could see that the day's events had redefined hijacking forever. He believes that the hijackings were the result of a systems, rather than security, failure. He cited the systematic efforts of the hijackers (how they infiltrated the system, none of them had jobs, they were frequent travelers, some were in flight schools, some had traveled to Afghanistan) and the fact that some were even chosen (by the CAPPS system) as selectees. He concluded, "They beat us in many ways." [U] During the summer of2001, Kinton didn't have a feeling ofa heightened threat. There was nothing that alanned him or made him more vigilant. He was not aware of the 1998 action which reduced the consequences (to checked bag search only) for "selection" by CAPPS or its predecessor, but knowing the situation before 9-11, it wouldn't have "hit him." He recalled that before 9/11, it was all about keeping bombs off airplanes, and many were still debating Lockerbie. That was why Boston moved so quickly on the checked bags screening. [U] Kinton stated that he was at ground zero of the investigation of the hijackings and he sees it differently than some others. He believes that terrorism is something that is very hard to defend against. He cited the fact that Israel is recognized as the best in counterterrorism, and he questioned if there is an investigation every time a bomb goes off over there. In Kinton's view, we have got to get over pointing the finger of blame and come together to deal with the problem, because terrorism will be with us for the foreseeable future. The Response to 9/11 [U] Mr. Kinton indicated that the Emergency Operations Center had practiced many times for crashes and accidents. There were over 60 positions staffed in it and he felt the operation was second to none. It remained in operation for several weeks after 9/11. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

-sst-

6

•

COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

SSt [U] Dave Mackey (a Massport counsel) suggested the idea of searching every grounded airplane on 9/11, and Kinton agreed. Using the State Police, they started with searches of wide-bodied aircraft that night and did it again and went through lockers, rest rooms and public areas. After the initial FAA Security Directive, they towed over 3000 cars. The FBI was involved at this point.

[U]. Kinton indicated that Massport received no directions from the FAA, FBI or anyone else about screening de-planing passengers or examining flight manifests. He recalled no evidence of further plots. Other than the discovery of the Atta car, he was not aware of other instances of surveil1ance of Logan by the hijackers. [U] Kinton recalled the September 19, 2001 charter flight to Logan to pick up Bin Laden [ami ly members. There was much confusion at that time with respect to air space and he wanted to make sure everyone that needed to know was involved (State Department, FBI and the State police). The FBI advised him to let the flight come. He remembered that the flight came out of Los Angeles going on to Orlando, Dallas, Boston, Gander and London, that a police officer got off in Boston, and that the FBI and Customs were there to meet the airplane. He saw the manifest, and will provide a copy to the Commission.

[U] Kinton stated that there were some flights he was concerned with coming out of

•

Canada in the immediate aftermath of9111, but nothing related to the Bin Laden family. He felt they needed to watch the Canadian border carefully because there had been many overseas flights grounded in Canada and he wanted to make sure individuals coming into the U.S. from those flights were on the approved list to come in here.

Recommendations 1) [U] Based on the Israeli experience, Kinton believes we need a layered approach for security, and not to rely on a single line of defense, such as checkpoint screening. Furthermore, the layers need to have some random elements in order to defeat surveillance. Kinton cited 9/11 Closed by Statute which is currently done at Logan as an essential layer which should be done nationaJIy: "we need to look at eyes, not just screens."

I

.

I

2) [U] Kinton supports "hardening" of new facilities (minimizing flying glass, resisting building collapse, etc.) to minimize the impact of future terrorist strikes. 3) ~

Kinton advocates deployment of better technology.

For example, Logan

9/11 Closed by Statute

•

COMMISSION ~

SENSITIVE

7

•

COMMISSION

.

SST

SENSJTTVF

9/11 Closed

by Statute

waiting for CAPPS II. Kinton believes that CAPP8.,II is headed in the right direction but he fears it will never be deployed because it is trying to do too much (criminals as well as terrorists). . 4) ¢Kinton supports expeditious deployment by all airpodi He noted that Logan met the original deadline, even as other--a"'""irp-ort-s -w-e-re-- ..... successfully petitioning Congress for a delay, because they didn't stop to make sure who was oin to a for it and the ot a waiver to allow Mass ort itself to pay the bill. 9/11 Closed by Statute

5) Kinton believes the country needs to "step up to the plate" on cargo. Technology needs to catch up to the need. If there is intel1igence that suggests the need to remove cargo on passenger planes (which the airlines depend on for revenue), he thinks the government should consider subsidizing the airlines for the lost revenue and putting it on a cargo-only carrier. Current

•

Security

Concerns

[U] Kinton cited the following as his current chief concerns with respect to transportation security: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Cargo Explosives in the aircraft cabin MANPADS - very hard to defend against Suicide bomber Containers - too late to scrutinize when they have arrivedin the U.S.; the screen in needs to be moved to forei orts of ori 6)~~ __ ~~ -. ~ 7) Rail- especial1y as a means 0 carrymg contamers 8) General Aviation [U] Kinton urged that the country not let its guard down. Once we put something in place we need it to get stronger over time rather than weaker because experience has shown that the terrorists can show great patience. Secu rity Consortia

•

[U] Pre-9/11, Kinton believed that the model Massport adopted (LAMCO) was the right vehicle at that time rather than the model suggested by the Gore Commission. Today, this has evolved where they "fill the room everyday, 7 days a week" with 20-25 people talking security. The Federal Security Director (FSD) and Kinton chair it. The airlines are in the room, along with Customs, Air Marshals, state police, and senior Massport management. He believes this approach results in problems getting solved, and he

recommends it to other airports. COMMISSION SENSITIVE SSI

8

.-,/19/11

•

Closed

by Statute

COMMISSION SENSITIVE , 891 ' .

TSA

,"

,:

"'"

"',-

rssrl With regard to TSA operat'ions, Kinton Cited th~""~xperi~nce with box cutters. 1)uri~g a recent morning rush-hour at Logan, TSA screeners at.the American Airl ines checkpoint found 4 within @'n hour. TSA takes the implement away from them and lets them go. He asked TSA about it and had the airport security people review the videotapes (using BPR }e'chniques) to insure that the persons weren't "suspicious looking. [U] Kinton recalled re~ent TSA Infonnation

I

Circulars abou~'l \, Ibut the Circulars contained-no guidance as to what specific steps should be taken. Unless the information is very specific, it is difficult to respond. He believes that Security Directives and Information Circulars need not only be warnings but also recommendations, giving guidance on what TSA intends for the airport to do. As an example, the Circular could recommend that suspect items should be:5ubject to random selection for extra scrutiny (for example, every fifth1

I

I

•

----

r

.....---

[U] Prior to 9-11, on Security Directives there was a "Dissemination Guidance" as to whether the information "shall" or "may" be given to the airport directors, and the result was sometimes important information was withheld. After 9111, Kinton started seeing "everything" after 9-11. However, he worries that TSA is becoming more secretive as it evolves. Since the checkpoints have been federalized, TSA does not share information on checkpoint screening performance and the Information Circulars seem to have less information than before. [U] Kinton stated that originally TSA put in place a "scientifically determined" screener workforce level, but have since (under Congressional pressure) arbitrarily reduced that workforce. However, he is not in favor of privatization of screening. Smaller airports could be contracted out, under federal oversight. General

Aviation (GA)

[U] There is a lot of General Aviation at Hanscom and also at Logan. Massport is requiring background checks and issuing ID's to pilots based out of Hanscom, in spite of

initial push-back from industry. They are taking the Cat X (large passenger airport) approach to GA and are screening GA passengers out of Logan. Radio talk show host Don Imus has mentioned it on his show. They screened a Saudi Flight with a sports team: "unless we get a letter from the State Department we are going to do it." Kinton supported the ideas of having a security coordinator at each GA facility, and of requiring a special ID for GA pilots.

•

Customer

Service (CS) Initiative

[U] Kinton indicated that the CS Initiative had nothing to do with security. It was aimed

at opening up more screening lanes; it was a problem of lack of staffing. He stated that COMMISSION SENSITIVE SSI

9

COMMISSION SENSITIVE ~

Massport didn't invent the standards, but used the ones set by the airlines themselves. He believes TSA itself is providing inadequate staffing levels for screening at present, and as the economy improves and flight levels increase, passengers will once again become very frustrated by the delays.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

-ssr

10