Civpro_rule3_sec4-6_digests.docx

G.R. No. 191170, September 14, 2016 CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. FIDEL O. CHUA AND FILIDEN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent. DECISION SERENO, C.J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 103809. The CA Decision annulled the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC Branch 258), which joined petitioner as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 01-0207. The CA Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. FACTS In 1988, respondents obtained an initial loan of P4 million from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over three parcels of land located in Parañaque City (subject property).4 The real estate mortgage was amended several times to accommodate additional loans they incurred over the years.5 On 13 January 2000, respondents and Metrobank restructured the obligation through a Debt Settlement Agreement over the outstanding obligation of P88,101,093.98.6chanrobleslaw For failure of respondents to pay, Metrobank sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over the subject property. On 4 May 2001, it sent them a Notice of Sale7 setting the public auction on 31 May 2001. Seeking to stop the intended public auction, respondents filed a Complaint8docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0207 for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction and damages. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 (RTC Branch 257), issued a TRO.9 However, upon the expiration of the TRO, Metrobank scheduled another public auction on 8 November 2001. On the morning of that day, RTC Branch 257 issued an Order directing Metrobank to reschedule the intended sale to a date after the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction.10 However, the latter allegedly received the Order only on 12 November 2001 and pushed through with the scheduled public auction on 8 November 2001. A Certificate of Sale11 was thereafter issued in its favor on 9 November 2001. In an Order dated 6 March 2002,12 the application for preliminary injunction filed by respondents was denied by RTC Branch 257 for mootness in view of the consummated public auction sale. When their motion for reconsideration was denied,13 respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Order dated 6 March 2002 issued by RTC Branch 257 and remanded Civil Case No. 01-0207 for further proceedings.14chanrobleslaw Upon motion of respondents, the presiding judge of RTC Branch 257 inhibited from further hearing the case.15 The case was later reraffled to RTC Branch 258.16chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint17 with attached Amended Verified Complaint18 for annulment of foreclosure of mortgage, declaration of nullity of certificate of sale, and injunction. On 17 October 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Joinder of Party and/or Substitution.19 It alleged that by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17 September 2003,20 Metrobank sold to Asia Recovery Corporation (ARC) its credit against respondents including all rights, interests, claims and causes of action arising out of the loan and mortgage agreements between Metrobank and respondents. ARC, in turn, specifically assigned the credit to petitioner through a Deed of Assignment dated 31 March 2006.21Petitioner prayed that it be substituted in lieu of Metrobank in the proceedings before RTC Branch 258. Aside from its conforme to the motion filed by petitioner, Metrobank also filed a Comment22 stating that the bank had no objection to its substitution by petitioner. Metrobank explained that the account of respondents had been declared a nonperforming loan pursuant to Republic Act No. 9182 (Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002 or SPV Act) and, as such, had been included among the other accounts sold to ARC by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale.23chanrobleslaw The motion of petitioner was, however, vigorously opposed by respondents.24 They alleged that they were entitled to a full disclosure of the details of the sale, as well as of the transfer and assignment of their debt pursuant to their right of redemption under the SPV Act and Article 163425cralawred of the Civil Code. RULING OF THE RTC In an Order dated 28 December 2007,26 RTC Branch 258 granted the motion and ordered petitioner to be joined as party-defendant, but without dropping Metrobank as defendant. In the Order dated 9 April 2008,27 RTC Branch 258 denied respondents' motion for reconsideration. It ruled that petitioner was a necessary party to the final determination of the case. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. RULING OF THE CA In the assailed Decision dated 26 August 2009,28 the CA granted the petition and annulled the Orders of RTC Branch 258. The CA ruled that if it was true that Metrobank had divested itself of any interest in respondents' debt, then the trial court should have forthwith ordered the bank's exclusion from the proceedings.29 According to the CA, the trial court provided for a provisional joinder/substitution of parties - a practice that cannot be countenanced due to the basic rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.30chanrobleslaw The appellate court also doubted whether substitution was proper, because the Deed of Absolute Sale between Metrobank and ARC did not specify whether respondents' debt was included in the portfolio of nonperforming loans sold.31chanrobleslaw

At bottom, the CA ruled that petitioner could not substitute for Metrobank in the proceedings before the trial court without first disclosing the consideration paid by petitioner for the transfer of interest.32chanrobleslaw Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in the challenged Resolution dated 11 February 2010.33chanrobleslaw

Nevertheless, "[w]hether or not the transferee should be substituted for, or should be joined with, the original party is largely a matter of discretion."42 That discretion is exercised in pursuance of the paramount consideration that must be afforded for the protection of the parties' interests and right to due process.43chanrobleslaw Notably, unless the exercise of that discretion is shown to be arbitrary, this Court is not inclined to review acts committed by the courts a quo.44chanrobleslaw

ISSUE The issue to be resolved in this case is simple: whether petitioner may be joined as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 01-0207. OUR RULING We

grant

the

petition.

As stated at the outset, the instant petition seeks a Rule 45 review of a Rule 65 decision of the CA. We stated in Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corp.34 that our task in these cases is not to determine the correctness of the ruling of the trial court, but to examine whether the CA correctly determined the existence of grave abuse of discretion in the Orders of RTC Branch 258 allowing the joinder of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0207. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides the rule on the joinder of parties:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. The rationale for allowing parties to join in a proceeding that delves on a common question of law or fact concerning them is trial convenience; i.e., to save the parties unnecessary work, trouble and expense.35In order to meet the requirements of justice and convenience, the rule on the joinder of parties is construed with considerable flexibility.36 Hence, courts are given broad discretion in determining who may properly be joined in a proceeding.37chanrobleslaw The rules also provide that in case of a transfer of interest, the court, upon motion, may direct the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.38chanrobleslaw Indeed, a transferee pendente lite is a proper party that stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor, the original party. 39 Transferees are bound by the proceedings and judgment in the case, such that there is no need for them to be included or impleaded by name.40 We have even gone further and said that the transferee is joined or substituted in the pending action by operation of law from the exact moment when the transfer of interest is perfected between the original party and the transferee.41chanrobleslaw

In this case, part of the reason why the CA ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the trial court was the latter's statement in the Order dated 28 December 2007 as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Thus, the Court hereby grants that [petitioner] be joined as party defendant in this case without dropping Metrobank at this stage conditioned, however, that if in the course of the trial, the Court finds that based on the testimonial and documentary evidence to be presented by Metrobank that it can be dropped, the same shall be effected pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary According to the CA, this statement allowed for a "provisional" joinder/substitution of parties. It is difficult to fathom how the above statement of the trial court could have constituted grave abuse of discretion when the ruling was in accordance with Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The rule provides that parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. For the CA to say that, as between Metrobank and petitioner, "only one of them is clothed with the personality to actively participate in the proceedings below"46 is to show a regrettable lack of understanding of the rules and an unwarranted restriction of the trial court's discretion. Contrary to the finding of the CA, there is enough evidence in the records to support the fact of the transfer of interest between Metrobank and petitioner. The CA highlights only that it was not clear whether respondents' debt was included in the portfolio of nonperforming loans sold to ARC. The appellate court then turned a blind eye to the representations of Metrobank before the trial court confirming the fact of the transfer of interest to ARC and then later to petitioner. The admission by Metrobank sufficiently supplied whatever was omitted by the non-presentation of the entire portfolio of nonperforming loans. The non-presentation may be understandable in view of the sensitive nature of the portfolio and its contents. At any rate, the Deed of Assignment clearly spelled out that all of the rights, title, and interest over respondents' loan, which had an outstanding principal balance of P88,101,093.98, had been transferred by ARC to petitioner. We observe that the CA effectively ruled that the disclosure of the consideration for the transfer of rights was a condition precedent for the joinder of petitioner in the proceedings. In order not to preempt judgment or make a pronouncement as to any matter other than the pertinent issue before it, this Court will simply remind the CA and the parties that a disclosure of the consideration for the transfer of interest is not among the following requirements for a party to be joined in a proceeding: (1) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (2) there is a question of law or fact common to all the parties; and (3) the joinder is not otherwise prohibited by the rules on jurisdiction and

venue.47chanrobleslaw In fine, we find that the CA erred in ruling that RTC Branch 258 committed grave abuse of discretion when the latter allowed the joinder of petitioner as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 01-0207. Under the rules, the trial court is given wide discretion and enough leeway to determine who may be joined in a proceeding, or whether a party may properly be substituted by another due to a transfer of interest. Within the premises, the trial court's grant of the joinder cannot be seriously assailed. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 26 August 2009 and Resolution dated 11 February 2010 in CAG.R. SP No. 103809 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

5.

6.

The Orders dated 28 December 2007 and 9 April 2008 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258, are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

DOH v Phil Pharmawealth GR No. 182358 Department of Health, Secretary Alfredo Romualdez, USec. Margarita Galon, petitioner; Philippine Pharmawealth, Inc, respondent;

7.

February 20, 2013 Second Division Del Castillo, J. FACTS: 1.

2.

3.

4.

On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1995 was issued by then Department of Health Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez. AO 27 sets the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public, such accreditation to be valid for three years but subject to annual review. On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2006 which amended AO 27. Under Sec 7 of AO 10, accreditation period for government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to 2 years. Also, accreditation of Pharmaceutical companies may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due deliberation and proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman. Sec 7 of AO 10 was later amended AO 66 series of 2008 which stated that the 2 year accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman. On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C9 which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers. In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon, issued

8.

9.

ISSUE:

Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000 inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000. During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled “Report on Violative Products” issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies’ products. PPI’s products were included as BFAD found that PPI’s products sold to the public were unfit for human consumption. The companies were directed to submit their respective explanations on the findings within 10 days. PPI did not submit its reply on time. Instead, it submitted a letter stating that it is referring the matter to its lawyers for preparation of a reply but with no indicated date of compliance, which DOH Usec Galon found untenable, thus she informed PPI thru letter that its accreditation had been suspended for two years in accordance with AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C. PPI thru letter, demanded that Usec Galon cease and desist from enforcing the suspension under pain of legal redress. PPI then filed a complaint to declare certain DOH issuances (Memorandum No. 171-C, AO 10, Series 2000, Usec Galon’s suspension order; and AO 14, Series 2001) null and void for being in violation of Section 26, Republic Act 3720, with prayer for injunction and damages against Usec Galon and later DOH Secretary Dayrit. It claimed that its accreditation was suspended without due notice and hearing. It prayed that it be awarded moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. The respondent DOH officials filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that it gave PPI the opportunity to explain but it did not do so in a timely manner. The suspension was necessary to stop the distribution and sale of substandard products. In a Manifestation and Motion, the DOH officials further moved to dismiss the case as it was a suit against the State; the complaint was improperly verified; and the corporate officer lacked the authority to file the suit. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case, holding that the suit is against the State, thus the principle of immunity form suit is applicable. On appeal to the CA, however, the latter reversed and set aside the RTC decision. According to the CA, it was premature for the RTC to have dismissed the case, as the cause of actions were sufficiently alleged in the complaint. Further, by filing a complaint, the DOH officials hypothetically admitted the allegations in the complaintthat they were being sued in their official and private capacities. Thus the DOH officials, herein petitioners, elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that PPI’s prayer for damages should be considered a suit against the State for it would require the needed appropriation to satisfy PPI’s claim for damages should it win. In issuing the assailed DOH issuances, they acted within the scope of their authority, hence should not be made to account individually. Petition was granted.

Whether or not DOH, in this circumstance, is under the mantle of state immunity. HELD: As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its nonsuability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity, x x x no such waiver may be implied.” “Statutory provisions waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

CASE DIGEST: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS FACTS: Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions. The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00. ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent? HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a

claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203 (1952) Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952) The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991. DENIED. G.R. No. L-27058 January 17, 1973 AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, vs. CIRIO H. SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.

INC., plaintiff-appellee,

William H. Quasha and Associates for plaintiff-appellee. Ernesto T. Zschornack, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.: This case is on appeal directly to this Court by the defendant from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 48318, sentencing him to pay the plaintiff the amount of $15,297.53,

plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed and 25% of the amount due by way of attorneys fees. The essential facts were the subject of stipulation in court below after the parties had filed their respective pleadings and the court had scheduled the case for pre-trial. The plaintiff is a foreign corporation with main office in New York City and a branch office in the Philippines which is duly registered and licensed to transact business as a travel agent. As part of such business and for convenience of its customers the plaintiff has adopted a credit system known as the American Express Credit Card whereby upon application of a customer the plaintiff may issue to him a credit card by means of which he may enjoy charge privileges in establishments all over the world listed in directories issued periodically by the company for the guidance of its card holders. On November 6, 1959 the defendant applied for one such card to the plaintiff at the latter's office in New York City and upon such application the corresponding American Express Credit Card was issued to him. Thereafter and before the card expired was cancelled as of June 20, 1961 the defendant used it in making purchases and obtaining services on credit in various foreign countries, such as Hongkong in June of 1960, and France, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Italy and HongKong in May and June of 1961. The credit charges he obtained ran up to a total of $15,297.53. In September 1961 the plaintiff made demands for payment upon the defendant, and after the latter refused to pay filed the presented suit for collection. The main defense raised by the defendant in his answer to the complaint and now reiterated in his brief as appellant before this Court is that the appellee has no cause of action against him, not being the real party in interest, the allegation that the credit card issued by the appellee was merely to introduce the appellant to the different establishments from which he made purchases and obtained services on credit and that it was these establishments who should properly have brought the suit. The court below, however, found as a fact — and this is not disputed here — that the stores or establishments which sold goods and services to the appellant on credit "bills the American Express Corporation which settles the accounts directly and, in turn bills the customers who possess the credit cards." The court added: "in other words, with the possession of the credit card, the possessor could purchase on credit from any store, and he could do that because the purchases on credit are backed-up by the American Express Corporation thru the credit card. This corporation pays for the purchase and the defendant has to reimburse such payment to the owner of the credit card; in this case to the plaintiff." The appellant presented no evidence in his behalf, only relying on the stipulation of facts. On the other hand the appellee presented as evidence not only the application signed by the appellant for the issuance of the credit card, manifesting conformity to the condition therein stated but also the testimony, in the form of deposition upon written interrogatories, of its employee, George R. de Salvio, who described the operation of the company's credit card system as follows:

and in turn they bill American Express Company for these goods and services. The American Express Company reimburses the establishments and in turn bills the credit card holders for whom the goods were delivered or services performed. The credit card holders are sent a statement once a month supported by all original charge forms. xxx xxx xxx A.-8 The service establishments submit charges and summaries to the American Express Company and we pay for these summaries, less the discount, once a week. Question 9: After the cardholder's accounts are paid to the establishments concerned by plaintiff, what obligation, if any, has the cardholder to plaintiff concerning the accounts thus paid by plaintiff? A.-9 He is obligated to pay the American Express Company upon receipt of this monthly billing. On the same point the witness also stated that the charge orders of the appellant were in due course of business submitted by the establishments concerned to the appellee for payment and paid by the latter. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the appellee is the creditor of the appellant and as such is the proper party to file this suit for collection. The other points raised by the appellant in his brief have to do with certain objections of his to a number of questions directed by the appellee to its employee and witness, George R. de Salvio, in the latter's deposition taken upon written interrogatories. The objections were mostly on technical grounds, such as, for example, that the matter sought to be elicited from the witness had already been admitted in the stipulation of facts, or that it was irrelevant and immaterial; that the question was leading, or vague, or sought to obtain from the witness a conclusion. We have considered the nature and the phrasing of the questions objected to and We find that the objections are either groundless or have no material bearing on the merits of the case. The appellant also objected to the admission of the aforesaid deposition as a whole on the ground that the procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 24 was not followed, particularly that portion which states that the officer who took the deposition shall "promptly file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by registered mail to the Clerk of Court thereof for filing." The noncompliance with this rule, according to the appellant, consists in the fact that it was the appellee's counsel who picked up the deposition from the Department of Foreign Affairs and delivered it to the Clerk of Court instead of its being filed directly with the latter. The appellee's explanation in this regard, which stands uncontradicted and which the trial court considered satisfactory, is as follows: xxx xxx xxx

A.-6: We appoint service establishments who accept our credit card. They perform services or deliver goods to our cardholders

... . The Philippine Consulate in New York by letter dated October 8, 1965 notified the undersigned of the transmission

on said date of the deposition "through the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Clerk of Court; yet, it was verified from the Clerk of Court that as of November 19, 1965 the deposition was not yet received. Upon inquiry with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the latter advised the undersigned that it received the sealed envelope from the consulate on October 20, 1965 and turned it over on October 25, 1965, to its record section, which until November 19, 1965, had done nothing towards transmitting the deposition to the court. This prompted the Department of Foreign Affairs to request the undersigned to take care of having the deposition filed with the court, which the undersigned consented to do, and did by means of their letter to the Clerk of Court dated November 19, 1965 (Exh. G-1) only to expedite filing of the deposition and "to accommodate the Department of Foreign Affairs." The undersigned received the sealed envelope from the Department of Foreign Affairs and delivered it in exactly the same condition to the Clerk of Court. xxx xxx xxx We do not believe that the manner, in which the deposition was delivered to the Clerk of Court, as above related, so affected its integrity as to render it inadmissible. After all there is no pretense here that the appellant did not contract the indebtedness for the collection of which he is being sued or that the same has been paid, the only important issue posed in this appeal being whether or not the appellee is the real party in interest. On this score the finding of the lower court, supported as it is by the evidence before it, is conclusive. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with modification as to the principal amount to be paid by the appellant, which is reduced to US $14,952.31 in view of the waiver by the appellee of its claim to US $345.22, and the further modification that payment of the said amount, together with the attorneys fees and costs, both in this instance and below, should be made in Philippine currency according to the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of such payment. Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.