Civpro Digest2.pdf

 BPI Family Savings Bank Inc vs Sps Yujuico G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015 Facts: On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261331 and TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. On June 30, 2000, the Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory on January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment on March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at ₱10, 000, 000.00. Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18, 522155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished. In the reply, respondents objected and alleged that the venue is improper. Issues: Whether or not improper venue as a ground for objection maybe raised at anytime. Whether or not a claim for deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure is a real action. Held: No. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue. No. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one. Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.

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UNITED ALLOY PHILIPINES CORPORATION, SPOUSES DAVID C. CHUA and LUTEN CHUA, Petitioners vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Respondent. G.R. No. 175949 January 30, 2017

Facts: On December 18, 2000, herein petitioner corporation, United Alloy Philippines Corporation (UNIALLOY) applied for and was granted a credit accommodation by herein respondent United Coconut Planters Bank. (UCPB) in the amount of PhP50,000,000.00, as evidenced by a Credit Agreement. Part of UNIALLOY's obligation under the Credit Agreement was secured by a Surety Agreement, dated December 18, 2000, executed by UNIALLOY Chairman, Jakob Van Der Sluis (Van Der Sluis), UNIALLOY President, David Chua and his spouse, Luten Chua (Spouses Chua), and one Yang Kim Eng (Yang). Six (6) Promissory Notes, were later executed by UNIALLOY in UCPB's favor. In addition, as part of the consideration for the credit accommodation, UNIALLOY and UCPB also entered into a "lease-purchase" contract wherein the former assured the latter that it will purchase several real properties which UCPB co-owns with the Development Bank of the Philippines. UNIALLOY failed to pay its loan obligations. As a result, UCPB filed against UNIALLOY, the spouses Chua, Yang and Van Der Sluis an action for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. UNIALLOY filed against UCPB, UCPB Vice-President Robert Chua and Van Der Sluis claiming that it holds office and conducts its business operations in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. UNIALLOY contended that Van Der Sluis, in cahoots with UCPB Vice-President Robert Chua, committed fraud, manipulation and misrepresentation to obtain the subject loan for their own benefit. UNIALLOY prayed, among others, that three (3) of the six (6) Promissory Notes it executed be annulled or reformed or that it be released from liability thereon. UNIALLOY filed with the RTC of Makati an omnibus motion praying for the suspension of the proceedings of the collection case in the said court on the ground of pendency of the certiorari petition it filed with this Court. However, the RTC denied UNIALLOY's motion in its Order dated August 19, 2002. On September 21, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed judgment denying UNIALLOY's appeal and affirming the questioned RTC Decision.

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed questioned decision when there is a pending civil action before the regional trial court of Cagayan de oro, branch 40, involving the same parties and subject matter which case, is now pending and assailed by the plaintiff-appellee via petition before the honorable supreme court.

Ruling:

The honorable court of appeals committed a serious, reversible error if not grave abuse of discretion, in denying petitioners' urgent motion for reconsideration without stating clearly and distinctly the factual and legal basis thereof. Considering that the promissory notes subject of G.R. No. 179257 are among the promissory notes which are also involved in the present case, petitioner contends that a judgment by this Court in G.R. No. 179257 that reverses the Decision of the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, which in effect would declare the nullity of the subject promissory notes, may conflict with the Decision of this Court in the present petition, which involves the collection of the sum being represented in the same promissory notes.  JELBERT B. GALICTO, PETITIONER, VS. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 EN BANC; BRION, J.: FACTS: On September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. Jelbert Galicto claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it is null and void for lack of legal basis. He asserts that EO7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President. It is contended, however, that the President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages in order to control the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives, etc. Hence, he filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of EO7. ISSUE: Was certiorari a proper remedy? HELD: No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7: Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphases ours.)