Civpro_rule 3_section7-8.docx

GR No. 159156

January 31, 2005

RAMON P. ARON Vs. HEIRS OF ALFREDO REALON CALLEJO SR., J FACTS: Roman Realon was the owner of two parcels of land which was inherited by Alfredo Realon and his siblings. Sometime in 1979, Alfredo executed a contract to sell his undivided portion of the lot to petitioner. He also obliged himself to execute a deed of final sale. However Alfredo failed to register the sale. To secure the balance of the purchase price, Aron mortgage the property to the remaining heir. Alfredo Realon died and his successors where unaware about the sale. Engineer Ilaban, the attorney-in-fact of Aron, filed a case for consignation against the heir of Realon. The Realon’s countered by contending that undue influence was present at the execution of the sale and that the balance of the price due in the contract to sell was not paid. Aron contended that the contract to sell was supersededby the deeds of the sale with mortgage in response, the Realons contended that even the other heirs did not receive the proceeds from the contract itself allegedly executed by Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court held that there was fraud present. ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs of Alfredo are the real parties in interest. HELD: The well settled rule is that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, the presence of all indispensable party is a condition sine qua non for the existence of judicial power. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all indispensable party and in the absence of one render all subsequent judgment voids. Failure to include the other heirs as indispensable parties in the complaint to nullify the contract to sell is fatal to the complaint. In light of all the foregoing, the petition is granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 68979, and that of the Regional Trial Court are set aside. No cost.

Lotte Phils., Inc. is a domestic corporation. RESPONDENTS were hired and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by Lotte. 1995-2000, 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services entered into a contract with Lotte to provide manpower. o to accommodate the needs of Lotte for workers to do and perform “piece works,” RESPONDENTS, among others, were hired and assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers. Feb. 2000, Lotte dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration of the service contract. o Lotte told the respondent “huwag muna kayong pumasok at tatawagan na lang kung may gawa”. o Unfortunately, RESPONDENTS were never called back to work. RESPONDENTS filed a labor complaint against Lotte and 7J for illegal dismissal. LA: ruled that 7J was the employer of the RESPONDENTS and ordered 7J to reinstate the respondents. RESPONDENTS appealed to the NLRC praying that Lotte be declared as their direct employer because 7J is merely a labor-only contractor. NLRC: affirmed the decision of the LA RESPONDENTS filed a petition for certiorari in the CA against the NLRC and Lotte ONLY, insisting that their employer is Lotte and not 7J. Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It prayed that the petition be dismissed for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. CA: reversed and set aside the decision of LA and NLRC. Thus, CA declared Lotte as the real employer of the respondents and that 7J who engaged in the labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte. -

Hence, this petition. ISSUE/S 1. W/N 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in the petition.

RULING & RATIO 1. YES 

So ordered. Lotte Phils. Co v. Dela Cruz GR No. 166302 | 464 SCRA 591 | July 28, 2005 Petition: Petition for review on certiorari Petitioner: LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., Respondent: ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LEONOR MAMAUAG, LOURDES CAUBA, JOSEPHINE DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM, VIVIAN DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ, ARNOLD SAN PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI JIMENEZ, JEFFREY BUENO, CHRISTOPHER CAGAYAT, GERARD CABILES, JOAN ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ, NELLY CLERIGO, DULCE NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO, DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN BAUTISTA and BALTAZAR FERRERA,

DOCTRINE The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable FACTS

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An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In Domingo v. Scheer, o the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.

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Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J.

DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED. Dael vs. Teves, 136 SCRA 199 (1985) Petition for Review on certiorari R 65 FACTS:  Dael spouses filed in CFI-Misamis Oriental a complaint for: "Ownership, Recovery of Possession & Damages" against the private respondentsEdorot EDOROT filed Answer with Counterclaim The case was set for pre-trial on various occasions to give the parties more chance to arrive at an amicable settlement (the original Judge was Malvar but he was transferred and TEVES- one of respondents was appointed to take Malvar’s place) the case was set for pre-trial before Judge Teves who ordered amendment of complaint to include the heirs or representatives of 2 deceased defendantsHerminigildo and Petra EDOROT filed an Ex- Parte Manifestation, praying that the case be dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for failure of petitioners to file an amended complaint- granted MR- denied Hence direct appeal to SC. Dael’s contention: Respondent Judge abused its discretion in ordering them to file amended complaint to include the heirs of deceased defendants. NO RULLING: Petitioner’s here claim that they are owners of the parcel of land in question while respondents also claim to be the owners and possessors, pro-indiviso by inheritance from their deceased parents, of the subject litigated parcel. Then, deceased defendants have an undivided interest, right and participation adverse to that of the petitioners' in the property in litigation. Since both of them are already even prior to the filing of the complaint against them in the court below and their interest in the property in question having inured by intestacy to their heirs, the latter thereby became the real parties in interest who should be impleaded as defendants without whom no final determination of Civil Case can be had. Sections 2 and 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court providesSection 2.Parties in interest. —Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. All persons who claim an interest in the controversy or the subject thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary to complete determination or settlement of the question involved therein shall be joined as defendants. Section 7.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. In the case of Garchitorena, et al. vs. de los Santos, et al. No.L-17045, June 30, 1962, 115 Phil. 490, citing Bautista vs. Teodoro, 54 O.G. 619; Dizon vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-14690, November 29, 1960 the SC held that: Where the Court orders the plaintiff to amend its complaint within a certain period of time in order to implead as party defendants one who is not a party to the case but who is an indispensable party, plaintiff's refusal to comply with such order is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, Heirs of deceased defendants are indispensable parties who should be compulsory joined as defendants in the case

and since the petitioners failed to comply with this Order, respondent Judge acted within his prerogative in dismissing the complaint. G.R. No. L-44339 December 2, 1987 CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL SENO, JR., DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY SENO and WALTER SENO, plaintiffs, vs. MARCOS MANGUBAT and Spouses FRANCISCO LUZAME and VERGITA PENAFLOR, ANDRES EVANGELISTA and BIENVENIDO MANGUBAT, defendants. Facts: This is an appeal that was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1, dated September 29,1972 in Civil Case No. 12205 dismissing the action for reformation of instrument and annulment of subsequent sale. 2 Plaintiff Crisanta Seno, a widow and herein defendant Marcos Mangubat agreed on a mortgage for the sum of P15,000.00 with a stipulation that as long as the 2% per month interest is being paid, the mortgage over the property will not be foreclosed. On the assurance of defendant Marcos Mangubat, a practicing lawyer, Seno agreed to the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of P5,000.00 in favor of defendant Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat on July 17, 1961 On January 8, 1962 Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat executed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring their share in the subject property to defendant Marcos Mangubat; Someyim in 1963, when plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno failed to pay the monthly interest of 2%, she was sued for ejectment by defendant Marcos Mangubat alleging non-payment of rentals; Seno also learned that defendant Marcos Mangubat sold the subject property in favor of spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor and Sena claimed that the spouses Luzame and Penaflor bought the property in bad faith since they had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the transaction between plaintiff and defendant Marcos Mangubat. Defendant spouses Luzame filed an ejectment case against plaintiff Crisanta Seno for alleged non-payment of rentals.  RTC  Plaintiff’s filed a complaint seeking:  1) the reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and,  2) the annulment of a subsequent sale to defendant spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor of a parcel of land in Barrio Dongalo, Paranaque, Rizal. 

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On motion of defendant spouses Luzame and Penaflor, TC the inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat on the ground that they are indispensable parties, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint impleading Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as defendants. The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the case against them on the ground of prescription granted Defendants Luzame, Penaflor and Mangubat in their motion for reconsideration asked the court a quo to dismiss the case against all the defendants- GRANTED  court is no longer in a position to grant plaintiffs' demands, principally the reformation of subject Deed of Absolute Sale.

 Plaintiff’s MOR - denied CA  Plaintiff’s filed an appeal praying for the reversal of the orders of the TC dismissing the complaint

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CA certified the instant case to this Court holding that the assignment of errors made by plaintiffs in their appeal raised purely legal questions ISSUE: WON defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat indispensable parties in the case without whom no action can be properly taken thereon? NO. For the determination of this issue, We find it necessary to consider the distinction between indispensable and proper parties as clearly stated in Sections 7 and 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide: Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. Sec. 8. Joinder of proper parties. — When persons who are not indispensable but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process and venue, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the action. But the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the action without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such persons. Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them. Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid multiplicity of suits. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale not if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of tile controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against defendant Marcos Mangubat. In fact the plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as shown by their non-inclusion in the complaint and their opposition to the motion to include said defendants in the complaint as indispensable parties. It was only because they were ordered by the court a quo that they included the said defendants in the complaint. The lower court erroneously held that the said defendants are indispensable parties. Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat not being indispensable parties but only proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3. By the dismissal of the case against defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat, the court a quohad lost jurisdiction over them. We have already pointed out that the joinder of proper parties is necessary in order to determine all the possible issues of the controversy; but if for some reason or another it is not possible to join them, as when they are out of the jurisdiction of the Court, the court may proceed without them, and the judgment that may be rendered shall be without prejudice to their rights. Hence, notwithstanding the absence of said defendants, the court could still proceed with the trial of the case as against the remaining defendants in accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.

Nevertheless, the court is constrained to affirm the dismissal of the complaint against all the defendants as there is merit in the argument raised by defendants-appellees that plaintiffs are barred by laches to bring suit against them. A perusal of the records shows that from the time of the execution of the deed of sale on July 17, 1961 to the time of the filing of the present complaint on August 29, 1969 or a period of 8 years, I month and 12 days, plaintiffs never took any step to enforce their rights which they claim to have despite the several opportunities available to them. Defendant Marcos Mangubat filed an ejectment suit against plaintiff Crisanta Seno in 1963 and this fact was admitted by the plaintiffs in their complaint. For failure of plaintiff to appear in the case, a decision was rendered by the trial court ordering plaintiffs to vacate the subject property 25 which decision was duly executed. 26 It further appears from the complaint that plaintiffs were well aware of the transfer of the title from the name of plaintiff Crisanta Seno to the names of defendants Marcos Mangubat, Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat and subsequently to the name of defendant Marcos Mangubat alone as early as 1963 when the ejectment case was filed against plaintiffs, and also they did not do anything about it. In January 1969, plaintiffs learned of the sale of the subject property to defendants-spouses Luzame. but it was only on August 29, 1969 when plaintiffs brought this action and only after an ejectment case was filed by said defendant spouses against plaintiff Crisanta Seno before the Municipal Court of Paranaque, Rizal on August 4, 1969. As defendants-appellees contend, before the nine-year period lapsed, plaintiffs never raised a voice to protest against all these proceedings. They chose to sleep on their rights and to rely on defendants' alleged word that their true agreement would be respected rather than bring their grievances to a court of law. However, when an ejectment case was filed against them just when the 10-year prescriptive period for bringing of their suit was nearly over, they finally decided to stake their claim against the defendants. By the negligence of plaintiffs in asserting their rights for an unreasonable length of time, they are now forever precluded from enforcing whatever right they may have against defendants. Indeed, it is an indicia of the infirmity of their claim. G.R. NO. 93010 August 30, 1990. NICENCIO TAN QUIOMBING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. FRANCISCO AND MANUELITA A. SALIGO, respondents. RULING: INCLUSION OF BISCOCHO AS CO-PLAINTIFF WOULD BE USELESS FORMALITY, BEING SOLIDARY CREDITORS, EITHER ONE OF THEM MAY SUE FOR THE RECOVERY OF DEBT. Facts:  This case stemmed stemmed from a “Construction and Service Agreement” whereby Nicencio Quiombing and Dante Biscocho jointly and severally bound themselves to construct a house for private respondents Saligo for P137, 940.00 which the latter agreed to pay.  Subsequently, Quiombing and Manuelita Saligo entered into a second written agreement whereby the latter acknowledged the completion of the house and undertook to pay the balance of the contract price.  Manuelita signed a promissory note for P125, 363.50 representing the amount still due from her and her husband payable on or before December 31, 1984 to Quiombing.  RTC: PETITIONER: RECOVERY OF MONEY.  RESPONDENTS: MOVED TO DISMISS.  ALLEGATION: BISCOCHO WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS CO-PLAINTIFF. o On October 9, 1986, Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. o Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Biscocho was an indispensable party and therefore should have been included as co-plaintiff.  RTC: MOTION GRANTED, COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

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Motion was denied but subsequently reconsidered and granted by the trial court. o Complaint was dismissed but without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint to include the other solidary creditor as co-plaintiff.  PETITIONER: APPEALED THE DISMISSAL.  ALLEGATION: SOLIDARY CREDITOR, COULD ACT ALONE. o Quiombing appealed the order of dismissal to the CA. o He argued that as a solidary creditor, he could act by himself alone in the enforcement of his claim against the respondents.  CA: AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.  Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether Biscocho should be joined as co-plaintiff in this case. HELD: NO.  It did not matter who as between Quiombing and Biscocho filed the complaint because private respondents were liable to either of the two as a solidary creditor for the full amount of the debt.  Full satisfaction of a judgement obtained against respondents by Quiombing would discharge their obligation to Biscocho and vice versa.  Hence, it was NOT necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho to file the complaint.  Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was competent to sue by himself alone, would be useless formality.  Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary because complete relief may be obtained from either.  The participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary, much less indispendable. COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. IMMIGRATION, Petitioner, vs. SCHEER, Respondent.

DOMINGO, BUREAU OF HERBERT MARKUS EMIL

Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals  Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, applied for avpermanent resident status and the same was granted o An Alien Certificate of Registration was issued in his favor  The Vice Consul informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany  respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him  the Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued a Summary Deportation Order against respondent Scheer  respondent, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order o complaint was dismissed  BOC did not resolve the respondent’s motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor deported  District Court of Straubing dismissed the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. o He was later on issued a regular passport to the respondent  BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration

 petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office and upon her orders, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his residence and held him in custody while awaiting his deportation o Despite entreaties from the respondents wife[21]and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the respondent  respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the respondents deportation  the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond  BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution pendente lite denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance  petitioner alleged that BOC was an indispensable party to the petition as it was a real party in interest and that petitioners failure to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition o petitioner claimed that the fact that Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the four Commissioners  Court of Appeals ruled: o There are quite a number of cases in relevant jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration Commissioner was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported o the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition ISSUE:

whether the members of the BOC were indispensable parties HELD: Yes  BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals  Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. o The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.  The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void.  The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff  However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action o Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an

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indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.. Supreme Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest.

 In this case, the CA did not require the respondent to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in some cases o The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases Chua vs. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, Aug. 30, 2005 Petition for ReviewR.45 Facts:  Chua filed a complaint for damges in RTCcaloocanimpleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff against defendants Jorge Torres(owner of Caltex) and Antonio Beltran(employee) The complaint alleged that Jonathan issued in favor of the Caltex Service Center his personal RCBC Check (P9,849.20) in payment for purchases of diesel oil. However, the check was dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment on the ground that the account was closed. Beltran sent petitioner a demand letter informing her of the dishonor of the check and demanding the payment thereof. Petitioner ignored the demand letter on the ground that she was not the one who issued the said check.Beltran instituted against petitioner a criminal action for violation (B.P. 22) filed in MTC-caloocan- issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The police officers tasked with serving the warrant looked for her in her residence, in the auto repair shop of her brother, and even at the Manila Central University were she was enrolled as a medical student, all to the alleged embarrassment and “social humiliation” of petitioner. Respondents move to dismiss the damage suit on the ground that Jonathan did not signed the verification and cerftification against non-forum shopping- granted Chua moved for MR-denied  Hence she went to SC via R.45 RULING: JONATHAN AS NECESSARY PARTY: Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as “one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.” Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. In this case Jonathan does not stand to be affected if RTC rule either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. This is due to the nature of the cause of action of the complaint, which alleges an injury personal to petitioner, and the relief prayed for, which is to be adjudicated solely to petitioner. There is no allegation in the complaint alleging any violation or omission of any right of Jonathan, either arising from contract or from law. MISJOINDER OF JONATHAN, EFFECT: A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place,

and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs. Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties, and the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motuproprio by the court,at any stage, without need for a motion to such effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit. It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to whatever act or omission of the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is inconsequential. Therefore, Jonathan’s failure to sign the certification against forum-shopping was not a ground for dismissal of complaint. G.R. No. 84895 May 4, 1989 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, JOSE D. CAMPOS, JR., petitioner-intervenor, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, TEODORO Q. PEÑA, GORGONIO MACARIOLA, ORLANDO PACIENCIA, JESUS TUPALAR SEVERINO DELA CRUZ, and FE CORTEZO, respondents. Facts:  Sandiganbayan  petitioner filed with respondent Court a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Alfredo (Bejo) T. Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Jose D. Campos, Jr. and forty five (45) other defendants including the above-named private respondents, seeking to 'recover from them ill-gotten wealth at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.  defendant Jose D, Campos, Jr., filed a 'Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Respect to Jose D. Campos' praying that he be removed as party defendant from the complaint on the grounds that he had:  voluntarily surrendered or turned over [any share in his name on any of the corporations referred to, aside from claiming any interest, ownership or right thereon] to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' and that  he was 'entitled to the immunity granted by the Presidential Commission on Good Government pursuant to Executive Order No. 14, under the Commission's Resolution dated May 28, 1986 ... to Mr. Jose Y. Campos (and) his family he 'being a member of the immediate family of Jose Y. Campos.'  petitioner (RP) filed with the respondent Court a 'Motion' seeking to drop defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. from the Complaint on the ground that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG for short) had, in a Resolution dated May 28, 1986, granted immunity to Mr. Jose Y. Campos and his family, which immunity necessarily extends to defendant Jose D. Campos, Jr. who is the son of said Mr. Jose Y. Campos.  private respondents opposed petitioner's motion

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Sandiganbayan DENIED petitioner's and Jose D. Campos, Jr.'s motions to drop him from the complaint. MOR was also DENIED  1) The PCGG did not then and does not now have the power to grant civil immunity;  2) Even if it did, the grant of immunity itself rendered in the PCGG's resolution dated May 28, 1986 has not been shown to cover the transactions involving the corporations and or properties for which Jose D. Campos, Jr., is now sought to be held accountable, i.e., Metroport Services, Inc.;  3) The fact is that nowhere, either in the original motions or in the Motion for Reconsideration before this Court has it been shown that, save for the alleged unqualified immunity, there no longer exists any demandable claim against Jose D. Campos, Jr., arising from the transactions resulting in his being impleaded thereon. In other words, were it not for the supposed grant of immunity, Jose D. Campos, Jr., would remain liable in the matter of Metroport Services, Inc., and for the 60% which Alfredo (Bejo) Romualdez acquired therein according to paragraph 14 (c) of the Complaint (supra) which does not appear to have been restored or compensated for. (p. 54, Rollo) The petitioner contends otherwise. The Solicitor General asserts that the name of Jose D. Campos, Jr. was included as defendant in the complaint through mistake or oversight and that pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court it has a right to drop him as defendant without prior consent of any party. The Solicitor General also maintains that although the defendants in the case were charged solidarily, Campos, Jr. was not an indispensable party since Article 1216 of the Civil Code allows the petitioner as solidary creditor to choose among the solidary debtors against whom it win enforce collection. Jose Campos, Jr. adds that the petitioner's motion to drop him as defendant should be considered as one filed under section 1, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court thus giving it the absolute right to dismiss the action by mere notice of dismissal.

SC  The petitioner (RP) charges the Sandiganbayan with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its motion to drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as defendant in its complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed against Jose D. Campos, Jr. and the other defendants  Petition in intervention of Jose D. Campos, Jr. Was allowed. ISSUE: WON the petitioner (RP) can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as party defendant by virtue of the PCGG's grant of immunity in favor of his father Jose Y. Campos and the latter's family. The PCGG was right when it filed a motion to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in the civil case. Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states: SECTION 11, RULE 3. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties Misjoinder of parties.-is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any patty or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. ... (Emphasis supplied) We interpreted this rule in the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425 (l975): ... the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. that it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes

that the original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested because it turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping be 'on such terms as are just-just to all the other parties. There is nothing whimsical or capricious in dropping the petitionerintervenor from the complaint. Quite the contrary, it is based on sound and salutary reasons. The PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that Campos, Jr. and all the other defendants were charged solidarily in the complaint does not make him an indispensable party. We have ruled in the case of Operators Incorporated v. American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154 SCRA 738 (1987)] that "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor 'may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." There is no showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as in defendant would be unjust to the other defendants in the civil case because, the other defendants can still pursue the case and put up their defenses. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is ordered to drop Jose Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case No. 0010. G.R. No. 166519 March 31, 2009 NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents. Facts Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the resolution denying reconsideration of the challenged decision. RTC Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of First Instance. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the occupied portion and to pay damages. Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of ownership and possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land. After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners’ failure to implead indispensable parties. The trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without prejudice. CA Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further, declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action.

With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1, 2004 Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition. Issue: Whether petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable parties gave rise to a ground for dismissal. Ruling The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for disposition on the merits. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their coowners as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other coowners who are indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith. Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City, et al. v. Mario D. Ebio and His Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision[1] and June 8, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155. Below are the facts. Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy,[4] Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name.[5] Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.[6] Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedros advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said compound.[7] On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights[8] ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.

Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedros name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebios name.[9] On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1999[10] seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound[11] traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.[12] In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.[13] On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of ownership over the affected property.[14] On November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was reached by and among the parties.[15] On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.[16] Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.[17] The request remained unheeded. Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.[18] In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[19] On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[20] denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party. Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.[21] Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of Appeals-The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8. The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City Government of Paraaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot. On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,

2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest. Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case. xxxx The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x x x. xxxx Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x. xxxx We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which bolster their right over the subject property. x x x. xxxx In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over the property in question. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.[22] On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT.[23] The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether the character of

respondents possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction. The petition is without merit. An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act.[24] It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may issue.[25] In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of Paraaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the action. We do not agree. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cutcut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect,[26] in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads: ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.[27] Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.[28] In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain.[29] Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.[30] Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,[31] the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law. Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.[32] In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.[33] In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Paraaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed. We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.

A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.[34] A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing.[35] It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.[36] In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-ininterest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Paraaque. From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership.[37] A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.[38] Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit? We answer in the negative. Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application for sales patent. Respondents application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.[39] Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Carandang v Feirs of Quinrino de Guzman, GR 160347, November 2006 Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Facts: [Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System. The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by [the spouses Carandang]. MBS again increased its capital stock [the spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. [De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by him. Thus [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said total amount. [The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the

amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang] and [de Guzman], for [Arcadio Carandang’s] technical expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment. [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover the sum of money together with damages. The TC rendered in favour of de Guzman. The spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the court’s decision. Issue: W/N the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court? Held: No. Ratio: The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any such legal representative appeared in court to be substituted for the deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be substituted for the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution was effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of the estate of her deceased mother. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the RTC. In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzman’s counsel. Indispensable parties in partition action. Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al., G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015 Facts: Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land in Iloilo City. He had 2 children with his first wife, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and 7 children with his second wife, namely, Mateo, Sr, Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo and Cebeleo, Sr. He also begot 3 illegitimate children, namely Eduardo, Rogelio and Ricardo. Both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. leaving children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Santiago, who allegedly bought the shares of majority of the heirs of a property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed a complaint for partition but did not implead Mateo, Sr.’s children. RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC held that Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon. CA, on appeal, dismissed Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition. It held the Mateo, Sr.’s children are indispensable parties to the judicial partition and thus, their non-inclusion as defendants would necessarily result in its dismissal. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of the heirs of Santiago, hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Is the action for partition proper without impleading Mateo, Sr.’s children? Held: No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties.

The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. (Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 486 Phil. 366, 379-380 (2004), citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA, 450 Phil. 532, 541 (2003); further citation omitted). Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235, 265 (2004). With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 345, the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. x x x In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.

G.R. No. 180654 April 21, 2014 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN, PASTOR B. VICHUACO (IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATAAN) and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF BATAAN, Respondents. DECISION

ABAD, J.: This case is about the distinction between an action contesting a local tax assessment and an action seeking to enjoin the local government from enforcing a tax assessment against a person who claims that the taxable business does not belong to him. The Facts and the Case On March 28, 2003 petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise tax delinquency from the respondent Provincial Government of Bataan (the Province) for ₱45.9 million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The Province based its assessment on the NPC’s sale of electricity that it generated from two power plants in Bataan. Rather than pay the tax or reject it, the NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the computation pending the decision of the Supreme Court in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan,1 a case where the issue of the NPC’s exemption from the payment of local franchise tax was then pending. On May 12 and 14, 2003 the Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC, calling its attention to the Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan that held the NPC liable for the payment of local franchise tax. The NPC replied, however, that it had ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax after Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9136, also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) that took effect on June 26, 2001. The new law relieved the NPC of the function of generating and supplying electricity beginning that year. Consequently, the Province has no right to further assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local franchise tax. Ignoring the NPC’s view, the Province issued a "Warrant of Levy" on 14 real properties that it used to own in Limay, Bataan. In March 2004 the Province caused their sale at public auction with itself as the winning bidder. Shortly after, the NPC received a copy of the Certificate of Sale of Real Property covering the auctioned properties for ₱60,477,285.22, the amount of its franchise tax delinquency. On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition for declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Province, the provincial treasurer, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The NPC alleged that the foreclosure had no legal basis since R.A. 7160 which authorized the collection of local franchise tax had been modified by the EPIRA. The latter law provided that power generation is not a public utility operation requiring a franchise, hence, not taxable. What remains subject to such tax is the business of transmission and distribution of electricity since these required a national franchise. As it happened, NPC had ceased by operation of the EPIRA in 2001 to engage in power transmission, given that all its facilities for this function, including its nationwide franchise, had been transferred to the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO). Thus, the NPC asked the RTC to issue a preliminary injunction, enjoining the transfer of title and the sale of the foreclosed lands to Bataan and, after trial, to make the injunction permanent, declare NPC exempt from the local franchise tax and annul the foreclosure sale. On November 3, 2005 the RTC dismissed the NPC’s petition, stating that the franchise tax was not based on ownership of property but on the NPC’s exercise of the privilege of doing business within Bataan. Further, the NPC presented no evidence that it had ceased to operate its power plants in that jurisdiction. The NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the Province moved to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction of that court over the subject matter of the case. The Province pointed out that, although the NPC denominated its suit before the RTC as one for declaration of nullity of foreclosure sale, it was essentially a local tax case questioning the validity of the Province’s imposition of the local franchise tax. Any appeal from the action should, therefore, be lodged with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). On November 27, 2007 the CA granted the Province’s motion and dismissed the petition on the ground cited. Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that the NPC no longer owned or operated the business subject to local franchise tax and that the Province cannot execute on former NPC properties that had been taken from it and transferred to other government corporations. Ruling of the Court The RTC found that the NPC failed to present evidence that it no longer owned or operated the business subject to local franchise tax and that the properties the Province levied on did not belong to it. But proving these things did not require the presentation of evidence in this case since these events took place by operation of law, particularly the EPIRA. Thus, Section 8 of the EPIRA provides: SEC. 8. Creation of the National Transmission Company. There is hereby created a National Transmission Corporation, hereinafter referred to as TRANSCO, which shall assume the electrical transmission function of the National Power Corporation (NPC), and have the power and functions hereinafter granted. The TRANSCO shall assume the authority and responsibility of NPC for the planning, construction and centralized operation and maintenance of its high voltage transmission facilities, including grid interconnections and ancillary services. Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, the transmission and subtransmission facilities of NPC and all other assets related to transmission operations, including the nationwide franchise of NPC for the operation of the transmission system and the grid, shall be transferred to the TRANSCO. The TRANSCO shall be wholly owned by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM Corp.). The subtransmission functions and assets shall be segregated from the transmission functions, assets and liabilities for transparency and disposal: Provided, That the subtransmission assets shall be operated and maintained by TRANSCO until their disposal to qualified distribution utilities which are in a position to take over the responsibility for operating, maintaining, upgrading, and expanding said assets. All transmission and subtransmission related liabilities of NPC shall be transferred to and assumed by the PSALM Corp. TRANSCO shall negotiate with and thereafter transfer such functions, assets, and associated liabilities to the qualified distribution utility or utilities connected to such subtransmission facilities not later that two (2) years from the effectivity of this act or the start of open access, whichever comes earlier: x x x. xxxx The above created the TRANSCO and transferred to it the NPC’s electrical transmission function with effect on June 26, 2001. The NPC, therefore, ceased to operate that business in Bataan by operation of law. Since the local franchise tax is imposed on the privilege of operating a franchise, not a tax on the ownership of the transmission facilities, it is clear that such tax is not a liability of the NPC. Nor could the Province levy on the transmission facilities to satisfy the tax assessment against the NPC since, as Section 8 above further provides, the latter ceased to own those facilities six months from the effectivity of the EPIRA. Those facilities have since belonged to TRANSCO. The legislative emasculation of the NPC also covered its former power generation function, which was the target of the Province’s effort to collect the local franchise tax for 2001, 2002, and 2003. Section 49 of the EPIRA provides: SEC. 49. Creation of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation. - There is hereby created a government-owned and controlled corporation to be known as the "Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation," hereinafter referred to as the "PSALM Corp.," which shall take ownership of all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, IPP contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets. All outstanding obligations of the NPC arising from loans, issuances of bonds, securities and other instruments of indebtedness shall be transferred to and assumed by the PSALM Corp. within one hundred eighty (180) days from the approval of this Act.1âwphi1 Section 49 above created the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM Corp.) and transferred to it all of the NPC's "generation assets" which would include the Bataan

Thermal Plant. Clearly, the NPC had ceased running its former power transmission and distribution business in Bataan by operation of law from June 26, 2001. It is, therefore, not the proper party subject to the local franchise tax for operating that business. Parenthetically, Section 49 also transferred "all existing xx x liabilities" of the NPC to PSALM Corp., presumably including its unpaid liability for local franchise tax from January 1 to June 25, 2001. Consequently, such tax is collectible solely from PSALM Corp. An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter and in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable.2Here, since the subject properties belong to PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO, they are certainly indispensable parties to the case that must be necessarily included before it may properly go forward. For this reason, the proceedings below that held the NPC liable for the local franchise tax is a nullity. It did not matter where the RTC Decision was appealed, whether before the CA or the CTA. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition of the National Power Corporation and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 87218 dated November 27, 2007. It further REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court so that the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation and the National Transmission Corporation may be impleaded as proper parties. SO ORDERED. [ G.R. No. 208343, February 03, 2016 ] SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS AND MONINA P. LAUS, AND SPOUSES ANTONIO O. KOH AND ELISA T. KOH, PETITIONERS, VS. OPTIMUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENT. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated March 25, 2013 and the Resolution[3] dated July 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122258, which lifted the writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) issued by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 62 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 12307 in favor of petitioners Spouses Ceferino C. Laus and Monina P. Laus, and Spouses Antonio O. Koh and Elisa T. Koh (petitioners), and dismissed their complaint for damages against respondent Optimum Security Services, Inc. (respondent).

The Facts On October 3, 2005, petitioners filed a complaint,[4] denominated as one for "Damages with Application for a Temporary Restraining Order [(TRO)] and [WPI]," docketed as Civil Case No. 12307, against respondent, several security guards employed by it, including Ronnie Marivalles (Marivalles) and Rodrigo Olivette, and TIPCO Estate Corporation (TIPCO; collectively, other defendants). Petitioners alleged that on three (3) separate occasions in August 2005, they were prevented by armed security guards working for respondent and TIPCO from entering the eight (8) parcels of land in Mabalacat, Pampanga belonging to them, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 576602-R,[5] 578037-R,[6] 578038-R,[7] 578039R,[8] 575138-R,[9] 575112-R,[10] 576601-R,[11] and 576603-R[12] (subject properties).[13] Thus, petitioners prayed that: (a) moral, exemplary, and liquidated damages be awarded to them; (b) a TRO and WPI be issued directing the respondent and the other defendants to refrain from interfering with the exercise of their rights as owners of the subject properties; and (c) after trial, the injunction be made permanent.[14] Opposing petitioners' application for TRO and WPI, respondent and Marivalles countered[15] that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and WPI prayed for because they do not own the subject properties. They maintained that Margarita dela Rosa, Manuel dela Pena, Michael Pineda, Fermin Dizon, William Lee, and Odon Sibug are the real owners thereof, who authorized[16] Mr. Ranilo M. Arceo (Mr. Arceo) to enter into the Security Service Contract[17] with respondent to secure the subject properties.[18] Respondent and Marivalles

further insisted that they acted in good faith in denying petitioners and their agents access to the subject properties as they were merely complying with a contractual obligation.[19] Moreover, they claimed that the signatures appearing on the Deeds of Sale, which were the source of petitioners' titles, were forged and, in fact, a petition for cancellation of petitioners' titles was filed by Jose Bermudo, one of the original holders of the emancipation patent over three (3) parcels of land in the subject properties, which was still pending before another court.[20] Respondent and Marivalles subsequently filed their Answer[21] where they added that petitioners did not suffer any injury as no wrongful act was committed against them.[22] Accordingly, they prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit, and that damages and attorney's fees be awarded to them.[23]

The Issue Before the Court The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in lifting the WPI issued by the RTC and in dismissing petitioners' complaint.

The Court's Ruling The

petition

is

partly

meritorious.

I. On the other hand, TIPCO denied preventing petitioners from entering the subject properties. It pointed out that it did not claim ownership or possession thereof, and, as such, did not hire the armed security guards who prevented petitioners from entering the subject properties.[24]

The RTC Ruling In an Order[25] dated October 6, 2010, the RTC granted the application for WPI based on its finding that petitioners had presented sufficient evidence to establish that they are the registered owners of the subject properties and thereby, have the right to possess the same. It found no merit in respondent's defense that petitioners were not the real owners of the said properties, observing that the former failed to present the alleged real owners of the subject properties to support its claim. Accordingly, it enjoined respondent and the other defendants from interfering with petitioners' exercise of acts of ownership over the same.[26] Dissatisfied, respondent and TIPCO separately moved for reconsideration,[27] but were denied in an Order[28] dated August 31, 2011. Consequently, respondent elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122258.[29]

The CA Ruling In a Decision[30] dated March 25, 2013, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and thereby, lifted the WPI and ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint. In so ruling, the CA observed, inter alia, that the WPI was intended to oust respondent and the other defendants from the subject properties, which, under prevailing jurisprudence, is not allowed where the claimant's title has not been clearly established by law, as in this case where petitioners' titles are under contest and they have failed to establish their prior possession of the subject properties.[31] To this, it emphasized that the purpose of a WPI is to preserve the status quo ante or the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status prior to the controversy; but in this case, the injunctive writ created another situation by transferring the possession of the subject properties to the petitioners.[32] Further, the CA held that respondent was not a real party in interest as it was merely contracted to secure the subject properties under the Security Service Contract, which had since lapsed without being renewed.[33] In this relation, it opined that the alleged real owners of the subject properties are the real parties in interest, without whom there can be no final determination of the issues involved.[34] Thus, the CA ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[35] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[36] dated July 22, 2013; hence, the present petition.

To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.[37] Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed.[38] After all, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.[39] While it is a general rule that a trial court's discretion in issuing injunctive writs should not be interfered with,[40] the Court finds the CA's lifting of the WPI issued by the RTC in this case to be proper, considering that the foregoing parameters were not observed, thus, tainting the trial court's issuance with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As aptly pointed out by the CA, although petitioners appear to be the registered owners of the subject properties, they nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual physical possession of the same at the time the incidents in August 2005 transpired. In fact, a cursory perusal of the complaint readily shows that petitioners never alleged that they were in prior possession of the subject properties. All that was stated therein is that respondent and the other defendants "[refuse] to recognize and respect [their] ownership and peaceful possession" of the subject properties.[41] Meanwhile, respondent alleged in its Opposition and Answer that petitioners were not in possession of the subject properties, and that the real owners thereof have been in possession of the subject properties since 1996 and 1997.[42] The dispute concerning the ownership of the subject properties was detailed by the CA as follows: As alleged by [respondent], these subject parcels of land were from four (4) original emancipation patent holders, namely: Marciano Lansangan, Vivencio Mercado, Crisencio Pineda[,] and Jose Bermudo. Said persons sold the same in 1996 and 1997 to certain individuals, namely: Margarita dela Rosa, Manuel dela Pena, Michael Pineda, Fermin Dizon, William Lee[,] and Odon Sibug, whom [respondent] pointed to as its principals. These aforementioned buyers were among those who authorized [Mr. Arceo] as their Attorney-in-[F]act to enter into a Security Service Contract with [respondent]. True to their claim of ownership over [the subject properties], Alexander Bermudo, one of the alleged patent holders, filed a Petition for Annulment of Title with Damages against [petitioners]. Likewise, Margarita dela Rosa[,] one of [respondent's] alleged principals, also filed a case against [petitioners] involving Lot 61 which is also claimed by them, and which case is still pending before the same lower court.[43] To reiterate, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed, as in this case. As earlier intimated, preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy. Therefore, it should not create new relations between the parties, but must only maintain the status quo until the merits of the

case is fully heard.[44] Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the WPI involved herein. Besides, as the CA further observed, the WPI issued by the RTC no longer serves any purpose, considering that respondent already vacated the subject properties since the Security Service Contract with Mr. Arceo had already expired.[45] Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer for preliminary injunction should be denied.[46] Indeed, when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition had already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited.[47] An injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done.[48]

II. While the CA was correct in lifting the WPI, it, however, erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The error springs from the CA's misconception that the alleged real owners of the subject properties, while real parties in interest, are indispensable parties to the case. The distinction between the two and the operational parameters as to each are well-settled in jurisprudence. As held in Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman,[49] the Court clarified that: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. x x x "[I]f a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action." However, [the dismissal on this ground entails] an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.[50] (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Meanwhile, in Plasabas v. CA,[51] it was held that "the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith."[52] In this case, while the alleged real owners of the subject properties may be considered as real parties in interest for the reason that their supposed rights over these properties stand to be prejudiced, they are not indispensable parties to the instant suit. Despite its denomination as an action for "damages' in the complaint's caption,[53] the action, as may be gleaned from the pleading's allegations,[54]is really one for injunction as it ultimately seeks to permanently enjoin respondent and the other defendants, from restricting petitioners' access to the subject properties.[55] The crux of the main case, therefore, is whether or not respondent and said defendants were justified in preventing petitioners from conducting the relocation survey on the subject properties. Damages are also sought as ancillary relief for the acts complained of. These issues can be resolved independent of the participation of the alleged real owners of the subject properties. Hence, they are not indispensable parties, without whom no final determination can be had.

In any event, even on the assumption that they are indispensable parties, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is, as abovediscussed, still not a ground for the dismissal of the suit. The proper course of action is for the court to order that they be impleaded. Only upon refusal of or non-compliance with such directive, may the complaint be dismissed. In view of the nature of the case as above-explained, respondent and the other defendants are real parties in interest. Clearly, they stand to be directly injured by an adverse judgment. They are the parties against whom the prayed for injunction is directed and are also alleged to be liable for the resultant damage. In fine, the petition is partially granted. While the CA's lifting of the WPI is affirmed, its order dismissing the complaint is reversed. As a consequence, the complaint should be reinstated and the main case should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. With this pronouncement, there is no need to delve on the ancillary issues raised herein. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated March 25, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122258 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the complaint is REINSTATED. The main case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 62 for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.