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Event: Tom Fingar Type of Event: Interview Date: November 19, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Gordon Lederman Team Number: 2 Location: Commission's

K Street Office

Participants - non-Commission:

Tom Fingar; Paula Burton (State Dept. representative)

Participants - Commission: Col. Lorry Fenner, Gordon Lederman (U)

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BACKGROUND

(U) He is currently Acting Assistant Secretary of INR. He was a German linguist in the U.S. Marines from 1969-1972. From 1972-1985, he was at Stanford University. In 1975, he began serving as a consultant to the State Department via its External Consultants Program. He also served as a consultant to CIA, 000, Congress and Congress's Office of Technology Assessments. From 1986-1988, he headed INR's , China office. From 1989-1991, he headed INR's office of East Asian and Pacific affairs. From 1992-3, he attended a senior executive seminar. From 1994-December 2000, he . was INR's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis. From December 2000 to June 2001, he was Acting Assistant Secretary. From June 2001 until October 2003 he was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, and since October 2003 he has been Acting Assistant Secretary.

CU) THE ROLE OF DIPLOMATIC

REPORTING

(U) Diplomatic reporting is valuable for analysis. Every analyst likes it because it is clear - it is what foreign interlocutors want the U.S. Government to know and believe. It is usually first-hand reporting, unlike HUMINT reports. State 'automatically disseminates to the IC almost all substantive reporting. State labels as "nodis" reporting that is perishable' and action-oriented; some nodis material is sent to CIA but is not widely disseminated) and sometimes it is sent to 000. Material that State labels as "exdis" is shared with the IC once a waiver is obtained. (U) There are two views of diplomatic reporting. One is that it is a subset of HUMfNT and thus should be incorporated into HUMINT requirements. The second is that it is

different than HUMINT. The Ie squares the circle by incorporating diplomatic reporting into HUMINT reporting requirements,

but in reality the fact that diplomatic reporting is

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included in HVMINT reporting requirements makes "no difference" because Foreign Service Officers know what is important to U.S. interests about the country in which they are stationed and will report accordingly. A significant amount of diplomatic reporting is oriented toward reports that State is required to write, such as human rights reports.

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(U) The Chief of Mission may redirect reporting, as diplomacy moves very fast. INR rarely formally tasks osts.· Instead, INR is a conduit for requests from analysts in the Ie, but these requests 9/11 Classified Information are usually to justify analysts' ricebowls. (V) Regarding the requirements process more generally, "the way the world really works and the formal mechanisms are different." Diplomatic reporting essentially derives from targets of opportunity within the context of overall priorities. The number of reporting officers at post is very small. The IC is oblivious to that fact. The IC's.requests for reporting boils down to a few junior officers at a post, all of whom have other responsibilities such as CODELs.

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time, reporting has been degraded because it is not needed by State's Washington headquarters - for the State/Washington to do its job, it can rely on telephone calls to embassies, and State/Washington tends to micromanage its posts' activities. (U) Diplomatic reporting has ancillary benefit to the Ie. Reporting was deemphasized by the dynamics of the 1990s and the competing demands on the IC. We used to care only whether a country was with us or the USSR and what needed to be done to sway that country to our side. Now, there is an enormous range of interests faced by U.S. diplomacy, and the V.S. presence is "everywhere" throughout the globe. Yet the downsizing of the Foreign Service has hampered State's capacity for reporting. In the 19905, the Ie decided not to do a lot of things, which meant that the IC relied more on diplomatic reporting - but at the same time, State was shifting away from diplomatic reporting. Open source grew in importance, but FBIS shrank. He recounted a conversation in which DCI Deutch referred to State's legions of linguists - which Fingar does not see existing, particularly on low-density languages. In sum: we are still living the consequences of decisions made in the early 1990s. (U) RELATIONS

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(U) The main problem with information-sharing generally is that the issue of sharing certain information too often has to get raised to very senior levels and becomes a 'political' issue. Asked who has authority in the Ie to decide rules on informationsharing and force cultural change, he responded that "there is no easy answer." There is ORCON, and regarding SIGINT CIA is concerned that releasing SIGINT will compromise HUMINT. Finally, there is the basic cultural and historical issue that State generally wants to reveal more information concerning sources and methods while the rest of the Ie is more conservative - it is an "ever-present tension." The process for assessing releasability needs to be streamlined. State needs the process to work because State often needs the information very quickly; other information-sharing issues, such as regarding military issues, is on a longer time-fuse and is not hampered by a longer decisiorunaking process on releasability. (U) Most of the U.S. Government's intelligence apparatus (NFIP, TIARA, etc.) is oriented toward support for the military - which is what it was intended to do - and on 15-20 countries, plus counterterrorism, countemarcotics, and counterproliferation. However, State is concerned with so much more - ] 70 countries and many different dimensions that have not made it into the NIPF. State is basically like a flea trying to change the course of an elephant by pulling on its tail - State basically does not even try. (U) State relied a lot on overtly-collected information, FBIS is key and needs to be strengthened. FBIS also needs to realize that it does not necessarily need as much language capability as it thinks - for example, much can be learned about Albania without looking at Albanian-language websites. (U) INR.has a big advantage in the Ie ...:.it can rely on the entire Foreign Service. has personal contacts throughout the Foreign Service and uses email extensively.

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..1(3) State reports via official channels

whatever is important from those emails. fNR does not use email to set requirements and

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give taskings but rather to solicit the views of relevant individuals. State is adopting a .new "smart" computer system which will make emails more accessible.

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(U) THE CRAFT OF ANALYSIS (U) As to whether counterterrorism analysis requires skills different from traditional analysis, counterterrorism requires an extra skill set and contacts, but the world is still divided geographically and by country. Transnational actors still act in geographic terrain .: It is much more productive to take an expert on a place, culture, religion, etc. and add counterterrorism to that person's portfolio vis-a ..vis the issues that the analysts already covers. In essence, INR's perspective is that "expertise counts"....,.the idea that-an analyst is a "utility infielder" is "ludicrous." Centers are not the wave of the future. (U) When it comes to all-source anal sis, much the Ie tends to care about information's pedigree - unlike INR. 9/11 Classi fied Information

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9/11 Classified Information ILater, he-clarified his views, stating that there is a legitimate tendency for analysts who have access to the sources and methods undergirding reporting from a particular INT to gi ve more credence to that INT. He disagreed that there is no true all-source capability in the Ie - he advised against overstating his point about analysts giving more credence to information from certain INTs.. .

(U) CIA has too many masters - ranging from Congress, to the Commerce Department, to Bill Gertz. INR has only one master: the State Dept.

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(U) Good analysts who have broad areas of inquiry are looking at all of the information but are essentially approaching that information from the perspective of how to answer certain questions. The key issue is, what is the question that is guiding the analysis? Taskings to collectors are geared to questions as well, which may differ depending upon the £NT. If analysts were allowed to drive collection without the constraint of the overriding questions that the analysts are required to answer, then the analysts would likely drive the collection system toward finding answers to whimsical questions. On the other hand, constraining collection to the predetermined questions causes collection to miss important information that does not answer one of the predetermined questions. The IC needs to move away somewhat from using predetermined questions to constrain analysts' ability to drive collection - analysts should be allowed to step back to figure out what macro-level questions need to be answered. . (U) The Community Management Staff does episodic surveys of which analysts use information from what !NT, and he believes that the results are neither surprising nor upsetting. For example, there is no reason to believe that diplomatic reporting' would be useful concerning counterterrorism. ~ Most of the Ie operates under a long time horizon, which is an outgrowth of the Cold War-era focus on military systems. In contrast, intelligence on economic and diplomatic matters needs to be very timely because those areas move very quickly; State's intelligence needs are very tactical in nature. Counterterrorism is somewhere in the middle between economic/diplomatic issues and military issues. INR does a lot of tactical support - conveying a lot of information orally. INR's papers concentrate on longer-term issues. 9/11 Classified Information

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multip e views. n onna teams are assem e to InC u e individuals from offices throughout State to get various views on subjects - those individuals are not allowed to 'chop' on INR's products but lend valuable insights and perspectives. INR's use of teams in some ways resembles the use of red teams. (U) INR is a big supporter of the NIC process because INR gets a vote. The NIC is the center of analysis. INR is not a "contrarian" but rather fiercely protects its independence. If INR disagrees with another agency's analytic conclusions, INR will voice its dissent in order to temper the enthusiasm of policymakers in relying on those analytic conclusions. INR never receives pressure from within State to concur with other agencies' analytic conclusions. (U) Measuring performance is an inherently difficult process. Informal feedback is

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critical, such as emails from conswners as well as the notes of senior officials in the margins' of INR products. INR tries to write its products at the lowest-level of secrecy possible for maximum dissemination. The problem of intelligence is-that it is a free good, and consumers do not want to voice criticism for fear that criticism will cause them to lose the free good.

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(U) As for the pathways of information, .intelligence reaching senior State policymakers circumvents INR via the PDB. CIA is supposed to disseminate information in the State Department only through INR channels. INR'sjob is to make sure that everyone involved in a policy issue at State is working from the same set of intelli ence so that one olic office does not have an unfair advanta e over another. 9/11 Classified

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(U) Regarding the question of how much INR screens intelligence given to IN,R by the rest of the Ie for dissemination to State officials INR must exercise some' udgment in this regard because IN 9/11 Classified Information annot flood policymakers with that m ormation. course, policymakers always think that they are their own best analysts, but the reality is that INR does significant screening although will alter its screening based on the desires of a particular State consumer. In other words, it is a conscious INR policy to screen intel1igence rather than burying the policymakers in raw material. The ADell A&P used to be a si

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as.the NIC.Chainnan, whi'~h'mean,~. that most of what he does is in the "community mode," such as concerning requiremenis.] ~npF is too skewed toward military issues, namely because "11 of the 13 people in the room" who voted on the NIPF "were from the military." What Lowenthal is doing concerning analytic priorities .involves the rest of the Ie, not INR.

CU) OVERALL

MANAGEMENT

ISSUES

(U) Each agency in the Ie does a reasonably good job of fulfilling its own duties. However, the Ie needs someone to ask, can't we do more, can't we do better, shouldn't we ask different questions? When asked who is accountable for the Ie's failure to ask these questions, he replied, "Everyone and no one." In a line chart, the DCI is ultimately .responsible. However, seeking synergy requires having someone' who has that issue high on his list of responsibilities. There is also the problem that there are too many chiefs and not enough worker-bees. The NIC lacks inducements and troops.

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(U) The amount of time and effort that is spent "oiling the machine" is enormous. Congressional QFRs must be answered, budget documents must be submitted, and CMS "exists to call meetings and do the budget" - and has 100 people more than INR. The enormous effort needed to keep the machine churning rivals the number of people employed by the IC for analysis . (U) Col. Fenner asked who has the power to .create solutions. He responded that it is not a simple question of structure, although he recommended the "nuclear fine adjustment tool" because if we were building the today we would never design the IC the way it currently exists. The key issue is cultivating expertise. There used to be expertise on various issues in pockets around the IC. However, other agencies have not cultivated expertise and instead have shifted toward being flexible. and responsive. Also, there is a generational change and experts are leaving the Ie. There need to be core groups of experts who nurture the next generation of experts, and teams that stick together over time. Also, analysts need to spent time in different offices such as consumers' in order to understand consumers' needs. The IC has programs such as ICAP and tiger teams to promote rotations, but such rotations are not done by design 'in order to culti vate in-depth expertise on particular issues and to ensure that people will stay in the IC over the long term. INR used to cherry-pick from the IC, but now that expertise does not exist and instead INR is trying to grow its analysts internally. Yet like other agencies, INR itself lacks masters to teach the students.

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(U) His portfolio included much of the world but specifically not counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and crime for "various historical reasons." With respect to the Cole and other bombings, if we had been alert to these clues we would have been more suspicious of what was to come. After the East African embassy bombings, we should have asked what is it about those countries that made it easy for terrorists to operate. Thinking about that question may have led to greater insights into the terrorist threat.

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CU) He cautioned against drawing lessons from the 9/11 attacks that are too rigid. Terrorists are like douds rather than machines - they group and group constantly. Moreover, we impute to terrorists too much cognitive process; it is not that hard to pull off two simultaneous attacks involving car bombs against civilian targets. However, it is very difficult to penetrate terrorist groups because the terrorists have such close relations among themselves.

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