Majahan - Full Spectrum Dominance (2003) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: October 18, 2004, 7:00 p.m. Rahul Mahajan, Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003). [Dedication] "To the people of Iraq . . . and to the global antiwar movement" (5). Epigraphs from Joint Vision 2020 (2000) ("The overall goal of the transformation described in this document is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations . . . Full spectrum dominance") and from Donald Rumsfeld on Apr. 28, 2003 ("We don't seek empires. We're not imperialistic. We never have been. I can't imagine why you'd ask") (9). Introduction: After the War: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond. Iraq was a "component in a sweeping new vision of U.S. foreign policy associated with . . . neoconservatives" (12). U.S. has plans to relieve Iraq of debt and establish military bases there (13-14). War should open Iraq to U.S. oil companies (15-16). U.S. support for "democracy" in Iraq is "a code word" for "a heavily dependent Iraqi government that will not stray far from U.S. dictates" (16-17). Need, because of oil, for a government with "real authority over the whole country (17-18). The U.S. organization of the political process is nondemocratic (18-19). The U.S. now seeks regime change in Syria and Iran (19-21). The 2003 "road map"; approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to recreate "a Palestinian client state . . . headed by Arafat's long-time associate Abu Mazen" (21-23). The war on Iraq was also a war on the U.N. (24). U.N.'s future is humanitarian support (25-26). Sanctions should not have been lifted until a legitimate Iraqi government took power (26-27). The U.S. is an empire, incompatible with "independence and international equality" and not "benevolent" (28). Section I: The "War on Terrorism." Ch. 1: What It's Not ― A War on Terrorism. Due to the U.S. response, Sept. 11, 2001, marked "the beginning of a new era" (31). But "the 'war on terrorism' is not a war on terrorism (32). Domestic security neglected (32-33). Internationally, the U.S. spurned extradition in favor of violence (33-37). War "exacerbated the threat from al-Qaeda and other Islamist formations" both strategically and tactically (3741). Ch. 2: A New Imperialism? Understanding the Bush National Security Strategy. The war on terrorism "can be fruitfully understood as a new Cold War" (42). Like the Truman Doctrine, the Bush Doctrine outlined in the 2002 State of the Union address "is a doctrinal system in which any development anywhere can be deemed a potential threat to our own national security" (43-

44). The "National Security Strategy" (NSS) and PNAC's "Rebuilding America's Defenses" (RAD) have roots in the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance" (45-46). Whereas the Cold War always pretended to be defensive, the war on terrorism admits it is aggressive (47-48). China figure centrally in the RAD (48-49). Four "principles of the neoconservative vision": (1) military transformation; (2) military bases; (3) régime changes; (4) control of oil (49-50). Missile defense allows the U.S. "to attack others with impunity" (51-54). In RAD, "an American peace" is a code phrase for dominance (55). The NSS is illogical in invoking terror as justification for small-state pre-emption (56). Rejection of the International Criminal Court and the American Servicemembers Protection Act (the 'Invade the Hague' Act) as needed complement (56-58). Ch. 3: A Survey of U.S. Foreign Policy since 9/11. Fiscal 2004 military budget $399.1 billion, up 30% from late 1990s (39). Shift from policy of nuclear deterrence to nuclear dominance; "bunker busters" (60-62). Oil-oriented base policy (62-63). Central Asia (63-65). Straits of Malacca (65-66). Philippines (66-67). Bab el Mandeb Strait and Straits of Hormuz (67-68). Georgia (68). Balkans (Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo) (68). Colombia (68-69). Venezuela demonstrates "régime change" policy has nothing to do with democracy (69-72). Section II: The War on Iraq. U.S. arguments for war were (1) to dissipate a threat and (2) promote democracy (73-75). Mainstream antiwar argument accepted these premises, supported sanctions, no-fly zones, etc. ― but "the primary driving force behind U.S. policy in the region [has always been] control of oil as a crucial component of global hegemony" (75-76). Ch. 4: Understanding "Containment": Iraq after the Gulf War ― Sanctions, No-Fly Zones, and Weapons Inspections. [Longest chapter] "Containment" is a notion providing a defensive guise (77). Post-Gulf War U.N. resolutions 661, 665, 666 starved people of Iraq (78-79). Res. 687 (April 1991) set up UNSCOM to inspect for weapons, with IAEA (79-81). True, Iraqis complied only "partially" (81-82). But inspections were effective at eliminating WMDs; problems were in accounting (81-84). U.S. explicitly said that nothing would bring about lifting sanctions short of régime change (85-86). Removal of inspectors caused by refusal of U.S. to commit to lifting sanctions (86-87). U.S. engaged in spying through inspections (88). U.S. "deliberately undermined a largely successful

inspections régime by eliminating Iraq's incentive" (89). Iraq sanctions were unprecedentedly comprehensive and harmful (9092). Oil for Food program (92-93). Effect of sanctions (93-94). Iraq's use of Oil-for-Food money (94-96). U.S. to blame Iraq's delay in accepting an Oil for Food program (96-99). Using its power to block contracts, the U.S. sabotaged and politicized provisioning of Iraq's humanitarian needs (99-103). Devastation of Iraq's social structure and economy (103-06). No-fly zones were "an illegal imposition" (106-07). Ch. 5: 9/11 and the Pre-Emption Doctrine: From Box-Cutters to Weapons of Mass Destruction. From 9/11 to attacking Iraq involved a "logical [i.e. illogical] leap" (108-09). Anthrax attacks were useful in persuading public of this (103). Nov.-Dec. 2001: John Bolton & the House International Affairs Committee claim Iraq is a "growing threat" (109-11). "Pre-emption doctrine" introduced in summer and fall 2002 (111). But "pre-emption" is a misnomer (111-12). This is really "preventive war," and is illegal (11213). U.S. has often acted thus (113-14). What is new is the rhetorical/doctrinal change to a "capabilities-based" justification for attack (11417). Ch. 6: The Threat from Iraq. U.S. justifications for war were absurdities (118-19), lies and coverups (119). Inspections were undermined (11920). U.S. behavior demonstrates lack of belief in threat from Iraq (120-21). Even if WMDs were found now, the failure to have used them would negate the claim they were a threat (121). All evidence is against Iraqi hostile intent toward the U.S. (121-27). No evidence of Iraq-al-Qaeda ties (127-30). The chaos of the Iraq war was more likely to put WMDs in terrorists' hands than was Saddam Hussein (130-31). The term "WMD" is itself a U.S. propaganda victory (131-32). Supposed evidence of Iraq WMDs was distorted or unreasonably inflated (132-34). U.S. has subverted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (ignoring Article VI), the Chemical Weapons Convention (introducing an exception to the inspections clause), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (failing to support development of an enforcement mechanism) (135-37). "Disarmament is impossible for the foreseeable future . . . proliferation is the order of the day" (137). U.S. absurdly asserts the Iraq war should deter proliferation (137-38). North Korean crisis demonstrates the opposite (138-40). Ch. 7: International Law. The U.S. claim that the Iraq war upheld international law "was ridiculous on its face" (141). Iraq's violations were technical; many have violated U.N. resolutions with impunity; the U.S. avails itself of immunity through its Security Council veto, or else ignores international law (141-43). It is

possible to argue U.S. violations "released Iraq from any obligations" (143). Bombing air defenses and command-and-control sites beginning Aug. 2002, maneuvering over Res. 1441, war planning, and false arguments that "time is running out" demonstrate "a clear case of aggression" (143-46). Aggression is a "crime against the peace" and "the most fundamental violation of international law" (147). "It surely is unprecedented in world history that a country has been required to disarm itself and even been castigated by the 'international community' for significant though partial compliance with disarmament requirements, when all along it was under escalating attack from another nation and told repeatedly that it would be subjected to a full-scale war of aggression ― and that all of this was done in the name of upholding international law" (147). Ch. 8: Democracy and Human Rights: Liberating Iraq. U.S. policy neglects or subverts humanitarian goals in non-military areas; to think its war policy is different "requires a remarkable effort of doublethink" (148-49). In The New Crusade (2002), Mahajan codifies U.S. principles of humanitarian intervention: (1) the humanitarian crisis is an excuse to pursue some other gain; (2) the intervention is structured to pursue this gain; (3) military force better serves U.S. interests than peacekeeping and humanitarianism (150-51). U.S. policy in the Middle East toward democracy has been "hostility and subversion," actively opposing popular movements in Iraq (1963, 1991) (151-54). Generally, U.S. pursues political control and benefits for U.S. corporations; democracy matters little (154-55). U.S. "régime change" policy represents a shift from currently dominant economic form of control to "the creation of governments . . . within a military framework of U.S. global hegemony," as more effective "in penetrating the societies where most of the world's oil lies" (155-58). Polemical denunciation of the "unbelievable effrontery" (162) and "most obscene hypocrisy" (160) of U.S. claims to act on human rights and humanitarian concerns, belief in which is possible only through "a certain dehistoricization" (158-62). Ch. 9: Oil as a Component of Empire. Iraq war demonstrably served principles of U.S.'s "new imperial vision" (cf. 49-50), but assertion of oil interest inexplicably evokes charges of belief in a "conspiracy theory" (163-64). Overview of history of Western involvement with Middle Eastern oil: 1920 San Remo agreement; 1928 "Red-line" agreement; 1933 Saudi concessions; 1943 FDR-Ibn Saud connection; 1951-1953 Iran; Iraq's Law 80 (1961); nationalization in Libya (1971), Iraq (1972), Kuwait (1975), Venezuela (1975), Saudi Arabia (1980); Carter Doctrine; Gulf

Wars (164-67). Correcting some misconceptions: oil companies do not always get their way (167), U.S. does not always pursue a "cheap oil" policy (168), U.S. Middle East policy is "not about access to oil" (168). But size of Iraq's oil wealth reserves (112.5-220b barrels) "magnify" its importance: (1) for U.S. oil companies; (2) as geopolitical lever; (3) in support of the dollar; (4) in response to growing world demand for oil (169-70). Iraq will bring U.S. oil company profits and invested petrodollars (171-75). Politically, Iraqi oil gives leverage over the EU, Japan, and China, and may allow the U.S. to break the power of OPEC (17576). The role of dollar denomination of oil sales is doubtful, but "dollar hegemony" is a reflection of "broader U.S. political hegemony" (177-78). Rising demand necessitates expansion of productive capacity; war "is necessary if the United States is to maintain control of that process" (179-80). "Oil is . . . behind this war . . . as a component of empire" (180). Conclusion: The New Imperialism. The imperialism of the Bush administration is a continuation of earlier policies, at least back to

post-WWII (181-83). What is different: a new "unipolarity" (183-85); assertion of "a U.S. right to aggression" ("pre-emption") (185); its "military mercantilism" offsets weakening effects of a huge and growing current account deficit (18587); U.S. and Israeli strategic interests are converging (187-88); unipolarity permits marriage of Realpolitik with neoconservative ideology (189); it lacks political legitimacy (189-91). The "decent left" is working "to keep the antiwar movement from becoming a more sustained movement and from becoming an anti-imperialist movement," but it is possible for it to become "a sustained, mass-based political avenue" to bring down an empire for the first time (191-94). Notes. 13 pages. About the Author. Web site: www.rahulmahajan.com. Ph.D. [Physics], U. of Texas at Austin. Founder, Nowar Collective (www.nowarcollective.com). Wrote The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism (2002). [Born 1969; BA Caltech in math.]