Immigration Discourses: The Case Of Romanian Immigrants In Italy

JoLIE 1/2008

IMMIGRATION DISCOURSES: THE CASE OF ROMANIAN IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY Teodora Popescu University of Alba Iulia, Romania

Abstract The aim of this study is to provide an overview of the situation of Romanian immigrants to Italy and the way in which this is reflected at various layers of communication. We will start by presenting some statistical data concerning this phenomenon, provided by various OECD publications. Next, we will comment on the findings of the surveys carried out by Metro Media Transilvania and commissioned by Agentia pentru strategii guvernamentale 1 : Comunitatea românească în Italia: condiţii sociale, valori, aşteptări - Studiu sociologic 2 (December 2007) and Percepţia cetăţenilor italieni asupra României şi comunităţii româneşti din Italia3 (MarchApril 2008). Last but not least, we will focus on media discourses on the issue of Romanian immigrants in Italy, as seen in the English-speaking media. Key words: migration, Romania, Italy, European integration, free movement of labour.

Introduction Immigration represents a far-reaching, global phenomenon, especially due to the new tendencies in migration patterns and movements: the ever-growing inflows of highly qualified workers, temporary workers and students. According to the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, the increase of 10% in the number of immigrants who entered OECD countries on a permanent basis in 2005 as compared to 2004 turns international migration into one of the main issues on the global agenda. One of the major issues in the global agenda is international migration. As with many other aspects of this agenda, the international mobility of people needs to be well managed, and sound policies designed and implemented. Migration is part of the solution for labour shortages and population ageing in OECD countries, but to take full advantage of it, effective integration policies are needed, in particular in the realms of education and the labour market (OECD n.d. para. 5).

1

Agency for Governmental Strategies. The Romanian Community in Italy: social conditions, values, expectations. 3 Italian citizens’ perception of Romania and the Romanian community in Italy. 2

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Approximately 4 million new immigrants entered OECD countries on a permanent basis between 2004 and 2005. The highest flows were registered in the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and Canada. In terms of temporary labour migration, the figures were also significant – a 1.8 million for all OECD countries, and the countries that ranked highest were Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, most of which also scored high on permanent immigration. One aspect that needs to be taken into account is that the above figures refer only to legal immigration, documented by papers and work permits. Illegal immigration is also high, but this is extremely difficult to assess correctly. The most stringent problem that migrants are facing in the host country is actually that of the underutilisation of immigrants’ skills and qualifications. Secondly, as far as the source countries are concerned, an alarming trend is the ‘brain drain’ of doctors and nurses from developing countries. Concerning Romanian immigration to Italy, in 2004 the official figure of Romanian legal immigrants was 62,300, which made Romania hold the 1st place in the hierarchy, followed by Albania, with only 29,600 nationals (OECD 2007: 309). At the other end of the chain, at 31.XII.2006, Italy held the 7th place in the hierarchy of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), with 2322 million Euro investments, representing 6.7 % of all FDI in Romania (BNR/INS n.d. p. 4). Therefore, it is evident that both countries (Italy and Romania) have a vested interest in finding a common ground in order to avoid the escalation of conflicts concerning Romanian immigrants in Italy, and leave all incendiary rhetoric aside while trying to work towards real solutions.

Background Romanian migration to Italy started in the early ’90s (after the overthrow of Ceausescu’s regime in 1989), and according to OECD (2007) Romanian immigrants have now become the largest ethnic community (48.4% of total inflows of foreigners during 1990-2004 and 56.6 of total inflows of foreigners in 2005). The sociological study commissioned by The Agency for Governmental Strategies in 2007, The Romanian Community in Italy: social conditions, values, expectations revealed insightful information concerning the Romanian community living in Italy. Generally speaking, Romanians living in Italy are more satisfied with their daily lives than most of the adult population living in Romania. Romanian immigrants’ dissatisfactions are mostly assignable to their poor interrelations (with family, friends), and less to health or money. Living conditions in Italy are similar to those in Romania as concerns the inhabitable surface, but are superior as concerns facilities and household appliances. Most Romanian immigrants are professionally skilled people, having obtained their qualifications in their birth country. When they left Romania, more than 60% of the immigrants had a job, generally insecure and badly paid, on average 140 euro/month. At present, almost nine Romanians out of ten have a job, earning approximately 1030 euro/month. Almost 2/3 of the Romanian immigrants work in constructions, cleaning services, trade, industry and social care. More than

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30% of working Romanians mentioned workplace discrimination, although they think highly of their employers and Italian counterparts. Although their pride of being Romanian is similar to that of their peers living in Romania, they tend to feel prouder of being an EU citizen than their peers living in Romania. As far as entertainment is concerned, watching TV remains the main means of spending their free time. Romanians living in Italy admit that, as compared to living in Romania, they now go less often to church or music concerts, read more rarely, listen less to the radio, seldom meet their friends, but on the contrary, they use the Internet more. Their experience with labour migration is in general terms a beneficial one, although it has its own demerits: especially considering migrants’ relationship with the family and the feeling of alienation and estrangement. Generally speaking, Romanian immigrants’ perception of Italians is a positive one (with few exceptions – Italians being considered as lazier) as compared with their self-perception as Romanian immigrants. Their experience of migration tends to make them more tolerant towards religious or sexual minorities, but places them at an increasing distance from the Roma community. It may well be possible that this distance-taking is largely produced by mass media. As far as future plans for the next two years are concerned, most Romanian immigrants hope to return to Romania for good (one out of three immigrants have set themselves this goal within the next two years), make more money, and build / buy a house in Italy. Real estate investments are aimed at Romania, and only one immigrant out of five would like to settle in Italy for the rest of their life. Almost all Romanian immigrants are aware of the crimes committed by Romanians and have found out about the ‘Mailat’ case. The majority’s perception is that the Italian press has presented this case tendentiously and that Romanian politicians have been more objective in this respect. The ones who stand to lose most as a follow up to the media exaggerations of the ‘Mailat’ case are the Romanians living and working in Italy and the Diaspora. The second sociological study commissioned by The Agency for Governmental Strategies in 2008, Italian citizens’ perception of Romania and the Romanian community in Italy brought forth more down-to-earth insights into the attitudes that Italians nurture towards Romanian immigrants. The study made a difference between Romanian ethnics and Romanian Roma; therefore, there will be a clear distinction between the two groups throughout the survey. In general terms, Italians consider that there are far too many foreigners in their country and they associate immigrants with very poor and dirty people, criminals or clandestine / illegal immigrants. 65% of Italians would never consider marrying a Romanian, whilst 87% have ruled out the possibility of marrying a Roma. 46% of Italians would not accept Romanians in their circle of friends, whereas 75% said the same thing about the Roma. The same negative attitudes of the Italian population were revealed when questioned about how willing they are to have Romanians / Roma as their neighbours or living in their city or country. 55% of the Italians questioned consider that Italy’s situation has worsened after the inflow of Romanian immigrants. 34% asserted that Romanians should not be allowed to come to Italy any more. 51% of Italians believe that everything that was said in the media about Romanian immigrants is true. The findings

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of this survey, as can be seen, are very worrying, and reflect the real perception of the host country towards Romanian immigrants, be they Romanian ethnics or Roma.

Theoretical background Analyses of migration discourses have tended to focus more on thematic content of policy-relevant language produced by actors with responsibility or influence in the policy-making process (Drake 2008). It has been also underlined that there is a widening gap between the philosophy of free movement of labour and the actual situation of immigrant workers across the EU. Although one of the foundations of EU treaties and agreements is the free movement of labour within member states, the reality has been much more strained and political agendas have revealed much to the contrary (see for example Berlusconi’s ‘security package’ of May 2008, through which the Government assumed the role of protector of the Italian nation against the terror of illegal immigration). According to Favell (2006), “There is in fact great electoral reward to be had by populist politicians using the ‘threat’ of open doors eastwards as a tool for berating the impact of the EU, in particular the liberalization of West European labour markets or employment legislation.” Another issue that has been debated refers to the status of immigrants in the host country. According to the definition provided by the OECD (2007), an immigrant is “a person of foreign nationality who enters the permanently resident population either from outside the country, or by changing from a temporary to a permanent status in the country” (OECD 2007: 37). From the intra-EU immigrants’ perspective, it is particularly this mobility that needs to be emphasised; settlement and integration, issues that have been traditionally associated with immigrants, are of little concern: “Both higher and lower end migrants from the East are attracted by the West and certainly see their movements as temporary, opportunistic and circular.” (Favell 2006: 4). It is certain that the free movers of modern Europe do not want to become stayers in the host country, and have no longer dreams or hopes of changing to a different citizenship. Moreover, “early integration theory and the EU’s own citizenship discourse emphasise the democratic process and the institutionalisation of democratic rights; and normative aspirations to a European demos or electorate are commonplace in political and academic discourses alike” (Drake 2008: 6). The analysis that follows is based on Norman Fairclough’s (1992, 1995a, 1995b, 2003) framework for textual analysis of participants’ representational meanings for processes, participants and circumstances. Fairclough (2003) delineates seven choices in the representation of social actors:

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1

inclusion

2.

pronoun (I, you, he, she, they, etc.)

3

Variables exclusion a) suppression (not in the text at all) b) backgrounding (mentioned somewhere in the text, but having to be inferred in one or more places noun (‘the immigrants’) grammatical role

participant in a clause (e.g. Actor, Affected)

within a circumstance (e.g. in a preposition phrase: ‘They have brought problems … to Rome’)

possessive noun or pronoun (e.g. ‘immigrants’ human capital’, ‘their children’)

4

activated The social actor is the Actor in processes (loosely the one who does things and makes things happen)

passivated The social actor is the Affected or the Beneficiary (loosely, the one affected by processes)

5.

personal Social actors can be represented personally

impersonal (e.g. ‘A band of thugs’)

6.

named Social actors can be represented by name (e.g. Giovanna Reggiani)

classified Social actors can be represented in terms of class or category (either individually e.g. ‘doctor’ or as a group e.g. ‘the doctors’, ‘doctors’)

7.

specific

generic ‘workers’ may refer to a specific group of workers (e.g. ‘workers from Romania’) or to the class of workers in general, all workers (e.g. ‘workers have the freedom to move’)

The corpus that I will examine in the following consists of texts taken from both political and media discourses. The first two texts are extracts from political discourses of people involved in policy-making at high level, while the other text appeared in the international publication The Economist. All texts were published between September 2007 and April 2008. The analysis will be centred on the way in which both discourses, political and media contribute to the construction of ethnic identity, by

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picturing the immigrants as ‘the other’. I will investigate how immigrants are represented as social actors using the variables outlined by Fairclough (2003).

Analysis The first text (Extract 1) is part of the OECD Secretary-General, Angel Gurría’s address (‘Gaining from Migration’) to the High Level Conference on Legal Immigration held in Lisbon, on 13 September 2007. I have underlined in the extract below social actors, and where relevant, social processes and circumstances. Extract 1 PRESENTATION OF "GAINING FROM MIGRATION" TO THE HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL IMMIGRATION […] What are the reasons for these impressive and accelerating migratory flows? Obviously, economic globalisation is one of the prime explanations. This is reflected by the greater diversity of nationalities of migrants. In recent years, more people have been coming from Central and Eastern Europe (notably in the context of EU enlargement), China, India and Sub-Saharan Africa. Population ageing can also explain increasing migration. Some of our member countries are ageing rapidly: Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan, to name a few examples. To face the ageing challenge, increasing labour force participation is crucial. Immigrants can be part of the solution. Spain, for instance, regularised a large number of immigrants in 2005. These workers not only fill labour shortages in critical sectors but pay taxes and contributions, thus helping to sustain an ageing population. Migration has also given a boost to female labour force participation: Spanish women can more easily combine work and family responsibilities thanks to domestic help provided by migrant women. […] The need for good policy practices is large as managing migration is a delicate task. Once immigrants have entered the country, policies to integrate them and their children into the labour market and society are vital. Often, immigrants’ qualifications exceed the skilllevels of the jobs they are offered. Foreign education and work experience are largely discounted, as many employers in receiving countries do not recognize or value them. We need better measures to assess foreign qualifications and work experience if host countries want to make use of immigrants’ human capital to everybody’s best advantage. Finally, international co-operation in the field of migration and development has to be a priority. Switching to this new concept will require policymakers to re-think and adjust their approach to immigration in a number of ways: • They will have to make it clear to immigrants what is expected of them in the receiving country and, in turn, what they can expect; • They must venture to explain and defend national immigration policy to their electorates; • They must engage with migrants and origin countries as genuine partners in governing the system of international labour mobility. This sounds good, but in practical terms, what does it mean? Let me give you three concrete examples of what is needed to move to the new concept. First, integration will always be first and foremost a local affair. Countries must provide all members of migrants’ families with access to the educational system, and to specialised language and other classes, at the earliest possible stage. Only in this way can migrants participate in the economy and society.

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Second, receiving countries should align their migration policies with development cooperation policies. In many countries, this will also involve reforming the organisational structures for migration management, both at national and international levels, and to improve communication across ministries and institutions. Third, migrant organisations should be given financial and technical support in a fair and transparent fashion; they should also be included and heard in the process of making migration and development policy. Ultimately, integration efforts succeed best when they reconcile the immigrants’ needs and interests with those of the broader community in a dynamic process that weaves a new social fabric. (Mr Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, Lisbon, 13 September 2007, http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3343,en_2649_34487_39290756_1_1_1_1,00.html)

The main social actors in Extract 1 above are the policy makers at international level (the elite group). The author himself (Angel Gurría) is included in this social group, through the use of the pronoun ‘we’ (‘We need better measures…’). As he addresses an audience, in order to be more persuasive, he uses the personal pronoun in the 1st person, ‘I’, although this is only a purely rhetorical device (‘Let me give you three concrete examples of what is needed to move to the new concept’). He is the authoritative voice, by virtue of his position of OECD Secretary-General; therefore his statements and recommendations are to be acknowledged as the ultimate strategy to follow. In all other instances, policy makers are referred to as ‘they’, but they are strongly foregrounded. The author uses modal verbs of obligation with varying degrees and verbs implying an authoritative request: (‘We need better measures to assess foreign qualifications and work experience’; ‘international co-operation in the field of migration and development has to be a priority’; ‘Switching to this new concept will require policymakers to re-think and adjust their approach to immigration’ ‘They will have to make it clear to immigrants what is expected of them’; ‘They must venture to explain and defend national immigration policy to their electorates’; They must engage with migrants and origin countries’; ‘receiving countries should align their migration policies with development co-operation policies’; ‘migrant organisations should be given financial and technical support’). The use of these verbs renders the activisation of the decision-making factors as possible and achievable in the future. Thus, the author creates an image of the ‘responsible political leaders’ who can act to the benefit of both receiving countries and immigrants. The second group of social actors in Extract 1, which helps in the construction of the ‘us’ versus the ‘other’ is represented by the receiving countries. Specific examples are given, nevertheless within the context of benefits that immigrants can bring to the host countries (‘Some of our member countries are ageing rapidly: Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan, to name a few examples’; ‘Spain, for instance, regularised a large number of immigrants in 2005’; Spanish women can more easily combine work and family responsibilities thanks to domestic help provided by migrant women). The third group of social actors that carry importance in the extract above are the immigrants, who form the ‘the other’ identity. They are impersonalised, rather backgrounded and strongly passivated, although they there are instances when they are also hypothetically activated. Immigrants are viewed as a group of people who exist,

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but who are not individualised or personalised. Nevertheless, they are seen in a positive light, as they present the possibility of bringing benefits to the receiving countries, to ‘us’, in other words (‘To face the ageing challenge, increasing labour force participation is crucial. Immigrants can be part of the solution’). They are also referred to generically, and in this specific instance they are activated (‘These workers not only fill labour shortages in critical sectors but pay taxes and contributions, thus helping to sustain an ageing population’). For most of the cases, immigrants are passivated (‘thanks to domestic help provided by migrant women’; ‘policies to integrate them (immigrants) and their children into the labour market and society are vital’; ‘if host countries want to make use of immigrants’ human capital to everybody’s best advantage’; ‘migrant organisations should be given’; ‘they should also be included and heard’). The moment they are activated is when they are assumed to take action as a result of the empowerment given to them by the authorities (‘Only in this way can migrants participate in the economy and society’). Extract 2 HUMANISING EUROPE’S APPROACH TO MIGRATION It is not possible to discuss or analyse migration without a thorough analysis of the causes that trigger it and priority must be given to the economic causes, imbalances and new forms of political, economic and cultural colonisation that are working against the planet’s weakest countries. Since 11 September 2001 and the attacks on London and Madrid, the need for security has taken precedence over the protection of human rights and consolidation of the established values of democracy in the European Union’s policies. The rhetoric of invasion and the obsession with security have been, and continue to be, essential to illustrate the threat posed by men and women seeking refuge or work in Europe who are increasingly depicted as criminals or even terrorists. The European debate has been hijacked by talk of crisis which has led public opinion and even democratic institutions, in some instance, to lose sight of democratic values, the primacy of politics and the need for all-out defence of the rule of law. Western democracies have often chosen to tackle the new challenges posed by immigration by tightening up the rules on civil co-existence, confirming that security is their main priority and a goal to be achieved by an ongoing authoritarian distortion of the rule of law. Migrants were the first to feel the effects of this distorted thinking: they were the pawns used to implement policies that criminalise diversity. Politicians, the press, and even democratic institutions are all involved in this risky venture. Current policies on immigration have produced a society in which cultures do not feed off one another but regard each other with suspicion. The crisis of multiculturalism affecting Europe has fuelled the clash of civilisations and, in line with Samuel Huntington’s theory, endorsed the dogma that migrants (especially Muslims) are a threat to civil security and public order. The outcome of this crisis could well be the creation of a racist and xenophobic society, an analysis substantiated by growing support for political parties across Europe which campaign explicitly, even solely, on issues of national identity and the fight against immigration. That model needs to be opposed by a different vision of society aiming to change the world, through peace and nonviolence, into a vast melting pot.

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For these reasons, immigration policy is a strategic battleground both for theorists of ethnocentrism who are advocating dangerous xenophobic initiatives and for those of us fighting to build a plural, inclusive, and multicultural society. Most of the European Union’s current policies are hypocritical. It is clear that Europe needs migrant workers but there seems to be no way of promoting their lawful entry that is acceptable to all. Crocodile tears are shed when thousands of migrants perish in the Mediterranean, yet we respond by setting up the Frontex Agency and ‘rapid reaction units’ tasked with border protection, while forgetting the fact that rescuing drowning migrants should be our priority. The doctrine of fundamental, indivisible, universal human rights is exalted while we criminalise migrants in detention centres, brutal and degrading places where men and women are deprived of their freedom even though they have not committed any crime. (Giusto Catania MEP, 2008, April, Making Migration Work for Europe, pp. 9-16)

The second extract is written by an important decision-making factor, one of the members of the European Parliament, who speaks too in favour of migration, albeit for political reasons. As in the previous extract, the major groups of social actors are the migrants (‘them’) and the receiving countries in general, as well as in particular all stakeholders involved (‘us’). Further distinctions are to be made within the last group, as the existence of a pro-migration sub-group is revealed. In this text, self-construction is double positioned: on the one hand, the Self represents the group of politicians who allegedly support the integration of immigrants (‘those of us fighting to build a plural, inclusive, and multicultural society’) versus those representatives of the public opinion, democratic institutions and political parties who take an opposing stand (‘theorists of ethnocentrism who are advocating dangerous xenophobic initiatives’) and on the other, these two sub-groups together against the immigrants (‘we criminalise migrants’). The categorisation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is clearly made through the use of the personal pronouns ‘we’/’our’ versus ‘they’/’their’ (‘we respond…’; ‘forgetting that rescuing drowning migrants should be our priority’; ‘they were the pawns…’; ‘promoting their lawful entry’). The differentiation inside the ‘us’ group is made in the same way: ‘Western democracies have often chosen to tackle the new challenges posed by immigration by tightening up the rules on civil co-existence, confirming that security is their main priority and a goal to be achieved by an ongoing authoritarian distortion of the rule of law’ (meaning that ‘we’ disagree with those actions, idea further on backed by ‘That model needs to be opposed by a different vision of society aiming to change the world, through peace and nonviolence, into a vast melting pot’); ‘those of us’. The immigrants as a social group are passivated, being either the Affected or the Beneficiary (‘are increasingly depicted as criminals or even terrorists’; ‘challenges posed by immigration’; ‘are deprived of their freedom’, ‘migrants were the first to feel the effects of this distorted thinking’; ‘rescuing drowning migrants’; ‘we criminalise migrants’). They are also impersonalised: ‘men or women seeking refuge or work in Europe’; ‘criminals’, terrorists’, ‘the pawns’, ‘thousands of migrants’; ‘men

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and women’. When they are activated, the negative form is used, emphasis being laid on what they have not done: ‘they have not committed any crime’. In terms of social processes, the author unveils the unjustifiable and duplicitous actions of the broader group to which he belongs himself (‘Most of the European Union’s current policies are hypocritical’; ‘Crocodile tears are shed when thousands of migrants perish in the Mediterranean, yet we respond by setting up the Frontex Agency and ‘rapid reaction units’ tasked with border protection; ‘The doctrine of fundamental, indivisible, universal human rights is exalted while we criminalise migrants in detention centres, brutal and degrading places’). Unlike the first extract, here we can notice a correlation between ‘us’-categorisation and criminalisation, which is regarded as negative, and at the same time as political capital for the one who denounces it as socially and morally unwarranted. The underlying conclusion of the author is that the real criminals are those of us who defy the democratic principles of humankind, those who ‘implement policies that criminalise diversity’. Extract 3 ITALY'S CACK-HANDED CRACKDOWN The trouble began on October 30th, when Giovanna Reggiani, a 47-year-old Italian naval officer’s wife, was returning home along a deserted lane in northern Rome. She was brutally attacked. Early reports suggested that she had been tortured, raped, robbed and ferociously beaten—though, in fact, she was neither tortured nor raped. But it may be that her assailant set about her savagely after she tried to defend herself from sexual assault. This was a horrifying crime, from which Ms Reggiani died two days later. The man accused of her killing is Nicolae Mailat, a Romanian Roma (gypsy) who lived in one of a string of shacks in a nearby wood. He denies murdering Ms Reggiani, but admits snatching her bag. Fellow shack-dwellers say that he is mentally disturbed. None of this carried any weight in the outcry that followed. Mr Mailat is one of hundreds of thousands of Romanians, many of them gypsies, who have flocked to Italy in recent years and now make up its biggest ethnic minority. They have unquestionably brought problems, particularly to Rome, where a disproportionate number live in dreadful conditions under bridges, in copses or in disused buildings. They have made some parts of the city feel distinctly unsafe. But the reason so many have come is that Italian politicians have encouraged them. The former centre-right government of Silvio Berlusconi waived visa restrictions on Romania five years before it joined the European Union in January. The current centre-left government of Romano Prodi chose not to restrict the entry of workers from Romania after it had become a full member. Romanians were initially popular. They speak a Romance language. Most integrate easily. Despite Italy’s open-arms policy, no steps were taken to provide even temporary shelter for the new arrivals. Part of the blame must fall on Rome’s centre-left mayor, Walter Veltroni. Yet it was he who was chiefly responsible for pushing the government into a panic after Ms Reggiani’s murder. […] After Mr Veltroni declared that “neither the police nor the local authorities can cope with the emergency”, the cabinet produced a decree that gave prefects, local representatives of the interior ministry, the power to expel citizens of other EU countries if they had the backing of a judge. A 2004 EU directive legitimised such expulsions in cases where there was a threat to public health or security.

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In Brussels, the justice commissioner, Franco Frattini, and his officials seem to have accepted the Italian move. But it is at best debatable whether the expulsions reflect faithfully a directive that, according to the EU’s own summary, was intended for a “serious and present threat which affects the fundamental interests of the state”. The most shocking aspect of the decree is that it is aimed so openly at Romanians. The preamble claims that “the proportion of crime committed by foreigners has increased, and those who commit most crime are the Romanians.” This is true only in absolute terms, because Romanians are the most numerous immigrants. As an analysis in La Stampa has shown, the proportion of Romanians reported to, or arrested by, the police in 2006 was lower than in most other foreign groups. Within 24 hours of the cabinet meeting, 20 people were expelled. A band of thugs beat up and stabbed three Romanians in a Rome suburb. The first of several immigrant encampments were flattened with bulldozers. Since then, the Roma have been the target of vitriolic abuse. Gianfranco Fini, the supposedly reformed leader of the former neo-fascists, accused them of prostituting their womenfolk, approving the kidnapping of children and believing that theft was morally justified. (The Economist, 2007, 7 November, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=E1_TDTDVDVJ)

The third extract is an article that appeared in the British newspaper The Economist, presenting both facts and stances in the immediate aftermath of the event that brought the relationship between the two states, Italy and Romania, to a turning point. It also analyses the broader context and what led to the escalation of the incident. The dichotomy Self – Other is clearly represented through the criminalisation of the immigrants. Another important aspect pertains to the construction of guilt. The main social actors in this text are immigrants, individualised through a murderer; second, the Italian people, individualised through an innocent victim, a woman killed by a Romanian Roma and third, Italian politicians, enforcing antiimmigration measures to ensure ‘public health and security’. Immigrants are criminalised through the presentation of the group as antisocial (‘They have unquestionably brought problems’; ‘[they] live in dreadful conditions under bridges, in copses or in disused buildings’; ‘They have made some parts of the city feel distinctly unsafe’), and mostly through personalising one of its members (‘Nicolae Mailat, a Romanian Roma (gypsy) who lived in one of a string of shacks in a nearby wood’; ‘assailant’; ‘Ms. Reggiani’s murderer’). The name, nationality, ethnicity, and social background are given. Nevertheless, from here on the immigrants are impersonalised and passivated. They will be throughout the text referred to as ‘hundreds of thousands of Romanians’; ‘the Romanians’; ‘a disproportionate number’. They are activated whenever reference is made to a negative attitude towards them (‘[…] she was […] attacked.’ i.e. by Mailat; ‘she had been tortured, raped, robbed and […] beaten’, i.e. by Mailat; ‘[he] set about her savagely’; ‘They have […] brought problems’; ‘They have […] made the city feel distinctly unsafe’; ‘those who commit most crime are the Romanians’; ‘crime committed by foreigners’). All these are reprehensible acts that are heavily taxed by public opinion. On the other hand, immigrants become passivated in the other instances, when reference is made to retaliatory measures taken by both officials and locals (‘expel citizens of other EU countries’; ‘Romanians reported to, or arrested

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by, the police’; ‘[Locals] beat up and stabbed three Romanians’; ‘immigrant encampments were flattened with bulldozers’; ‘the Roma have been the target of vitriolic abuse’; ‘Gianfranco Fini […] accused them of prostituting their womenfolk, approving the kidnapping of children and believing that theft was morally justified). Guilt is constructed in terms of individual member vs group, and guilt vs. mitigated guilt. Nicolae Mailat is himself the victim of media exaggeration: ‘Early reports suggested that [...], though, in fact, she was neither tortured nor raped’; ‘But it may be that […]. Doubt is cast on the validity of police reports (‘suggested’, ‘it may be that’, ‘in fact’) and aggravating circumstances are revealed, although the were not taken into consideration: ‘Fellow shack-dwellers say that he is mentally disturbed’. At group level, the situation is not much different: immigrants do not solely bear the guilt for the existing conflicts. ‘But the reason so many have come is that Italian politicians have encouraged them’. ‘The former centre-right government of Silvio Berlusconi waived visa restrictions on Romania’. The shared guilt is further on emphasised: ‘Despite Italy’s open-arms policy, no steps were taken to provide even temporary shelter for the new arrivals. Part of the blame must fall on Rome’s centreleft mayor, Walter Veltroni’. Another myth that is dispelled is that of the overwhelming number of Romanian criminals. ‘The preamble claims that “the proportion of crime committed by foreigners has increased, and those who commit most crime are the Romanians.” This is true only in absolute terms, because Romanians are the most numerous immigrants. Romanians, as compared with other immigrants, per number of immigrants, do not commit more crimes. It can be therefore asserted that the author of the article has tried to offer a balanced view of the facts, presenting all sides of the story.

Conclusions I have tried in this paper to analyse how migrants’ identity is constructed, through political, media and public opinion discourses. The pervasive elements are that it is common knowledge, a fact acknowledged by everybody, that immigration is a phenomenon that has far-reaching implications and that, if used correctly it may hugely be turned to account by all stakeholders. It is particularly the speeches of politicians that abound in pro-migratory arguments. Media stances are less biased, and try to expound the facts, without fictionalising them. Nevertheless, there are arguments used by nationalist politicians that are dismantled. In general terms, the identities that are construed are those of the ‘Self’ versus the ‘Other’, ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and guilty and innocent victims versus mitigation of guilt. A much longer corpus would have been necessary, evidently, in order to be able to reveal all salient discoursal categories and constructs. Subsequent analyses are therefore on the way.

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