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MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Ambassador William Milam Type of Event: Interview Date: December 29, 2003 Special Access Issues: Treat aJ.. ... Prepared by: Niki Grandrimo Reviewed by: Scott Allan Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: 2100 K St. Participants: 9-11 Commission: Philip Zelikow, Mike Hurley, Niki Grandrimo, & Scott Allan

Interviewee Background Ambassador Milam spent a majority of the last ten years of his career as an ambassador. From 1990-1993, he served as Ambassador to Bangladesh. He returned to Washington in 1993 and served as a Special Negotiator for the State Department's ("State") Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science for two years. In 1995, he was appointed Ambassador to Liberia and from September 1998 - July 2001, he served as Ambassador to Pakistan. Since 2001, Ambassador Milam has been a Senior Fellow at the Wilson Center.

US Government's

("USG") Approach to the Taliban

Ambassador Milam arrived in Pakistan immediately after the August 1998 TLAM strikes in Afghanistan. Because of the urgency of the situation, Ambassador Milam went . directly from Liberia to Pakistan without being briefed in Washington. He commented that after the bombings, it seemed as if the USG was trying to determine the best way to deal with the Taliban, especially regarding Usama bin Laden C'UBL"). [U] Ambassador Milam said that while the relationship between VBL and the Taliban had received some attention by the USG prior to the bombings, it was not the top priority. Ambassador Milam was not certain what issues were the highest in priority) but he believes they included a representative political structure and the Taliban's treatment of women. He commented that the approach to the Taliban prior to the bombings was more nuanced and the usa was more in "watching mode." After the bombings, UBL was the top priority. [U]

Pakistan's Approach to the Taliban Ambassador Milam stated that the Government of Pakistan ("GOP") characterized their policy towards the Taliban as one of "strategic depth" - they needed a friendly, pliable

neighbor on the west because of their hostile relationship with India on the east. He said

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that the GOP would support anyone who they thought could unify Afghanistan and who would be supportive of the GOP. Ambassador Milam stated that it is possible that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate ("ISID") created the Taliban, but it was certainly true that ISID was helping the Taliban. [U] He noted that the relationship between the GOP and the Taliban did not change after the US cruise missile attack on Afghanistan; the GOP simply took greater caution in their dealings with the Taliban. When asked if ISID officers were killed in the bombing of suspected al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, Ambassador Milam said that he knew that Pakistanis were killed but assumed that they were mujahadin who had gone to fight in Afghanistan. However, because ISID used the camps to train Kashmiri militants he stated that it was possible that the Pakistanis killed were ISID officers.

USG's Approach to 'Pakistan Ambassador Milam opined that he thought the USG's approach to both the GOP and the Taliban "had too many moving parts." He stated that the USG could never determine what issues were highest in priority. He said that every time he called upon the GOP, he had a significant number of talking points including nuclear nonproliferation, the Taliban, and democracy. However, after August 1998, more of his talking points were related to the Taliban and al Qaida. He said that he thought of himself as the Ambassador to Afghanistan because he was spending 45-500/0of his time on 'Afghanistan. He believes that the Embassy bombings were a "wake-up call" for the USG. [U] Ambassador Milam stated that the USG had little leverage over the GOP with regard to the Taliban because of the GOP's deep belief that a friendly, Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan was in their national interest. He commented that even in the months just prior to September 11,2001, the GOP thought they could work with and influence the Taliban. He stated that, because of the Pressler and Glenn Sanctions,' the USG was not . willing to offer the significant economic and political considerations that might induce the GOP to stop their support for the Taliban. [U] Ambassador Milam believes that the GOP never thought that the USG was serious about the Taliban and al Qaida, despite the US cruise missile attack, largely because the strikes were ineffective; they killed people but the camps were moved. As such, the GOP never believed the USG would use force against them for their support of the Taliban. Thus, the GOP was more worried about sanctions than military action. Ambassador Milam stated that the GOP consistently told the USG that sanctions and the use of force was not the way to influence the Taliban. The GOP recommended that the USG engage Taliban

J The Pressler and Glenn Amendments provided nuclear non-proliferation conditions on assistance to Pakistan. Pressler Sanctions were applied to Pakistan for the first time in 1990 and Glenn Sanctions were applied to Pakistan for the first time in May 1998. These sanctions were lifted on September 22,200 I, after the September I I, 200 I terrorist attacks. [U]

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moderates and make them believe that the USG was willing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. [U] On October 23, 1998, Ambassador Milam was instructed to demarche the GOP on pressuring the Taliban to expel VBL. He stated that the GOP's response again was that the USG should engage Taliban moderates. He noted that this response was consistent even after General Pervez Musharaff became President of Pakistan, but commented that Musharaff was more helpful on counterterrorism. ~ The USG wanted the GOP to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban because of the GOP's leverage with them. In Ambassador Milam's opinion, the GOP never used their influence over the Taliban. When the GOP finally tried but failed, to convince the Taliban not to destroy the Buddhist statues in Spring 2001, they realized that they had no influence. Ambassador Milam believes that this was the impetus for the GOP to rethink its relationship with the Taliban. [U]

Expelling UBL from Afghanistan On October 11, 1998, Ambassador Milam met with Taliban Foreign Minister, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, to discuss al Qaida and UBL. He was instructed to tell Muttawakil that UBL was.a criminal who needed to be expelled or brought to justice within the next few weeks. When asked where the USG wanted UBL expelled to, Ambassador Milam' said that he believed Saudi Arabia however he noted that he was not aware of any discussions between the USG and Saudi Arabia regarding this issue. He stated that Muttawakil demanded proof that UBL committed the acts for which the USG accused him. Muttawakil said that UBL was a guest in Afghanistan and the Taliban could not reject a guest. However, Muttawakil acknowledged, according to Ambassador Milam, that VBL was a problem and offered to try him in Afghanistan with an Ulema council (religious scholars). The USG rejected this offer. ~ Ambassador Milam said that Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia also twice approached Mullah . Omar regarding rendering UBL. Ambassador Milam speculated that Turki believed that he had a deal with Mullah Omar the first time but realized the second time that Mullah Omar was not going to surrender VBL. Ambassador Milam believes that the Saudis initially aided the Taliban but became frustrated with them in 1999 and cut off aide. ~ Ambassador Milam commented that the USG might have had a chance to convince the Taliban to render VBL prior to the cruise missile attack; however he did not know if the USG would be willing to offer the Taliban enough diplomatically to induce them to do so or if the Taliban would fulfill its role and actually render UBL. Ambassador Milam stated that by the time of the TLAM attack, UBL had ingratiated himself so much with Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, through money and ideological affinity that he could not be persuaded to abandon support for UBL. ~ Ambassador Milam commented that the Taliban was not intimidated by the USG's military power because the Taliban did not believe the USG would do more militarily

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than cruise missile attacks. However, the Taliban did take the seriously on the diplomatic front because they desperately wanted to be recognized and control Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations. Ambassador Milam stated that the USG always dangled recognition before the Taliban but this became increasingly unrealistic due to opposi tion from members of Congress and those who lobbied on behalf 0 f women's issues. [U]

Sanctions on the Taliban In July 1999, the usa adopted Executive Order 13129, which blocked property and transactions with the Taliban. In addition, by December 2000, the United Nations Security Council had adopted resolutions 1267 and 1333 which applied sanctions to the Taliban. Ambassador Milam does not believe that the sanctions worked because the Taliban did not change its position or actions. He stated that sanctions were insignificant in Afghanistan because everything was smuggled into the country. [U] He also stated that the sanctions did not have a significant effect on the GOP's relationship with the Taliban. However, he believes that the sanctions did cause the GOP to be more cautious about their dealings with the Taliban because the GOP did not want to willingly violate the sanctions. Nevertheless, he believes that the GOP continued to provide aid covertly to the Taliban. [U] Ambassador Milam commented that in general, he does not believe that sanctions work. He noted that the USG sanctions on the GOP prohibited military assistance/relationships. As a result, a whole generation of senior Pakistani military officers did not have a relationship with the USG. He stated that this is counterproductive in a country that is run by the military. [U]

Assessment of the USG's Strategy Towards the Taliban . Ambassador Milam said that by Spring 1999, the USG's strategy of leaning on the GOP to lean on the Taliban to expel UBL was not working. He was convinced that the Taliban would not render UBL; Mullah Omar was a lost cause, and the moderates in the Taliban had no influence over Mullah Omar. Ambassador Milam sent a cable to Washington stating that sanctions were not working and that the USG should increase its diplomatic campaign with the Taliban to include more "carrots," such as recognition and reconstruction aide, and different "sticks,' such as threatening to assist Ahmad Shah Masood, leader of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan ("the Northern Alliance"), in taking over Afghanistan. ~ Ambassador Milam also stated that the Taliban was winning the public relations war regarding VBL, noting that the Taliban's praise for UBL had resonance in Pakistan, . because the usa was not presenting any evidence that VBL was connected to terrorist acts. Ambassador Milam does not believe he received a response to this cable or that this cable prompted the USG's decision to intensify its efforts with the GOP in December

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1999. Ambassador Milam commented that the Millennium for the USG's increased diplomatic actions. ~

threat was the likely catalyst

Ambassador Milam does not know why Washington did not consider his recommendations. He does not remember any specific carrots or sticks that were presented to the Taliban except aid to Masood and he speculated that this occurred because Dick Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the NSC, was pushing for it. He stated that Clarke had a counterterrorism policy but this was not incorporated into a greater Afghanistan or Pakistan policy. Ambassador Milam believes that the USG did token things to make it look like the USG cared about Pakistan and Afghanistan but was not willing to "seriously put anything on the table." ~

Increased Diplomatic Efforts with the GOP in 2000 On March 25,2000, President Clinton visited Pakistan and met with President Musharaff. The two main issues of discussion were nuclear nonproliferation and Kashmir. Ambassador Milam stated that in all of the meetings, President Clinton discussed the Taliban and al Qaida but advanced nothing new. Ambassador Milam does not recall Musharaffs response but noted that he likely put forth the standard response - that is, the USG was dealing with the Taliban in the wrong way. Ambassador Milam noted that this meeting did not result in any new policy initiatives from Washington. fSir. In May 2000, Thomas Pickering, State's Under Secretary for Political Affairs, traveled to Islamabad. Again, the main focus of this trip was Kashmir and not Afghanistan. Under Secretary Pickering did however meet with the Taliban and the GOP's Minister of Interior, Moinuddin Haider. Ambassador Milam said that Under Secretary Pickering presented Haider with "evidence" against UBL, and while the Ambassador believes that Haider was impressed by it, no further developments occurred. ~.

Transition from President Clinton to President Bush . Ambassador Milam said that the change in administration did not result in a change in the USG's policies towards Pakistan or Afghanistan. He stated that the Clinton Administration increased its focus in 2000 but the focus declined during the transition which lasted until around May 2001. Ambassador Milam commented that even after President Bush's team was in place, time was needed to develop policies. However, Ambassador Milam noted that by the end of May 200 1, the Bush Administration was considering the removal of sanctions on India and Pakistan. In his opinion, the new Administration wanted to break down the diplomatic barriers which could allow for progress on Kashmir and Afghanistan. Despite this initiative, said Ambassador Milam, the new Administration did not make firm decisions until after September 11, 2001. ~

Engaging the Taliban in 2001 In February 2001 Ambassador

Milam had series of meetings with Muttawakil's

successor, Mullah Jalil. Ambassador Milam stated that he again asked the Taliban to

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I render UBL to the USO. He described UBL as "a boulder in the road" of the Taliban's relations with the Ambassador Milam said that the Taliban consistently asked what benefits they would receive for rendering UBL. Ambassador Milam always replied "recognition" despite the fact that he was not authorized to make such a statement. Likewise, Ambassador Milam does not believe that Jalil had the authority to make a deal. He stated that Taliban officials could not do anything without the consent of Mullah Omar, which could take a significant amount of time. In his opinion, the USG used this as one rationale for not offering an aid package. ~

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On June 20, 2001, Ambassador Milam demarched the Taliban telling them that the USG would hold them responsible for any acts committed by al Qaida that harmed US citizens or interests. The Taliban offered no new response. Ambassador Milam had his final meeting with Jalil on July 3, 2001 at which time he reiterated this warning. ~

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Recommendations Ambassador Milam stated that the USG placed too much emphasis on working with the warlords in Afghanistan and might have been able to get UBL if the increased its diplomatic overtures. Regarding the current war in Afghanistan, Ambassador Milam expressed concern that the USG will not "stay the course" and noted that the USG must remain in Afghanistan for a long time and invest a significant amount of money into the country. [U]

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Regarding Pakistan, Ambassador Milam stated that the must support Musharaff. He believes that the recent attempts on Musharaff's life may translate into increased efforts to crack down on extremists. He stated that the USG must help to transform Pakistan into a more modem society. Ambassador Milam believes that the USG should

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push the GOP on women's education, curriculum reform in madrassas, and a more democratic government. In addition, the USG should encourage Musharaff to form alliances with other secular political parties. [U]

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