Land-titles (2).docx

Manotok v Heirs of Homer Barque “Decree Binds the Land” Facts : 1. On June 11, 1998, a fire destroyed several certificates of title in the Register of Deed of Quezon City. 2. The heirs of Homer Barque, claiming that their title was lost to the 1988 fire, filed for administrative reconstitution of tile. They presented tax declarations and a Survey Plan covering their property. 3. The Manotoks, upon learning about Barque’s petition filed their opposition thereto. They claimed that part of their property which was covered by a reconstituted title was included in the area being claimed by the heirs of Barque. They alleged that the Barque titles were spurious.

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The LRA -

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About the land they were both claiming. Barque title- TCT 210177

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1. They both refer to the same parcel of land which was originally part of the Piedad Estate. 2. The Barque titles involves two parcels of land which amount to 342,000 square meters while the Manotok title only covers one parcel of land but with similar land area. Ruling of Atty. Bustos (the reconstitution officer) -

Found that the Barque titles tend to duplicate the Manotok titles since they included the exact same parcels of land referred to as the Piedad Estate.

As categorically stated by the Chief Geodetic Engineer who conducted the survey, the Plan submitted by the heirs of Barque was spurious. So he denied the Barque’s petition for administrative reconstitution.

Reversed the ruling of the Reconstitution officer. Held that the Atty. Bustos shouldn’t have required the submission of additional documents but should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. Found that the Barque titles were genuine stating that TCT No. 210177 (the one owned by the heirs of Barque) was placed in the logbook of the Register of Deeds as one of the titles that were lost during the 1988 fire. Also, the technical description conformed to the boundaries of the lot. So the LRA ordered the reconstitution of the Barque titles after the cancellation of the titles of the Manotoks. The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration (to have the adverse decision against them reversed) and the Barques also filed a petition for the immediate execution of the LRA decision, both petitions were denied by the LRA so the issue was now elevated to the CA.

At the CA 1. The heirs of Barque prayed for the immediate reconstitution of their titles without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok titles be cancelled first.

2. The Manotoks on the other hand prayed for the reversal of the LRA decision. 3. Held that the appellate court correctly deferred in giving due course to the Barque petition since ther was still no final judgment as to the validity or invalidity of their titles. 4. The CA also ordered the cancellation of the Manotok titles finding that these were fraudulent. At the SC 1. Both appeals were consolidated (the SP and CA rulings) 2. Sps. Manahan filed a motion to intervene contending that they were the rightful owners of the subject land alleging that their predecessors in interest have been ONEC possession and occupation in the concept of an owner. They even presented a sales certificate. 3. The OSG was also included as a party. 4. The SC allowed the relaxation of the Rules of Procedure on a pro hac vice basis since the stability of the Torrens system was at stake. Issue : Did the CA have the authority to cancel the Manotok titles through the petitions raised to it by the Barques and the Manotoks? No. Sec 48 of PD 1529 prohibits a cancellation to arise incidentally from an administrative proceeding for reconstitution of title. The CA does not have the original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles. So in pursuant to BP 129, it is imperative that the court of origin (the LRA) had the jurisdiction to annul certificates of title in the first place.

Issue : Did the LRA have the jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles? No. Section 6 of PD 1529 does not mention that the LRA has the authority to order the cancellation of Torrens titles. Issue : Did the LRA act correctly when it ordered the administrative reconstitution of the Barque titles? No. Republic Act No. 26 as amended by RA 6732 states that the LRA may only exercise jurisdiction over petitions for administrative reconstitution when it appears that no other Torrens title covers the land claimed by the applicants. If there are titles already covering the claimed areas, the proper recourse would be to refer the case to the judiciary and not the LRA. If the petition for administrative reconstitution is attended by adverse claims, the LRA would have no other recourse but to deny the petition. The denial may be appealed to the CA but its inquiry would only be limited to the question as to whether or not there was really a title already covering the area being claimed by the claimant. (Alabang Development Corporation v Valenzuela)

Issue : May the Ortigas case be correctly invoked? (2005 SC decision was heavily relied on this) No, the factual circumstances in the Ortigas case is totally different from the facts in the case at bar. This is because the court of origin in the Ortigas case had the jurisdiction to annul reconstituted titles (the RTC). On the other hand, in the

Manotok case, the LRA did not have the jurisdiction to annul reconstituted titles. It would have been pointless for the LRA and CA to ascertain the validity of the Barque titles since they did not have the authority to annul the titles of the Manotoks. In order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, SC tested the premises under which the LRA and the CA had concluded that Barqu had a valid claim to the title. The SC observed that the claim of the Barques was anamolous. They aver that they bought the property from a certain Setosta, so it should follow, the TCT should have been titled under the name of Setosta, but it was not. It was instead titled under the Manotok Realty Inc., so it appeared that the Barques acquired the land from the Manotoks. The Barques contend that their claim was based on a subdivision plan made under the name of Setosta, however the said subdivision plan did not sit well the DENR records. THE HEIRS OF BARQUE WERE NOT ABLE TO EXPLAIN THESE DISCREPANCIES. Further, the plan of submitted by the Barques showed that the land they claimed was beyond the boundaries of Quezon city, this is weird since the Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate was within the boundaries of Quezon City. So the claim of the Barques is exceedingly weak.

Flaws regarding the Manotok title apparent also by claims of petition-for-intervention of Manahans who filed a petition for cancellation/ reversion proceedings against the Manotok title.

The Court applied the ruling in Alonso v Cebu Country Club. The Manotoks were made to establish a valid paper trail successfully connecting their acquisition of Lot 823 from the Government. The CA was made to receive evidence. Decision : The LRA and the CA decisions are reversed and set aside.

Reyes v Raval – Reyes

were the subject matter of the pending civil action, and that the same has not yet been decided on the merits.

“Owner’s Duplicate Certificate” Facts : 1. Mateo, Juan and Francisco (all surnamed Reyes) were registered as owners of several parcels of land which were all embraced under OCT No. 8066. These lands are situated in Ilocos Norte. 2. In 1962, both Mateo and Juan filed in the cadastral cases motions for the issuance of writs of possession for the all lots covered by the certificates. 3. Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion contending that he acquired the 1/3 undivided share of Francisco through Absolute Sale. He alleged that he was in possession of the lots covered under OCT 22161. 4. The court granted the writ of possession for the Lots 15891 and 15896 (both these lots are covered under OCT 22161, the same OCT which Raval Reyes claims possession under. 5. In 1963, Mateo and Juan filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages against Raval Reyes. 6. Raval Reyes avers that he was the co – owner of both Juan and Mateo since he acquired the 1/3 undivided share of Francisco through Absolute Sale. Pending the ordinary civil action -

The petitioners presented in the cadastral cases a motion to compel Raval Reyes to surrender possession of the disputed lots. The cadastral court did not grant these motions on the ground that the subject lands

Contentions : Mateo and Juan -

The subject matter of the civil case was not the land themselves but their products as well as moral damages. And since the respondent had already raised the issues of ownership and possession in his reply to their complaint, despite which the court still issued the writs of possession, he is now estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case.

Raval Reyes -

He alleges that since both Mateo and Juan failed to implead their brother as co-plaintiff, the writs of possession issued against him was only valid with respect to the 2/3 undivided shares of both brothers. Hence, he wasn’t estopped from raising the issues of ownership and possession with respect to Francisco’s undivided 1/3 share of the lots.

Issue : Who has the better right of the possession or custody of the owners duplicate certificate of titles. The court says that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owner’s duplicated certificate of title. Since the names of Mateo and Juan were inscribed on the title’s they had the better to right to custody of the certificates of titles.

In addition, Raval Reyes already had the chance to avail of the provision of the notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14 of the ROC for the purpose of recording the fact that the said lands were being litigated upon in the Civil Case. Since he didn’t avail of these remedies, Mateo and Juan have the preferential right to custody of the owner’s duplicate certificate.

Abrigo v De Vera “Owner’s Certificate of Title” Facts : 1. Villafania sold a house and lot located in Pangasinan to Salazar and Cave – Go. The sale became a subject for a suit of annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees. 2. In 1993, the RTC rendered a judgment approving a compromise agreement between the two parties. Said compromise agreement states that : “Villafania was to be given a chance to buy the house and lot back within 1 year from the effectivity of the CA and that failure to do so would render the assailed sale valid. And that if Villafania fails to buy the house and lot back, she was to vacate the premises without a need of a demand. 3. Villafania wasn’t able to buy the house and lot back so the buyers declared the lot in their name. 4. Unknown to Cave Go and Salazar, Villafania had acquired a free patent over the subject lot sometime in 1988. The free patent was cancelled and a TCT was issued. 5. Villafania, sometime in 1997 sold the TCT arising from the free patent to De Vera. De Vera registered the sale, then a TCT was issued in her name. 6. In 1997, De Vera filed an ejectment suit against Sps. Abrigo (Cave – Go and Salazar sold the subject lots to Sps. Abrigo). Both parties agreed to have the proceedings for the ejectment withheld pending the resolution of the instant case (Abrigo v De Vera) which was an action for annulment of documents against De Vera and Villafania.

7. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring the sale between Villafania and De Vera void, and that Sps. Abrigo were not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. At the CA 1. Both parties appealed the RTC decision. 2. The CA held that a void title cannot give rise to a valid title, so logically, De Vera’s title is void since Villafania already transferred ownership thereto to Cave – Go and Salazar, the predecessors in interest of the Sps. Abrigo. 3. CA also dismissed the Sps. Abrigo’s prayer for exemplary and moral damages. 4. The CA amended its decision and declared De Vera as an innocent purchaser for value and afforded protection to her. At the SC (Sps. Abrigo appealed from the amended decision of the CA) Issue : Whether or not Villafania could have validly transferred the property to De Vera considering that she no longer owned the same during the time she sold it. Yes. Villafania validly transferred ownership to De Vera. The Supreme Court applied Art 1544 of the Civil Code which deals with double sales. Said article states that a double sales of immovable transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith, (2) the first possessor in good faith , then the (3) the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This is the order of priority.

De Vera had the better right over the land since she was the first to register it under the Torrens System. The Sps. Abrigo only registered the disputed land under Act 3344. In Soriano v Heirs of Magali, it was held that for registration to effectively bind third persons, it must be done at the proper registry. Therefore, the registration under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. In Naawan Community Rural Bank v Court of Appeals, it was held that principle, “first in time, better in right” does not apply to instances where one of the parties registered the lot under the Torrens system and the other under Act 3344. What is required is registration under the Torrens System. This is the rule since “the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecoreded”. Applications to land not registered under Act 496 cannot be made applicable to Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the petitioners cannot validly argue that they were misled in to thinking that the lot was unregistered since registration under the Torrens system is notice to the whole world.

Good Faith must couple the registration under Act 496. For the second buyer to be able to displace the claim of the first buyer, he must show that he registered the land first in good faith. Good faith meaning that he was ignorant of the first sale from the time of acquisition until title was transferred to him through registration.

Issue : Whether or not the registration of Sps Abrigo under Act 3344 could serve to operate as constructive notice. No. Registration under Act 3344 could only have the effect constructive notice when the land being claimed is still unregistered. Registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the subject property is already registered under the Torrens system as in the case at bar. The registration under the Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) is considered as the operative act which binds the land. The buyer need not look beyond what the Torrens title says, he may rely on what the title states.

Issue : Was De Vera an innocent purchaser for value? Yes. The TCT presented by Vilafania was free from encumbrances and liens and there was nothing that would have caused a reasonably prudent man to be suspicious and to look beyond the titles. She did not know about the civil proceedings and the prior Compromise Agreement between Cave – Go, Salazar and Villafania. As a matter of fact, she was never impleaded as a party thereto.

Decision : The instant petition is DENIED.

Republic v Mendoza “Owner’s Duplicate Certificate” Facts : 1. Paninsingin Primary School is a public school owned by the State. It is using 1,149 square meters. Respondent Mendoza owned portions of the lot as they were registered in his name. (TCT 11410) 2. Mendoza caused the subdivision of the lots into four lots. 3. Out of the 4 lots, on Lot 4 was given to the state. 4. In the meantime PPS was in possession of the lots. Contentions of the Republic -

Even if no title had been issued in the name of the Republic, the fact that Mendoza relinquished ownership to the state can be gleaned from the subdivision of the lot. Also, PPS had already introduced permanent improvements on the property and had the same declared for tax purposes.

Mendoza’s contention -

Although PPS had been in possession of the lots, there was an understanding that ownership would be retained in Mendoza’s name. This is supported by the fact that TCT 11410 was still titled under Mendoza’s name.

On 1998, Mendoza demanded that PPS vacate the lots. PPS didn’t vacate so Mendoza failed a case for unlawful detainer before the MTC. 1. The MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Republic is immune from suit.

2. Upon appeal, the RTC ruled that the doctrine of state immunity was inapplicable since the action was not directed against the state but against PPS. 3. So Mendoza filed with a MTC a motion to render judgment. The MTC still didn’t render judgment on the ground that it was now the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case. 4. The RTC finally rendered a decision in favor of Mendoza. PPS was ordered to vacate since Mendoza, being the registered owner, had the better right over the property in dispute. At the CA 1. The Republic, through the OSG filed an appeal. They contended that the (1) Mendozas were barred by laches, (2) that sufficient evidence was shown proving that Mendoza had relinquished title over the lots, (3) that Lot 4 had already been declared for tax purposed under the City Government. 2. The CA affirmed the RTC decision stating that a registered owner’s right to recovery of possession is imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership. That there was no documentary evidence proving that Mendoza really relinquished his title over the subject lots. And that even if Mendoza really transferred ownership to PPS, the state never took steps to register the lots under the name of the Republic. At the SC Issue : Whether or not the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject Property.

First, Mendoza’s right to recover possession is imprescriptible since possession is only a consequence o ownership. Second, the genuineness of Mendoza’s title over the lot is undisputed. Although Lot 4 was designated to the City Government, the City Government never took steps to have Lot 4 registered under their name. The Republic even admits that no new titles was issued in its favor ever since they started occupying the lot way back in 1957. HOWEVER, the fact that PPS had been occupying the subject property for about 50 years gives rise to the conclusion that Mendoza had permanently ceded it to the Government. The Court held that where a land owner allows the government to use his land, he thereby waives his right to institute expropriation proceedings. In other words, he waives his right of possession over the property. MENDOZA’S REMEDY WASN’T EJECTMENT BUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION. Since the MTC did not have the jurisdiction to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate Mendoza’s right to just compensation, the CA should have dismissed the unlawful detainer case outright

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Decision : The Mendozas’ claim for ejectment is denied.

Litam v Espiritu “Statement of Personal Circumstances” Facts : 1. Gregorio Tam, instituted in behalf of his brothers and sisters special proceedings claiming that they were the

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heirs of Rafael Litam. They claimed his ½ share of the properties acquired during the subsistence of his marriage with Marcosa Rivera. Tam avers that Rafale Litam married Sia Khin in China back in 1911. And that Litam contracted anther marriage with Marcosa Rivera on 1922. They claimed 60,000 pesos which was Litam’s ½ share of the conjugal properties which constituted 3 parcels of land situated in Pampanga and 1 parcel of land in Bulacan. Marcosa filed a counter complaint assailing the supposed filiation of the Tam siblings with the late Litam, that the properties under litigation are her paraphernal properties. She also prayed for her nephew Arminio Rivera to be appointed as administrator of Litam’s estate. The court appointed Arminio as administrator and allowed him to make an inventory excluding the properties mentioned in the complaint file by the Tam siblings. Marcosa Rivera was declared to be incompetent so Espiritu was appointed as her guardian. The Tam siblings filed a civil case against Espiritu as Marcosa’s guarding claiming that 8 separate pieces of property were conjugal and acquired during the subsistence of the marriage between Litam and Rivera through their joint efforts. All of the properties taken together had an assessed value of 150,000 pesos. In her answer, Marcosa reiterated her defenses.

The Lower Court

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Decided that the properties were Marcosa Rivera’s paraphernal property and that the Tam siblings weren’t actually the children of the late Rafael Litam.

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At the Supreme Court Issue : Are the Appellant the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? The evidence on record shows that Rafael Litam never married Sia Khin in China back in 19111. This is supported by the marriage certificate which shows that Litam was single at the time he contracted marriage with Marcosa Rivera. Also, in his sworn application for Alien certificate of registration, he declared under oath that he had no child. In other pieces of documentary evidence, Litam repeatedly mentioned Marcosa as his one and only wife and never mentione Sia Khin. An impartial witness, Felipe Cruz, openly testified that he knew Litam even before he married Rivera. He further testifies that he never had any children prior to his marriage to Rivera. On the other hand, the evidence presented by Tam et al was weak. They failed to present a marriage certificate which proves the alleged marriage between Litam and Khin. Furthermore, they only presented Luis Litam, the youngest among 8 siblings. The court wonders why the other 6 siblings were not presented to corroborate Luis’s testimony. To make things worse, the birth certificates of the petitioners state they had different fathers all born in different places in China. The name of the mothers on their birth certificates weren’t even consistent. Therefore, the Supreme Court rules that the petitioners are not the heirs of Rafael Litam. And that his only heir was his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera.

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The Tams attempted to prove that Rafael Litam was guilt of Bigamy. The Court was not persuaded since their allegations were highly improbable. They essentially assert that Litam was able to keep his other marriage unknown for the past 30 years despite being openly regarded by the community in Malabon Rizal as the husband of Marcosa Rivera. The proofs which the Tams adduced were not enough since the court took into consideration that they were in effect accusing Litam of a grave offense which would have soiled his honor. Furthermore, the court took into consideration the admission made by Litam during his lifetime which were against his own interest. In Spec. Pro.. 1537, he admitted that he and his wife adopted a system of Separation of Property. That his wife obtained all of the properties with her separate and exclusive money. He even admitted to having stolen money from his wife after the second world war ended. It was established that at the time Rivera married Litam, the former was already rich, having been born into a rich family. The latter on the other hand was poor, that he had to borrow money from Rivera and that he had not contributed any amount or labor to the properties acquired by his surviving wife. Before Rivera became incompetent, it was also established that she had been administering the properties to the exclusion of Litam. She leased these properties alone. THE TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF RIVERA STATES “MARCOSA RIVERA, MARRIED TO RAFAEL LITAM”. THAT PHRASE ONLY DESCRIBES RIVERA’S CIVIL STATUS. IF IT WERE WRITTEN

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MARCOSA RIVERA AND RAFAEL LITAM, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONJUGAL PROPERTY. The allegations of the petitioners are simply not supported by evidence.

DECISION : The Supreme Court affirms the assailed decision.

Salas v Aguila “Statement of Personal Circumstances” Facts : 1. On September 1985, Salas and Aguila married each other. On June 1986, they bore a child and named her Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left the conjugal home and never, since then he never communicated with his wife or his daughter. 2. On October 2003, Salas filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage citing Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity) as legal basis. The petition states that “they had no conjugal properties whatsoever”. 3. The RTC rendered its decision in May 2007 declaring the nullity of their marriage. 4. Aguila discovered that there were two parcels of land in Tondo, and Quezon registered under Juan Salas and Rubina Salas. She filed a manifestation and motion stating the same. The notice was returned unserved stating that RTS refused to receive. At the RTC

1. Salas filed a manifestation with entry of appearance requesting entry of judgment of the RTC decision since no MR or appeal was filed. 2. Trial ensued. During the hearing, Aguila testified that someone had informed her about the “discovered properties” 3. Salas contends that there were no conjugal properties to be partitioned based on her petition so in effect she waived her rights over these discovered properties. 4. The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila and directed both parties to partition the Quezon and Tondo properties. The RTC held that even upon the entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court may still liquidate conjugal properties pursuant to the ROC. 5. Rubina filed a complaint in interventions stating that she was a widow and was not married to Salas. She referred to herself as Rubina Cortes. She alleged that the discovered properties are her paraphernal properties, that Juan Salas did not contribute to the acquisition of said properties since he had no permanent job in Japan. And that it was her brother who registered the properties in the name of “Juan Salas, married to Rubina Salas”. This was said to be an error since Rubina’s brother were not well versed with the legalities of registration. 6. The RTC still denied this motion for reconsideration on the ground that it is not capable of going beyond what the TCT says. It held that Juan and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the title which says that they were married to each other. At the CA

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Affirmed the RTC decision finding that Aguila did not have knowledge about the subject properties when she filed the petition. Also disallowed Rubina Cortres from interfering in the case.

At the Supreme Court -

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Held that Salas’ and Rubina’s contention that the subject properties are owned solely by Rubina is unmeritorious. The TCT states that Juan Salas, married to Rubina is the registered owner of the property in question. The phrase “married to” is simply descriptive of the owner’s civil status. Since Rubina failed to prove that she had legal interests over the lands, she is precluded from intervening. Article 147 states that properties acquired during the subsistence of a common law marriage raises the presumption that the said properties were acquired through the joint efforts of the common law spouses. Their relations are to be governed by the rules of co ownership.

Decision : The order of the RTC and CA ordering the partition of the disputed properties should be sustained on the grounds of co – ownership and not on CGP.

Boromeo v Descallar “Statement of Personal Circumstances” Facts :

1. Wilhem Jambrich arrived in the Phils. In 1983 after he was assigned by his employer Simmering Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian Company. 2. He met Antonietta Descallar at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended her and asked her to tutor him in English. He was brought to a squatter area somewhere in Gororodo where she taught Jambcrich. 3. The both of them fell in love (they did not marry each other). They bought a house situated in Agro – Macro Subdivision somewhere in Madaue City. A deed of absolute sale was executed including both Jambrich and Antonietta as buyers. 4. When they tried to register the lands under their names, the Register of Deeds only included Antonietta’s name since Jambrich, being an alien was precluded from owning Filipino lands under the Constitution. 5. Jambrich adopted Antonietta’s two sons through Special Proceedings. 6. By April 1991, both of them had already found new lovers. 7. Sometime in 1986, Jambrich met Borromeo. He procured his services to have a boat repaired. To pay for his services, Jambrich executed a Deed of Assignment transferring his interests over the Agro – Macro properties to Borromeo. At the RTC 1. Borromeo filed a complaint against Antonietta alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true intentions of the parties since respondent never spent a single centavo to acquire the Agro – Macro properties.

2. Borromeo avers that it was Jambrich who spent for everything. 3. Antonietta on the other hand avers that she was the one who spent for the properties. She says that she had a copra business and that Jambrich wasn’t allowed to hold lands in the Philippines since he was a foreigner. 4. The RTC rendered decision in favor of Borromeo stating that Antonietta couldn’t have spent for the properties since she was a mere waitress earning about 1,000 pesos per month. Her financial situation wasn’t all that well, she admitted in the DSWD report (the one used for the adoption of her two sons by Jambrich) that she was a having a tough time making ends meet. The RTC ordered Antonietta to hand the properties over to Borromeo. At the CA 1. The Court of appeals reversed the RTC decision stating that in a long line of cases, the subsequent Filipino buyer was only allowed to retain the properties they bought from foreigners when the Torrens titles were titled in the name of the foreigner. Since the titles were issued in the name of Antonietta, a Filipino, the principle in the cited cases do not apply. The SC reversed the CA decision.