Huntington - The Clash Of Civilizations (1996) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: August 14, 2006, 7:00 p.m. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, London, Toronto, and Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 1996; paperback 2002). Themes: “Alone among civilizations the West has had a major and at times devastating impact on every other civilization. The relation between the power and culture of the West and the power and cultures of other civilizations is, as a result, the most pervasive characteristic of the world of civilizations. As the relative power of other civilizations increases, the appeal of Western culture fades and nonWestern peoples have increasing confidence in and commitment to their indigenous cultures. The central problem in the West’s—particularly America’s—efforts to promote a universal Western culture is its declining ability to do so” (184). Thesis: “In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international world order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war” (321). List of Illustrations: Tables, Figures, Maps. Preface. This book is not meant to be social science, but rather “an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War” (13). It should be tested by “whether it provides a more meaningful and useful lens . . . than any alternative paradigm” (14). These ideas were first expressed publicly in an Oct. 1992 lecture at the American Enterprise Institute (14). Ms. readers included Fareed Zakaria (14). Writing of the book funded by the John M. Olin Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation (15). I. A WORLD OF CIVILIZATIONS

Ch. 1: The New Era in World Politics. INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY. “[C]ultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people” (20). This book’s main proposition: “that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the postCold War world” (20). Five corollaries: (1) “For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies” (20). (2) The power of the West is in relative decline (20). (3) “A civilizationbased world order is emerging” (20). (4) “The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China” (20). (5) “The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal” (20-21). A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD. Historical review; three maps (1920, 1960s, post-1990) (21-28).“The post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations” (29). OTHER WORLDS? Paradigms are essential and unavoidable (citing Thomas Kuhn and others) (29-31). Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis represented a moment of euphoric belief in post-Cold War harmony (31-32). A two-world us-and-them model is “always” a temptation (32-33). The “realist” model of international relations proposes a 184-state model (33-35). Anarchy as model (35). COMPARING WORLDS: REALISM, PARSIMONY, AND PREDICTIONS. Comparing paradigms (36). A 7- or 8-civilization

model is superior to the others and fits many 1993 events (37-39). Ch. 2: Civilizations in History and Today. THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS. Scholars of civilization (40). Civilization is a plural concept; a singular concept “cannot be sustained” (40-41). Outside German, civilization is a cultural concept, composed of blood, language, way of life, and, especially, religion (41-42). Civilizations are comprehensive: “A civilization is a ‘totality’”; however, they have no clear-cut boundaries in space or time, and they can “interact and overlap” (42-43; cf. “Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale” [207]). They are long-lived but mortal, and they evolve (43-44). They are not political and do not perform governmental functions (44). Despite disagreement on how many civilizations have existed, “the identity of the major civilizations is not contested. ‘Reasonable agreement’ . . . exists on at least twelve major civilizations, seven of which no longer exist (Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Middle American, Andean) and five which do (Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, and Western)” (44-45). Review of contemporary entities to which Huntington accords the status of civilization: Sinic; Japanese; Hindu; Islamic; Orthodox; Western; Latin American; African (possibly) (45-47). Buddhism is not associated with a particular civilization (47-48). Rejects concept of Jewish civilization (48n.). RELATIONS AMONG CIVILIZATIONS. Encounters before A.D. 1500 (48-50). The rise of the West (50-53). As the West declines relatively, the phenomena of civilizationgenerated religion and empire “began to disappear” (53-55). Ch. 3: A Universal Civilization? Modernization and Westernization. UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION: MEANINGS. No universal civilization, in a deep and

meaningful sense, is developing (56-59). English is not becoming the world language because “[a]s power diffuses, Babelization spreads” (59-64). A universal religion is unlikely to emerge (64-66). UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION: SOURCES. “The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Western civilization” (66). Neither the end of the Cold War, nor increased trade, nor social psychology augur the emergence of a universal civilization (66-68). THE WEST AND MODERNIZATION. “Modernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures. It is a product of the tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge beginning in the eighteenth century” (68). It is distinct from Westernization, which involves the Classical legacy, the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy, European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, the rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, and individualism, among other things (6972). RESPONSES TO THE WEST AND MODERNIZATION. Rejectionism, e.g. Japan before the 1850s (72-73). Kemalism, i.e. embrace of both modernization and Westernization, e.g. Turkey under Ataturk (73-74). Reformism, i.e. embrace of modernization and rejection of Westernization, the most popular response (74). Typically, societies have more strongly away from Kemalism and toward reformism over time (75-78). II. THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS Ch. 4: The Fading of the West: Power, Culture, and Indigenization. WESTERN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE. The power of the West is both dominant and in a slow, intermittent relative decline (81-83). This can be measure in terms of territory and population controlled (84-86), economic product

generated (86-88), military capability (88-90). The West’s dominance will extend “well into the early decades of the twenty-first century” (90-91). INDIGENIZATION: THE RESURGENCE OF NONWESTERN CULTURES. As the West declines, other civilizations reassert their one values more strongly (91-95). LA REVANCHE DE DIEU. The global revival of religion is caused by this, and the fact that religion is fundamental to the human need for identity. (95-101). Ch. 5: Economics, Demography, and the Challenger Civilizations. Asia and Islam exemplify these trends most strongly (102-03). THE ASIAN AFFIRMATION. Asian societies have gone through various phases in reasserting themselves (103-05). China is experiencing a new emphasis on its culture (105-06). Japan is embracing its own distinctiveness (106-07). They share in an East Asian resurgence that values collectivism over individualism (107-09). THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE. This is a major historical event that can be compared to the Protestant Reformation (109-11). Inspired by students and intellectuals and facilitated by urbanization, it has been more important culturally and socially than politically, but its political manifestations are also important (11116). Population growth is its “motor force” (116-20). CHANGING CHALLENGES. Asian economic growth and Muslim population growth, which will moderate as the 21st century goes on, are be destabilizing forces (120-21).

STRUCTURE OF CIVILIZATIONS. Civilizations develop around core states, some have lone countries; countries can be cleft (divided between civilizations) or torn (marked by a failed attempt at shifting from one civilization to another) (13539). TORN COUNTRIES: THE FAILURE OF CIVILIZATION SHIFTING. Russia’s failed Westernization (139-44). Turkey’s faltering Westernization (144-49). Mexico became a torn country in the 1980s (149-51). Australia’s “Asian ploy” (151-54). But torn countries produce “cultural schizophrenia” (154). Ch. 7: Core States, Concentric Circles, and Civilizational Order. CIVILIZATIONS AND ORDER. A multipolar, spheres-of-influence world is developing (155-57). BOUNDING THE WEST. France and Germany are European core states (157). The West’s “eastern boundary” (158-60). Implications for the EU and NATO (16062). The special case of Greece (16263). RUSSIA AND ITS NEAR ABROAD. Russia is a core state creating an Orthodox heartland with a buffer of Islamic outlier states (163-65). Ukraine is deeply divided (165-68). GREATER CHINA AND ITS CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE. China aims to champion Chinese culture and resume its regional hegemony (168-71). Taiwan will probably become more integrated with China (171-74). ISLAM: CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT COHESION. Tribal and cultural commitments have been more important than political ones (174-75). The Islamic concept of ummah (175-77). Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey aspire to be core states (177-79).

III. THE EMERGING ORDER OF CIVILIZATIONS

IV. CLASHES OF CIVILIZATIONS

Ch. 6: The Cultural Reconfiguration of Global Politics. GROPING FOR GROUPINGS: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY. Because of the roots of identity, civilization is the key to political regrouping (125-30). CULTURE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. Regional interests are less important (130-35). THE

Ch. 8: The West and the Rest: Intercivilizational Issues. WESTERN UNIVERSALISM. “What is univeralism to the West is imperialism to the rest” (184). “Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle” (184). Islam and China are the principal “challenger civilizations”

(184-85). Pace the realist theory of international relations, the civilization paradigm predicts that a non-Western coalition is not likely to form (185-86). Proliferation, human rights & democracy, and immigration are central issues for the West’s attempt to defend its interests (185-86). WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. Acquisition of nuclear weapons is a way of a shortcut to military capability (18692). HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY. The decline in the West’s ability to promote human rights is concomitant with its relative decline in power (192-97). “The paradox of democracy” means that to the extent that the West succeeds in promoting democracy, it also promotes resistance to Western interests (197-98). IMMIGRATION. Western ambivalence and uncertainty on immigration issues (198206). Ch. 9: The Global Politics of Civilizations. [N.B. In chapters 9-12, Huntington forgets his proviso that “civilizations are cultural, not political entities” and “do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do” (44; emphasis added).] CORE STATES AND FAULT LINE CONFLICTS. Civilizational differences “sharpen the conflict” when “intercivilizational conflict” occurs in the form of fault line conflicts or core state conflicts (207-09). ISLAM AND THE WEST. Historically “stormy” relations (209-10). Sources of conflict in “difference” and “similarities” (210-11). Influencing factors, especially economics and demography (211-12). Territorial issues are now “relatively insignificant” [sic; Israel goes unmentioned in this chapter] (212). Bernard Lewis’s interpretation of Muslim anti-Westernism (213). AntiWesternism has been Islam’s “overall trend” in the 1980s and 1990s (213-14). Western fear of Muslim extremism (21516). After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, “an intercivilizational quasi war developed between Islam and the West”

(216-17). “The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam” (217). ASIA, CHINA, AND AMERICA. “Asia is the cauldron of civilizations” marked by complexity, fluidity, and instability (218-21). Cooling of U.S.-Japan relations (221-22). Increasing antagonism of U.S.-China relations (222-24). Civilizational issues kept the U.S. from playing Japan off against China (224-29). Possibilities for East Asia’s development are many (22938). CIVILIZATIONS AND CORE STATES: EMERGING ALIGNMENTS. Speculation about emerging patterns, hedged with caveats (238-45). Ch. 10: From Transition Wars to Fault Line Wars. The “Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989” was the first “civilization war” (246-47). The Gulf War was also a “civilization war,” because of how Muslims interpreted it (247-52). CHARACTERISTICS OF FAULT LINE WARS. Fault line conflicts—“communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilizations”— tend to be long-lasting and bloody, have a religious dimension, are relatively unlikely to spread (252-54). INCIDENCE: ISLAM’S BLOODY BORDERS. “The overwhelming majority of fault line conflicts . . . have taken place along the border looping across Eurasia and Africa that separates Muslims from nonMuslims” (255). “Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbors” (256) and have a “propensity toward violent conflict” (258). CAUSES: HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY, POLITICS. Factors involved are demographic (259-62) and political (26263). Additional factors (263-65). Ch. 11: The Dynamics of Fault Line Wars. IDENTITY: THE RISE OF CIVILIZATION CONSCIOUSNESS. Radicalization favors extremists (266-67). Religious consciousness generally comes to predominate, a feature “particularly prevalent among Muslims” (267-70). The other side is identified, then demonized in civilizational terms (270-72).

CIVILIZATION RALLYING: KIN COUNTRIES AND DIASPORAS. In the post-Cold War world, the “kin-country syndrome” leads communal conflicts to expand and escalate (272-74). Kashmir (274-75). Sri Lanka (275). Russia’s “anti-Muslim wars” (275-78). Armenia-Azerbaijan (278-81). The former Yugoslavia (281-91). HALTING FAULT LINE WARS. “Fault line wars are intermittent; fault line conflicts are interminable” (291). The wars are ended by secondary and tertiary kin countries who do the negotiating, which is made more difficult in the absence of core states (292-94). The Bosnian conflict illustrated this (294-98). “Fault line wars bubble up from below, fault line peaces trickle down from above” (298). V. THE FUTURE OF CIVILIZATIONS Ch. 12: The West, Civilizations, and Civilization. THE RENEWAL OF THE WEST? The West may not fit the pattern of past civilizations of achieving what Toynbee called a “universal state” (301-03). The West exhibits characteristics of “a mature civilization on the brink of decay” (304). “Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies” (304)— immigrants (304-05), multiculturalists (305-07). The “Atlantic community” is a promotion of Western culture (307-08). THE WEST IN THE WORLD. Statesmen should recognize civilizational patterns (308-09). American foreign policy clings unduly to Cold War policies (309-10). The West is attached to universalism, but “Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers from three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous” (310). Recommendations on how to “preserve Western civilization” (311-12).

CIVILIZATIONAL WAR AND ORDER. War between core states of civilizations is “highly improbable but not impossible” (312). A scenario of how the U.S., Europe, Russia, and India could become engaged in a global war against China, Japan, and most of Islam (313-16). Core states should “refrain from intervening in conflicts in other civilizations” to minimize the danger of such conflicts— the abstention rule—and core states should negotiate to end fault line conflicts (the mediation rule) (316). Difficulties in these rules being accepted (317-18). THE COMMONALITIES OF CIVILIZATION. “Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world. . . . The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality” (318). Cultural coexistence requires “a search for what is common to most civilizations” (318; this is “the commonalities rule” [320, emphasis in original]). Singapore in the early 1990s as an example (318-19). For the West to flourish, the U.S. and Europe need to hang together; to avoid a reversion to barbarism, civilizations need to hang together (321). “In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international world order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war” (321). Notes. 30 pp. Note on majors scholarly works on civilizations (324-25 n.1). Index. 15 pp. Credits.