Legal Counseling Cases.docx

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. ISSUE: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship RULING: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

KHAN VS. SIMBILLO, A.C NO. 5299, AUGUST 19, 2003 FACTS: A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD: Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

IN RE: ARGOSINO, 270 SCRA 26 FACTS: Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim. ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law. HELD: YES. Petition granted. RATIO: Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society. FERDINAND A. CRUZ v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, GR No. 154464, 2008-09-11 DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July 31, 20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court. The antecedents: On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 010410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally. During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss

instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002. On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.5 In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the said order. On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. 8 In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied. In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002. On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors: I. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER’S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT; II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS. The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case. This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. 11 A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 13 Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We

will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us. In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary. Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school. However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal authorized member of the bar.

a party may him for that his litigation or by a duly

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A. From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. 14Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, 15 petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself. The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself. The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a

non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138A. It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, 18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence." The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision. In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish. Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality. We do not agree. It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case19 against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case. In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, 20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.21 Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 010410 as a party litigant. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (DIGEST) B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013 TOPIC: Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys FACTS: Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number. About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted. The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and companies. However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction. A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession. Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.

[ G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971 ] PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS, PETITIONERS, VS. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING, RESPONDENTS. DECISION REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULPIloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case. The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., etal." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, QuintinMuning filed a "Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed by CiprianoCid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer. The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning. On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows: Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates----10% Quintin Muning-------------------------- 10% Atty. Atanacio Pacis------------------- 5% The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition. Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.[1] He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petition for review.[2]The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.[3] Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,[4] that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is

immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case. The provision in Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 875 that -"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel. . . . . . . ." is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that ? "it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence ", thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing -"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . . . . ." imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated: "But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction where the services were rendered."[5] "No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice. . . . .and is an attorney in good standing at the time."[6] The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated[7]; that acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both[8], and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or an act done in violation of law[9]; and that if fees were to be allowed to nonlawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.[10] "And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an 'agent' and not as an attorney."[11] The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception. The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court[12], on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the employees' moral, social and economic wellbeing"[13]; hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides: "Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases - Appeals. - Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines. . . . . . .", since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations. Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many others like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law. WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 11078 VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed. Antecedents In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) sent several demand letters to Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding her unpaid obligations secured by the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. 2 To avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was not around at that time. On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them about their right to redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure.3 In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and scheduled an appointment with them on August 30,2013.

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they inquired on the status of their mother's property. After the respondent had oriented them on the procedure for redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price and for litigation expenses, 5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC identification card. Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents for redemption were ready for their mother's signature. 6 On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a letter 7 that she had signed, along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8 The letter reads: Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff Regional Trial Court Caloocan City Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013 Dear Atty. Dabalos, Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as to the full redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same. Thank you. Truly yours, (Sgd.) rances E. Ramon Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the redemption, but discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where she was attending a hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under process, and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three weeks time.9 After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond finally went to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent had not deposited the redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the property.10 On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her their demand letter requiring her to return the amount she had received for the redemption. 11 She acknowledged the letter and promised to return the money on December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did not show up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in Branch 145.12 With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, V erlita and Raymond brought their disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1âwphi1 Findings and Recommendation of the IBP The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not attend the mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation proceeded ex parte.13 IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and Recommendation, 14 whereby he found the respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and recommended her suspension from the practice of law for two years, and her return to the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2, 2013.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's recommendation as stated in its Resolution No. XXI-2014-929,15 viz.: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant. Ruling of the Court The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit. The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession. 17 Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath. The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough, however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession. As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants. The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.1âwphi1 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 20The Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.21 Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney misconduct.22

The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of Governors recommended her suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law because she had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest.23 She should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection, we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair and just because she did not comply in the least with her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe penalty. WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision. Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice