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FORTIFICATTONS

PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

WCD

4896-4

ARMY WAR COLLEGE WASHINGTON :

NOVEMBER,

1915

WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916

513

.

-/ War

Department,

Document No. Office

513.

of the Chief of Staff

w

SYNOPSIS. I.

Introduction. Page.

1.

Influence of forts and fortified

cities, as

distinguished from intrenched areas,

upon operations on land

5

Fortifications of Liege

Fortifications of

5

Namur and

along the French frontier

6

Antwerp Verdun

7 7

Przemysl and the Russian

The

fortified city of

fortifications

the future

2. Influence of seacoast fortifications

allied fleet

7

on Dardanelles

8

with particular reference

to the attack

fortifications

10

Description of the Dardanelles

10

Fortifications of the Dardanelles

Power

10

the guns (6) Character of the batteries Reduction of the forts at the entrance

12

Operations against the forts at the narrows

13

(a)

of

11

12

Final attack of March 18

13

Efficiency of seacoast fortifications

14 15

Requisites for successful defense 3.

by

Necessity for mobile troops of attempt to take Dardanelles fortifications

Summary

delay Terrain Strength of forces Allies' plan Landings at south end of peninsula Landing by the Australian-New Zealand corps Diversion by the French Initial

Attempts to advance Landing at Suvla Bay and subsequent operations Necessity for heavy mobile guns The value of mobile troops in coast defense 513

(3)

15

by mobile

troops

16 16

17

17 17 18 19

19 19

20 21 21

:

FORTIFICATIONS.

I.

In a

INTRODUCTION.

memorandum from

the Chief of Staff dated

November 15, brochure upon

1915, directions were given for the preparation of a the subject of " Fortifications,'' with sole reference to the present

European war, giving

especial attention to the following points: "What influence forts and fortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas, have exerted on the operations on land. {!)) Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack of the allied fleet against the fortifications of the Dardanelles. Give in detail the total armament, with calibers of arms of the fleet as well as of the land forts, and the losses in personnel and material suffered by both fleets and forts. brief summary of the attempt to take these forts by the (c) operation of the mobile troops; the number of mobile troops, as near as can be determined, used to date, both in the attack and in the defense, with total losses. This has been done as far as practicable with the data now available, and the results are noted in the following paragraphs (a)

A

1.

INFLUENCE OF FORTS AND FORTIFIED CITIES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM INTRENCHED AREAS, UPON OPERATIONS ON LAND. FORTIFICATIONS OF LIEGE,

At

European war the Germans, in their march through Belgium, were, on the evening of August 4, 1914, closing in on Liege, which lies astride the Meuse River near the eastern boundary of Belgium. The fortifications of Liege had been constructed by Brialment, a Belgian officer, who also designed the fortifications of Namur and Antwerp. They were completed in 1892, and consisted of a circle of forts commanding the main approaches to the city and about 4 miles therefrom. There were six main forts of the pentagonal type and six smaller, triangular in shape; the greatest distance between forts was 7,000 yards, and the average less than 4,000 yards. Each fort had a garrison of about 80 men and an armament of two 6-inch guns, four 4.7-inch guns, two 8-inch mortars, and three or four quick-fire guns, the total number of guns in the 12 forts being about 400. It was intended to construct the outbreak of the present

513 (5)

6

between the forts lines of trenches and redoubts for infantry and gun pits for artillery, but this had not been done. The fort itself consisted of a low mound of concrete or masonry, roofed with concrete and covered with earth; a deep ditch surrounded the mound, the top of the latter barely showing above the margin of the ditch. The top was pierced with circular pits, in which " cupolas " or gun turrets moved up and down. Within the mound there were quarters, machinery, stores, etc. "VYlien the Germans appeared the Belgian mobilization was still in progress, and it is probable that the garrison, instead of being 30,000 The Germans, numbering about as was intended, was only 20,000. 30,000, concentrated the attack 'on the four forts at the southeast sector and opened up with field gims on the night of August 4-5.

on the 5th, and on the 6th the Germans brought up their 8.4-inch hoAvitzers and probably some 11-inch mortars, outranging the Belgian guns. Shells are said to have gone through 12 feet of concrete. The accurate firing of the Germans showed that the forts could not long withstand, and in the afternoon of the 6th the Belgian field force was withdrawn from the city and all the forts abandoned except the northern ones. The Germans left the remaining forts in peace until the 13th, when the 11-inch mortars opened on them, and by the 15th all had been captured. The cupolas had been smashed and shells had penetrated the roofs and exploded the magazines.

One

of the forts

was

silenced

FORTIFICATIONS OF

by

this fire

NAMUR AND ALONG THE FRENCH

FRONTIER.

a ring of nine forts, 2^ miles from the The city, with an armament similar to that in the Liege forts. inintervals by garrison of 26,000 had prepared the defense of the trenchments and wire entanglements, and a vigorous defense was intended, as French help was expected. The Germans brought up

Namur was defended by

32 modern siege pieces, including the 42-centimeter howitzer, its first appearance, and the Austrian 12-inch mortar, and placed them

from the Belgian lines. The attack began August 20. On the next day the Belgians had to withdraw from the advanced trenches owing to their inability to reply to the German fire; two forts fell; three others were silenced after an attack of two hours. On the 23d Namur was occupied, and on the 25th the last fort had fallen. One fort had fired only 10 times and was itself struck by

3 miles

1,200 shells fired at the rate of 20 per minute.

Namur came

The speedy

fall of

near playing havoc with the allies' plans, as with the delay caused by its resistance they had intended to complete the concentration along the Belgian frontier. 513

Other fortified places, such as Lille, Laon, La Fere, and Kheims, along the northeastern French boundary fell before the advancing Germans without striking a blow. The advance was on such a broad front that an attempt at defense would have endangered the safety of the garrisons, and it was imperative that the garrisons join the By August 28 Mauberge of all the northern strongfield army. holds alone held out. The defenses had been brought to a high state of efficiency, the intervals well prepared with an armored train running on a track encircling the main line of defenses. The German infantry invested the place August 27, but the siege guns did not go into action until September 3. The place fell September 8 with a loss of 40,000 men.

ANTWERP.

Antwerp, said to be the second most strongly fortified city of Europe, encircled by a girdle of 20 permanent forts and 12 earthen redoubts, was in similar manner quickly reduced by the heavy siege guns. The garrison, beginning to profit by the lessons learned at Liege and Namur, attempted to keep the enemy's big howitzers beyond range of the forts, but were driven back by the superior numbers of the Germans, whose siege guns were then brought up and quickly demolished the masonry forts. Thus the garrisoix was deprived of any further assistance from its larger guns and, being but poorly entrenched and unable to withstand the overwhelming artillery fire, was forced back to the inner line, thereby permitting the siege guns to come within range of the city, which had therefore to be abandoned promptly in order to prevent its destruction by bombardment. VERDUN.

Verdun, however, on the eastern French frontier, with a ring of forts 5 miles from the city, is still in the hands of the French, because with a field army employing earthworks the fortified zone has been largely extended and the German howitzers have been kept 6 miles from the forts. The unfortified city of Nancy has withstood several heavy attacks, being protected by a field army on the hills forming the " Grand Crown."

PRZEMYSL AND THE RUSSIAN FORTIFICATIONS.

The Russians

invested the fortress of Przemysl on September 22, 1914, but later the siege was raised and on November 12 it was invested a second time. As the Russians had no heavy siege guns, the siege resulted in 513

an attempt to starve out the garrison, which suc-

:

8 ceeded March 22, 1915. With the return of the Teutonic allies in May, 20 days was sufficient to recapture the place. The Eussians stated that their ammunition supply was low, but it is safe to assume that the presence of the heavy siege guns with the Germans had a great deal to do with the recapture. The fortresses guarding Warsaw and the Russian frontier on the west were quickly taken during the advance of the Teutonic allies

summer

of 1915, either by maneuvering the defenders out of up the heavy guns and shattering the fortifibringing by them or in the

cations, as at

Novo Georgievsk. The

Niemen-Bobr-Narew had

fortress of Ossowetz on the line

a different history.

In February, 1915,

the Russians fell back across the Bobr River to the protection of Ossowetz, which stood on the east bank along a long ridge covered

with woods, affording good artillery positions, and commanding the opposite bank, where artillery positions were poor. There were extensive marshes along the river, but at this time of the year they were frozen. The Germans at first tried to turn the position, but failing, brought up their heavy mortars, even the 42-centimeter The Russian batteries were so well concealed that the howitzer. Germans could not locate them and their big guns did no damage. The Russians silenced several batteries without suffering from their fire. As the warm weather advanced, the marshes made it difficult to emplace the heavy gims. Ossowetz did not fall until August 22 in the general Russian retreat after the capture of Warsaw.

THE FORTIFIED CITY OF THE FUTURE.

The

failure of the forts in the present

war

is

due to several causes

Being built some years before the war, their position was accurately known to the enemy, thus losing the advantage of concealment also, the details of their construction leaked out and guns .were First.

;

especially designed to destroy them.

Second. Their armament had not been kept up to date and was entirely overpowered by gi;ns of recent construction and of a type

unlaiown to the defense. Third. The garrisons permitted the enemy to emplace his gims within their effective range, but beyond range of the forts' guns. The favorable effect of concealment, as a defensive measure, is illustrated by the operations against Ossowetz, and that of keeping

enemy at a distance by the operations against Verdun. The experiences of this war confirm the conclusion reached during the siege of Port Arthur in 1904, that the mounting of large-caliber guns in a fort for use against the siege guns of the enemy is a fatal the

''

518

would therefore seem preferable to place the fixed heavy guns in emplacements located in rear of the line of forts, depending for protection upon concealment rather than masonry or other cover. The forts themselves, whether permanent or improvised after the outbreak of war, should be designed for an infantry garrison only, and the main line of defense should consist of a continuous system of infantry entrenchments (including machine-gun emplacements), located in advance of the line of forts. These latter would serve mainly

error."

It

as supporting points for organizing a counter attack in case the

front were penetrated.

To check

the enemy's advance before his heaviest

guns

have

reached points within effective range of the city, naval base, or other vital object to be protected, a garrison sufficiently strong to operate well in advance of the forts, is indispensable, and its action should be assisted

by long-range

from the

fire

be superior in caliber and range to

army in the field. The guns of the

armament, which should the guns usually supplied to an fixed

both fixed and mobile, should be distributed over a large area and advantage taken of the terrain to secure concealment, which must be had at any price. It is important to bear in mind that the number of guns permanently emplaced should be comparatively small compared with the total heavy armament of the fortress, or, in other words, the main reliance will be placed on the mobile guns, some of which should be at least as powerful as any the enemy can bring against them. The fortress of the future should consist of a large area so organized as to insure extreme mobility both to troops and guns. There will be no conspicuous forts of masonry and armor. Permanent gun emplacements should be constructed only at important fortress,

points with the primary intention of compelling the

enemy

to lose

time in bringing up his heaviest siege guns. The mobile guns would be located in earthen emplacements well concealed from the enemy's observers who might endeavor to direct fire on them. The point to be emphasized is that unless the garrison be strong enough in both mobile troops and mobile guns to keep the enemy from breaking through the line or coming within effective range of the city proper or other vital point or object to be protected, then there

is

no hope

of offering a prolonged resistance.

In view of the foregoing it is apparent that intrenched areas with mobile troops and guns are a more dependable protection than a stereotyped system of permanent forts. 30669°—No. 513—16

2

;

10 2.

INFLUENCE OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ATTACK BY ALLIED FLEET ON DARDANELLES FORTIFICATIONS. DESCRIPTION OF THE DARDANELLES.

The western approach to the city of Constantinople from the Aegean Sea is through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. The Dardanelles (ancient Hellespont) is a long winding channel, 47 miles in length, but the really narrow portion, extending from the

Aegean Sea

to the

town of

Gallipoli, represents a sea passage of

The passage

no point wider than 7,000 yards, and at one point, the Narrows, 14 miles from the entrance, it conThe surface current flows westward into the tracts to 1,400 yards. Aegean at an average speed of IJ knots, which is sometimes trebled The depth in midin the Narrows after strong northerly winds. channel varies from 25 to 55 fathoms, and there are shallows at some of the bays in the wider sections. Owing to the narrowness, the strong current, and the cross currents set up at some of the bays, maneuvering of large vessels is difficult. The weather is treacherous and uncertain; the prevailing winds for nine months of the year are northeasterly, but south winds spring up quickly, and blows last from three to five days. Unfavorable weather and frequent haze and mist were encountered during the earlier stages about 33 miles.

is

at

of the naval operations.

The long narrow tongue Peninsula.

of land to the north

is

the Gallipoli

It has its greatest width, 12 miles, just above the Nar-

rows or opposite Suvla Bay; it is narrowest at Bulair, 3 miles; at the Narrows the width is 5 miles. Ships can therefore lie in the Gulf of Saros and fire across the peninsula. The Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is lower than the European. The hills are low and wooded, while on the peninsula they are bare and rocky cliffs. On both shores there are heights which give advantage to defensive artillery and at the Narrows both shores tower above the ships. FORTIFICATIONS OF THE DARDANELLES.

The two

original fortifications were the "Dardanelles Castles"; the inner, the " Old Castles," at the Narrows, were built by the

Mohammed

conqueror of Constantinople, in 1462 New Castles," were built in 1659. At the two the instigation of Great Britain new fortifications were built in the Narrows between 1864 and 1877. After the peace of San Stefano in 1878 the Germans designed new fortifications and all the new fortifications were armed with Krupp guns. Sultan

II, the

at the entrance, the "

513

11

From

the best obtainable information, in the spring of 1915 the armament was as follows: At the entrance between the towns of

Seddel-Bahr near Cape Helles on the Europeon side, and Kum Kale on the Asiatic side, there were four forts or batteries, two on each side, with an armament of ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch guns, and two 6-inch guns. Proceeding towards the Narrows, there were on the Asiatic side fortifications on Dardanes Hill, 4 miles south of the Narrows, and two forts at the Narrows near the town of Chanak the whole

—

mounting an armament of four 14-inch guns, six 10.2-inch guns, one On the European side there 8.3-inch howitzer, and nine 6-inch guns. were three batteries south of the town of Kilid Bahr at the Narrows, and a number of batteries on the hills around Kilid Bahr, the total

armament being four 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, eight

10.2-inch

guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and twentyfour 6-inch guns. The armament between the entrance and the Nar-

rows thus amounted to eight 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, fourteen 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fourteen 8.3-inch howitzers,

and thirty-three 6-inch guns. extended 4 miles farther north to the line through Nagara, beyond which the Dardanelles turns to the northeast and broadens out. The armament on both sides amounted to

The

fortifications

two 14-inch guns, five 10.2-inch guns, five 9.2-inch guns, eight 8.3inch howitzers, and fifteen 6-inch guns, all except six 6-inch guns being on the Asiatic side. In addition to the above there were smaller guns to protect mine fields.

From an examination

seems that a hostile fleet, after silencing the guns at the entrance and proceeding towards the Narrows, would be subject to the fire of the following guns when it of the chart,

it

had reached a point 4 miles from the Narrows: ten 14-inch guns, eighteen 10.2-inch guns, eight 9.2-inch guns, twenty-one 8.3-inch howitzers, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns. (a)

Power

of the guns:

guns are guns of very great power. The heaviest gun, of which there were 10, the 14-inch Krupp, with a projectile weighing 1,365 pounds, appears superior to our 14-rnch seacoast gun with its 1,600-pound projectile, as it has a reported penetration in Krupp hardened steel armor at Its life, 8,000 meters of 20 inches, while our gun has 16.3 inches. however, is limited to 80 or 90 rounds, and hence it is probably not

The guns

in the batteries vary greatly ; alongside old

as accurate as ours after firing a

number of

shots.

The next heaviest gun is the 11-inch, but there was only one of that caliber. Then comes the 10.2-inch, of which there were 29, a 513

:

;

12

gun manufactured some years ago by the Krupps.

It is not as power-

gun; its projectile weighs 450 pounds, as against our 575 pounds, and its penetration at 3,000 meters is 6 inches, while our gun penetrates 9.3 inches at 8,000 meters. The other heavycaliber gun is 9.2 inches, of which there were 25, with a projectile weighing 420 pounds, and still more inferior to our 10-inch gun. It is believed that Krupp guns of later pattern were mounted after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and it seems to be certain that heavy mobile howitzers or mortars were used against the allies. (h) Character of the batteries The batteries were built with great care, but groups were formed of different calibers and types, which rendered serving them difficult and slow in action. The emplacements are of concrete and steel with earthen cover, with guns in embrasures rather than in turrets. There was a mc?dern system of searchlights, telephones, and range They were generally finders, and good communication by roads. invisible from the sea, but their positions were detected by the stone barracks, which were usually close behind them and in full view of ful as our 10-inch

passing ships. One of the batteries was mamied entirely by Germans, but the others had Turkish crews that had been drilled by German- officers. The movable howitzer batteries appeared to have had German coast artillerymen with German naval officers in command.

REDUCTION OF THE FORTS AT THE ENTRANCE.

On November

bombarded the forts at the entrance, but the real operations began February 19, 1915, with a fleet of British battleships and cruisers, aided by a strong French squadron. The attack was at first at long range, to which the forts 3, 1914,

the allied

fleet

could not reply, being outranged. In the afternoon the ships closed in and opened fire with the secondary batteries; the forts returned the fire. The forts on the European side were apparently silenced

one on the Asiatic side continued firing. The damage was subsequently found to be comparatively small and many of the guns were still intact. Eight battleships were engaged with a total of 46 guns of major caliber, 30 being 12-inch, and 58 guns of minor caliber from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. The shore guns were ten 10.2-inch, six 9.2-inch, and two 6-inch. No ship was hit. In general the guns were mounted in open works near the old masonry castles, with the sea faces protected

by

earth.

Action against these forts continued until February 25, when the reduction of all four was completed. In the meantime the new battleship, the Queen Elizabeth^ with eight 15-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns, had arrived, giving the allies 16 armored ships of

13 the line, 12 British and 4 French.

The

British casualties had been Landing parties had been sent ashore as quickly as possible to complete the work of destruction, but were driven back by the Turks before completing the job. It was reported by the British that all forts were completely demolished three killed and five

wounded.

with the exception of one at

Kum

Kale.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FORTS AT THE NARROWS.

Sweeping operations to clear the channel of mines and obstructions began February 25, and on March 1 three ships entered the strait and attacked Fort Dardanes with its five 6-inch guns in rectangular turrets on the military crest of a hill 350 feet high these were said to be the only Turkish guns with telescopic sights. Sweeping operations and the attack on Fort Dardanes with its outlying smaller batteries continued until March 5, the French division and the Queen Elizaheth using indirect fire from the Gulf of Saros on the forts at Kilid Bahr at the Narrows. An aeroplane ship with sea planes and aeroplanes accompanied the fleet. But not a shot hit the forts during the indirect bombardment; according to the Turks, the aeroplanes did not remain long enough in the air to direct the fire. On March 8 the Queen Elizaheth entered the strait and fired on Kilid Bahr at 21,000 yards range. This long-range bombardment of the forts at the Narrows and closer action by the other ships against the batteries south of the Narrows, together with mine sweeping, continued until March 18. The ships were hit several times, including the Queen Elizaheth^ which was struck by field guns, but no material damage was done and the casualties were slight. Fort Dardanes and other concealed batteries near by were almost daily under the fire of from four or five ships, sixteen 12-inch guns and forty-eight 6-inch guns being used against five 6-inch guns. No battery on the Turkish side was put permanently out of action. The Turkish casualties, omitting those in the forts at the entrance, which were heavy, were 23 killed and 10 wounded. ;

FINAL ATTACK OF MARCH

On March

18.

18 there was a general attack on the Narrows, partici-

pated in by 12 British and 4 French ships, mounting a total of 82 major caliber guns from 15-inch to 9.2-inch, and 178 minor caliber guns from T.5-inch to 4-inch. As stated in paragraph 2, subparagraph 2, " Fortifications of the Dardanelles," pages 4 and 5, the number of guns that the Turks could bring into action against this fleet was 36 major caliber direct-fire guns and 21 howitzers, a total of 57, and 37 minor caliber guns. In addition there were fieldpieces 513

14 and movable heavy howitzers, the number being indeterminate. In the forenoon the Queen Elizabeth^ just inside the entrance, 10^ miles from the Narrows, and three older British ships bombarded the forts at the Narrows, while two other British ships at closer range attacked Dardanes and the batteries south of the Narrows. Shortlyafter noon the French division of four ships advanced to the support of these two ships, taking up a position near Kephez Point, 3 miles south of the Narrows.* A heavy fire was now returned by the forts, but as the ships were maneuvering in circles, few hits were made. The 10 ships that were engaged at this time mounted 58 major caliber guns. At 1.25 p. m*. the forts ceased firing. A fresh British squadron of six ships now arrived to relieve a corresponding number of ships well within the strait. As this squadron neared Kephez Point, the other ships turned to withdraw when the French ship, Bouvet^ was struck several times and blew up, the cause of the explosion probably being a drifting mine. The new squadron continued the advance, attacking in line; the ships just within the entrance continued the bombardment, but it was manifest that the forts had not been silenced. Mine sweeping operations continued,

but drifting mines sunk the British ships Irresistible and Ocean^ and a mine and gunfire so badly damaged the Inflexible that it with difficulty reached the harbor of Mudros, 40 miles away. The French ship Gaulois was also badly damaged by gunfire. The attack ceased when darkness fell. The attack had been badly repulsed and was not again renewed.

The

British casualties were slight, 61 all told, practically all the

crew from the Irresistible and Ocean being saved; but the French lost nearly the entire crew of the Bouvet. The Turks lost 23 killed and 60 wounded. The 6-inch guns in the turrets at Dardanes, which had received such a heavy fire, were not damaged; the turrets were hit only three times. On the European side three 10-inch guns were put out of action, but three weeks later all were ready again. The stone barracks in rear of the batteries were destroyed; 86 shells fell in a space 300 feet deep in rear of one battery, but the battery was untouched. The shells easily penetrated earth, but not one passed through sand parapets. After March 18, the Turks substituted sand for earth to a large degree in the parapets and divided up the large interior rooms of the batteries into smaller ones by hollow walls filled with sand. EFFICIENCY OF 8EAC0AST FORTIFICATIONS.

The operations in the Dardanelles have been the only instance in this war of a naval attack on seacoast fortifications, except the minor attack of the Japanese Navy against the Grerman fortifications at Tsingtau.

Elsewhere, by virtue of their existence, they have per-

15

formed their functions of protecting harbors, fleets, and naval bases. The German fleet, under the protection of the shore guns, has maintained

its existence in spite

of the proximity of the superior British

fleet.

These operations have emphasized the fact that has been thoroughly demonstrated by history that a purely naval attack can not succeed against seacoast fortifications adequately armed and manned, and that in such actions the proper function of the navy is to convoy the army, which will make the attack by land, and to protect its line of communications. REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE.

The

and those in the Narrows were scarcely damaged, though in both cases there was an overwhelming The difference in the two cases is this: At the fire from the ships. entrance the guns were outranged and the ships had plenty of sea room in which to maneuver and bring the heavy guns to bear, free from danger of mines in the narrow mined channel of the Narrows, with both shores lined with guns, some of them equal or nearly so to the heaviest ship gun, the ships had to come within range and could attack with only a portion of the force. In such a position, a fleet, exposed to fixed and floating mines, shore torpedoes and submarines, will fail. The slight damage sustained by the shore batteries is illustrated by Fort Dardanes, which withstood the fire from the British ships, admittedly inferior to none in marksmanship. An interior city, with its approach channel protected with wellplaced and concealed guns, equal in range to the enemy's, and provided with the accessory means of defense, need not fear capture by bombardment or a run by the forts. A fort on the seacoast proper, exposed to the fire from ships at sea, must have guns of greater range than the ships' guns; otherwise the ships could silence the gims on shore at their pleasure, and under their fire could land troops to forts at the entrance fell

;

complete the destruction of the

forts.

Concealment and dispersion are also necessary. The aeroplane observation of fire by the allies does not seem to have been very efficient, but this can not always be relied on, and concealment from Without such observation, aerial observation should be obtained. long-range indirect bombardment is worthless. By taking advantage of the terrain and resorting to dispersion, the amount of concrete might be reduced, and the money thus saved put into more guns.

NECESSITY FOR MOBILE TROOPS.

The power of coast enemy fleet, is limited their influence

is

fortifications, to repel a direct attack

by an

to the area within range of their guns, but

extended considerably further whenever they cover

16

from which submarines operate. These fortifications must therefore be recognized as of supreme importance within the scope of their proper functions, and this is especially true of a country possessing an enormous frontage on two oceans. Their paramount value is that they relieve the navy of the local defense of important harbors or other strategic points and thus release our seagoing fleet for operations against the enemy on the high seas, and furnish a refuge for it in the face of overpowering odds. But beyond the sphere of influence of our seacoast forts, enemy ships may approach a base

the shore with impunity and, under the cover of their gims, may land troops that can then proceed against the important places de-

fended by the forts or even against the forts themselves, since they are vulnerable from the land side. With our long coast lines, the guarding of every possible landing place by seacoast fortifications is out of the question, and, although the development and employment of heavy mobile seacoast armament along our coastal railroads will further restrict the landing places open to an enemy, there will still remain many places affording facilities for landing operations which can only be opposed by mobile troops acting without the cooperation of Coast Artillery. For these reasons it is evident that there must also be available a mobile force properly trained, organized and equipped, to send against the enemy at the landing and

advance toward his objecUntil we have adequately protive, should a landing be effected. vided for this dual defense of our coasts, having full regard to both fixed defenses and mobile troops, our Navy will never be free to perform its primary function, but will be frittered away in response to clamor for protection from our coast population. An illustration of the value of mobile troops in coast defense is defeat

them

there, or at least prevent his

afforded by the operations at the Dardanelles, described in the last subhead under paragraph 3, page 12, of this study. 3.

SUMMARY OF ATTEMPT TO TAKE DARDANELLES

FORTIFICA-

TIONS BY MOBILE TROOPS. INITIAL DELAY.

Before the attack of March 18 it had been decided to undertake operations by land at the Dardanelles. An official French note stated on the 12th that a force was on its way to the Levant, and Gen. lam Hamilton was appointed commander of the British force and arrived in time to witness the action of the 18th. Both the French and British forces had arrived in the harbor of Mudros on the island of Lemnos, west of the Dardanelles; but as the British transports had not been loaded with a A^ew to make a landing in force on a hostile shore and the lack of facilities in Mudros made

17

had to be sent back to Alexmonth was lost, which it is safe to say

redistribution impossible there, they

andria for reloading.

A

was well employed by the Turks. TERRAIN.

by hills which rise to a height Achi Baba, 600 feet high, domiof 1,000 feet; on the southern end nates the end of the peninsula; just west of the Narrows, Kilid Bahr, 700 feet high, covers the forts from an attack from the Aegean and northwest of the Narrows, Sari Bair Mountain reaches a height of 970 feet. These hills must be taken before an advance can be made to the shores of the Narrows. The hills do not run in a regular or well-defined direction, and between the hills there are a confusing number of valleys. The area is practically roadless and most of it covered with prickly scrub. The sides of the hills are almost vertical. At the water's edge there is generally a narrow beach with a steep bank 10 feet high, and then the rolling hills with their crests 1,000 yards from the beach. Every trail leading to the beach was covered with one or more machine guns in screened pits, and the roads were covered with field guns in groups of from three

The

Gallipoli Peninsula is covered

;

to six.

STRENGTH OF FORCES. British force consisted of the Twenty-ninth (Regular) Division, the East Lancashire (Territorial) Division, a- naval division of bluejackets and marines, some Indian troops, and the Australian

The

New

Zealand Corps, with 20 battalions of infantry, together with artillery and engineers. The strength was approximately The territorials and colonial troops had been wintering 100,000. in Egypt. The French force was about 35,000. The Turks were in greater force and better posted than was expected; the number on the European side has been given as over 150,000. Besides, they were supported by the Germans.

and

allies' plan.

The

coast being precipitous, landing places few,

and trenches and

entanglements being visible on shipboard at most of them. Gen. Hamilton decided to throw the whole of his troops very rapidly ashore at a number of places, and selected five beaches at the tip of the peninsula and two on the west coast, near Sari Bair Mountain, as landing places. He could thus advance up the peninsula or cross it where it was about five miles wide, and obtaining possession of the high hills, secure observation points whereby the navy could assist in the reduction of the forts. 518

18 LANDINGS AT SOUTH END OF PENINSULA. April 25 was the date of the landing. The Twenty-ninth Division, 20,000 men, was to land at the end of the peninsula at the five beaches, the three at the tip, near Sedd-el-Bahr, being the main At the other two places, the landing was to take place at ones. dawn, while at the main places the landings were to be simultaneously at 5.30

a.

m., after half an hour's

bombardment by the

fleet.

The

landing parties, covering the advance of the division, were placed on naval vessels the previous day and before dawn on the 25th

were in the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. The accompanying squadron of four battleships and four cruisers began At S beach, in Morto Bay, the the preliminary bombardment. farthest to the east, three companies (750 men) made a successful landing, with a loss of 50 men, and kept the position. On Y beach, the westernmost landing, two battalions (2,000 men) landed on an undefended beach, but were subsequently attacked and driven to the boats with heavy losses. battalion (1,000

On

men) made

X beach,

3 miles south of

Y

beach, 1

a successful landing, under cover of

the fire of the Implaeable^ which stood close inshore, firing with every possible gun, thus preparing the way for a subsequent force of 2,000 men, which joined hands with the force landing at beach, the next to the south.

On

W beach,

W

1 battalion (1,000

men)

landed on a beach 350 yards long and 15 to 40 yards wide, well protected with intrenchments and entanglements, the latter extend-

ing under water. The Turks reserved their fire until the first boatload of soldiers grounded, and under this fire the assailants had to make their way through the entanglement. A foothold was gained beach. and, more infantry following, connection was made with At V beach, west of Sedd-el-Bahr, the site of the seacoast forts that had previously been reduced by the navy, a force of about 3,000 attempted to land on a beach 350 yards long by 10 yards wide, overlooked by a natural amphitheater rising back from the beach, with concave slopes. On the very margin of the beach ran a wire entanglement and up the slopes were two other lines, the whole covered with fire of rifles, machine guns, and pom-poms. Three companies (750 men), landing in small boats, were almost annihilated, the survivors obtaining shelter under the lee of a low sandy bank 4 feet high, at the inner edge of the beach; the boat crews were all killed. It was intended to land 2,000 men from a collier, the Clyde^ which was to be run ashore, and lighters used to form a gangway between ship and shore. The attempt failed; of 1,000 men who left the colliers, 50 per cent were kill or wounded. Nothing could be done until night, when the remainder of the infantry from the Clyde went ashore. On the 26th, under cover of the fire from the

X

19 ships, the troops established themselves

on the

crests of the sur-

rounding hills. During the night of the 25th, the disembarkation of the remainder of the Twenty-ninth Division was proceeding on

W

and

X

beaches.

LANDING BY THE AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND CORPS. This corps of 35,000 men landed north of Gaba Tepe, near the foot of Sari Bair Mountain. This rugged and difficult part of the coast was chosen because it was believed it would be undefended. The landing was to be a surprise and the preliminary bombardment was omitted.

The covering

force of 4,000

men

in

ships'

boats was

towed by destroyers to within 500 yards from the beach, which was 1,000 yards long, when the destroyers dropped behind and steam launches towed the boats in. In the darkness the boats were close About a battalion of to the shore before they were discovered. Turks disputed the landing, but they were driven back. The main body came up in the transports and by 2 p. m. 12,000 men and two The Turks promptly batteries of mountain artillery were ashore. rallied and reinforced to 20,000 by 11 a. m., made counter attacks. These counter attacks continued for several days, but with the assistance of the ships' fire the British maintained their position. On this first day April 25 29,000 men were landed.

—

—

DIVERSION BY THE FRENCH.

draw the fire of the Asiatic guns from Sedd-elBahr, a regiment of the French corps landed at Kum Kale on the

As

a diversion to

Asiatic shore on the 25th, but on the 26th they reembarkeyd, after a loss of 754, one-fourth of its effective strength, and the French corps

began landing

at

V

Beach.

ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE.

On

April 28 the allies held a line across the peninsula, three miles north of Sedd-el-Bahr, and an attempt was made to capture the The troops landing on the west hill of Achi Baba, which failed. coast also tried to advance, but were held to a semicircle 1,100 yards in diajneter from the beach. Here they were holding open a door to the vital point of the Turkish p.osition and were keeping 24,000 of the best Turkish troops out of the main action around Sedd-elBahr. By May 5 the landing of the allies was completed. The British official report gives the losses among the British at this time as 602 officers and 13,377 men, which is about 13.5 per cent of the total estimated force of 100,000.

It is estimated that the

18,000 in the operations of April 25-27.

Turks

lost

20 advance was attempted against the town of Krithia and the hill of Achi Baba, but the attack was unsuccessful. May 18 the Turks, estimated at 30,000, attacked the force at Anzac Cove (the name given to the landing place of the Australian-New Zealand Corps, themselves termed " Anzacs"), and were repulsed with a loss of 7,000, the Anzacs losing 500. To May 31 the British losses were 38,636 (1,722 being officers), the French about 5,000, and the Turkish

May

6 a general

estimated at 60,000.

The

total battle losses of the British in the three

years of the Boer War were 38,156. According to a Turkish report at this date the number of British and French troops amounted to 90,000. The Turks had received 60,000 reenforcements. June 4 there was another general attack by the allies from Seddel-Bahr on the right there were two French divisions, the rest of the ;

line, 4,000

result

was

yards, being held by 24,000 British infantry. The net a gain of 200 to 400 yards along a front of three miles.

extended from south of Krithia southeast across the peninsula, about 4 miles from Sedd-el-Bahr. The appearance of German submarines caused the withdrawal to Mudros Harbor of the

The

line then held

transports and the sending of supplies in small boats. The Turks under Enver Pasha made a general attack in the vicinity of Krithia

but accomplished little, with a loss of 5,150 killed and 15,000 wounded. To July 18, the British losses were 49,283, 2,144 being officers.

eTuine

30-Ju»ly

2,

LANDING AT SUVLA BAT AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

August 7 another landing was made at Suvla Bay, 4 miles north of Anzac Cove. The landing began at 2 a. m. on three beaches and by day a force of two divisions was firmly established. The Anzac force joined in the attack, the intention being to connect the two foixes and capture the Sari Bair Ridge. The attack from Anzac was carried to the summit of the ridge, but as the Turks had been heavily reenforced, the attp.ck from Suvla Bay did not make the expected progress, and the line had to fall back. The two forces were finally joined on a line 12 miles long. The number of men landing at Suvla Bay is not known; the British speak of it as a fresh army and the Turks estimated it as 70,000. The British losses were heavy according to the Turks, 30,000. According to a German estimate, on August 30 the allies had from ;

20,000 to 25,000 troops at Sedd-el-Bahr, of whom 9,000 were French, all that was left of the original 35,000; 9,000 at Anzac Cove, and 70,000 at Suvla Bay. These numbers were not materially increased after that date,

though the

losses in the trench

had brought the casualties on November British. The Turkish losses are unknown.

warfare since then

9 to 106,610

among

On December

20

it

the

was

21

announced that the troops at Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, about 100,000, had been withdrawn from the peninsula for service elsewhere; the troops at Sedd-el-Bahr were left there until January 9, 1916, when they, too, were withdrawn. NECESSITY FOR HEAVY MOBILE GUNS.

Although the Turks had ample warning of the impending attack, with an abundance of men to draw upon, and had guarded the most probable landing places with intrenchments and entanglements, the With the limited number of allies succeeded in getting ashore. beaches suitable for landing, the Turks apparently had sufficient force to guard every one but some were overlooked and the success of the The main reason for the success, allies is due partly to that fact. though, is due to the fire of the covering ships, which could come in close enough to use all their guns and thus keep down the fire of the Turks. If the Turks had employed guns heavy enough to stand the ships off, the landing would not have taken place, for experience has shown that even the most powerful naval guns at long range are unable to put well concealed shore guns out of action. Even chance hits have little effect upon the sand or earthen parapets. ;

may

be accepted then as a fact, that to prevent a hostile force from landing there must be in addition to the usual infantry defense at all the possible landings, guns of sufficient power to keep the naval vessels at such a distance that their secondary batteries can not be used. Thus the landing of troops or supplies from ships at so great a distance from the shore can readily be prevented by the infantry It

and field guns. In the case of a landing on our long that

it is

coast, the stretch to be covered is so

impracticable to implace in prepared positions enough

of these guns to cover all the possible landing places.

It will there-

fore be necessary to use mobile guns that can be quickly transported

The

method of transportation appears to be a railroad paralleling the beach, from which spurs could be run to points near enough to the front to keep ships at about 8,000 yards from the shore. The railroad, spur tracks, and gun locations should be prepared in time of peace.

to the point threatened.

quickest

THE VALUE OF MOBILE TROOPS IN COAST DEFENSE. After the allies had succeeded in the landing operations and had assembled on the peninsula the entire expeditionary force, their further advance was small, and after maintaining a position near the water's edge for over nine months, the force was withdrawn. The reason for the failure appears to be threefold First, the size of the :

513

22 Turkish force was underestimated and an insufficient number of troops was sent at first, and these troops were not sufficient!}^ reinforced; second, the terrain was favorable to the Truks third, most important of all, the Turks had sufficient troops to prevent the allies from ;

advancing.

Considering our own requirements, it should be noted that the terrain along our Atlantic Coast is not so favorable to the defense as that of the Gallipoli Peninsula, as the landing beaches are nu-

merous and extensive and the ground in rear is generally favorable for an advance. Moreover, our coast is too extended to permit the preparation of defenses in advance at all possible landing places. There is consequently the more necessity for mobile troops. With a well-trained and equipped force equal or superior to the force that had succeeded in landing, the operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula lead us to believe that an advance from the beach away from the cover of the ships, can be prevented; but without such a force, once the outer line of defense at the beach has been penetrated, the forces must be withdrawn to some thoroughly prepared position covering the objective of the enemy. Unless such a position of suitable extent has been prepared in advance, further resistance is hopeless.

513

O

\

^ DAY AND TO

OVERDUE.

*<

OO

™^ ^°URTH on^^e"^ T^"E SEVENTH '^

DAY

PAT. IAN. 21. 1908

667370 /'\

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

UBRARY