Federalismo Al Centralismo 1834-35

Federalism to Centralism in Mexico: The Conservative Case for Change, 1834-1835 Author(s): Michael P. Costeloe Source: The Americas, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Oct., 1988), pp. 173-185 Published by: Catholic University of America Press on behalf of Academy of American Franciscan History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1006783 Accessed: 15/05/2009 16:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aafh. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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FEDERALISMTO CENTRALISM IN MEXICO: THECONSERVATTVE CASE FOR CHANGE,18341835 tn

the summerof 1835 Mexico chose to abandonthe federalformof governmentinstituteda decadeearlierin 1824 andto replaceit witha centralizedrepublic.The dismantlingof federallaws and institutions andtheenactmentof thosedesignedto replacethemoccupiedthenexteighteen monthsuntilon December30, 1836the processof changeto the new systemculminatedin the publicationof a new constitution,the so-called Constitucionde las Siete Leyes. This fundamental changein the political structureof the nationwas not achievedwithoutconsiderabledissentand the protractedtransitionalperiodpermittedmanygroupswho opposedthe new orderof thingsto air theirviews andin some cases, notablyin ZacatecasandTexas,to attemptmilitaryresistance.Thesupporters of centralism found themselves, therefore,obliged to make and justify their case for changeand to convincethemselvesas well as theiropponentsthat their proposalsrepresentedthe popularwill. It is with this centralistcase for change,or manifesto,thatthis articleis primarilyconcerned. |

The transitionto centralismhas attractedremarkably littleattention,and even less sympathy,in Mexicanhistoriography. 1 Mosthistoriesof the periodignorethe case putforwardat the timeor rely entirelyon the contemporaryaccountsof liberalwriterswho assertthatthe prime,if not only, motivatingforcesat workwerethe Churchandthe militaryandthatfederalismcollapsedbecausethosetwo institutionsandtheirmembersweredeterminedto retaintheirpowerandprivileges.Hencethe adoptionof centralism is explainedas a reactionexclusivelyto the liberalthreatto Religiony Fueros. The mostinfluentialandcertainlythe mostoftencitedadvocateof this view is the contemporary liberaltheorist,Jose MariaLuis Mora.2His analysisof the politicalintrigueswhichlay behindthe changeremainsthe 1 One of the few studies to examine in any detail the transitionalperiod and its conservativeideology is A. Noriega, El pensamiento conservadory el conservadurismomexicano (2 vols., Mexico, 1972). 2 Mora's work has been the inspirationof most analyses of the political life of the period. See, for example, J. Reyes Heroles El liberalismo mexicano (3 vols., 2nd ed., Mexico, 1974) and C. Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora (New Haven & London, 1968).

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bestof the few available.3Accordingto him, AntonioLopezde SantaAnna chose to opposethe radicalliberalreformof the GomezFariasadministration(1833-1834)becauseof pressurefromtheclericalandmilitaryinterests most affectedby it and becausehe himself aspiredto dictatonalpower whichhe hopedto achieveby turningto his own advantagewhatwas a very volatilesituationin the springof 1834. Havingachievedthe resignationor departureof leadingliberalsunderthe Plan of Cuernavaca(May 1834), SantaAnnaproceededto close congress,the state legislaturesand other federalorganswhichposeda threatto his absolutistambitionsandhe governed the countryalmost single-handedlyfor the rest of 1834. In the scrambleamongthe politiciansto gain his favorduringthis constitutional vacuum,accordingto Mora,the moderateprogressivesandmoreimportant from our point of view, convincedfederalistswon this early contestand SantaAnnaallowedthemto occupythe mainoffices of state. They persuadedhim to endorsesome of the radicalliberalreformsin ecclesiastical andeducationmattersandthatwhilethe 1824constitutionrequiredreform, the basicfederalstructureshouldbe maintained. Throughout1834, therefore,SantaAnnadiscouragedall talk of fundamentalconstitutional changeandnew congressionalelectionsunderfederal law were ordered.These were in due coursewon by the pro-Church and pro-military factionswhichobtaineda majorityin the still federalcongress whichopenedin January1835. Justas the liberalsweredividedinto moderatesandextremists,however,so the supporters of the Churchandarrny were by no means unanimousin their views. The more extremeof the Church'sallies were soon incensedthatthe new governmentcontinuedto refuse to revoke some of the anti-clericallegislation,notablyon tithes, monasticvows andmostcontroversial of all, ecclesiasticalpatronage.Conspiracieswere soon afootto persuadeSantaAnnato get rid of thoseof his ministerswho had persuadedhim to retainsuch partsof the liberalprogramme.SantaAnnaquicklytiredof thepoliticalintriguein thecapitaland perhapsalso becauseof his failureto get moresupportfor his napoleonic aspirations,he withdrewto his countryestate. The campaignagainstthe moderateministersincreasedandone by one theyresigned. The mostdetenninedandradicalof the liberalswereto be foundin some stateswherethe physicalsymbolof statesovereigntyandfederalismrested in the civic militia.Henceone of the firsttargetsof the centralistswas the abolitionof the militiaandwhenit becameclearthatsomestateswoulduse 3 Mora, 'Revista politica de las diversas administracionesque ha tenido la Republicahasta 1837', in Obras Sueltas (Mexico, 1963), pp. 152-169.

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themto sustaintheirsovereigntyby forceif necessary,the mainconservative and reactionarygroupsin the capitalconcludedthatthe only secure way to asserttheirown controlof the politicalpowerwas to abolishthe federalsystemaltogether.Accordingto Mora,LucasAlamanandFrancisco Sanchezde Tagle, representingthe clericalinterest;GeneralGabrielValencia, representing the army,andJose MariaTornelandManuelBonilla, representing SantaAnna,agreedon the abolitionof the federation.Tornel, Valenciaand Bonillawere to arrangepopulardemonstrations, or pronunciamientos, in favorof centralism;SantaAnnawouldlead a militarycampaignagainstthe federaliststrongholdof Zacatecas;andAlamanandTagle wouldlook afterthe organization of the new centralistsystem.Subsequent eventsfollowedthis patternbeginningwith SantaAnna'svictoryover the Zacatecasmilitia led by FranciscoGarcia.Then hundredsof seemingly spontaneouspronunciamientos for centralismappearedandtheseprovided the politicaljustificationfor congressto declareitself constituentand its intentionto drawup a centralizedformof government.4 Thebasiclines of this analysisby Moraappearto be accuratebuthe also goes on to statethatthe centralistshadno politicalprogramexceptto reestablishthe controlof the privilegedclassesandto constructon the ruinsof the federation"the rule of the militaryand priestlyoligarchy".5In this respect,Moradoes less thanjusticeto his politicalenemiesfor in fact, the case for centralismand whatmay be labelledthe conservativemanifesto was set out in considerabledetailduringthe long monthswhenthe political maneuversdescribedaboveweretakingplace. Throughout mostof 1834, a timewhenthe wordcentralismwas still rarely usedin public,the intellectualandpoliticalcaseforchangebothin the form of governmentand the social groupswho exercisedpower, was carefully anddeliberatelypresented.Countlessnewspaperarticlesandeditorialsand pamphletsanalysedthe advantagesand disadvantagesof federalism,arguing at first by implicationbut lateropenly, the case for change.6This propaganda campaign,hotlycontestedby the pro-federalist presswhichrealized that, despite SantaAnna's repeatedprotestationsof loyalty, their groundwas beingundermined, reflectedthe convictionof all politicalfactions of the time thatthe popularwill hadto be persuadedof the virtuesof change.Thus, promisesandpledges,some publicandsome private,were made in the attemptto demonstratethattherewas a betteralternativeto Many of these popularplans were published in the press. s Mora, Obras sueltas, p. 158. 6 The propagandacampaign against federalism, without specifying centralismdirectly as the alternative, began in earnest with the publicationof the paper, El MosquitoMexicano on March 14, 1834. 4

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federalismandthe radicalliberaldoctrinesassociatedwith it. Clericaland militaryinterestswerecertainlyprominentbutthe appealfor supportrested on a muchbroaderbase thanthatadmittedby Moraandlaterhistorians. The initialplankof the centralistplatformwas negative,moreaversions than principlesas Moraputs it, in that it consistedof an attackon the federalsystemon the groundsof its unsuitability as a formof government for the counttyin its thenstateof developmentandmoreimportant,on its failureto fulfil the expectationsarousedon its adoptionin 1824. The respectivemeritsof centralismandfederalismas formsof government had,of course, been debatedat length in many forumsafter independenceand especiallyin the congressof 1823-1824whichhadvotedafterlong debate for the federation.At thattime, however,beforethe eventsas it were, the argumentshad been largelyjuridicalandinevitablyin the abstractbut by 1835 a new factorprevailed.This was the decadeor so of experienceof federalismin operationwhichprovidedthe centralistsupporterswith numeroustargetsfor criticism.Hencetheirattackon the systemembracedthe wholerangeof political,socialandeconomicproblemsfacingthe republic, almostall of which were attributedto or blamedon the form of government.7 The condemnation of the practicaleffectsof federalismwas expressedin representations from state legislatures,local authoritiesand otherpublic bodies as well as in almostdaily editorialsin some sectionsof the press. Citizensof Toluca,for example,saidthatfederalismhadbeenadoptedin a desireto imitatethe UnitedStatesbut withoutany real understanding of how the systemworkedand withoutany accountbeing takenof the very differentcustoms,traditionsand level of civilizationin Mexico. None of the federalistshadforeseenthe consequencesof dividingwhathadbeenfor centuriesan homogenousand compactmass into so many heterogenous parts.8But the consequenceswerenow evidentfor all to see, accordingto the Guadalajara town council.9The federalsystemhad not broughteconomicprosperitybut ratherpovertyandrecession.It had causedpolitical andfactionaldivisionwhichin turnhad led to the constantrebellionsand pronunciamientos whichinhibitedall progress.Provincialandlocal politicians had neverproperlyunderstoodthe conceptof statesovereigntywith 7 The argumentin the 1834-1836 years also differs from the earlier period in that there is markedly less reference to Europeanwriters, notably EdmundBurke. 8 M. Diez de Bonilla -Ministerof War, Toluca, May 30, 1835, in El Sol, May 31, 1835. 9 'Representaciondel muy ilustre ayuntamientode la capital del estado de Jalisco, dirigidaal honorable congreso del estado paraque inicie ante las camarasde la Union la variacionde la actualforma de gobierno, en republicacentral', Guadalajara,June 1, 1835, in El MosquitoMexicano, June 30, 1835.

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of the resultthatsome statesbelievedthemselvesto be totallyindependent had all nationalauthority.The enormousincreasein state bureaucracies costs and whereasin the colonialera causeda huge rise in administrative for45,000 pesosa year,by 1834thecost had Jaliscohadbeenadministered risen to more than 1,000,000 pesos. Taxes had thereforeincreasedto an intolerablelevel. Federalismhad broughtthe people no benefits.On the contrary,"fortunes,properties,individualfreedom,publicmorality,law, religion,everythinghas been destroyed." Similarbroadcriticismof the effectsof federalismweremadeagainand againin the centralistpress. Accordingto El Sol whichcalTieda seriesof theearlymonthsof 1835, the stateshad editorialson the subjectthroughout to the nationalexcherarelyif ever madetheirdue financialcontributions querandthe "frenzyof provincialism"hadfomentedthecreationof exces10Therushto createpublicsectorjobs had sive andwastefulbureaucracies. whichsowedthe seedsof revolutions of aspirantismo plague the stimulated as peoplewerewillingto supportanyonewho promisedthememployment. Therewerefar too manyexpensivelypaidlegislatorswiththeirretinuesof advisorsandofficialswho weremoreoftenthannot an ostentatiousluxury. Withso muchof the nation'sscantresourcesbeingconsumedby the ever expandingnumberof officials,commerceandindustrywerebeing starved of investmentandeconomicprogresswas impossible.ll The Orizavamunicipalityand the Queretarolegislaturemade similar points.12 Theconstantstrifeandpartypoliticalrivalrycausedby the federal system were now such that even the independenceof the nationwas in clergyproscribed, jeopardy.Thereligionof thepeoplehadbeenthreatened, Churchgoods alienatedandmonasteriesclosed. Therewas no justice, no personalsecuritynorprotectionof property.Thecivic militia,so promoted andprotectedby federalists,was a nationalscandal: The civic militiais a burdenon the Treasury,damagingto thosepeoplein it, to theirfamiliesandto society;it is uselessin timeof waranda dangerin time of peace;it upsetspublicorder,disturbsthe peaceandwiththe utmost certaintyit may be statedthat it is the clearestenemyof a well organized system. administrative

and sponTheseattackson federalism,althoughseeminglyindependent taneousexpressionsof opinionfrom diversesourcesaroundthe country containmanysimilarltiesbothin the pointsmadeandin the languageused. in the case of thosewhichappearedin 1835, it seemsthatthey Particularly El Sol, Februaxy1, 1835. Ibid., 24 March 1835. 12 Representationspublished in ibid., 28 March, May 24, 1835.

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were coordinatedcentrally,presumablyfromthe capital,and it gradually becameevidentthatcertainthemeswerebeingemphasisedas the centralist case forchangewasbeingconstructed in thepublicmind.Possiblythemost prominentof these was the problemof law andorder.Ruralbanditryand crimesof violence againstpersonsand propertyhad long been a serious problemespeciallyon the highwaysbut althoughwe lack statisticalevidence of crimerates, accordingto centralistpropaganda,generallawlessness and violencehad significantlyincreasedin the yearsfollowingindependenceandthe effectivebreakdownof the Spanishjudicialcode. It was no longera dangeronly in the remoterruralareas.Accordingto the Minister of Justiceand numerousnewspaperreports,theft and murderwere almostdailyeventsin the cities.l3Muggingsandrobberieswerecommonplace in broaddaylightin the main thoroughfares of the capitaland the people went abouttheir affairsin fear of their lives and theirproperty. Thereis no personalsafetyanymorein Mexico, one newspaperdeclared. People, especiallyhonorablecitizens, were being obligedto buy guns to protectthemselvesbut "nobodyis safe on the streetseven in broaddaylight, nor in theirhomes at any time.''14Demandsfor toughersentences wereheardin congressandin the pressandthe governmentpromisedthat increasedpenaltiesfor cnmes of theftandviolencewouldbe introduced. Violenceagainstthe personand againstpropertywere not restrictedto the level of commoncriminality.Accordingto the centralists,they werea reflectionor extensionof officially sanctionedviolence againstthe individual.One of the mostembitteredcomplaintsagainstthe liberalregimeof GomezFariasandthe federalauthoritiesin the stateswas theirallegedpersecutionof politicalopponents.Thisissueattractedprobablymorehostility and hatredof the liberalsthanany of theiranti-clericallegislationand no single act was more condemnedthan the so-calledLey del caso of June 1833. Underthe termsof thatlaw, 51 persons,all well-knownandinfluential figuresincludingFranciscoSanchezde Tagle, AnastasioBustamante andFranciscoFagoagaweresummanlysentencedto six yearsexile, apparentlybecauseof theirpoliticalbeliefsandin someinstances,for reasonsof personalvengeance.Formernisters, againhighlyrespectedmembersof the propertyowningclass like LucasAlaman,werechargedwith an array of offences,includingcomplicityin the deathof VicenteGuerreroin 1831, andhundreds,if not thousands,of publicemployeeshadbeendeprivedof theirjobs when the liberalstook controlof the nationaland statebureaucracies.Seniorclergyhadbeensubjectedto personalabuseandthenation's 13 14

Diario del Gobierno, November 20, 1835. Ibid.

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few bishopshad been orderedinto exile. Whateverthe reasonsfor these actionsby the liberals,they were depictedby theiropponentsas totally unjustifiedacts of stateviolenceagainstthe individual,as crimeson a par withthoseof commoncriminals.Similarly,themanyconfiscationsof property of corporationsandindividualswereportrayedas symptomaticof the liberals'contemptfor the acceptedstandardsof politicalandpersonalconduct. of civilizedpolitThis breakdownof law andorderandof the standards ical conductwere attributedto the effects of federalism.The "plagueof thieves" was said to includethose who "as they committheirrobberies, defendlibertyandthedivinesystem.ss15Thecrimewavewas alsoa product of a moregeneralmalaise,a "torrentof immorality"whichfederalismand hadcaused.16 Respectfor law andorder,for property its liberalsupporters disappearedin the coriuptionnow endemicin all had person the for and by the valueswerebeingundermined areasof life. The nation'straditional new ideas and those liberalswho advocatedthem. Immoralliteraturewas and floodingintothetownsandcitiesandtherewasanairof demoralization had service public of feeling strong once despairin all social classes. The personalambitionanda spintof to be replacedby unrestrained disappeared Lawswereabused,disciplinein the armywas lax, corrupinsubordination. tion andtheftby publicofficialscommonplaceandcriminalsescapedwith impunitybecauseof protectionby theirpoliticalpatrons.Educationwas andyouthpervertedas parentsstruggledin vainto protect beingprostituted theirfamilies: The fatherof a familycan no longercounton even the securityof his own hometo preservethe innocenceof his unwarychildrenbecauseimmoralityis beingsubtlyintroducedinto it andin placeof innocence,thereis corruption. Thoseimpiousbooks,thoselewd pnnts,thoseconcoctionsdisguisedwithan attractiveappealand a deceivingname, how manyfamilieshave they not ruined?l7

One cause of this declinein publicandprivatemoralstandardswas the damagedone to the Churchandto religiousfaithby the federalistsanscuottes. They had consistentlydecriedthe value of the establishedChurch attackingits temporalitiesandridiculingits clergy.Religionhadbeenprofanedby GomezFariasandhis cohortsandit was not suIprisingthatstandardsof behaviorhad declined.The cancerof impietyhad to be stopped beforeit was too late andthe socialfabricof the nationdestroyed.Respect El Mosquito Mexicano, April 24, May 8, 1835. Diario del Gobierno, November 8, 1835. 17 El Mosquito Mexicano, June 30, 1835: El Sol, February1-3, 1835.

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for religion,the Churchandits ministershadto be restoredbecauseit was preciselyattackson theirprestigein any society whichbroughtcivil disorder: Disturbancesin a State have always been connectedwith those of the Churchbecausethereis no respectforthecivil authoritywhentheyokeof the faith is shakenoff: once heresyentersa nation,lightingthe revolutionary flame,good citizensbecomeseditiousrebels.Oursuprememagistrates know this very well andthey will not allowerrorto triumphovertruth.18

The restorationof publicmorality,respectfor the government,for law and orderand for religioncould only be achievedby removingthe federalists from power and replacingthem with gentede orden.They would restorethe now lost valuesof earlieryears. Employeeswouldbe paidon time, the publichighwaysmadesafe andcrimesjustlypunished.Orderand stabilitywould againprevailand the nationwouldgrow prosperousonce the inEnite"congresitos"and anarchicfactionshad been defeated.The only social groupwhichcouldachievethesethingswerethe men of property: It seemsundeniable,therefore,thatthe governmentwhichoffersthe most guaranteesis one in whichpropertyownershave influencebecauseunlike non-property owners,they have an equalinterestin freedomandindividual securityand, in addition,they have an eminentinterestin orderand good management of propexty.Certainlytheydo notformall of societybuttheyare the trunkandthe rootswhichmustfeed anddirectthe branches. 19

The "chimericalequality"preachedby liberalextremistswas theirpretext to deprivehonorablecitizensof theirgoods andtheirhostilitytowardsthe propertiedclasseswas intendedto stirup popularhatredagainstthem: All theywantis to takeotherpeople'swealthin thenameof equalityandto seize honoursandjobs whichshouldbe reservedfor knowledgeandvirtue. The lackof equalitywhichthe Authorof all naturehas placedin all sections of societyto forma scale of communications andserviceshas beenusedby the instigatorsof the populaceto makethem regretthe differenceof their particular situation,to stiruptheirself-interestagainstthengorsof fateandto encouragethemto conquerit throughcnme andpillagein the nameof some

sacredequality.20 Theelectoralsystemmustbe reformedto ensurethathombresde bienwere electedandthe only secureway to do this was to makepropertythe essential qualificationfor votersandcandidates.Propertyownerswouldrestrain the wild extremismand"dangerousinnovations"of radicals:"It is only in 18 19 20

La Lima, March 14, 1835, supplement. El Sol, April 7, 1835. El Telegrafo, 1, July 17, 1834

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those countries where propertyis representedthat one finds rational freedomanda less exposedpeaceandorder.''2lWithsuchmen in control of nationalaffairs,economicprogresswouldbe rapidlyachievedbecauseit was in theirown interest.Federalistshad neglectedthe economybecause they wereonly concernedwithcollectingtheirsalanesandgettingjobs for theirfriends.Underthe new regime,industry,agricultureand commerce wouldbe encouragedand Mexico'snaturalresourcesfully exploited.The taxationsystemwouldbe revisedandwithmoreefficiencyandless corruption, revenueswouldincreaseandpublicinvestmentin roads,communications andotherservicesexpanded. Thusmen of property,hombres de bien,definedby Alamanas "menof faith,honour,propertyandvirtue"wouldhenceforthpredominate andensurethatconservativevaluesprevailed.22 Whilea respectedandprivileged Churchand armywouldguaranteethe new social order,however,it was notthe intention,as Moraalleged,to createa dominantmilitaryandpriestly oligarchy.WhatAlamanand his colleaguesin the 1835 ccngresssought was to centralizepowerin theirown socialclass throughout the country.In essence,theywanteda returnto whattheyfondlyremembered as the social stabilityof colonialsocietybutin thatcolonialsociety,theChurchhadbeen a subordinate institutionsubjectto the will of the secularheadof state. In the mindsof the moremoderateconservatives,thatwas to continueto be the clericalstatusin theircentralistrepublic.Henceonly certainof the liberal anti-clericallegislationwas repealed,for example,the laws against individualclergyandagainstclericalpropertybecausetheywerein accord with the new emphasison the sanctityof the personand property.Other reformsremainedon the statutebooksandin themostcontroversial issueof all, ecclesiasticalpatronage,the moderateconservativeposition on the matterof principleinvolvedwas little differentto thatof the liberals.23In otherwords,the regalistprincipleof statesupremacyandthe government's rightto makeecclesiasticalappointments was upheldmuchto the fury of seniorclergyandtheirrelativelyfew ultramontanist supporters in congress. Even SantaAnna, neverknownas a man of convictionon such matters, 21

Ibid., June 23, July 7, 1834-

L. Alaman, 'Defensa del ex-ministro de Relaciones don Lucas AlamEn, escrita por el mismo ex-ministroquien la dirige a la nacion' (Mexico, 1834) in Obras.Documentos diversos(Mexico, 1946), vol. 11, p. 45. Alaman refers throughouthis writings to the importanceof political power being in the hands of hombresrespetables,clase propietariaetc. See, for example, his letter to Santa Anna of February 23, 1837, cited in J. C. Valades, Alambn,estadistae historiador(Mexico, 1938), pp. 362-368. For a good examination of Alaman's political ideas, see M. Gonzilez Navarro, El pensamientopoliticode LucasAlamdn(Mexico, 1952). 23 For a study of the patronagecontroversy, see my book Church andStateinIndependent Alexico.A studyof thePatronageDebate,1821-1857(London, 1978). 22

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refusedto give in to clericalpressureon thisissueandtheactingMinisterof Justice, Joaquinde Iturbide,rouseda stormof clericalprotestwhen on February4, 1835 in his annualreportto congress,he firmlydefendedthe principleof nationalpatronage.24 The government,he said, wantedto repeal the liberalmeasureson clericalappointments becausethey were "impoliticandinopportune" buthe wantedto remindthepublicandthe clergy thatthe possessionandexerciseof nationalpatronagehadbeenestablished. Despitethe protestsof the clergyandtheirsupporters, the government kept to its positionandin the new centralistconstitution,the clauseson Church affairswere similarto those of its federalpredecessor,for example,congressretainedtherightto approveconcordatsandtheexecutivestill hadthe powerto admitor refuseentryto papalbulls.25 Thusthe Churchfoundthatdespitethe backingit hadgiven SantaAnna andthosewho opposedthe liberals,therewas not goingto be any "priestly oligarchy"whichwoulddominatethe politicallife of the nation.Instead, religionwouldbe usedby thehombres de bienin the sameway it was used by the Spanishmonarchy,thatis, to inculcate'proper'socialvaluesin the population,respectfor law andorderandaboveall, for menof property.26 In rathersimilarfashion, Mora'ssuggestionthat civilianpoliticianslike CarlosMariaBustamanteand Sanchezde Tagle favoreda militaryoligarchyis also misleading.Certainlythe militaryreformsenactedby the G6mezFariasgovernmentweremostlyrepealedandthe maindemandsof the militarywere met, especiallywith the destructionof the civic militia andwitha guaranteethatin thenewconstitution themilitaryfuerowouldbe protected.27 The manydemotionsof individualofficersorderedby the liberalswerealso repealedandconservativegeneralsandotherswererestored to theirranksandcommands.But the praiselavishedon the armywas not unqualified.In April 1835the Ministerof Warcriticisedrecruitment practices, moraleand disciplineand insistedthattherewere far too manyofficers who expectedand obtainedrewardsfor their servicesto political parties.The militaryfuerowouldcontinue,he said, for reasonsof circumstance and convenienceeven though "the progressof enlightenment" For details of the uproarcaused by Iturbide'sspeech, see ibid., pp. 146-150. This issue caused a heated debate in congress: see El Nacional, April 20, 1836. 26 Clerical supportwas financial by way of loans and, more important,from the pulpits and episcopal palaces with sermons and pastoralsurging the people not to join in revolts: see, for example, 'Circular del Illmo. sr. obispo de la Puebla a los curas de su diocesis', Puebla, February11, 1835, text reprinted in La Lima, February24, 1835. 27 The civic militia was reducedto a maximumof 1 per 500 inhabitantsin decree of 31 March 1835, in M. Dublan y J. M. Lozano, Legislacion mexicana(Mexico, 1876), vol. III, p. 38. Fourweeks later, a new merchantmilitia to be composed of merchantsand propertyowners in the Federal District was established: see El Sol, May 8, 1835. 24

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thoughthe army mightdemandotherwise.Moreover,he warned,important was "the militaryaristocracyis the mostdangerousof all."28 Like the Church,therefore,the armywas restoredto favorbutonly as a meansto an end, thatis, the consolidationin powerof the largelycivilian elite of hombresde bien. Indeed,somekey aspectsof thenew constitution, notablythe fourthpoweror Poder Conservador,were devisedat least in of the army, partto frustratethe ambitionsof the leadingrepresentative namelySantaAnna. Thereis considerableevidence,albeitcircumstantial, that he aspiredto formaldictatorialpoweror, as some allege, to be the monarchof Mexico. Sincehe hadassumedeffectivecontrolof the country in May 1834with the nebuloustitle of Protector,therehadbeenpersistent rumorand speculationthathis supporterswere tryingto mobilizeopinion for his elevationto supremeand absolutepower. "The partyof a king is now appearing,"one newspaperdeclared,and anotherwriterspeculated the bizarre if interestingidea that Santa Anna's backerswanted him crownedandthenmarriedto the Queenof Spain.29Theserumorswere so persistentthatthe government'sofficialnewspaperfelt it necessaryto deny publiclythatSantaAnnahadanysuchregalambitionsor thathe considered himselfthe Napoleonof Americawhichwas anotheraccusationhis opponents frequentlylevelled againsthim.30Despiteofficial denials,his supporterscontinuedto take every opportunityto eulogize him and he did nothingto preventthe promotionof his own personalitycult.3l But the politicianswho hadused SantaAnnaas muchas he hadusedthem,would not countenancea militaryoligarchyheadedby an autocraticSantaAnna. They lavished ceremonialhonourson him, commissionedportraitsand statuesand declaredhim 'Benemeritode la Patria'but manydid so reluctantly. As Carlos Maria Bustamanterecalled, he and his fellow congressmenlet SantaAnna know that "we would not let him use us as a steppingstoneto raisehimselfunderourauspicesto be the Autocratof the Mexicans.9932 These, then, were the maingeneralthemesof the manifestowhich the conservativesofferedto theMexicanpublicin thefinalmonthsof 1834and early partof 1835 as they triedto win popularsupportfor theirplanned changeto centralism.Thepoliticsof nostalgiawas a powerful constitutional 28'Memoria del Ministerio de Guerra', in El Sol, April 12-27, 1835. 29EIAnteojo,July 19, 1835: Procesodel GeneralSantaAnna(Mexico, 1836). November 7, 1835. 30 Diariodel Gobierno, to 31 See, for example, LaLuz,December 16, 1835 and 11 March 1836 where Santa Anna is refexTed as "the pretender". del cuadrohistoricode la revolucionmexicana(Mexico, 1963), 32 C. M. Bustamante,Continuacion vol. IV. p. 366.

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force in Mexico afterthe decadeof chaos experiencedunderthe federal systemandcentralistpropaganda wascarefulto remindthepropertyowning classes of the peace andorderof the colonialera when, it was suggested, socialvalueswereacceptedandeveIymanknewhis place.33A newformof governmentwouldbringbacknationalunityandendthe factionaldivisions andmulti-party politicswhichhadcausedso muchinstabilityand administrativedisruption.Law andorderwouldbe guaranteed withthe streetsand highwaysmadesafe for decentpeople. Aboveall, the valuesof the family,respectfor the nation'sonce venerated traditional institutions,the spiritof publicserviceandpublicmoralityin generalwould be restored.The preceptsof the onlytruefaithwouldagainbe taughtin schoolsandthe corruptionof youthby the modernheresiesof the day stopped.34 Menof property wouldreoccupytheirrightfulpositionin the corridors of powerand their presencewouldensurethatreformswhen neededwould be madewithout theradicalupheavalof societyandall the dangers of social andeconomic equalityas preachedby the demagogic,federalist TheChurch andthe armywouldonce againbe the twinpillarssansculottes. of theirnew society,but notits masters.35 If we areto acceptcontemporary opinion,excludingliberalslikeMora,it wouldseem thatthis manifestodid reflectMexican publicopinionof the time.The wordfederalismhas lost its once magic appeal,as one writerput itandthe experienceof the pastdecadehas broughtdisillusionanda desire forchange.36Morethan400 petitionsfor change were gressand while these may well have been centrally presentedto condirectedfromMexico City,most contemporaty observersacceptthatthe greatmajorityof what Arrangoiz callsgentedeordenfavoredtheabolitionof the In a private letterto the Dukeof Monteleonewho was one offederation.37 several property owners whosegoodswererestoredto himin the new atmosphere of respect forproperty,Alamanwrotethatthe changeto centralismwouldbe easily achieved becausethe people were tiredof the presentsituation.38 Carlos In many respects, the transitionto centralism was a rerunof the events and ideological propaganda of the Bustamante/Alamanregime of 1830-1832 and those years were also held up as a model of the beneficial effects of centralizingthe political system: see the editorial in El Sol, 16 March 1835. 34 Alaman was among those invited to draw up a new plan for public education. He replied that he would help to provide the nation with an education "que esta en consonancia con el estado de las luces", in Valades, Alamdn, pp. 351-352. 3S For an unequivocal statementof the conservativephilosophy by another contemporarypolitician, and especially of the Churchas the guardianof public morality, see L.G. Cuevas, Porvenir de Mexico (Mexico, 1954), pp. 391-425. 36 El Sol, February2, 1835. 37 Bustamanteclaims that the petitions emanateddirectly from the cabinet: Bustamante,Caadro historico, IV, 370-371: F.P. de Arrangoiz,Mexico desde 1807 hasta 1867 (Mexico, 1968), p. 369. 38 Alaman-Dukeof Monteleone, July 28, 1835, Obras, vol. XII, pp. 286-290. 33

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Mana Bustamantealso maintainedthat the change was popularbecause they were tired of the "excesses of those in power, especiallythe little congresses(congresitos) and stategovernors"and Jose MariaBocanegra Centralism,as impliesthe sameopinionin his descriptionof the situation.39 a morerecenthistorianhas expressedit, was in the airanda largenumber of Mexicanshadreachedthe conclusionthatfederalismhadfailed.40In the words of the editorof El Sol, "a new constitution,a new constitution, aboveall else, is whatthe countrywants.''4 Universityof Bristol Bristol, England

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39Bustamante, Cuadro historico, IV, 370: J.M. Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de Me'xico independiente, 1822-1846 (Mexico, 1897), vol. II, pp. 610-61S. 40 J. Vazquez et al., ffilistoriageneral de Mexico (Mexico, 1976), vol. III, p. 28. 41 El Sol, March 26, 1835.