Land Tits Chap 4 For June 2 (2).docx

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 18, 2008.] SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, Represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, respondents. RESOLUTION TINGA, J p: The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles have helped stabilize land ownership in the Phi lippines. Its underlying principle is security with facility in dealing with land. 1 Its fundamental purpose is to quiet title to land, to perpetually enjoin any question in the legality of the title, 2 hence, the titles issued under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system is imperfect in that it remains susceptibl e to fraud, either in the original registration proceedings or in subsequent transactions. 3 These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices relating to the attempts at registration of the subject property. Nec essarily, they call for the correct application of entrenched principles in land registration. At the same time, they afford this Court the opportunity to again defend the Torrens system against unscrupulous elements who use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to exert judicial might in ensuring that fraud does not prevail in the end. These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the Special First Division which had initially ruled on them, most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12 December 2005. 4 They were accepted by the Court en banc in a Resolution dated 26 July 2006. Subsequently, the parties presented their various contentions before the Court in an oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the submission of their respective memoranda. While the cases were under consideration of the Court en banc, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General was required, 5 and a set of new parties was allowed leave to intervene. 6 The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005 Decision, but are summarized herein for convenience. On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that office, which were destroyed as a consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze on specific property registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in a nu mber of cases since then. 7 These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the most contentious of those cases thus far. Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition 8 with the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of Homer Barque. They allege d that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner's duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property. Learning of the Barques' petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT -22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et al. They further alleged that the Barque title was spurious. A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both the Barques' and the Manotoks' titles advert to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated in the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The Barque title actually involves two parcels of land as part of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title concerns only one parcel of land, but with a similar area of 342,945 square meters. On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA, denied 9 the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that: xxx xxx xxx 1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 37 2302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991; 2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997. CAaDSI xxx xxx xxx The Barques' motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order 10 dated 10 February 1998; hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA. The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further found anomalies in the Manotoks' title. It observed that: Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT No. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's duplicat e copy of TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . . The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 21017 7 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 . . . . It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely con form to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate . . . as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28 -37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands . . . . It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory . . . . CacEIS It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property

in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Se ction, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos . . . confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical R ecords and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . . xxx xxx xxx The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3 168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Loc ator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Official Receipt . . . . The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the cust odian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. . . . Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that on ly the Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the Manotok title as a Torrens title. It thus ruled, 11 that: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction. SO ORDERED. The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the Barques with a prayer that the reconstitution be ordered immediately. The LRA denied 12 the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration and the Barques' prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques' petition for review 13 was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks' petition for review 14 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Manotoks argued in their own petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the Manotok ti tle was spurious and fake.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to intervene. 15 She sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the subject property. CTacSE On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 16 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, denying the Barques' petition and affirming the LRA Resolution. The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration. 17 Subsequently, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision 18dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that: WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners' valid, genuine and existin g Certificate of Title No. T-210177. 19 The Manotoks filed a motion for the reconsideration of the amended decision in CA -G.R. SP No. 66700, but this was denied. 20 On the other hand, as to the Manotoks' petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 21 on 29 October 2003 which affirmed the resolution of the LRA. 22 The appellate court held that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the Barques' petition for reconstitution, since there was as yet no final judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title. The Barques fi led a motion for reconsideration of this ruling. 23 As had occurred with the Barques' petition, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the Barques' motion for recons ideration and on 24 February 2004, promulgated its Amended Decision 24 wherein it held that: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT -22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177. Aggrieved with the twin decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, both ordering the cancellation of the Manotok title, the Manotoks filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively. On 2 August 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 162605 with G.R. No. 162335. 25 On 12 December 2005, the Court's First Division rendered its Decision 26 affirming the two decisions of the Court of Appeals. 27 The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court's First Division denied in a Resolution dated 19 April 2006. 28 Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration attached. The Court denied the same in a Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further ordered that entry of judgment be made. 29 Thus on 2 May 2006, entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment. 30 The Barques filed multiple motions with the Court's First Division concerning the execution of the judgment, including a Moti on for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For Execution. 31 In response, the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division referred these cases to the Court en banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution accepting the cases. 32 On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. 33 Movants alleged that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605 was owned by them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks were no t as old as they were purported to be. 34 The Director of the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) recommended to the Director of the LMB that: . . . steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481(372302) and all its derivative titles so that the land covered may be reverted to the State. 35

Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in these cases, directing the O SG to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments were eventually held on 24 July 2007. TDSICH After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the Solicitor General to submit their respecti ve memoranda. I As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are attended by a few procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court en banc's move on the Special First Division's referral for re-evaluation of these petitions when an entry of judgment had already been made in favor of the Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus within the Court en banc was to proceed with the re-evaluation of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in such rare manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings by the First Division and the Special First Division warranted either affirmation or modification by the Court acting en banc. It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc". It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts which implement that system do not deserve needless hassle. The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before had sanctioned the recall entries of judgment. 36 The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final. 37 The militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the field. It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved to accept these petitions in 2006, we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Court's First Division, as well as the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of th at same Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide. II In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercis e the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRA's position, but ultimately, upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the r econstitution of the Barque title. Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the cancellation of Torrens titles in the Philippines. To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the cancellation of the Manotok title eve n as it mandated the reconstitution of the Barque title. The obvious question is whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks. It could not. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [. . . and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law". 38 Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over owners hip of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. 39 Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques' and the Manotoks' petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction 40 over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens titl e in the first place.

Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for the government and its agencies including the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a certificate of title. I t invokes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC under Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein . . . ." That the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over actions seeking the cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of examples in jurisprudence . Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation of "exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC ", there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we can perhaps assess such law separat ely from B.P. Blg. 129. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, as follows: SEC. 6. General Functions. — (1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions: (a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuan ce by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title; (b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission; (c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds; (d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Court of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands;

(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor; (f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered byP.D. No. 957. Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles . Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to e nsure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.

Commented [P1]: LRA and CA had no jurisdiction to cancel Manotok title

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative reconstitution of the Barque title. Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of titles have been lost due to "flood, fire and other force majeure". The petitioner in such a case is required to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments: AEIHaS

Commented [P2]: Reconstitution of title

(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is still pending a ccomplishment; (2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional alterations or erasures; (3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its ge nuineness or due execution or issuance; (4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed; (5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the Assessor's Office; and (6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution. 41 Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, further provides: Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate of title , after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the pr ocedure prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be f ollowed with respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof. 42 Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states: Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than two years but not exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court. Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a decision allowing reconstitution in favor of a ny person not entitled thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One hundred thou sand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 43 These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued to its owner. 44 The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 45 which we held that "[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that ar e already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners". 46 That such doctrine was established for cases of judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of administrative reconstitution. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or to diminish its legal effect. Even assuming that the pre viously issued title is obviously fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the courts, and not with the LRA. If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official records that the subject property is already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not there is a previously existing title coveri ng that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competin g claims over the property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by t he OSG on behalf of the Republic. cSTDIC III The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 47 where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the "fatal infirmities" of Molina's cause of

Commented [P3]: SolG- the corrective recourse lies with the RTC If petition for reconstitution is filed with LRA and it appears that subject property is already covered by existing title in the name of another person, there is nothing further LRA can do but DISMISS THE PETITION

ctaction, the Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques' petition.

The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary because in that case the trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for reconstitution of Molina's titles . Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the Court of Appeals would have then reviewed the trial court's decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct resolution which was the annulment of Molina's titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil action ofcertiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these alternative results — the more prudent recourse of directing the trial court to act on the notices of appeal and to forward the case records to the Court of Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process and the Court itself by directly annulling Molina's titles.

Commented [P4]: ORTIGAS CASE cannot be applied

The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the Manotok title with that undertaken by the Court in Or tigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competen ce to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRA's ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional defects that attended the actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive au thority. IV The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious and according ly sanctioned its cancellation, even though no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial court. That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our earlier explanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA from inquiring into the validity of that title. ASIDTa Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to have ruled definitively on the validity of the Barques' claim to title. A fter all, since neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation of the Manotok title, any declaration that th e Barque claim was valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best for this Court to test the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record before the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task. The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900. 48 The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the name of Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name of Manotok Realty , Inc. 49 This detracts from the Barques' claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the anomaly. The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence b etween the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing, 50 nor did the LMB have a record of the plan. 51 However, a microfilm copy of FLS3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital Region (DENRNCR). 52 The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from its office. 53

Commented [P5]: Barque claims that they bought the land from Setosta under TCT 13900 However TCT 13900 is registered under Manotok This retracts from Barque’s claim that Manotok have no title to the property Barque failed to explain this

Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Secto r. 54 The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it was a forged document. 55 To amplify the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove that 33333it did not come from its office. 56 In a letter to the administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that "it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC for in vestigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your administration". 57IEaCDH There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Esta te as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR. 58 The DENR-confirmed technical description reads: Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Payatas Estate; on the SE., by Tuazon Estate; along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 818; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate. 59 However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are critical changes with respect to the boundaries named therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in the subdivision plan would read: Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Diez Francisco; on the SE., by Diez Francisco; along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 826; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate. 60 The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the subdivision plan it relies on and the DENR record . They also do not contradict the finding of the National Archives that there is no copy in its files of the deed of sale allegedly executed bet ween Setosta and Barque. 61 Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA dated 23 August 2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out that the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line falls outside Quezon City". This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the boundaries of Quezon City. 62 A similar finding was made by the Land Management Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate. 63 These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques' claim of ownership is exceedingly weak. V In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind eye on the evidence and points raised again st the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in the Manotoks’ claim are considerable and disturbing enough. The Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the integrity of the land registration system of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective as they are of a scourge this Court is dedicated to eliminate.

Commented [P6]: Error of CA and LRA in acknowledging right of Barque to seek reconstitution BARQUES CLAIM IS WEAK Discrepancies between technical description relied on by Barques and technical description of DENR No case files of deed of sale between Setosta and Barque Lot falls outside of QC and the Piedad Estate is within QC

Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention of Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG seeking that it initiate cancellation/reversion proc eedings against the Manotok title. That petition was referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the Manotok titl e, through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000. 64 Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Roseller S. dela Peña a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering that query through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the Manotoks could not have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. 65 The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point that it is not visually discer nible what year the same was issued. More crucially, a certification was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January 2000 stating thus:

Commented [P7]: Flaws in Manahan title

After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it appears that the documents leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found from the files of this Office. 66 These findings were twice verified with due diligence and reconfirmed by the DENR, according to Undersecretary dela Peña. 67 TIADCc The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in conducting the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales certificates and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the purported predecessors -in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and Felicisimo Villanueva — certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded that the said documents "could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be". 68

According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City a Deed of Con veyance for registration and mandatory issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of Conveyance was referred to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001. Also on record 69 is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate dated 5 July 1989, authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, La nd Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), NCR-North Sector and addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No. 823 had actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginnin g in 1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was issued Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated: Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was issued to Valentin Manahan as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman Manahan as (Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 23, 1974. Based on my research at the Land Management Bureau (LMB), Central Office, it appears that original claimant of lot 823 was Valentin Manahan. 70 All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks' claim dissuade us from being simply content in reflexively dismissing th e administrative petition for reconstitution filed by the Barques. Indeed, we have to take further action. VI The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent in the Manotok title is the fact that we are not engaged in the review of an original action for the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the questionable title were now properly at issue, the Court would without hesitancy rule on such question. Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed warrants more deliberation. The conservative approach would be to still affirm the continuing validity of the Manotok title until the proper case for its can cellation is filed with the regional trial court. Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse for us is to direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. However, it is already apparent, following the evaluation of these cases, that there is eviden ce — unrefuted thus far — indicating that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques. Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, 71 the subject property therein had originally formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the administrative reconstitution of the title to the property, lea ding Alonso to file a complaint for nullification of such title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property. Alonso's comp laint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending with this Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment on the validity o f Cebu Country Club's administratively reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Cebu Country Club had not been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its decision declared "that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines". The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in Alonso, 72 extensively discussed why it had taken that extraordinary step even though the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, had not participated or intervened in that case b efore the lower courts. It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act. xxx xxx xxx It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private property. Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded to prove their claim of ownership over the subject property. xxx xxx xxx Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron -clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation o f the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unles s therein expressly provided, is founded on "the great principle of public

Commented [P8]: How the court will proceed since this is not an original action for cancellation of title Commented [P9]: Conservative approach: just affirm validity of Manotok title until a cancellation is filed in RTC Commented [P10]: Alonso approach respondent to prove acquisition of title by clear and convincing evidence Prescription cannot be invoked Declaration that friar land belongs to the government does not amount to reversion without due process

policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence o f the officers or agents to whose care they are confided." DEAaIS xxx xxx xxx Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law insofar as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a Friar Land and both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of the State or that it had become private property. 73 The Alonso approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all. At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Man otok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks' claim to title is flawed . To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function. The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before — in Republic v. Court of Appeals 74 and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals. 75 Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case: Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The deleg ate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision. The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence. In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'o pen spaces' and/or 'areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus , resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure. The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive ev idence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. T he commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of r eference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. 76 The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in receiving and evaluating evidence should be whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. On that evidence, this Court may ultimately decide whether annulment of the Manotok title is warranted, similar to the annulment of the Cebu Country Club titl e in Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the respective claims to title by other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they may submit on their behalf, may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would thus be prudent , in assuring the accurate evaluation of the question, to allow said parties, along with the OSG, to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. If the final evidence on record definitively reveals the proper claimant to the subject property, the Court would take such fact into consideration as it adjudicates final relief.

For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a repo rt on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice of this Resolution. To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the Office of the Solicitor General is directed to se cure all the pertinent relevant records from the Land Management Bureau and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and submit the same to the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the Court's First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7 November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA -G.R. SP No. 66700, and the Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TcSICH The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this Resolution. ||| (Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, [December 18, 2008], 595 PHIL 87 -264)

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. L-21703-04. August 31, 1966.] MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners-appellants, vs. MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent-appellee. Harold M. Hernando for petitioners-appellants. Rafael Ruiz for respondent-appellee. DECISION REYES, J.B.L., J p: Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L.R.C. Rec. No. 1188, and 42 L. R. C. Rec. No. 1194, denying petitioners' motion to compel respondent to surrender their owners' duplicates of Original Ce rtificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066, as well as from a subsequent order of the same court, refusing, upon petitioners' motion, to reconsider the first order o f denial. The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered own ers of several parcels of land, to wit: Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161 and also Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940. On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed in the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title above referred to. Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale (not recorded) from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation of these disputed lots. After due hearing on this incident, the court a quo issued, on 20 December 1962, the writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos. 15891 and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the other lots cover ed by both titles. Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of possession. Subsequently, petitioners in the above stated cadastral cases, as plaintiffs, commenced, on 15 January 1963, before the same court of first instance, a n ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659. Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the complaint and pleade d a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots, alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession, i. e., he is their (plaintiffs') coowner, he having bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one- third (1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots. Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented, on 25 February 1963, in the cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed this motion. The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the merits by it. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order to a motion for reconsid eration, but without success; hence, the present appeal. Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court, contending that, since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or value, and moral damages, these lots are not in litigation in this ordinary civil case, and that since respondent had already raised the issue of ownership and possession of these lots in his opposition to the (petitioners') mot ion for issuance of writ of possession and, despite this opposition, the court a quo granted the writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent is barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case, under the principle of res judicata. On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintain that, having pleaded a counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said Civil Case No. 3659, the trial court correctly held that these lots are subjects of litigation in this ordinary civil case. He also maintains that petitioners not having impleaded their brother, Francisco H. Reyes, or his heirs as parties in their motion for issuance of writ of execution, and because these hei rs have not intervened in this particular incident, the writ of possession issued by the trial court is, at most, valid only with respect to their (petitioners') undivided two-third (2/3) share and participation in these disputed lots; hence, he concludes that he is not barred and estopped from raising the issue of ownership and possession of the undivided one-third (1/3) share and participation of petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, which share respondent allegedly bought from the latter. In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter argument of respondent-appellee by showing that they previously obtained special authority from the heirs of their deceased brother to represent them in the proceedings had in the court below. The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee has a better right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title. While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects in litigation in 'Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant therein, had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid and plausible reason t o justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has already held that: the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereof. Thus this Court said: "Como acertadamente dijo el Jusgado, lo unico que se suscita es si Ana Umbao de Carpio tiene derecho a la posesion del duplic ado para al dueño del Certificado de Titulo Original No. 698, con preferencia a la opositora-apelante. A nuestro juicio, la solucion es clara a includible. Hallandose admitido que el decreto final que se dicto en el expediente catastral en 28 de mayo de 1936, en relacion con el lote No. 778, fue a fa vor de Ana Umbao y que el duplicado para el dueño del Certificado de Titulo Original No. 698 se expidito por el Registrado de Titulos a favor de la misma, es obvio que quien tiene derecho a poseer el certificado de titulo es ella y no la apelante (art. 41 de la Ley No. 496, tal como ha sido reformado) "Alega la apelante que ella tiene tanto derecho como is apelada a poseer el titulo porque el terreno a que se refiere es de la prepiedad de laa tres hermanas. La pretencion no es meritoria. Segun el articulo 41 de la Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido enmendado, el duplicado par a el dueño debe expedirse por el Registrador a numbre de la personala cuyo favor se ha decretado el terreno y dispone, además que dicho duplicado debe entregarsele

al dueno inscrito. Si la apelante cree que tiene derecho a participar en el lote No. 778, como coheredera, debe e jercitar una accion independiente, encaminada a obtener su participacion." (El Director de Terrenos contra Abacahin, 72 Phil. 326) It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to recover his alleged co -owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected, and considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In view of the above consideration, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the merits of the second contention of petitioners -appellants. WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from should be, as they are hereby, reversed and in accordance with this opinion, respondent Mateo Raval Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners the owners' duplicate of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066. With costs against respondent appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes. ||| (Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-21703-04, [August 31, 1966], 124 PHIL 521-527)

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004.] Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J p: Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first registr ant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest ti tle. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision 2 and the July 22, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows: “WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original DECISION of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and an other one is entered AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from, as follows: “1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful owner and with better right to possess the property in question, being an innocent purchaser for value therefor; “2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to [Petitioner -] Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit: As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera: 1. P300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual damages; 2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; 3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 4. P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and 5. Cost of suit. As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo: 1. P50,000.00 as moral damages; 2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3. P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; 4. Cost of suit.” 4 The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. The Facts Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows: “As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial court: ‘On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees. ‘On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name. ‘Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996. ‘On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo]. ‘On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera . . . Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name. ‘On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question u ntil the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.’ 5 “Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania]. “After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999 , awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, . . . Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorney’s fee s. “Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].” 6 Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Commented [P11]: RTC decision:Awarded propeprty to Sps. Villafania was ordered to pay damages

In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one a nd hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera. 7 Since Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected. 8 Hence, this Petition. 9

Commented [P12]: CA decision Sale to de vera was void Ownership was already transferred to Salazar and cavego Dismissed appeal of abrigo, no basis for damages CA amended decision De vera is purchaser in good faith and for value

Issues Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below: “1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid. “2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a purchaser for value in good faith. “3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in questi on.” 10 In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property. The Court’s Ruling The Petition is bereft of merit. Main Issue: Better Right over the Property Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to he r. 11 They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. 12 Law on Double Sale The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the di sputed property to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent Romana de Vera. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus: “Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. “Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. “Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.” Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good f aith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. 13 There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system. This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 14 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument — except a will — purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration . 15 Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons. 16 In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (TignoSalazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344. 17 For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system 18 because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property. 19 Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras: “. . . If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 . . .” 20 We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P 30522. 21 The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name. 22 As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to respondent. Soriano v. Heirs of Magali 23 held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the “priority in time” principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act

Commented [P13]: SC RULING As to who has better right over property Civil code—if the same thing is sold to different vendees, ownership shall be transferred to the one who have first recorded it in registry of property; or was the first in possession; one who possesses the oldest title This is in accord to Sec 51 PD 1529 which provides that no deed purporting to convey the registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration Thus if sale is not registered, it is binding only between seller and buyer De Vera contends that her registration under Torrens system should prevail over Sps Abigo who recorded theirs under ACT 3344 –that land under LRA and the sale is not registered in LRA, sale is not considered registered bind the land SC-registration must be done in the proper registry in order to

3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the Torr ens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo. Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo 25 explained the difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise: IcaHTA “Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. “The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals 26 is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered underAct No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, 27 this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was regi stered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. “Applying this principle, . . . the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.” 28 Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once reg istered, serves as a notice to the whole world. 29 All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 30 Good-Faith Requirement We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. 31 Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration. 32 We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals, 33 which we quote:

Commented [P14]: SC held that execution sale in favor of DE VERA has no effect bcs the land no longer belonged to Villafania at the time of the sale De vera cannot argue that they were misled bcs the Torrens titles one registered serves as notice to the whole world

“Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘(t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) — from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.’” 34 (Italics supplied)

As to good faith requirement—prior registration of disputed property by 2nd buyer does not by itself confer ownership, there mus be good faith Knowledge gained by 1st buyer of the 2nd sale cannot defeat 1st buyers right except if 2nd buyer registers in good faith Knowledge of 2nd buyer of 1st sale defeats his rights even if he first registered

Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. 35Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title. 36 Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale. 37

Registration by first buyer under ART 3344 can have the effect of contructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as buyer in good faith but this does not apply if there is Torrens title

Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 38 petitioners contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent and negates her good faith at the time she registered the sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C. Vitug: “The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26 December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992). xxx xxx xxx “Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (seeCarumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138).” 39 (Emphasis supplied) Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales, 40 which held: “Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On accou nt of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names . . .” 41 Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from the issuance of the TCT in their names.42 There was no registration under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land. 43 Such registration was therefore considered effectual.

Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not register the sale. 44 In Taguba, registration was not an issue. 45 As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case. We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein: "The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981)," 46

Respondent in Good Faith The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value. 47 After its factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained thus: “. . . Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Vera’s vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which wa rrant [Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her vendor’s title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contra ry evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bou ght the same, and only then when she bought the same, and only then when she brought an ejectment case with the . . . Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land is registered in the nam e of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. . . .” 48 We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the property, she would have found petitioners to be in possession. 49 This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses’ own admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the property. 50 The family members may reasonably be assumed to be Villafania’s agents, who had not been shown to have notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus, goo d faith on respondent’s part stands. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. AScHCD SO ORDERED. ||| (Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, G.R. No. 154409, [June 21, 2004], 476 PHIL 641-659)

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 185091. August 9, 2010.] 2:45 P.M. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OF LIPA CITY (FOR PANINSINGIN PRIMARY SCHOOL),petitioner, vs. PRIMO MENDOZA and MARIA LUCERO, respondents. DECISION ABAD, J p: This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the Government for its failure to acquire ownership of a privately owned property that it had long used as a school site and to pay just compensation for it. The Facts and the Case Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410. 1 On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows: Lot 1 — 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga; Lot 2 — 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas; Lot 3 — 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and Lot 4 — 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa. 2 As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. 3 Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property. IaESCH The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-declared. 4 The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled. On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. 5 When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. 6 On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republic's immunity from suit. 7 The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republic's cons ent was not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it. 8

Commented [P15]: Municipal trial court- dismissed, Republic is immune from suit Appeal to RTC- ruled that consent was not necessary since the action was not against the state

In light of the RTC's decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before it. 9 The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. 10 Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, 11 which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. 12 Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 2001 -0236. On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of owners hip of the land in its favor. 13 PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa Cit y for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes. 14

Commented [P16]: RTC remanded to MTCC-dismissed case for insufficiency of evidence RTC- on appeal, in favor of Mendoza, ordered PPS to vacate; Mendoza had the better right as registered owners

In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. 15 Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas' registered title and the imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republic's possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into owner ship. DIEcHa The CA also rejected the Republic's claim of ownership since it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in f avor of the government. Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the governmen t's favor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas' title. The C A held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action. With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Issue Presented The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from t he subject property that it had used for a public school. The Court's Ruling A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice. 16 Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. 17 No one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. 18 Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.

Commented [P17]: WON Mendoza is entitled to evict the Republic from the property that it had used as a school

Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas' title over the property has not been disputed. While the consolidation a nd subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the Repu blic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957. 19 That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas' title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. 20 Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership. 21 The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but nev er got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas' formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. aHICDc The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, 22 the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitut es a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas' remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment . In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court affirmed the RTC's power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in a n ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is set tled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. 24 Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate th e Mendozas' right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation. WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza's action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just compensation against the Republic of t he Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa. SO ORDERED. ||| (Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 185091, [August 9, 2010], 641 PHIL 562-569)

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.] HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, as guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, and ARMINIO RIVERA,defendants-appellees. [G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956] IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM. GREGORIO DY TAM, petitioner-appellant, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, in her capacity as judicial guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, counter-petitioner, ARMINIO RIVERA, administratorappellee. Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar for appellants. De Los Santos & De los Santos and E. L. Gonzales for appellees. SYLLABUS 1.PATERNITY AND FILIATION; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH STATUS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BARS CLAIM TO SHARE IN THE ESTATE. — Appellants claims that they are the children of the decedent by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with S.K.; that during the subsistence of the marriage, the decedent had contracted in 1922 another marriage with M.R.; that as heirs, they are entitled to the decedent's one-half share in the properties acquired during the second marriage. Held: The various official and public docu ments executed by the decedent himself convincingly shows that he had not contracted marriage with any person other than M.R., and that he had no child. Thus in mar riage certificate it was clearly stated that he was single when he married M.R. in 1922; in the sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950, he declared under oath that no child; and in several other documents executed by him and presented in evidence he had consistent ly referred to M. R. alone his wife; he had never mentioned S. K. as his wife, or their alleged children. On the other hand, appellants did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of the decedent and their mother, which is the best evidence of the alleged marriage; or gave any explan ation for the nonpresentation thereof or of its loss neither have they presented any competent secondary evidence of the supposed marriage. Th e finding, therefore, of the lower court that the appellants are not heirs of the decedent is correct. 2.HUSBAND AND WIFE; PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE PRESUMED CONJUGAL; PRESUMPTION, HOW OVERCOME. — The evidence shows that the properties in questions were brought by the wife with her separate and exclusive money, although during her marriage with the decedents; that the spouse had adopted a system of separation of properties; that the wife had been administering said properties, to the exclusion of her husband; and that said properties were registered in her name. Thus, the disputable presumption of law that properties acquired during marriage are conjugal properties has been overcome. 3.EVIDENCE; DECLARATION AND ADMISSION AGAINST OWN INTEREST; PERSON BOUND THEREBY. — The decedent had acknowledged the fact that he had obtained from his wife sums of money which belongs exc lusively to the latter and had not been paid to her up to the present. He also acknowledged that he had not given any money to his wife and that they have actually adopted a system of sep aration of property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other. These declarations and admission of fact made by the decedent against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well. 4.DAMAGES; WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY NOT BE SENTENCED TO PAY. — The complaint in question contains nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the defendants-appellees. On the contrary, it may be surmised from said pleading that the defendant spouse had no knowledge of the alleged previous marriage of the decedent. Moreover, there was no showing that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith. Hence, the latter should not b e sentenced to pay damages. 5.SUCCESSION; DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP; NOT PROPER IN CIVIL CASE. — The declaration of heirship is improper in a civil case it being within the exclusive competence of the court in a Special proceedings.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J p: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the above entitled case, which were jointly tried. On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537 of said court, entitled "In the matter of the Intesta te Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam". The petition therein filed, dated April 24, 1952, states that petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; that the deceased was survived by: Li Hong Hap40 years Li Ho37 years Gregorio Dy Tam33 years Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho29 years Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian27 years Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee25 years William Litam alias Li Bun Hua23 years Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin22 years that the foregoing children of the decedent "by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, now deceased"; that "af ter the death of Rafael Litam, petitioner and his co-heirs came to know" that the decedent had, during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin, "contracted in 1922 in the Philippines . . . another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, Filipino citizen"; that "the decedent left as his property among others, his one-half (1/2) share valued at P65,000 in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera, which . . . partnership consisted of t he following real property acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera, to wit: (1)"Three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of P ampanga: (2)"One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Bulacan." and that the decedent had left neither a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that, after appropriate proceedings, le tters of administration be issued to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the decedent". Soon thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed a counter- petition: (1) substantially denying the alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin, as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; (2) asse rting that the properties described herein are her paraphernal properties, and that the decedent had left unpaid debts, and certain properties in Bulan and Casiguran, Sorsogon,

Commented [P18]: Facts: Gregorio Tam filed this petition stating that he is the son of Rafael Litam. That they came to know that Litam contracted marriage in the Phils with Rivera, left property in the conjugal properties with Rivera Rivera denied the alleged mariiage, asserted that the properties were hers and that Litam had unpaid debts and prayed that Arminio Rivera be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of Litam

and in Virac, Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock in a private corporation known by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; and (3) praying that her nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased. In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera , who assumed his duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the latter filed, on November 29, 1952, a motion for the removal of Rivera as administrator of the aforementioned estate. This led to a number of incidents hinging on the question whether said properties belong in common to the decedent and Marcosa Rivera or to the latter exclusively. Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and Arminio Rivera. In said complaint, plaintiffs therein reproduced substantially the allegations made in the aforementioned petition of Gregorio Dy Ta m dated April 24. 1952, except that the properties acquired "during the existence of marriage" between Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera "and/or with their joint e fforts during the time that they lived as husband and wife" were said to be more than those specified in said petition, namely: "(1)3 parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Titl e No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, issued on July 29, 1947; "(2)2 Parcels of land, together with all buildings and improvements thereon except those expressly noted in the title as belonging t o other persons, situated in the Municipality of Navotas, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on October 4, 1938; "(3)1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on June 12, 1933; "(4)1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-Badia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21809 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on May 25, 1939; "(5)1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-16049) situated in Barrio of Quibadia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on April 9, 1943; "Other properties are located in Bataan province. "All properties total an assessed value of approximately P150,000.00." In said complaint, plaintiffs prayed that the judgment be rendered: "(1)declaring the aforesaid properties as belonging to the conjugal partnership or tenancy in common which existed between the deceased Rafael Litam and the incompetent Marcosa Rivera; "(2)ordering the defendants to deliver the aforesaid properties to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Li tam (Rule 75, section 2, Rules of Court); "(3)ordering the said defendants further to render an accounting of the fruits they collected from the aforesaid properties a nd to deliver the same to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam;

"(4)ordering the said defendants to pay the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam damages in double the val ue of the fruits mentioned in the preceding paragraph which they embezzled; and "(5)ordering the defendants to pay the costs. "The plaintiffs further pray for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises." In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in effect, the allegations in her counter -petition, dated July 12, 1952, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, and set up some affirmative and special defenses, as well as a counter-claim for attorney's fees and damages in the aggregate sum of P110,000.00. Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No. 2071 and in the aforementioned incidents in Special Proceeding No. 1537, both were jointly heard. Later on, the court rendered a decision. "(1)Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs against the plaintiffs; "(2)Sentencing the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071, under the defendants' counterclaim, to pay jointly and severally each of the defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages; "(3)Declaring that the properties in question, namely: the fishponds, consisting of three parcels, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer certificate of Title No. 1228 of the land records of Pampanga, one -half undivided portion of the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Navotas, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, the parcel of la nd with the improvements thereon situated in Malabon, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248, both of the land records of Rizal, and the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the land records of Bulacan, are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera; and "(4)Declaring that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 (who are the same persons alleged to be children of R afael Litam in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, filed by the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537) are not the children of the deceased Rafael Litam, and that hi s only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera." The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by the petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071. The issues for determination are: (1) Are appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question, or do the same constitute a common property of her and the decedent? The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants herein. In this connection, the lower court had the following to say: ". . . the evidence weikhs very heavily in favor of the theory of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 to the effect that th e said deceased Rafael Litam was not married to Sia Khin and that plaintiffs, are not the children of the said decedent. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 have utterly failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin .

"It appears from the evidence presented by the defendants in civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and the counter-petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that there was no such marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that the plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not children of said deceased. The various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly show that he had not contracted any marriage with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no child. In the marriage certificate, (Exhibit 55) it was clearly stated that he was single when he married Marcosa Rivera on June 10, 1922. In the sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950 (Exhibit 1), Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child. In the several other documents executed by him and presented in evidence, (Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A) Rafael Litam had consistently referred to Marcosa Rivera alone as his wife; he had never mentioned of Sia Khin as his wife, or of his alleged children. The witnesses presented by the defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and counter petitioner in Sp. Proc. No . 1537 positively testified to the effect that they know that Rafael Litam did not have any child, nor was he married wit h Sia Khin. An impartial and disinterested witness, Felipe Cruz, likewise testified that he has known Rafael Litam even before his marriage with Marcosa Rivera and that said Rafael Litam did not have any child. "On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 presented in support of their theory the testimony of their lone witness, Luis Litam, and certain documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that the said plaintiffs and said petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificateof Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the opinion of the Court, is the competent and best evidence of the alleged marriage between them. No explanation has been given for the non-presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there been any showing of its loss. Neither have said plaintiffs and said petitioner presented any competent secondary evidence of the supposed marriage. "The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam, cannot be given any credence and value at all. His testimony is mostly hearsay, as according to him, he was merely informed by Rafael Litam of the latter's supposed marriage with Sia Khin. His testimony is uncorroborat ed. The court noticed that the said witness was only 22 years old when he testified, and it appears in the petition filed by the petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that said witness is the youngest of all the alleged eight children of Rafael Litam. The Court is at a loss to understand why one or some of the older alleged children of Rafael Litam were not presented as witnesses in view of the unreliable testimony of Luis Litam, and considering that older persons ar e better qualified to testify on the matters sought to be proved which allegedly happened a long time ago. "The birth certificate presented by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071 and petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 cannot be given even little consideration, because the name of the father of the children appearing therein is not Rafael Litam, but different persons. I t is very significant to note that the names of the father of the persons appearing in said birth certificates are Dy Tham, Li Tam, Lee Tham, Rafael Dy Tam, and that said persons were born in different places, some in Amoy, China, another Fukien, China, and the other in Li mtao, China. It also appears in said birth certificates that the children's mothers named therein are different, some being Sia Khim, others Sia Quien, the other Sia Khun, and still another Sia Kian. These documents do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father. Besides, it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof. "The other documentary evidence presented by the said plaintiffs and petitioner are entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and the alleged statue of the plaintiffs as children of said decedent. "It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that the plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not heirs of the said decedent, his only heir being his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera." (Emphasis ours.) The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from are borne out by th e records and the conclusion drawn from said facts is, to our mind, substantially correct. Appellants' evidence on this point consists of the testimony of appellant Li Bun Lin, who said that he is, also known as Luis Litam; that his coappellants are his brothers and sisters; that their parents are the decedent and Sia Khin, who were married in China in 1911; and that Sia Khin d ied in Manila during the Japanese occupation. He likewise, identified several pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which were claimed to be family portraits, but the lower court rejected their admission in evidence. Although we agree with herein appellants that this was an error, it is clea r to us that said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence adverted to in the above-quoted portion of the decision appealed from, are far from sufficient to outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of the appellees. It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married Marcosa Rivera in 1922. In the very petit ion of appellant Gregorio Dy Tam, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952, he alleged that Marcosa Rivera is "the surviving spouse of the decedent". In their complaint in Civil Case No. 2071, appellants specifically admitted and averred "the existence of the marriage between said Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera" — which would have been void ab initio, and, hence, inexistent legally, if appellants' pretense were true or they believed it to be so — and that they had "lived as husband and wife". Again, although Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his aforementioned petition, that he and his co -heirs "came to know" about the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa Rivera "after the death of Rafael Litam", the very testimony of Li Bun Lin, as witness f or the appellants, show, beyond doubt, that said appellants knew, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam that he and Marcosa Rivera were living in Malabo n, Rizal, openly and publicly, as husband and wife, and regarded her as his lawful wife. Indeed, in the course of his testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to her as his "mother". In other words, aside from the circumstance that the wedding and marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is undispute d, it is, also, an established fact that they had the general reputation of being legally married and were so regarded by the community and by appellants herein, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam.

Upon the other hand, appellants maintain, in effect, that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of bigamy; that he had, lik ewise, willfully and maliciously falsified public and official documents; and that, although appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Mar cosa Rivera — whom appellants knew — resided only a few kilometers away, in Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending to his business in Manila, the decedent had succeeded, for about thirty (30) years, in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his all eged relations with the other. Apart from the highly improbable nature of the last part of appellants' pretense, it is obvious that the same can not be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not only because it entails the commission by Rafael Litam of grave crimin al offenses which are derogatory to his honor, but, also, because death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most effective means of defe nse. The proof for appellants herein does not satisfy such requirement. As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence thereon was analyzed by the lower court in the following language: "It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought by Marcosa Rivera with her separate and excl usive money. The fishponds situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the fishponds situated in Navotas, Rizal with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, and the property situated in Hulong -Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 were all purchased by Marcosa Rivera with the money she earned and accumulated while she was still single; while the fishponds situated in Macabebe, Pampanga with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 were purcha sed by her with the money she inherited from her late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money she received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry s he inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera and her sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties in question, having been bought by Marcosa Rivera, although during her marriage with

Rafael Litam, with her exclusive and separate money, said properties are undeniably her paraphernal properties. (Art. 1396, Spanish Civil Code, which is the same as Art. 148 of the Civil Code of the Phil.) "Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence, vis: Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 19, 46 and 46 -A, presented by the defendants, in Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and counter- petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, which prove beyond peradventure of any doubt that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. In Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under his oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the fishponds in Obando, Bulacan was her exclusive and separate money which was earned by her while she was still single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, both dated June 16, 1947, sameRafael Litam, also under oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00 and P10,000.00 loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and Juliana Pascual, and to Juliana Pascual, respectively , are the separate and exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which money Rafael Litam had no interest whatsoever. In Exhibit 19, same Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact that he had obtained, before the outbreak of the second world war, from Marcosa Rivera the sum of P135,000.00 which belongs exclusively to the latter, and that after the liberation, or more specifically, on January 4, 1946, he stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of P62,000.00, also belonging exclusively to the latter, which amounts, totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of interests, have not, according to the evidence, been paid to her up to the present. In Exhibits 46 and 46-A, it was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that he had not given any money to his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that they haveactually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other. These declarations and admission of fact made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs and succes sors in interests and third persons as well. (Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court). "The finding of this Court that the properties in question are paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, having been bought by her with her separate and exclusive money, is further strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she was already rich, she having already earned and saved money as 'consignataria' while she was still single. It also appears that she was born of a rich family, her father, Eduardo Rivera, being the owner of fishponds, commercial and residential lands and buildings, (Exhibits 5 to 18, inclusive), with an assessed value of around P150,000.00 (Exhibits 25 and 42, inclusive), now worth approximately a million p esos, and most of which properties as may be seen from the certificates of title were acquired by him way back in the years 1916 and 1919. When Eduardo Rivera died on February 5, 1942, his cash and jewelry were inherited by his eldest daughter, Rafaela Rivera, and when the latter died single on July 2, 1943, Marcosa Rivera inherited her cash amounting to P150,000.00, Philippine currency, and and her pieces of jewelry. It is with this amount and with the pr oceeds of the sale of some of said pieces of jewelry that Marcosa Rivera purchased the fishponds in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga. "On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when Rafael Litam was on June 10, 1922, married to Marcosa Rivera, he wa s poor. He had to borrow from Marcosa Rivera, the sum of P135,000.00 belonging exclusively to her before the outbreak of the war, and to steal from her further sum of P62,000.00 after the liberation (Exhibit 10). The said amounts totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of the stipulated interests, according to the evidence, have not been paid to Marcosa Rivera up to the present. Rafael Litam did not contribute any amount of money or labor to the properties in question, as he and Marcosa Rivera maintained an absolute separation of property (Exhibits 46 and 46-A). Besides, during his lifetime he used to go his office in Manila everyday. "Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question belong exclusively to Marcosa Rivera is the established fact that before she became incompetent sometime in the early part of the year, 1953, she had been administering said properties, to the exclusion of Rafael Litam. In fact, as may be seen from the very documentary evidence (Exhibit 'EE', same as Nxh. 50) presented by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 themselves and petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, she alone leased the properties in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and the corresponding lease contract, dated July 13, 1948 was signed by her as lessor and by Rafael Suarez, Jr. as lessees. Furthermore, the properties in question have been declared in the name of Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone pays the real estate taxes due thereon. (Exhibits 43, 44 & 45.) "Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of 'Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam.' This circumstance indicates that the properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words 'married to Rafael Litam' written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properti es covered by said titles. "On the other hand, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 in support of their contention that the properties in question are conjugal is, in the mind of the Court, very weak, unreliable, and mostly incompetent, and cannot overcome the clear, convincing and almost conclusive proofs presented by the opposite party. Scant or no consideration at all could be given by the Court to the immaterial, incompetent and unbelievable testimonies of the witnesses presented by the said plaintiffs and petitioners. The d isputable presumption of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties, upon which legal presumption said plaintiffs and petitioner mainly rely has been decisively overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of evidence adduced in these cases that the properties in quest ion are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera." (Emphasis ours.) Appellants' counsel assail the decision appealed from upon the ground that the lower court had been partial to the appellees and had not accorded to the appellants a fair and just hearing. As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have been, and should have been, more liberal in the reception of evide nce. Appellants' witnesses (Li Bun Lin, Dominador Gadi, Benigno Musni and Rafael B. Suarez) should have been allowed to testif y on the alleged title of Rafael Litam to certain properties and on his alleged reasons for the language used in the public and official documents relied upon by the a ppellees. However, it is apparent to us that said evidence cannot affect the decision in these cases. The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would have depended mainly upon their individual appraisal of certai n facts, upon their respectiveinferences therefrom and their biases or view points, and upon a number of other factors affecting their credibility. At best, said testimony could not possibly prevail over the repeated admissions made by the decedent against his own interest in Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted to in the abovequoted portion of the decision appealed from), which admissions are corroborated by the fact that the deceased father of Marcosa Rivera was well to do; that aside from her share in his estate, she had, likewise, inherited from a sister who died single and witho ut issue; that the lands in dispute were registered, and some were, also, leased, in her name, instead of hers and that of the decedent; and that the latter lived in her house in Malabon, Rizal.

Appellants contend that the transactions covered by said Exhibits 19, 21 to 23 and 46 and 46-A, as well as by the other deeds referred to in the decision appealed from, were caused to be made in the name of Marcosa Rivera, to the exclusion of her husband, in order t o evade the constitutional provision disqualifying foreigners from the acquisition of private agricultural lands, except by succession. Apart from being based, solely, upon a surmise, without any evidentiary support, this pretense is refuted by the fact that said residential property in Hulon g-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, was acquired on April 12, 1933, or prior to the adoption of our Constitution (see Exhibits Z and AA). Her transactions subsequently thereto, merely followed, therefore, the pattern of her activities before the drafting of said fundamental law.

Commented [P19]: “Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Lim” merely a circumstance describing Rivera’s civil status

This notwithstanding, we do not believe that appellants should be sentenced to pay damages. The petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 contain nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the herein appellees. On the contrary, it may be surmised from said pleadings that Marcosa Rivera had no knowledge of the alleged previous marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin. Moreover, the records do not show that appellants have acted in bad faith. Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of th e court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project o f partition. Wherefore, with the elimination of the award for damages in favor of the herein appellees, and of said declar ation of heirship, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellants. It is so ordered. ||| (Litam v. Espiritu, G.R. Nos. L-7644-45, [November 27, 1956], 100 PHIL 364-378)

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 202370. September 23, 2013.] JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., petitioner, vs. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J p: The Case This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the 16 March 2012 Decision 2 and the 28 June 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed the 26 September 2008 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 787. The Facts On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicat ed with Aguila or their daughter. On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever." 5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff narrated that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the petition. 6 On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any." 8 IASTDE On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion 9 stating that she discovered: (a) two 200-square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properti es"). The registered owner of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas' notice of hearing was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused to Receive." On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance 10 requesting for an Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal property was involved. On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguila's manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and the state prosecutor present. D uring the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone informed her of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas' common-law wife. 11 On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation 12 alleging that there is no conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguila's petition. According to Salas, Aguila's statement was a judicial admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas cl aimed that Aguila waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in fav or of Aguila, to wit: (1) parcels of land with improvements located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Sama niego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to P200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX (collectively, "Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deeme d partitioned. cHaDIA

Commented [P20]: Salas and Aguila were married on 1985. Five months after Aguila gave birth, Salas left their conjugal dwelling and never communicated with them since then. 2003 Aguila filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on grounds of psychological incapacity and stated that they have no conjugal properties 2007 RTC declared nullity of the marriage and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains if any Aguila discovered properties registered to a Juan Salas married to Rubina Salas Salas then filed for manifestation of entry of appearance, opposed and alleged that there is no conjugal property to be partitioned. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to discovered property and that he also waived some properties in favor of Aguila. Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned RTC RULED in favor of Aguila

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed to partition between th emselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following properties, without prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jissel le Aguila Salas: (1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San Bart olome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as Exhibit "A" and its improvements; (2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497 marked as Exhibit "B" and its improvements; (3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas located in Tondo and covered by TCT N o. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its improvements. Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by the parties, and such partition, together with the Order of the Court confirming t he same, shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds of the place in which the property is situated. SO ORDERED. 13 The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, 14 even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RT C found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties. ETHaDC On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute money to purchase the Discovered Propertie s as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal documentation, he registered the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to correc t the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed. Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.

Commented [P21]: RTC in favor of Aguila That court can proceed with adjudication of property if it ha not ben adjudicated yet as in this case RTC also found out that the discovered properties are part of the conjugal properties and that Salas failed to prove the existence of the waived properties Salas appealed to CA: CA affirmed RTC

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. 15 The CA ruled that Aguila's statement in her petition is not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 o r before the promulgation of the RTC decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be unfair to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she made the admission. The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the opportunity to r efute Aguila's allegations in her manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina cannot collaterally attack a c ertificate of title. In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012, 16 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration 17 filed by Salas. Hence, this petition. The Issues Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution: DEAaIS 1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision ordering the partition of the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N -259299-A and N255497 in Quezon City and as well as the property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent. 2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision in not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in this case. 18 The Ruling of the Court The petition lacks merit. Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it first mak es a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership. 19 Thus, the settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action. 20 Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. 21 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila's petition stating that they had no conjugal property, they actuall y acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during thei r marriage: A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case. These are the following: (1) TCT No. T-65876 — a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan Jiselle A. Salas, single; (2) TCT No. T-68066 — a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr. Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement) listed in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008. Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. . . . . Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name of [Aguila], certified true copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption that properties registered in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes. 22 On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas' name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguila's marriage. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during the marriage is a factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, par ticularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us, except under compelling circumstances not present in this case. 24 On Salas' allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of Aguila's manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his opposi tion to the manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal.ADCIca On both Salas and Rubina's contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorio us. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. 25 The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina's statement that she owns the Discovered Properties. Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the pa rties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action." 27 In Diño v. Diño, 28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in t his case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. CDHaET Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

Commented [P22]: RUING OF SC As to ownership of properties—the party making an allegation has the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence. Salas alleged that they had no conjugal properties, that they actually acquired the Wiaved Properties during marriage. But RTC and CA held that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage On allegation that Salas was not accorded due process— Salas was given opportunity to be heard when he filed his opposition manifestation, which is the essence of due process On the contention that Rubina owns the discovered properties—the TCT states that “Juan Salas, married to Rubina Salas” as registered owner. The phares “Married to” is merely descriptive of the civil stats of the registered owner. (further Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the disputed properties) Court also mentioned Art 147 of CC stating that when a man and a woman who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by rules of co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they love together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts and shall be owned by them in equal share. SALAS did not rebut this presumption. Where ground for nullity is psychological incapacity, the properties will be governed by co-ownership. So RTC and CA ruling is still sustained but not on the basis of conjugal partnership but of co-ownership

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co -ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belo ng to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all ca ses, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied) Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple's joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. 29 In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. 30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. HIaTCc WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 16 March 2012 and the Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. SO ORDERED. ||| (Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, [September 23, 2013], 718 PHIL 274-285)

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.] CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, respondent. DECISION PUNO, C.J p: What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the Torrens system? CaAIES The facts are as follows: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer, Simmering -Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Co rporation. There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children, respondent agree d. The tutorials were held in Antonietta's residence at a squatters' area in Gorordo Avenue. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, th ey transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 1 and March 10, 1986 2 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 3 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Ja mbrich's name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent's signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 2479 2 over the properties were issued in respondent's name alone. Jambrich also formally adopted respondent's two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, 4 and per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988. 5 However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent's sons for only two months after the break up. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business. He also buil t and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro -Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment". 6 On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Co urt of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true a greement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the propertie s using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor. IcSEAH In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single ce ntavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question", and th at Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property with money fr om a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G. In its decision, the court a quo found —

Commented [P23]: FACTS: (Borromeo v Descallar) Jambrich and Austrian fell inlove with Descallar, a separated mother of 2. They decided to live together in a rented house first. Then later transferred to a subdivision with their own house and lot. In the deed of absolute sale, the name of Jambrich was erased because he was an alien and this prohibited from owning land in the Phils. The deed of absolute sale and the TCT was issued in Descallar’s name Jambrich also adopted Descallars sons By 1991 the love birds were already separated and had different partners Jambrich became indebted to Borromeo. To pay for his debt he sold his right and interests in the Agro-Macro Properties to Borromeo When Borromeo sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the lots have been transferred to Descallar, and is already mortgaged Borromeo now filed in RTC for recovery of property against Descallar He alleged that the sale to Jambrich and Descallar of the properties do not reflect the true agreement bcs Descallra did not pay anything , that Jambrich was the one who pad and that Jambrich was the real owner. That he acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the sale made to him by Jambrich Descallar denied this, claimed that she was the one who paid for the properties bcs JAmbrich was an alien and therefore was prohibited to own properties here

Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich's financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed. 7 xxx xxx xxx On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she wa s only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] s quatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered her a bet ter life which she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child Study R eport dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children. 8 IDAESH This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband. 9 xxx xxx xxx The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 198 5 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and

Commented [P24]: Trial court held that Jambrich capacity to acquire and purchase the property was undisputed Meanwhile Descallar’s capability to acquire was improbable and impossible since she was working as a waitress earning 1k per month as salary and is living in a squatter’s area BORROMEO WAS DECLARED OWNER with ownership of Jambrich as basis

exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, swe etness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was stil l going smoothly and harmoniously. 10 [Emphasis supplied.] The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by: 1)Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land des ignated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue Cit y; 2)Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Re gister of Deeds of Mandaue City; 3)Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in t he name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo; 4)Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I", "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to convey rights and inte rests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar; ATSIED 5)Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount o f P10,000.00; and, 6)To pay the costs. 11 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, 12 the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held: We disagree with the lower court's conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower court and similar ca ses decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al. vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. 13

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner assigns the following errors: I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH'S PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT. II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE). 14 HTScEI First, who purchased the subject properties? The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employe d at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almos t one year where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00. On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre -trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings . She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report 15 submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondent's two sons by Jambrich disclosed that: Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 19 84. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich w ho later offered her a decent place for herself and her children. 16 The DSWD Home Study Report 17 further disclosed that: [Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly the chil dren who were malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place. He told Antoniett a that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children. 18 aSTECA

Commented [P25]: Descallar appealed to CA CA reversed the trial court decision—Jambric could not have transferred ownership of the property bcs title was in Dascallar’s name

Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon: (1)Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer. (2)The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent. (3)In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where she was completely under the support of Jambrich. (4)Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to respondent. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law. Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple's cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. 19 In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. 20 DcaCSE Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed hou se and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of responden t? It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the prope rty. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, 23 and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. 24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. 25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich. Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, 26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, 27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 28 The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transf erred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain". Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law expl icitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former n atural-born citizen. 29 Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen . In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases 31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cur ed and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.: [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of re spondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respon dent to pay petitioner P25,000 as attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit. DScTaC

We affirm the Regional Trial Court. The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, 32 is this — since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful t he acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protect ed. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN -1148 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. ||| (Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, [February 24, 2009], 599 PHIL 332-346)

Commented [P26]: SC DECISION The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without benefit of marriage but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply Descallar was still married when she and Jambrich started living together thus no co-ownership exist Presumption of co-ownership does not apply, what is necessary is for each of them to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property to be able to claim any part of property As to the possession of Certificate of title of Descallar is not a source of right, it does not make Descallar automatically the owner Rule o indefeasibility of title does not apply to respondent—cert of title implies that the title is quiet and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible (exception) when the transferee is not holder in good faith and did not acquire the properties for valuable consideration In the instant case, Descallar did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of properties, she has no income nor savings at the time As to the ownership of Jambrich—it would have been declared invalid if challenged had not Jambrich conveyed it to a Filipino --the acquisition of Borromeo cured the flaw in the original sale to Jambrich Ordered the cancellation of TCT of Descallar

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 108547. February 3, 1997.] FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, MARYJANE CABRERA and FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGILIA ORAIS DE FELICIO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ERNESTO M. ORAIS, respondents. Belo Gozon & Elma for petitioners. Ramirez, Corro & Associates for private respondents. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; INDEFEASIBILITY OF THE TORRENS TITLE; A DEFENSE WHICH DOES NOT EXTEND TO A TRANSFEREE WHO HAS NOTICE OF A FLAW IN THE TITLE. — As can be discerned from the established facts, the Certificates of Title of the vendees Orais are, to say the least, irregular, and were issued in a calculated move to deprive Felicidad Teokemian of her dominical rights over the pr operty reserved to her by descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the part reserved to Felicidad Teokemian, as this was not among those ceded in the Deed of Sale bet ween Daniel/Albertana Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that registration does not vest title, it is merely eviden ce of such title over a particular property. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 335). The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. (Anonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113739, May 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 28). The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuan ce of the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82220, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 162). 2. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE; PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION; REQUIREMENTS. — In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 330, we observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property , since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the rig ht to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possessi on of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and det ermine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. As it is, befor e the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a) the trustee had performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounti ng to an ouster of the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to thecestui que trust, and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACHES; DEFINED. — Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right with in a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE; RATIONALE. — The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not concern ed merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay. This Court emphasized in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, G.R. No. L-9335, October 31, 1956, 100 Phil 277, the reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in w hich there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties has to change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable power s in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property Regi stration Decree), no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to laches. As we have stated earlier in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession (37 years) the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. 5. ID.; ID.; CO-OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF AN HEIR AS CO-OWNER OF THE PROPERTY. — In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270, this Court ruled that the heirs, as co-owners, shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An heir may therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in i ts enjoyment, except when the personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co -owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J p: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993 in CA -G.R. No. 22407-CV, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering defendants Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera to vacate the portion of Lot 2238 occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff. SO ORDERED." Reversed by the foregoing pronouncements was the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baganga, Davao Oriental in Civil Case No. 379, an action for "Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages with Preliminary Injunction." The trial court's disposition reads: "WHEREFORE, the plaintiff is hereby ordered: (a) To execute a reconveyance within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final and executory in favor of defen dant Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera corresponding only to that portion of Lot No. 2239 actually and physically possessed and occupied by the defendant as seen from the sketch

plan of Engr. Enecio Magno (Exh. '2') and pinpointed and identified during the ocular investigation as to its extent and boundaries of the said portion bought by defendants Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera from Felicidad Teokemian; (b) To reimburse defendants for litigation expenses and attorney's fees in the amount of P7,000.00; and (c) To pay the cost. SO ORDERED." We are restating the facts as determined by the appellate court, viz: "On January 16, 1950, a Deed of Sale (Exh. B) was executed by Daniel Teokemian and Albertana Teokemian in favor of Andres Ora is over a parcel of unregistered land situated at Abejod, Cateel, Davao Oriental with an area described as 7.3720 hectares. The property was owned in common by Daniel and Albertana and their sister Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the same from their late father, Domingo Teokemian. Howe ver, the Deed of Sale was not signed by Felicidad, although her name was printed therein as one of the vendors. On January 26, 1950, the parcel of land was surveyed in the name of Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee Andres Orais, and denominated as Lot No. 2239, PLS -287, Cateel Cadastre. As surveyed, the property had an area of 11.1000 hectares. On June 24, 1957, Virgilia Orais was issued Free Patent No. V-79089. Original Certificate of Title No. P-10908 was issued in her name (Exh. A). On July 27, 1972, Alberto (sic Albertana) Teokemian executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Elano Cabrera, husband of Felicidad Cabrera, 'ONE HALF PORTION OF LOT NO. 2239, Cad-287, eastern portion, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TEN (55,510) SQUARE METERS, more or less' (Exh. 3), which portion supposedly corresponded to the one-third share in Lot 2239 of Felicidad Teokemian who was not a party to the Deed of Sale earlier executed by her brother and sister in favor of Andres Orais, Virgilia Orais' predeces sor-in-interest. It was explained by Felicidad Cabrera that the Deed of Sale was signed by Albertana Teokemian, not by Felicidad Teokemian, because t he whole of Lot 2239 was adjudicated to Albertana in a decision of a cadastral court dated June 8, 1965 as evidenc ed by a Certification of an officer-in-charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 7, Baganga, Davao Oriental (Exh. 4). Felicidad Cabrera and her husband immediately took possessi on of the western portion of Lot 2239. In 1974 and 1978, Virgilia Orais' brothers, Rodolfo and Jimmy Orais went to Cateel, Davao Oriental and confronted the Cabreras of the latter's alleged encroachment and illegal occupation of their sister's land, but no concrete action on the matter was pursued by Virgilia Orai s until February 11, 1988 when she filed Civil Case No. 379 against Felicidad Cabrera, now a widow, and her daughter Maryjane Cabrera for 'Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.'

The complaint, which was amended on June 22, 1988 by including Felicidad Teokemian as party defendant (pp. 42-47, Records), alleged that sometime in 1972 and 1973 the late Elano Cabrera and defendant Felicidad Cabrera, knowing that Lot 2239 was already registered in the name of the plaintiff, prepared a document of sale and had Felicidad Teokemian sign it conveying a portion of said lot to them as described in the Ske tch Map (Annex D of the Complaint), after which they entered and possessed said portion and enjoyed the fruits thereon. Plaintiff f urther averred that by reason of the document of sale and the declaration of the property involved in the name of defendant Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera, there creat ed a cloud of doubt on the former's title on said property. cdtai Plaintiff prayed as follows: 'WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff through the undersigned counsel respectfully prays this Honorable Court that: a) After due notice and hearing, a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued restraining the defendants from further di spossessing the plaintiff of the land in question; b) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly the plaintiff the amount of not less than Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred (P16,200) as to tal value of the rice produced from the riceland in question, and the amount of Twenty One Thousand Six Hundred (P21,600.00) Pesos as the total proceeds of the nuts of the coconut land in question; c) The Defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as litigation expenses; d) The defendants be ordered to pay Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos for attorneys fees; Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos as expenses for every appearance in Court; e) The document of sale executed by Felicidad Teokemian and the Tax Declarations issued to the late Elano Cabrera and Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera and the subsequent Tax Declaration creating a cloud of doubt on the title, possession, rights and interest be declared null a nd void for being fraudulent and without any legal basis and inexistent; and f) Such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just, proper, and equitable in the premises.' In their answer with counterclaim (pp. 10-18, Records), defendants alleged that they acquired a portion of Lot 2239 in good faith and for value; that said portion was owned by Felicidad Teokemian who was not a party to the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel and Albertana Teokemian o n January 16, 1950 in favor of Andres Orais over Lot 2239; that not having signed the Deed of Sale, Felicidad Teokemian's one-third share in Lot 2239 could not have been legally conveyed to Andres Orais; that Virgilia Orais (successor-in-interest of Andres Orais) committed fraud in including the portion owned by Felicidad Teokemian in her applying for free patent over Lot 2239 is concerned pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil Code; and that plaintiff is guilty of laches for not initiating an action against defendants to recover the western portion of Lot 2239 despite plaintiff's knowledge of defendant 's acquisition thereof in 1972, as in fact it was only in 1988 when the complaint for quieting of title was filed in court. Defendants prayed, thus: "WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and hearing on the merits of this case; to issue order or orde rs; 1. Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal owner of that portion which was sold to them by Felicidad Teokemian and which was included in the title of plaintiff;

2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and that they have personal knowledge of the same when the plaintiff filed and secured the title under the Administrative Proceeding; 3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion only in an implied trust in favor of the real owner; 4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation of the portion at their expense and deliver formally the said portio n to the real owners, the defendants; 5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any instrument or document to final ly vest in the Defendants absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the portion which the plaintiff holds title in trust in defendant's favor; 6. To Order the Plaintiff to pay actual damages in the sum of P2,000.00 as litigation expense and Atto rney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 in favor of defendants; 7. To direct the plaintiff to account for the share of the real owner of the portion of land illegally cultivated and planted by plaintiff to rice in favor of FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN to be paid thru the Defendants who are the owners, which consisted in ONE THIRD OF THE RICE HARVEST every year since the year 1950 to 1972 when the portion was sold and cultivated by defendant based on the computation of income by the p laintiff in Paragraph 16, a paragraph in the Second Cause of Action of the complaint; and to grant the defendants such other reliefs and remedies proper and equitable in the premises." 3 On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, rul ing that the latter can no longer recover the western portion of Lot 2239 conveyed in 1972 by Felicidad Teokemian in favor of the late Elano Cabrera and Felicidad Cabrera due to laches. In support of its findings, the trial court referred to the Court's pronouncements in Lola vs. Court of Appeals, 4 where it was held that although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the petitioners, because admittedly, the title to the subject lot was still registered in the name of the respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to the respondent's failure to asser t her claim and ownership for thirty-two years; and in Republic vs. Court of Appeals 5 that, while it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property; and in Miguel vs. Catalino, 6 that even granting appellant's proposition that no prescription lies against their fathers' recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than thirty four years justifies the defendant appellee in set ting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. The respondent Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal. Even as the appellate court observed that the registration made by the plaintiff was fraudulent insofar as it involved the on e-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian, which was not included in the sale executed by Albertana and Daniel Teokemian, it nevertheless upheld its effects, on the justifi cation that the defendants' action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred by prescription. Furthermore, the action of the plaintiff is not barred by laches, as was held by the lower court. Said the appellate court: "We disagree with the lower court's ruling that plaintiff is barred from bringing an action for recovery of ownership. Parent hetically, while the complaint filed by plaintiff is designated as one for quieting of title, the allegations therein show that it is actually for recovery of ownership/possession. First. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 27, 1972 (Exh. 3) executed by Albertana Teokemian in favor of Elcano Cabrera over the portion of 55,510 square meters of Lot 2238 which allegedly pertained to the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian did not convey any title to Elcano Cabrera, assuming that Felicidad Teokemian still owned a one-third portion of Lot 2238 which was already registered in plaintiff's name, considering that Albertana did not have any authority from Felicidad Teokemian to effect such conveyance. Consequently, defendants Felicidad v da. De Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera had acquired no title upon which to anchor their claim of ownership over the one-third portion. Such being the case, plaintiffs cannot be barred by laches from instituting the action to quiet title against defendants. xxx xxx xxx Second. There was no allegation, much less proof, that Lot 2239 had been partitioned among the co-owners Daniel, Albertana, and Felicidad, all surnamed Teokemian, before the land was sold to Andres Orais in 1950 when the same was still unregistered. This being the cas e, and assuming that Felicidad Teokemian had retained ownership over an undivided one-third portion of Lot 2239 despite its being titled in plaintiff's name in 1958, Felicidad Teokemian could only dispose her undivided interest, not a definite portion described in the Deed of S ale executed on July 27, 1972 (Exh. 3) as "eastern part". Worse, the supposed vendee, Elcano Cabrera, and her successors-in-interest, defendants Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera, occupied the western portion of Lot 2239, not the eastern portion which was the subject of the sale. Their occupation of a definite portion of an undivided property, without any color of title, could not have ripened into ownership on the principle of laches. Third. As testified to by Jimmy Orais, plaintiff's brother, it was only in 1974 when plaintiff came to know that her property was occupied by Elcano Cabrera. According to Jimmy, he and his elder brother Dr. Rodolfo Orais went to the house of Elcano Cabrera three times in 19 74 and in 1979 complaining of the latter's occupancy of their sister's property. Jimmy further declared that after Elcano Cabrera was shown plaintiff's title to the p roperty, Elcano Cabrera proposed a relocation survey of the area to determine whether the premises occupied by him were included in the plaintiff's title (T.S.N. pp. 39-44, January 3, 1989). It appears, however, that nothing came out of the proposal to conduct a relocation survey. From the tim e plaintiff became aware of Cabrera's possession of the western portion of Lot 2239, which was in 1974, up to the time she instituted the action for quieting of title in 1988, only fourteen (14) years had elapsed. This case, therefore, has no congruency with those cases where the Supreme Court ruled that the registered owner is barred by laches from recovering his property. Thus, in Lola vs. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA 439), the petitioners acquired title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due, according to the Supreme Court, to respondent's 'fai lure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years.' In Miguel vs. Catalino (26 SCRA 234), the Supreme Court said that appellant's 'passivity and inaction for mo re than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his behalf.' In Mejia vs. Gampomana (100 Phil. 277), it was held that 'the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and title thereto fro m the defendant has by the long period of 37 years and by the patentee's inaction and neglect been converted into a stale demand.'

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by t he exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 32 SCRA 29). Since imprescriptibility is one of the basic features of a Torrens title, it is not an ordinary delay in asserting one's right that will give rise to the application of the principle of laches, otherwise, registered title can e asily be defeated by prescription. This is precisely the reason why, in the cases cited, the delay or inaction by the registered owners in asserting their rights was considered unreasonable and unexplained because it took them from 32 to 37 years to do so. In contrast, the delay in the case at bar was only fourtee n years.

While possession of defendants Felicidad vda. De Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera could not have ripened into ownership as already discussed, they are possessors in good faith of the portion occupied by them and, therefore, entitled to the benefits accorded by the Civil Code as such." 7 Sisters Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera, together with Felicidad Teokemian are now before the Court as Petitioners in this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking relief from the respondent court's decision, assigning as errors the following: A RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT FILED IN 1988 FOR QUIETING OF TITLE WHICH ACTUALLY IS ONE FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION AS FOUND BY RESPONDENT COURT IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES BECAUSE: 1. A PERIOD OF 30 YEARS HAD ELAPSED FROM 1958 WHEN TORRENS TITLE WAS ISSUED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO 1988 WHEN HER COMPLAINT BELOW WAS FILED DURING WHICH PERIOD OF TIME THE PROPERTY HAS BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL OWNER, FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN, FROM 1958, OR EVEN EARLIER IN 1941 WHEN SHE INHERITED THE PROPERTY, TO 1972 WHEN SHE SOLD IT TO THE CABRERAS WHO CONTINUED THE PRIOR POSSESSION UNTIL 1988 WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT WAS FILED. 2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO RESPONDENT COURT'S HOLDING THAT ONLY 14 YEARS HAD ELAPSED COUNTED FROM 1974 WHEN CABRERAS' POSSESSION WAS QUESTIONED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S BROTHERS, STILL THAT PERIOD CONSTITUTES LACHES. B RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LACHES DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE WHAT WAS SOLD TO THE CABRERAS WAS A DEFINITE PORTION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY BEFORE PARTITION, HENCE, VOID AND THAT ALBERTANA TEOKEMIAN WHO SIGNED THE DOCUMENT OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE CABRERAS HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM HER SISTER-CO-OWNER FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN TO EXECUTE THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE. 8 The bone of the petitioners' contention rests on the alleged waiver of the plaintiff to recover any interest she had in the o ne-third portion of the property inherited by Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian from their late father, Domingo, due to the long period of time which lapsed from the time the plaintiff's title was registered until the action for quieting of title was instituted. We find merit in the petition. At the outset, it must be observed that the Certificate of Title of the plaintiff, which was derived from Free Patent No. V-79089, issued in the name of Virgilia Orais, leaves much to be desired in propriety, considering that the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel and Albertana Te okemian, on one hand and Andres Orais on the other, did not bear the signature of Felicidad Teokemian, and therefore, did not cover the latter's share. It was the respondent appellate court which observed that "the registration of the plaintiff's title over the subject propert y was fraudulent insofar as it involved the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian who did not sign the Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiff's predecessor -in-interest and, therefore, the latter held that portion as a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil Code." 9 Needless to state, these conclusions, being matters of fact, are entitled to our full affirmation, since they are congruent w ith the findings of the trial court, thus: "It would seem from the facts of the case that the basis of the right of plaintiff over the land in litigation specifically L ot No. 2239 now titled in the name of the plaintiff, located at Buayahon, Abejod, Cateel, Davao Oriental, proceeded from the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel Teokemian and Albertana Teokemian on January 16, 1950 acknowledged before Judge Proserador Danao as Notary Ex Oficio. Taking a hard look over the aforesaid deed of sale (Exh. "B") the said document apparently included the third heir of Domingo Teokemian Felicidad Teokemian because her name was typewritten toget her with her sister Albertana and brother Daniel all surnamed Teokemian in the said document. Again this fact will come to mind t hat the vendee Andres Orais was anticipating at the time Felicidad Teokemian will also sell her share in this portion of land (Lot No. 2239) which at the time of the sale it was still unregistered land. The non-signing of Felicidad Teokemian over her typewritten name in this deed of sale (Exh. "B") will attest to the fact that she did not sell her share in the lot in question. After this sale the vendee Orais through his encargado Melecio Capilitan and later Servillano Abarca immediately took possession of the two third portion of said parcel of land respecting the third portion owned by Felicidad Teokemian." 10 However, the appellate court stated further that nonetheless, the plaintiff's attempt to recover the property is justified be cause defendant Felicidad Teokemian's own action for reconveyance has already been barred by prescription, 11 which is the same as stating that the very tardiness of the plaintiff in pursuing the present action for reconveyance of the subject property has rendered the defendants' defense nugatory, and has made the fortr ess of the plaintiff's case impregnable. cdtai This conclusion is incorrect. As can be discerned from the established facts, the Certificates of Title of the vendees Orais are, to say the least, irregular, and were issued in a calculated move to deprive Felicidad Teokemian of her dominical rights over the property reserved to her by descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the part reserved to Felicidad Teokemian, as this was not among those ceded in the Deed of Sale between Daniel/Albertana Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals) 12 The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with n otice of a flaw in his title. (Añonuevo vs. Court of Appeals) 13 The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals)14 Be that as it may, that the right of the defendants for reconveyance of the subject property arising from an implied trust un der Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiff, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiff's action. In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, 15 we observed that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property , since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possessi on of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and det ermine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that (a) the trustee has performed unequi vocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive. 16 In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian, and thereafter, the Cabreras were in actual possession of the property since it was left to Felicidad Teokemian by her father in 1941, which possession had not been interrupted, despite the sale of the two-third portion thereof to the plaintiff in 1950, and the latter's procurement of a Certificate of Title over the subject property in 1957. Until the institution of the present action in 1988, plaintiff, likewise, had not displayed any unequivocal act of repudiation, which could be considered as an assertion of adverse interest from the defendants, which satisfies the above-quoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the right of reconveyance on the part of the defendants, and its use as defense in the present suit, has been lost by prescription. On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting of title) of the plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is, thi rty years from the time the plaintiff's husband was able to acquire Certificate of Title covering the properties inherited by the Teokemians, and apparently includin g that portion belonging to Felicidad Teokemian. In the meantime, defendant Felicidad vda. De Cabrera and her late husband have been actively in possession of the same, tilling it, and constructing an irrigation system thereon. This must surely constitute such tardiness on the part of the plaintiff co nstituting the basis for laches.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 17 The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be ba rred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not con cerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay. 18 This Court emphasized in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 19 the reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which ther e has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties has to change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without d oing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possessio n of property by virtue of laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration Decree), no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to Laches. 20 As we have stated earlier in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession (37 years) the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has , by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community propert y, and, therefore, void, is likewise untenable. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code: "Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and even he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co ownership." In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 21 this Court ruled that the heirs, as co-owners, shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An heir may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when the personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignore d — the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio possidentis). Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the portion subject matter in the ins tant case on the ground that their right has been lost by laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: "As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil 320 [1923]). This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his gran tor in the partition of the things owned in common (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil 528 [1909]). . . . For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: 'No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." 22 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE. The decis ion of the trial court dated April 27, 1989 is hereby REINSTATED in toto. SO ORDERED. ||| (Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108547, [February 3, 1997], 335 PHIL 19-36)

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 161360. October 19, 2011.] ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (Deceased) substituted by CARMEN M. TIONGCO a.k.a. CARMEN MATILDE B. TIONGCO, petitioner, vs. JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J p: Before us on appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the Court of Appeals (CA) August 28, 2003 Decision 1 which dismissed petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared's appeal and affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, of Iloilo City, dismissing petitioner's complaint for annulment of affidavit of adjudication, deeds of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), reconveyance a nd damages. Also assailed is the appellate court's November 27, 2003 Resolution 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, follow: Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and Maria Luis Tiongco. Together they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The present dispute involves three parcels of land namely, Lots 3244, 3246 and 1404, all located in Iloilo City . Lots 3244 and 1404 used to be covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 484 and 1482, respectively, in the names of Matilde (wife of Vicente Rodriguez), Jose (married to Carmen Sonora), Vicente (married to Ursula Casador), and Felipe (married to Sabina Montelibano), each in 1/4 undivided share, while Lot 3246 used to be covered by OCT No. 368 in the name of "Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco." 4 While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their children and descendants. Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and Carmelo Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco. 5 Sometime in 1965, petitioner built her house on Lot 1404 6 and sustained herself by collecting rentals from the tenants of Lots 3244 and 3246. In 1968, petitioner, as one of the heirs of Jose, filed an adverse claim affecting all the rights, interest and participation of her d eceased father on the disputed lots, but the adverse claim was annotated only on OCT No. 484 and OCT No. 1482, respectively covering Lots 3244 and 1404. 7 In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the tenants of Lots 3244 and 3246. In December 1983, respondent Jose filed a suit for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against several tenants of Lots 3244 and 3246 wherein he obtain ed a judgment in his favor. 8 Respondent Jose also filed a case for unlawful detainer with damages against petitioner as she was staying on Lot 1404. While the RTC, Branch 33, of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Jose's favor, the CA reversed the RTC's decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. 9 As such, respondent Jose never took possession of the properties. AHCETa In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, she discovered that respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit of Adjudication 10dated April 17, 1974, declaring that he is the only surviving heir of the registered owners and adjudicating unto himself Lots 3244, 3246 and 1404. Consequently, the OCTs of the aforementioned lots were cancelled, and in place thereof, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued TCT No. T-37195 for Lot 3244, TCT No. T-4665 for Lot 3246, and TCT No. T-37193 for Lot 1404, all in the name of respondent Jose. 11 Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears that on May 10, 1974, the same day when the TCTs covering Lots 3244 and 1404 were issued, respondent Jose sold the said lots to Catalino Torre. TCT Nos. T-37195 and T-37193 were thus cancelled and TCT Nos. T-37196 and T-37194 were issued in the name of Catalino Torre. 12 Similarly, the records of the Register of Deeds showed that Lot 3246 was likewise disposed of by respondent Jose. On March 30, 1979, or barely two days after obtaining TCT No. T-4665, respondent Jose sold Lot 3246 to respondent Antonio G. Doronila, Jr. who was issued TCT No. T-4666 which cancelled TCT No. T-4665. Catalino Torre also sold Lots 3244 and 1404 on the same date to Doronila who was issued the corresponding new TCTs. 13 However, just a few days later, or on April 2, 1979, Doronila sold Lot 1404 back to respondent Jose. Lots 3244 and 3246 were also sold back to respondent on January 17, 1980. 14 On October 2, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint before the court a quo against her nephew respondent Jose and respondent Antonio G. Doronila, Jr. Petitioner argued that respondent Jose knowingly and wilfully made untruthful statements in the Affidavit of Adjudication bec ause he knew that there were still other living heirs entitled to the said properties. 15 Petitioner claimed that the affidavit was null and void ab initio and as such, it did not transmit or convey any right of the original owners of the properties. Any transfer whatsoever is perforce likewise null and void. 16 Moreover, the petitioner averred that since respondent Jose executed said documents through fraud, bad faith, illegal manipulation and misrepresentati on, Lots 3244 and 1404 should be reconveyed to its original registered owners and Lot 3246 to the heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco subject to subseque nt partition among the heirs. 17 Petitioner also posited that granting for the sake of argument that the affidavit of adjudication was simply voidable, respon dent Jose became a trustee by constructive trust of the property for the benefit of the petitioner. 18 Respondent Jose, for his part, argued that the petitioner's father, Jose, was not an heir of Maria Luis de Tiongco but an hei r of Maria Cresencia de Loiz y Gonzalez vda. De Tiongco. Respondent Jose claimed that he was the only legitimate son and that while it was true that he has two other siblings, he refused to acknowledge them because they are illegitimate. 19 Respondent Jose denied that the series of sales of the properties was fraudulent. He claimed that Lot 3244 was bought by the City of Iloilo from its own auction sale for tax delinquency and was merely resold to him. Respondent Jose averred that he has been paying real property taxes on the said properties for more than ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals from Lots 3244 and 3246 only because he allowed her. 20 After trial, the Iloilo City RTC ruled in favor of respondent Jose. The court a quo ruled that prescription has set in since the complaint was filed only on October 2, 1990 or some sixteen (16) years after respondent Jose caused to be registered the affidavit of adjudication on May 10, 1974. 21 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA 22 which, however, sustained the trial court's ruling. The CA agreed with the trial court that an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. According to the CA, when an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certifi cate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. For the rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office o f the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration. 23 AECDHS Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA as aforesaid, denied petitioner's motion. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner raised the following arguments in the petition, to wit: A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO, WHO IS A LAWYER AND IS AWARE OF ITS NULLITY, IS MERELY VOIDABLE; ON THE CONTRARY, SAID

DOCUMENT IS A COMPLETE NULLITY BECAUSE RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO HAS MALICIOUSLY AND IN BAD FAITH ADJUDICATED IN FAVOR OF HIMSELF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION OVER WHICH HE, AS A LAWYER, KNOWS HE HAS NO RIGHTS WHATSOEVER AND HE ALSO KNOWS HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE PETITIONER AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST UNTIL THE PRESENT. B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT BY THE LOWER COURT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO'S AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION, BEING A TOTAL NULLITY, THE ACTION TO DECLARE SUCH NULLITY AND OF THOSE SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS ARISING FROM SAID ADJUDICATION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IN THIS CASE THE PETITIONER AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION AND RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO HAS NEVER BEEN IN POSSESSION THEREOF. 24 C. FURTHER, EVEN IF ARGUENDO, THE AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION IS VOIDABLE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS STILL ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT BY THE LOWER COURT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT, JOSE B. TIONGCO, BEING A LAWYER AND BEING AWARE OF PETITIONER'S OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION, THE SAID AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION MAKES THE RESPONDENT AN IMPLIED TRUSTEE THEREOF FOR THE PETITIONER AND THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED ON TRUST DOES NOT PRESCRIBE SO LONG AS THE BENEFICIARY LIKE THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT THEREOF, AS HELD IN THE CASE OF VDA. DE CABRERA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (267 SCRA 339). 25 The only issue in this case is who has a better right over the properties. The petition is meritorious. The Court agrees with the CA's disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) ye ars from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 26 However, there is an exception to this rule. In the case of Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Court reiterating the ruling in Millena v. Court of Appeals, 28held that there is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plai ntiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. In Heirs of Pomposa Saludares, 29 this Court explained that the Court in a series of cases, 30 has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of title to the land and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value. But in all those c ases, the common factual backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of the disputed property. The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another. cSATEH In Alfredo v. Borras, 31 the Court ruled that prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such p laintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third p arty and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action f or reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription. The Court reiterated such rule in the case of Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 32 wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of th e property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe. Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay 33 the Court held that there was no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten (10) years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the tr ue and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, or it s equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In that case, the Court reiterated the ruling in Faja v. Court of Appeals 34 which we quote: . . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undist urbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 ye ars and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title coveri ng it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commenc es to run against such possessor. In this case, petitioner's possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose filed a case for recovery of possession. 35 The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Jose's favor but the CA on November 28, 1991, during the pendency of the present controversy with t he court a quo, ruled in favor of petitioner. 36 Petitioner never lost possession of the said properties, and as such, she is in a position to file the complaint with the cou rt a quo to protect her rights and clear whatever doubts has been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent Jose's name. The Court further observes that the circuitous sale transactions of these properties from respondent Jose to Catalino Torre, then to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and back again to respondent Jose were quite unusual. However, this successive transfers of title from one hand to another could not c leanse the illegality of respondent Jose's act of adjudicating to himself all of the disputed properties so as to entitle him to th e protection of the law as a buyer in good faith. Respondent Jose himself admitted that there exists other heirs of the registered owners in the OCTs. Even the RTC found that "[t]hese allegations contained in the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by defendant Jose B. Tiongco are false because defendant Jose B. Tiongco is not the only surviving heir of Jose Tiongco, Matilde Tiongco, Vicente Tiongco and Felipe Tiongco as the latters have other children and gr andchildren who are also their surviving heirs." 37 ScEaAD In the case of Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He is one who buys the property with the belief th at the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim that he acted in good faith.

And while it is settled that every person dealing with a property registered under the Torrens title need not inquire further but only has to rely on the title, this rule has an exception. The exception is when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has some knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of sa id certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in go od faith and hence does not merit the protection of the law. 39 In this case, when the subject properties were sold to Catalino Torre and subsequently to Doronila, respon dent Jose was not in possession of the said properties. Such fact should have put the vendees on guard and should have inquired on the interest of the respondent Jose re garding the subject properties. 40 But regardless of such defect on transfer to third persons, the properties again reverted back to respondent Jose. Respondent Jose cannot claim lack of knowledge of the defects surrounding the cancellation of the OCTs over the properties and benefit from his fraudulent actions. The subsequent sale of the properties to Catalino Torre and Doronila will not cure the nullity of the certificates of title obtai ned by respondent Jose on the basis of the false and fraudulent Affidavit of Adjudication. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 28, 2003 Decision and November 27, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44794 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Iloilo City is ordered to RESTORE Original Certificates of Title Nos. 484, 1482, and 368, respectively covering Lots 3244, 1404 and 3246, under the name/s of the regist ered original owners thereof. Furthermore, respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned as a member of the bar for executing the April 17, 1974 Affidavit of Adjudication and registering the same with th e Register of Deeds. DHIETc No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ||| (Yared v. Tiongco, G.R. No. 161360, [October 19, 2011], 675 PHIL 608-620)

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 152007. January 22, 2007.] PROCOPIO TAPUROC, HEIRS OF ANTONIA EBE (Deceased) represented by her children namely: HEIRS OF CELEDONIA PUTONG, namely: FORTUNATO ESCUDERO, TERESITA TABALDINA, CONCORDIO E. NEBRIA, PEDRO ESCUDERO and LUISA PEDRERA; HEIRS OF EUFEMIO PUTONG, namely: RICARDO PUTONG and PORFERIA PUTONG; HEIRS OF GREGORIO PUTONG, namely: ROSALIO PUTONG, PERSEVERANDA LOPEZ, BERNARDO PUTONG and ROSALINDA OMAGAC; HEIRS OF MARIANO PUTONG, namely: SERAPIA DALHOG, TEODORA AYENG, MARCIANO PUTONG, RESTITUTA LIQUIT, SERAPIA LUAY, FAUSTINO PUTONG and SOFRONIA PATROLLA, ALL REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, AUREA P. MERCIDOR, petitioners, vs. CARMELITA LOQUELLANO VDA. DE MENDE and the HEIRS OF EVANS MENDE, namely: ERIC MITCHEL, ERIC LYNDON, ERIC FERDINAND, JOSE ERIC ERVIN and JENNIFER MILDRED, ALL SURNAMED MENDE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF TAGBILARAN, respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J p: Under consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following is suances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, to wit: 1. Decision 1 dated September 21, 2001, affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in a n action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and Damages, thereat commenced by the herein petitioners against the respondents; and 2. Resolution 2 dated January 23, 2002, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The petition embodies an alternative prayer for this Court to remand the case to the trial court for the presentation of an e xpert witness. The facts: On September 19, 1996, in the RTC of Tagbilaran City, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and Damages 3 was filed by the petitioners against respondents Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende, the Heirs of Evans B. Mende, and the Register of Deeds of the City of Tagbilaran. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5970 and raffled to B ranch 47 of the court, the Complaint alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are the co-owners, co-heirs and/or descendants of the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square meters, more or less, situated in the Barrio (now District) of Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol and previously covered by TCT No. 3444; that sometime in 1992, when the petitioners decided to partit ion the subject property, they discovered from the Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors -in-interest on December 30, 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein, who were Procopio Tapuroc and the predecessors-in-interest of the other petitioners, did not sign the conveying deed nor receive any consideration therefor; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed a way in 1960, or long before the purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967. Petitioners, as plaintiffs, thus pray for the nulli fication of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Evans Mend e and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus damages. cDEICH In their Answer, 4 the respondent Mendes, as defendants, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende and father of the herein co -respondents, bought the subject parcel of land from its previous owners on December 12, 1967 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They further assert that they had been in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously paying the r ealty taxes due thereon. By way of affirmative defense, the respondents assert that petitioners' cause of action, if any, had already prescribed in view of the unrea sonable delay in filing the suit in court, let alone the fact that their (respondents') title has become indefeasible. On June 7, 1999, after due proceedings, the trial court came out with its decision 5 finding that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs (now petitioners) was insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was a forgery. The court explained that despite the opportunity given them, the plaintiffs failed to present a handwriting expert to determine whether the said Deed of Sale was indeed a forged instrument, adding that laches had already set in because of plaintiffs' inaction and neglect in questioning the supposed forged character of the document after the lapse of more than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of its execution. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, thus: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. No compensation for d amages, moral, exemplary and litigation expenses is awarded for failure of plaintiffs (sic) to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of malice or bad faith in filing the instant case. SO ORDERED. From the adverse decision of the trial court, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, faulting the court of origin in ruling that they failed to present convincing evidence to prove the fact of forgery in the execution of the assailed Deed of Sale. They l ikewise faulted the lower court in denying their motion to have the original copy of the Deed of Sale in dispute and their own Special Power of Attorney containing the genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest, be examined by a handwriting expert. As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its Decision 6 of September 21, 2001, dismissed the petitioners' appeal and affirmed that of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution 7 of January 23, 2002, the petitioners are now with this Court via the instant recourse on their main submission that — THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS DESPITE SUFFICIENCY OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS, and presenting for our resolution the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED ON DECEMBER 30, 1967 BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS' PREDECESSORSIN-INTEREST AND THE RESPONDENTS IS VALID. CScaDH II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CONTRADICTED ITSELF AND ARRIVED AT A CONCLUSION CONTRARY TO THE RECORDS, LAW AND THE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.

The recourse must fail. As it is, the petitioners call for a review of the facts of the case. This is evident from the pleadings they filed with this Court. In their main petition 8 and Memorandum, 9 the petitioners emphatically state: The issue in the case at bar boils down to whether or not the signatures of the petitioners' predecessors -in-interest and Procopio Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to the alleged deed of sale) were forged; and if they were, is the declaration of nullity of the said deed o f sale dated December 13, 1967 is proper (sic). Clearly, the foregoing statement calls for a determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not for this Court to resolve. Well -settled is the rule that factual questions may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is explicit. It reads: SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review oncertiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied) Evident it is from the above that the function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. And, as a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so when, as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal, save only for the most compelling reasons, 10 such as when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support or when grave abuse of discretion has been committed. 11 This is as it should be since the Court, in petitions for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law. Stated other wise, it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holdings of lower courts. 12 The Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more so when those findings are affirmed by the CA, as here. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which it is not meant to be. 13 What is more, it appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having been duly notarized by a cert ain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who, unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution. To overthrow that presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is required, otherwise the document should be upheld. 14

Petitioners maintain, however, that by merely examining the signatures in the questioned Deed of Sale and the genuine signatu res of their predecessors-in-interest in their Special Power of Attorney, the glaring dissimilarities between the two sets of signatures are immediately evident to support their claim of forgery. aHCSTD We are not convinced. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. 15 Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden. As it were, the petitioners merely alleged that they filed two motions before the trial court to have the original copy of th e documents in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City be examined by handwriting experts but their motio ns were ignored by the trial court. They then harp on the excuse that they could not be expected to prove forgery if the trial court denied them the opportunity to do so. We are not persuaded. The trial court correctly ruled that the parties themselves dictate the course and flow of the presentation of evidence, as well as the witnesses for each side. Considering that the case before it is civil, not criminal, the lower court certainly cannot, on its own, issue an orde r requiring a handwriting expert to appear before it and compare the documents presented by the parties. It behooves upon the parties themselves to call forth their own set of witnesses and present their own evidence to bolster their respective claims. If the petitioners failed to present an ex pert witness, only themselves ought to be blamed. For, as the trial court itself pointed out in its decision: . . . . Plaintiffs, despite the opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a handwriting expert to determine whether the re was indeed forgery in the execution of the subject Deed of Sale. In the absence of the testimony of the handwriting expert, the allegations of forg ery by the plaintiffs is merely self-serving. Unfortunately, this Court is not in the position to assess or evaluate the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures, much less, categorically state whether or not forgery exists. Neither could this court rely on the observation of the plaintiffs as to t he alleged "glaring differences and dissimilarities" of the questioned signatures. (Underscoring ours) Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged documen ts, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison of handwritings. 16 In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA, 17 the Court identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings: . . . [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signatures and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. Th e result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best , inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned si gnature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of the questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questio ned handwriting and an authentic one. ACTEHI And to determine forgery, the Court in Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 18 (quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof) wrote: The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and significance of this resemb lance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, o r is only the expected and

inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also necessary to decide w hether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine handwriting. When these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is solved. In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on the issue of forgery was their bare denial t hat their predecessors-ininterest signed the subject Deed of Sale. Such denial will not suffice to overcome the pres umption of regularity of notarized documents, to overthrow which, the countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 19 Moreover, and as aptly pointed out by the lower court in its decision of June 7, 1999: However, even if it were true that the signature of Antonia Ebe is forged, it cannot brush aside the fact that all the heirs of Antonia Ebe, namely: Celedonia Putong, Eufemio Putong, Gregorio Putong and Mariano Putong all signed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. As earlier discussed their signatures cannot be said to have been forged as evidence presented to prove the same is found to be insufficient. Henceforth, all the r ightful heirs who could question the subject sale are themselves signatories of the supposed questionable transaction. Meanwhile, granting that Procopio Tapuroc's signature found on Exh. C is indeed a forgery, he testified in open court that he discovered the sale and the fact of Mende's possession of the subject land in 1967 yet — and did not do anything about it. At the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of their claim of ownership over the property in dispute. The respondent Mendes maintain that they had been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967, the year of the alleged sale, or for more than thirty (30) years now. No less than the petitioners themselves acknowledged this in their pleadings 20 before this Court. And beginning the year 1968, the respondents have been religiously paying the realty taxes due on the same property. Likewise, when TCT No. 3444 was lost, respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende filed a petition for judicial reconstitution to secure a second owner's copy of the lost t itle. Said petition went through the proper procedure and thereafter Carmelita was issued a second owner's copy of TCT No. 3444 which was later changed to TCT No. (8585) T-4767. All told, we find that the petitioners, who initiated in the court of origin the basic complaint in this case, have not suffi ciently met the burden of proof to sustain their cause. Additionally, we agree with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the petitioners: . . . The records show that they [petitioners] did not institute any action against the order of the then Court of First Inst ance, 14th Judiciary District. Their inaction and failure to assert any right, if any, over the disputed lot, bars them from recovering the same as said failure clearly asserts to laches. Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed their complaint of declaration of nullity only after twenty -nine (29) years from the execution of the alleged forged deed of sale. In the meanwhile, title to the property had already been in the name of respondent Mendes since 1967. The Mendes had been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land, and had been reli giously paying the realty taxes due thereon. These are hard facts that ought not to be disregarded. The Court, in a long line of cases, 21 has uniformly held in favor of the registered owner who had been in possession of a disputed property for a considerable period of time. With the Mendes' possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner and the land itself registered in their names for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had become indefeasible and their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners' failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty -nine (29) years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground of laches. THIcCA As a final note, we emphasize that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The question on the validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, diminished, or cancelled in a collateral proceeding. The action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale commenced by the petitioners in the RTC of Tagbilaran City is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens certificate of tit le. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ||| (Tapuroc v. Vda. de Mende, G.R. No. 152007, [January 22, 2007], 541 PHIL 93 -108)

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 175720. September 11, 2007.] CRESENCIANA TUBO RODRIGUEZ (now deceased), substituted by SUSANA A. LLAGAS, petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ, BELEN RODRIGUEZ and BUENAVENTURA RODRIGUEZ, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, and reinstated the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, dismissing the complaint for ejectment; as well as the Resolution d enying the motion for reconsideration. Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street, Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and covered by TCT No. 144865. 2 On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed a "Huling Habilin at Testamento" giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the deceased husband of respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C. 3 SHIcDT However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner. 4 Thus, TCT No. 144865 was cancelled and a new TCT No. 150431 was issued in the name of the petitioner. 5 aEIcHA The case arose when petitioner filed on September 20, 2001 a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents, allegin g that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property; and that in 1984, she allowed respondents Evang eline, Buenaventura and Belen, out of kindness and tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However, without her knowledge and consent, respondents separately leased t he units to Montano Magpantay, Mel Navarro and Socorro Escota, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals thereof. 6 In their Answer, respondents claimed ownership over the subject property by succession. They alleged that while petitioner is the registered owner of the property, however, she is not the lawful owner thereof because the June 14, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void . As in Civil Case No. 01-1641 now pending before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 141, which they filed to assail the validity of the said sale, respondents maintain that petitioner exerted undue influence over their father, who at that time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the propert y for only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento.Further, she had no cause of action against them for being a party to the August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement wherein they recognized each other as c o-owners and partitioned the property in accordance with the provision of the last will and testament. 7 On February 26, 2002, the MTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondents and held that the deed of sale was simulated otherwise petitioner would not have entered into the Partition Agreement, which legally conferred upon each heir exclusive ownership over their re spective shares, thus: WHEREFORE, the Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff is ordered to pay attorney's fees of P10,000.00 and the costs of suit in favor of defendants. SO ORDERED. 8 On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that petitioner's certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein; and that unless and until said title has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, such title is existing and valid. This is true also with respect to the deed of sale. The present action, which involves only the issue of physical or material possession, is not the proper action to challenge it. Further, the MTC erred when it relied heavily on the "Huling Habilin at Testamento," which was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein. The Partition Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the Huling Habilin at Testamento should not also be considered. Thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City, is hereby ordered REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Consequently, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to va cate the premises and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an amount of P5,000.00 a month per unit beginning 13 August 2001 until they finally vacate the premises and the costs of this suit. HETDAC SO ORDERED. 9 Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of t he RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the MTC correctly received evidence on ownership since the question of possession could not b e resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Further, theHuling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments not only to the respondents but also to the petitioner; and pursuant thereto, the parties executed the Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes of the testator, thus: WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. The decision dated February 26, 2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Civil Case No. 75717 dismissing the complaint for ejectment is hereby REI NSTATED. cHECAS SO ORDERED. 10 The motion for reconsideration was denied hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review raising the following error s: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DISMISSING PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. aTIEcA II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THE PROPERTY, A PARCEL OF LAND UPON WHICH A FIVE-UNIT APARTMENT STANDS, BECAME THE SUBJECT OF JUANITO RODRIGUEZ'S HULING HABILIN AT TESTAMENTO WHEREIN THE PROPERTY WAS DISTRIBUTED TO HIS HEIRS (HEREIN RESPONDENTS) INCLUDING THE RESPONDENT (PETITIONER HEREIN). 11 Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys the right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court may look into the evide nce of title or ownership and possession de jure to determine the nature of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that

the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior to his death. Contrarily, respondents pray that the instant petition for review be dismissed since the resolution of the question of owners hip by the MTC and the Court of Appeals was provisional only to resolve the issue of possession. Petitioner can always avail of legal remedies to have the issue of ownership passed upon by the proper court. Aware of the provisional nature of the resolution on ownership in ejectment cases, respondents file d Civil Case No. 01-1641 to assail the validity of the deed of sale of the property and the registration thereof in petitioner's name. DHITSc The petition has merit. An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. 12 The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. 13 Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property, the question of title is not involved 14 and should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate action in the proper court. 15HIAcCD However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70 of the Rule s of Court provides: SEC 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the is sue of possession. TcSAaH Thus, all that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. 16 But this adjudication is only provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.17 In the case at bar, petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer was based on her alleged ownership of land covered by TCT No. 150431 and that she merely tolerated respondents' stay thereat. However, when respondents leased the apartments to other persons without her consent, their possession as well as those persons claiming right under them became unlawful upon their refusal to vacate the premises and to pay the rent. On the other hand, respondents assailed petitioner's title by claiming that the deed of sale upon which it was based was simulated a nd void. They insisted that they were co-owners thus, they have the right to possess the said property. To prove their claim, they presented the Huling Habilin at Testamento of Juanito Rodriguez and the Partition Agreement. CTcSIA

The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at their respective decisions, albeit the RTC decision contradicts that of the MTC and Court of Appeals: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito Rodriguez on October 27, 1983; 2) Deed of Sale of the property executed by Juanito Rodriguez and the petitioner on June 14, 1984; 3) TCT No. 150431 in the name of the petitioner; and 4) th e August 23, 1990 Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents and the petitioner. cEAHSC Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the petitioner's claim. Respond ents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of pu blic policy. 18 Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue of possession. ECcTaH Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it d uring his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in Civil Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that purpose. DCcIaE We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title over the property to consider. We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein; the validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack, especially in an ejectment case which is summary in nature. DSATCI In Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong, 19 the Court held that: The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. IcTEAD In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of t he respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the ri ght to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer. SECcIH Further, in Co v. Militar, 20 it was held that: [T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the in tegrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. IaTSED It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has be en nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of tit le at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title. aIcDCA As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. . . . We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of ownership is only provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 01 -1641. Our ruling that petitioner has a better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of evidence without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case, where the

issue as to who has title to the property in question is fully threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.EScAID WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, reversing the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. ||| (Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 175720, [September 11, 2007], 559 PHIL 398-408)

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 154270. March 9, 2010.] TEOFISTO OÑO, PRECY O. NAMBATAC, VICTORIA O. MANUGAS and POLOR O. CONSOLACION, petitioners, vs. VICENTE N. LIM, respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J p: The subject of controversy is Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO -9969-(O-20449), over which the contending parties in this action for quieting of title, initiated by respondent Vicente N. Lim (Lim) in the R egional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City, assert exclusive ownership, to the exclusion of the other. In its decision dated July 30, 1996, 1 the RTC favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Luisa Narvios -Lim (Luisa), Lim's deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest. On appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC on January 28, 2002. 2 It later denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the resolution dated June 17, 2002. 3 Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari. Antecedents On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa; 4 that Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in 1937 to Luisa by Spouses Diego Oño and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oño), the lot's registered owners; and that although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oño (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of Spouses O ño, had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Luisa a notarized document denominated as confirmation of sale, 5 which was duly filed in the Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu. Zosimo Oño and petitioner Teofisto Oño (Oños) opposed Lim's petition, contending that they had the certificate of title in th eir possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oño. On account of the Oños' opposition, and upon order of the RTC, L im converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title, 6 averring additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter alia, that the Oños be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Luisa in lieu of said OCT. In their answer, 7 the Oños claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, Spouses Oño, never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that the confirmation of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being authentic. RTC Ruling On July 30, 1996, after trial, the RTC rendered its decision, 8 viz.: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered quieting plaintiff's title to Lot No. 943 of the Balamban (Cebu) Cadastre, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu — (1) To register the aforestated April 23, 1961 Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre by Antonio Oño in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim; (2) To cancel the original certificate of title covering the said Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre; and, (3) To issue in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim, a new duplicate certificate of title No. RO-9969 (O-20449) of the Register of Deeds of Cebu, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate of title, and shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original certificate, and shall be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree, pursuant to the last parag raph of Section 109, Presidential Decree No. 1529. AcSIDE Without special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 9 The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that their possession had never been disturbed by the Oños, except on two occasions in 1993 when the Oños seized the harvested copra from the Lims' caretaker; that the Lims had since declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to the lot; that the signature of Antonio on the confirmation of sale was genuine, thereby giving more weight to the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the document and affirmatively testified that Antonio and Luisa had both appeared before him to acknowledge the instrument as true than to the testimony of the expert witness who attested that Antonio's signature was a forgery. CA Ruling On appeal, the Oños maintained that the confirmation of sale was spurious; that the property, being a titled one, could not be acquired by the Lims through prescription; that their (the Oños) action to claim the property could not be barred by laches; and that the action i nstituted by the Lims constituted a collateral attack against their registered title. The CA affirmed the RTC, however, and found that Spouses Oño had sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that such sale had been confi rmed by their son Antonio. The CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that the Lims' undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own title. Nonetheless, the CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicat e certificate of title in the name of Luisa, considering that the owner's duplicate was still intact in the possession of the Oños. The decree of the CA decision was as follows: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from is CORRE CTED as follows: (1) Within five (5) days from finality of the decision, defendants-appellants are directed to present the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969 (O-20449) to the Register of Deeds who shall thereupon register the "Confirmation of Sale" of Lot No. 943, B alamban Cadastre, Cebu, executed on April 23, 1961 by

Antonio Oño in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim, and issue a new transfer certificate of title to and in the name of the latter upon cancellation of the outstanding original and owner's duplicate certificate of title. (2) In the event defendants-appellants neglect or refuse to present the owner's copy of the title to the Register of Deeds as herein directed, the said t itle, by force of this decision, shall be deemed annulled, and the Register of Deeds shall make a memorandum of such fact in the record and in the new transfer certificate of title to be issued to Luisa Narvios-Lim. (3) Defendants-appellants shall pay the costs. SO ORDERED. 10 The CA denied the Oños' motion for reconsideration 11 on June 17, 2002. 12 Hence, this appeal. IDCHTE Issues The petitioners raise the following issues: 1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title; 2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse possession; 3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Oño in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost durin g World War II; 4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and 5. Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine. Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. A. Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of title should be disallowed because it constituted a collateral attac k on OCT No. RO-9969-(O20449), citing Section 48 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529, viz.: Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The petitioners' contention is not well taken. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the ju dgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. 13 The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 14 Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertaint y affecting title to real property. 15 Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, en cumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said tit le, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. 16 In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the p roperty dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit. 17 Lim's complaint pertinently alleged: 18. If indeed, the genuine original of the Owner's Duplicate of the Reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO -9699 (O-20449) for Lot 943, Balamban Cadastre . . . is in Defendant's (Oño's) possession, then VNL submits the following PROPOSITIONS: xxx xxx xxx 18.2. Therefore, the Original of Owner's Duplicate Certificate (which Respondents [Defendants Oños] claim in their Opposition is in their possession) must be surrendered to VNL upon order of this Court, after the Court shall have determined VNL's mother's acquisition of the attributes of ownership over said Lot 943, in this action, in accordance with Section 107, P.D. 1529, Property Registration Decree . . . xxx xxx xxx [t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for Lot 943 be issued directly in favor of LUISA NARVIOS, to complete her title t o said Lot; 18 The averments readily show that the action was neither a direct nor a collateral attack on OCT No. RO -9969-(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name of the petitioners' predecessors had become inoperativ e due to the conveyance in favor of Lim's mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had been decreed. In other words, the action sought the removal of a cloud from Lim's title, and the confirmation of Lim's ownership over the disputed property as the successor-in-interest of Luisa. B. Prescription was not relevant The petitioners assert that the lot, being titled in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

The assertion is unwarranted. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the m anner and under the conditions laid down by law. 19However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base hi s right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had be en voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest. Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she h ad taken over its possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by paying real property taxes on the p roperty, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her name;20 and that in view of the delivery of the property, coupled with Luisa's actual occupation of it, all that rema ined to be done was the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her name. cdrep C. Forgery, being a question of fact, could not be dealt with now The petitioners submit that Lim's evidence did not preponderantly show that the ownership of the lo t had been transferred to Luisa; and that both the trial and the appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonio's signature on the confirmation of sale was a forgery. Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties. The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence, because the Court is not a trier of facts. 21 Although this rule admits of certain exceptions,viz.: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the f indings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findin gs of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record, 22 it does not appear now that any of the exceptions is present herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal for that reason. It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the RTC that the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or forged. The CA ruled that the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared before him prevailed over that of the petitioners' expert witness. The concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonio's s ignature now binds the Court. 23 In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with th e term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the truth. 24 It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other than their copy of the reconstit uted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or ti tle over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co -owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. 25 WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision dated January 28, 2002 is affirmed. The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. cCaEDA ||| (Oño v. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, [March 9, 2010], 628 PHIL 418-430)

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 183822. January 18, 2012.] RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C. Agullana, petitioner, vs. SPS. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA AGUSTIN, respondents. DECISION SERENO, J p: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1 dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution 2 dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner. The Factual Antecedents The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows: Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag Ci ty Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows: 1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Jo aquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded . . . containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more or less . . . . 2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of S anta Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded . . ., containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less . . . . Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O -1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises. Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971. Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Cor puz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00). aCSDIc The Municipal Trial Court [in Cities] found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint. In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 s q. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that defe ndants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as o wners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED. On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision s tates: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. SO ORDERED." 3 Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the MTCC, by instituting an appea l with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal. 4 It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their e xecution. 5 The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976, 6 resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered. 7 Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real property executed be tween Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against respondents, the appe llate court concluded that respondents' possession of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner — petitioner's father — but was in the exercise of ownership. 8 The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father's sale of the properties to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties. 9 The appellate court rejected his contention that, as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents' unregistered deed. 10 In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents' possession was "not . . . anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the complaint for e jectment must fail." 11 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 12 The Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO CLAIM BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE. IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT. 13 Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties — petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties? The Court's Ruling We DENY the Petition. Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature of an ejectment case for t he recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to possession in this unlawful detainer case. One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding . . . which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court." 14 In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. 15 Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. 16 ScCDET In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties as owners, having acquire d these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of own ership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to possession. Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession. 17 Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondent s was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day. Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., 18 which has facts and legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal issue was who be tween the two parties had the better right to possess the subject property. This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to possession of the disputed property based on the following justification: We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property invol ved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and th e question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubte d competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the tran sfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner. In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has be en nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title. As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in h is name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be alt ered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 19

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel 20 and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al., 21wherein we consistently held the age-old rule "that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof." 22 However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful detainer case against respon dents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply ou st respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding. Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera, 23 which reads thus: Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the prop erty involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possessionde jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. The statements in the complaint that respondents' possession of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.) CTEacH In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents' continued possession of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents' possession of the properties b ecame unlawful — a requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case. In Canlas v. Tubil, 24 we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows: Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the e xpiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession. xxx xxx xxx In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued p ossession of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the cour ts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner. We concur in the appellate court's findings that petitioner's father engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the oth er hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership. We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sa le to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of respondents' unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: 25 (But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)], Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The Torrens system can not be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.] CDEaAI

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of res pondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioner's father to respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the transaction. We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was an "act of fraud" 26 on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of petitioner — an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case. It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. 27 Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.28 It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. 29Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed. Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 — all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner — are AFFIRMED. We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence. SO ORDERED. ||| (Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, [January 18, 2012], 679 PHIL 352-368)