Management Systems, Conflict, And The Changing Roles Of The Military

Management Systems, Conflict, and the Changing Roles of the Military Maurice Yolles Liverpool Business School J. Conflict Processes, 1999, 4(1)13-28. ISSN 0965-8130 Abstract Military roles need to respond to the change demanded of them with the decline of the superpower standoff. There are perspectives from which conflicts can be evaluated in terms of the optimisation of incursion outcomes, and from which judgements can be made about whether they can be won or lost. However, a new view is emerging that conflicts are not so simple as to make the notions of optimisation, or decisive lose outcomes, useful. To respond to this view, senior military strategists should adopt new ways of thinking that encompasses the idea of complexity. Viable systems theory, concerned with the survivability of organisations, provides a graphic way of exploring this. 1. Introduction Many organisations operating within the commercial sphere of society still make decisions to deal with day to day events from perspectives that derive from simple or mechanistic thinking. They see situations in terms of sets of local autonomous events that do not interconnect, and they try to optimise locally. There is a growing graveyard of such organisations, because, in a complex world, such behaviour is not appropriate. This is also true of military organisations. Here, the frame of reference that drives simple mechanistic thinking will see a conflict as a simple type of situation (as opposed to a complex type). In the military context, this is composed of a set of independent incursions that can be individually optimised to enable decisive (win/lose) outcomes to be attributed to it. One way of facilitating this is to use the Lanchester model (1916), enabling the evaluation of local field strategy outcomes to be expressed in terms of war dead, and providing opportunity for military strategists to claim victory or defeat. In stark contrast to this, in a situations of complex conflicts are unclear, uncertain, and context interdependent. Incursions cannot be considered autonomously, and thus incursion optimisation has no value. The two recent World Wars are perceived by many to have been a simple type, and the Cold War period between the superpowers beyond these events maintained these traditional perspectives. However, in other domains of conflict the myth of wars being simple came under siege, with indications that the traditional military frame of reference had to be changed. The rise of terrorism was one of these, as described by Dobson and Payne [977, p206/208]: “On a summer day in 1914 in Sarajevo, Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Hapsburg heir to the throne of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire. At his trial he was given an opportunity to explain why he had done so. He replied: ‘I am a Slav nationalist. My aim is the union of all south Slavs, under whatever political regime, and their liberation from Austria.’ Questioned about how he meant to accomplish this political aim he replied: ‘By terrorism’. Nothing could be more succinct. His aim was legitimate, and he had chosen this particular form of warfare to achieve it because it was practical and, he believed, effective. What he succeeded in doing was to detonate the explosive charges of nationalism under an entire continent and to provoke the beginning of the First World War. The essence of terrorism is to sew fear, to make heroes out of murders, and thereby to convince opponents that the terrorists’ cause is right and that the authorities are wrong. During the last fifty years such tactics have succeeded in a few special cases. In the 1920’s the southern Irish won their independence by terrorism, but that terrorism was supported by a much stronger war. Guerrilla warfare is conducted by unconventional means but with real military aims and targets; whereas terrorism is indiscriminate in both. It is planned for public effect, not for military objectives. Yet even in Ireland, the Black and Tan counter-insurgency force that fought against the rebels were an effective and successful one. Michael Collins, the Irish leader, said to a British official at the peace negotiations: ‘You had us dead beat. We could not have lasted another three weeks.’… In that instance, of course, the methods of repression force caused such an outcry in a free society that they 1

were the ones who finally appeared as the villains. How different the situation would have been had the events taken place in the Soviet Union. Even the Black and Tans would still be receiving praise as ‘honoured security men who so effectively helped solve the Irish minority problem’. …We believe that what brought about the success of the Irish at that time was not so much terrorism itself, but a symptom induced by terrorism that we call fatigism. Public opinion grows tired of endless news about killings and bombings, and eventually comes to believe that the nation is faced with an insoluble problem, and that struggle does not justify the bloodshed”.

It is not only because of the rise of terrorism that the roles of the military are seen to be changing. The cold war between the major superpowers has ended, and with this, military frames of reference must be redefined. The simple mechanistic thinking of win-lose outcomes hardly has validity any longer. New ways of seeing are required that are able to embrace the paradigm of complexity. Take as an example the violent conflict between the Serbs and Nato in Kosovo. Like 20 th Century terrorism, it too “represents a new kind of situation for the West…is possibly a prototype for the future,… [and]…represents a conflict situation not about ideology, and not involving the vital political or economic interests of the great powers” [The Prague Post, 26th March 1999]. The suggestion that ideology is not involved is open to question, however. According to Holsti [1967] people use ideology as a filter to interpret information, thus enabling them to view reality. Crises such as these are full of uncertainty. Rules are often formulated locally, and can change. It is difficult to assess who is winning, firstly because criteria for such judgements are difficult to formulate, and secondly because it is difficult to identify what constitutes the nature of a winners. The conflict appears to be human rights rather than sovereignty centred, calling on the principle that no leaders have the right to decimate populations, whether their own or not. Interventions are seen to be necessary. When they become beahvioural through military action, problems arise because strategic goals are not clear. Intervention continuity can be endangered if the count of lives lost caused by it becomes an important consideration. Fatigism, together with economic cost, bounds the degree of commitment by the interventionists in maintaining their participation in the conflict to achieve an end, which in any case is unlikely to be in any way clear or certain. In order to deal with complex conflict situations, it is essential that the traditional worldviews of senior military thinkers change. They need to understand the nature of complexity and its constant companion chaos, and the significance of change management that entails management systems principles. This paper takes a view about conflict situations that derives from change management. It adopts a modelling approach that comes from Yolles [1999] in viable systems, and links with the notions of boundary critique as developed by Midgley [1992]. This seeks to explain the relationship between thought and action, and illustrate where the notion of complexity fits in. Complex conflicts require structured inquiry that see situations as a whole, not simply a set of autonomous parts like separate incursions. By a whole, we do not mean some absolute thing that will be obvious to everyone as some unique entity that is greater in its assembly than it is in its set of separate parts. More relativistically, we mean something that can have assigned to it an emergence that is not a property of the separate parts. This emergence is conceptual, is a function of both world view and information, and may be distinct for different individual inquirers. The structured approach can reduce complexity, and lead to relevant feasible intervention strategies that can generate desirable outcomes. 2. Complexity, and Viable Systems Theory The complexity paradigm provides a powerful modern view for the exploration of problem situations, and entails the concept of chaos [Nicolis an Prigogine, 1989; Cohen and Stewart, 1994]. In problem situations, people have traditionally sought stable solutions that are consistent with the goals of the social group or organisation with which they are associated. In any complex situation, stable outcomes 2

may occur, but they may be circumstantial, unintended and short lived. Complex situations can be defined in terms of five empirically and analytically independent, but interactive dimensions [Yolles, 1999]: 1. Computational complexity, defined in terms of the (large) number of interactive parts. 2. Technical complexity, occuring with a “tangle” of control processes that are difficult to discern because they are numerous and highly interactive. It also involves the notion of future and thus predictability, and technically complex situations have limited predictability. 3. Organisational complexity, defined by the rules that guide the interactions between a set of identifiable parts, or specified attributes 4. Personal complexity, defined by the subjective (or local) view of a situation. 5. Emotional complexity, were a “tangle” of emotional vectors are projected into a situation by its participants (and can be seen as emotional involvement). Viable systems theory is implicitly concerned with complexity. It derives from a base of work by Beer [1959, 1975, 1979, 1981] and Schwarz [1994, 1995]. It has become part of management systems, that explains how organisations - seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems, are able to survive. Such organisations, when described in terms of their externally related activities, are called actors (or even collective actors). Examples of such an actor are an enterprise, a coherently organised ethnic group, a nation state, or a coherent coalition of states. Stafford Beer has been a pioneer in this field, with interests in dealing with organisations that are involved in uncertain complex problem situations. For this, he has developed the field of managerial cybernetics. Part of Beer’s theory of managerial cybernetics involves conceptualisations about viable organisations that are purposeful, adaptive, and are able to maintain their long term stability, and he referred to this as the viable systems model (VSM). Most curiously, the approach has also been used to show how organisations can be attacked and destroyed [Hutchinson and Webb, 1999]. We say curiously, because the intention of the VSM is to work in a complex world, and the idea of an organisation being “out there” that must be attacked and destroyed demonstrates highly simplistic thinking. It draws badly on such a sophisticated model as the VSM that is concerned with developing potentials, and harnessing the variety needed to deal with complexity. More recently, Eric Schwarz has published in the associated area of general systems. He developed his own theory of (Schwarzian) viable systems that applies the dynamic concepts of chaos and complexity generically to self-organising systems capable of evolving. Yolles [1999] links Beer’s and Schwarz’s approaches, and in doing so also calls on ideas that come from cognitive and social psychology, connectionism, and artificial intelligence. From this base, he has developed a new theory of viable systems that belongs to management systems, and which will define the approach taken here. It is possible to model any organisation as a viable system. It is able to survive, and in doing so can respond to changes, whether or not they have been foreseen. Such a system can generate sufficient variety through self-organisation to deal with that variety that impacts on it from its environment (called requisite variety). A viable organisation is able to support adaptability and change while maintaining stability in its behaviour. In particular an organisation is viable if it can maintain stable states of behaviour as it adapts to perturbations from its environment. This environment can be differentiated into a suprasystem of interacting actors, and the environment of the suprasystem. The actors are all autonomous, in that they are taken to be analytically and empirically independent from one another. The nature of that independence is a matter of practical requirement that enables, for instance, data about a given actor to be collected without conceptually complicating it with data from other organisations. The question of whether one organisation in a suprasystem of them is indeed autonomous, is one of estimating its degree of interactivity with the other organisations. It is ultimately axiomatic, and perspective driven. 3

When we speak of perspective, we really mean a view of something that comes from a worldview. The notion of worldview is a literal translation from the German weltanschauung that adopts the use assigned to it by Mannheim [1964]. Weltanschauungen are relative to the institutions that individuals are attached to in a given society, and they change as the institutional realities change [Berger and Luckman, 1966]. More recently [Yolles, 1996], it has taken on the meaning of a view or perspective of the real world that is determined by cultural and other attributes of the viewers. Through a process of socialisation, a view is formed within the institutions one is attached to in a given society, and they change as the institutional realities change. Weltanschauung may be shared by a group of people. When this occurs, the individuals that are involved each retain their own realities while using common models to share meaning. They have boundaries that are created by a belief system (that is the beliefs, attitudes and values and their mutual interactions) that supports the assumptions, concepts and ideas of the viewholders. Weltanschauung may be seen as a worldview of an individual or a shared worldview of a group that is more or less visible to its viewholders, but not to others who are not viewholders. It is seen by some to be something that is personal (to the individual or group) and indescribable, informal, and not visible to others. With peer group support weltanschauung can become formalised through language, enabling a set of explicit statements (propositions and their corollaries) to be made about their beliefs and knowledge. In this form it can become a paradigm when supported by a peer group. Paradigms enable a set of explicit statements about their beliefs and other attributes that enable everything that might be expressed about the worldview, to be expressed. They are thus more or less transparent to others who are not viewholders. The formalisation process uses language that (more or less) enables everything that must be expressed, to be expressed, in a self-consistent way. Worldviews are generators of knowledge. They are defined in terms of their “culture” that has the attributes of cognitive organisation (the set of beliefs, values and attitudes), and language. Normative standards also exist, that guide our behaviours and ways of thinking. Worldviews also have a cognitive space, populated by concepts and meaning, from which knowledge comes. Exemplars, where they exist, also form part of worldviews, and represent the illustrative examples through which knowledge is validated. Worldviews are action related, and through communications define a prerequisite for organised behaviour. Worldviews are by their very nature bounded, and constrain the way in which situations can be seen and described. They can change [Yolles, 1998b], and the nature of the constraint is subject to the degree of change. Frequently, this constraint is highly limiting, bounding the degree of change to which a worldview may be subject. Developing on some ideas by Kuhn [1970], we can argue that different worldviews have distinct and incommensurable cognitive organisations, propositions, and normative standards. This means that these elements can be in contradiction across different worldviews, particularly when differences in language force misunderstanding. This conceptualisation has impact for the notion of conflict, as we shall see shortly. The foundation of our viable systems theory is worldview based, and derives from an identification of the relationship between weltanschauung and paradigm shown in figure 1. This comes from the idea that shared weltanschauung acts as a cognitive basis for the paradigm. Within it, we develop cognitive models that involve beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, ideology, meanings, and concepts. We perceive “reality” through our cognitive models as we interact with it through them.

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Tranformational/organising domain Behavioural domain representation

Paradigm (formal world view) Cognitive domain

Behavioural world

organisation of intervention

development learning

formation/ consolidation

interpretation

reflection, creation

Weltanschauung (informal world view)

Figure 1: Relationship between paradigm and weltanschauung as a paradigm cycle

It is through the process of cognitive formalisation that weltanschauung becomes manifested as a paradigm that itself changes through a process of cognitive challenge. This may involve: a process of conflict that should be resolved; reflection to enhance our understanding of what we perceive; and conciliation enabling word view boundaries to change. The relationship between the perceived real world and weltanschauung is partly through interpretation. By this we mean that the behavioural world is an interpretation that involves our perceptions, and these are generally influenced by our beliefs. It also involves empirical challenge, which is connected to observation (or at least viewing). The real world is represented in the paradigm in a way that conforms with its belief system. Action is manifested in the real world through an organising process that is in effect a transformation. This means that the cognitive basis of the paradigm is applied to what is seen to be the behavioural world. This occurs according to some formalised regime that involves a transforming organising process that effectively defines logical relationships that become manifested as structures with associated behaviour in the perceived behavioural world. The very idea of there being an organising process is a consequence of the notion of purposefulness, and results in purposeful behaviour. Purposeful behaviour is said to occur because of cognitive purposes that direct the actions of individuals and groups in a given situation [Allport, 1961; Ackoff,, 1981]. It is worldview determined, and can be expressed in terms of a behavioural mission. Cognitive purposes are interpreted within a domain of action through: knowledge of data processes and structural models; modelling processes that contain data; procedures or rules of operation and other models relating to the current situation; a mechanism for structured inquiry. Here, a distunction has been made between the behavioural and cognitive domains that are analytically and empirically independent. The former contains perspectives that relate to the behavioural world, and that are created within a frame of reference defined by the cognitive domain. Connection occurs between the two domains through a transformational or organising process that we say defines the transformational/organising domain. It has attributes that relate to self-organisation. Let us explore the relationship between these domains a little. We perceive the behavioural world through our cognitive models as we interact with it through them. It is through the process of cognitive formalisation that weltanschauung becomes manifested as a paradigm that itself changes through a process of cognitive challenge. The behavioural world is represented within the paradigm in a way that conforms to its belief system. Action is manifested in the behavioural world through an organising process that is in effect a transformation, and is sometimes subject to perhaps chaotic surprises. Thus, the cognitive basis of the paradigm is applied to the peceived behavioural world according to some formalised regime that involves a transforming organising process. This effectively defines 5

logical relationships that become manifested as structures with associated behaviour in the perceived behavioural world. Weltanschauungen and paradigms are connected through cognitive development. The relationship between weltanschauung and the real world is empirical and explains how individuals become involved in perceived behavioural world creation. Empirical explanations are based on the observation of behaviour. The cognitive domain is formed from worldviews and their interaction. Organising converts from the cognitive world to that of the behavioural manifest world, and it may be subject to perturbations from the environment. If the manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals that create organisations with form and behaviour, then manifest behaviour is sensitive to the composition of individuals that defines a possibly innumerable number of situations over time. The composition of individuals who make up a situation will potentially influence the nature of that organising. When we refer to an actor in the behavioural domain as a system, we will mean it metaphorically in the traditional systems sense, consistent with the views of Checkland and Scholes [1990], and as explained by Yolles [1999, 1998a]. Using this terminology, the cognitive domain becomes a metasystem (the “cognitive consciousness” of the system) from which decisions come, and has embedded within it a paradigm(s) that maintains cognitive knowledge. The behavioural domain displays manifest behaviour associated with the social forms that are manifested. The two domains are linked through the organising domain that entails self-organisation that is associated with logical and cybernetic processes, and facilitates strategy with information as a commodity. In contrast, the behavioural domain is one of purposeful activity or behaviour, occurring by means of energy. In defining this approach, we adopt a set of propositions, some of which have been discussed here, and others of which are found in the literature (e.g. Midgley [1997], Yolles [1999]). The propositions are: 1. the metasystemic, systemic and organising domains are analytically and empirically independent 2. the metasystem works through a paradigm(s) that is itself populated by a belief system, standards or norms, and concepts bound into a set of propositions, all of which are communicated through language, 3. knoweldges exist as part of paradigms, and are generated within them, 4. a paradigm has a penchant that is reflected in terms of the generation a specialist type of knowledge, 5. knoweldge is the commodity of the cognitive domain 6. specialist knowledge is connected to cognitive purposes, 7. the organising domain is the place where systemic organising processes occur 8. cognitive purposes are attached to the organising domain, and can be seen in terms of mission and goals 9. cybernetical, rational, and ideological cognitive purpose attributes exist as part of the organising process of the system that contribute to systemic shaping 10.cybernetical processes satisfy intention, and are concerned with control and communications that assist technical cognitive interests 11.logico-relational processes define a rationality that is manifested in practical situations 12.ideological processes define manner of thinking, have associated with them politics and ethics, and define a backcloth within which social structures and processes are facilitated. 13.Information is the commodity of the organising domain 14.The cognitive domain is exposed to influences that affect the worldviews of individuals and groups that are culturally, socially and politically derived 15.The influences have an impact on the worldviews that are developed.

The notion of cognitive interests within this context originated with Habermas [1970], while that of cognitive purposes has been proposed by Yolles [1999]. Their relative connections to each other and to knowledge are explained in table 1. This table is used as a way of explaining how different paradigms can be used together. From Habermas, human beings possess two basic cognitive interests in acquiring knowledge: a technical 6

interest relates to the human endeavour referred to as work, and a practical interest for interaction. Another cognitive interest is critical deconstraining that results in the human endeavour emancipation, seen to many to be pivotal to work and interaction because power relations may distort both mutual understandings and work. However, within this we consider there to be degrees of emancipation that result in the application of political processes and ideology on interests. The notion of emancipation is important from the simple proposition that comes from viable systems theory: that a viable organisation best survives in a complex world by generating “requisite” variety that is able to respond to perturbing environmental variety. Ultimately, the individual within the organisation creates requisite variety. The most effective long term way to enabling this is to enable the development of individual potential within the organisation, and this requires critical deconstraining. Paradigms and their (systemic) behavioural manifestations may be validly used in a complementary way when viewed in terms of Habermas’ classifications [Jackson, 1992]. This work has been used in relation to the mixing of methodologies, but it is also valid in other areas of manifest behaviour (e.g. Yolles [1999a]). While paradigms guide knowledge production and therefore determine knowledge type, patterns of behaviour should be seen to serve cognitive interests. Most approaches would seem to follow this distinction. Yolles [1999] has shown that it is possible to extend Habermas’ argument. He introduced the idea of cognitive purposes that are associated with the organising domain, while cognitive interests should rather be seen as assigned to the systemic domain.

Table 1: Relationship between human cognitive interests, purpose, and influences COGNITIVE INTERESTS OF THE BEHAVIOURAL DOMAIN (ENERGY) Technical Practical Critical Deconstraining Work. This enables people to achieve Interaction. This requires that people as Degree of emancipation. For organisational goals and generate material well-being. individuals and groups in a social viability, the realising of individual potential It involves technical ability to system gain and develop the is most effective when people: (i) liberate undertake action in the environment, possibilities of an understanding of each themselves from the constraints imposed by and the ability to make prediction and others subjective views. It is consistent power structures (ii) learn through establish control. with a practical interest in mutual precipitation in social and political processes understanding that can address to control their own destinies. disagreements, which can be a threat to the social form of life COGNITIVE PURPOSES WITHIN THE ORGANISING DOMAIN (INFORMATION) Cybernetical Rational Ideological Intention. This is through the creation Logico-relational. Enables missions, Manner of thinking. An intellectual and strategic pursuit of goals and aims goals, and aims to be defined and framework through which policy makers that may change over time, enables approached through planning. It observe and interpret reality. This has a people through control and involves logical, relational, and rational politically correct ethical and moral communications processes to redirect abilities to organise thought and action orientation. It provides an image of the future their futures. and thus to define sets of possible that enables action through politically correct systemic and behaviour possibilities. strategic policy. It gives a politically correct view of stages of historical development, in respect of interaction with the external environment. COGNITIVE INFLUENCES WITHIN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN (KNOWLEDGE) Social Cultural Political Formation. Enables individuals/groups Thinking. Influences occur from Freedom. Influences occur from knowledges to be influenced by knowledges that knowledges that derive from the that affect our polity determined, in part, by relate to our social environment. This cognitive organisation (the set of how we think about the constraints on group has a consequence for our social beliefs, attitudes, values) other and individual freedoms, and in connection structures and processes that define our worldviews. It ultimately determines with this to organise and behave. It ultimately social forms that are related to our how we interact and defines our logicohas impact on our ideology and our degree of intentions and behaviours. relational understandings. emancipation.

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Further, he has also identified a third cognitive property relating to the cognitive domain. It has a commodity of knowledge, and is referred to as cognitive influence. The nature of cognitive influences derives from the notion that every social organisation can be defined in terms of it cultural, political and social domains. They are fundamental to all organisations. Their natures are summarised as follows. The cultural domain has a cognitive organisation that is part of worldview, and when people perform social roles, they do so through the veil of their beliefs, values and attitudes. The political domain is concerned with polity (condition of order), and as such has an interest in attributes that condition the social domain and its situations. It involves the creation of power placed at the disposal of some social roles, the use of which is also worldview determined. When conditions (of order) affect the social domain and become issues, political processes are used to address them (e.g., conflict resolution). The social domain itself is composed of both substructure and superstructure. The former is concerned with the nature of an organisation that relates to such things as purposes, modes and means of activity (like service or production), and the social contexts that are responsible for it. It is thus concerned with the technical aspects of the organisation, including methods, operations, practices and technologies, and the way these are used. Superstructure is concerned with the form of the organisation. It can include formal and informal structures (e.g., role relationships) and their associated processes, and the behaviours of individuals (e.g., management style), groups, and the organisation as a whole within its environment. 3. Conflict from Cognitive Turbulence It is possible to distinguish between two forms of conflict: realistic and nonrealistic [Coser, 1968, p4855]. Realistic conflicts occur with struggles against collective opponents for the acquisition of scarce values, when they are means towards specific external ends, namely gaining a scarce value. Nonrealistic conflict is tension releasing, self-rewarding aggressive action. It serves to express the feelings of a conflict actor rather than achieve goals external to it. Unrealistic conflict always has unplanned consequences for a social systems. Sometimes these are seen a beneficial, but mostly they are undesirable and harmful. In this paper, our use of the word conflict will relate to realistic conflict. According to Galtung [1975, p78], conflict is the recognisable occurrence of incompatible goal states between actors in the suprasystem. A realisation of one goal will exclude, wholly or partly, the realisation of others. A broader definition of conflict comes from Crawley [1992, p10] as “a manifestation of differences working against one another”. More succinctly, we prefer to define conflict as a manifestation of contesting differences. We have indicated that groups form shared worldviews through the establishment of common cognitive models that involve beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, ideology, and meanings. We perceive the “real” or behavioral world through our cognitive models as we interact with it through them. The sharing process will not include the whole of each worldview involved, and in some cases there may be implicit contradiction between the individual and shared worldviews that are in some way “rationalised”. Outside the common model, worldview incommensurability may be preserved. A useful way to visualise how common cognitive models can arise is through a metaphor that comes from physics that explains the curious patterns that occur when light waves interfere with each other under particular circumstances. Take two pieces of fine net curtain and place one arbitrarily over the other so that the strands of material that form the fabric of each are in some way orientated one to the other. Normally a (Moiré) pattern will appear that is dependent upon both the form that the net curtains have, and their relative orientation. Now shift one of the pieces in any arbitrary way and you will see that a change in pattern results. The explanation for this is that light interference occurs between the two pieces of net curtain. Consider now that a worldview is composed of a conceptual extensions associated with cognitive organisation, and it defines a set of “cognitive strands” that compose the “cognitive fabric”. When two or 8

more worldviews come together during attempts for meaning to be shared between a group of viewholders, some cognitive strands become coincident. However, with worldview incommensurability, others are not. The (Moiré) cognitive pattern that emerges represents a “cognitive turbulence” that becomes a source for the manifestation of conflict. The turbulence arises from the interference that occurs because of incommesurable differences in cognitive organisation and knowledge. The patterns are responsible for arbitrary stable processes of understanding and misunderstandings, and communication and miscommunication; and these can become institutionalised in organisations. Conflict is therefore the manifestation of cognitive turbulence in the behavioural world, and it may be enhanced by each of the five dimensions of complexity. Metaphorically speaking, if the actors in a suprasystem find themselves with a problem situation due to cognitive turbulence, change can occur by realigning their paradigms to enable a new cognitive pattern to emerge. In this way, the nature of understanding or misunderstanding will shift, perhaps by the creation of new arbitrary stabilities that in turn might lead to new related conflicts. However, in some cases, while a new pattern may not be any more suitable for the group, it may be possible for pattern variations to emerge such that the conflictual manifestation of cognitive turbulence is less eventful. 4. Boundary Critique and Conflict Manifestation A currently emerging theory of boundary critique has been developed by Midgley [1992] and Midgley et al [1998] that has significance for our models of conflict. It has roots in the work of Churchman [1970], in which he was attempting to find ways of “improving” problem situations. For him, defining improvement to a problem situation is a systems problem, involving boundaries that must be decided about in order to create an intervention. The boundaries constrain what should be taken into account in a situation. Making decisions about which boundary to accept in preparing an intervention strategy is therefore crucial, and this involves maximising the information that reflects on this. Change the boundary that defines the system, and you are likely to change the nature or meaning of a given intervention, and this may require a new intervention to be formulated. In a development of these ideas, Ulrich [1983] questioned how inquirers could rationally define their boundaries. Rational inquiry is seen to be essential in that assumptions held by all stakeholders in a situation should necessarily be seen as potentially valid. Together with this a sufficient condition is that the inquiry process that enables analysis to occur has boundaries that should enhance the ability for critique to occur. The boundaries are created through the values, ethics and knowledge of the viewholders involved in creating them. Debating the boundaries can thus been seen to be in part an ethical process. However, as we shall show it can involve more than this. Further, Midgley [1992] had an interested in what happens when a conflict occurs between two groups of people who have different ethics that relate to the same issue, thereby making different boundary judgements. In Midgley et al [1998] a model that intends to approach this problem is proposed (figures 2 and 4). It distinctly limits the nature of the theoretical problem by supposing that the boundary defined by one group is contained within that of the other. When the two boundaries do not coincide, the issue elements that exist between the inner and outer boundaries are marginalised. To see this more clearly, suppose one group makes a narrow primary boundary judgement B1, and the other a wider secondary boundary B2 that contains B1. The marginal area is shown in figure 2, and lies between the two boundaries. This marginal area may be valued and thus made sacred, or it may be devalued and thus made profane. In the case that it is made sacred, the secondary boundary will become the focus of the systemic processes, while if it is made profane then the primary boundary will be.

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Secondary boundary (B2) Wider system (not Marginalised elements seen as perminant)

Primary boundary (B1) Elements with primary boundary

Figure 2: The notion of Marginalisation For Midgley et al, not only do ethical tensions give rise to sacredness and profanity, but they also becomes overlaid with social ritual. This ritual is a form of behaviour independent of context, and involves stereotypical elements having symbolic expression of wider social concerns [Douglas, 1966; Leach, 1976]. Ritual enables us to determine where sacradness and profanity may lie, and thus where ethical conflicts might be found that involve some form of marginalisation [Midgley, Munlo and Brown, 1998]. In figure 3 it is argued that we can see one ethic arising from within the primary boundary, and another from within the secondary. These come into conflict, and this can only be addressed by making one of the two boundaries dominant. This occurs through a process of making the marginal region sacred or profane. This process is symbolically expressed as ritual that helps support the system as a whole. Having argued this, it is stressed that this model is a “simplified account that does not fully express the complexity of the many values and boundary judgements that interact dynamically in social situations”. Sym bolic expression in ritual

C on flict E th ic arisin g from with in secon dary boun dary

E th ic arisin g from with in prim ary boun dary

Prim ary boun dary

Secon dary boun dary Sacred or profan e m argin al region

Figure 3: Role of ethic in the creation of conflict in boundary critique While this model would appear to be satisfactory in dealing with situations in which one boundary is embedded in another, there are frequently situations in which this does not occur. This comes from the idea that if a single group comes together that enables an inner boundary to be defined, and it is enlarged, then there is no guarantee that the new boundary will embed the old one. This is seen from the notion of group worldview and its development [Berger and Luckman, 1966]. The description of boundary critique by Midgley et al is intended to relate to a broad or narrow set of issues each defined within their own boundaries for analysis, where the narrow boundary is contained within the broader one.

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In a different more general class of situation, we can suppose that two actors A1 and A2 each with their own (incommensurable) worldviews have each individually generated a bounded model of the “real world” B1 and B2. We are now likely to find that we are faced with a bounded (though changing) issue based suprasystem that embeds the two actors, each of which have their own bounded systems. This suprasystem is equivalent to the wider system of Midgley et al., and is represented in figure 4. Here, we are supposing that the actor A2 is dominated by A1, so that the boundary B2 contains marginalised elements. B ou n d a r y B 2 belon g in g to a ctor A 2 S u p r a system em bed d in g a ctor s A 1 M a r g in a lised a n d A 2 w ith bou n d a r ies B1, B2

E lem en ts w ith in B 2

B ou n d a r y B 1 belon g in g to a ctor A 1

elem en ts

E lem en ts com m on to a ctor s A 1 a n d A 2

Figure 4: Likely form for boundaries associated with actors A1 and A2 in boundary critique We are now led to another consideration. Figure 4 is a cognitive manifestation of a cognitive interaction that also resides in the cognitive domain. Figure 4 can thus be seen as a manifestation of a cognitive process, and is directly associated with a set of interacting worldviews that results in shared knowledge and meaning. It therefore represents a “window” of the interactive cognitive domain shown in figure 3. That is, it derives from a decision on boundary definition that is actually a cognitive process. This is consistent with the view of Luhmann who tells us that “...the boundaries of social systems fall within the consciousness of psychic systems. Consciousness intervenes and thereby acquires the possibility of drawing boundaries for social systems precisely because these boundaries are not, at the same time, boundaries of consciousness.” (Luhmann, 1995, p.217). Now, a boundary can be defined by a frame of reference (Yolles, 1999). This distinguishes between distinct objects of attention that are associated with the frame of reference, and those that are not. Thus, a topological differentiation is created at the cognitive level that is manifested as a (perhaps fuzzy and changing) boundary. We can now set figure 4 into the cognitive domain of the viable systems tridomain model. This results in figure 5, showing a viable systems representation of conflict development. Let us now explore this. Con flict ma nifestatio n supp or ted by sym bo lic e xpression in ritua l

Be ha viour al do ma in

Co nflic t pr oce ss A 2 co gnitive pu rpo ses associate d w ith B2

A 1 c ogn itive purpo se s O rganising C on tes t ed d i ff eren ces asso ciated w ith d oma in B1

C o gnitive dom ain Bo unda ry B 1 of a ctor A1 B oun dary B2 of actor A2

Po ssible mar ginal r eg ion

Figure 5: Differences are contested, conflict processes invoked, and conflict is manifested 11

behaviourally The actors in a suprasystem operate on the basis of their worldviews that generate perspectives and operate through the use of locally generated knowledge. Some of the knowledge has occurred through experience, but much has come through migration from other worldviews via social, cultural, and political cognitive influences, as common cognitive models develop. Actors are also subject to a thinking process that is effected by the migrated knowledges, and resulting changes in cognitive organisation. It ultimately determines how interaction occurs, and how rationalities are defined. Migrating knowledges also affect polity, determined partly by how we think about the constraints on group and individual freedoms, and how collective actors organise and behave. As illustrated in table 1, from its cognitive purpose it ultimately has impact on their related ideology that embeds the ethics that are of particular interest to Midgley. Further, from cognitive interest it impacts on the degree of emancipation that they have, and the degree that they are prepared to offer others. This knowledge has formed our social perspectives, and contributed towards the establishing our social forms that are related to our intentions and behaviours. Midgley et al have not only referred to ethics in their construction of this problem. They also associate the terms sacred or profane with the marginal region. However, the use of these concepts is likely to be more complex than that offered by Midgeley et al, since: (a) the marginal area is likely to be subject to change within and between actor systems as the nature of the issue based suprasystem changes over time, and this will affect the meaning of the conflict for each actor, (b) there is likely to be a loss in behavioural potential for at least one actor in the developing conflict that may have impact on beliefs about what is scared or profane. Ideas are transformed into action within the organising domain through information. It is here that worldview differences are contested. The contesting process defines a cognitive purpose that will be directly responsible for the manifestation of conflict. In so doing, intention is realised through the creation and strategic pursuit of goals and aims that may change over time, and this enable actors through control and communications processes to redirect their futures. The strategic process derives from a relational logic that derives from actor rationality. This will likely be different for each of the actors in a suprasystem that are involved in contesting differences. As part of this, each actor will pursue its own missions, goals, and aims. This results in an organisation of thought and action that ultimately determines the behavioural possibilities of the actors. Finally, ideology defines the manner of thinking. This intellectual framework enables policy makers to interpret reality politically. It involves ethical and moral orientations, and provides an image of the future that enables action through politically correct strategic policy. It also gives a politically correct view of the stages of historical development, in respect of interaction with the external environment. In the behavioural domain, the organised behaviour of actors in the suprasystem operates for cognitive interest through work, enabling the achievement of goals. It also involves a technical ability to undertake action in the environment, and the ability to make prediction that ultimately feeds back to organising and enables the establishment of control. In situations of cognitive turbulence that lead to conflict, complexity can increase. For instance, computational complexity can develop through circumstantial exigency, when parts of an actor develop “autonomous” behaviour, thus increasing the number of interactive parts. In such cases, sub-actors of a given actor spontaneously emerge, and adopt patterns of behaviour not sanctioned or supported by the actor. Technical complexity also worsens, as control processes are likely to become more entangled. This is exacerbated with the emergence of subactor activity. Predictability becomes more difficult. Organisational complexity increases, as new local rules develop spontaneously with the emergence of sub-actors. These can have chaotic impact on the interactions between the actors in the suprasystem.

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The pursuit of goals in a theatre of war can result in the “collateral damage” of civilian dead. In modern times, the surgical strike should avoid this. However, technical complexity chaos in the cybernetic domain that leads to inadequate information and communications processes makes the surgical strike only a useful fiction. Personal complexity also increases, as actors become entrenched in their own local view of the situation. With conflict manifestation, the actors are likely to become more locked behind the boundaries of their own worldviews, as they withdraw from dialogue. Consequently, a practical interest of pursuing actor purpose results that exacerbates the conflict rather than addressing it. This often means that the actors become unable to develop the possibilities of an understanding of each other’s subjective views. In particular, it can inhibit the development of variety, and impair actor viability. This can lead to more limited possibilities for conflict settlement because the actors are less able to adapt to changes. In addition, it can also endanger the potential of individuals who become subject to the conflict, and impose on them new constraints from new power structures and political processes. This threatens the social form of the actors, the degree of emancipation that the individuals who compose them enjoy, and inhibits their participation in controlling their own destinies. Finally, enhancement of emotional complexity also occurs, and drives the conflict further. 5. Conflict, Power, and Marginalisation Conflict situations develop through: cognitive turbulence that occurs in the cognitive domain, contesting of differences that occurs in the organising domain, or manifest conflict in the behavioural domain. At least two types of conflict situation can be defined, endogenous and exogenous. In the former, the conflicts occur within a group situation, and in the latter they occur between two autonomous actors in a suprasystem. It is not always easy or simple to say which is occurring in a given conflict, especially when the classification changes through the intervention and participation of a third party “other”. This “other” can also be referred to as an agency that will in some way be involved with the conflict situation through intervention, which may be required to relate to each of the three domains. Care that the agency does not itself become part of the conflictual suprasystem is a rational requirement if an endogenous conflict is not to become an exogenous one, as seems to have occurred in the recent Serbian Kosovo situation. The pursuit of local or “personal” agency values can often be seen to act as a transformer that shifts a conflict from an endogenous to exogenous one. Intervention can best occur at the cognitive turbulence stage, this enabling the realisation of the potential of a situation that can increase requisite variety. It is rare to see this occurring in the international arena, however, often because of lack of will or opportunity, or lack of integral appreciation of the situation and its implications. Intervention can also occur by addressing contesting differences through political process. It is the place where clarity and transparency are required. Without this, it can never be demonstrated that the actors in the suprasystem do not operate for political expediency, to satisfy vested interest, or to pursue their own values over and above the exigencies of the situation. However, while interventionists may be aware of their own perspectives, the boundary critique problem means that there may be less clarity about the issues, how they are informed, and any resulting judgements the interventionists might make. Cognitive turbulence affects the organising domain, by interfering with any established relationships, logical processes, control and communications processes, and manner of thinking. This can lead on to manifest conflict that defines the traditional sphere of action for the military. Interventions can also occur in the behavioural domain where conflict is manifested. It is an unstable region full of chaos, and involves military operational activities. In complex situations, military actions can become an interlude that contributes more to the degradation of the situation rather than its settlement. Military actions can materialise the worst fears of all the actors, and freeze patterns of cognitive turbulence for decades or even centuries.

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Dealing with conflict situations also means being aware of power. Conflict is a manifestation of contesting differences that derives from cognitive turbulence. This appears as goal diffenences in the organising domain, where they are contested through purposeful political process. It is when this process becomes devoid of rational cognitive purpose that conflict is manifested. Therefore, a struggle or contest between the actors [Himes, 1980, p15] occurs through the mobilising and application of power. Power comes from polity that also has a responsibility for conflict. Polity is the creation of an organised group condition that ultimately defines organisational form. It is facilitated through politics, itself concerned with causal relationships about behaviour that enables a social engineering of group form and order. In management systems, Checkland and Scholes [1990, p50] see politics to be a process by which differing interests reach accommodation through the dispositions of power. Thus, power is the tool of politics, which itself functions as a facilitating and organising process that enables a desirable social system to become established. It does this by distributing power to role positions that result in the making of judgements, dispensing of decisions, and in general facilitating formal action. A power structure therefore exists in the behavioural domain as part of the manifest system. It sanctions formal action that occurs by due political process within a collective actor organisation. Power is ultimately an instrument that enables individuals or groups to defeat or remove opponents, or gain status, resources, and other scarce values [Himes, 1980]. When conflict ensues, it is because scarce values are sought, and resistance to the ideas of other actors in the suprasystem is overcome. The actors have usually thought and talked about what they would do [Ibid., p14], and believe their impending behaviour to be sensible and smart. More frequently, they are not aware of the complexities or chaotic nature of the situation that they are going to involve themselves in, being familiar with simple mechanistic ways of thinking. Foucault (1980) suggests that one actor exercising power over another is actually the end result of the power/knowedge/identity relations that occur in any social system. This view can be expressed in terms of the model in figure 1. Here, knowledge from the cognitive domain is used within the organising processes (in the organising domain). It can be reflected back to the cognitive domain create understandings of self. In the other direction, the organising process manifests behavioural patterns that define and reinforce the system. A comprehensive definition of power that derives directly from the boundary critique model, is the ability of one actor in the suprasystem to marginalise others in some way. In complex situations there are many possible dimensions of marginalisation. There are also degrees of marginalisation, and this provides the possibility of providing a measure of the relative power that an actor has. The way that actors respond to the process of marginalisation will also vary in complex situations. Simple thinking strategies often favour the embarkation of violent conflict as a way of dealing with it. They will be dependent upon not only the personal and emotional complexity of the situation, but also the relative degree (which may be seen differently by each actor) of power possessed by the actors. The conflict then progresses according to the ability of the actors to deal with the technical and organisational complexity of the situation. A coherent way of dealing with potential conflict is to establish a structured inquiry process for the purpose of arbitration, that is able to address with the three domains of interest given in table 1. This might take on the characteristics of an arbitration tribunal, as is used for instance in various industrial disputes in some industrialised countries. Senior military strategists should be involved in this. Formal methodologies that seek intervention for the purpose of change management may also play a role here, and we have in mind one called the Conflict Modelling Cycle proposed by Yolles [1994]. 6. Conclusion The role of the military is changing in a complex world of cognitive turbulence. Simple perspectives 14

that lead to incursion optimisation, and the notion of winning or losing, are no more adequate. Complex situations require new approaches to be adopted. They require that military leaders take on new perspectives that adopt structured approaches able to deal with complexity, and that are consistent with the modern view of change management. Without this, there is the likelihood that conflict will become exacerbated, the possibility of effective enduring settlements diminished, and the chance that human emancipation and rights will be further encroached. 7. References Ackoff, R.L., 1981, Creating the Corporate Future, Wiley, New York. p34 Allport, G.W., 1961, Pattern and Growth in Personality. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. p224 Beer, S., 1959, Cybernetics and Management. English Universities Press; 1975, Platform for Change. Wiley; 1979. The Heart of Enterprise. Wiley; 1981, Brain of the Firm. 2nd ed. Wiley, New York; 1985. Diagnosing the System for Organisations. Wiley Berger, P., Luckman, T., 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. Penguin. Checkland, P.B., Scholes,J., 1990, Soft Systems Methodology in Action. John Wiley & Son, Chichester. p.35. Churchman, C.W. 1970, Operations Research as a Profession. Mngmt Sci. 17:B37-B53. Cohen, J., Stewart, I., 1994, The Collapse of Chaos: discovering simplicity in a complex world. Viking, London Coser, L., A., 1956, The Functions of Social Conflict. Free Press of Glencoe, New York. Crawley, J., 1992, Conflict: Managing to Make a Difference. Nicholas Brealey Publishing Ltd., London Crick, B., 1962, In Defence of Politics. Widenfield and Nicolson, London Douglas, M., 1966, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. Ark, London. Flood, R.L., Romm, N.R.A., 1995, Diversity Management: Theory in Action. Systems Practice, 8(4)469-482. Fourcault, M., 1980. In Gordon, C., (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Harvester Press, Brighton Galtung, J., 1972, Peace: Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 1. Christian Ejlers, Copenhagen Habermas, J., 1970, Knowledge and interest. Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, pp36-54, (Emmet, D., MacIntyre, A., eds), MacMillan, London Himes, J.S., 1980, Conflict and Conflict Management. University of Georgia Press, Athens 30602. Holsti, K.J., 1967, International Politics, a Framework for Analysis. Prentice Hall Hutchinson, W.E., Webb, K.G.L., 1999, Using the Viable System Model (VSM) to Attack and Destroy Organisations. Systemits vol. 21(1), Feb. Jackson, M.C., 1992, Systems Methodologies for the Management Sciences. Plenum, New York Kuhn, S.T., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Lanchester, F., 1916, Aircraft in Warfair, The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. Constable, London. Leach , E., 1976, Culture and Communication: The Logic by which Symbols are Connected. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Luhmann, N., 1995, Social Systems, Stanford University Press, California. Translated from the 1984 German edition. Mannheim, K., 1964, Wissenssoziologie. Nenwied/Rhein, Luchterhand Midgley, G., Munlo, I., Brown, M., 1998, The Theory and Practice of Boundary Critique: developing housing services for older people. J. Op. Res. Soc. 49,5,467-478. Midgley, G., 1997, Mixing Methods: Developing Systemic Intervention. In Mingers, J., Gill, A., Multimethodology: the theory and practice of combining science methodologies. Wiley, Chichester. Midgley, G., 1992, The Sacred and Profane in Critical Systems Thinking, Systems Practice 5: 5-16. Nicolis, G., Prigogine, I., 1989, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction. W.H.Feeman and Co., New York Schwarz, E., 1994 (April), A Metamodel to Interpret the Emergence, Evolution and Functioning of Viable Natural Systems. Presented at the European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems Research, Vienna, and in Trappl, R., (ed.), 1994, Cybernetics and Systems ‘94, World Scientific, Singapore, pp1579-1586 Schwarz, E., 1995, Where is the Paradigm? In the Peoples Mind or in the Social System? Seperata de Revista International de Systemas, vol. 7, No. 1-3, pp5-54. Ulrich, W., 1983, Critical Heuristics of Social Planning: A Reconstruction of Kantan A-Priori Science for Planners and Practical Philosophers. Paul Haupt, Bern, Switzerland Weber, M., 1946, Class, Status, Party. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills, 180-95, New York; Oxford University Press. Yolles, M.I. 1994 (Dec.), Generic Metamodelling. Systemist. 16,4,269-286 15

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