La Guerre Revolutionnaire

Lieutenant Colonel Dorm A. Starry, United States Armg _

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N3 July 1962 France turned over control of Algeria to the D&mcratic People’s Republic of Algeria. The French Empire had withered as a result of spreading anticolonialism and the mortal debilitation of French etrength in the first great war of tbk century. At the end of World War II, the French were the first to meet the expending Cormpnnist revolution in a form which has rsceived wide recognition in the reet of the world only recsntly. For when most of the world was fusused on traditional ideas of general war and its doctrine of maesive retaliation, the French were in Indoshina struggling with Ho ChL minh’s inheritance from Mao Tse-tung —the war of “national liheration~ the Comnmniet revolution. In the IndocNlneee War, the French military forces, in tragic defeat, felt the lees of their traditional expertise and their profmsienal ability. Following defsat at Dien Bien Phu, they set about to restore their a~llity to conhtmmy1967 k..

.,

duct this new form of war. For two yaars at least, possibly more, military intellectuals struggled with theory and doctrine, and evolved a theory of revolutionary war and how to deal with iguerre ?@volutfonmuireand actbapWchologique. Ssarcely had they come to a satisfactory theory of h gusrre r&volutionnaire and a doctrine for combating it than they were obliged to put it to the test in Algeria. New doctrines and new organisation yielded rsmdts. As had been the caae in Indochina, however, military and political voices were not in harmony. Althongh the miiitary forces abettsd tbe fall of the Third Republic, and the rise of the Gaullist Fifth Republic, their political hopeful never quite communicated to his military leaders. As a rsanlt, the professional officer corpe revolted. Their revolt a defeat, their generals in disgrace and condemned to death, their sseret army in Algeria a failure, the army came home to be rseonstituted in a new image.

61 .1

LA 6UERRE It is significant that throughout empires, republice, restoration,

the

and governments that rose and fell, tbe army remained loyal to France. The French Army avoided politjcs and was generally contemptuous of the government, but quite unwilling to trike positive action against it. La grwrve r6volzthmaire, however, as they came to understand it, challenged the very core of the profeeeion. Contributing

Factora

In the attempt to restore expertness to the profeaeion in the face of this new challenge of war, the army met its demise. There were many contributing factors: ● General develo~nt of the parameter of tbe cold war. . Tbe worldwide fttte of colonial empires. ● A political kaleidoscope of changing governments in France. ● Traditional aloofness of the French military services from tbe rest of tbe populace. ● Continuing deaf ears in Parie to the voices of military counsel. ● French military defeat in the war in Indochina, and conquest without victory in Algeria. ● Prideful struggle of tbe French military leaders to restore professional know-how. Tb9 war in Indochina had been Iost, but the army came out with come hardLieutenant Colonel Dorm A. Sta~ is am”ng m“th the 18t Field Ibree Headquarters itI Vietnam. He in a graduate of the U. S. Armv C%rmnand and General Staff College, the US Armed Forvea Stifl College, and compZeted the US Arrnu War CoUege coune in Juna 19$6. He haa nerved with Hsadquartsr8, 8th US Arnnt, in Korea, and with the $d Armored Division in Erbrope. u m.

won lessons. They conceived that rev. ohrtionary ware are fought for the allegiance of people, and that tbe point of convergence of the effort is largely social and psychological-not military, They saw the need and application Of conflicting prm%ces: education and social programs on one band; props. ganda, psychological programs, invel. untary population resettlement, and political indoctrination on the other, Two significant lessons struck French military intellectual ruminaL ing on their experience with tbr Communiet revolution in Indochine, The principal lesson they drew wta the way that an inferior force could always defeat a modern army-asps. cirdly a modern mechanized army-if it had the suppert of the local pepulace. They were also impressed by the seeming cohesion of politico-military command action demonstrated by the Vietminb. They concluded that proper psychological meeeures could form the cobeaive bond between tbe civilian supporters and ttgbters that thk war required. A kind of formula emerged: revolutionary war = partisan war+ psychological war. FiveStafes Commandant Jacques Hogard, vrcal among the military intellectual analyzed ta guerre rdvolutiermaire in five stagee: ● Propagandists and agitators work secretly among ths people sounding out and ap~ling to reaentrnenb against prevadm social and economic conditiork. ● Having gained a foothold, agitators and organizer form eynpthir..sre into age, occupation, and other groups. Gradually, theee groupe sprd a net of resletence to the regime over the country. ● Some of the groups are organlrtd

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into armed bands for ambush, mbotege,

terror,

raids, and. assassination.

● The level of terrorism risw, forcing gove~ment elements to withdraw from some areas which are momptly seiied by the agitatora and declared liberated aonea. ● A general psychological and pothe governlitical campaign against

ment cnd a.military

eamuaiffn

againet

Algeria wee a war for the control its armed forces

is gradually devel-

qwd. From this analysis, the intellccWe then sought a emtnterrevolutionw doctrine, aimed at the weakneasee of la guarre mfvolutionmzire, which they saw se: ● The superiority of Weetern ethMclry 1967

ical value codee ehould bring liberal. iem to the top providing it could demonstrate equal aptitude in the application of psychological techniques. ● Subversion, especially in the early stages, requiree a greet deal of time to organize. Security forcee, properly warned, can intervene during thle time. ● The imetrrxente. eeoecielly at the

of civilian

support

and loyalty

outset, seldom have an adequate logistice base and are, therefore, vulnerable to a starve-out eiimpaign, witbering them on the vine. ● !Che insurgents can draw out the battle indefinitely, but can almost never produce a decisive milita~ blow unleee given an unusual opportunity. 63

IA SUERRE ● Population control is based on a clandestine politico-military network of cells, groups, and sympathizers covering the country. If this organization can be broken up, the insurgency collapses. The action program to support the doctrine de~eloped plans to isolate the insurgents from outside sources of

INSURGENCY

settlement of the population as r quired to deprive the insurgents support and a culture in which germinate; and to reeducate insi gentz” captured or who surrendered The theory then developed a p gram of action and successful ra tion as shown in the chart. Against la gczerre ‘rf%oktkm?mij

ACTION AND REACTION

lnsurgsmt 1. Forms agitation and propaganda cells. 2. Expande and coordinates resistance into effective extensive network. 3. Intensifies propaganda; terror, sabotage, assassination, and other armed action. 4. Creates liberated areas; inetalle provisional government; gradual change from irregular to regular war. 5. Regular war with fully developed diplomatic activity. 4, Regularization guerrilla war.

fails;

reverts to

3. Reduced liberated zones; emallscale guerrilla war.

Police and intelligence activity increase; strengthena administrative and military controle; propagand~ social, and economic reforms.

Mobilizes state’s political and phys ical resources; attscke the subversiw infrastructure; organizes selfdefense units; resettles population regains control over Iiherated areas isolates and destroys enemy regulars

Destroys regular forces; continues diplomatic, psychological, social, am political action.

Reduces auxiliary military effort: continues reforms.

2. Opposition and some sabotage continue. 1. Continuee propaganda and agitation. supply and help; destroy ineurgent regular forces and large guerrilla bands; protect eesential communications and economic centers, but not tie down regular military forces to this task; accomplish community re34

Continues reforms and reeducation new order emerges. the French sought to bring the msd touted Communiet weapons of psychrr Iogical action and political indoctriastion in the context of a general war common to Marx-Lenin-Mao. To conv plement their action program, they MulteryR* -....d

ieveloperf

action

ps~chologique—a

theory of psychopolitical

action.

In 1957 the French Army took acreorganize the staff and command effort, implementing the new conceptsof countering Zaguerre r&soWionwatre. To their four-part general ~taf.type organization, they added a tMh section, G5, in the army, field army,corpe, and division staffs. At the top level, there was a third deputy chief of staff specialized in paychologirsl and political operations. Finally, in the French military schools, there were introduced courses of instruction in psychological war and political operations. At the height of its organizational experience, the G5’s responsibilities included psychological action, psychological warfare, moral=ivilian and ndlitsry-troop and public information, chaplain activities, and civil affairs. G5 coordinated with G2 on intelligence bearing on psychological or civil affaira matters, and with G3 on planning matters. With this organisotion and theory, the French Army went to Algeria. tion to

Source of Revolt

The source of the Algerian revolt was Marxist chiefly becauee its theories of revolutionary war were derived from Karl Marx, Nikolai Lenin, ond Mao Tae-tung. The leaders of the Algerian revolt were quick to realize that the Communist theory of wars ef “national liberation” was the context in which many changes were in progreesaronnd the world. This helped tbanr describe their view of the nature of their struggl~gainst impwiafism, total and ~nticolonial. On the other hand, the political attitudes of the Algerian rebels, their liking for strong centralism in their Ceeialdemocratic ztatelmost in the ktleery laa7

LA 6UERRE

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image of 1789—and their preoccnpation with the liberty metalrhysic rew resented Jacobh national~em at its best. Finally, the rebele apparently felt they could outlast the French as Ho ChLminh had done, taking skillful advantage of each opportunity, while building a subterranean nation.

: ;

Similarities Analvats –. -.. . of la ouerre revolution- . naire held the view that the revolution played into tbe hands of international communism; that it was plotted, channeled, and controlled to a remarkable degree. Much of the French Arroy eventually believed thk. Actually, the Algerian war was much more spontaneous, far more confused, and less cohesively directed than the Indochinese War had been. But to the French, Algeria became the model into which Indochina, Greece, - Malaya, and the Philippine fit with precieion. Some of these similarities were: ● AlgeMa was a war for the control of civilian eupport and loyalty. . Algeria was a etrnggle of psychological and propaganda mechanisms with both eidee rising a wide variety of psychological and political action techniques. ● There was in Algeria a total allocation of resources in a limited area. It was general war, but general within the borders of a single country—a pattern to be repeated in later ware of “national liberation.” ● Ideology became a factor of contest, openly on the Algerian side, more surreptitiously on the French eide. ● Algeria was fought against the background of ths cold war. Eventually, abnoet three-fifths of France’s active military establishment was committed to Algeria, augmented there by the genrhzrmetie, eeveral

as

LA 6UERRE ‘civil-defense groups, and Moslem auxiliaries. Their task was to fight the guerrillas, but, abnve all, to administer, control, and convert. This preponderance of French forces and auxiliarise enabled m,ilitary pacification to proceed untii rebel units were reduced and isolated, When thie oc-

to ite social rol~ppeared -in mk isterial directives and was the bssh for the “war for the crowd” and “W in the crowd” theme in French min. tery writing. In Algeria, tbe wu against kt guswe rcfvoluthmaire WM divided into twoarsse, rural andur. ban, ssch with a different line ofst.

The Algerian war sgsirmt la uuerre riuokfkmnoire wee fought as urben arees

curred, reeieta~ce levels fell back to terrorism and smalksle skirmishes. The Sections Administnztives SP& ciaKnte8 (SAS), a group of reserve otlicers with a knowledge of the Algerian eituation 8nd $luency in Arabic, was called to duty and became the principal administrative unit in the struggle to regain administrative control. The army coordinated its activities with SAS at all levels through its G6, making almoet complete immereiun in political and psychological action inevitable. The psychological roIe of the military services-se’ Id to be second only

tack for the counterrevokrtion8u forces. The political and psycbologicdl effurt expended by the French miii. tsry forces wae of great magnituda The French Army newepaper, LB EM for example, at one time bad an M gerian circulation estimated at !W,000 copies, more than most newspapcn in France. The ftrat great test of h gum ?t?volutionnaire and act bra psvchclogiquc crime in the Algiers revolts of 1967, fought betwosn the troops of Germrsl Jacques Massu and the lord element of the Natiunal Libsratios Front. The robrds had created 8 llh Mllm Md@

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in rugged rurel m well

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LA GUERRE eratedzone of Algiers centered on the city’s Arab quarter. Into thie situation came the 10th Parachute Divieionof General Massu, freeh from the frustration of Suez. In a repressive year, they overcame the rebele in the city. To the proponents of tm gue.me m$vetutionnaire and actiom psychologique, this was vindication of their methods and theoriee, and proved tbe Velidlty of their doctrines and action programs. They se}zed the circumstances aa justification for their years ef research and intellectual soul searching. By 1958, when the army played a bead in the coup that brought down tbe Republic, the army was deeply bwolved politically and had developed SSPSrtknowledge in political and psychological warfare. frmob Understanding In Charles de Gaulle, the French Army felt it had someone who understood it better than all othere. The ~. using all the resources Of Wtien psuchologique in Algeria, secured I&tar than 60 percent support for the referendum adopting the Fifth Repubtic in September 1958. However, General de Gaulle soon diivowed the concepts of war in Algeria held by the bulk of the army there. One of the parainount factors &t made tbe arm~s position so etrong wae the widespread French feeling for Algeria ae part of Metropolitan France. TO resident Frenchmen, as to the army’s leaders, Algeria wos France. The army had demonstrated their know-how in successful containment of the revolution in Algeria. Then, on 16 September 1959, General de Gaulle made the prorrouncement that selfdetermination for the Algerians wae the only method worthy hbsay 1*7

for France to follow. Reaction to this pronouncement by the Algerian French was revolt in Algiers-the week of the ba’micades in January 1960-which failed, The triale of the participants clearly revealed the deep involvement of the army in the po. litical, psychoIogicaI, and sneial fiber of Algeria. In the aftermath, the G6 system waa disbanded in the French ‘Army— actioa pegchologique had run its course. General de Gaulle, after touring Algeria, and eensing the deep involvement of his army in political affaire, had directed a gradual reduction of political activity by the military services. As 1961 arrived, there was a growing sentiment in the French mititary forces that Algeria had become another revolutionary struggle, lost through civilian control of military affairs. Then came the coup in Algeria on 22 April 1961, followed by the trial of its leaders. Notes on a Theory Some writers contend that had there been no Indnchina and no Algeria, la guerre rc?votuthrmaire-mctiom pszwhologique would never have come into being. Its previous colonial war experience araund the world, and the bitter lessons the French Army learned in Indochina created a ramarkeble background for tbe military profession. to work out ite destiny. This school also pointa to other revolutionary wars of the period-Greece, the Philippines, Malaya—with the observation that no such turbulence came out of them. On the other hand, it should be remembered that most of the world, the United States in patilcular, has only reeently become aware of the nature of wars of liberation. Only since 87

IA 6UERRE Chairman Nikita Khrushchev’s speech in January 1961, and President John reaction to his Vienna F. Kennedy’s meeting with Chairman Khrushchev, had serious attention been given this problem at top levels of Government in the United States. With Marshal Lin Piao’s confirmation of the methodology of Indochina as the preferred

area and some degree of administra. tjve control. The problem we shall face increae. ingly is how to project aid to thw.s governments faced with insurgency without seeming to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. So the problem of doctrine development is, perhaps, more acute for the West to

Chinese method, the West is faced with developing some type of doctrine to counter the Communist drive to power. Further complicating the problem of countering C%grterre rdvolutiOnmzire is the fact that in the contemporary world most such wars will be conducted inside the border of another sovereign state. The French, at Ieast were in the poeition of a colonial power with initial acceee to the

day than it was when the French k gan their period of meditation aftw Indochins. Truly, the US military pro fession maybe said to be in its period of meditation-searching for theorj and doctrine. It would seem that to be truiy u# fui, espeeial[y in a demoeracy, a dwtrine such ae action petichologigw must be noliticallv viable. Dart of i balanced ‘national_ strateg~, Actien ps@oloUigue was politically viebk

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from the standpoint that it recognizedthat one. ~ure way to counter a tetatitarian regime was to impose one similarly constructed to counter it. Having done whsther in so d%/X%&%% beento destroy that which one sought tosave in the first place. teals and Objectives

Initially, uctiom psvckologigue was pAitically viable in Algeria hemmse, given the world temperament and treadsof the time, it was probably the oolymethod that could have succeeded ie countering the revolution and saving Algeria for France. But the minute France recognized self-determination for Algeria as the only appropriate goal, the doctrine fell apart. Doctrine can be politically viable only so long as Iit is cast in pursuit of objectives of the state on which there is at least common understanding, if not consensus. Changing objectives, especially during an operation, is a hazardous undertaking as Generrd Douglas MacArthur and others havetestified. In a military establishment with as elaborately constructed sad dogmatic a doctrine as k guerre r.holutionnadre and action peycholog. iwe, it is likely to bring down the whole structure. Goals and objectives, clearly stated, aredficult to come by in a liberal democracy. It is just not in the democratic way of doing businees for !s dsmoeracy to eetablieh clear, longrange goals and proceed either directlyor indirectly from hereto there. Democracy’s soldier is continually placedin the position of having to divine the intentions of his leaders. He must do thle to establish force structure and get on with management of bodgets, purchase of hardware, and deployment of troops. Mreary1ss7

>’

How he is supposed to do it is obviously a subject that needs some study. We Rave just looked at the case history of an entire military eetsblishment that misunderetood the goala of ite government, and of a government that imposed on its military force a national goal inimical to the eurvival of an elaborate aud intricately contrived network of dectrine and theory. Negativist Prsmise Ie the doctrine

of la ge6erre rdvolu-

tiourraire and action psychblogiqwe sound ? Strategically, the theory looks at the world ae one continually at war. Juet as does Marxiem-Leninism-Maoiem, twk view ignores the poeeibllity of mutual accommodation between nations, of balances of power, and of spheres of influence. It, therefore, begins from a negativist premise. WMle the interpretation of la guerre rtvolutionnaire ae a negative, total dogma is quite correct, there ie nothing to say that this came philosophy must extend to the counterprogram, regardleee of ite rationale. To accept the negative caet of la gueme is to deny the very principles on which the liberal Weet reste its case. For better or worse, the institution of Weetern democraey will eurvive or fall on the positivist, humanist, individualist values of the liberal ethic. If groups or governments of the Weet, in pureuit of better methode for dealing with communism, ehould adopt the philosophic%] bias of communiem iteelf, then liberalism ie doomed. Action pe~chologique as a counterrevolutionary dcctrine was ,probably correctly drawn for the colonial experience. Given their long history of colonial ware, the French military leaders probably divined the right

LA GUERRE method of dealing with what they found in Indochin~ even in Algeria. Being broadly objective about 10 guerre and action, however, we must conclude that they were, in fact, theoriee of propaganda and politicsl indoctrination of large groups of people using military power and organization to get the job done. The French extended the idea to activities not normalIy military. One cannot help but be struck by the narrow vieion of this program. It wae aimed at the right target-people, and it dealt with the key problem— public administration. But there are sure] y other waye of implementing programe like this without turning eolely to the military cervices. The French Army took the entire task upon itself largely because, in the dogmae of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, such a course ie quite appropriate. But again thie is a method inimical to the structure of liberal democracy. Armed forces can surely fight against the etfecte of subversion, but military

force in a democracy is not the proper agent to deal with tbe causee of sub version. If such a program is to be mean. ingf ul and not self-defeating in n democracy, there must be a broader baae of disciplines, ekille, and rc. sources applied. Economic, political, social, psychological, and educational programs with a nonmilitary bias cm all be constructed. When the world first recognized general war of the nuclear kind, there was much talk of the economic and military coordination necessary to prcduce victory. With general war in the counterrevolutionary senee, we muet realize that economic, military, Political, social, psychological, and eduw tional forces mu5t be brought to berm Victory may not be eo total ae we orm thought it to be. Re~ization of the totality of war, and the ambiguity o! victory in this sense, ie eimply to ad. mit implicity that eince war ie total the milita~ services can no longer handIe more than part of war,

LESSONS LEARNED The MILITAEY REVIEW ie particularly interested in receiving manuscripts covering leseone learned by US units in Vietnam. Problems of organization, command and control, equipment, tactics, and fire support merit informed discussion. After complying with appropriate local regnlatione, authors may eubmit manuscripts direct to the MILITARYREVIEW. We will obtain the necessary eecurity review on thoee accepted.

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