Koha Digest 16 (1994)

Digest # 16 (1994)

WAR THE END OR THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW WAR? by JELENA LOVRIC/AIM/Zagreb "We should think about a Confederation of Croatia and Krajina as a transitional solution for the reintegration of UNPA's. Under the condition to not question the internationally recognized borders of Croatia at all, the International Community must determine how long would that confederation last as well as its modalities, which would assure local and territorial self-administration to the Serbs, but which would be linked to the central government in Zagreb". This is how the leaders of the Serbian People's Party, Milan Djukic and Veselin Pejnovic explained their postures, and immediately drew the rage of the turbo-Croats against them, and the request to immediately discharge Djukic from the post of vice-chairman of the Croatian Parliament and the prohibition of his party. But, Djukic is not rushing, even though it might seem so. He only repeated what, days ago, had been said by the American Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. Galbraith is categorical about the autonomy: it will have the right to legislation, autonomous tax system, control of the police, education and the development of culture and most probably symbolical elements, as well. The American Ambassador said that the American states had their own flags, and therefore saw no reason why the same thing wouldn't be applicable in the case of, as he says, "the autonomous Serbian region, canton or state". The Serbs, according to Galbraith, would have to give up on the hope of becoming an independent state. Such a solution, which reminds us of what Vitaly Churkin had defined last year as a "state within a state" has either the further division or war as an alternative. If the Croats decide that they can't live with the Serbs any longer, then they could choose to divide their state, says Galbraith. If they choose war, concludes the American, Croatia will lose. America couldn't help it. Later, Croatian sources confirmed that Croatia hasn't gotten international consent to gain back the conquered territories by the force of weapons. When one year ago Churkin mentioned the Serbian state within the Croatian state, the public suffered a shock. So did the politicians: Churkin's statement was qualified as an expression of Russian-Serbian conspiracy. One year later, a similar statement of the American ambassador was not attacked at all. Time is a very strong factor, but the Croatian public has also understood that the American ambassador is almost as important for Croatian politics, as president Tudjman proper. Some media joke about it, and some seriously state that Galbraith is the second most influential person in Croatia and even more, wonder who is the first one in The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

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line. The port-parole of the "newest ally of Croatia", as Tudjman formulates it, even allowed himself to, in public, reply to President Tudjman, and what's more, the Croats are getting used to listen to many unpleasant things coming from him. Taking into account that no one in the Former Yugoslavia has an autonomous policy, the external factors are very influential, it is obvious that they influence the formation of Tudjman's autonomous will, also. The Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic declared to Spanish journalists while in Madrid, what has not been yet heard in Zagreb: that Croatia is ready to accept the international control of the Serbian autonomy in Croatia as well as the EU monitoring and guaranteeing the Serbian autonomy in the UNPA's. "Finding a solution" was also announced by the Head of the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade, Zvonimir Markovic. After talking for two hours to Slobodan Milosevic, he declared that the international community is headed towards the final solution of the Serb-Croat issue and the new mutual agreement. The meeting between the two presidents might be initiated, therefore Markovic claims that "Milosevic is looking forward to such meeting". This meeting has been announced by the Serbian president's cabinet. Tudjman's cabinet doesn't speak of that yet, but someway at the same time, as interviewed by "Vecernji List" and asked whether he believes in a peaceful agreement with Serbia, Tudjman textually replied: "I think that there are signs enough which prove that competent Serbian politicians have become aware that the occupation of Croat territories can't stand. (...). Some of them, even the most competent, have understood that it is a historical must to normalize the relations, based on the mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia". Tudjman confirms that radical changes are occurring in Serbian politics and he describes it thus: "They have declared themselves in favor of the end of war and the normalization of Croat-Serb relations, and above all, they have agreed upon the inauguration of Bureaus in Zagreb and Belgrade". This according to Tudjman is a "sign enough". The Croatian president is even willing to forget that it is no problem for Milosevic to promise something institutionally and work otherwise extra-institutionally. Later on, minister Granic relativized such statements, declaring that Croatia is conditioning the meeting between the presidents with the unconditioned recognition of the Croatian sovereignty and borders. Then, are all what Tudjman says about the "competent Serbian politicians" , the occupied territories, "mutual recognition of both states" and eventual meeting with Milosevic, consequence of internal problems he is facing in Croatia? Maybe he is buying some time, because Geneva dictates/modifies the "take it or leave it" plan - the mutual recognition of the newly-created states of the former Yugoslavia? There are probably many problems with the whole package in Geneva, which is not suitable for any of the parties, and the least for the Serbian party. Even though there are serious doubts (or maybe they were purposely created) about the ultimate purpose - conserving or dividing Bosnia - the offered "facts", much more complete than before, lead us to the final decision. Not only for Bosnia but also for the rest of the Former Yugoslavia. Its three essential purposes are the following: the respect of internationally recognized borders, and inside their framework, a possibility for constitutional arrangements "to establish relations between Bosnian, Croat and Serbs ethnic groups", as well as the free return of refugees to their original "homes". Even though it is not completely transparent, it seems that some parts of Bosnia will cling on to the neighboring countries. -2-

Horst Wiesel, the German Ambassador to Zagreb, analyzing the new "ultimatum" of the international community regarding Bosnia, ascertains that "the plan is safe and allows close links of these two parts of Bosnia with the neighboring countries", but also adds that "nothing above that level can be spoken about at this stage". Right now it is much more important to have all parties agree on "the plan of the last offer" and establish peace. What will the cooling-off war serve for? Are the contours of a new Yugoslavia becoming visible? Or is it something much slower, but very certain - the creation of Greater Serbia? Could the possibility of asymmetrically linking parts of Bosnia with the neighboring countries be the beginning of a new Yugoslavia? How to conciliate that part of Croats from Herzeg-Bosnia who want to be part of Croatia, but want nothing to do with any Yugoslav association? And have the Serbs from Krajina unite with Serbia? What will be stronger in Bosnia: the Serb-Croat centrifugal force or the Bosnian centrifuge? Will Serbia manage to conceal for some time, all what it has achieved until now, in order to use it in the future as a spring-board? Is this the beginning of the end of a big war or is it the initiation of a new, bigger conflict? The answers to these and many other questions will depend on whether the international community has a long-term plan about what it will do with this region. Is it gradually building a durable and definitive solution, whose signs are emerging from ashes, or is it also acting as fireman?

WAR GENEVA'S SHORT WICK by VISAR REKA/Geneva The warring parties in Bosnia have 15 days to decide whether they accept or not the newest plan elaborated by the international "mediators" who, on this occasion are known as "the contacting group" for Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Mediators" are purposely placed within quotes, because the way this plan was elaborated more resembled a fait accompli, than mediation. The main idea of this plan (decree) is simple; 51% of the Bosnian territory will belong to the Croat-Muslim Federation, whilst 49% to Karadzic's Serbs. If this plan is compared to the other failed plans, which were drawn within the framework of the ICFY, one will see that in the aspect of figures nothing changes, but this last one differs because the creation of the Federation eliminated the complications regarding the way out to the sea and in general, any problems among Croats and Muslims. However, the problems regarding quality rather than quantity still remain. Speaking of quality, the experience until now proves that the division of Bosnia has been personalized by the parties in conflict, therefore the pastures where Gen. Mladic has taken its herd to paste or the neighborhood where Haris Silajdzic grew up are not unimportant. For the time being, the Serbs are the noisiest because of the Posavina corridor which connects all conquered territories in Bosnia and Croatia. The Serbs claim that the corridor is too narrow and, de facto, has no protection for the future, when the military balance will be different from the present one. However, the main problem of this plan is, same as before, that both parties want to reject it, and the difference is that now everybody is more careful and do not want to blamed for the -3-

failure of the plan. The Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic even uncovered the strategy which was applied in the past, in public. In an interview to the Kuwait News Agency KUNA he declared: "If we evaluate that the Serbs shall say no, then we will say yes, therefore I say that we will say yes, because the Serbs will surely refuse the plan". On the other hand, Karadzic said that the representatives of the Great Powers were "world's mafia", but also gave no certain signal of how would the Serbs react to it. It is another matter that he declares, for internal use in Pale and its surroundings, "that the Serbs will never accept the American dictate and that this plan makes the existence of Serbs in the Bosnian space impossible". It is evaluated in Geneva that Serbs and Bosnians will use the strategy of stalling the answer, not giving a sharp negative reply. The consultation with the parliaments and placing conditions which are beforehand unacceptable for the other party, are only some of the failed ways of stalling with the answer. In the press conference at the Russian Mission, the ministers of foreign affairs of the Great Powers presented the measures that they have foreseen as an award or punishment, which are known in the diplomatic slang as "the stick and the carrot". The stick, or the punishment, for the Serbs would be the lifting of the arms' embargo in Bosnia. "Lifting the embargo would be unstoppable if the Serbs will refuse this plan", stated Russian minister Koziryev. Whilst the carrot for the Serbs would be the softening of the sanctions against the FRY. These two are considered to be the principal means which would force the Serbs to accept this plan, because, their patron Milosevic is tired of the sanctions, and the economists foresee that the limit of the stability of the super-dinar is autumn, when they anticipate the eruption of inflation and the deterioration of the economic situation in Serbia. The first sign that the relations between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs are not the way they used to be, were evident during Karadzic's last visit to Geneva. This time the support of the Yugoslav diplomacy was not as closely strong as before, whilst different articles in Belgrade's press about the financial scandals of the leaders from Pale are looked upon by observers as a clear signal that Milosevic has given up on the maximalist request of the Bosnian Serbs. To make things even more complicated, Karadzic declared that "no one in Serbia can convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept this plan". At the same time, the financial aid for reconstruction to the ones who will be the most cooperative, came up as a very important element. Nevertheless, the observers and diplomats evaluate that the biggest and decisive pressure will be exerted behind closed doors, and here the tasks are shared. The American should convince the Croat-Muslims, whilst the Russians will have to deal with Serbs. It is no secret what will the item of discussion be. The Americans will try to convince the Bosnians that they have lost the war and that it the maximum they could gain, whilst the Russians will tell the Serbs that they will not be able to block the lifting of the embargo and that in this case they should not expect any support from Russia. The fact that the Bosnians have started to get the message is best proven by Izetbegovic's statement: "Militarily we are stronger than before, but are not so strong to accomplish a fast victory, and if war is repeated it could last even longer".

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This approach which differs from the one the ICFY had, because now the intention is first to define the territories and then regulate the relationships between the composing units, speaks of the fact that the problem has no concrete solution. Even the ministers of foreign affairs of USA, Russia, Germany, Great Britain and France were almost unanimous to claim that Bosnia will remain a state within the borders acknowledged by the UN, and that the possibility of considering the unity of Bosnia as a transitory phase after which the composing units will independently decide about their attachment to another state, should not be excluded. Alija Izetbegovic doesn't conceal his wish to keep Bosnia as a whole. He declared: "We are not talking about the division of Bosnia. Bosnia is divided for the time being. We are trying to put it together again". Accoprding to some speculations, after the territorial definition, the Serbs will be offered some kind of limited independence of the Quebec type, whilst Bosnia and Herzegovina will be regulated as "an asymmetric (Con)Federation". However, the problem of Krajina in Croatia should not be forgotten. In public, this problem is treated separately and it is still in the competence of the ICFY. The latest news speak of the interruption of the conversations (Ambassador Arens is in a one month's leave) and that a meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman is planned. For the time being, the only guide is Christopher's statement that all parties should try and acknowledge each other. Regarding Kosova, the so much mentioned internationalization is hardly seen. If it weren't for the employees of the Information Center of the Republic of Kosova (or the Ministry of Informations of the Republic of Kosova) who on a daily basis "bomb" diplomats and journalists with informations and questions about the solution of this problem, the statement of Serbia that Kosova is an internal problem, is not far away from the truth. A large portion of Kosova's fate will depend on the solution of the problems in Bosnia and especially in Krajina. And how the things are right now, there is no space for much optimism.

EDITORIAL THE BARGAIN PRINCIPLE by VETON SURROI Some days ago, I read an accusation in a newspaper, written in Albanian and published in Kosova, which was directed to a group of political phantoms, about how they, with or without consciousness, are lowering the price in the "Kosova bargaining". The accusation, if I understood it well, is based on the action of the phantoms who, with their statements or actions, are informing the Serbian authorities and the foreigners, that they don't have the same postures with those of the key Albanian political activists in Kosova. Therefore, the conclusion is drawn, the foreigners and the Serbs could understand, even before starting the "bargain", that the price of Kosova could be lower that the one pretended to be set by the Albanian leaders of Kosova. This is a not very pleasant surprise. Not so much because of the phantoms' hunt, which as a style always announced the weaknesses of one's own system or organization, trying to find an explanation for one's own deficiencies by finding the guilty elsewhere. It was more because of the admission of the thought, and even the articulation of words, inside the concepts of -5-

"bargaining" and "selling-out". In this direction, I think, that the one that accuses the other of "lowering the bargain", or that "will cheaply sell-out" is acknowledging a principle of action, accepting the idea that Kosova could be object to bargaining and could be sold-out. Cheap or expensive, it is not important. The important thing is that such a problem can be treated as an object of goods. Where does this tolerance, to have Kosova get the contours of a conglomerate of tomatoes, sheep and steel, come from? From, somebody would say, the lack of political tradition. Yes, but also, among others, the lack of responsibility today. A lack of responsibility which in itself has become a tradition. And which costs, and could cost too much. Some years ago, when the idea of the division of Kosova arose, coming from the circles close to Dobrica Cosic, one of the main leaders of the Serbian nationalistic ideology, then the Kosovars expressed different opinions. Not only once, and not only by unknown Kosovars, it was said that this idea could be eventually discussed, but only with the condition that Serbia would get back Leposavic, and Kosova would get back Preshevë and Bujanovc. At first sight, such an idea didn't hurt much. But, it was never thought that this statement was acknowledging a principle: that of the divisibility of Kosova or that of the swamp of populations and territories. Where did this principle take Bosnia, it is more than obvious today, and you don't need much imagination to know where would it lead Kosova. Accepting this principle would mean the to accept final consequences of the application of force as the most efficacious way of exchanging populations and the respect of force as the judge to determine the parameters of the exchanged territories. Recently, the issue of the division of Kosova has become actual once again. A reason could be, for example, the book of Dobrica Cosic published in French, which will explain how could a "radical solution" for Kosova be found. Maybe there will be people in Kosova who will understand that the tongue is made of flesh and has no spine. This is why it needs control of a grey mass called brain.

WAR THE DINAR CONVERTS MILOSEVIC INTO A PACIFIST by DIMITRIJE BOAROV/AIM/Belgrade When after 100 days of power, the Serbian prime-minister Mirko Marjanovic visited President Milosevic to, together with him, celebrate the success of the Avramovic's anti-inflation program, the public was acquainted with the decision of the Serbian leadership to, by all means, defend such an economic stability achieved with a sane dinar. For a long time, Milosevic was evading to link his fate to Avramovic's dinar, despite the spectacular start of the anti-inflation operation on Jan. 24 of the current year, when within some days the dinar became stable, even though the sanctions of the UN were not lifted and the crisis in Gorazde was at its peak.

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This hesitation could be interpreted not as lack of faith in the techniques to decrease the inflation, but more as the fact that Milosevic hadn't still evaluated which would be of greater benefit: the stable and sane dinar or the maximalist purposes in Bosnia. After the economic cure during spring time, the people are convinced that chaos can be evaded, despite the war so close and the international blockade. Governor Avramovic even carelessly declared that the FR of Yugoslavia "has evaded the sanctions", and thus eliminated all criticism against Milosevic for the economic debacle of Serbia. An eventual break-down of the dinar could eventually be explained as the result of a new, bigger war, not as the present one, and this is the reason why the Serbian leader has to defend the stable dinar with the policy of the speedy end of the war in Bosnia, the policy of normalization of relation with Croatia and the radical decrease of administration consumption. The reception of prime-minister Marjanovic and the public acknowledgement of his cabinet's course, make it clear that the dinar will be defended even at the price of Karadzic's territories in Bosnia and, it is possible, with the state-hood ambitions of Martic in Krajina. Because Milosevic is well aware that Avramovic's program, in this expected crisis, "is in the decisive phase of its realization". Milosevic received Marjanovic precisely that moment when he was convinced that, despite all problems, the Serbian government had elaborated a plan to acquire this year's harvest, which has its chances for success. Even though the opposition, once again, claims that the farmers will be deceived, the psychological importance of Avramovic's trick producing 100 thousand golden dinars, allegedly for the purchase of the grain overplus, has saved the harvest campaign. Despite the simple calculation that there will be about 15 million dinars available (one golden dinar is worth 150 Avramovic's dinars) and they have to be used to pay for 3.5 million tons of wheat, even knowing that one million tons are worth 180 million dinars, the importance of the application of the golden endorsement in this underdeveloped and non-reliable state, will be enormous for the farmers. Anyways, the farmers won't have much options, because there is an overplus of wheat, to which last year's 500 thousand tons must be added, and there is not enough storage capacity. If the credibility of the state can be bought with gold, i.e. promised gold, it won't help the industry and trade to gain the faith in the state. Not because, as Yugoslav former prime-minister Milan Panic declared, Yugoslavia has only 4 tons of gold in reserve (which means 700 thousand golden dinars less that announced!), but because of many serious reasons, before all, because of the tax policy which is becoming more and more aggressive. The present level of governmental consumption makes the prosperity of the inefficacious industry in Serbia impossible, therefore all attempts to "vitalize the production" are in vane. While reporting to Milosevic, prime-minister Marjanovic thanked Serbia for having decreased its budget from 42 to 32 % of the gross national product, but also stated that his government "requested from other participants in the public consumption to adapt to lower consumption". The other participants are the Federal state and Montenegro. But, the Federal state spends 80% of its budget on the Army. After the mentioned consolidation of the budget, the planned Yugoslav public expenses have decreased from 5,5 billion dollars to 4,5 billion US$. However, Dr. Oskar Kovac, an economist close to ruling party claims that the reduction of the budget is not enough, because as it was calculated, during last year, the state didn't spend 5,5 billion dollars, but 4,3 billion. This in practice means that there is no reduction of budget this year, and not to forget that last year, it destroyed the national currency. The fictitious rate of the dinar is mostly criticized in this "decisive phase of the program". Dr. Tomislav Popovic, from the Economic Sciences Institute in Belgrade says that insisting on -7-

this fictitious parity, which makes the dinar un-realistically expensive, deepens the tendency of isolationism which has been incited by the economic sanctions. The problem is that the policy of the fluctuating rate of the currency can be leas only by the state, but the state in whose purposes no one can have faith, can not change the rate, even at the cost of a wrong economic calculation. This is why Milosevic received his prime-minister: in order to tell the enemies and allies that he is supporting the policy of the stable dinar, meaning that he urgently need to calm down the war and solve the Yugoslav crisis.

URBANIZATION SELL REAL-ESTATE, BUILD CHURCHES by IBRAHIM REXHEPI Very soon, no locality in Kosova, where there is "at least one Serbian grave" will be left out without an Orthodox church. All of this has its political symbolic, because this is how the Serbian government wants to prove the centuries' long presence of Slavs in this area. The incited euphoria by the actual policy started five years ago and now it has reached its peak. An anecdote speaks of a time when the construction of an Orthodox church had started in Jezerc, Ferizaj. The farmers had killed the master workman, and this was the reason why only the foundation of the church remained, because wherever there is blood, such a building can't be erected. However, the church has started being built on the old foundations, regardless of the fact that this locality is inhabited only by Albanians. The problem of the disrespect of the urbanization plans does not arise only when it comes to the construction of the Orthodox churches, but is also manifested through other forms. Now, the wild construction has started being legalized. This happens throughout Kosova. Despite the fact that these buildings do not fit in the urbanization plans, the Serbian authorities do not make use of excavators any longer, but they requests from the owners of houses and shops to pay communal and utility fees, even though they have already paid them all long time ago. This fresh money can be invested anywhere else, but not as requested by the one who pays. It thus happened in Prishtina that a row of shops was demolished, because a Serb claimed he owned the land, and now only ruins remain there. Or take the area close to the new PTT building in Prishtina, where flats for colonizers are being built. According to the urbanization plan, this area should have been a green area. At the same time, at the Lenin Boulevard, a row of private shops was also built outside the urbanization solutions foreseen for this area of the town. All work is "wild", and this is because since 1987 no urbanization plan has been revised, altered, replaced or approved. Everything functions according to the needs of the actual policy, which doesn't have in mind that the population in this town must keep on living here. According to some urbanization standards, every town or village must have between 20 and 25 sq. meters of green area per inhabitant, out of which 15 must be in inhabited areas. Kosova never respected these parameters: every inhabitant is entitled to only about 2 sq. meters of green areas! This data is four years old. The constructions are now taking place in parks and other green areas.

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The Orthodox church in Prishtina is being build in the core of the town, in a green area that belongs to the University. The foundation has been set, but there is a lack of money to continue its building. Maybe Serbs will see themselves forced to pay contributions to finish up its construction. It is also foreseen that a similar building be erected in the middle of Istog, where there has never been an Orthodox church. The most drastic case is that of Gjakova. Downtown, in the park between the Palace of Culture and the "Pashtrik Hotel", the terrain for an Orthodox church has been prepared. Many trees have been cut in this area, a monument which stood there for decades was removed, and money for its construction is sought. No "harsh protests" of the political subjects of Gjakova made the investors change their mind. There are rumors stating that the money will be provided from the sale of land in other parts of town, in which construction was not foreseen to take place. Even some of that land belongs to the Islamic Union. The worst thing of all is that a parcel of land is worth only 20 thousand dinars (or German marks), whilst only a sq. meter of construction land in Gjakova costs that much. Not to mention the price of the land in Gjakova downtown. Despite the fact that the Independent Trade Unions have asked the citizens not to participate in the auction, more than 600 applications have been presented. Something completely different happened in Gjilan. 120 parcels of land were put on sale. The future building were imagined to spread over the park of the town and cover up all the green areas. Provoked by the convenient price and location, many individuals from other towns bid. There were the least people from Gjilan, who had paid attention to the appeals that these parcels should not be purchase because they would destroy the green areas and the urbanization plan of the town. The people self-organized and convinced the interested to give up. And they succeeded: none of the 120 parcels were sold. But it is very hard to believe that the Gjilan case will be repeated, because there is almost no care for the green areas in towns. At the same time, in business fever, a very few give up on expanding their businesses. Such a characteristic is present in Prishtina, which as is lacking water and green areas, is filled up with garbage, which will very soon asphyxiate its own citizens.

KOSOVA THE LDK CONVENTION ON JULY 14? by B.H./Prishtina As we were informed at the LDK Presidency, the Annual Convention of this party was finally announced to be held on July 14th. After several attempts and requests of several members of the Presidency and the wide membership of this party to have the Convention celebrated before, now the conditions have been fulfilled for the LDK Board to explain the gathered problems. As we were informed, the time and place of celebration of the Convention are still unknown. The competent Serbian organs, which must allow the celebration of the Convention, have still not replied to LDK Presidency's request. The Convention has been prolonged in the past three years. All verbal promises and different informations speaking in favor of the party policy, however, should not exempt the leadership -9-

to take concrete political steps as the membership has been requesting. It also has insisted to get accurate informations regarding the political situation in Kosova and contacts between some members of this party lead by president Rugova and international factors. According to the informations available as well as the political discussions in Prishtina's couloirs, the LDK Convention will engage new people and choose a new Presidency. Some members of this party who had been elected in the previous two mandates will, most probably, not be there any longer. Another item of the agenda will be the role of the Government of Kosova in exile, which according to the impression of the majority, did not show proper ability to represent Kosova's politics. The problems with the budget and the expenses that the Presidency of this Party and the Government of Kosova have made, out of the "three percent" paid by our workers, will be especially sensitive. Realistically, the Convention will try to avoid all these items, and will allow only some members of the Presidency to have long statements which will make the discussions about these topics impossible, because the Convention can't last forever. The membership says that if the Convention does not determine itself in favor of concrete tasks and new political creativeness, then it might happen that the Kosovan political silence and political inefficaciousness will be replaced by a new political structure which would emerge from its inside. All of this, of course, if the Serbian authorities do not prevent the celebration of the LDK Convention.

KOSOVA THE DECREE CALLED RECTOR by ASTRIT SALIHU/ Prishtina The University used to be "an association of institutions of superior studies", and today, after the adoption of the new Decree-Law on Superior Studies has become "a University organic integrity". A definition which is followed and quoted by every article of the decree-law. The organic function of an organism (an institution) is defined by the determination of a center, which would have to orient the functions of its extremities. Thus, the organic model of the functioning of the University, clearly defined in this decree and even though adopted by the Government of Kosova, is still not accepted by all people working at the University. The Decree, which was set on public discussion (not longer than a couple of days) has many deficiencies or rather has caused many essential complaints about the definition of its function. All remarks have to do with the centralization of the decision-making institution within the Senate of the University and the person of the Rector. It might be very serious to qualify this act as centralist, but as the Dean of the Faculty of Philology Zejnullah Rrahmani claims: "If the faculties are deprived of the right to decide themselves about their problems, then this is centralism!". "The Law on Superior Education is the first system law which is adopted in these conditions and it has its juridical grounds", claims Secretary General of the University Destan Halimi, but also adds that "there are many procedural and contents deficiencies in this act". He claims that not all the subjects concerned were consulted about the act. For example the Collegium of Deans was not informed at all about the draft-law, therefore no rational and real discussion - 10 -

was possible to take place. In its contents, this law should be unacceptable when it regards the organization of the management of the University. Halimi claims that the Educational and Scientific Boards are deprived from the professional right to give scientific titles. Now they have to do it only with the consent of the Senate. Also, the election of Deans as well as election of cadres in different faculties can be done only after the candidates have been verified by the Senate or after it has given its consent. The draft foresaw that the Rector should have given his opinion about the election of any dean and this should be, further on, verified by the Senate. This provision was changed because as Islam Krasniqi, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy said "...there would be much to space for manipulations and people loyal to the Rector would have been elected". The suppression of this provision has only superficially eliminated the possibility of manipulations, because Art. 108 Par. 4 still remains, and it foresees that "the Rector and his deputies are, by function, members of the Senate". Despite the fact that the Senate and the Rector are two organs of the University, the remaining paragraph is "juridically not valid, because they have the right to vote and influence in the organ. All of these could take us to an arbitrary situation", says Halimi. On the other hand, there is another disputable situation, and that is that the Rector is elected for a three years' term, whilst the deans for a two years mandate. This means that the University Council, comprised of the Rector, his deputies and the Deans could undergo the direct influence of the Rector on the ocassion of the re-election of the deans. Regarding the centralism in the Rectorate, another detail could be mentioned. The Rector is given authorization to propose and elect his deputies and the Secretary General of the University. Many of these paragraphs were emended by different faculties and superior schools and proposed as new provisions, which were not taken into consideration by the Commission and Government at all. The Commission that elaborated the Decree was comprised of Ejup Statovci (Rector), Ismet Salihu (Dean of the Faculty of Law), Abdullah Aliu (Instructor, assistant to Dr. Statovci), Destan Halimi (Secretary General of the UP) and Shefqet Maloku (Secretary of the Faculty of Physical Culture). Inside the commission proper, there were discrepancies. The last two members of the commission gave new proposals and suggestions which were not taken into account. Thus, they wrote a separate evaluation to the president of the Commission, requesting it to become part of the report which had to be sent to the Government. They even stated that if their separate evaluation is not included in the report, they will send it directly to the Government. This is a very indicative fact, for the remarks to the contents of the decree are not coming only from people outside the Commission, but from the people inside. The Decree, in its present form has been adopted by the Government on June 22, 1994. There are also different radical opinions in regard to the Decree. Shyqri Nimani, Dean of the Faculty of Arts considers it to be "illegal", because all proceeding that should have taken place before its approval have been violated. Zejnullah Rrahmani considers the law not to be realistic, because the law "projects the - 11 -

structure of a future Ministry of Education, and it should be the opposite". Based on all statements and remarks in respect to this act, especially those which have to do with the University management and organization, then those of procedural nature and its public discussion, many claim that the normal conditions for its approval didn't exist. They also state that this Decree-Law is not the best solution for the University. Despite all difficulties that the University is facing in its labors, there is no consensus, however, about this Decree and there are even opinions that "the law should be changed very soon". If the provisions of this act contain at least one valve which would release manipulations or eventually voluntarism, and which can be evidenced once the act is read, then the opposite side should be listened to.

INTERVIEW Federico Mayor Zaragoza, General Director of UNESCO WAR MUST END IN SARAJEVO Interviewed by VETON SURROI/Geneva "I have Arab and Celtic blood, I am Catalonian and Spanish and am presently living in Paris", explains as briefly as possible, his cosmopolitanism. Federico Mayor Zaragoza, General Director of UNESCO and former Rector of the University of Granada, the ancient Arab town in the south of Spain, has been dealing, since some time now, with the problems in the Former Yugoslavia. Starting from the appeals to defend Dubrovnik, up to the letter he sent to the Belgrade authorities requesting normal conditions for Albanian education. He got a very harsh reply to the first letter he had sent the corresponding ministries in Belgrade. As he expresses his reaction, his face blushes: "I said, this is not the way to talk to me!" And then he wrote a letter to the Serbian president explaining to him that he had gotten a harsh response from the Belgrade authorities for a basic request to have Albanian education in Kosova under normal circumstances, which proved the lack of sense for the need of education in general. The fourth exchanged letter informed Mayor that there had been a misunderstanding and that the authorities in Belgrade, on the contrary, were very interested to have the whole education organized in normal circumstances. It is a stalemate, as he explained last week in Geneva. KOHA: If I remember well, when you took office, you had mentioned the old symbolic of converting spades into ploughs. This year, on the other hand, paradoxically, the United Nations based on the initiative of your agency have declared this to be the Year of Tolerance, precisely in the year we are experiencing genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda for example. Don't you think that the international organizations, including UNESCO, are outside the reality, now that the cold war is over? MAYOR: You are mentioning only the bad cases. I will list the good examples: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, the Near East, Cambodia. In all these countries there is a leadership, a feeling for the future which has enabled reaching solutions which couldn't be imagined three or four years ago. And this was thanks to the peaceful conviction. Don't forget that for example in El Salvador, where UNESCO has its big program - 12 -

"Culture of Peace", there was a war going on for over thirty years. Over 100 thousand victims in a small country. And still, the agreement of Chapultepec was reached, and the warring parties declared: that despite all wounds and still fresh pain, we want peace and will create it. And, as you know, free elections were celebrated in this country several months ago, and the state is living in an atmosphere of reconciliation and formulas of justice, but at the same time, it is holding trials against all those who are responsible for the suffering of the people. Because, the people are always innocent; the guilty are those who on behalf of the people force decisions and oppress them. I also want to tell you another thing: there are many crises unknown, because the conflicts have been prevented. This is what I, as Director of UNESCO, insist on, because all preventive actions, if successful, they are invisible. Therefore, when you draw conclusions and ask what the international organizations have done, you have nothing else in mind but the negative results, the war conflicts. Many places which have evaded war thanks to the domination of reason, remain outside the reach of the public opinion. KOHA: If I understood you correctly, you mean that the present conflicts are being solved? MAYOR: In majority of the cases, yes. I would make a difference between Bosnia and Rwanda. Bosnia, as I see it, is the result of living along each other, but not with each other, and also of the lack of Europe's preparedness. Europe, as its name defines it, is a economic community, and economic communities are not prepared for political action, and even less for military action. This is why Europe must urgently react and have at its disposal corresponding and urgent mechanisms, always under the UN flag, in order to prevent the developments of situations as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Especially when there are such violation of International Law. The case of Rwanda, to me, is a terrible one, because more than a year ago, here in Geneva, a document which stated that we won't tolerate genocide any longer, was signed by the end of August. And it was said that in case that genocide appears, we will intervene, and try to stop it. It was said that the human life is over territoriality. I was very happy about this document, because in a world of glass, in a world where we can see what is happening through the media, not undertaking anything would convert us to accessories to murder, because we accept barbarism, we accept mutilation and killing, even of children. However, you can see, that we have allowed this to happen, for one reason or another. And nobody should claim that this happens because of the Hootos and Tootsies, or that all of it happens in Africa - there is proof that it is also happening outside Africa, and that is Bosnia. And what is the lesson? The lesson is that Africa too should have, through the Organization of African States, an ultra-rapid system of mobilization, with blue-helmets from all countries which would prevent such situations within 24 hours. KOHA: In an interregnum we are living in, where the old structures of order have died and the new ones have not been born yet, you were very happy that UNESCO opened its office in Sarajevo. What are the dimensions of opening an office, is it the importance of small steps what makes you happy? MAYOR: The essence is that it is my conviction that war must stop precisely in Sarajevo. And this I say with full conviction. Eighty years ago, World War I started in Sarajevo. Maybe - 13 -

now, after eighty years it may happen that the name of Sarajevo is linked to the end of the war. There is an impressive reaction in the world regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a feeling of concern and also a problem of consciousness. It is very important that I, as Director of UNESCO, can feel that in Australia, Japan, China or Brazil: Bosnia has become a point of reference to claim that war is the only thing right now that stops general progress of humanity. I think that the rich countries are becoming aware that they must help more the developing countries, not for the sake of solidarity but for their own safety. Therefore, I can say that there are some positive developments in the world. KOHA: And what you just said could prevent the war from spreading to Kosova and Macedonia, for example? MAYOR: As a Catalonian I am, I understand the problem of Kosova. If we achieve to keep truce in Bosnia, if we achieve to have relationships of dialogue and multi-culture...the ethnic division of Bosnia would be a mistake...I am Catalonian, but we all know that we are a mixture from the past...So, going back, if this situation is kept and strengthens and dialogue starts, if the intellectuals are more listened to and if different currents are allowed to mix, I believe that Kosova won't become such a problem. If the war option is chosen in Bosnia, then I do fear for bloodshed in Kosova. If the domino effect is stopped in Bosnia, inshallah, then I believe that a process of consolidation of the rights of all citizens must start in Kosova. If not, then it is clear that it can become the next focus of crisis. KOHA: There is a possibility to have status-quo, this situation to last for years, and live in a situation of no war and no peace. MAYOR: The world explains the status-quo situations. They are used for some time tor prevent war, but after some time, and precisely in order to evade war, the situation must be unknotted. The situation of status-quo can't be the same to the ones of the 17th century, and which could last one or two hundred years. Right now I think that the status quo situations in the world must find a solution, even though it can prevent war for three or four years. KOHA: What do you think to undertake directly in Kosova? MAYOR: What UNESCO is planning to do, within its mandate, is to favor education with educational means, to reflect the cultures of Kosova and above all, the basic culture. This means that we must provide for educational material, books which would reflect what Unamuno used to call "the spirit of culture, the spirit of language". KOHA: And finally, could UNESCO have an office in Kosova, if the situation doesn't change? MAYOR: Whatever the situation may be in the territorial and political context, and you see that I have decided to open the office in Sarajevo, even though UNESCO doesn't have any offices in Europe, I wouldn't be against a UNESCO office in Kosova.

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INTERVIEW Stefano Bianchini, Director of the Institute of History of the Balkans and Eastern Europe in Bologna THE BALKANS - A DROP IN THE SEA, COMPARED TO RUSSIA Interviewed by BATON HAXHIU/Strugë KOHA: In a lecture in the Summer School in Strugë, you clarified the problems of the maps of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It seems that your Institute in Bologna is seriously studying the geo-political problems in the region. How do you look upon these problems now? BIANCHINI: It is not an easy answer to give, for it needs a lot of time for explanation. Many plans can be elaborated now, but the situation is such that the geo-political balance will be deeply changed. It will suffer changes in Europe more than other parts of the world, and the reasons are evident after the destruction of Communism. It is very present in the Former Yugoslavia and former USSR, and this will last as long as the EEC will last in this composition, and which will by any means try to prevent war from spreading. This is way the whole thing will be localized. If the EEC will not be able to overcome the crisis it is going through, the regional problems will be solved by the Great Powers and the changes will be even deeper. The essential issue is whether the EU will survive. I am not very optimistic right now, even though it is spoken of admitting new members in the EU. However, there is a signal, a very significative one, regarding the election of the person who will replace Jacques Delors. I think that this is a strong argument that proves of how much are the members of the EEC ready to coexist under the umbrella of a possible Union. The war in the Former Yugoslavia proves how divergent are the opinions about this problem. And I don't believe that the newly created states will be secure in the new territorial spaces. It is early to say that states created by a union of states will not be secure to exist in a future union of states. KOHA: You are not the only one to doubt about the survival of the EU. There is no unification of political dispositions. This happened in the case of Bosnia. BIANCHINI: When we speak of the EEC or the EU, we can easily conclude that this is a weak confederation that functions only in the economic aspect. It is true that there is a Parliament, but it doesn't function on the principles of a national parliament. There is no unification of legislature and it can't have a government elected. On the other hand we have 12 people (ministers) who meet, agree upon something, of course if they can, maybe to you it is unknown, but we are used to disagreements in the EU. Therefore, it is very hard to have something function if there is no Government. It is very hard to agree upon the matter of defense. And now we face a new division within the Union. The problem is whether there should be a Union as an economic community which can preserve the national sovereignty or the Union should exist and politically integrate. In this case, state centralism should be diminished. KOHA: What is preventing the functioning of the EU is the conservative policy of Great - 15 -

Britain and France, even though the later one is showing more flexibility, especially after the German unification. After losing their colonies, they would want their policy to function outside the EU. Why is it so? BIANCHINI: I would separate the problem of Great Britain from the problem of France. Britain was never in favor of the Union and it has always tried to prevent it from happening. It, as a state, has never doubted that the sovereignty of the state must be restricted. They finally accepted to become part of the Union, but were against losing their governmental competencies, which makes no sense. On the other hand, France has never had such a conservative posture. From the times of De Gaulle and up to Mitterand's era, Europe has been and still is a strategy of double meaning. First, the Union was a defense from the Russian Communist tendencies during the cold war and also the tendency of France not to allow Germany wander around Europe. One thing is very clear that until Germany was not reunified, the EEC functioned at the perfection, and the relations between Germany and France were very good. These kept the compactness of the EEC. This is not like this any longer. Not only because of the German unification, but because the conflict inside the Union became unbearable because of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. This problem appeared in 1991 when Genscher went to Ante Markovic and told him that Yugoslavia was over with and that it can't exist any longer! He told him to leave, because there was no future for him. He didn't say this to Milosevic, but to Markovic. When he spoke this out, then the doubts regarding the direction that Germany would take, arose. Then came the doubts of what the role of the Germany in the EU will be, and how strong with the German Mark become, which it did, as we can see now. I think that we can't evade this. It is impossible. Germany, whether we want it or not, is the leader of the EU because its experts know how to manage an economic and political system better than any other member-state of the EU. KOHA: As long as there will be misunderstandings between the political and ethnic problems in the Former Yugoslavia within the Union, it is probable that the American policy will dominate this aspect. Do we have a political americanization of a parte of Europe? BIANCHINI: I doubt that Europe will deal with ethnic problems in any of its parts, because it has so many problems inside. It still doesn't have a model to solve these problems and the solution coming from a third party, according to them, doesn't belong to Europe, and the precedent will not serve. Regarding the USA, even though faraway, it is still very present. The second issue is how much is America interested to solve Europe's problems and is a stable Europe of its convenience. America won't see itself involved in the war in the Balkans, as long as NATO is not endangered, and this can happen in Kosova and Macedonia. This is why the American troops are there. Visiting Albania on one occasion, I had asked the American militaries the reason of their presence, and the reply was that they were either counsellors, or were in the area for a couple of days. It doesn't make sense. However, we shouldn't forget that America is here, but has its eyes set on Russia. This is clear, and must become clear to you too. The problem here is narrow and it can be further restricted, whilst in Russia there are 30 thousand nuclear heads which can be used. And then? The Balkans are a drop in the sea compared to Russia. KOHA: About Russia, there are many dilemmas regarding its political influence, political conditioning and even doubts that it has become an American puppet. What do you think is the truth about Russia right now? - 16 -

BIANCHINI: We must not forget that Russia is a super-power. It has been so for the past 200 years. Since Russia stopped Napoleon, from then on it has been deciding about regional problems of strategic interest. It has the feeling of the strong, of a country that makes decisions and it is understandable to have American-Russian agreements on all problems. Russia however has its internal problems, the Caucasus, its problem to come out to the sea, Crimea and the internal economic problems. As far as I know, Russia still exerts much influence on the former Soviet republics. Wherever there are military barracks, or where the strategic points are, there is the control of the Russian state. The largest problem of Russia is Ukraine. This state is not as politically homogenous as to keep on existing as an independent state. This is not because there are so meany Russians in Ukraine, but it has a long history linked to Russia. The other problem that bothers Russia is that of the political parties. Having a balance among them is of a great importance to Russia. I am not referring to Zhirinovski, but to the Russian army which will insist on, most likely, the solidarity with Orthodox countries. This means that there are many options because the situation is not stable. KOHA: Do you think that all those victims in Bosnia are just a matter of statistics? BIANCHINI: Yes! To the Great Powers and the geo-political balance it is really just statistics. What if the nuclear weapons are used in Russia and the Ukraine? Do understand that this is cynical. I understand it. I could speak of moral categories and speak of killings and genocide, but I as many other can just observe these things, but not convince the spirit of the military that this can't be achieved only through genocide, when we know that their decisions are determining. KOHA: How much is Italy present in the Balkans, and especially in Albania? BIANCHINI: It is very hard to say. To my understanding the influence of Italy in Albania is decreasing while the American influence is increasing. I can also say that Italy doesn't speak of these processes at all. And because of its own problems, its main interest is not to have a new wave of emigrants coming to Italy. My sources tell me that Italy is trying to have a big role in the Balkans, but it still doesn't have a clear policy in this respect. Italy is still not aware of what is happening in the Balkans and has yet not created a political and cultural structure to understand the situation. Our Government is dominated by Fascists and if Italy decides to get involved, Britain and France will decide to step aside because of the structure of the Italian government and Parliament. But history teaches us that Italy is not in a situation to exert much influence in the global policy. Italy would only influence the economic and cultural reconstruction and will remain where it is. KOHA:You just said that the American soldiers replaced the Italian ones. Have you got any vision or information about the posture of the Americans and their role in Albania? BIANCHINI: I would prefer you ask Berisha about this. I'm joking. The problem of Kosova is here. The issue is, if something happens in Kosova, then what would Albania do. The American presence in Albania right now is of great influence, because if something happens in the region, then America would promote the political steps of Albania and would directly assist it. KOHA: Albanians in Kosova opt for independence. How realistic is this option in these - 17 -

political circumstances? BIANCHINI: It is clear to me that the ideas that anything can be achieved only through force, dominate. But, this is not the case in Macedonia, for example. KOHA: However, Macedonia was created thanks to political arbitration, and its existence is not sure yet. BIANCHINI: Nothing is sure. I am not sure that even Slovenia is out of the war. I think that this war can move up and down. I don't even think that Croatia will remain the way it is. It is not certain that Greater Serbia will be established, and that Ethnic Albania will be established either, etc. Can Croatia exist without Krajina, the answer is no. This means that war will go on. Whom are they going to fight? The Serbs of Krajina, Serbia or even Bosnia! Nothing is clear. I can also say that Italy is not far from a similar situation. Six months ago, I didn't think of this option, but now when there are some tendencies towards some territories in Slovenia and Croatia, then this can't be excluded. KOHA: Are we facing a Balkanization of Europe? BIANCHINI: An Italian geo-strategist once said that we will easier go through the Balkanization of Europe than the Europeization of the Balkans. KOHA: You claim that the actual borders are note secure. Then why was the Croat-Muslim Confederation established. How realistic is its existence? BIANCHINI: What borders? Those on paper or those gained in war? If you are referring to the first ones, then they must be assured by war. The Confederation will last as long as there is will on the part of Herzeg-Bosnia to unify with Croatia. KOHA: Serbia has expanded by conquering territories in the past. The same thing is happening now. Kosova is next. How do you see the Albanian-Serb problem right now? BIANCHINI: It is hard to say, because everything depends on Bosnia. I believe that it was not accidental that nothing has happened in Kosova until now. I'm referring to war and not the repression. In the '90-ies, Milosevic deprived the Albanians from all their rights and they are fully oppressed. But he achieved to immunize the Albanians and to create a situation of calm which suits him because of the war in Bosnia. I don't think that Serbia's sovereignty is questioned or endangered in Kosova. It is another matter to claim that there are two states in Kosova. A real one and a parallel one. This situation can last only if Serbia wants to give up on the plan of a Serbian ethnic state. KOHA: If the problem of Bosnia is solved in the way that it will suit the Serbs, will the Serbs be more flexible towards the Albanians or will go to the extreme? BIANCHINI: You should ask Milosevic about this. He has no determined and predictable moves. Every move he makes is unexpected and - 18 -

possible. What do you mean, if the solution suits the Serbs. If it means that they will unite to Serbia, then where is Croatia? On the other hand, the division of Bosnia is being expected by the Hungarians, who want to revise the Trianon Agreement. It is not easy to solve Bosnia and then to just go to Kosova. This situation will last a while. And it is more probable to have a conflict in Kosova before having a solution in Bosnia. KOHA: Do you think that a Trusteeship in Kosova is possible? BIANCHINI: Hardly. It is hard, because thus the sovereignty of Kosova would be acknowledged. And Kosova is a part of Serbia. If the sovereignty of Serbia in Bosnia can't be amortized, it is less probable to happen in Kosova. KOHA: Then this means that we would have to fight for what we consider is ours. According to you, the policy of the Albanians is wrong. Patience and silence is a political failure. Do you mean then, that we must fight? BIANCHINI: I have been to Kosova, and I know how it is there. Imagine the Serbs attacking you. Kosova is on a plain. Whichever part of Kosova is bombed, it will be bulls-eye. There are a few Serbs and Montenegrins there. What does this mean? This would mean massive killings, killing which would not stay within the framework of Kosova. Who would react? Nobody. I mean militarily. Imagine that war in Kosova could start a war in the Balkans. Here we have Albania. If it enters the war, what could we then expect from the Albanians in Macedonia? Then we would have Greece and its interests, Bulgaria because of its territorial pretensions towards Macedonia and Turkey which won't lose here interests in the Balkans. Turkey is waiting for a reason to start a conflict with Greece. This is the only reason. KOHA: Why do we all think that war in kosova will cause a war in the Balkans? BIANCHINI: Because Kosova is a region in which the main geo-political and economic paths of the Balkans go through. It is the place that connects West and East, South and North. This is an exclusive geo-strategic region. It is true that Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia have been recognized, but the conflict would still remain inside former Yugoslavia. This is why the borders set after WWII haven't been changed, even after the unification of Germany. My Hungarian colleagues claim that unless the borders are changed, the problems will remain the same. But if Moldavia unites with Rumania and the Serbian part of Bosnia to Serbia, then their option is clear: Transilvania should unite to Trianon. KOHA: Macedonia was created as a tampon zone. Could this state be object of other conflicts because of the territorial pretensions of its neighboring countries towards it? BIANCHINI: This state was created in times when the need to stop the conflict from spreading, was big. Regarding the pretensions of other states, we must let time pass. At least ten years. And in ten years the political culture and reason can change. KOHA: You said that Serbia has full sovereignty over Kosova. You don't show much respect for Kosova's policy and give no opinion about it. You also say that the creation of an ethnic state is impossible. Why? BIANCHINI: Because a person of the personality of a De Gaulle must come to power in Serbia, to claim that Serbia doesn't need Kosova. I don't believe there are such persons in - 19 -

Serbia. Not even Milosevic who is so strong, would not have the courage to do it. KOHA: Serbia is prepared only for the division of Kosova. BIANCHINI: They do this because they know that it doesn't suit the Albanians. You would lose all the riches. KOHA: Diplomats claim that Kosova's independence would endanger Macedonia's independence. BIANCHINI: I understand why. Macedonia is the only state that can stop the expansion of the conflict. Taking into account that the Albanians are not endangering peace right now, then it is reasonable to understand why everybody is in favor of Macedonia's independence and not that of Kosova. KOHA: From what we heard from you, it comes out that all the problems in the Balkans can be solved only in a new Yalta or as Koziryev said Yalta III of Geneva I. BIANCHINI: I think that this is impossible. You know why? We had the Berlin Congress. After some years we had the same problems emerging. This is why I think that a new Yalta won't solve a thing. The problem is the political culture. I think that diplomatic and cultural invasion are the only hopes for solutions. This culture doesn't exist right now. If we keep on demanding ethnic and historic borders, then we will keep on fighting in the next 100 years. KOHA: What is the role of the international community in this case? BIANCHINI: The international community would do much more if it centers its activities on culture and politics. First they must work on the establishment of the European Community and to restrict the sovereignty of the states, to create the Government and its instruments. Regarding the Balkans, if the solutions are not radicalized, then it will be very hard to solve the problems. KOHA: Do you think that ethnic states should be created? Are there any plans and chances for this? BIANCHINI: In theory, it is very possible, but the price is too high, not only in money, but people also. This is morbid. This is happening in Bosnia, unfortunately. KOHA: Don't forget that the international community is legitimating, in a sense, the violence. It is evident. BIANCHINI: It is true. Since the beginning, when Bosnia was recognized as such, everything should have been done to prevent the conflicts and accomplish the unity of Bosnia. And now that the unity is being defended, people claim that Muslims, Serbs and Croats can live together. But this did not happen, because everything is in the hands of Belgrade and Zagreb and not the international community. It is the situation similar to the murder of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. This could easily be a reason to, in the future, have conflicts similar to WWI.

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