Labor Relations Digest 1.docx

SOCIAL JUSTICE Calalang vs. Williams Facts: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents. It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER. G.R. No. 184011 September 18, 2013 REYNALDO HAYAN vs. FIRST SOLID RUBBER INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent. PEREZ, J.:

MOYA, Petitioner,

FACTS: Sometime in May 1993, MOya was hired by the company First Solid, a business engaged in manufacturing of tires and rubbers, as a machine operator. He was promoted as head of the Tire Curing Department of the company.

Issue: 1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

On October 15, 2004, he reported an incident about an under curing of tires within his department which led to the damage of five tires. The company conducted an investigation of the incident and he was later required to explain.

2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

In his explanation, he stated that the damage was caused by machine failure and the incident was without any fault of the operator. Despite his explanation of what transpired, he was terminated by the company through a letter dated November 9, 2004.

Held: 1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to

Moya added that his termination fell short of any of the just causes of serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and willful breach of trust. First Solid denied that it illegally dismissed Moya and maintained that his severance from the company was due to a valid exercise of management prerogative. The company insisted on its right to validly dismiss an employee in good faith if it has a reasonable ground to believe that its employee is responsible of misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. The company countered that Moya failed to exercise the diligence required of him to see to it that the machine operator properly operated the machine. This act is considered as a gross and habitual neglect of duty which caused actual losses to the company.

Moya insisted that the cause of the damage of five (5) tires was due to premature hauling of the tires below curing time. The company informed Moya that the damage was caused by the operator’s unlawful setting of the timer from manual to automatic without Moya’s permission. To make the matter worse, Moya failed to disclose the real situation that the operator was at fault. Moya was given twenty-four (24) hours to defend himself and explain the matter. In response, Moya admitted in a letter his mistake of not disclosing the true incident and explained that he found it more considerate to just let the operator be suspended and be fined for the damage committed. He denied any willful intention to conceal the truth or cover up the mistake of his employee. Finally, he asked for the company’s forgiveness for the fault he had committed. In a letter dated 3 November 2004, Moya reiterated his plea for forgiveness and asked for another chance to continue his employment with the company. LA rendered a judgment finding sufficient and valid grounds to dismiss Moya for concealing and lying to First Solid about the factual circumstances leading to the damage of five (5) tires on 15 October 2004. NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in its entirety. CA ruled in favor of the company and reversed the decisions of the labor tribunals. ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner employee is entitled to separation pay based on his length of service. (That there is a valid ground for the dismissal of Moya based on breach and loss of trust and confidence is no longer at issue)

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character. Moya’s dismissal is based on one of the grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code which is willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer. Also, he is outside the protective mantle of the principle of social justice as his act of concealing the truth from the company is clear disloyalty to the company which has long employed him. Indeed, as found below, Moya’s length of service should be taken against him. The pronouncement in Reno Foods, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM) Katipunan is instructive on the matter: x x x Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer… It is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Thus, it may be said that betrayal by a long-time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer. THE NATURE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

RULING: NO. Petitioner is not entitled to separation pay. Payment of separation pay cannot be justified by his length of service. It must be stressed that Moya was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was holding a supervisory rank being an Officer-in-Charge of the Tire Curing Department. The position, naturally one of trust, required of him abiding honesty as compared to ordinary rank-and-file employees. When he made a false report attributing the damage of five tires to machine failure, he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by the company. In a number of cases, this Court put emphasis on the right of an employer to exercise its management prerogative in dealing with its company’s affairs including its right to dismiss its erring employees. We recognized the right of the employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. However, this Court also provides exceptions to the rule based on "social justice" or on "equitable grounds" following the ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC, stating that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. The PLDT case further elucidates why an erring employee could not benefit under the cloak of social justice in the award of separation pay, we quote:

G.R. No. 211892 INNODATA KNOWLEDGE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner vs. SOCORRO D'MARIE T. INTING, ISMAEL R. GARAYGAY, EDSON S. SOLIS, MICHAEL A. REBATO, JAMES HORACE BALONDA, STEPHEN C. OLINGAY, DENNIS C. RIZON, JUNETH A. RENTUMA, HERNAN ED NOEL I. DE LEON, JR., JESS VINCENT A. DELA PENA, RONAN V. ALAMILLO, ENNOH CHENTIS R. FERNANDEZ, FRITZ J. SEMBRINO, DAX MATTHEW M. QUIJANO, RODOLFO M. VASQUEZ, MA. NAZELLE B. MIRALLES, MICHAEL RAY B. MOLDE, WENDELL B. QUIBAN, ALDRIN O. TORRENTIRA, and CARL HERMES CARSKIT, Respondents PERALTA, J.: FACTS: Innodata Knowledge Services, Inc. (IKSI) is a company engaged in data processing, encoding, indexing, abstracting, typesetting, imaging, and other processes in the capture, conversion, and storage of data and information. At one time, Applied Computer Technologies (ACT), a company based in the United States of America, hired IKSI to review various litigation documents. Due to the nature of the job, ACT required IKSI to hire lawyers, or at least, law graduates, to review various litigation documents, classify said documents into the prescribed categories, and ensure that outputs are delivered on time. For this purpose, IKSI engaged the services of respondents Socorro D’Marie Inting, et. al. as senior and junior reviewers with a contract duration of five (5) years. On January 7, 2010, however, respondents received a Notice of Forced Leave from IKSI informing them that they shall be placed on indefinite

forced leave effective that same day due to changes in business conditions, client requirements, and specifications. Hence, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, and damages against IKSI. Subsequently, IKSI sent respondents separate notices dated May 27, 2010 informing them that due to the unavailability of new work related to the product stream and uncertainties pertaining to the arrival of new workloads, their project employment contracts would have to be terminated. LA declared that there was no illegal dismissal. Undaunted, the employees elevated the matter to the CA Cebu, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC’s part. CA granted their petition and reversed the assailed NLRC ruling. IKSI then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed an error when it reversed the NLRC, which declared that respondent employees, as mere project employees, were validly placed on floating status and, therefore, were not illegally dismissed.

coterminous with the project. He may no longer be employed after the completion of the project for which he was hired. But project employment contracts are not lopsided agreements in favor of only one party. The employer's interest is equally important as that of the employees'. While it may be true that it is the employer who drafts project employment contracts with its business interest as overriding consideration, such contracts must not prejudice the employee. As stated in IKSI’s petition itself, the employment contracts which respondents signed with the company which the contract is entitled as “Project-Based Employment Contracts.” Moreover, the duration states that: The Employee shall hold the position of [Junior/Senior] Reviewer and shall perform the duties and responsibilities of such for the duration of the Project, which is expected to be completed after a maximum of five (5) years, or on or before___________, (the "Term").

NATURE OF RESPONDENTS’ EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

Indeed, records would disclose that respondents signed employment contracts specifically indicating the Content Supply Chain Project, also known as the ACT Project, as the project for which they were being hired, which was expected to be completed after a maximum of five (5) years. However, sometime in November 2008, IKSI required respondents to work on another project called "Bloomberg," which was not included in the original contracts that they signed and without entering into a new project employment contracts. Respondents initially opposed working on said project but eventually agreed, in fear of losing their employment altogether. Months later, they were again required to work on the ACT Project and reverted to their previous designation as Document Reviewers.

The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. Equally important to consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are never at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply entering into contracts with each other.

In the case of ALU-TUCP v. NLRC, the Court made a pronouncement on the two (2) categories of project employees. The project for which project employees are hired would ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the employer. There should be no difficulty in distinguishing the employees for a certain project from ordinary or regular employees, as long as the duration and scope of the project were determined or specified at the time of engagement of said project employees.

Article 295 of the Labor Code provides the distinction between a regular and a project employment.

In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word "project" which prevents them from attaining regular status, employers claiming that their workers are project employees have the burden of showing that: (a) the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged; and (b) there was indeed a project.

RULING: NO. They are illegally dismissed and are considered as regular employees. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The aforecited provision contemplates four (4) kinds of employees: (1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee; (3) seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are seasonal in nature, and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (4) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal employees. Jurisprudence later added a fifth (5th) kind, the fixed-term employee. Based on Article 295, the law determines the nature of the employment, regardless of any agreement expressing otherwise. The supremacy of the law over the nomenclature of the contract and its pacts and conditions is to bring life to the policy enshrined in the Constitution to afford full protection to labor. Thus, labor contracts are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts since these are imbued with public interest and, therefore, subject to the police power of the State. Project employment contracts, which fix the employment for a specific project or undertaking, are valid under the law. By entering into such a contract, an employee is deemed to understand that his employment is

Therefore, as evident in Article 295, the litmus test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. Here, while IKSI was able to show the presence of a specific project, the ACT Project, in the contract and the alleged duration of the same, it failed to prove that respondents were in reality made to work only for that specific project indicated in their employment documents and that it adequately informed them of the duration and scope of said project at the time their services were engaged. It is well settled that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence, as allegation is not evidence. The fact is IKSI actually hired respondents to work, not only on the ACT Project, but on other similar projects such as the Bloomberg. When respondents were required to work on the Bloomberg project, without

signing a new contract for that purpose, it was already outside of the scope of the particular undertaking for which they were hired; it was beyond the scope of their employment contracts. The fact that the same happened only once is inconsequential. What matters is that IKSI required respondents to work on a project which was separate and distinct from the one they had signed up for. This act by IKSI indubitably brought respondents outside the realm of the project employees category. IKSI likewise fell short in proving that the duration of the project was reasonably determinable at the time respondents were hired. The NLRC upheld the same, finding that the contracts clearly provided for the duration of the project which was expected to end after a maximum of five (5) years, or on or before July 2, 2013. It is interesting to note that the five (5)-year period is not actually the duration of the project but merely that of the employment contract. Naturally, therefore, not all of respondents' employment would end on July 2, 2013, as the completion of the five (5)-year period would depend on when each employee was employed. This is precisely the reason why IKSI originally left a blank for the termination date because it varied for each employee. If respondents were truly project employees then the termination date would have been uniform for all of them. The Court has previously recognized the validity of fixed-term employment contracts, but it has consistently held that this is more of an exception rather than the general rule. Aware of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term employment contracts, the Court has declared that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy or morals. It is evident that IKSI’s contracts of employment are suspect for being highly ambiguous. In effect, it sought to alternatively avail of project employment and employment for a fixed term so as to preclude the regularization of respondents' status. The fact that respondents were lawyers or law graduates who freely and with full knowledge entered into an agreement with the company is inconsequential.

IKSO claims that the cause of respondents’ dismissal is retrenchment. However, there being no valid suspension of business operations, IKSI’s act amounted to constructive dismissal of respondents since it could not validly put the latter on forced leave or floating status pursuant to Article 301. And even assuming, without admitting, that there was indeed suspension of operations, IKSI did not recall the employees back to work or place them on valid permanent retrenchment after the period of six (6) months, as required of them by law. But even on May 27, 2010, there was still no basis for IKSI to finally make the retrenchment permanent. While it acknowledged the fact that respondents could not be placed on an indefinite floating status, it still failed to present any proof of a bona fide closing or cessation of operations or undertaking to warrant the termination of respondents' employment. Since dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee, the requisites for a valid dismissal from employment must always be met, namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded due process, meaning, he is notified of the cause of his dismissal and given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Our rules require that the employer be able to prove that said requisites for a valid dismissal have been duly complied with. Indubitably, IKSI’s intent was not merely to put respondents' employment on hold pending the existence of the unfavorable business conditions and call them back once the same improves, but really to sever the employer-employee relationship with respondents right from the very start. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye to IKSI’s manifest bad faith in terminating respondents under the guise of placing them on a simple floating status. Respondents are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement, as a necessary consequence. However, reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case because of the palpable strained relations between the parties and the possibility that the positions previously held by respondents are already being occupied by new hires. Thus, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

The utter disregard of public policy by the subject contracts negates any argument that the agreement is the law between the parties and that the fixed period was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. In the interpretation of contracts, obscure words and provisions shall not favor the party that caused the obscurity. Consequently, the terms of the present contract should be construed strictly against the employer, for being the party who prepared it. Verily, the private agreement of the parties can never prevail over Article 1700 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shops, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

The Court sustains the CA’s award of moral and exemplary damages. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer.

Thus, there were no valid fixed-term or project contracts and respondents were IKSI’s regular employees who could not be dismissed except for just or authorized causes. Any ambiguity in said contracts must be resolved against the company, especially because under Article 1702 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt, all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the worker. The Court cannot simply allow IKSI to construe otherwise what appears to be clear from the wordings of the contract itself.

FACTS

The award of attorney's fees is likewise due and appropriate since respondents incurred legal expenses after they were forced to file an action to protect their rights. The case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the labor arbiter for the computation of the amounts due each respondent. BURDEN OF PROOF BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), Petitioner, vs. FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO, Respondents.

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On May 23, 2008, the petitioner Danilo (Bitoy) Javier filed a complaing against the respondents (Fly Ace Corporation / Flordelyn Castillo) for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits.

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Javier worked for the respondent’s company since September 2007 as an all around worker around the respondent’s warehouse and a pahinante for the company’s deliveries. The petitioner claims that he worked for the respondent from 7:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday to Saturday during his time of employment but was never issued a company ID nor any payslips like the other employees. On May 6, 2008, the petitioner was barred from entering the company’s premises and despite repeated pleading to allow him to resume work he was not allowed to, Petitioner further claims that when asked for a reason on why he was being barred from working, his superior a certain Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong) replied by telling him “Tanungin mo anak mo” Petitioner claims that Mr. Ong had been courting his daughter and apparently after being spurned had terminated Javier without a chance to refute the cause/s of his dismissal. To support his allegations, the petitioner presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who alleged that petitioner was a stevedore or pahinante of Fly Ace from September 2007 to January 2008. The said affidavit was subscribed before the Labor Arbiter.

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Fly Ace on the other hand claims that the petitioner was contracted by its employee Mr. Ong as a pahinante on a pakyaw (or per work) basis at an agreed rate of 300 per trip (later increased to 325 on January 2008). Mr. Ong had contracted the petitioner only roughly 5 to 6 times per month whenever their contracted hauler (Milmar Hauling Services) was not available. Fly Ace submitted their contract with Milmar, and copies of acknowledgement receipts evidencing the payment for the petitioner’s services with the words “daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay) with the petitioner’s signature / initials to try and prove that petitioner was not one of their employees.

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LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, saying that the petitioner failed to present proof of his regular employment with the company. On appeal at the NLRC, Javier was favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the argument of Javier and immediately concluded that he was not a regular employee simply because he failed to present proof. It was of the view that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employeremployee relationship. CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former employee of Fly Ace and reinstated the dismissal of Javier’s complaint as ordered by the LA. Case was elevated to the SC on appeal.

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ISSUES + HELD 1. 2.

WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was not a regular employee of FLY ACE (NO) WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner is not entitles to his monetary claims (NO)

RATIO  

 The Court affirms the assailed CA decision. It must be noted that the issue of Javier’s alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of an employeremployee relationship between him and Fly Ace. This is essentially a question of fact.

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Generally, the Court does not review errors that raise factual questions. However, when there is conflict among the factual findings of the antecedent deciding bodies like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, "it is proper, in the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings." In dealing with factual issues in labor cases, "substantial evidence – that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion – is sufficient." As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javier’s claim of employment with Fly Ace as wanting and deficient. The Court is constrained to agree. Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC28 allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a complete dispensation of proof. In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. "Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto. Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he was made to work in the company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery items for delivery to clients, no other proof was submitted to fortify his claim. The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening Javier’s cause. The Court cannot ignore the inescapable conclusion that his mere presence at the workplace falls short in proving employment therein. The supporting affidavit could have, to an extent, bolstered Javier’s claim of being tasked to clean grocery items when there were no scheduled delivery trips, but no information was offered in this subject simply because the witness had no personal knowledge of Javier’s employment The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.35 In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip" rate as a stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents because "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery." Considering the above findings, the Court does not see the necessity to resolve the second issue presented. The Court’s decision does not contradict the settled rule that "payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation." Payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. "The term ‘wage’ is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code

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as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the petitioner is not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However, in determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. PETITION DENIED, CA RULING AFFIRMED.

LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW IN FAVOR OF WORKERS Manaya vs Alabang Country Club G.R. 168988 June 19, 2007 Topic: Liberal Construction Facts: Manaya (Employee) was hired by Alabang Country Club (ACC)(Employer). He was informed that his services was no longer required, without any reason. As such, he filed an illegal dismissal case against ACC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Manaya. ACC appealed to the NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal for it was filed out of time. ACC is now contending that NLRC should have liberally interpreted and applied the rules, allowing them to file the appeal even beyond the reglementary period. Issue: Should the NLRC allow ACC to file its Appeal even beyond the reglementary period? Ruling: No. Court will only allow the liberal interpretation of the Rules when there is an extraordinary circumstance that justify deviation from its stringent rules. In this case no extraordinary existed. It is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the Labor Code that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." The NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of rules in deciding labor cases. However, such liberality should not be applied in the instant case as it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted. The liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.

Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case "as it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted." As so rightfully enunciated, "the liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration." This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the survival of an employee and his loved ones who are dependent on him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine and education; it also wears down the meager resources of the workers to the point that, not infrequently, they either give up or compromise for less than what is due them. FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA, Petitioners, vs PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO, Respondents. G.R. No. 152048; April 7, 2009 FACTS: Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition. Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then in a Memorandum, petitioners were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on November 8, 1993, the date they received the abovementioned memorandum. LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA. CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process. Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision before the SC. They contend that there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for 30 days. ISSUE: Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process. RULING: 1.

Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence resulted. Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents.

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence. Respondents failed to discharge this burden. Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee. Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees. We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides that an employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires. The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an employee must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.” Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which ordinarily means “considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b). Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer

and the employee. The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its spirit. Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed “substantially,” not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process. A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, while the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment. In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases: (a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way. (b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it. (c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations. On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period. Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. In this

case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. 14 years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. So petitioners will just be paid their separation pay. Petition is hereby GRANTED. RESPECTING MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TOPIC: “BUT MANAGEMENT RIGHTS LIKEWISE PROTECTED”

G.R. No. 191281 December 5, 2012 BEST WEAR GARMENTS and/or WARREN PARDILLA vs. ADELAIDA B. DE LEMOS and CECILE M. OCUBILLO, FACTS: Petitioner Best Wear Garments is a sole proprietorship which hired respondents Cecile M. Ocubillo and Adelaida B. De Lemos as sewers on piece-rate basis. De Lemos & Ocubillo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that they were arbitrarily transferred to other areas of operation of petitioner’s garments company, which amounted to constructive dismissal as it resulted in less earnings for them. De Lemos claimed that the reason for her transfer was her refusal "to render overtime work up to 7:00 p.m." On her part, Ocubillo alleged that her transfer was precipitated by her having "incurred excessive absences since 2001." Petitioners denied having terminated the employment of respondents who supposedly committed numerous absences without leave (AWOL). It explained asserted that respondents are piece-rate workers and hence they are not paid according to the number of hours worked. ISSUE: Whether the transfer of the respondents to other areas of operation amounted to constructive dismissal? RULING: NO. Being piece-rate workers assigned to individual sewing machines, respondents’ earnings depended on the quality and quantity of finished products. That their work output might have been affected by the change in their specific work assignments does not necessarily imply that any resulting reduction in pay is tantamount to constructive dismissal. Workers under piece-rate employment have no fixed salaries and their compensation is computed on the basis of accomplished tasks. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the transfer was unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the respondents. Such deployment of sewers to work on different types of garments as dictated by present business necessity is within the ambit of management

prerogative which, in the absence of bad faith, ill motive or discrimination, should not be interfered with by the courts. The records are bereft of any showing of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of petitioners in transferring respondents to perform a different type of sewing job. It is unfair to charge petitioners with constructive dismissal simply because the respondents insist that their transfer to a new work assignment was against their will. The constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy management. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Thus, where management prerogative to transfer employees is validly exercised, as in this case, courts will decline to interfere.