Frkn Gula
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reedom and
T
u*
for
-/n the l"st.hapter we looked at some of the maior conditions ni-* p.*on made in the imagc of God ln this chapter' we will
" ;#?."il;; ;"ffi;;iJ;,
conditions-of being a moral subiect' frecdonr tbe kin
iJlp"nt,urt ;pJiaily
the moral life.
Freedom without it we cannot properly Freedom is so ceotral to the moral life that freedom' then we are beyond we are ."."f. u"i* *otel persons at all' If lives where fieedom of our "i areas those to M"Liitv p.,r"int as the.imagc of God' potential our actt'alize u'.'to
;ffiJ;#;. ilt*lrui.lti.""Jr* tffi#; ild".l, ",ih. ,""
ti'n" prombting the possibiliry for a moral
life.
freedom' We crn soeak of frecdom in the moral life in two ways: as basic ln either choice of frecdom and as ,h;;;;;;lelfd"t.r'nin"don, good morally be only "r w€ can that ,** ri,ft"-*-a, freedom is so necessary our we us€ when but only moral ludgment' not when we r€i$on well to a freedom well..
t
Fftdont Self'Ihtemination psychologiel ln comirw to self-awareneis, especially through the use of and
t".t.;;;;::';;;ize 'ilir',it
the limid'ng coniirions io who we can become o, to achi"u!. We know that we are very much the *.ttr"tt' c'onsider' for exampli' the influeoce of
. -.rrurc"r;"jil ;;#i; "* to whichrve are all.subiect ' our ffiil ;i;il;J*,ritur"l -"ditioning of willing can change.what is amo-unt !.".iJr*t"rr,"'... JunJ*t"urt' No of develog menner the alter we rnav H;;;;; ,il;-rtt-a'.v' although stress our uniqueness and color our f";;h".j; d.."(il"tic
p'redisposiiions
7t
Rcaw Infomcd By Feitb potential. But hetedity does not predetermine specifcelly what we will do or who we will become. Our fieedom can be exercised across a brocd spectruo of genetic possibilities end is subiect to €ovironmental influences. We must find our way within thc limits of thcse potentids and the forces of the social-
cultural conditions which slrape our worldvicw and influence not only the way ve int€rpret expetiend but even tITe kirds ofexperiene we have. The fiqueotly gven advice "Be yourself" is not simply p€tmission to turn in on oneself; it is, instead, an cncouragement to express oneself within one's own limits rnd according to one's own predispositions. Freedom necessarily acts within the given conditions of heredity and envirorunent. One of the dangers in facing these limitrtions is that we can sell out to determinism. Selling out is en attempt to escape from freedom by claiming thrr we are forced to be who we are and to do what we do by herediry or environment- If we sell out, then we claim that we are not responsible for anything .v6 de. In fact, by refusing to acccprt the freedom which is ours, we shor' that rve are afraid to accept responsibility. One of the tasks of human life is to achieve freedom in those areas where we are not yet free. Therefore, a primary goal of monl education is to free people from becorning directed by the unalterable givgns of heredity or by the chengeatrle limits of some external authority. It is to free them to live well within limits. Of course. the behavioral sciences have clearly shown that our freedorn is limited. Our actions fall somewhere on the continuum betwen absolute freedom and absolute determiaism. If this were not so, I suspect we would not hrve tie experience of feeling unsetded or indecisive about our choices. Moreover, we would not have to deliberate about anything if we were completely free or completely determined. Assuming, then, some freedom of selfdetermination in the moral life, we rccogaize thut one purpose of this freedom is to appropriate actively what happens to us into the persons we are and can yct beomc. We do not look on hum4n existence as though we should all be deelt a winning hand. Rather, we see life as a matrcr of playing well the hand we have been handed. Freedom eoables us to integrate the "slings and arrows ofqrtrageous fornrne" into our lives so that we might grow tcward wholencss and live with peace. This involves making what happens to us part of who we are. Turning necessity
into a virnre is one of the signs of a sbong moral chrracter, and expression ofour capecity for selfdeterminatiom. .
it
is
.
an
But what does this kind of frecdom look like? Stanley Hauerw.as tells a story that shows how much the capaciry for this frcedom is associated prlmarily with character and not with choices or actions.
I have r friend who, after failing to get tenure at a university as a philosopher, decided to go to law school. He is now an extfrordi-
Fncdom otd Kruukdge
narily able lawyer end is quite hrppy he ..decided. to go to law
school; but in another sense he hardly decided rt all^ He was forced to go to INw school because his teaching career wrs blocked. The fact that he is now happy as a lawyer means that he has leerned to make a vinue out of
neessity.r
As the old ioke would have it, if someone dumpa a load of lemons on your pnrch, don't complain. Make.lemonade! Wc cennot be held morally accounable for the determining givens of our lives, but since th€y constirute something of wbo we are, they need to be appropriated into ourclves. The more we are able to become aware of ourand possess ourselves, including all the determining influences, the . selves more we will experience ourselves as responsible for what we do and who wc become.
The freedom to decide about oneself and to make someone of oneself brings us squarely in touch with what theologians call iavc or core freedom. Basic freedom is directed roward a loving relationship with God, the ultimate end of our lives. But since we experience God in mediated ways, we ultimately establish our relationship with God in and through the ways we rclate to all things. For this reason, basic freedom ofself-determination before God is always incrmated in the panicular choices we make thmugh lifeBut not every choice we make involves us at the deepest levels of our being. For example, consider thes€ two expressions of freedom of choice. At our seminery we take our meals in r cafeteria which always has at least threc options for dessen- To illustrate fieedom of choicc with my students, I ask them if they ceo remember which dessen they chose for lunch on a certain day of the previous week. Only those who choose jello every day remember! The rest do not. One of the reasons they do not remember their choice of dessen is that such a choice does not demand a very deep involvement of their perso-ns. Freedom of choice, the smorgasbord freedom of choosing among indifferent goods, is like that. It do€s not dernand very much fiom us. On the other hand, basic freedom, the freedom of self-determinarion, involves more. For example, a friend of mine smrggled for several years over whether he ought to remain in the seminary and proceed toward.priesthood, or withdraw in order to be free to devote his life to working in a ihird world oountry through an agency of the United Nrtions. He chose the latter. Such a chgice is an exercise of besic freedom. [t demands more personal involvement than choosing iello over cmkies in the cafeteria. The notion of basic freedom, or the freedom of se lf{etermination, rests oo an undersmnding of the human person as a complex multi-leveled being. To illirstrate this I like to diagram the human person as a moving spirrl. Others prder to use the food metaphors ofan onion, anichoke, or cinnamon
Reann lalormed 81 Faith
rol!. The spiral illustret€s bctter our heving a cosrnron c€nter for erch ofthe levels ofour being. Furthermore, with the spiral we cennot tell clearly where one level ends and the next begins. This is closer to real life, I think. With e spiral, too, we know that each levcl shares a common center and moves out from there without ever being disiointed frorn the whole. The spinl is "moving" to capture the temporal dimension of being human and the developmentel orienution of the moral life. My diagram lmks like this:
level of extemal possessions Ievel of feelings level of convictions cenrer of identity
Frccdon
a
Ktrottkdge
cov€n ot widr God is a basic ect of faidr--the most self-committing choice we cen cvcr rntke. This act of feith is "the" fundamental option. Yet we must live out this condition in r bmken world----q world where original sin and social sin abound, and r world where many temptetions and bad influences arise to go(ltradict the very ori€ntation of our innermost beiog, or heaft. Though more deeply marked by grace than by sin, we elways stand in ned of puri$catim eud conversion. This gives a dynamic character to a life ofconstent growth. Traditioual moral theology understood this basic condition of being human. The clrssic moral manuals began with attention on our ultinrate end and the necessity to make decisions for that Lnd . From a theological point of view, this end is God calling us into communion with Godt self. Our basic decision is whether we will live our lives responding to God in and through all our choices.
Fundamntal Stance As the diagram shows, our actions c2n spring from different levels ofour being- Not everything we do is a clear and complete embodiment of what springs from the deepest core of our being. Some actions might be rrnted
there, but most of our actions spring from a more peripheral level. This cautions us to refrain fmm concluding on the basis of isolated.actions alone dut anyone has embodied the full meaning and commitment of the self. What seems more likely is thet we come to actualize who we are through a rvhole series of actioas which, when tak€n together, express the brsic character or dominsnt direction of our lives. This basic direction of our lives, which manifests a rather consistent personal indentity, is our fundanental starce. Tlrosr-. significant moments of choice in our lives, which establish or af6rm more strongly than others the character and direction of our lives, are
flndnnettal Etioas.t
Thc Theory of Fundamental Option Bernard Hiring has gone to grcxt length in the fust volume of his Fzse ir Cbrist to give a proper understanding of the theory bf fundrmental option- He shows that contemporary theology finds biblical roots for the theory of fundamcntal option in the notions of covenanr aod heart.a This theory assumes the basic conviction of the covenantal experience, namely, that we are born graced- That is, God has created us out of love for tove. We are the good creation of a gracious God. Without destroying our freedom, Godt love for us has so affeced us in our innermost being (i.e., our hearts) as to make a cleim on us and to give us an orientatioD torvard love and life- Our response is to live out of this orientation in freedqn. To agree to live in
a
Fait$al
Within the context of the fundamental option theory, "fundamental stance" expresses the sort of person we have cbosen to be, the fundamental direction we have chosen for our lives. Itbrings a stable direction, perduring quality, and personal meaniig to our actions. The fundamental stance of the Christian is one which allows the great commandment to function as a critical iudge of one's relationships and activities. Bemard Hdring has aligned wh4t is entailed by the fundameotal stance with Eric Erikson's notion of identity.t By this he means that rre cmnot lay claims to having achieved a fundamental direction for our lives until we can lay claim to having achieved a stable identity. For neither identig' nor stance arises dl at once. They come into being through committing ooeself to a way of life that is stable enough to sustain a perduring quality of life, and in this way to give personal meaning to actions. Actions taker by themsclves are ambiguous. Situating actions in relation to the fundamental direction of a person's life, however, enables us to discover the personal meaning of actions. Our actions embody, to a greeter or lesser degree, the fundamental dirgction of our lives- They are signs more or less expressive of or interiority. In this sense, our actions are like t}le tip of en iceberg. They err held above the surfacc by our anitudes, coniictions, and the fundamental direction of our lives which se€k exteroal, concret€ expres* sicr- To get to the mre meaning of our ections as expressions of ourselves, we nced to look beneeth the surfrce of observable bchavior to the attitudes and convictions of the person, These-give expression to the fundameqtal direction seek coocrete embodiment in panicular actions. Only by looking beneath the nrrhce of our actions will wc be able to get to the rmts of moral conversion, lrealirg, and growth.
of our lives and
Reaon
Inforad 81 Faitb
When we take srrch an indepdl look at our actions, tve discover that they may be more or less consistent with the fundauental direction of our lives. This is because our actions arise from differert levels of our being. Not all our ections spring from the deepest center ofoursclves wherein lies the core of our identity. In dre biblical sense, this is the "hart"-the deepest source from which we commit ourselves to God and to others aad show whet we most care &bout or value. The truest expression ofourselves as moral persons arises from there; it does not lie in our extemal ections alone. Moral gcodness Iies in the loving disposition to choose God, while right actions are extemal expressions of this disposition. The challenge of moral living is to do those actions which are consistent with the love of God. The role of the 'heart" in the moral life gives full force to the bibliel prayers which beseech God for a "pure heart" and give power toJesus' sayings, "Where your beasure is, there will be your heart" (Mt 6:21), and "Of what the hean is full, the mouth will speak" (Mt 12:34). The goal of moral growth is to live singleheartedly committed to God so that our actions are consistent wit}' whom we have chosen to bc through that comrnitmenr.
Fandanatal Aption A choice which arises from such a personal depth that it can siguificantly reverse or reinforce the fundamentel direction of our lives is a firndamental option. To qualify as a fundamental option, a choice must be roorcd in a d€ep knowledge of self aud a freedom to commit oneself. Through a fundamental option we express our basic freedom of selfuetermination to comrnit ourselves profoundly toward a cenain way ofbeing in the world. Bernard Hiring speaks of the "great decisions" rs specid moments in life
which express the fundamental option. These are decisions appropriate to those who have reached the necessary stage of identity and who are able to commit themselves in knowledge and with freedon to a community or to a person. Without any claim to completeness, Hering suggests the following examples:
.
I want to poiot to such fundamcntal decisions as personal choice of faith in Jesus Christ and in the role and missiort of the Church, made by an adult or an adolescent who his already reached the necessary stage of identity. I would lisi among such choices: adult baptism as sign of personal cosmitment to Chdst and covenant with the Church-and since adult baptism is the exception in the West, I would note confirmation as a meture ratification of what God offers us in baptism; marriage vovs; the vows of celibacy for the kingdom of God; a decision that is the test of deep and true
Freedon
ud
Knuulcdge
IlI
Fiendship or of selfgiving love; tie deliberate choice of a profession such as that ofa physician or of a politician with r firm commitment to the positive €thos,6 Pope Johr Paul II has used the notion of fundanental option in a similar sense in his document on catechetics, Cdtecf,cti Tradcndaz,' in 1979. When s?erking about the youth, he writes:
With youth comes the moment of the first great decisions. Alrhough the young may enioy the suppon of the members of their family and their hiends, they have to rely on rhemselves and their own conscience and rnust ever more frequently and decisively as_ sume responsibility for their destiny. Good rnd evil, grace anti sin, life and death will more aild more confront one another withiu them, not jusi as moral categories but chiefly as fundamental op tions which they must accept or reject lucidly, conscious of their own responsibility (Par. 39).2 These statements of theologiaa Bernard Hdring and of pope John paul II suggest that those fundemental decisions which affecr the ba;ic-direqtion of o.ur-lives are not made quickly, or easily. We must be ruly ready for them on all levels of our personelity. These statements also show thaifuirdamental choices aie deeply rooted in the relational character of our lives- Our basic decisions have to do with our commimtent to our own integriry and identity, our commitment m odrers, and our sense of responsibiiity to the world around us. If these basic decisions are made soundly and noi precipitously, they can well esrablish dre direction of our lives so as to resisi thoie strong determining forces which are constandj' warring against us fighting to maki us someone else.
Fradm
of Choice
The other kind of freedom at stake in the moral life has to do with realizing our capacity to be ourselves through the particular choiceg we make. This is what most people call moral freedom, thbugh rnoralists call it more properly freedom of choice. Freedom of choice--a smorgasbord kind of freedonr-
.
the hereditary derermitrants of our basic inclinations, but aiso to lirniiing factors such as unconscious motives, peer pressure, drugs, ignorance, passions, fears, blind habis, and the hidden persuaders of the miss media. yet the more aware we become of these determinants and their influence ort us,
Reana lalotmcd
,az the nore we
Bl Faitb
will be able either to overcome those we cin or to live more
ear.Iv within the limits of those which we cannot ov€roome'
"'-i'"ow.tt t ,". ne frcm Onc FIat Axt * C'ukoo\ N6t bings homc this should all bc about in our fr.# oi "f,"ice gt"phicetly, end shows what we McMurpiy fakes iosanity nwel' In t$s ;d*ib6.dults. lnJ *i"i"s * However' he institution' a mental life of softer for the farit * dU who has " ward tbe of ill."*"o" t La-" -llision with Big Nurse, the tyrrmt they can no )onger have ni"JA.gi*ffy
iriL.
;Jf* calling
io
emascuhted her pe-tients so that McMurphy begins r one-man campaigu against-tyranny
"ttiot..Io s."o" hJ"t"go showdown yq B-tg ryYt: !y fr""d.-. -" " allow the patients m wetch the li't/ofld Denes would for a vote which
ii, ii. H" i. on uo." short of a maiority' It is up to Chief' the big Indian he- cannot who, to escape the pains of tyranny, has retired into r fog whert hand' Chief his to raise ,p"uk. McMurphy pleads with him h.rr'"t d ""n'.rnt 6n& his hrnd going up, and he 'ays to himself:
It's too late to stop it now. McMurphy did something to it.that first day, put somc kind of hex on it. . . . McMurphy's got hidden wires holkid to it, lifting it slow iust ro get me out of the fog-and into the open where I'm fa-ir game He's doing the mrth. I lifted it mvself.s
This
is
it,
wires
' No, that's not
the goal of moral striving- We need to cut short olr-attemPted
escroes from
frJdom .o th"t *e
cri
responsibly claim,
"l
did it myselll"
nr*o* tna rcsponsibiliry go hand in hand. Responsible frecdom..says' "l chme to do this'bec",rre,'"i , responsible person' I uczl to do it'" This is " or "l had bmer ' ' .'' ouite different from the familiar, "i really should ' Whenever we without' Jr'l must. . . ." These all indicate motivation from we really y'o that are chanccs find ourselves saying'Acnrally I should . - -" pressure to, there are possible rewards if oo, *".,, ,o, *" ia"l'*a" "*t*al A cuckoo's nest mey be 4n extreme we do notse do, or punishmenrc if yet the n€urotic is clear image of the we live, *orld in which inugs ior tiie The neurotic' suggests thrt the we all share. which conditions A"ti;inea twmnv of determining influenc€s over which we seem to have no codtrol has in our lives' -"d" Jo*.rl"rsn.s oir chief neurosis. We all have a Big Nurse attempt to fog and into the Th* is inevitable. With Chief we often retreat esirye from freedorn However, our freedom to choose this or that---€ven within limits-is
fundamcntelly *fteedom to choose an identity, to bccome a certain son of pcrson. We cannot do ca€rything. Determining factors prwent rhat' But we as a can pour ourselves into what we do, make it truly our own, choose it of freedom The integrity' our goiine expression of ourselves which asserts
Frudom aad
Kru
8l
edgc
our moral striving does not mean doing iust anything we want to do. Rather, the freedom of our moral striving is wanting to do what we can do. Moral frcedom is an act of self-determination, an act which, through all the pathways of partidar choices, chooses who we want to be, persoas either open or cloed to thc nystcry ofour livcs end of all life.
Knowledge If the actual stuff of moral freedom is not a.choice between in(lividual obtlcts, but rarher the self-realiz{tion of the person choosing, then this dlemen( of being a mord person must also be present in moral knowledge. This meens thar the object of moral knowledge is primarily not something outside
the person, but it is the free moral person in all his or her concreteness and possibilities. The moral life entails two kiods of knowledge conceptual and evalua-
tivc.e Conceptual knowledge, the explicitly formulated cousciousness of moral reality, is necessary for passing on moral wisdom from generation to gencration and for living in a moral community which shares a common discourse about rnoral experience. But conceptual knowledge is not to be equated with genuine morhl knowledge- Evaluative knowledge, on the other hand, counts as genuine moral knowledge for it calls fonh decisions and actions expressive of one's moral freedom. Without any degree of evaluative knowlulge we could not live as moral persons in the full sense of that term-
CoacEtaal Knuwlzdge Conceptual knowledge in the moral life penains both to a knowledge of self and to a knowledge of moral values. It is what most pcople mean when they speak of moral knowledge, though it is not whrt moralists mean by genuine moral knowledge. C,onceptual knowledge is symbolized by the hcad.to k is the kind of knowledge we have when we have the right ioformation and have mastered the facts. It is dre kind of knowledge which is fairly easy to grasp ead to verify, for we only need to double check our observxtions, our facts, our logic. We cen easily comfiunicate this kind of knowledge thmugh preaching, teaching, and sharing since wc can detach the facts from the knowdr and the circumstances to make them readily available to anyone who wants them. C.oncepruel knowledge of the self comes as a result of being an obiect of our own scrutiny and being able to express what we discover. Psychological tests, for example, help us to attain this kind of awareoess. Through such testing we can know our fundamental limits and basic potentids, our personality preferences, or whether we have any character disorders. Whatever we cen do to enhance our criticel, conceptual awareness would serve our mpral
Rewon Informcd
Bl
Faitb
lives well sine the badc conditions of our unique identity influence the way we interpret moral reJity and the responses we cln make.
Coriceptual self-sw:reness has some important implicetions for the moral llfe. Right mord living, for instance, involves expressing ourselves according to the capacities we have. While v/e .r€ fimrrlly rcquired to cxFess ourselvd eccordiag toour crPacities, no one is mordly obligeted to do what lr or she is incepoble ofdoing. Sensitive pastorrl rnonl gui&oce will respect dre limited capocity ofr person and not imPoee what e Person is incepobh of att3ining. Since our predispositions will give us a certain amount ofeese or trouble with different virnres, we would do well to know our proclivities so that we will know when we are acaing with them or straining against them. We only frustrare ourselves urorally by running ahead of our graces, i.e., by trying to live bevond our means. We incur guilt unnecessarily if we comPare our own mord effons with thcee of someone with a capacity different from our own, We need to leam, then, the limits and potentials which are ours both as humans rnd rs unique individuals. A basic demand ofChristian morality is to live ,ccording to the graces we have received. The goal of moral striving,
then, is ro b€comc what God hes mede us to be by appropriating our capacities and developing our potatial within th€ limits ofour natural endowrnentIn this way we live out ofour blessings ind give thanks and preise to God by using n'ell what is ours. Livin{ in this way makes the moral life a continuous expression of praise and thanksgiving to God who has endowed us with different gifts or with different degrees of the same gifu. In matters pertaining to moral values, conceptud knowledge is tnowledge about values. It comes with a knowledge of morel rules and the strategies for doing what the rules prescribe. We use conceptual moral knowledge to communicate values and to argue for or against a position. However, conceptual knowledge is the least convincing kind of knowledge for achieving mord conversion. We do not change what we or another person mey value simply on th€ basis of the right information or ratiorlal explanations. We changc our values on the basis of experiencing a value as satisfying ir basic need. Moreover, we do not mrke our moral decisions on the basis of bare fects, nor do we exercise our moral iiredom in e disinterested way. A nrre conceptual grrsp that a pcniculer coursc of action is right or wrong is not enough to cnsune that a person will act in a vimrous way, A 'iimrous responsc requires that the person has interiorized the vrlues inherent in the action. A personal commitment to value is an essential dimension of moral behavior. So, while cnnceptual knowledge is important and necessary for the moral life, it abne is not sufficient if we rre to ect as rrcrdly virtuous persons. We also need waluative knowledge.
Fncdom
ad Ktutlcdge
85
fudaatile Knuolcdge Moral knowledge, properly
so called, is evaluative knowledge. t r It is the and so is knowledge diffcult to express in concep6. We cen r€cognize bern's it in the knowledge lovers have of one another. For example, when we want a
friend
to koow
truly love, wc excitedly try to give all the dut we can. Try es we might, we cannot close the
someone we
descriptioos of our love
grp betw€en our p€rsonel knowledge of the one we love end otrr descriptions. Faced with the limitations ofconceptual media rnd the incommunicabitity of whlat the hqrt knows, we finally say in frustradon, "You'll iust h.ve to meet my love!" That is it exectly. Only through personal encounter will anyone else be able to know what we know by hean. Even then degrees of knou'ing will differ. That is how evaluative knowledge work.
Evaluative knowledge, symbolized by rhe heart, is the kind qf knowlwe have when we are "caught up" in someone or something through personal involvement or commitment. Evaluativc knowledge is more personal, more self-involving than conceptual knowledge of facts or ideas, for it has to do with grasping the quality of a person, obiect, or event. We do ner gain evaluative knowledge by words but by touch, sight, and sound, by experiencing victories and failures, sleeplessness and devotion. In shon, evaluative knowledge is a felt knowledge which we discover ttrough personal itrvolvement and reflectio. !t is not something which can easily be passed on through statements, formulas, or rules. A Pcouts cartoon ooce captured the sense of evaluative knowledge well in a scene which has Peppermint Patty sining at her school desk and speaking out to her teacher: "You know what Oscar Wilde said, !la'am? He said, 'Nothing thrt is wonh knowing can be taught.'Nodring pcrsorul, Ma'am . . . Carry on." While we nuy not want to agree with Oscar Wilde's statem€nt atrsolutely, it does coovey the significence of eveluetive knowledge as the kind of knowledge which is not easily taught in a deached way but must be evoked rnd caught il our experiences. The most we can hope for in trying to communicate eqluative knowledge is to occasion similar experiences of this value for anotlrcr so as to draw out of another the value experienced As it pertains to dre self, eveluative lnowledge touches the deepest level of ourselves as persons. It is diffiorlt to gresp frrlly or to express dlequately not only for oneself but also for others bectuse it is knowledge of such a dceply personal reality. This implies that we need to refrrin from making an abcolute and final ludgment not only about our own moral status before God but also about sorneone else's. If we do not have a full or clear grasp of o rselves, how much rnore difficult it is to have a total, explicit grasp of someone elsc's true rnoral self. We bave ao window into another pcrson's soul w{rich would allow us to see clearly enough where she or he stands before edge
li6
Reasor Informed. By
CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
FEATUBE
Faith
EVALUATIvE KNOWLEDGE
Swnbol
Heed
Heen
C.ontent
Right information; "master tlr facts."
Quality or vrluc of someone
Easily verifed since the
Dif6cult to verify since the quality or value escapes easy
Verifable
facts can be observed and
the logic demoostrated.
Acquired
Can be easily learned,
for
tight information is rfre for teacbing, preaching,
or something.
demonstration and logical exposition.
Fncdon
ad Kxwlcdge
God in order to make a moral iudgment of absolute condemnation, elen if tbrt p€rson's observable patterns of behavior are destructive of human u,.e!l-
being, The teaching of the Council of'lient on iustification claimed as much. It declares that no one but God crn know q,-ith absolute certitude anyonc's u conditioa before God. As it pertains to value, evaluative knowledge is the self-involving knou,ledge whic-h males de.ciding and acting on behalf of what u,e value tiuly our ou,z. Without this knowledge we ict rnerely bv hearsay, by rvhar we are told is right, rather than on the basis of what we have discovered to be valuable. 'l'his kind ofknowledge is not acquted nor altered t hrough ia tion a I a rgu ment alone, but by personal experience, discovery, and appreciatiou of moral values. The accomprnying chart summariz.es some of the distinguishing charac, teristics of conceptual and evaluative knou.ledge. Since rhese approaches ro freedom and knowledge have had a profound effcct on the ways v,e underr the issue uf sin. stand and cvaluate sin. we turn, nextr 10
Quality and value must be caught through personal interaction end encounter.
Notes
aad sharing.
l. Communicated
Information or facts are easily detached from the knower and the situarion, so th€y 4re easy to pass
on,
Since quality aod value are not easily deached fiom knower and situation, comftunication is difficult and must be discoverui to be ap
pteciated.
Erhies Be
On rhe influence of drese "givens,"
see James l\{. Gustafson, 6arr Cbrbt;an? (Chicago: Universitv of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 32-3a;
also, Vincent Rush, TDe Rn1rttsible Cbristian (Chictgo: l,oyola Universiry Press, 1984), pp. 32-48.
2.
Tbe Peauabh Kingdon $'Jotre Dame: University
of Notre Dame
Press, t983), pp. 37-38.
3. Not all theologians who use the fundamental option theory employ the distinction betw€en fundamental stance and fundamenral oprion as TimoO Connell does in his book, Pnzc iplu for a Catholic Moraliry (Ncw York:
t\ Morality
This is the knowledge of rules and tlre strategies fot achieving what the nrles presciibe; this is koowl-
fue
about
v&te-
This knowledge is a personal grasp ofvalue. This is what makes our actions truly our oarz. With this knowledge, on the basis ofwhet we truly v.lue. Mor.l 8rofih aod cooversion haP. peo drrough the experience of value and acquiriog evaluative knowledge. r,ve ect
The Seabury Press, 1978); see especially pp. 64-66, 70-74. Bernard H?iring, for example, gives,a lengthy treltment of the fundamental option theory without making this distinction. See his Frre and Faithful it Cbrist, Yol. 1: G.rreral Morsl Tholog (New York: The Seabury Press, t978), pp. 16+-222. . However, I6ndusingthe term'bption" (u,hich ordioarily coonotes a parricular mom€nt of choice) m refer to "basic direcrion" or "orientarion" of life to be misleading, O'Connell's distinction seems to capture the heart of the fundamental option theory wit}out building in unnecessary confusion. 4.'Hering, Fne and Faithful in Christ, Yol. 1: ()ewra! ll'Iorul l bcLtllLtg (New York The Seabury Press, 1978), pp. 164-222i for his secrion on the "heart" as it relates to the theory of fundamental option, see pp. 185-1ij9. 5. Ibid.,pp.16vt77,fslp. W. t72-17 s.
6. Ibid., p. 189. 7. Pope John Paul ll, Cttubri'
Tradezrla:, "Apostolic Exhortation on
T
u*
for
-/n the l"st.hapter we looked at some of the maior conditions ni-* p.*on made in the imagc of God ln this chapter' we will
" ;#?."il;; ;"ffi;;iJ;,
conditions-of being a moral subiect' frecdonr tbe kin
iJlp"nt,urt ;pJiaily
the moral life.
Freedom without it we cannot properly Freedom is so ceotral to the moral life that freedom' then we are beyond we are ."."f. u"i* *otel persons at all' If lives where fieedom of our "i areas those to M"Liitv p.,r"int as the.imagc of God' potential our actt'alize u'.'to
;ffiJ;#;. ilt*lrui.lti.""Jr* tffi#; ild".l, ",ih. ,""
ti'n" prombting the possibiliry for a moral
life.
freedom' We crn soeak of frecdom in the moral life in two ways: as basic ln either choice of frecdom and as ,h;;;;;;lelfd"t.r'nin"don, good morally be only "r w€ can that ,** ri,ft"-*-a, freedom is so necessary our we us€ when but only moral ludgment' not when we r€i$on well to a freedom well..
t
Fftdont Self'Ihtemination psychologiel ln comirw to self-awareneis, especially through the use of and
t".t.;;;;::';;;ize 'ilir',it
the limid'ng coniirions io who we can become o, to achi"u!. We know that we are very much the *.ttr"tt' c'onsider' for exampli' the influeoce of
. -.rrurc"r;"jil ;;#i; "* to whichrve are all.subiect ' our ffiil ;i;il;J*,ritur"l -"ditioning of willing can change.what is amo-unt !.".iJr*t"rr,"'... JunJ*t"urt' No of develog menner the alter we rnav H;;;;; ,il;-rtt-a'.v' although stress our uniqueness and color our f";;h".j; d.."(il"tic
p'redisposiiions
7t
Rcaw Infomcd By Feitb potential. But hetedity does not predetermine specifcelly what we will do or who we will become. Our fieedom can be exercised across a brocd spectruo of genetic possibilities end is subiect to €ovironmental influences. We must find our way within thc limits of thcse potentids and the forces of the social-
cultural conditions which slrape our worldvicw and influence not only the way ve int€rpret expetiend but even tITe kirds ofexperiene we have. The fiqueotly gven advice "Be yourself" is not simply p€tmission to turn in on oneself; it is, instead, an cncouragement to express oneself within one's own limits rnd according to one's own predispositions. Freedom necessarily acts within the given conditions of heredity and envirorunent. One of the dangers in facing these limitrtions is that we can sell out to determinism. Selling out is en attempt to escape from freedom by claiming thrr we are forced to be who we are and to do what we do by herediry or environment- If we sell out, then we claim that we are not responsible for anything .v6 de. In fact, by refusing to acccprt the freedom which is ours, we shor' that rve are afraid to accept responsibility. One of the tasks of human life is to achieve freedom in those areas where we are not yet free. Therefore, a primary goal of monl education is to free people from becorning directed by the unalterable givgns of heredity or by the chengeatrle limits of some external authority. It is to free them to live well within limits. Of course. the behavioral sciences have clearly shown that our freedorn is limited. Our actions fall somewhere on the continuum betwen absolute freedom and absolute determiaism. If this were not so, I suspect we would not hrve tie experience of feeling unsetded or indecisive about our choices. Moreover, we would not have to deliberate about anything if we were completely free or completely determined. Assuming, then, some freedom of selfdetermination in the moral life, we rccogaize thut one purpose of this freedom is to appropriate actively what happens to us into the persons we are and can yct beomc. We do not look on hum4n existence as though we should all be deelt a winning hand. Rather, we see life as a matrcr of playing well the hand we have been handed. Freedom eoables us to integrate the "slings and arrows ofqrtrageous fornrne" into our lives so that we might grow tcward wholencss and live with peace. This involves making what happens to us part of who we are. Turning necessity
into a virnre is one of the signs of a sbong moral chrracter, and expression ofour capecity for selfdeterminatiom. .
it
is
.
an
But what does this kind of frecdom look like? Stanley Hauerw.as tells a story that shows how much the capaciry for this frcedom is associated prlmarily with character and not with choices or actions.
I have r friend who, after failing to get tenure at a university as a philosopher, decided to go to law school. He is now an extfrordi-
Fncdom otd Kruukdge
narily able lawyer end is quite hrppy he ..decided. to go to law
school; but in another sense he hardly decided rt all^ He was forced to go to INw school because his teaching career wrs blocked. The fact that he is now happy as a lawyer means that he has leerned to make a vinue out of
neessity.r
As the old ioke would have it, if someone dumpa a load of lemons on your pnrch, don't complain. Make.lemonade! Wc cennot be held morally accounable for the determining givens of our lives, but since th€y constirute something of wbo we are, they need to be appropriated into ourclves. The more we are able to become aware of ourand possess ourselves, including all the determining influences, the . selves more we will experience ourselves as responsible for what we do and who wc become.
The freedom to decide about oneself and to make someone of oneself brings us squarely in touch with what theologians call iavc or core freedom. Basic freedom is directed roward a loving relationship with God, the ultimate end of our lives. But since we experience God in mediated ways, we ultimately establish our relationship with God in and through the ways we rclate to all things. For this reason, basic freedom ofself-determination before God is always incrmated in the panicular choices we make thmugh lifeBut not every choice we make involves us at the deepest levels of our being. For example, consider thes€ two expressions of freedom of choice. At our seminery we take our meals in r cafeteria which always has at least threc options for dessen- To illustrate fieedom of choicc with my students, I ask them if they ceo remember which dessen they chose for lunch on a certain day of the previous week. Only those who choose jello every day remember! The rest do not. One of the reasons they do not remember their choice of dessen is that such a choice does not demand a very deep involvement of their perso-ns. Freedom of choice, the smorgasbord freedom of choosing among indifferent goods, is like that. It do€s not dernand very much fiom us. On the other hand, basic freedom, the freedom of self-determinarion, involves more. For example, a friend of mine smrggled for several years over whether he ought to remain in the seminary and proceed toward.priesthood, or withdraw in order to be free to devote his life to working in a ihird world oountry through an agency of the United Nrtions. He chose the latter. Such a chgice is an exercise of besic freedom. [t demands more personal involvement than choosing iello over cmkies in the cafeteria. The notion of basic freedom, or the freedom of se lf{etermination, rests oo an undersmnding of the human person as a complex multi-leveled being. To illirstrate this I like to diagram the human person as a moving spirrl. Others prder to use the food metaphors ofan onion, anichoke, or cinnamon
Reann lalormed 81 Faith
rol!. The spiral illustret€s bctter our heving a cosrnron c€nter for erch ofthe levels ofour being. Furthermore, with the spiral we cennot tell clearly where one level ends and the next begins. This is closer to real life, I think. With e spiral, too, we know that each levcl shares a common center and moves out from there without ever being disiointed frorn the whole. The spinl is "moving" to capture the temporal dimension of being human and the developmentel orienution of the moral life. My diagram lmks like this:
level of extemal possessions Ievel of feelings level of convictions cenrer of identity
Frccdon
a
Ktrottkdge
cov€n ot widr God is a basic ect of faidr--the most self-committing choice we cen cvcr rntke. This act of feith is "the" fundamental option. Yet we must live out this condition in r bmken world----q world where original sin and social sin abound, and r world where many temptetions and bad influences arise to go(ltradict the very ori€ntation of our innermost beiog, or heaft. Though more deeply marked by grace than by sin, we elways stand in ned of puri$catim eud conversion. This gives a dynamic character to a life ofconstent growth. Traditioual moral theology understood this basic condition of being human. The clrssic moral manuals began with attention on our ultinrate end and the necessity to make decisions for that Lnd . From a theological point of view, this end is God calling us into communion with Godt self. Our basic decision is whether we will live our lives responding to God in and through all our choices.
Fundamntal Stance As the diagram shows, our actions c2n spring from different levels ofour being- Not everything we do is a clear and complete embodiment of what springs from the deepest core of our being. Some actions might be rrnted
there, but most of our actions spring from a more peripheral level. This cautions us to refrain fmm concluding on the basis of isolated.actions alone dut anyone has embodied the full meaning and commitment of the self. What seems more likely is thet we come to actualize who we are through a rvhole series of actioas which, when tak€n together, express the brsic character or dominsnt direction of our lives. This basic direction of our lives, which manifests a rather consistent personal indentity, is our fundanental starce. Tlrosr-. significant moments of choice in our lives, which establish or af6rm more strongly than others the character and direction of our lives, are
flndnnettal Etioas.t
Thc Theory of Fundamental Option Bernard Hiring has gone to grcxt length in the fust volume of his Fzse ir Cbrist to give a proper understanding of the theory bf fundrmental option- He shows that contemporary theology finds biblical roots for the theory of fundamcntal option in the notions of covenanr aod heart.a This theory assumes the basic conviction of the covenantal experience, namely, that we are born graced- That is, God has created us out of love for tove. We are the good creation of a gracious God. Without destroying our freedom, Godt love for us has so affeced us in our innermost being (i.e., our hearts) as to make a cleim on us and to give us an orientatioD torvard love and life- Our response is to live out of this orientation in freedqn. To agree to live in
a
Fait$al
Within the context of the fundamental option theory, "fundamental stance" expresses the sort of person we have cbosen to be, the fundamental direction we have chosen for our lives. Itbrings a stable direction, perduring quality, and personal meaniig to our actions. The fundamental stance of the Christian is one which allows the great commandment to function as a critical iudge of one's relationships and activities. Bemard Hdring has aligned wh4t is entailed by the fundameotal stance with Eric Erikson's notion of identity.t By this he means that rre cmnot lay claims to having achieved a fundamental direction for our lives until we can lay claim to having achieved a stable identity. For neither identig' nor stance arises dl at once. They come into being through committing ooeself to a way of life that is stable enough to sustain a perduring quality of life, and in this way to give personal meaning to actions. Actions taker by themsclves are ambiguous. Situating actions in relation to the fundamental direction of a person's life, however, enables us to discover the personal meaning of actions. Our actions embody, to a greeter or lesser degree, the fundamental dirgction of our lives- They are signs more or less expressive of or interiority. In this sense, our actions are like t}le tip of en iceberg. They err held above the surfacc by our anitudes, coniictions, and the fundamental direction of our lives which se€k exteroal, concret€ expres* sicr- To get to the mre meaning of our ections as expressions of ourselves, we nced to look beneeth the surfrce of observable bchavior to the attitudes and convictions of the person, These-give expression to the fundameqtal direction seek coocrete embodiment in panicular actions. Only by looking beneath the nrrhce of our actions will wc be able to get to the rmts of moral conversion, lrealirg, and growth.
of our lives and
Reaon
Inforad 81 Faitb
When we take srrch an indepdl look at our actions, tve discover that they may be more or less consistent with the fundauental direction of our lives. This is because our actions arise from differert levels of our being. Not all our ections spring from the deepest center ofoursclves wherein lies the core of our identity. In dre biblical sense, this is the "hart"-the deepest source from which we commit ourselves to God and to others aad show whet we most care &bout or value. The truest expression ofourselves as moral persons arises from there; it does not lie in our extemal ections alone. Moral gcodness Iies in the loving disposition to choose God, while right actions are extemal expressions of this disposition. The challenge of moral living is to do those actions which are consistent with the love of God. The role of the 'heart" in the moral life gives full force to the bibliel prayers which beseech God for a "pure heart" and give power toJesus' sayings, "Where your beasure is, there will be your heart" (Mt 6:21), and "Of what the hean is full, the mouth will speak" (Mt 12:34). The goal of moral growth is to live singleheartedly committed to God so that our actions are consistent wit}' whom we have chosen to bc through that comrnitmenr.
Fandanatal Aption A choice which arises from such a personal depth that it can siguificantly reverse or reinforce the fundamentel direction of our lives is a firndamental option. To qualify as a fundamental option, a choice must be roorcd in a d€ep knowledge of self aud a freedom to commit oneself. Through a fundamental option we express our basic freedom of selfuetermination to comrnit ourselves profoundly toward a cenain way ofbeing in the world. Bernard Hiring speaks of the "great decisions" rs specid moments in life
which express the fundamental option. These are decisions appropriate to those who have reached the necessary stage of identity and who are able to commit themselves in knowledge and with freedon to a community or to a person. Without any claim to completeness, Hering suggests the following examples:
.
I want to poiot to such fundamcntal decisions as personal choice of faith in Jesus Christ and in the role and missiort of the Church, made by an adult or an adolescent who his already reached the necessary stage of identity. I would lisi among such choices: adult baptism as sign of personal cosmitment to Chdst and covenant with the Church-and since adult baptism is the exception in the West, I would note confirmation as a meture ratification of what God offers us in baptism; marriage vovs; the vows of celibacy for the kingdom of God; a decision that is the test of deep and true
Freedon
ud
Knuulcdge
IlI
Fiendship or of selfgiving love; tie deliberate choice of a profession such as that ofa physician or of a politician with r firm commitment to the positive €thos,6 Pope Johr Paul II has used the notion of fundanental option in a similar sense in his document on catechetics, Cdtecf,cti Tradcndaz,' in 1979. When s?erking about the youth, he writes:
With youth comes the moment of the first great decisions. Alrhough the young may enioy the suppon of the members of their family and their hiends, they have to rely on rhemselves and their own conscience and rnust ever more frequently and decisively as_ sume responsibility for their destiny. Good rnd evil, grace anti sin, life and death will more aild more confront one another withiu them, not jusi as moral categories but chiefly as fundamental op tions which they must accept or reject lucidly, conscious of their own responsibility (Par. 39).2 These statements of theologiaa Bernard Hdring and of pope John paul II suggest that those fundemental decisions which affecr the ba;ic-direqtion of o.ur-lives are not made quickly, or easily. We must be ruly ready for them on all levels of our personelity. These statements also show thaifuirdamental choices aie deeply rooted in the relational character of our lives- Our basic decisions have to do with our commimtent to our own integriry and identity, our commitment m odrers, and our sense of responsibiiity to the world around us. If these basic decisions are made soundly and noi precipitously, they can well esrablish dre direction of our lives so as to resisi thoie strong determining forces which are constandj' warring against us fighting to maki us someone else.
Fradm
of Choice
The other kind of freedom at stake in the moral life has to do with realizing our capacity to be ourselves through the particular choiceg we make. This is what most people call moral freedom, thbugh rnoralists call it more properly freedom of choice. Freedom of choice--a smorgasbord kind of freedonr-
.
the hereditary derermitrants of our basic inclinations, but aiso to lirniiing factors such as unconscious motives, peer pressure, drugs, ignorance, passions, fears, blind habis, and the hidden persuaders of the miss media. yet the more aware we become of these determinants and their influence ort us,
Reana lalotmcd
,az the nore we
Bl Faitb
will be able either to overcome those we cin or to live more
ear.Iv within the limits of those which we cannot ov€roome'
"'-i'"ow.tt t ,". ne frcm Onc FIat Axt * C'ukoo\ N6t bings homc this should all bc about in our fr.# oi "f,"ice gt"phicetly, end shows what we McMurpiy fakes iosanity nwel' In t$s ;d*ib6.dults. lnJ *i"i"s * However' he institution' a mental life of softer for the farit * dU who has " ward tbe of ill."*"o" t La-" -llision with Big Nurse, the tyrrmt they can no )onger have ni"JA.gi*ffy
iriL.
;Jf* calling
io
emascuhted her pe-tients so that McMurphy begins r one-man campaigu against-tyranny
"ttiot..Io s."o" hJ"t"go showdown yq B-tg ryYt: !y fr""d.-. -" " allow the patients m wetch the li't/ofld Denes would for a vote which
ii, ii. H" i. on uo." short of a maiority' It is up to Chief' the big Indian he- cannot who, to escape the pains of tyranny, has retired into r fog whert hand' Chief his to raise ,p"uk. McMurphy pleads with him h.rr'"t d ""n'.rnt 6n& his hrnd going up, and he 'ays to himself:
It's too late to stop it now. McMurphy did something to it.that first day, put somc kind of hex on it. . . . McMurphy's got hidden wires holkid to it, lifting it slow iust ro get me out of the fog-and into the open where I'm fa-ir game He's doing the mrth. I lifted it mvself.s
This
is
it,
wires
' No, that's not
the goal of moral striving- We need to cut short olr-attemPted
escroes from
frJdom .o th"t *e
cri
responsibly claim,
"l
did it myselll"
nr*o* tna rcsponsibiliry go hand in hand. Responsible frecdom..says' "l chme to do this'bec",rre,'"i , responsible person' I uczl to do it'" This is " or "l had bmer ' ' .'' ouite different from the familiar, "i really should ' Whenever we without' Jr'l must. . . ." These all indicate motivation from we really y'o that are chanccs find ourselves saying'Acnrally I should . - -" pressure to, there are possible rewards if oo, *".,, ,o, *" ia"l'*a" "*t*al A cuckoo's nest mey be 4n extreme we do notse do, or punishmenrc if yet the n€urotic is clear image of the we live, *orld in which inugs ior tiie The neurotic' suggests thrt the we all share. which conditions A"ti;inea twmnv of determining influenc€s over which we seem to have no codtrol has in our lives' -"d" Jo*.rl"rsn.s oir chief neurosis. We all have a Big Nurse attempt to fog and into the Th* is inevitable. With Chief we often retreat esirye from freedorn However, our freedom to choose this or that---€ven within limits-is
fundamcntelly *fteedom to choose an identity, to bccome a certain son of pcrson. We cannot do ca€rything. Determining factors prwent rhat' But we as a can pour ourselves into what we do, make it truly our own, choose it of freedom The integrity' our goiine expression of ourselves which asserts
Frudom aad
Kru
8l
edgc
our moral striving does not mean doing iust anything we want to do. Rather, the freedom of our moral striving is wanting to do what we can do. Moral frcedom is an act of self-determination, an act which, through all the pathways of partidar choices, chooses who we want to be, persoas either open or cloed to thc nystcry ofour livcs end of all life.
Knowledge If the actual stuff of moral freedom is not a.choice between in(lividual obtlcts, but rarher the self-realiz{tion of the person choosing, then this dlemen( of being a mord person must also be present in moral knowledge. This meens thar the object of moral knowledge is primarily not something outside
the person, but it is the free moral person in all his or her concreteness and possibilities. The moral life entails two kiods of knowledge conceptual and evalua-
tivc.e Conceptual knowledge, the explicitly formulated cousciousness of moral reality, is necessary for passing on moral wisdom from generation to gencration and for living in a moral community which shares a common discourse about rnoral experience. But conceptual knowledge is not to be equated with genuine morhl knowledge- Evaluative knowledge, on the other hand, counts as genuine moral knowledge for it calls fonh decisions and actions expressive of one's moral freedom. Without any degree of evaluative knowlulge we could not live as moral persons in the full sense of that term-
CoacEtaal Knuwlzdge Conceptual knowledge in the moral life penains both to a knowledge of self and to a knowledge of moral values. It is what most pcople mean when they speak of moral knowledge, though it is not whrt moralists mean by genuine moral knowledge. C,onceptual knowledge is symbolized by the hcad.to k is the kind of knowledge we have when we have the right ioformation and have mastered the facts. It is dre kind of knowledge which is fairly easy to grasp ead to verify, for we only need to double check our observxtions, our facts, our logic. We cen easily comfiunicate this kind of knowledge thmugh preaching, teaching, and sharing since wc can detach the facts from the knowdr and the circumstances to make them readily available to anyone who wants them. C.oncepruel knowledge of the self comes as a result of being an obiect of our own scrutiny and being able to express what we discover. Psychological tests, for example, help us to attain this kind of awareoess. Through such testing we can know our fundamental limits and basic potentids, our personality preferences, or whether we have any character disorders. Whatever we cen do to enhance our criticel, conceptual awareness would serve our mpral
Rewon Informcd
Bl
Faitb
lives well sine the badc conditions of our unique identity influence the way we interpret moral reJity and the responses we cln make.
Coriceptual self-sw:reness has some important implicetions for the moral llfe. Right mord living, for instance, involves expressing ourselves according to the capacities we have. While v/e .r€ fimrrlly rcquired to cxFess ourselvd eccordiag toour crPacities, no one is mordly obligeted to do what lr or she is incepoble ofdoing. Sensitive pastorrl rnonl gui&oce will respect dre limited capocity ofr person and not imPoee what e Person is incepobh of att3ining. Since our predispositions will give us a certain amount ofeese or trouble with different virnres, we would do well to know our proclivities so that we will know when we are acaing with them or straining against them. We only frustrare ourselves urorally by running ahead of our graces, i.e., by trying to live bevond our means. We incur guilt unnecessarily if we comPare our own mord effons with thcee of someone with a capacity different from our own, We need to leam, then, the limits and potentials which are ours both as humans rnd rs unique individuals. A basic demand ofChristian morality is to live ,ccording to the graces we have received. The goal of moral striving,
then, is ro b€comc what God hes mede us to be by appropriating our capacities and developing our potatial within th€ limits ofour natural endowrnentIn this way we live out ofour blessings ind give thanks and preise to God by using n'ell what is ours. Livin{ in this way makes the moral life a continuous expression of praise and thanksgiving to God who has endowed us with different gifts or with different degrees of the same gifu. In matters pertaining to moral values, conceptud knowledge is tnowledge about values. It comes with a knowledge of morel rules and the strategies for doing what the rules prescribe. We use conceptual moral knowledge to communicate values and to argue for or against a position. However, conceptual knowledge is the least convincing kind of knowledge for achieving mord conversion. We do not change what we or another person mey value simply on th€ basis of the right information or ratiorlal explanations. We changc our values on the basis of experiencing a value as satisfying ir basic need. Moreover, we do not mrke our moral decisions on the basis of bare fects, nor do we exercise our moral iiredom in e disinterested way. A nrre conceptual grrsp that a pcniculer coursc of action is right or wrong is not enough to cnsune that a person will act in a vimrous way, A 'iimrous responsc requires that the person has interiorized the vrlues inherent in the action. A personal commitment to value is an essential dimension of moral behavior. So, while cnnceptual knowledge is important and necessary for the moral life, it abne is not sufficient if we rre to ect as rrcrdly virtuous persons. We also need waluative knowledge.
Fncdom
ad Ktutlcdge
85
fudaatile Knuolcdge Moral knowledge, properly
so called, is evaluative knowledge. t r It is the and so is knowledge diffcult to express in concep6. We cen r€cognize bern's it in the knowledge lovers have of one another. For example, when we want a
friend
to koow
truly love, wc excitedly try to give all the dut we can. Try es we might, we cannot close the
someone we
descriptioos of our love
grp betw€en our p€rsonel knowledge of the one we love end otrr descriptions. Faced with the limitations ofconceptual media rnd the incommunicabitity of whlat the hqrt knows, we finally say in frustradon, "You'll iust h.ve to meet my love!" That is it exectly. Only through personal encounter will anyone else be able to know what we know by hean. Even then degrees of knou'ing will differ. That is how evaluative knowledge work.
Evaluative knowledge, symbolized by rhe heart, is the kind qf knowlwe have when we are "caught up" in someone or something through personal involvement or commitment. Evaluativc knowledge is more personal, more self-involving than conceptual knowledge of facts or ideas, for it has to do with grasping the quality of a person, obiect, or event. We do ner gain evaluative knowledge by words but by touch, sight, and sound, by experiencing victories and failures, sleeplessness and devotion. In shon, evaluative knowledge is a felt knowledge which we discover ttrough personal itrvolvement and reflectio. !t is not something which can easily be passed on through statements, formulas, or rules. A Pcouts cartoon ooce captured the sense of evaluative knowledge well in a scene which has Peppermint Patty sining at her school desk and speaking out to her teacher: "You know what Oscar Wilde said, !la'am? He said, 'Nothing thrt is wonh knowing can be taught.'Nodring pcrsorul, Ma'am . . . Carry on." While we nuy not want to agree with Oscar Wilde's statem€nt atrsolutely, it does coovey the significence of eveluetive knowledge as the kind of knowledge which is not easily taught in a deached way but must be evoked rnd caught il our experiences. The most we can hope for in trying to communicate eqluative knowledge is to occasion similar experiences of this value for anotlrcr so as to draw out of another the value experienced As it pertains to dre self, eveluative lnowledge touches the deepest level of ourselves as persons. It is diffiorlt to gresp frrlly or to express dlequately not only for oneself but also for others bectuse it is knowledge of such a dceply personal reality. This implies that we need to refrrin from making an abcolute and final ludgment not only about our own moral status before God but also about sorneone else's. If we do not have a full or clear grasp of o rselves, how much rnore difficult it is to have a total, explicit grasp of someone elsc's true rnoral self. We bave ao window into another pcrson's soul w{rich would allow us to see clearly enough where she or he stands before edge
li6
Reasor Informed. By
CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
FEATUBE
Faith
EVALUATIvE KNOWLEDGE
Swnbol
Heed
Heen
C.ontent
Right information; "master tlr facts."
Quality or vrluc of someone
Easily verifed since the
Dif6cult to verify since the quality or value escapes easy
Verifable
facts can be observed and
the logic demoostrated.
Acquired
Can be easily learned,
for
tight information is rfre for teacbing, preaching,
or something.
demonstration and logical exposition.
Fncdon
ad Kxwlcdge
God in order to make a moral iudgment of absolute condemnation, elen if tbrt p€rson's observable patterns of behavior are destructive of human u,.e!l-
being, The teaching of the Council of'lient on iustification claimed as much. It declares that no one but God crn know q,-ith absolute certitude anyonc's u conditioa before God. As it pertains to value, evaluative knowledge is the self-involving knou,ledge whic-h males de.ciding and acting on behalf of what u,e value tiuly our ou,z. Without this knowledge we ict rnerely bv hearsay, by rvhar we are told is right, rather than on the basis of what we have discovered to be valuable. 'l'his kind ofknowledge is not acquted nor altered t hrough ia tion a I a rgu ment alone, but by personal experience, discovery, and appreciatiou of moral values. The accomprnying chart summariz.es some of the distinguishing charac, teristics of conceptual and evaluative knou.ledge. Since rhese approaches ro freedom and knowledge have had a profound effcct on the ways v,e underr the issue uf sin. stand and cvaluate sin. we turn, nextr 10
Quality and value must be caught through personal interaction end encounter.
Notes
aad sharing.
l. Communicated
Information or facts are easily detached from the knower and the situarion, so th€y 4re easy to pass
on,
Since quality aod value are not easily deached fiom knower and situation, comftunication is difficult and must be discoverui to be ap
pteciated.
Erhies Be
On rhe influence of drese "givens,"
see James l\{. Gustafson, 6arr Cbrbt;an? (Chicago: Universitv of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 32-3a;
also, Vincent Rush, TDe Rn1rttsible Cbristian (Chictgo: l,oyola Universiry Press, 1984), pp. 32-48.
2.
Tbe Peauabh Kingdon $'Jotre Dame: University
of Notre Dame
Press, t983), pp. 37-38.
3. Not all theologians who use the fundamental option theory employ the distinction betw€en fundamental stance and fundamenral oprion as TimoO Connell does in his book, Pnzc iplu for a Catholic Moraliry (Ncw York:
t\ Morality
This is the knowledge of rules and tlre strategies fot achieving what the nrles presciibe; this is koowl-
fue
about
v&te-
This knowledge is a personal grasp ofvalue. This is what makes our actions truly our oarz. With this knowledge, on the basis ofwhet we truly v.lue. Mor.l 8rofih aod cooversion haP. peo drrough the experience of value and acquiriog evaluative knowledge. r,ve ect
The Seabury Press, 1978); see especially pp. 64-66, 70-74. Bernard H?iring, for example, gives,a lengthy treltment of the fundamental option theory without making this distinction. See his Frre and Faithful it Cbrist, Yol. 1: G.rreral Morsl Tholog (New York: The Seabury Press, t978), pp. 16+-222. . However, I6ndusingthe term'bption" (u,hich ordioarily coonotes a parricular mom€nt of choice) m refer to "basic direcrion" or "orientarion" of life to be misleading, O'Connell's distinction seems to capture the heart of the fundamental option theory wit}out building in unnecessary confusion. 4.'Hering, Fne and Faithful in Christ, Yol. 1: ()ewra! ll'Iorul l bcLtllLtg (New York The Seabury Press, 1978), pp. 164-222i for his secrion on the "heart" as it relates to the theory of fundamental option, see pp. 185-1ij9. 5. Ibid.,pp.16vt77,fslp. W. t72-17 s.
6. Ibid., p. 189. 7. Pope John Paul ll, Cttubri'
Tradezrla:, "Apostolic Exhortation on
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