Khalid Chraibi - Selected Articles

tabsir.net Saturday 16 Aug 2008

Issues in the Islamic Calendar

Full Moon on lunar eclipse and Venus, dated June 18, 2008 - Photo by Mohamad Soltanolkotabi by

Khalid Chraibi

“The sun and the moon follow courses (exactly) computed;” (Koran, Ar-Rahman, 55 : 5) “It is He Who made the sun to be a shining glory and the moon to be a light (of beauty), and measured out stages for it; that ye might know the number of years and the count (of time).” (Koran, Yunus, 10:5) “The ulamas do not have the monopoly of interpretation of the shariah. Of course, their advice must be sought in the first place on shariah matters. (But) they do no make religious law, in the same way that it is not the law professors who make the law, but parliaments.” (Ahmed Khamlichi, Point de vue n° 4) Issue # 1: Why do Muslims observe the new moon to determine the beginning of months?

When the Messenger was asked by his Companions for a method to determine the beginning of the month of fasting, he told them to begin fasting with the observation of the new moon (on the evening of the 29th day of sha’aban) and to end fasting with the new moon (of the month of shawal). “If the crescent is not visible (because of the clouds), count to 30 days”. (1) At that time, the Bedouins didn’t know how to write or how to count. They knew nothing about astronomy. But, they were used to observe the stars, at night, in order to find their way in the desert, and to observe the birth of the new moon to determine the beginning of months. The Messenger’s recommendation fitted perfectly with the specifics of their situation. Issue # 2: Why is the new moon visible, at its birth, in some regions of the world only? The new lunar month begins, for astronomers, with the monthly “conjunction”, when the Moon is located on a straight line between the Earth and the Sun. At that moment, the Moon is invisible. The lunar crescent begins to be visible only some 18 hours after the “conjunction”, and only subject to the existence of a number of favourable conditions relative to weather, time, geographic location, as well as various astronomical parameters (number of hours after conjunction; relative positions of the Sun, the lunar crescent and the observer; altitude of the moon at sunset; site of observation; limits of vision of the human eye…). (2) Each month, the new Moon will be visible, at first, at some specific sites on Earth, before it can be seen elsewhere. Issue # 3: Can we identify in advance the most favourable sites for the observation of each new moon? Renowned Muslim astronomers, such as Ibn Tariq (8th c.), Al-Khawarizmi (780 ?- 863), AlBattani (850-929), Al-Bayrouni (973-1048), Tabari (11th c.), Ibn Yunus (11th c.), Nassir alDin Al-Tousi (1258-1274 ?), etc. devoted much attention to the study of the criteria of visibility of the new moon, with the objective of developing efficient techniques of forecasting of the beginning of a new month. But, it’s only in recent times that some astronomers and information systems experts succeeded in developing procedures which make it possible to identify in advance, each month, the areas on Earth in which favourable conditions will exist for the observation of the new moon. Thus, in 1984, a physicist from Malaysia, Mohamed Ilyas, succeeded in drawing on the Earth map a “line of lunar date”, at whose west the crescent will be visible on the evening of the new month, whereas it won’t be seen, East of this line, until the next evening. (2) Today, detailed maps of the areas of visibility of the new moon are monthly drawn, well in advance, and published in such sites as « Moonsighting.com ». (3) Issue # 4: Shouldn’t the observation of the new moon, wherever it is carried out, mark the beginning of a new month for all Muslims? In theory, when the new moon is observed, this indicates the beginning of a new month for all Muslims in the areas in which the information is received. At the time of Revelation, when communications from one region to another were difficult, this rule applied essentially to the geographic areas which were proximate to the site of observation. But, today, with modern communication means, and instant transmission of news throughout the world, the area in which the rule could apply is much wider. (4) (5)

However, in order to demonstrate their sovereignty, most Islamic States generally proceed with their own monthly observation of the new moon (or, failing that, await the completion of 30 days) before declaring the beginning of a new month on their territory. Each State has defined its own applicable parameters and procedures in this matter, thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. (6) Issue # 5: Since the lunar month can only have 29 days or 30 days, why is there a difference of two days (and sometimes even three days) in the celebration of the beginning of Ramadan or of eid al-Fitr in different countries? Logically speaking, either a State will observe the new moon on the evening of the 29th day, or it will complete a count of 30 days. So, the beginning of a new month should differ by only 24 hours between the countries of the world. But this is not verified, in practice. Thus, the 1st Ramadan 1428 corresponded to Wednesday 12 September 2007 in 2 countries; to Thursday 13 September in 40 countries; and to Friday 14 September in 9 countries. (7) Similarly, the 1st Shawwal 1428, date of celebration of Eid al-Fitr, corresponded to Thursday 11 October 2007 in 1 country; to Friday 12 October in 33 countries; to Saturday 13 October in 23 countries; and to Sunday 14 October in 3 countries. (8) Since different Muslim States determine different days for the beginning of the same month, they also reach the 30th day of the month on different days. Political and geostrategic considerations, as well as human errors in the observation of the new moon, also explain some discrepancies. The Muslim astronomers who proceeded, in recent years, with in-depth studies of these issues reached the conclusion that the beginning of months that were announced by Islamic States over a period of several decades was often erroneous, for a number of reasons. (2) (9) Issue # 6: Is the lunar calendar based on calculations a satisfactory alternative to the observation of the new moon? The lunar calendar based on astronomical calculations has been in existence for some four millennia. It was already used by the Babylonians in the 18th c. B.C. Each lunar month begins, as was stated, at the time of the monthly “conjunction”, when the Moon is located on a straight line between the Earth and the Sun. The month is defined as the average duration of a rotation of the Moon around the Earth (29.53 days). The lunation (period of time between two successive new moons) varies within a zone whose limits are 29.27 days at the Summer solstice and 29.84 days at the Winter solstice, giving for the 12 months’ year an average length of 354.37 days. From an astronomical point of view, lunar months do not alternate between a length of 30 days and 29 days in succession. There are, at times, short series of 29 d, and at other times short series of 30 d, as illustrated by the length (in days) of the following 24 lunar months, corresponding to the period 2007-2008 : « 30, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 30, 29, 30, 30, 30, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 30 »

The astronomers formulated the convention, over two thousands years ago, that months of 30 days and 29 days would succeed each other, in order for two successive months to add up to 59 full days. This left only a small monthly variation of 44 minutes to account for, which added up to a total of 24 hours (i.e. the equivalent of one full day) in 2.73 years. To settle accounts, it was sufficient to add one day every three years to the lunar calendar, in the same way that one adds one day to the Gregorian calendar, every four years. The “tabular calendar” thus obtained includes 11 “abundant” years, with a duration of 355 d each, within a cycle of 30 years (years # 2, 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, 18, 21, 24, 26 and 29), whereas there are 19 « common » years, with a duration of 354 d each. (10) Issue # 7: Why don’t Muslims use the lunar calendar based on calculations? The Koran does not prohibit the use of astronomical calculations for the establishment of the calendar. At the methodological level, it merely specifies that the lunar year has only 12 months. (11) But, based on the Messenger’s recommendation to the Bedouins to start and to end the fast of the month of Ramadan with the observation of the new moon, the Ulamas (Muslim jurists) developed a consensus to reject the use of calculations, based on the postulate that one shouldn’t go against the teachings of the Messenger (12). This consensus has lasted for 14 centuries. The only exceptions were a handful of theologians, in the early years of Islam, who saw no contradiction between the Messenger’s teachings and the use of astronomical calculations to determine the beginnings of lunar months. (13) At the institutional level, the (shi’ite) dynasty of Fatimids in Egypt was the only State to use a pre-calculated calendar, over a period of two centuries, between the 10th and 12th centuries, before a change of political regime reactivated the procedure of observation of the new moon. (14) Issue # 8: Does the hadith of the Messenger concerning the observation of the new moon establish an immutable rule of law? Since the beginning of the 20th century, many Islamic thinkers have questioned the arguments presented against the use of calculations. They consider that the Messenger’s recommendation to the faithful was merely adapted to the culture of the times, and should not be confused with the acts of worship (‘ibada). In their opinion, the hadith about observation did not establish an immutable rule of law, no more than it forbade the use of a calendar based on astronomical calculations. (4) (15) They note that, over long periods of Islamic history, the hadith under discussion was not interpreted to mean the visual observation of a new moon, but only the acquisition of information, according to credible sources, that the month had begun. (16) This opens entirely different vistas in the discussion of this question. They observe that Saudi Arabia’s Umm al Qura calendar (which is used for administrative purposes only) has been prepared for years based on the calculation of the schedules of sunset and moonset at the coordinates of Mecca, on the evening of the 29th day of each month. By convention, if the “conjunction” takes place before sunset at the coordinates of Mecca, and if the sun sets before the moon, this signals the beginning of a new month. Otherwise, the new

month will begin on the next evening, after the completion of 30 days. (17) This procedure has little to do with the observation of the new moon. They also note that Muslims find it perfectly licit to use the Gregorian calendar to manage all their activities, and have been doing so for centuries, without having any misgivings about it. Why should the use of the solar Gregorian calendar, based on astronomical calculations, be considered as licit, whereas the use of the lunar Islamic calendar, based on the same astronomical calculations, would violate Islamic religious prescriptions? Issue # 9: Is it licit to use a calendar based on calculations? Egyptian cadi Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (18) is the spokesman and the theoretician of this school of thought. He is a distinguished jurist of the first half of the 20th century, who was to become President of the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Shariah at the end of his career, and who remains to this day an author of reference in the field of hadith (19). He published, in 1939, a detailed legal opinion on the subject of the Islamic calendar, entitled: “The beginning of arab months… is it licit to determine it using astronomical calculations?” (20) According to him, the Messenger took into account the fact that the Muslim community of his time was « illiterate, not knowing how to write nor how to count. » So, he recommended to its members to observe the new moon to carry out their religious duties at the time of fasting and hajj. But the community evolved considerably over time, and some of its members even became experts in astronomy. According to the principle of Muslim law which states that « a rule is no longer applicable, when the factor which justified its existence has disappeared », the Messenger’s recommendation didn’t apply anymore to the Muslims, after they had learned to write and count and had ceased being illiterate. Therefore, according to Shakir, contemporary ulamas commit an error of interpretation when they give to the Messenger’s hadith the same interpretation that applied at the time of Revelation, as if the hadith prescribed immutable rules. But, it has stopped being applicable to the Muslim community long ago, based on the principles of the shari’ah themselves. Furthermore, Shakir refers to the principle of Muslim law according to which « what is relative cannot refute what is absolute, nor can it be preferred to it, according to the consensus of the ulamas. » The observation of the new moon with the naked eye is relative, and can be the subject of error, whereas the knowledge of the beginning of lunar months, based on astronomical calculations, is absolute, and belongs to the domain of certainty. He observes that numerous distinguished Muslim jurists have taken into account astronomical calculations data in reaching their decisions. He concludes that there is nothing in the shari’ah which opposes the use of calculations to determine the beginning of all lunar months, in all circumstances, and not only in special situations, as had been recommended by some ulamas. For Shakir, there can exist only one lunar month applicable in all countries of the world, based on astronomical calculations. This precludes the possibility that the beginning of the month should differ from one country to another. He adds that the use of the same pre-calculated calendar in all Muslim countries will give them an opportunity to celebrate all major Islamic

events on the same day, throughout the world, thereby increasing their feeling of solidarity and unity as an “ummah”. It should be noted that Shakir’s reasoning parallels some of Ibn Taymiyyah’s (1263-1328) own observations on this subject, developed centuries earlier. In a discussion of the hadith of the Messenger according to which the Bedouins can neither write nor count, and must thus avoid using (astronomical) calculations, Ibn Taymiya observes that the argument may have been justified at the beginning of the 7th century, but he questions whether it could still apply to Muslims centuries later, after they had been at the vanguard of development of scientific knowledge, including in the field of astronomy. (21) In recent years, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a distinguished jurist, who is also President of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) became another well-known representative of this line of thinking. In 2004, he published an article entitled: “Astronomical calculations and determination of the beginning of months” (22) in which he expressed his full support for the use of calculations in the establishment of the Islamic calendar. Throughout his analysis, he quoted extensively and approvingly the major legal arguments developed by cadi Shakir in his 1939 study. The advocates of the use of calculations gained in strength, in the last few years, when the « Islamic Society of North America » (ISNA), the « Fiqh Council of North America » (FCNA) and the « European Council for Fatwa and Research » (ECFR) announced, in 2006 and 2007 respectively, their decision to use, from then on, a calendar based on calculations. (23) They justified their decision using the same type of legal reasoning which was pioneered by Shakir and further developed by al-Qaradawi in their respective studies. (24) (25) Notes : (1) Al-Bokhary, Hadiths (3/119) (2) Karim Meziane et Nidhal Guessoum : La visibilité du croissant lunaire et le ramadan, La Recherche n° 316, janvier 1999, pp. 66-71 (3) <">Moonsighting.com (4) Allal el Fassi : « Aljawab assahih wannass-hi al-khaliss ‘an nazilati fas wama yata’allaqo bimabda-i acchouhouri al-islamiyati al-arabiyah », a report prepared at the request of King Hassan II of Morocco, Rabat 1965 (36 p.), with no indication of editor (5) Abi alfayd Ahmad al-Ghomari : Tawjih alandhar litaw-hidi almouslimin fi assawmi wal iftar, 160p, 1960, Dar al bayareq, Beyrouth, 2nd ed. 1999 (6) Procedure of observation of the new moon by country (7) The observation of the new moon of Ramadan 1428 by country (8) The observation of the new moon of Shawwal 1428 by country (9) Nidhal Guessoum, Mohamed el Atabi and Karim Meziane: Ithbat acchouhour alhilaliya wa mouchkilate attawqiti alislami, 152p., Dar attali’a, Beyrouth, 2nd ed., 1997 (10) Emile Biémont, Rythmes du temps, Astronomie et calendriers, De Borck, 2000, 393p (11) In pre-Islamic Arabia, the Bedouins used a lunar calendar based on a year of 12 months. But they added to it, beginning in 412, a movable 13th month (whose concept was borrowed from the Jewish calendar), in order to make the month of hajj correspond to the autumn season. After major abuses were associated with these adjustments, the Koran set the number of months in the year to 12 and prohibited the intercalation of a 13th month. The Koranic verses are as follows: (Koran 9: 36) “The number of months in the sight of Allah is twelve (in a year), so ordained by Him the day He created the heavens and the earth; of them four are sacred: that is the straight usage. So wrong not yourselves therein, and fight the Pagans all

together as they fight you all together. But know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves”. (Koran 9: 37) “Verily the transposing (of a prohibited month) is an addition to Unbelief: the Unbelievers are led to wrong thereby: for they make it lawful one year, and forbidden another year, in order to adjust the number of months forbidden by Allah and make such forbidden ones lawful. The evil of their course seems pleasing to them. But Allah guideth not those who reject Faith”. (12) Muhammad Mutawalla al-Shaârawi: Fiqh al-halal wal haram (édité par Ahmad Azzaâbi), Dar al-Qalam, Beyrouth, 2000, p. 88 (13) Abderrahman al-Haj: « The faqih, the politician and the determination of lunar months» (in Arabic) (14) Helmer Aslaksen: The Islamic calendar (15) Sheikh Abdul Muhsen Al-Obaikan, a Councilor in the Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, is clearly favourable to the use of modern technology to determine the beginning of months. He says : « Using the naked eye to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan is primitive in an age of modern science and technology. There is no other way to put it. It’s pure backwardness.” » (Anver Saad, « The Untold Story of Ramadhan Moon Sighting » Daily muslims, October 07, 2005) (16) Al-Ghazali: ‘Ihya’e ‘ouloum addine’, quoted in al-Ghomari, p 30 (17) Van Gent : The Umm al Qura calendar (18) Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (biographical notice in Arabic) (19) An author of reference in the science of hadith (in French) (20) Ahmad Shakir:<"> « The beginning of Arab months … is it licit to determine it using astronomical calculations? » (published in arabic in 1939) reproduced by the daily « AlMadina », October 13, 2006 (n° 15878) (21) Ibn Taymiyyah: Fiqh azzakat wa asseyyam, Dar al fikr al ‘arabi, Beyrouth, 1996, p. 133 ff. and p. 142 : Ibn Taymiyyah has a good knowledge of the astronomical facts. He rejects the use of a tabular calendar, in which months alternate between 30 days and 29 days in sequence, with the addition of a day every three years approximately. He explains that this calendar does not truthfully represent the astronomical facts, because it does not take into account the existence of series of two or three months of 30 days in a row, and at other times series of two or three months of 29 days in a row, as they happen, but only adjusts for them in the framework of a 30 year cycle. (p. 142) (22) Yusuf al-Qaradawi: « Astronomical calculations and determination of the beginning of months » (in arabic) (23) Fiqh Council of North America: Islamic lunar calendar (24) Zulfikar Ali Shah: The astronomical calculations: a fiqhi discussion (25) These developments were detailed in an article published by Tabsir.net on July 23, 2008 entitled: Khalid Chraibi: Can the Umm al Qura calendar serve as a global Islamic calendar? References : Helmer Aslaksen: The Islamic calendar Moonsighting.com: Selected articles on the Islamic calendar Islamic Crescent’s Observation Project (ICOP): Selected articles on the Islamic calendar Mohamed Odeh: The actual Saudi dating system Khalid Chraibi: Can the Umm al Qura calendar serve as a global Islamic calendar? Khalid Chraibi: It is time for the Islamic world to replace lunar uncertainty with scientific facts (SaudiDebate.com, September 5, 2007)

tabsir.net Wed 23 Jul 2008

Can the Umm al Qura calendar serve as a global Islamic calendar?

by

Khalid Chraibi

Over the past 50 years, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and other similar bodies presented their member States with over a half-dozen proposals aiming at the establishment of a common Islamic calendar. Although none of these proposals was adopted, efforts in search of a solution that could be satisfactory to all interested parties continue to this day. For its part, the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) was also regularly confronted with the responsibility of telling its Muslim American audience when to start fasting, when to celebrate «eid al-Fitr», «eid al-Adha», etc. After several years of study of the legal issues involved, it reached a decision, which it announced in August 2006, to use henceforth a pre-calculated Islamic calendar, taking into consideration the sightability of the new moon anywhere on Earth. (1) First, it retains the well-known principle of unicity of horizons (matâli’) which states that it is sufficient to observe the new moon anywhere on Earth, in order to declare the beginning of a new lunar month, applicable in all areas in which the information is received. Second, it uses the International date line (IDL) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) as its conventional point of reference to conduct its analysis. Based on the maps of sightability of the new moon in the various regions of Earth, which are now regularly prepared by professional astronomers, (2) FCNA reached the conclusion that when the conjunction took place before 12:00 noon (GMT), there was enough time left for the new moon to be seen in numerous areas on Earth where sunset took place long before sunset in North America. Since the criteria of sightability of the new moon were met in these areas,

the new moon would be observed (or could have been observed if weather conditions had been adequate) long before sunset in North America. Therefore, the requirements of sightability of the new moon as set by the shari’ah would be respected, and the new lunar month could begin in North America on sunset of the same day. On the other hand, if the conjunction took place after 12:00 noon GMT, the month would begin in North America on sunset of the following day. The FCNA decision aroused much interest in many Muslim countries, because it elegantly met the requirements of the traditional interpretation of the shari’ah, while making use of the state-of-the art know-how in the field of astronomy to respond to the needs of the modern age. It was thought that this solution could be applicable in other Muslim countries, and could give them a chance to adopt the same pre-calculated Islamic calendar (prepared on an annual basis, long in advance), in order to fulfill all the religious duties as well as to manage all other tasks. An international conference was thus held in Morocco, in November 2006, to study the issues involved, with the participation of astronomers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Iran, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, and the USA. The overwhelming majority of the participants, including Saudi, Egypt, and Iran astronomers agreed that the calendar adopted by Fiqh Council of North America could be used as a Global Islamic Calendar. (3) (4) But FCNA changed position in 2007 to align itself on a new decision by the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), which used the same parameters as those of the Umm al Qura calendar (5) to determine the beginning of Islamic months. These parameters are as follows : the “conjunction” must take place “before sunset at the coordinates of Mecca” and “moonset must take place after sunset” at the same coordinates. (6) FCNA and ECFR justify the adoption of the new parameters by their desire to help develop a consensus within the Muslim community throughout the world on issues of common interest, among which that of the calendar. From a methodological point of view, the substitution of the parameters of Umm al Qura calendar to those initially set by FCNA in its August 2006 decision has the following consequences: • The requirement that the “conjunction” take place “before sunset at the coordinates of Mecca” instead of 12:00 noon GMT, as previously specified by FCNA, adds 3 hours to the time period during which the conjunction will be taken into account. This improves the chances that the first day of the new month will immediately follow the day on which the conjunction takes place. • But, the requirement that “moonset take place after sunset” at the Mecca coordinates sets an unduly restrictive condition, which didn’t exist in FCNA parameters of 2006. It implies that the new moon will be potentially sightable at Mecca on the evening of the day of conjunction, whereas the FCNA based its reasoning on the fact that the new moon would be potentially sightable “somewhere on Earth”. According to FCNA, the data of the calendar thus obtained differs only marginally from the data developed using its methodology of August 2006. Concretely, the decisions of FCNA and ECFR have already had the following results:

• The principle of use of a calendar based on calculations is officially sponsored by religious leaders who are well-known and respected within the Muslim community (7) (8) (9) • This principle is officially adopted by Islamic organizations whose legitimacy and credibility are unquestionable; • The Muslim communities in Europe and America are willing to use this calendar to determine the beginning of all months, including those associated with religious events. The impact of these decisions, worldwide, will of course depend on the attitude of the various Muslim Governments towards them, since it is the latter which have the last word on such matters, each one in its territory. For example Saudi Arabia only uses the Umm al Qura calendar for administrative purposes. (5) It considers that it would be against the shari’ah to use it for the determination of religious dates, such as the beginning of Ramadan, eids al-Fitr and al-Adha, the dates associated with Hajj, the 1st of Muharram, etc. But, once the use of the calendar based on calculations becomes part and parcel of the culture of the Muslim community in Europe and America, won’t the minds in Saudi Arabia be more open to the use of the Umm al Qura calendar for the determination of all lunar months, including those associated with religious occasions? The initiatives of CFAN and ECFR may thus help many Muslim States develop, in time, a consensus about the adoption of a “Global Islamic calendar” for use by all Muslim communities in the world. (10) Footnotes : (1) Fiqh Council of North America Islamic lunar calendar (2) http://www.moonsighting.com/ (3) Moonsighting.com 1427 Zul Hijja (4) Morocco meeting November 2006 Moonsighting.com (5) Van Gent: The Umm al-Qura Calendar of Saudi Arabia (6) Islamic Center of Boston, Wayland Moonsighting decision (7) Yusuf al-Qaradawi : « Astronomical calculations and the determination of the beginning of months » (in Arabic) (8) Zulfikar Ali Shah: The astronomical calculations: a fiqhi discussion (9) Ahmad Shakir : « The beginning of arab months … is it legal to determine it using astronomical calculations? » (published in Arabic in 1939) reproduced in the Arab daily « AlMadina », 13 October 2006 (n° 15878) (10) This article updates a previous article on the subject entitled : “It is time for the Islamic world to replace lunar uncertainty with scientific facts” published by SaudiDebate.com on 5 September 2007 and reproduced at http://aster77.wordpress.com/category/islamiccalendarcalendrier-islamique/ under the title: “Towards a global Islamic calendar”.

SaudiDebate.com Saudi judge ignores Quranic rights in harsh decision over the ‘Girl of Qatif’ Tuesday, 22 January 2008

By Khalid Chraibi In a memorable scene in Ingmar Bergman’s movie Wild Strawberries, Isak, the central character, dreams that he is standing in court, waiting to be sentenced. But he has no clue as to the charges against him. When the judge declares him guilty, he asks, bewildered: “Guilty of what?” The judge replies flatly: “You are guilty of guilt”. “Is that serious?” asks Isak. “Unfortunately,” replies the judge. The verdict in the case of the ‘Girl of Qatif’, as the incident has become known worldwide, is as bewildering to most people as the judge’s verdict was to Isak. How can a young bride of 18 who has been subjected to the harrowing experience of being blackmailed by a former ‘telephone boyfriend’, then gang-raped 14 times in a row by seven unknown assailants, be further brought to trial for the offence of khalwa and condemned to 90 lashes? How does one justify raising the punishment to 200 lashes and 6 months in jail when she appealed the first sentence? The case had all the necessary ingredients to become an instant cause célèbre, when word of it reached the global news agencies. It received very large coverage in the media, with the verdict being criticized by commentators, politicians and citizens in all walks of life, within the region and in far away countries. Amnesty International protested against the flogging verdict (which was also applicable to the men involved in the case), observing that “the use of corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.” It added that “the criminalisation of khalwa is inconsistent with international human rights standards, in particular, an individual’s right to privacy.” The sentence against the ‘Girl of Qatif’ and the boy who sat with her in the car “should therefore be declared null and void”.

The Saudi authorities were perplexed and incensed by such criticisms. As far as they were concerned, the court sentence against the ‘Girl of Qatif’ was made in application of

the Shari’ah as it has traditionally been interpreted in the country, and raised no particular or unusual issues. The Saudi Ministry of Justice observed, in a statement, that the girl went out to meet her male acquaintance “without a mahram, a legal guardian, and exchanged with him forbidden affairs through the illegal khalwa. She knows that khalwa with an unrelated man is forbidden by Shari’ah and by doing this she has broken the sacred matrimonial contract.” Her punishment is thus perfectly justified in Islamic law. But, the ‘Girl of Qatif’, her husband and her lawyer questioned several points in the Ministry’s statement, as well as the legal grounds on which the sentence was based.

According to them, the girl had not put herself in this situation of khalwa out of her own free will. She and the boy who was raped with her had been chatting regularly on the phone for two years, since they were both 16, but without meeting. Somehow, the boy obtained her picture. When she got married at age 18, she wanted her picture back, and the boy agreed to do that, if she met him in his car, in a public mall. After returning her picture to her, the boy volunteered to drive her home but, on their way, they were overtaken by another car, which compelled them to stop. They were kidnapped and taken to a deserted place, where the boy and the girl were separately subjected to a gang-rape. The girl’s husband insisted that there was no adultery involved in this case, nor was there any sexually-oriented activity between the couple in the car. The meeting only took place to allow the girl to retrieve her picture which, moreover, was harmless and did not show her in any compromising position. In his opinion, it had been bad judgment on the part of the girl to go to this meeting, but there was nothing more to it. The lawyer of the ‘Girl of Qatif’, Abdul Rahman al-Lahem, argued, for his part, that there was no khalwa between the girl and the ex-boyfriend, in the legal sense, “because they met in a public place”. Moreover, the boy was trying to blackmail the girl with the picture, and she wanted to retrieve it… She was forced to meet him in a "khalwa", which invalidates the rule of "personal will" in Shariah. As Saudi jurists agree, the legal definition of khalwa doesn’t apply to the situation when a person is in dire need to attend such a meeting, or does so under duress. The Saudi judiciary accepted to review the case, but before it began looking into it, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah decided, on December 17, to pardon the ‘Girl of Qatif’, bringing the dramatic story of this girl to a compassionate ending.

Despite this humane conclusion to the case, many Muslims would agree with Amnesty International, that “the criminalisation of ‘Khalwa’ is inconsistent with international human rights standards, in particular, an individual’s right to privacy.” Of course, if any human rights organization in the area were to present the political/religious authorities of the Gulf States with a proposal to suppress any sanctions for khalwa, they would reject it out of hand, on the grounds that it was “inconsistent” with Muslim law. But

this only demonstrates the important differences which continue to exist between Muslim countries in their interpretation of the prescriptions of the Shari’ah. Everybody agrees that there are no Qur’anic verses which forbid khalwa, or define any sanction applicable to it. The main text of reference on the subject is a hadith of the Messenger, which states: “'Whosoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, let him not be alone with a woman who has not a Mahram (male relative who she cannot marry) with her. Indeed, the third (person) is alShaytan!” [Ahmad]. This hadith implies that, when a man and a woman are alone in a secluded place, there may be temptation lurking. But, at the same time, Islam teaches moral responsibility and individual accountability, underlining the fact that each person is individually responsible for their actions before God. Therefore, in North African countries, for example, the hadith on khalwa is viewed as merely indicating ethics of conduct, in order to avoid committing sins of the flesh. Some people may frown on a situation of khalwa but, as long as no fault has been committed there is no reason to apply any sanction. Punishment is only called for when actions which are forbidden by law actually take place, such as adultery, prostitution, and the like. In other countries, such as the Gulf States, the hadith has been interpreted by the ulema as forbidding khalwa. But, even in that case, the Messenger did not define any punishment to be applied to those who put themselves in such a situation. It was the ulema, through their own ijtihad – their personal reflection – over the centuries, who studied the ‘offence’ in its various aspects, defined its nature and decided on the applicable sanctions (under the ta’azir approach, in which the judge has latitude to decide on the applicable sanction).

When a case such as that of the ‘Girl of Qatif’ gains worldwide publicity, most Muslim people find themselves at a loss to understand why different Muslim countries, applying the same Islamic law, implement it with such strikingly different results. How can the same action be a punishable offence that is severely sanctioned in one region, whereas in another region it is no offence at all, and carries no punishment? The situation becomes even more perplexing when a Saudi judge explains, in an interview published by a major Saudi daily newspaper, that the Courts have shown “compassion and pity” for the girl (when she was condemned to 90 lashes, later raised to 200 lashes plus 6 months in jail). If that had not been the case, it was his opinion, as a judge with 30 years experience, that the judges “should have condemned the girl of Qatif to death”, together with the other people involved in the case.(1) One is reminded of Ali ibn Abu Talib’s observation that it is human beings (with all their frailties) who interpret the Shari’ah. In the Gulf States, personal status law has not yet been codified into a mudawwana, and both the judges and the people have some difficulty at times, distinguishing between tribal ‘law’ and customs and the prescriptions of Islamic law, especially in ta’azir situations.

One would think, in these conditions, that there is latitude for change in the judicial system’s view of khalwa in the Gulf States, if the political authorities were inclined to do so. The only major obstacle to be confronted is the weight of traditions. “Unfortunately,” says Suhaila Hammad, a writer who supports women’s rights, “tradition and customs control many people here (in Saudi Arabia) and they confuse them with Islamic law. As for the argument that we should introduce women’s rights gradually, I say Islam came 1,428 years ago. Are all these centuries not enough to understand it?” (2) Notes: (1) Okaz newspaper, Nov 27, 2007 : an interview with judge Ibrahim al-Khodhairi (in Arabic) (2) Heba Saleh, ‘Women’s rights: Barrier of silence has been broken’, Financial Times, December 4, 2007

SaudiDebate.com It is time for the Islamic world to replace lunar uncertainty with scientific facts: Wednesday, 05 September 2007

By Khalid Chraibi Muslim people regularly get puzzled at the inability of the Islamic calendar to predict precisely, well in advance, the day on which major Islamic events are to take place, such as the first day of ramadan, or eid al-fitr, or eid al-adha, or the first day of the new Islamic year. They may even get annoyed because they cannot arrange in advance such ordinary things as taking a few days off from work on such occasions, making hotel bookings or flight reservations, or avoiding to make business or travel commitments on such dates. The Islamic calendar's shortcomings are indeed severe, since the data it shows each month differs from one Muslim country to another, and the information it provides does not extend beyond the current month. For instance, the first day of « ramadan » 1427 corresponded to Saturday, September 23, 2006 in 20 countries ; Sunday, September 24 in 46 countries ; and Monday, September 25 in 5 countries. (1) This situation is in no way unusual, but can be observed every month. Nowadays, the Muslims use the Gregorian calendar to meet all their needs, and only care about Islamic dates on momentous Islamic occasions. However, the Islamic calendar only lost its usefulness when Muslim theologians disconnected it from its astronomical, conceptual and methodological moorings, early in the 7th century. It could fulfill all the basic functions of a calendar, and meet all the needs of modern man, within the Muslim community, on a worldwide basis, if it were prepared using the applicable scientific concepts, methods and parameters developed in astronomy. Cadi Ahmad Shakir, President of the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Shari'ah, explained in a famous 1939 study that there was absolutely no obstacle, on the theological level, to the establishment of such an Islamic calendar, using astronomical calculations. (2) In 2004, renowned jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi announced his full support for Shakir's analysis and conclusions. (3) For its part, the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), acting independently, presented in 2006 an ingenious, well thought-out methodology which permits

the adoption of a pre-calculated calendar, while meeting all the requirements of the Shari'ah (4).

The lunar calendar is based on a year of 12 months adding up to 354.37 days. Each lunar month begins at the time of the monthly "conjunction", when the Moon is located on a straight line between the Earth and the Sun. The month is defined as the average duration of a rotation of the Moon around the Earth (29.53 days). The astronomers formulated the convention, over two thousands years ago, that months of 30 days and 29 days would succeed each other, adding up over two successive months to 59 full days. This left only a small monthly variation of 44 minutes to account for, which added up to a total of 24 hours (i.e. the equivalent of one full day) in 2.73 years. To settle accounts, it was sufficient to add one day every three years to the lunar calendar, in the same way that one adds one day to the Gregorian calendar, every four years. The Islamic calendar, however, is based on a different set of conventions. When the Messenger was asked for a method to determine the beginning of the month of fasting, he recommended to the faithful to begin fasting with the observation of the new moon (on the evening of the 29th day of sha'aban) and to end fasting with the new moon (of the month of shawal). "If the crescent is not visible (because of the clouds), count to 30 days". Thereafter, each Islamic State proceeded with its own monthly observation of the new moon (or, failing that, awaited the completion of 30 days) before declaring the beginning of a new month on its territory, instead of using a pre-calculated calendar, as computed by professional astronomers. But, the lunar crescent becomes really visible only some 18 hours after the conjunction, and only subject to the existence of a number of favourable conditions relative to weather, time, geographic location, as well as various astronomical parameters... According to the months and seasons, the favourable conditions of observation of the new moon will be met in different sites on Earth.

The Koran prohibits nowhere the use of astronomical calculations for the establishment of a pre-calculated calendar. The procedure is therefore perfectly and undisputably licit. Numerous theologians in the early years of Islam saw no contradiction between the Messenger's teachings and the use of astronomical calculations to determine the beginnings of lunar months. (5) The dynasty of Fatimids in Egypt used a pre-calculated calendar over a period of two centuries, between the 10th and 12th centuries, before a change of political regime reactivated the procedure of observation of the new moon.

But the majority of Muslim theologians insist nowadays that, no matter what, one can't go against the Messenger's teachings. They interpret his recommendation concerning the observation of ramadan's new moon as if it were part of the fundamental Islamic dogma. It would be utterly wrong, in their view, to use a calendar based on the conjunction, because one would start fasting, end fasting, and celebrate all other important Islamic events about two days earlier than would be the case, if the procedure of observation of the new moon were applied.

However, many Islamic thinkers insist that the Messenger's recommendation to the faithful was merely adapted to the culture of the times. It should not be confused with the acts of worship. (6) The Saudi authorities must share this view, somehow, since the country gave up in 1999 the procedure of observation of the new moon, to substitute to it a procedure based on the calculation of the schedules of sunset and moonset at the coordinates of Mecca, on the evening of the 29th day of each month. If the sun sets before the moon, this signals the beginning of the new month. In the opposite case, the month-in-progress lasts 30 days. This procedure has little to do with the observation of the new moon. (7) One should also note that, during long periods of Islamic history, the hadith under discussion was not interpreted to mean the visual observation of a new moon, but only the acquisition of information, according to credible sources, that the month had begun. This opens entirely different vistas in the discussion of this question. (6) As for the hadith of the Prophet according to which the Bedouins can neither read nor count, and must thus avoid using (astronomical) calculations, Ibn Taymiya observes that the argument may have been justified at the beginning of the 7th century, but he questions whether it could still apply to Muslims centuries later, after they had been at the vanguard of development of scientific knowledge, including in the field of astronomy. Sheikh Abdul Muhsen Al-Obaikan, a Councilor in the Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, is clearly favourable to the use of modern technology to determine the beginning of months. He says : « Using the naked eye to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan is primitive in an age of modern science and technology. There is no other way to put it. It's pure backwardness." » (8)

Egyptian cadi Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (who was to become President of

the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Shariah at the end of his career, and who remains to this day an author of reference in the field of hadith) (9), wrote a lengthy legal opinion in 1939 on the subject of the Islamic calendar, entitled : "The beginning of arab months... is it legal to determine it using astronomical calculations?". (2) According to him, the Messenger took into account the fact that the Muslim community of his time was « illiterate, not knowing how to write nor how to count ». So, he recommended to its members to observe the new moon to carry out their religious duties at the time of fasting and hajj. But the community evolved considerably over time, and some of its members even became experts in astronomy. According to the principle of Muslim law which states that « a rule is no longer applicable, when the factor which justified its existence has disappeared », the Messenger's recommendation didn't apply anymore to the Muslims, after they had learned to read and count and had ceased being illiterate. Therefore, according to Shakir, contemporary ulamas commit an error of interpretation when they give to the Messenger's hadith the same interpretation that applied at the time of Revelation, as if the hadith prescribed immutable rules. But, it has stopped being applicable to the Muslim community long ago, based on the principles of the shari'ah themselves.

Furthermore, Shakir refers to the principle of Muslim law according to which « what is relative cannot refute what is absolute, nor can it be preferred to it, according to the consensus of the ulamas. » The observation of the new moon with the naked eye is relative, and can be the subject of error, whereas the knowledge of the beginning of lunar months, based on astronomical calculations, is absolute, and belongs to the domain of certainty. Shakir reaches the conclusion that there is nothing in the shari'ah which opposes the use of calculations to determine the beginning of all lunar months, in all circumstances, and not only in special situations, as had been recommended by some ulamas. For him, there can exist only one lunar month applicable in all countries of the world, based on astronomical calculations. The use of the same pre-calculated calendar in all Muslim countries will give them an opportunity to celebrate all major Islamic events on the same day, throughout the world, thereby increasing their feeling of solidarity and unity. In the 68 years since their publication, Shakir's conclusions have not been refuted by any

Muslim jurist. As a man of law, and as an expert on hadith, he continues to be highly considered by his peers, long after his death. (9) Thus, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the well-known theologian and jurist, has lavishly praised Shakir in a 2004 article entitled : "Astronomical calculations and determination of the beginning of months" in which he expressed his full support to cadi Shakir's conclusions. (3)

The Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) was also regularly confronted with the responsibility of telling its Muslim American audience when to start fasting, when to celebrate « eid al-fitr », etc. After several years of study of the legal issues involved, it reached a decision, which it announced in August 2006, to use henceforth a pre-calculated Islamic calendar, taking into consideration the sightability of the new moon anywhere on Earth. (4) The decision of the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) combines the theological requirements of the ulamas with the state of the art in the field of new moon observation. First, it retains the well-known principle of unicity of horizons (matali'e) which states that it is sufficient to observe the new moon anywhere on Earth, in order to declare the beginning of a new lunar month, applicable in all areas in which the information is received. (10) Second, it uses the International date line (IDL) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) as its conventional point of reference to conduct its analysis. Based on the maps of sightability of the new moon in the various regions of Earth, which are now regularly prepared by professional astronomers, (11) the FCNA reached the conclusion that when the conjunction took place before 12:00 noon (GMT), there was enough time left for the new moon to be seen in numerous areas on Earth where sunset took place long before sunset in North America. Since the criteria of sightability of the new moon were met in these areas, the new moon would be observed (or could have been observed if weather conditions had been adequate) long before sunset in North America. Therefore, the requirements of sightability of the new moon as set by the shari'ah would be respected, and the new lunar month could begin in North America on sunset of the same day. On the other hand, if the conjunction took place after 12:00 noon GMT, the month would begin in North America on sunset of the following day.

The Islamic calendar can adequately fulfill all the functions of a calendar, and meet all the needs of the Muslim community throughout the world, if it is set up using the concepts, methods and parameters developed by professional astronomers. But it can fulfill

none of these functions if it is based on the monthly observation of the new moon with the naked eye, carried out separately in each independent country. The majority of ulamas base themselves on tradition to state that one should respect the recommendation of the Messenger to observe the new moon in order to start fasting. But, according to Cadi Shakir, from a purely legal point of view, this view isn't defensible anymore. In his 1939 legal opinion, he concludes that there is no theological objection to the establishment of a pre-calculated Islamic calendar, based on astronomical calculations. Professor Al-Qaradawi now concurs with this conclusion (2004). For its part, the Fiqh Council of North America, conscious of the intricacies of the issues involved, developed in 2006 a solution which elegantly meets the requirements of the shari'ah, while making use of the state-of-the art know how in the field of astronomy to respond to the needs of the modern age. This solution is applicable in all Muslim countries, and gives them a chance to adopt the same pre-calculated Islamic calendar (prepared on an annual basis, long in advance), in order to fulfill all the religious duties as well as to manage all other tasks.

The rulers, political leaders and religious authorities in each Muslim country now have the clear choice between adopting either the conclusions of Cadi Shakir, or the solution developed by the Fiqh Council of North America, or perpetuating the status quo. According to a report entitled « Break through for Global Islamic Calendar » published on « Moonsighting.com » in late December 2006, some countries were trying to develop a common stand on this issue in the autumn 2006: « In November 2006, there was an International Conference in Morocco about adopting a Global Islamic Calendar. Astronomers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Iran, Ginnea, Libya, Morocco, and USA participated. Overwhelming majority including Saudi, Egypt, and Irani astronomers agreed with the calendar (adopted by Fiqh Council of North America), that can be used as a Global Islamic Calendar. Morocco is willing to adopt it immediately. Further development on this issue will follow as time progresses. » (12)

Footnotes (1) http://www.moonsighting.com/1427rmd.html

(2) Ahmad Shakir : « The beginning of arab months ... is it legal to determine it using astronomical calculations? ». (published in arabic in 1939) reproduced in the arab daily « al-madina », 13 october 2006 (n° 15878) : http://ahmadmuhammadshakir.blogspot.com/

(3) Yusuf al-Qaradawi : « Astronomical calculations and determination of the beginning of months » (in arabic) : http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/contemporary/2004/10/article01b.shtml (4) Fiqh Council of North America: http://www.moonsighting.com/calendar.html (5) Abderrahman al-Haj : « The faqih, the politician and the determination of lunar months » (in arabic) : http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/contemporary/2003/10/article03.shtml (6) Allal el Fassi : « Aljawab assahih wannass-hi al-khaliss ‘an nazilati fas wama yata'allaqo bimabda-i acchouhouri al-islamiyati al-arabiyah », report prepared at the request of King Hassan II of Morocco, Rabat, 1965 (36 p.), with no indication of editor (7) The Umm-al-Qura calendar of Saudi Arabia http://www.phys.uu.nl/~vgent/islam/ummalqura.htm

(8) Anver Saad, « The Untold Story of Ramadhan Moon Sighting » Daily muslims, October 07, 2005 : http://www.muslimsweekly.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=804&Itemid=63 (9) Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (biographical notice in arabic) : http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/history/1422/09/article17.shtml (10) Abi alfayd Ahmad al-Ghomari : Tawjih alandhar litaw-hidi almouslimin fi assawmi wal iftar, 160p, 1960, Dar al bayareq, Beyrouth, 2nd ed. 1999 (11) http://www.moonsighting.com/ (12) http://www.moonsighting.com/1427zhj.html

SaudiDebate.com Extremists cannot claim Koranic justification for violence despite proud boasts of ‘jihadis’: Saturday, 28 July 2007

By Khalid Chraibi Watching TV news programmes these days, one gets the impression that the whole Middle East is in turmoil, with terrible acts of violence taking place routinely in a multiplicity of settings. The distress is at its peak in Iraq where, every single day, trucks and cars laden with explosives are rammed into crowded places, such as a central market or a mosque at the time of the midday prayer, and detonated, killing dozens of civilians and wounding hundreds of people. This wave of violence is only marginally directed at foreign troops of occupation. The overwhelming majority of the victims are civilians who are not even individually targeted, but simply belong to a group that their adversaries have decided to attack, such as the employees of some administration, or the members of a religious group (Sunni or Shi'a). Many of the victims are accounted for merely as "collateral damage", i.e. people who happened to be standing within the range of an explosive device, at the time of explosion. The authors of these acts of violence proudly describe themselves as "jihadists", "salafi", etc. to underline their Islamic affiliations. Based on this, Western governments and media lump all these acts together under the generic label of "terrorism", attributing them to a resurgence of religious extremism in the Muslim world. They either present them as symbols of an ongoing "clash of civilizations" between Islamic countries and the West, or point at them as an indication of the struggle between conservatism and modernity in Muslim societies.

Nevertheless, most Muslims find it hard to reconcile these acts of violence with the teachings of their religion. But, the political/religious leaders who mastermind such actions have developed their own "fatwas" about them, which they use to convince would-be

suicide-bombers of the righteousness of their acts of violence. They justified their actions as follows, in a recent interview published by a major American newspaper: "In the typical car bombing, God will identify those who deserve to die - for example, anyone helping the enemy - and send them to hell. The other victims will go to paradise. ‘The innocent who is hurt, he won't suffer. He becomes a martyr himself'." (1) Nor, do they feel any distress about the random killing of children in such operations, because "Children receive special consideration in death. They are not held accountable for any sins until puberty, and if they are killed in a jihad operation they will go straight to heaven. There, they will instantly age to their late 20s, and enjoy the same access to virgins and other benefits as martyrs receive." (1)

Many Saudi youth have been associated, in recent years, with this type of violence, in such diverse settings as Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, North Africa, etc. The Saudi authorities are worried about this situation, and try to develop new guidelines to provide the youth with the appropriate religious guidance, including within the environment of summer camps this summer, to enable them to distinguish between true Islamic teachings and "deviant ideology". Thus, at a meeting with more than 600 imams and khateebs in late June 2007, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif expressed his concern about Saudi youth involvement in acts of violence in Iraq and Lebanon. He was quoted by the Saudi Press Agency as asking the imams, and beyond them Saudi society more generally: "Do you know that your children who go to Iraq are used only for blowing themselves up, causing the deaths of innocents? Are you happy for your children to become instruments of murder?" He's reported to have added: "Do you want people in your society who call you, your state and your leaders infidels?" The Prince emphasized the positive role that imams and khateebs could play in the country's fight against terrorism, "deviant ideology" and destructive thoughts and ideas, by regularly using the Friday sermon in over 14 000 mosques to expose the "deviants" and their ideology.

In theory, the task of the imams and khateebs is quite straightforward and simple. They have to explain to Saudi youth that Islam is based on the respect of life and property, freedom, equality, solidarity and justice for all. It is the religion of "ummat al wassatt" (the community of the Just, or of the Middle position) as explained in the following verse: "Thus have We made of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves;..." (Al-Baqarah II:143)

Islam opposes extremism in religion, as explained in the verse: "Say: O People of the Book! exceed not in your religion the bounds (of what is proper), trespassing beyond the truth, nor follow the vain desires of people who went wrong in times gone by, who misled many, and strayed (themselves) from the even Way." (Al-Maidah, V:77) The Prophet also warned repeatedly and strongly against extremism in religion, emphasizing that it was the cause of the disasters which befell earlier nations. Thus, Islam abhors the indiscriminate killing of civilians and non-combatants. The high value that Islam places on human life is clearly expressed in a multiplicity of Kor'anic verses such as: "...take not life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law: thus doth He command you, that ye may learn wisdom." (Al-An'am, VI:151) Or: "if anyone slew a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people." (Al-Maidah V:32)

The principle of sacredness of human life is also emphasized in the "Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights" of 19 September 1981 (21 Dhul Qaidah 1401) which states: "Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect it. In particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under the authority of the Law." Islam also established very strict rules on how to deal with cases of murder. Capital punishment can be applied by a court of law, which respects due process. But, no individual is allowed to take the law into his own hands, to decide at his personal whim who is to live and who is to die, etc. Such a situation, if it were to take place, would be comparable to a state of "fitna", which is strongly denounced by Islam. The Muslim community is organized to handle and resolve all the conflicts between its members through peaceful means, or using the alternative means which the shari'ah has established. The imams are also to remind the youth that, even in a situation of warfare, Islam has established very strict rules, which all parties to the conflict have to respect. These rules were observed during the life of the Prophet, with the objective of ensuring that damages were limited to what was necessary, without unnecessary destruction of life (women, civilians, old people, non-fighters) and property (trees, orchards, wells, cattle, etc.). The Caliph Abu Bakr reminded his troops of these rules, on the eve of their departure for battle, as follows: "Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone."

It is clear from the preceding statements that Islam is definitely opposed to the indiscriminate killing of people, no matter what the circumstances may be. It also stands against takfeer, which is another aspect of extremism. Clearly, one cannot say on a whim that other Muslim people are "kouffar" (infidels) who can therefore be killed without any misgivings. This would be the most extreme case of "fitna". Resort to violence, even at the State level, is the exception and not the rule. It must take place within strict rules: no abuse of power, no excess, respect of non-combatants (civilians, women, children, elderly...), respect of private property, which must not be destroyed except in extreme situations... One can't say, in this respect, that he wants to promote the values and principles of Islam, while he violates himself all its fundamental rules to achieve his own political objectives.

In short, in a modern State, people cannot take the law into their own hands. Individuals can't declare war to foreign States. Nor can they declare war to their own established Government. Otherwise, the community enters into a situation of anarchy, of "fitna". The confusion between politics, religion and "fitna" is promoted by all the parties concerned in the conflicts raging in the Middle East, because it fits with each participant's agenda. Western Governments and media can point to the violence and explain it by religious extremism, so that they don't have to delve into the complex political conflicts taking place in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, etc. The political authorities of a country can explain the violence as the product of "religious extremism" or of a "deviant" ideology, rather than as a rebellion against their authority. The "jihadists" can claim that they are merely trying to achieve the objective of a unified "ummah" set by Islam, rather than the political objectives they truly have in mind, such as the conquest of power in a given country. The people at large may be left bewildered by all these conflicting claims. But, the unquestionable fact is that Islam is the religion of "ummat al wassatt" (the nation of the Just people, or the people of the Middle position) which abhors all acts of extremism in any aspect of life. In particular, Islam is based on the respect of life and property, freedom, equality, solidarity and justice for all. One can't do away with all the values it stands for, and everything it teaches, and still assert with any credibility that he's acting on its behalf.

Notes:

(1) Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet: 'The Guidebook For Taking A Life', The New York Times, Week in Review, June 10, 2007)

SaudiDebate.com Pope and people must understand truth of Qu’ranic teachings on jihad and religious freedom Thursday, 07 June 2007

By Khalid Chraibi In his Regensburg lecture of September 12, 2006 Pope Benedict XVI argued that Islam, contrary to Christianity, had resorted to violence and coercion to spread its faith (1). Quoting a long-forgotten 14th century Byzantine emperor in support of his argument, the Pope commented: "The emperor must have known that surah 2 : 256 reads: "There is no compulsion in religion". It is one of the surahs of the early period, when Muhammad was still powerless and under threat. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur'an, concerning holy war." The Pope then quoted the emperor as saying: "Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached". The Pope's derogatory remarks offended the Muslim community worldwide. Many media analysts saw in it the clear imprint of the Vatican's campaign to disparage Islam, in order to counter its progress in developing countries. The ulamas criticized the Pope for misrepresenting the facts concerning the Qur'anic verses he quoted, and for being clearly prejudiced in his discussion of Islamic thought and history. They reminded him that the principle of religious freedom was enunciated in numerous Qur'anic verses, none of which was ever abrogated. Moreover, the Qur'an only prescribed Jihad to the Muslims as a defensive war to protect themselves and their faith when under attack. The incident provided an opportunity for Muslims and non-Muslims alike to acquaint themselves with the Qur'an's real stand on the issue of religious freedom.

The Qur'an proclaims the principle of religious freedom not in one, but in a

multiplicity of verses, interspersed in many surahs, usually in the context of the discussion of the Messenger's mission. The description of the latter sets out its scope, limits and contents, with indications as to how it is to be carried out, and how the Messenger is to deal with a variety of issues, including his nearest kinsmen, the People of the Book, the polytheists, etc. (2) According to this description, the Messenger's main function is to convey the Lord's Message, to expound openly what he has been commanded and to give a clear warning to the people. He is "to invite all to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious."

But, he is not set over people to arrange their affairs, and is not to overawe them by force. He can admonish them but, if they disobey him, he is to leave them alone, to their own choice. "Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)." Or again: "Everyone acts according to his own disposition." "Those who receive Guidance, do so for the good of their own souls; those who stray, do so to their own loss." This point is so important in the Qur'anic message that it is reiterated on several occasions, using different wordings: "If people accept guidance, they do it for the good of their own souls, and if any stray, the Messenger is only a Warner." "If any will see, it will be for [the good of] his own soul; if any will be blind, it will be to his own [harm]: the Messenger is not [here] to watch over their doings." Thus, if he discusses the Lord's Message with People of the Book and they dispute with him, the Messenger is to say to them: "Allah is our Lord and your Lord: for us [is the responsibility for] our deeds, and for you for your deeds, there is no contention between us and you." Similarly, "If people argue with him, dispute with him, charge him with falsehood, he is to say: ‘My work to me, and yours to you! Ye are free from responsibility for what I do and I for what ye do!'" In such situations, the Messenger is "to turn away from them, have patience with what they say, and leave them with noble [dignity]." The Messenger is repeatedly reminded that: "If it were Allah's Will, He could gather people together unto true guidance." "If it had been Allah's Plan, they would not have taken false gods: but the Lord did not send the Messenger to watch over their doings, nor is he set over them to dispose of their affairs."

The reason for the existence of religious freedom is explained in the

following way: "If Allah had so willed, He would have made mankind a single People, but [His plan is] to test them in what He hath given them; so they must strive as in a race in all virtues." On one occasion, the Messenger is admonished in the following terms: "If it had been the Lord's Will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth! Wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe!" The most-often quoted verse reads: "Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error [...]." Contrary to the Pope's assertion, this verse was not revealed in Makkah, in "the early period, when Muhammad was still powerless and under threat," but in a later period, in al-Madinah, when the Messenger was in a situation of relative power and security. The occasion is narrated in all tafsir textbooks: in pre-Islamic times, some women gave their child to a Jewish family to raise, often in the Jewish faith, in the belief that this would give him a better chance to survive. When the parents of such children converted to Islam, the children were reluctant to follow suit, so the Messenger was asked by the parents whether they could coerce their children into changing their faith. The verse quoted by the Pope forbade the parents to exercise any such coercion, stating: "Let there be no compulsion in religion."

The Messenger is repeatedly reminded that, no matter what happens, it is not his role to punish anyone who rejects the Lord's Message:"...thy duty is to make (the Message) reach them: it is Our part to call them to account." "It is not for the Messenger, but for the Lord to make the decision whether to turn in Mercy to the unbelievers or to punish them. It will be for the Lord to call them to account." The Messenger is to "leave them alone until they encounter that Day of theirs, wherein they shall [perforce] swoon [with terror]." Although the principle of religious freedom is thus perfectly established in the Qur'an, and was never abrogated, the Muslim communities have at times had difficulties in applying it, for all kinds of reasons. As an illustration, Islamic jurists diverge to this day on how to deal with the issue of apostasy. Some consider that the Qur'anic principle of religious freedom covers the cases of apostasy, but most ulamas dispute that view, basing themselves on the Sunnah. Nevertheless, it remains as a fact that the Qur'an, while denouncing the people who commit apostasy, does not prescribe any sanction to be applied to them by any other person, as is clear from the following verses: "Those who believe, then reject Faith, then believe [again] and [again] reject Faith, and go on increasing in unbelief, Allah will not forgive them nor guide them on the way." "Anyone who, after accepting Faith in Allah, utters Unbelief, - except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in Faith - but such as open their breast to Unbelief, on them is Wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a dreadful Penalty."

As to Jihad, the consensus of the ulamas today is that the Qur'an prescribes it to the Muslims only to defend themselves and their faith, when under attack. This appears explicitly in the following verses, which were the first revealed on the subject of Jihad: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight], because they are wronged; and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid; [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, [for no cause] except that they say, "Our Lord is Allah." Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure. Allah will certainly aid those who aid His [cause]; for verily Allah is Full of Strength, Exalted in Might, [able to enforce His Will]."

The Qur'an never prescribes Jihad as an offensive war, to extend Islamic rule to foreign lands and to convert their people "by the sword". Those who defend these views merely interpret Qur'anic verses in a manner which suits their own purposes. They are merely attributing to Islam their own views on the subject. Based on the numerous rebuttals of the Pope's assertions that were published by the ulamas in the media worldwide, one can draw the following conclusions: The Qur'an proclaims the principle of religious freedom, explicitly and unequivocally, throughout dozens of different verses interspersed in a variety of surahs. It prescribes the use of dialogue and persuasion to transmit the Muslim message, and forbids the use of any form of coercion towards anyone to this end. This principle was upheld throughout the life of the Messenger and was applied to all, including the Muslim's own children raised in the Jewish faith. As to Jihad, the Qur'an prescribes it to the Muslims only to defend themselves and their faith, when under attack. Notes: (1) Pope's speech at University of Regensburg http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=46474 (2) All Qur'anic quotations are from the Qur'an's English translation at www.al-islam.com (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Islamic Affairs site) : http://quran.alislam.com/Targama/DispTargam.asp?nType=1&nSeg=0&l=eng&nSora=1&nAya=1&t=eng

SaudiDebate.com Mixed message on 'riba' leaves Muslims trapped between usurers and lenders: Tuesday, 24 April 2007

By Khalid Chraibi The question put to scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi at a youth gathering in Morocco, in the summer of 2006, was innocuous enough: in the absence of Islamic banking in Morocco, is it licit for a Moroccan to take an interest-bearing loan from a conventional bank to buy a home? Al-Qaradawi referred his audience to a ruling by the European Council for Fatwa, which authorized Muslim minorities living in Europe, with no access to Islamic banking, to take such a loan, based on the rule that: “Necessity allows the use of what is illicit” (addarouratou toubihou al mahdhourat). He added that, since the Moroccans had no possibility to buy a home except through the conventional banking system, their situation was comparable to that of Muslim minorities living in countries in which Islamic banking was not the norm. The ruling applicable to the latter was also applicable to them. Al-Qaradawi’s fatwa raises the issue of the compliance of modern banking with the shari’ah, a subject of continuing controversy between traditionalist and modernist religious thinkers. Between usury and interest Modern banking is inextricably linked with interest, which many contemporary Muslims associate with riba. Since the Qur’an prohibits riba, explicitly and unequivocally, they are convinced that modern banking activities are “illicit”. But the definition of riba is elusive. For centuries, the ulema have been faced with the difficult challenge of sorting out, generation after generation, what the riba prohibition should apply to, and they have not reached any consensus on this matter to this day. Of course, the ulema agree that riba refers, in the first place, to usury, i.e. “the lending of money with an exorbitant interest charge for its use”. But a majority of ulema consider that riba also refers, in a second meaning, to “interest under all its forms”. This was the position of al-Azhar’s Research Council when it ruled, in 1965: “Interest on all types of loans is forbidden Riba. There is no difference in this regard between so called consumption and production loans. Moreover, Riba is forbidden (haram) in small as well as large quantities, whether it is effected through time deposits, demand (or checking) deposits, or any interestbearing loan contract. All such dealings are among the forbidden Riba”.

This was also the position upheld, more recently, by the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), an affiliate of the Organization of Islamic Conference, which was established by its 43 member States to try to develop an Islamic consensus about just such complex fiqh issues. In a 1985 resolution, IFA stated: “Any increase or interest on a debt which has matured, in return for an extension of the maturity date, in case the borrower is unable to pay ; and the increase (or interest) on the loan at the inception of its agreement, are both forms of usury, which is prohibited under Shari’ah.” Under this definition, conventional banking operations are all “illicit”, because they incorporate interest, i.e. “a charge for borrowed money, generally a percentage of the amount borrowed”. But, modern financial activities differ in kind from anything that existed at the time of Revelation. One may wonder, therefore, with Abdullah Yusuf Ali, about the legitimacy of extending to them the riba prohibition, based on “qiyas” and “ijtihad”. Says Ali, best known for his classic translation of the Qur’an into English: “Our Ulema, ancient and modern, have worked out a great body of literature on Usury, based mainly on economic conditions as they existed at the rise of Islam. I agree with them on the main principles, but respectfully differ from them on the definition of Usury… My definition would include profiteering of all kinds, but exclude economic credit, the creature of modern banking and finance.”

Modern banking structures and financial instruments were introduced in Muslim countries at the time of their occupation by foreign Western powers, in the 19th and 20th Centuries. When Islamic jurists saw how these modern banking institutions and their assorted financial tools were used to develop the national economy, they understood the positive role that interest could play in modern society. They realized that its total prohibition in economic and financial dealings could conflict with society’s economic and social needs and aims, and could hamper the country’s development. The voices of al-Azhar For these reasons, from the 19th Century on, Egyptian Grand Muftis and Sheikhs of al-Azhar, as well as numerous religious leaders in various Muslim countries, have been earnestly looking for ways and means to convert the total prohibition of interest into a selective one, in order to reconcile the prevailing definition of riba with the economic and financial requirements of modern society. Muhammad Abduh, the mufti of Egypt and Sheikh of al-Azhar, was a pioneer in this field, when he wrote a fatwa to the effect that interest paid by the Egyptian Post Office on “personal savings accounts” was lawful. He also explained to the readers of “al-Manar” that the use of interest could be quite licit in some financial dealings, and have nothing to do with a riba situation. He wrote: “When one gives his money to another for investment, and payment of a known profit, this does not constitute the definitely forbidden Riba, regardless of the pre-specified profit rate… This type of transaction is beneficial both to the investor and the entrepreneur. In contrast, Riba harms one for no fault other than being in need, and benefits another for no work except greed and

hardness of heart. The two types of dealings cannot possibly have the same legal status (hokum).” Another Sheikh of al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltut, wrote a fatwa in which he declared that interest paid on State bonds was licit, when issued by the State to meet public needs, and to further the country’s economic development. He even asserted that any transaction which was offered by the State, with a fixed interest in advance, was licit, since there was no exploitation of either party in such cases. Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, the present Sheikh of al-Azhar, though a traditional, orthodox scholar, worked for decades along the same lines as his predecessors, to try to disentangle interest from riba. As Grand Mufti of Egypt (1986-96), he ruled that fixed interests on bank deposits were “halal”, even suggesting that the legal terminology used for bank interest and bank accounts be changed, to avoid their assimilation to riba. Furthermore, in 2002, the ulema of Al-Azhar, working under Tantawi’s direction, revised the 1965 stand of the institution on riba. They approved a fatwa which stated that “investing funds with banks that pre-specify profits or returns is permissible, and there is no harm therein.” For Tantawi: “…the bank investing the money for a pre-specified profit becomes a hired worker for the investors, who thus accept the amount the bank gives them as their profits, and all the excess profits (whatever they may be) are thus deemed the bank’s wages. Therefore, this dealing is devoid of riba.” He adds : “We do not find any Canonical Text, or convincing analogy, that forbids pre-specification of profits, as long as there is mutual consent.” Bankers and shari’ah One could quote many other efforts by distinguished Muslim jurists, aiming at separating interest from riba. For instance, Abd al Mun’im Al Nimr, a former Minister of Awqaf in Egypt, explained in a 1989 article that the prohibition of riba was essentially justified by the harm caused to the debtor. Therefore, since there was no harm caused to depositors in banks, the prohibition of riba did not apply to bank deposits. Explains Nasr Farid Wasil, Tantawi’s successor as Grand Mufti of Egypt: “So long as banks invest the money in permissible venues (halal), then the transaction is permissible (halal)... The issue is an investment from money. Otherwise, it is forbidden (haram)...” He adds: “There is no such thing as an Islamic or non Islamic bank. So let us stop this controversy about bank interest.” The banking debate revolves, therefore, essentially, around the definition of riba. A conservative definition of riba equates it with banking interest. On that basis, modern banking systems in Muslim countries are described as “illicit”, because they use interest in their operations. But, according to a number of Grand Muftis of Egypt, and Sheikhs of Al-Azhar, this is an outdated view of the banking issue. In their opinion, riba should be equated with usury only. Since modern banking does not use usury in its operations, it is not concerned with the riba issue, and raises no problem of compliance with the shari’ah. Explains Moroccan law professor Ahmed Khamlichi, in this respect: “The ulema don’t have

the monopoly of interpretation of the shari’ah. Of course, they must rank high in consultations on shari’ah issues. [But] they don’t make the religious law, in the same way that it’s not the law professors who make the law, but the parliaments”. Sovereign States have promulgated their own national codes, whose contents take into account the specifics of the country, which may differ considerably from one country to another, and over time. One shouldn’t be surprised, therefore, to discover that what’s licit in one country may be considered as illicit in another, and that the items in these categories may also change over time. The important thing to remember is that, in each country, it is the law of the land which applies, as defined by its national institutions. That’s what’s “licit” in that particular country, at that particular time.

SaudiDebate.com Women cite Qu’ranic rights as Muslim modernists use law to confront culture of oppression: Monday, 02 April 2007 By Khalid

Chraibi

The status of Arab women underwent a drastic change in the 7th Century, with the advent of Islam. The new faith liberated them from a situation of tutelage and granted them their full share of rights and responsibilities within Muslim society. The part they played in family life and in the community increased markedly, as they acquired the right to inherit property, conduct business, and have access to knowledge. But these rights, to this day, aren’t properly implemented in many communities, and the issue of women’s rights continues to be at the center of a controversy in many countries. Thus, associations handling the cases of women in difficult situations describe innumerable instances of oppression, exploitation or mistreatment, with many women living under the threat of repudiation, polygamy, domestic violence, “honour” killings, and the like. At work, women suffer from discriminatory practices with regard to employment status, pay scales, responsibilities, promotion, not to mention sexual harassment. In recent years, women’s rights have further deteriorated in various areas of the world, as extremist groups have become increasingly influential in the political and legislative life of different African and Asian countries. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan illustrated this development, imposing strict segregation between the sexes, compelling women to wear a burqa covering them from head to toe, denying them the right to education and to adequate health care, and preventing them from work. It also instituted lashings and amputations as forms of corporal punishment. But the experience of Afghanistan’s women under the Taliban was in no way unique, as Zainah Anwar wrote of Malaysia : “New shari’a criminal laws were passed [in the 1990s in Malaysia], designed to ensure that the Muslim lifestyle does not transgress Islamic teachings. New offences were created, and moral surveillance, strict enforcement and more severe punishment of Muslims were introduced. The Islamic Family Law, one of the most enlightened personal status laws in the Muslim world, was amended to make divorce and polygamy easier for men, and reduce men’s financial responsibilities towards women.”

Women reading the Shari’ah Until these developments, women's associations throughout the Muslim world had given high priority to putting pressure on Governments to implement the UN-sponsored international conventions these countries had signed, concerning human rights in general, and women's rights in particular. They also wanted them to withdraw the reservations they had expressed on signing these conventions concerning various provisions – on the grounds that they “conflict with religion” – since the reservations had the effect of diluting much of the conventions’ usefulness. The changed conditions in the Muslim world led these associations to redefine their priorities and to include a serious study of the Shari’ah, in order to determine for themselves what it really said, with the objective of developing new tools to oppose the repressive new laws, policies and amendments to existing laws that were being introduced by Islamic groups. Says Nora Murat, from Malaysia’s Sisters in Islam organisation: “If, as believers, we want to live a life according to the tenets of our faith, a simplistic call to return to an idealised golden age of Islam, that has little bearing on the realities of today’s world, cannot be the answer. And yet the answers can be found within our faith - if only we have the intellectual vigour, the moral courage, and the political will to strive for a more enlightened and progressive interpretation of the Qur’an in our search for answers. For us in Sisters in Islam, this is not heretical; rather it is imperative, if religion is to be relevant to our lives today.” Women's associations were further motivated in their study of the Qu’ran and Sunnah by the realization, in the words of Pakistan’s Riffat Hassan, that “there was a big gap in what the Qu’ran was saying about women’s rights and what was actually happening in Muslim culture. So, one has to distinguish between Qu’ranic text and the Islamic tradition. The interpretation of the Qu’ran from the earliest times till now has been done almost entirely by men. It was also done in a male-dominated patriarchal culture. So the Qu’ran was interpreted through a male-centric cultural lens—which obviously has affected women’s rights.” Women’s study of the Shari’ah convinced many of them, in the words of Nigeria’s Ayesha Imam, of the need “to distinguish between Islam – the way of Allah – on the one hand, and, what Muslims do – those who believe in Islam and attempt to practice it – on the other”. In a paper entitled “Women's rights in Muslim laws”, she explains: “Islam is not questioned. But, what Muslims (human fallible people) make of Islam can be”. She observes that, though religious laws draw their inspiration from the divine, they are not the same as divine laws. They “do rely on human agency to elaborate, implement and enforce them”. She explains that, in many situations, even the experts do not agree on the definitive meaning of verses in the Qu’ran. Moreover, it is admitted that “many hadith (accounts of the life of the Prophet) are apocryphal, motivated by inter-sect and dynastic rivalries”. Several hadiths of this type seem to have had as their principal aim to put restrictions on women’s rights, although they do not fit with surahs (chapters) in the Qu’ran or with other hadith.

Ms. Imam adds that many people believe the shari’ah to be the same everywhere, throughout the Muslim world. But the fact is that it varies significantly from one country to another, as

well as over time. The existence of four main schools of Shari’ah in the Sunni tradition illustrates the diversity of interpretations. The founders of these schools themselves declared emphatically, and repeatedly, that their views should not be considered as final or binding on all Muslims. So, “refusing further ijtihad (personal reflection) is not a religious or divinely sanctioned act. It is not required in the Qu’ran or by the Sunnah. To the contrary, both the Qu’ran and hadith refer approvingly to thinking, reasoning and diversity of opinion”. Though Ms. Imam’s analysis may come as a surprise to readers who have been raised in the belief of the singularity of Shari’ah in Muslim countries, the facts suggest otherwise, as is easily verified by a comparison of current Personal Muslim Law in various countries. Personal Muslim Law also undergoes important changes over time within the same country, as illustrated, for example, by the evolution of family law in Egypt in the 20th Century. The reform of Morocco’s Family Law in 2004 illustrates, for its part, the considerable change in women’s rights that can be achieved over time, through a progressive, but faithful and equitable implementation of the provisions of the Shari’ah. Change within the religious framework Morocco’s Moudawana (Personal Status Law) of 1957, though relatively modern and equitable in many respects, showed a clear conservative bias in its interpretation of many provisions of the Shari’ah, putting several undue restrictions on women’s rights. The network of Moroccan women associations fought for a half-century to obtain its reform. In methodological terms, the revision was to be based on a very attentive reading of the Shari’ah, taking into account as faithfully, as fully and equitably as possible, all relevant surahs and hadiths applicable to every aspect of Muslim personal law. Nevertheless, a major controversy developed around the project, between modernist groups and conservative political forces, jeopardizing the whole operation, which was only saved through the personal intervention of King Mohamed VI. Acting as Amir al-Moumineen (Commander of the Faithful), and assisted with the advice of the Council of Ulama, the King of Morocco had the final say on how to resolve difficulties of a religious nature, and he provided detailed explanations to Parliament on the choices he made. The Parliament had the final say on non-religious issues. The reformed Family Law came into effect in 2004. Among other things, it makes the family the joint responsibility of both spouses, rescinding the wife’s duty of obedience to her husband. It allows women to be their own guardians, and raises the minimum age of marriage for women to eighteen years. It puts prohibitive restrictions on polygamy, by requiring the consent of the first wife, the notification of the second wife of the existence of the first one, and a judge’s consent to the second marriage – which may be granted if he is satisfied that the husband will grant equal status to each wife, in every respect. The Law makes polygamy grounds for divorce by the first wife, and promotes the use of a marriage contract to exclude the possibility of a second marriage by the husband. It puts repudiation under strict judicial control, and requires an equitable distribution of the couple’s assets before a divorce can be final. The Moroccan Family Law of 2004 may have its shortcomings, but it is unquestionably rooted in the Shari’ah, in every respect. Nevertheless, thanks to a more modern interpretation

of the stipulations of the Shari’ah, it affords a considerable progress in the situation of women in Morocco. Who decides what is Islamic? Most womens’ associations working in the field of women’s rights understand fully, today, the usefulness of the strategy of change within the religious framework. Having drawn the lessons of past experiences, they are better prepared to confront the real issues. This shows clearly in the following observations by women working in the field. Asks Zainah Anwar: “If Islam is to be used as a source of law and public policy to govern the public and private lives of citizens, then the question of who decides what is Islamic and what is not, is of paramount importance. What are the implications for democratic governance when only a small, exclusive group of people is accorded the right to interpret the Text and codify it? Particularly when they do so very often in a manner that isolates the Text from the socio-historical context in which it was revealed, isolates classical juristic opinion from the socio-historical context of the lives of the founding jurists of Islam, and isolates the Text from the context of contemporary society.” Adds Nora Murat: “Knowledge that the Qur’an supports the universal values of equality, justice and a life of dignity for women, gives us the courage and conviction to stand up and argue with those who support discrimination against women in the name of religion. It is this knowledge that gives us the confidence to tell them that there are alternative views on the subject and that their obscurantist view, which discriminates against women, is not the only view in Islam.” References: Zainah Anwar: Islamisation and its impact on laws and law making process in Malaysia Nora Murat: Sisters in Islam: Advocacy for change from within the religious framework Riffat Hassan: Interview by Samina Ibrahim, Newsline, Karachi, April 2001 Ayesha Imam: Women's rights in Muslim laws Morocco: Family Law 2004

"Misyar" marriage Wednesday, August 02, 2006

Khalid Chraibi “(Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are Believers, but chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time, when ye give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness, nor secret intrigues.” (Quran V,5) Summary of major findings : Contrary to widely-held beliefs, misyar marriage fits within the general regime of marriage in Muslim law, and not in a special regime. Its fulfillment of all the requirements of the sharia is a sine qua none condition for its validity. Muslim law confers on the parties the right to set up in the marriage contract certain particular stipulations relative to their reciprocal rights and obligations. When the parties agree, within the framework of the marriage "misyar", that the woman will give up some of the rights the law confers to her as a wife, this is perfectly legal, if that is her will freely expressed. But, in the event of a change of circumstances, she can assert all the rights which the law confers to her in her capacity as a wife (like the "nafaqa" for example), because these are inalienable rights within the framework of the marriage. The clause of renunciation constitutes only a promise not to assert certain rights. It has an undeniable standing as a moral commitment, but is of no value on the legal level. The wife can thus respect it as long as she wishes, and reclaim all her legal rights when she needs to do so. Such a clause does not affect in any way the rights of the children who could be born from this union, such as the recognition of paternity, the effects of filiation, the financial responsibility of the father for his children, or the lawful rights of the wife and children to their share of inheritance, etc. Despite the fact that the "misyar" marriage is perfectly legal, according to the theologians, and that the wife can reclaim at any time the rights which she gave up at the time of establishment of the marriage contract, many theologians like Muhammad Ibn Othaymin or Nassirouddine Al-Albany, as well as many Al Azhar professors, are opposed to this type of marriage because it contradicts the spirit of the islamic law of marriage and has perverse effects on the woman, the family and the community in general.

Definition of a Misyar Marriage "Nikah Misyar" or "travellers' marriage" (Arabic language|Arabic]]: {{Ar|‫ )}}نكاح المسيار‬can be described as a legal framework of [[marriage]] in which a [[Islam|Muslim]] couple is united

by the bonds of marriage, based on the usual Islamic marriage contract, but without the husband having to take the usual financial commitments with respect to his wife. The latter exempts him from some of them by a clause of the marriage contract through which she gives up some of her rights (such as cohabitation with the husband, the equal division of the nights between all the wives in the event of [[polygamy]], the residence, the subsidy of maintenance "nafaqa", etc...). (1) The wife continues to carry out a separate life from that of her husband, living in her home and providing for her needs by her own means. But her husband has the right to go to her home (or to the residence of her parents, where she is often supposed to reside), at any hour of the day or the night, whenever he wants to. The couple can then appease in a licit way their "legitimate sexual needs" (to which the wife cannot refuse herself). The marriage misyar represents, according to some, a spontaneous adaptation of the mode of marriage to the concrete needs of people who are not able any more to marry in the traditional way in countries such as [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Kuwait]] or the [[United Arab Emirates]], because of the dearness of the rents ; the high cost-of-life in general; the high amounts of [[dowry]] required; and other similar economic and financial reasons. (2) It fits the needs of a conservative society which punishes severely “[[zina]]” ([[fornication]]) and other sexual relationships which are established outside the bonds of marriage. The [[Theology|theologians]] explain that it is suitable for young people whose resources are too limited to found a home ; for the all too-numerous widows living in the area, who have their own residence and their own financial resources, and who cannot hope to marry again according to the usual formula (or do not wish to), because they have dependent children, for example ; for the numerous divorcees ; as well as for the "old maids" who see their youth fading in an involuntary celibacy, without having tasted the joys of marriage, for one reason or another. Thus, a million and half women are reduced to a situation of forced celibacy in Saudi Arabia alone. (3) The Sheikh of [[Al-Azhar]] [[Muhammad Sayid Tantawi]] and the well-known theologian [[Yusuf Al-Qaradawi]] note, however, in their writings and in their lectures, that a major proportion of the men who take a spouse in the framework of the marriage "misyar" are already married men. (4) Some traits of this marriage are reminiscent of the Nikah [[Mut'ah]] which was practised in Arabia before Islam, and is still practised by [[Shia]] Muslims as a legitimate form of marriage, although it is considered as an illicit one by [[Sunni]] Muslims. (5) But, whereas the Nikah Mut'ah is based on a contract with a fixed date of expiration, the Misyar marriage contract is concluded for an indeterminate period (even though the husband who enters into this union looks at it only as a temporary marriage, which ends up in divorce in 80 % of the cases). The popularity of misyar marriage today results, probably, from a misunderstanding about its real nature, and about its true legal implications for the husband, the wife and the children that may be born from this marriage.

Licitness of misyar marriage

From a legal standpoint, the marriage "misyar" raises several complex issues : is it licit ? Doesn’t it violate the wife’s legitimate rights ? What is the legal value of the wife’s renunciation to some of her rights ? What effets does this situation have on the family and at the social level ? Contrary to widely-held beliefs, misyar marriage fits within the general regime of marriage in Muslim law, and not in a special regime. Its fulfillment of all the requirements of the sharia is a sine qua none condition for its validity. Thus, when Muslim theologians say that the "misyar" marriage is perfectly licit, all they mean is that the contract on which it is based must fulfill all the requirements set out by the charia (agreement of both parties ; presence of a tutor in certain rites ; payment by the husband to his wife (or to the "tutor") of a dowry of an amount agreed upon between them (which can be important or modest, according to their wishes) ; presence of witnesses ; publicity of the marriage...). (6) The Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), a specialized body of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), has conforted this point of view in a fatwa (7) of April 12, 2006. (8) and (9) The clause by which the woman gives up some of her rights (the cohabitation of the couple, the residence, the subsidy towards maintenance (nafaqa)...) raises, for its part, more subtle points of law. Does it belong with this category of well-known clauses in Muslim law which are against the essence of the marriage contract, and which vitiate the latter and make it null, as well as the legal union which is based upon it? Or, maybe, with this second category of clauses which are struck of nullity, whereas the marriage contract remains valid? The Sheikh of Al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi reminds one, in this respect, that Muslim law confers on the parties the right to set up in the marriage contract certain particular stipulations relative to their reciprocal rights and obligations. When the parties agree, within the framework of the marriage "misyar", that the woman will give up some of the rights the law confers to her as a wife, this is perfectly legal, if that is her will freely expressed. (10) The former mufti of Egypt Nasr Fareed Wassel adds, for his part, that the woman can legitimately give up some of her rights at the time of marriage, if she so wishes, owing to the fact that she has private means, for example, or that her father intends to continue to provide for her needs. But, in the event of a change of circumstances, she can assert all the rights which the law confers to her in her capacity as a wife (like the "nafaqa" for example), because these are inalienable rights within the framework of the marriage. (11) Wassell notes that the clause of renunciation constitutes only a promise not to assert certain rights. It has an undeniable standing as a moral commitment, but is of no value on the legal level. The wife can thus respect it as long as she wishes, and reclaim all her legal rights when she needs to do so. He adds that such a clause does not affect in any way the rights of the children who could be born from this union, such as the recognition of paternity, the effects of filiation, the financial responsibility of the father for his children, or the lawful rights of the wife and children to their share of inheritance, etc. (12)

The eminent Saudi theologian Abdullah bin Sulaiman bin Menie, a member of the Higher Council of Ulemas of Saudi Arabia, corroborates this point of view. In his opinion, the wife can denounce at any time the renunciation she agreed to at the time of marriage, and require of her husband that he give her all her rights, including that he live with her and provide for her financial needs ("nafaqa"). The husband can then either give her satisfaction or grant her a divorce (a right that any husband can exercise at any time, anyway). (13) Professor Yusuf Al-Qaradawi , for his part, observes that he doesn’t support this type of marriage, but has to recognize that it is licit (14). He then states straightforwardly his preference that the clause of renunciation be not included within the marriage contract, but be the subject of a simple verbal agreement between the parties (15). He underlines the fact that Muslims are held by their commitments, whether they are written or verbal. He thus conforts the point of view of Wassel and bin Menie on this question. He adds that the inclusion of this clause in the act would not invalidate the latter, which rejoins the point of view of the other two lawyers when they say that the clause can be denounced by the woman, and be declared without legal value, without calling into question the validity of the marriage itself.

Negative effects of misyar marriage Despite the fact that the "misyar" marriage is perfectly legal, according to the theologians, and that the wife can reclaim at any time the rights which she gave up at the time of establishment of the marriage contract, many theologians like Muhammad Ibn Othaymin or Nassirouddine Al-Albany (16), as well as many Al Azhar professors (17), are opposed to this type of marriage because it contradicts the spirit of the islamic law of marriage and has perverse effects on the woman, the family and the community in general. It leads to a degradation of men’s morals, resulting in an irresponsible behaviour towards their spouses. Based on the experience of the "misyar marriage agencies", the man who resorts to the "misyar" marriage is usually married to a first wife with whom he shares a residence, and to the financial needs of whom he provides. (18) It wouldn’t come to this man’s mind to marry a second wife within the regime of polygamy, if he had to obtain the agreement of his first wife and to assume important additional financial responsibilities towards his second wife. But, thanks to the "misyar" marriage, this man feels relieved of any financial or moral responsibility towards his second wife, as if she were only a licit sexual partner, a mistress “halal”. He thinks he can bring this relationship to an end by a mere act of repudiation, at any time, without any negative consequences for himself. (19) Since he usually refrains from telling his first wife of his second marriage, the relationship within the couple is distorted, resulting at times in major complications which can even end in divorce, when the first wife finds out about the situation. As to the second wife, her status is devalued, because she does not have any right on her husband, be it over the time he gives her, his presence at her home, or his financial contribution to help her cover her own needs. Moreover, this type of marriage ends up sooner or later in divorce, (in 80 % of the cases, according to some), when the wife is no longer to the

liking of the husband. She finds herself abandoned, to lead a solitary life as before the marriage, but traumatized by the experience. Her social status also suffers from her repudiation. For these reasons, Al-Albany considers that the "misyar" marriage is not licit, because it runs counter to the objectives and the spirit of marriage in islam, as described in this verse from the Quran : “And among His Signs is this, that He created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquillity with them, and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts)…” (20) It also seems to run counter to the recommendations of this well-known verse from the Quran : “(Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are Believers, but chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time, when ye give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness, nor secret intrigues.” (21) Al-Albany and Wassel also underline the family and social problems which result from the “misyar” marriage, particularly in the event that children are born from this union. The children raised by their mother in a home from which the father is always absent, without reason, may develop serious disturbances on the psychological level (16) and (22). The situation becomes even worse if the wife is abandoned or repudiated by her husband "misyar", with no means of subsistence, as usually happens. As for Ibn Othaymin, he recognizes the licity of “misyar” marriage from the legal standpoint, but considers that it should be opposed because it has been turned into a real merchandise that is being marketed on a large scale by “marriage agencies”, with no relation to the nature of Islamic marriage. (16) The authors who oppose this type of marriage also underline its harmful effects on the community at large, in that it allows the development of questionable sexual practices which put the community's religious beliefs, values and practices in a dubious light. Thus, wealthy Muslim tourists from the Gulf region regularly go on vacation to exotic places where they “marry" local call-girls according to Islamic rites, in order for their frolicking to be "halal" (licit in a religious sense). In some cases, the notary of the local “marriage agency” prepares simultaneously the papers of marriage and those of divorce, to save time. (23) Such parodies of islamic marriage carry a prejudice to the image of the whole community, and can also have a bad influence on the younger generation.

New family law codes The proponents of the marriage "misyar", though they recognize that it can result in such drifts, observe that it doesn’t have a monopoly on them. They result, more generally, from the way in which men interpret and apply the rules of Muslim law : unslung polygamy, easy repudiation, associated with great wealth, are its basic factors.

It would therefore be more accurate to explain this state of things as a heritage from medieval times, when marriage was defined by Muslim authors as "a contract posed in order to acquire the right to enjoy the woman". (24) Women organizations often observe, in this respect, that the Quranic verses and the Hadiths which deal with these issues have, more often than not, been interpreted, throughout Muslim history, in favour of men and at the expense of women's and children's rights. (25) They remind one that numerous feminine movements and reformist authors have been asking, throughout the 20th c., for a different reading of Muslim family law, using a modern point of view, in order to adapt it to the needs of a modern society. In their view, one can scrupulously respect both the provisions of a religious nature and women's and children’s rights, as established by modern international law. (26) But this requires that the modern Muslim community recognize at its proper value the central role of the woman and the family within the community, instead of devaluing them. It wouldn’t be possible, anymore, for men to resort to "hiyals" (legal gimmicks to go around the law) such as those on which the marriage "misyar" is based, to treat their spouses as second class citizens. Various Islamic countries have reinterpreted the provisions of the charia relative to family law, in the light of the needs of a modern society, through their own "ijtihad" (legal scholarship) efforts. Each one of them has set for itself new rules of application of these dispositions, based on its own circumstances, needs and social objectives. The following definition of marriage, which one can read in a recently adopted Code of family law, illustrates how these countries are trying to establish a new equilibrium in the relationships within the family, between husband and wife : “Marriage is a pact based on mutual assent in order to establish a legal and durable union, between a man and a woman. Its purpose is a life in reciprocal fidelity, purity and the foundation of a stable family under the direction of the two spouses, in accordance with the provisions of this Code.” (27) In the countries which have promulgated such laws, "misyar" marriage cannot take place.

Notes and Références (1) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Misyar marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544160 ] (2) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Misyar marriage [http://answeringislam.org.uk/Index/M/misyar.html] (3) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Zawaj al misyar, (1999), (in arabic), p 10 (4) Jobarti, Somayya : Misyar marriage – a marvel or misery ? [http://www.arabnews.com/?page=9§ion=0&article=64891]

(5) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Mut’ah marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503544100&pagename=IslamOnlineEnglish-Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar ] (6) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Misyar marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544160 ] et Zawaj al misyar, p 11 (7) A fatwa, whether it originates with the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, with the Mufti of Egypt, or with the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), for example, is not a text of law or a court order with which everybody must comply, whether he likes it or not. A fatwa’s objective is merely to present a qualified legal point of view, which makes it possible for all interested parties to better understand what the law has to say on a given topic, according to the author of the fatwa. The only person that is committed to the fatwa is its author. Thus, none of the 43 member States of IFA is under any compulsion to apply the IFA fatwa, whose provisions may even be incompatible with the national codes of family law of some of them. * See for example an interview given by Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Al-Obeikan, vice-minister of Justice of Saudi Arabia, to the arabic daily "Asharq al awsat" on July 9, 2006, in which he discusses the legal value of a fatwa by the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) on the subject of misyar marriage, which had been rendered by IFA on April 12, 2006. Some relevant excerpts follow : (Asharq Al-Awsat) From time to time and through its regular meetings, the Islamic Fiqh Academy usually issues various fatwas dealing with the concerns Muslims. However, these fatwas are not considered binding for the Islamic states. What is your opinion of this? (Obeikan) Of course, they are not binding for the member Islamic states. (Asharq Al-Awsat) But, what is the point of the Islamic Fiqh Academy's consensus on fatwas that are not binding for the member States? (Obeikan) There is a difference between a judge and a mufti. The judge issues a verdict and binds people to it. However, the mufti explains the legal judgment but he does not bind the people to his fatwa. The decisions of the Islamic Fiqh Academy are fatwa decisions that are not binding for others. They only explain the legal judgment, as the case is in fiqh books. (Asharq Al-Awsat) Well, what about the Ifta House [official Saudi fatwa organism] ? Are its fatwas not considered binding on others? (Obeikan) I do not agree with this. Even the decisions of the Ifta House are not considered binding, whether for the people or the State.[http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=5572] (8) Al-Marzuqi Saleh Secretary General IFA, interviewed by TV Alarabiya.net on 12/04/06 concerning the IFA decisions [http://metransparent.com/texts/ulemas_legalize_misyar_marriage.htm] (9) An-Najimi, Muhammad : member of IFA, interviewed by TV Alarabiya.net on 28/04/06 concerning the IFA decisions [http://www.alarabiya.net/Articlep.aspx?P=23324] (10) quoted in Hassouna addimashqi, Arfane : Nikah al misyar (2000), (in arabic), p. 14 ; see also Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Zawaj al misyar, (1999), (in arabic), p. 12

(11) quoted in Hassouna addimashqi, Arfane : Nikah al misyar (2000), (in arabic), p. 16 (12) quoted in Hassouna addimashqi, Arfane : Nikah al misyar (2000), (in arabic), p. 16 ; see also Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Zawaj al misyar, p. 15 in which he recommends that the marriage contract be registered to protect the rights of children in case of dispute. (13) quoted by Al-Hakeem, Mariam : Misyar marriage gaining prominence among Saudis [http://www.gulfnews.com/Articles/RegionNF.asp?ArticleID=165873] (14) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Zawaj al misyar p. 8 (15) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Zawaj al misyar , pp.13-14 (16) Bin Menie, Abdullah bin Sulaïman : fatwa concerning the marriage misyar (and opinions by Ibn Othaymin, Muhammad Saleh et Alalbany, Nassirouddine on the same subject) (in arabic) [http://www.bab-albahrain.net/forum/showthread.php?p=329473#post329473] (17) Yet another marriage with no strings [http://www.metimes.com/articles/normal.php?StoryID=20000407-042210-7478r] fatwa committee of al azhar against misyar (18) Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Zawaj al misyar, p. 24 - see also : Jobarti, Somayya : Misyar marriage – a marvel or misery ? [http://www.arabnews.com/?page=9§ion=0&article=64891] (19) Marriage of convenience is allowed, says Grand Imam Tantawi [http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=42349] (20) (Quran, XXX : 21) (21) (Quran, V : 5) (22) Wassel quoted in Hassouna addimashqi, Arfane : Nikah al misyar (2000), (in arabic), p 16) (23) Arabian Sex Tourism [http://www.danielpipes.org/article/3022] – see also : Indonesia Deports Saudis for Running Marriage Racket [http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=85970&d=3&m=8&y=2006] (24) Chehata, Chafik : droit musulman, Dalloz, Paris, 1970, p. 68 (25) See for example Ahmed, Leila : Women and gender in islam, Yale University Press, 1992 – or Hassan, Raf’at, Islam and women’s rights (arabic translation, 2000) – or Amin, Qassim : Tahrir al mar’a (26) See for example Zineddine, Nadhera : Assoufour wal hijab – or Zineddine, Nadhera : Alfatat wa chchouyoukh (27) Kingdom of Morocco, Code of family law, 3 February 2004, art. 4 [http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:Im_QZ2myMBsJ:www.a-e-

r.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Commissions/EqualOportunities/EventsAndMeetings/2006/Kirun aLe_nouveau_Code_de_la_famille_au_Maroc.ppt+Maroc+code+famille+2004&hl=fr&gl=ma &ct=clnk&cd=6&client=firefox-a]

Links English * Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Misyar marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544160 ] * Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : Mut’ah marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503544100&pagename=IslamOnlineEnglish-Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar ] * Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf : The philosophy of marriage in islam [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-EnglishAsk_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503543574] * Kutty : Conditions of valid marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503546572&pagename=IslamOnlineEnglish-Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar ] * Siddiqi : Witnesses and mahr (dower) for marriage [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1119503549066&pagename=IslamOnlineEnglish-Ask_Scholar%2FFatwaE%2FFatwaEAskTheScholar ] * Al-Qasim : Temporary marriage (mut'ah) [http://www.islamtoday.com/show_detail_section.cfm?q_id=367&main_cat_id=17] * Urfi marriage [http://marriage.about.com/od/islammarriage/g/urfi.htm?once=true&] * Yet another marriage without strings [http://www.metimes.com/articles/normal.php?StoryID=20000407-042210-7478r] fatwa committee of al azhar against misyar * Misyar marriage [http://answering-islam.org.uk/Index/M/misyar.html] * Misyar marriage [http://lexicorient.com/e.o/misyar.htm] * Misyar marriage [http://marriage.about.com/od/islammarriage/g/misyar.htm] * Misyar marriages [http://ziadrazak.net/?p=176] * Dahiru Atta, Aisha : Misyar marriages : a puzzle or a solution ? [http://www.islamonline.net/English/family/2005/07/article04.shtml] * Misyar marriage – a marvel or misery ? [http://www.arabnews.com/?page=9§ion=0&article=64891] * Misyar offers marriage-lite in strict Saudi society [http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060719/od_nm/saudi_marriage_dc_3] * Al-Hakeem, Mariam : Misyar marriage gaining prominence among Saudis [http://www.gulfnews.com/Articles/RegionNF.asp?ArticleID=165873] * Part time marriage the rage in Egypt [http://answeringislam.org.uk/Index/M/passerby_marriages.html] * No strings attached marriage enrages Gulf women [http://www.metimes.com/articles/normal.php?StoryID=20060425-070226-4676r] * Prostitution is now official and religiously condoned in Arab land [http://sabbah.biz/mt/archives/2006/04/27/prostitution-is-now-official-and-religiouslycondoned-in-arab-land/]

* Marriage or mockery ? [http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10823&Ite mid=116] * Al-Obeikan, Sheikh Abdul Mohsen, vice-ministre de la Justice d'Arabie Saoudite : interview de Asharq al-Awsat du 09/07/06 où il discute de la valeur légale de la fatwa de l'AIF [http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=5572]

Arabic * Al-Marzuqi Saleh Secretary General of IFA, interviewed by TV Alarabiya.net on the subject of the IFA decisions on 12/04/2006 [http://metransparent.com/texts/ulemas_legalize_misyar_marriage.htm] * An-Najimi, Muhammad : member of IFA, interviewed by TV AlArabiya.net on the subject of the IFA decisions on (28/04/06) [http://www.alarabiya.net/Articlep.aspx?P=23324] * Bin Menie, Abdullah bin Sulaïman : fatwa concerning marriage misyar (and opinions of Ibn Othaymin and Al-albany on the same subject) * [http://www.bab-albahrain.net/forum/showthread.php?p=329473#post329473]