Mfr Nara- T3- Dos- Moose George- 10-9-03- 00739

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Ambassador George Moose Type of Event: Interview Date: October 9, 2003 Special Access Issues: Treated as GO~JFIDENTIAL Prepared by: Niki Grandrimo Reviewed by: Scott Allan Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: 2100 K St. Participants: Niki Grandrimo & Scott Allan Interviewee Background As a career Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Moose served at various State Department posts including: the US Mission to the United Nations, 1983; Ambassador to the Republic of Benin, 1983-1986; Office of the Under Secretary for Management, 19861988; Ambassador to Senegal, 1988-1991; Alternate US Representative to the United Nations, 1991-1992; Clinton Administration Transition Team, 1992-1993; Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ("AF"), 1993-1997; and Ambassador to the European Office of the United Nations, 1998-2001. In 2001 Ambassador Moose went on sabbatical to Howard University. In 2002, he worked for the Office of the Inspector General until July of2003, when he retired from the Foreign Service. [U] Priorities in Africa from 1993-1997 Ambassador Moose said that when he became the Assistant Secretary of AF, Somalia was a major priority. In the fall of 1992 President Bush authorized a humanitarian mission and it was not going well. In addition, the US Government ("USG") was trying to find ways to support South Africa's transition to democracy. The USG was also concerned about the collapse of the civil war cease-fire in Angola and Burundi, both of which were on the verge major ethnic conflicts. Also at this time, the USG was involved in the negotiations in Rwanda, trying to gamer agreement between Tutsis and Hutus. Furthermore," Liberia was in chaos and the USG believed that it would have to intervene because of the potential threat to regional stability. Finally, the civil war in the Congo, which was causing increased instability in the region, was of major concern to the USG. Sudan was one of a number of issues. When asked if he felt that his bureau had enough resources to adequately address these priorities, Ambassador Moose said that they could have used more. [U] Terrorism as a Priority Ambassador Moose said that terrorism was a major concern, but more so in West Africa than East Africa. He said that it was clear that Libya was involved in supporting rebel

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.-GO~(FIDENTIAL movements in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. Such support led to changes in governments or coup d' etats and was a destabilizing factor across West Africa. Ambassador Moose said that the USG's terrorism priority in East Africa was Sudan ..~ Ambassador Moose said that it had become increasingly clear that the Government of Sudan ("GOS") was providing safehaven to several terrorist groups such as the Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya ("IG"). Soon after he became the Assistant Secretary for AF in 1993, Sudan was placed on the State Department's list of State Sponsors of terrorism. 1 He noted that while the designation process was in place before he became the Assistant Secretary, he believed that the designation was warranted. Ambassador Moose said that he had no reason to doubt the information provided to him detailing the GOS' s role in providing safehaven to terrorist groups. He stated that AF worked on this designation with the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism ("S/CT") and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs ("NEA"). He speculated that NEA was involved because the Government of Egypt ("GOE") was highly concerned with the situation in Sudan. [U] When asked why he believed the GOS supported terrorism, Ambassador Moose said that he was not knowledgeable regarding the subject. He did speculate that it was because the GOS was not "paying enough of a price" for its association with terrorists and terrorist organizations. He also remembered that AF was concerned that Sudan's Arab neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, were not as concerned as they should have been about the significant terrorist presence in Sudan. AF tried to determine how it could get Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to focus on the terrorist presence in Sudan. ~ Incident at Juba Ambassador Moose said he did not clearly recall the circumstances that led to the incident in which the Sudanese Security Forces executed four Foreign Service Nationals who were caretakers of the US Agency for International Development ("USAID") facility in Juba. He said that he had a strong suspicion that the USAID workers were killed because they were in a position to serve as witnesses to unfavorable activities in Southern Sudan and could communicate those to the USG. Ambassador Moose said that this incident did not change any perceptions in the USG, but reinforced the skepticism that existed regarding the intentions and motives of the GOS. [U] Priorities with the GOS Ambassador Moose said that the USG's agenda with the GOS was complicated. Issues were numerous and included: ending the devastating civil war; diminishing the instability along Sudan's borders; improving human rights; and terminating the GOS's support for international terrorism. Ambassador Moose did not know where terrorism ranked amongst these issues when the USG presented them through diplomatic representations to the GOS. He stated that the USG presented to the GOS a I The law establishing the "State Sponsors" list states that, "The US may not provide assistance to any country that the Secretary of State determines that the government of that country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism (22 USC 2371). [U]

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CO~(FIDENTIAI::; comprehensive agenda, on all of which the USG expected the GOS to take action. However, he stated that terrorism was certainly a high priority. [U] Ambassador Moose said that the USG told the GOS that they would not be removed from the State Sponsors list until they decisively addressed the USG's issues of concern. He did not recall any positive responses from the GOS. He said that it was not until the USG pled its case to the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") and sanctions were levied that the GOS asked what could be done to alleviate the USG's concerns. As a result, the USG had to translate its intelligence into an actionable list to present to the GOS. [U] Mubarak Assassination Attempt In 1995, a member of the IG attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The assassins came from Sudan and fled back to Sudan after the attempt. Ambassador Moose said that the USG did not believe that the GOS was involved in the assassination attempt. However, the GOS provided the assassins safehaven and refused to make any effort to apprehend and extradite them. He stated that this caused the GOE to become more pointed with the GOS and reinforced the mistrust that other governments already felt towards the GOS. Ambassador Moose said that the GOE was the only government outside of AF' s jurisdiction with which he had a continuing dialogue. He stated that Egypt was a member of the Organization of African Unity and was taking initiatives to resolve the civil war in Sudan. With both the USG and the GOE attempting to influence events in Sudan, AF spent some time de-conflicting the different approaches. [~ UBLin Sudan At the time he served as Assistant Secretary of AF, Ambassador Moose stated that he had no sense of what UBL represented. UBL was one of several terrorists/terrorist organizations that were potentially dangerous in Sudan. Ambassador Moose thought that the USG viewed UBL as a terrorist facilitator or financier. He stated that he did not recall why UBL presented any particular threat. Ambassador Moose stated that AF felt as if it was on the periphery of a larger discussion of terrorism and the Middle East. [U] USG Policy Towards Sudan:

1995 - 1997

Ambassador Moose stated that the USG's isolation policy was consistent with listing the GOS as a State Sponsor and levying sanctions against Sudan through the UNSC. In connection with implementing the policy, AF received direction to "lay on" the Sudanese. He said that the USG anticipated having to augment its policy to underscore the pressure being applied; however, he said, that this was not indicative that the USG's policy was failing. Ambassador Moose noted that the USG received some indications that the GOS might be trying to alleviate the USG's concerns. He said that the GOS rendered Carlos the Jackal, one of the world's most notorious terrorists of the 1970's and

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1980's, to the French? In addition, expelled UBL at the request of the USO . However, the USG was always skeptical.of the GaS's intentions. [U] 'Regarding GOS offers to expel UBL, Ambassador Moose said that in late 1995/early 1996, the GOS asked the USG what steps needed to be taken for removal from the State Sponsors list. The USG developed a list'andprovided it to the Gas. Ambassador Moose said that he does not remember the specifics ofthe list but remembers that the GOS agreed to expel UBL. He said that he and'others in the USG were skeptical of the GaS's offer. When asked whether the USG asked, the O,OS to render UBL to the USG or any other specific country, Ambassador Moose 'said that he could not remember. He remembered saying that UBL should be rendered tQ Saudi Arabia because he was a Saudi national. However, Ambassador Moose stated that where UBL went after the expulsion was not a concern for AF. He believed that til direct: on from se io te Denar -r rn,~nt officials was sim 1 to et UBL out of Sudan.

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In his May 15, 1997 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador Moose stated, "The international community has made it clear that it will not accept cosmetic changes from Khartoum and will insist on real improvement in Sudan's domestic and international behavior." When Ambassador Moose was asked to discuss this quote, he said that the GOS had a pattern of "paying lip service" to the USG's concerns, denying the most serious charges against it, and telling the USG that it would take action; however the GaS never did anything to address the USG's concerns. Nevertheless, the USG maintained a dialogue with the GOS because it was important to do so and other countries in the region desired it. ~ USG Policy Towards Sudan:

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When asked if the USG ever considered changing its isolation policy towards the GOS, Ambassador Moose said, "Yes." He stated that the USG considered greater engagement. When asked about an interagency review of Sudan policy in mid-1997 that proposed a "warming" in USG-GOS relations, Ambassador Moose said he did not remember the , review. When he was told that Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, and National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, opposed such a 2

Ambassador Moose cautioned that his recollection of this event was not clear. [U]

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warming with the GOS in favor of continued isolation, Ambassador Moose said that this position was not unreasonable. [~ Ambassador Moose stated that those in favor of warming argued that the National . "" . . . 9/11 Classified

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Increase engagement WIt t e assa or oose s sense was aura was in greater control of the political apparatus than Bashir. Bashir was deemed to be merely a figurehead. [U]

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On the other hand, those who favored continued isolation of the GOS argued that the best way to exploit the rift was to continue applying pressure to the GOS. Isolationists were very skeptical of the GOS's intention and objectives. They did not believe that engaging the GOS would effectuate any change in GOS policy. [U] When asked about the debate regarding re-assigning personnel to Embassy Khartoum, which was relocated to Nairobi in 1996 due to threats against American citizens, Ambassador Moose said he could not remember the discussions. When asked if he knew Janet McElligot, a lobbyist for the GOS who claimed to have approached the State Department's Sudan desk but was turned away, Ambassador Moose said he had never heard of her. [U] •

Missed Opportunities Ambassador Moose did not believe that the usa missed any opportunities to cooperate with the GOS. He stated that diplomacy with Sudan was a challenge. He commented that in order for the USG' s policy to have made a difference, the usa would have had to assemble a meaningful coalition of countries to apply pressure to the GOS. Ambassador Moose noted that the Government of France lost interest in Sudan after the GOS rendered to France Carlos the Jackal. In his opinion, the Government of Great Britain had no interest at all in Sudan. Ambassador Moose stated that the GOE was greatly concerned with Sudan but this concern did not extend to other Arab countries. [C)

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As a result, the usa never assembled the kind of coalition that would have applied the type of pressure that would have forced a change in GOS policy. Ambassador Moose believes that if the USG was able to apply such serious political pressure, the GOS may have been more forthcoming. He stated that the USG's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200) had the effect of applying the necessary political pressure to the GOS. Ambassador Moose believes that post-September 11th USG policy put the GOS on notice that it could face serious consequences if it was not responsive to the USG's concerns. As a result, AF is now more capable of working productively with the GOS. [U]

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Domestic Political Groups Ambassador Moose did not believe that domestic political groups were constraining the USG's policy options. He never felt that human rights or American Christian groups played a significant role in shaping US policy towards Sudan. The groups made it more difficult to change the hard-line position that the USG had already taken with Sudan however, these groups did not persuade the USG to adopt a more stringent policy. Ambassador Moose also noted that Congress was very concerned about Sudan's human rights abuses, civil war, and terrorism. However, Congress still wanted the USG to have a dialogue with the GaS in the hopes that the USG could help to resolve these problems. [U] .

Frontline States Policy In the mid-1990's, the USG developed the Frontline States Policy, which involved providing non-lethal assistance to Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, who would in tum provide assistance to the Sudan People's Liberation Army ("SPLA"), the Sudanese opposition fighting to overthrow the regime in Khartoum. When asked if the USG should have dedicated more resources and effort to this policy, Ambassador Moose said, "No." He said that he was not certain whether the SPLA could have mounted the type of pressure needed to be successful. In addition, he noted that Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea had weaknesses and other pressures that limited the success of the Frontline States Policy. ['E>i When asked if he thought that the USG should have directly supported the SPLA, Ambassador Moose said, "No." Ambassador Moose said that the USG continually debated whether to provide aid directly to the SPLA. He never believed that it was the correct approach. He doubted that it would succeed and was concerned about the human suffering it would cause and the political uproar that would occur from supporting an organization that was fighting to overthrow a legitimate African government. Ambassador Moose said that some officials in the Clinton Administration believed that the USG should support the SPLA. However, he noted that the GOE was extremely opposed to any policy that could split Sudan in two. He stated that the GOE was concerned about how political change would effect resources, specifically, the flow of the Nile.

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Recommendations Ambassador Moose said that it is clear that the potential is great for terrorists to exploit failed states or weak governments in Africa. He believes that the USG failed to take seriously this consideration. As an example, he stated that Libyan politics in West Africa had a devastating effect on Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. In addition, he noted that Africa is full of natural resources that terrorists could exploit. As such, Ambassador Moose believes that the USG should devote greater attention to Africa. He stated that a disconnect exists between the USG's intellectual understanding of the problem and the resources that are devoted to it. [U]

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In addition, Ambassador Moose believes that a lack of understanding exists within the USG of the "Islamic element" that is present throughout Africa. He stated that in the mid-1990's, elements in the Gulf States made efforts to exploit Muslim populations in Africa. Similarly, Ambassador Moose stated, enormous potential exists for terrorist groups to create safehavens for terrorism and destabilize countries in Africa. Such instability, he said, poses serious problems for the US. [U] He believes that the USG should invest more in West Africa and ensure that Senegal and Ghana remain viable states amidst instability. As such, he believes that the USG should not focus only on failed states but those in the region that are threatened by failed states such as Kenya. As an example, he stated that the possibility still exists for terrorists to use places like Somalia to launch attacks on Kenya. [U] Ambassador Moose said that the USG should continue to focus on Sudan despite his skepticism that such engagement will produce viable results .. He stated that the increased attention on Sudan after September 11, 2001 will constrain the ability of terrorists to exploit Sudan. [U] Ambassador Moose commented that he recognizes that other crises exists elsewhere in the world but stated that the situation in Africa requires attention. He said that one of the unfortunate effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom is that it draws resources, time, and attention away from other issues; but he cautioned that if the USG ignores the situation in Africa, future "Afghanistans" will arise. [U] Ambassador Moose commented that the President's Millennium Challenge Account, which will increase the USG's core assistance to developing countries by fifty percent by fiscal year 2006, and the President's HIV /AIDS Initiative, which will provide $15 billion over five years, are good first steps. However, he stated, the additional resources need to be backed by well-planned programs that can be executed in the field. In addition, the resources must be incorporated into a larger political security strategy. [U] When asked if the USG is engaging all of the regional leaders it should be, Ambassador Moose said that he was unsure. He commented that the USG needed to engage Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. Ambassador Moose said that these countries could be helpful in combating the problems facing Africa. [U] NMG

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