Jm Dmsu Recent Juris.docx

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN POLITICAL LAW Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales 1. Can the Court still pass upon the main issue even if the case has indeed been rendered moot and academic? YES. The moot-and-academic principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuade courts from resolving cases, because they will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if they find that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character, and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or (d) a case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Peralta v. PHILPOST, G.R.No.223395, December 4, 2018; Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R.No. 234608, July 13, 2018) 2. Can the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a specified group of citizens, impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program? Does the right to profit give rise to an action for just compensation? YES. The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens patriae, which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens Patriae means parents of his or her country, and refers to the State in its role as “sovereign”, or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation. NO. The right to profit does not give rise to action for just compensation. A level adjustment in the pricing of items is a reasonable business measure to take in order to adapt to the contingency. This could even make establishments earn more, since every fractional increase in the price of covered items translates to a wider cushion to taper off the effect of the granting of discounts and ultimately results to additional profits gained from the purchases of the same items by regular patrons who are not entitled to the discount. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017) 3. Until when does the power of contempt by the Senate be properly exercised? The Senate has no power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries. As long as there is legitimate inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. The legislative inquiry ends upon the approval or rejection of the committee report and/or upon the expiration of one Congress. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. 234608, July 3, 2018) 4. Is the Senate a continuing institution? YES. The Senate is a continuing institution. However, in the conduct of its day-today business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of the Senate during the expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The termination of the Senate’s business and proceedings after the expiration of Congress was utilized by the Court in ruling that the Senate needs to publish its rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress. The pronouncement in Neri was reiterated in Garcillano v. House of Representatives and Romero v. Estrada, 602 Phil.312 (2009) (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. 234608, July 3, 2018) 5. Non-suability of an incumbent President Citing David v. Arroyo, the SC ruled once again that settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019)

6. What are the effects of clustering of nominees in the Sandiganbayan by the Judicial and Bar Council? Can the President appoint a nominee from other divisions? By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists by the Judicial and Bar Council influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. . Clustering can be used as a device to favour or prejudice a qualified nominee. There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council. The designation by the Judicial and Bar Council of members to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts encroached on the President’s power to determine the seniority of the Justices appointed to the said court. Accordingly, the President can appoint nominees from other divisions. And as long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, GR. No. 224302, February 21, 2017) 7. What are the requisites for the validity of any service contract with a foreign corporation for the exploration of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils? Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seacape Strait, e.g.,Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Before a party can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress afforded to him by law. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. In Catipon Jr. v.Japson, GR No. 191787, June 22, 2015, it was ruled that where petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the (CSC) Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the Court of Appeals may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it. The courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case., Indeed, the administrative agency – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. (Catipon Jr. v.Japson,supra) 9. Who has primary jurisdiction over questions involving access charge stipulations in a bilateral interconnection agreement? To accord with the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. Here, it would be more proper for the RTC to yield its jurisdiction in favor of the NTC since the determination of a central issue, i.e., the matter of access charges, requires the special competence and expertise of the latter. (PT&T Corp. v. Smart Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 189026, November 9, 2016) The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not call for the immediate dismissal of the case pending before the court. The case is merely suspended until the issues resolvable by the administrative body are threshed out and fully determined. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426) ELECTION LAW 10. What is the citizenship of a foundling found in the Philippines? As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. (Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, GR. No. 221697, March 8, 2015)

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen since birth without the need for an express statement in the Constitution making her so. This status commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to consumate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of RA 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as a Senator of the Republic. Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV, Section 2’s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is a substantial proof otherwise. (David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016) 11. Who among the candidates may be substituted? Under the express provision of Section 77 of the OEC, not just any person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party, thus she can be validly substituted. (Cerafica v. COMELEC, GR No. 205136, December 2, 2014) 12. When is the deadline for filing of substituted certificate of candidacy? Is withdrawal of COC as a ground for substitution allowed when the ballots are deemed printed?

Substitution can only take place on the first day of campaign period until not later than mid-day of election day. Different deadlines were set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to file the certificate of candidacy. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should have filed the certificate of candidacy by December 4, 2009. The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will be just wasted. (Federico v. COMELEC, GR No. 199612, January 22, 2013) In Engle v. COMELEC, GR No. 215995, January19, 2016, it was held that the petitioner’s husband clearly indicated in his COC that he was a nominee of Lakas-CMD and attached thereto not only the CONA signed byRomualdez but also the Authority to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance in favor of Romualdez signed by Lakas-CMD President Revilla and Secretary General Aquino. It was publicly known that James Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD. As far as the party and his wife is concerned, Engle, as a member of the party, may be substituted as a candidate upon death. There was no evidence on record that the party had notice or knowledge of the COMELEC’s classification of Engle as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013, when petitioner filed her COC as substitute for her deceased husband. The only document in record indicating that the party has been notified of Engle’s designation as an independent candidate is the Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law Department to Romualdez stating that Engle was an independent candidate due to the failure of the party to submit the authority of Romualdez to sign Engle’s CONA to the Law Department and in view thereof the petitioner’s COC was denied due course. The letter is not binding and at most, recommendatory. The COMELEC did not cancel petitioner’s COC on the ground of false material representation as there was none. 11. What are the two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race?

One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of candidacy. A petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of CoC under Section 78 is an option that involves a finding not only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such he made a material representation in the CoC that was false. The Court has stressed in Mitra v. Comelec that in addition to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible. (Agustin v. Comelec, GR No. 207105, November 10, 2015)

The violation of the three-term limit rule is not included among the grounds for disqualification, but a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. (Albania v. COMELEC, GR No. 226792, June 7, 2017) 12. What is the consequence of a void certificate of candidacy? If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day of election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.(Diambrang v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201809, October 2016) 13. Who will take over the position of Mayor whose COC was voided? Reasons. In cases of vacancies caused by those with void certificates of certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the vacant position, would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible. The rule of succession under Section 45 would not apply if the permanent vacancy was caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically, with respect to dual citizens their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because they possess “a substantive [disqualifying circumstance]… [existing} prior to the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Legally, they should not even be considered candidates. The votes cast for them should be considered stray and should not be counted. (Chua v.COMELEC, G.R. No.216607, April 5, 2016) 14. Who would take over the elective position vacated in cases of Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy? In cases of Petition for Disqualification, the disqualified candidate’s vacated position would be taken over by his successor, such as Vice Mayor Succeeding the disqualified and unseated Mayor. In cases of Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy, or where vacancies are caused by those with void ab initio certificates of candidacy, such as a violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office and misrepresentation of such is a ground to grant the petition to deny due course and/or cancel a COC. A person whose COC had been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his COC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily a valid votes. Accordingly, the person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible. (Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019) 15. Is the prohibition on posting campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals constitutional? NO. The prohibition constitute a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate. The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content neutral regulation which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC to issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. Likewise, the prohibition is not only repugnant to the free speech clause but also violates the equal protection clause. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In term of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a

valid classification. The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from other private vehicles and other properties. (1UTAK v. COMELEC, GR No. 206020, April 15, 2015) 16. A tarpaulin was posted by the Diocese of Bacolod within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod containing the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or “Pro-RH) Team Patay with an “X” mark. The tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. The COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin as it will be constrained to file an election offense against the Diocese. Is the order of the COMELEC Law Department valid? NO. While respondent COMELEC cited the Constitution, laws and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin, however, all these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case. Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property. The present case also involves one’s right to property. Even though the tarpaulin is seen by the public, it remains the private property of petitioners. Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement of their fundamental right to speech. (The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015) 17. Rules in the Appreciation of Ballots for Manual Barangay Election (1)The Idem Sonans Rule states that when a name or surname is incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound similar to the name or surname of a candidate when correctly written shall be counted in such candidate’s favor. In the present case, the name “Nanie G” written on the space alloted for Punong Barangay in the questioned ballot was validly credited to private respondent. “Nanie” undoubtedly sounds like the name of private respondent, I.E. “Ranie”. Moreover, the surname of private respondent, i.e., Gupit starts with a G. While the Court notes that there was a candidate for Barangay Kagawad under the name of “Nanie” Ballangca y Gubat, such fact alone is insufficient to invalidate the ballot. (2) Neighborhood Rule states that, where the name of the candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for such candidate. (3) The Intent Rule originates from the principle that, in the appreciation of the ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with certainty. The COMELEC En Banc rightly ruled that both the Neighborhood and the Intent Rules find no application in the present case, considering that there was a name written in the space provided for Punong Barangay and regardless of the fact that such name does not belong to any candidate vying for the said position. Section 211(19) of the OEC states that any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as stray vote. (Sevilla v. Comelec, G.R. No. 227797, November 13, 2018) 18. Distinguish annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC. ANSWER: First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is an exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function. Second, Electoral tribunals only annul the election

results connected with the election contest before it, whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When the COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted. (Abayon v Daza, GR No.222236/GR No. 223032, May 3, 2016) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19. What is the so-called “Lemon Test”? The “Lemon Test” is a 3-pronged test to adjudge whether the assailed governmental act violates the non-establishment of religion clause, namely: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute must not foster “an excessive entanglement with religion.” (Peralta v. PHILPOST, G.R.No. 223395, December 4, 2019)

20. Does the printing and issuance of the INC commemorative stamp involve disbursement of public funds and violate the non-establishment of religion and separation of Church and State clauses in the Constitution? NO. The printing and issuance of the assailed commemorative stamps were not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were neither for the benefit of INC, nor money derived from their sale inured to its benefit. The stamps delivered to the INC were not free of charge and whatever income derived from the sale to INC and of the excess to the postal clients were not given to the INC, but went to the coffers of the PHILPOST. In refusing to declare unconstitutional the INC’s commemorative stamp, this Court is merely applying jurisprudentially sanctioned policy of benevolent neutrality not only because of its merit but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion is society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Also, it bears to emphasize that the Constitution establishes separation of the Church and the State, and not separation of religion and state, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two in the former, is not possible. (Peralta v. PHILPOST, G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2019) 21. Does the holding of masses at the basement of QC Hall of Justice violate the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State and the Non-establishment clauses in the Constitution? What are the limitations on religious freedom? NO. The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice cannot be prohibited because the said practice does not violate separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination or any other system of religion. not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. Also, there is no appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any church. The basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics. To disallow the holding of religious rituals with in the halls of justice would set a dangerous precedent and commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate such right would be

unconstitutional encroachment. Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society’s perspective. Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their official functions. (Re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017) 22.

What is the Policy of Accommodation? What is the Non-establishment Clause? Distinguish Nonestablishment Clause from Policy of Accommodation.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation which is the recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. The Non-establishment Clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass a law which aids one religion, aids all religions, or prefers one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from the church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who wants to freely exercise their religion. (Re: supra) 23. Does a bus inspection conducted by the TASK Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitute a reasonable search? YES. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against “unreasonable” searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is reasonable, Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution does not apply. Simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, Such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets like metal detectors before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating their constitutional rights. A routine inspection of public transport buses or any vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal or along its route or when in transit, constitutes a reasonable search. This guideline does not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither they are applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle. (Saluday v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No.215302, April 3, 2018) 24. Does the installation of a revolving camera by an owner of an adjacent lot overlooking the fenced side lot of a neighbor where there is an on-going construction violate the latter’s right to privacy? YES. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence” covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. The application of Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code is not limited only to residence. A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable expectation of privacy test”. This test determines whether a person has reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.

The installation of video surveillance should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under RA 4200 of the Anti Wiretapping Law. (Hing v. Choachuy Sr, GR No. 179736, June 26, 2013; 669 SCRA 667) Chain of Custody 25. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that there was an actual inventory and photography done and that it was conducted in the presence of the accused and the required witnesses. The accused was in the investigation room while the alleged inventory was conducted. Furthermore, none of the required witnesses were present, and no justifiable reason was offered nor was there was a showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. In view of these unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Paming were compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Paming, G.R. No. 241 091, January 14, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J.) 26. Where the inventory of the seized items was not conducted in the presence of the representatives from the NPS (which falls under the DOJ) or media contrary to the procedure provided under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purported seized from Misa have been compromised. Consequently, he is acquitted of his crimes. (People of the Philippines v. Misa, G.R. No. 236838, October 1, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, J.) 27. Is the issuance of HDO,WLO or ADO by the DOJ Secretary constitutional ? NO. DOJ Circular No. 41, which allowed the Justice Secretary to stop from travelling abroad any suspect who are the subjects of DOJ investigation, is unconstitutional because it violates the right to travel under Article III, Sections 6 of the 1987 Constitution. There was no legal basis for the Department Circular because of the absence of a law authorizing the Secretary of Justice to issue Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Department Orders. All issuances released pursuant to the said DOJ Circular are null and void. (Genuino v. De Lima GR Nos. 197930, 199034 and 199046, April 17, 2018) 28. The DOJ Secretary issued an advisory addressed to reminding media networks and press groups that if their field reporters, news gatherers, photographers and cameramen will disobey lawful orders from duly authorized government officers during emergencies which may lead to collateral damage to properties and civilian casualties in case of authorized police or military operations may incur liability. Is the Advisory content-neutral and thus constitute prior restraint, censorship, and are content-restrictive, which resulted to a “chilling effect” in violation of freedom of the press? NO. The challenged advisory was merely a reminder of already established laws and jurisprudence, and respondents’ actions were lawful implementation thereof. With or without such advisory, if media networks and personnel are found to have violated penal laws, they may be prosecuted and held liable therefor. The Secretary, being the head of the DOJ was well-within his authority to remind the media of the consequences of resisting and disobeying authorities with their lawful orders, especially during emergency situations and when public safety and order are at risk. The advisory reveals that the press people were neither restricted from reporting or writing on any subject matter nor was there any statement disallowing any media persons from covering any newsworthy event. There was no trace of any unlawful restraint on the free discharge of petitioners’ duties as members of the press. (Tordesillas v. Hon. Puno, et. al, G.R. No. 210088,, January 4, 2019) 29. Does the temporary closure of Boracay by virtue of Proclamation No. 475 issued by the President impair the right to travel and to due process? NO. The Proclamation does not pose an actual impairment on the right to travel. The impact of the Proclamation on the right to travel, unlike a number of existing laws, is not direct but merely consequential;

and the same is only for a reasonable short period of time or merely temporary The Proclamation does not actually impose a restriction on the right to travel, its issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of the relationship between the State and the people. The Proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely, the President did not usurp the law-making power of the legislature The Proclamation is a valid police power measure. Police power constitutes an implied limitation of the Bill of Rights, and that even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Petitioner Zabal and Jacosalem cannot be said to have already acquired vested rights to their sources of income in Boracay. They are part of the informal sector of the economy where earnings are not guaranteed. Vested rights are “fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable. Zabal and Jacosalem’s asserted right to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay is merely an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one’s own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may, or may not come into fruition. Hence petitioners have no vested rights on their sources of income as to be entitled to due process. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019) Proclamation No. 475 is not a law, but rather an executive issuance which derives statutory imprimatur from existing laws and hence, has the “force and effect” of law. The Proclamation is a declaration of state of calamity and therefore it was necessary for the Executive to effect “expeditious rehabilitation”, and to implement this objective, the President had to direct the area’s temporary closure. The power of the President to declare a state of clamity over a particular locality may be sourced from the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to the Philippine Disaster Risk Reducation and Management Act of 2010. While it appears that the above-cited statutes do not spell out in “black and white the power of the President to temporarily close-off an area, it is a logical complement to the Executive’s power to faithfully execute the laws is the authority to perform all necessary and incidental acts that are reasonably germane to the statutory objective that the President is tasked to execute.. The doctrine of necessary implication which evokes that “{e}very statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate it object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The Proclamation constitutes a restriction not against a person’s freedom of movement, but rather, a “place-based” regulation. Protected property under the Constitution includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. While such right is sheltered by due process provision, it is by no means absolute and it must yield to the general welfare. The government had a legitimate State interest in rehabilitating the affacted localities of Boracay given the Island’s current critical state. Thus, the State may deprive persons of property rights provided that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (Zabal, supra, Separate Concurring Opinion,Perlas-Bernabe, J.) 30. Payment of Just Compensation and Ineterest As for the contention of the Republic-DPWH that it is the value indicated in the property’s tax declaration, as well as its zonal valuation that must govern, the Court adopts the findings of the BOC, the RTC, and the CA in ruling that the same are not truly reflective of the value of the subject property, but it is just one of the several factors considered under Section 5 of RA 8947. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid reasons; that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. As such, “trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Evidently, the recommendations of the BOC carry with great weight and value insofar as the determination of just compensation is concerned. The delay in the payment of just compensation, is a forebearance of money and as such, is necessarily entitled to earn interest. Computed as follows: the difference between the principal amount of just compensation and the amount of initial deposit shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of taking, or May 5, 2008 until June 30,2013, and the difference between the principal amount of just compensation and the amount of initial deposit shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until the finality of the Decision. (Republic of the Philippines v. Spouses Silvestre, G. R. 237324, February 6, 2019) 31. Requisites for Writ of Kalikasan

For a Writ of Kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity and; (3)the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. In Segovia v. Climate Change Commission,G.R.211010, March 7, 2017, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Petitioners were not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited. On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive orders and administrative orders as claimed by petitioners. Project and programs that seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondent, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfare, Truck Ban, Anti-smoke belching, AntiColorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs and Urban Re-greening Programs. What the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act – the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principla. Clearly, petitioners preferred specific course of action (i.e., bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Dsharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considred an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not to implement an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in the executive issuance relating to environment is best implemented. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 32. Can a writ of mandamus be issued against the officials of the City Of Manila to stop the construction of the high-rise building Torre de Manila? NO. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista, sightline, or setting” of the Rizal monument. City Ordinance No. 8119 of Manila does not disallow the construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic sight or facility, where such building may affect the background of a historic site. To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under the ordinance to the Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park – and the Torre de Manila project is outside the Rizal Park. (Knights of Rizal v.DMCI, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017) 33. When does an LGU be entitled to a writ of possession authorizing immediate entry over a property subject of expropriation as a matter of right? The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance, and the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the petitionaer in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance of the writ becomes ministerial. (Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder Development Corporation. G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016) 34. What is a boundary dispute? Is filing a case before the RTC proper when a party to a boundary dispute is not amenable to any form of settlement? A boundary dispute may involve “a portion or the whole” of a local government unit’s territorial area. Nothing in this provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different local government units, there exists a boundary dispute. Respondent’s resort to filing a case before the RTC was warranted under the circumstances of this case. It must be emphasized that respondents followed the procedure laid down in the Local Government Code. They took all the necessary steps to settle the dispute within the procedure set out in the law, and by all indication, was prepared to see the matter thru in order to lay the issue to rest. (Province of Antique v. Calabocal, G.R. No. 209146, June 8, 2016)

35.Is the constitutional prohibition on the so-called Presidential “midnight appointments” applicable to appointments made by a local chief executive? NO. The constitutional prohibition on the so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials for making appointments during the last days of their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by irregularities or anomalies which breach laws and regulations governing appointment. (De Rama vs. CA, 353 SCRA 650) However, Memorandum Circular No. 9 s. 2003 issued by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 030918 dated August 28, 2003, states that all appointments of whatever nature or status issued within 45 days before any national or local elections shall be disapproved, subject to the exception pursuant to Section 262 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The CSC MC further states that all appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as shown in the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting. 36. Is there a violation of the prohibition of midnight appointment when the appointment is made during the prohibitory period but the Personnel Selection Board has already screened and recommended the appointment before such prohibitory period? ANSWER: NONE. Although Marcos’ appointment was made five (5) days before the end of Governor Ong’s term, he was fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening process conducted by the Personnel Selection board before the election ban. Moreover, although issued in bulk, the 26 appointments can hardly be classified as “mass appointment”, and this per se does not invalidate the appointment. Considering that Marco had already accepted his appointment by the time the Province prevented him from assuming his office, his appointment remains effective up to the present. Consequently, the CSC correctly ordered the Province to reinstate Marco as Cooperative Development Specialist II and to pay him back salaries from July 4, 2004 when the Province prevented him from reporting for work up to his time of actual reinstatement. (Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R.No. 202331, April 22, 2015) 37.

What is the rationale behind the three-term limit rule? Name the two conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the threeterm limit rule. Is the second term as mayor of a municipality interrupted by the conversion of the municipality into a component city?

The intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position but also to “enhance the people’s freedom of choice. There are two conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served the three consecutive terms. NO. Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. The territorial jurisdiction of Mabalacat City is the same as that of the Municipality of Mabalacat which did not change even an inch in the land area. Also, the elective officials of the Municipality of Mabalacat continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials.The inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected Morales to be their mayor for three consecutive terms, and over whom he held powers and authority as their mayor. Accordingly, Morales never ceased from acting and discharging his duties and responsibilities as Chief Executive of Mabalacat, despite conversionof the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City. (Halili v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019)

38. Is the Province of Palawan entitled to the statutory 40% LGU share in the proceeds of the utilization of the Camago-Malampaya gas reservoir project? NO. Under existing laws, the Province of Palawan is not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya gas project. The Province of Palawan is comprised only of islands. The continental shelf, where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located, was clearly not included in its territory. Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution did not apportion the entire Phlippine territory among the LGUs. There is no law granting the Province of Palawan territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya reservoir. Also, the UNCLOS, did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf. Unless clearly expanded by Congress, the LGUs territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area. Accordingly, only utilization of natural resources found within the land area is subject to the 40% LGU share. Furthermore, LGUs share cannot be granted based on equity. Our Courts are basically courts of law, not courst of equity. For all its conceded merit, equityis available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. (Republic of the Philippine v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R.No.170867 and, Arigo v. Hon. Executive Secretary Ermita, et. al. G.R. No.185941, December 4, 2018)

PUBLIC OFFICERS 39.

Who can be held liable for nepotism? What are the exceptions thereto?

The following can be held liable for nepotism: 1) appointing authority 2) recommending authority 3) head of office and immediate supervisor. These persons must be related to the appointee within the third degree (national positions) or fourth degree (local positions) of consanguinity or affinity. By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition on nepotism: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity (2) teachers (3) physicians, and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. Hence, respondent’s Cortes’ appointment as Information Officer V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of Information Officer V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. (Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, GR No. 200103, April 23, 2014) 40.

Does having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority constitute nepotism?

NO. Having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority, does not nepotism make. Besides, the law does not absolutely prohibit persons from being appointed to an office the appointing authority of which is a relative so long as such relation, by consanguinity or affinity, is not within the prohibited third degree. (Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 115) 41. What right does an illegally dismissed employee of the civil service enjoy? What if he is employed during the litigation of his case?. The Constitution mandates that no employee of the civil service shall be removed from office except for cause provided by law. Corollary to this, any employee illegally dismissed from the office, is entitled to reinstatement. Any other employment does not bar his or her right to be reinstated. The employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his or her position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never left the office. The right to receive full backwages means exactly this - that it

corresponds to his salary at the time of dismissal until reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from this amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere during the pendency of his case. (Campol v. Balao-as, G.R. No. 197634, November 28, 2016) 42.

Can an impeachable official be removed via a quo warranto proceeding? Distinguish impeachment proceeding from quo warranto proceeding as modes of removing an impeachable official. YES. Quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding are not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The existence of the other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer’s fitness to stay in the office. An action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules. The two proceedings may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to jurisdiction, grounds, applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and limitations. (Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno, G.R. No.237428, May 11, 2018) 43.

Doctrine of Condonation The Doctrine of Condonation of Misconduct of Public Officers Committed During a Previous Term is of American origin introduced in the Philippines in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil 446 (1959) . Known as the Doctrine of Condonation, it expresses that an elective public official who has been reelected to his position cannot be removed administratively for acts committed during his previous term because, by reelecting the public officer into office, the electorate has been deemed to have condoned or forgiven his acts during the previous term and the public officer becomes immune from removal by way of administrative charges. In Giron v. Ochoa, GR No. 218463, March 01, 2017, it was held that the condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to office, was the same. With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers which positively recognized, acknowledged and declared that “public office is a public trust.” Accordingly, “public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.” Hence, the Court in Morales v. Court of Appeals and Binay Jr. GR Nos.2007105, November 10, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.) effectively abandoned the doctrine which is wholly within the prerogative of the Court with a clarification that such abandonment should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court further justified the abandonment of the doctrine by stating that the same has no constitutional and statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offense may be condoned by the President in the light of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution. Also it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for disciple enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualifiction from holding public office as an accesory penalty fo dismissal from service. It was ruled in Office of the Ombudsman v. Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017, that inasmuch as this case was instituted prior to the Binay ruling, the doctrine of condonation may still be applied. Unlike in the said case, however, the case against Mayor Dator, was instituted on

May 2, 2016, or AFTER the ruling of the Court, in the seminal case of Binay. Clearly, the condonation principle is no longer applicable to him. (Dator v. Morales, G.R. No. 237742, October 8, 2018) INTERNATIONAL LAW 44. Does the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent (private individual) comply with the double criminality rule in an extradition treaty? NO. Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state. Considering that the transactions were entered into by and in behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and instrumentality of the Philippine Government, Munoz should be charged for the offenses not as a regular agent or one representing a private entity but as a public servant or employee of the Philippine Government. Yet, because the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged against him in the HKSAR is one that deals with private sector bribery, the conditions for the application of the double criminality rule are obviously not met. Accordingly, the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent must be dropped from the request for extradition. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Munoz, G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016) 45. Does Mandamus lie to compel the enforcement of the View of the Committee, which found the allegations falling under Article 14, paragraph 1,2,3, and 6 of the ICCPR inadmissible? Distinguish ministerial act from discretionary act. NO. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. There must be an act more than ratification to make a treaty applicable in our jurisdiction. To be sure, what was ratified were the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, nowhere in the instrument does it say that the View of the Committee forms part of the treaty. Two pertinent principles are well settled in this jurisdiction: (i) one is that mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal, board or officer to comply with a purely ministerial duty, or to allow a party to exercise a right or to occupy and enjoy the privileges of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; (ii) the other is that for a writ of mandamus to issue, petitioner must establish a clear legal right to the relief sought, and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in relation thereto. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Other than RA 7309, under which Wilson had already been granted compensation, there is no other law or regulation that forms the basis of such ministerial right arises from with respect to additional compensation. It is not within this Court’s discretion to adjust any monetary grant arbitrarily. (Wilson v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 189220, December 7, 2016) --oo0oo--