Falk, Gendzier, And Lifton, Eds. - Crimes Of War, Iraq (2006) - Synopsis

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UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Book Discussion Series @ Mandolin Café (Tacoma, WA) July 17, 2006, 7:00 p.m. Richard Falk, Irene Gendzier, and Robert Jay Lifton, eds., Crimes of War: Iraq (New York: Nation Books, 2006). Introduction: On the Responsibility and Accountability of Leaders, Military Personnel, and Citizens in Wartime. “We believe the Iraq war to be illegal and immoral” (xv). This book is modeled after Crimes of War (1971), edited by Falk, Lifton, and Gabriel Kolko, about Vietnam. Citizens of a democratic society have “a special duty to examine critically questions of war and peace, particularly if they involve the legal, ethical, and political behavior of our own government” (xvi). Summary (xvi-xvii). The volume is designed for citizens, activists, and university courses (xvii). Alternative approaches are an urgent matter: the current U.S. approach is only strengthening al-Qaeda (xviii).

SECTION ONE: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK. Edited by Richard Falk Introduction. Assertion that law has come, historically, to regulate international affairs, though “It would seem that the U.S. government has now repudiated this development”; the issues surrounding Iraq war are part of this larger struggle (3-4).

The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (2001). Synopsis (43-46). UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2005) (excerpts). Rejects rewriting Article 51 (on self-defense), defines “five basic criteria of legitimacy: (a) Seriousness of threat. . . . (b) Proper purpose. . . . (c) Last resort. . . . (d) Proportional means. . . . (e) Balance of consequences” (47-53). REVIVING THE NUREMBERG LEGACY Justice Jackson’s Opening and Closing Statements as Prosecutor (1945). Calls “aggressive war” “the greatest menace of our times” (55-61). Nuremberg Judgment. Abridged; presents arguments for the legitimacy of the judgment: “That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states has long been recognized,” citing the 1942 ex parte Quirin case (61-74).

SOURCES OF LAW AND POLICY.

Nuremberg Principles. Seven principles (7476; 1950).

U.S. Constitution, Art. VI(2). (5).

THE IRAQ INTERNATIONAL LAW DEBATE

UN Charter Provisions. (5-7).

William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, “Preemption, Iraq, and International Law.” A defense of the legality of U.S. war on Iraq (77-83; AJIL [2003]).

International Committee of the Red Cross Summary of International Humanitarian Law. Lists customary rules of international humanitarian law (8-24). Genocide Conventions (1948). (24-28). Convention on Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict. (29-31) Convention Against Torture (1984). (3134) Declaration on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (1961). Apparently misdated articles of 1968 NPT treaty (came into effect in 1970), without the preamble (34-38). Kosovo Report, Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000). A proposal to structure the debate over the legality/legitimacy of intervention in Kosovo (38-42).

National Security Strategy of the USA, White House, 2002. George W. Bush’s cover letter (83-86). Philip Shiner, “A New International Legal Order.” Argues for the urgent need for accountability for the Iraq war: the war was an illegal crime of aggression (89-91); organizing it was a “joint criminal exercise” (91-93); Shiner, while not pronouncing on the legitimacy of Security Council Resolution 1483’s conferral of the legal status of occupying power on coalition forces, finds evidence of war crimes in the occupation: torture; Fallujah (93-101; AJIL [2005]). Amy Bartholomew, “Contesting Empire’s Law and Human Rights as ‘Swords of Empire.’” On the “horror” of the Iraq from an

international legal point of view, with special criticism for “liberal human rights hawks” like Michael Ignatieff (102-08; article in AJIL [2003]). Mary Ellen O’Connell, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Richard Falk, Thomas M. Franck, and James Crawford, “Iraq: One Year Later.” Having argued in 2003 at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law that the Iraq war was illegal but potentially legitimate, Anne-Marie Slaughter concluded a year later that the war was “both illegal and illegitimate” (110); Richard Falk defended “the legal norm of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states” (112; “In my view, the illegality of recourse to war against Iraq in 2003 was clear” [115]); Thomas Franck called for renunciation of unilateralism (116-20); Mary Ellen O’Connell argued that the Iraq war “has created a crisis for international law on the use of force” requiring that the “illegal but legitimate” approach tried in Kosovo be abandoned (120-23); and James Crawford urged that international lawyers should stop talking about legitimacy and stick to “the instruments at our disposal, the treaty-making system, the canons of interpretation, the modalities of dispute settlement, the hermeneutics of qualified consent” (126). Downing Street Memos, 23 July 2002. Full text (126-29). “But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” (127). IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS Lord Millett’s Separate Opinion in the House of Lords Decision in the Pinochet Extraction Case (March 24, 1999). On the effect of international law on state immunity and the circumstances under which “crimes prohibited by international law attract universal jurisdiction under customary international law” (140). The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001). Takin the view that the nature of “genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious crimes under international law” is such that “national courts may . . . exercise jurisdiction under international law” (145). THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY TRIBUNALS Richard Falk: “It is our view that the final statement of the Jury of Conscience is a historic document that deserves widespread attention” (153).

Jean-Paul Sartre’s Inaugural Statement, Russell Tribunal (1967). Argues as a general matter that legitimacy can be founded in “the people, in a revolutionary period, when institutions are changing. . . . But judges exist everywhere. It is for the peoples of the world and, in particular, the American people that we are working” (156). David Dellinger’s Appeal to American and World Opinion, Russell Tribunal (1967). “The peoples of the world must refuse to commit the crimes that have been documented here. They must refuse to be accomplices in these crimes. But it is not enough to stop there. In addition they must make positive acts to stop the crimes” (159). Arundhati Roy, Opening and Closing Statements at the World Tribunal on Iraq [excerpts]. “[A]n attempt to correct the record” (160). Challenge to tribunal “sounds like somebody asking me whether I have the legitimacy to write a novel. We’re just a group of human beings—whether we’re five or ten or fifteen or ten million—and surely we have the right to express our opinion” (162). Richard Falk, Opening Statement at the World Tribunal on Iraq [excerpts]. The contribution of the World Tribunal on Iraq to “a longer journey of international law” (163-68). Declaration of the Jury of Conscience at the World Tribunal on Iraq. Findings; charges against U.S., U.K., U.N. Security Council, governments of the coalition of the willing, governments of other countries, major corporate media; and recommendations (16878). About the Contributors. 1-2 lines each (179).

SECTION TWO: U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ. Edited by Irene Gendzier. Introduction: Irene Gendzier, “On Averting Our Eyes.” U.S. Middle East policy shows “the continuity of U.S. interests, and those based on oil, corporate expansion, and the role of defense” (186). FROM SUPPORT TO SANCTIONS Richard Sale, “Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot.” Saddam Hussein’s “first contacts with U.S. officials date back to 1959, when he was part of a CIA-authorized six-man squad tasked with assassinating then Iraqi Prime Minister General Abd al-Karim Qasim,”

who had overthrown the Iraqi monarchy a year earlier (192-94; UPI, Apr. 10, 2003). Roger Morris, “A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making.” U.S. ties to Saddam Hussein go back to 1962 & 1963 (195-97; New York Times, Mar. 14, 2003). U.S. District Court (Florida: Southern District) Affidavit, United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Cardoen [et al]. NSC staffer Howard Teicher’s 1995 affidavit, describing U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, “personally spearheaded” by CIA director William Casey (197-202). Irene Gendzier, “Democracy, Deception, and the Arms Trade: The U.S., Iraq, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 1992 congressional hearings showed extent of U.S.’s aid to Saddam Hussein’s regime (202-12). Gary Milhollin, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. How U.S. equipment helped Iraq build WMDs (212-18; 1992 testimony). Kamil Mahdi, “The Iraq Sanctions Debate: Destruction of a People. The sanctions regime “destroyed” Iraq’s “economy and social structure” (218-22; Middle East International [1999]). Eric Herring, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: A Critique of the Case for UN Economic Sanctions.” On the U.N. sanctions regime and its administration ad “a callous, racist policy defended through deception and self-deception” (222-30). MANUFACTURING CONSENT FOR “OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM” Michael Smith, “The War before the War.” Evidence of the British government’s early embrace of invading Iraq (232-34; New Statesman [2005]). John Prados, “Iraq, Lies, and Videotape.” General review of Bush administration’s deceptions (235-42; from Hoodwinked [New Press, 2004]). Lieutenant Colonel Steven Collins, “Mind Games.” U.S. use of PSYOPS (preferable to INFO OPS) (242-48; from NATO Review [2003]). Aijaz Ahmad, “The War of Occupation.” Examination of the effects of the war on its 4th day (248-58).

IN WHOSE INTEREST Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in Iraq.” April 20, 2003, article in the New York Times. Andrew Stephen, “America: The U.S. Military Now Puts Machine Guns into the Hands of Mercenaries.” Generalized use of “civilian contractors” to provide security (26466; New Statesman). James A. Paul, “Oil in Iraq: The Heart of the Crisis.” Prewar speculation on how the U.S. would exploit Iraqi oil (266-75; Global Policy Forum). Judicial Watch, “Media Advisory: Cheney Energy Task Force Documents Feature Map of Iraqi Oilfields.” FOIA lawsuit turned up a map of Iraqi oil fields in Cheney Energy Task Force documents (275-77). Steve Kretzmann and Jim Vallette, “Operation Oil Immunity.” Under the Development Fund for Iraq, endorsed by U.N. Resolution 1483, “The Iraqi people’s oil will finance U.S. corporate entrees into Iraq”; Bush’s Executive Order 13303 “places oil companies above the rule of law” (278-79; TomPaine.com). The Center for Public Integrity, “U.S. Contractors Reap the Windfalls of PostWar Reconstruction.” Analysis of how contractors went about profiting from reconstruction (279-92). Ed Harriman, “So, Mr. Bremer, Where Did All the Money Go?” Audits show “the absence of any meaningful accountability” for funds expended in Iraq (296; from the Guardian [UK]). “THE SUPREME CRIME” Jordan J. Paust, “Executive Plans and Authorization to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees” [excerpts]. On the involvement of lawyers (DOD General Counsel William Haynes figures prominently, and Yoo and Delahunty are charged with “complete fabrication,” “clear falsehood”) in promulgating approval of illegal interrogation tactics: “I know of no other instance in the long history of the United States of a plan approved by lawyers and at the highest levels of our government systematically to deny human beings protections under the laws of war” (311;

from an article in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law [2005]).

strategies” (346; from an article in The New England Journal of Medicine [2005]).

R. Lafta, L. Robert, R. Garfield, J. Khudhairi, and G. Burnham, Summary Background Statement of the Report, “Mortality before and after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey.” Conclusion of the Lancet study, showing “about 100,000 excess deaths or more have happened since the 2003 invasion of Iraq” (313).

Physicians for Human Rights, “Break Them Down: Systematic Use of Psychological Torture by U.S. Forces.” Application of prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, severe sexual and cultural humiliation, use of threats and dogs to induce fear or injury is “widespread and systematic” in Afghanistan and Iraq (350-61).

A Survey Estimating the Death Toll from the War in Iraq: A Lay-Person’s Summary. The Lancet survey’s methodology.

Michael Wilks, “A Stain on Medical Ethics.” The weak institutional response to the participation of doctors in torture at Guantanamo (363-66; in Lancet [2005]).

Gilbert Achcar, “Seven Theses on the Current Period, the War, and the Antiwar Movement.” A call to revive “the momentum of February 15th 2003” now that the imperial neoliberal Iraq project has stalled (315-22; from Znet). Noam Chomsky, “Preventive War, ‘the Supreme Crime.’” Iraq’s function is to exemplify the U.S.’s new official policy, announced in the National Security Strategy in September 2002. Howard Zinn, “It Is Not Only Iraq That Is Occupied. America Is, Too.” “But more ominous, perhaps, than the occupation of Iraq is the occupation of the U.S. I wake up in the morning, read the newspaper, and feel that we are an occupied country, that some alien group has taken over” (328). About the Contributors. 1-2 lines each (331-33).

SECTION THREE: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL CONTEXT. Edited by Robert Jay Lifton. Robert Jay Lifton, “Conditions of Atrocity.” Analysis of the “atrocity-producing situation” (340-41; article in The Nation [2004]). Robert Jay Lifton, “Doctors and Torture.” Doctors have contributed a “medical component” to the atrocity-producing situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay (342-44; article in The New England Journal of Medicine [2005). M. Gregg Bloche and Jonathan H. Marks, “Doctors and Interrogators at Guantanamo Bay. “Health information has been routinely available to behavioral science consultants and others who are responsible for crafting and carrying out interrogation

Philip Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators.” We must overcome “the illusion of moral superiority” that encourages a “me-us-them distinction” (367). Philip Zimbardo, “Power Turns Good Soldiers into ‘Bad Apples.’” The importance of “situational factors” (371). Hebert C. Kelman, “The Policy Context of Torture: A Social Psychological Analysis.” “The essential phenomenon of torture, however, is that it is not an ordinary crime, but a crime of obedience . . . . Lee Hamilton and I have defined a crime of obedience as ‘an act performed in response to orders from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community’” (372; from an article in the International Review of the Red Cross [2005]). “[T]he occurrence or perceived threat of violence against the State is central to the rationale for a policy of torture” (374). Stanley Milgram, “Obedience to Authority: An Experimental Vies.” “Obedience is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that binds men to systems of authority” (379; from Obedience to Authority [1974]). “A reader’s initial reaction to the experiment may be to wonder why anyone in his right mind would administer even the first shocks. Would he not simply refuse and walk out of the laboratory? But the fact is that no one ever does” (381). Eva Steele-Saccio, “Breaking Ranks: An Interview with Mike Hoffman.” Interview with co-founder of Iraq Veterans Against the War (387-92).

Dahr Jamail, “What Have We Done?” Testimony of Iraq war veterans remorseful for what they did in Iraq, include Camila Mejia: “It wasn’t until I came home that I felt it—how wrong it wall was and that I was a coward for pushing my principles aside” (394). Sergeant Kevin Benderman, Narrative. “[U]ntil you have the misfortune to engage in it for yourself you cannot begin to understand how insane it all is . . . Why can’t everyone agree that war is the most repugnant of all human endeavors?” (397-98). Stephen L. Robinson, “The Hidden Toll of the War in Iraq.” On the toll on the mental health of Iraq war veterans (399-409). Ronald J. Glasser, “A War of Disabilities: Iraq’s Hidden Costs Are Coming Home.” On the large number of wounded Iraq war veterans, thanks to medical advances (41015). Jonathan Steele and Dahr Jamail, “This Is Our Guernica.” On Robert Zoellick’s visit to Fallujah in April 2005 (415-18). Dahr Jamail, “Fallujah Refugees Tell of Life and Death in the Kill Zone.” On the killing of civilians in Fallujah (418-20). Judith Coburn, “Unnamed and Unnoticed: Iraqi Casualties.” Analysis of how U.S. information sources discuss the number of Iraqi deaths. Robert Jay Lifton, “Americans as Survivors.” Collectively, Americans are survivors of trauma. “Most Americans seem to be hovering between traditional and alternative responses to the war in Iraq” as the country struggles to give meaning to “the pain of death and loss” (427-31; abridged from an article in The New England Journal of Medicine). Paul Rogat Loeb, “They Died for Their Country.” That those who die in war “died for their country” is a useful myth used to sustain war (431-33). Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Normalization of War.” Americans embraced militarism at the end of the Cold War (433-43; from The New American Militarism [2005]).

Paul Krugman, “The War President.” “[T]he people who led us to war on false pretenses have no credibility and no right to lecture the rest of us about patriotism” (443). James Carroll, “The War Against Islam.” “The image of Muslims as prone to violence by virtue of their religion was mainly constructed across centuries by Europeans seeking to bolster their own purposes” (445). Jonathan Schell, “The Bomb and Karl Rove.” Indicts “a decade of neglect” on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation (446). Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, “A War over Meaning.” “At the heart of the matter is what we owe the dead” (448). Cindy Sheehan, “What Kind of Extremist Will You Be?” Lament that “before my son was killed, I didn’t publicly speak out against the invasion/occupation of Iraq” (450). Rebecca Solnit, “Acts of Hope: Challenging Empire on the World Stage.” Future is dark, not desperate. “It’s always too soon to go home. And it’s always too soon to calculate effect” (451). “History is like weather, not like checkers. A game of checkers ends. The weather never does. That’s why you can’t save anything” (452). “We achieved a global movement without leaders” (454). “We succeeded in doing what the anti-Vietnam War movement infamously failed to do: to refuse the dichotomies. . . . We are not just an antiwar movement. We are a peace movement” (454-55). “The world gets worse. It also gets better. And the future stays dark. Nobody knows the consequences of their actions . . .” (456). Concludes quoting Thoreau: “I believe in the forest, and the meadow, and the night in which the corn grows” (457). About the Contributors. 2 pp., 2-3 lines each (459-60). Acknowledgments. Falk: World Tribunal on Iraq (Istanbul, 2005). Gendzier: Noam Chomsky. Lifton: Tom Engelhardt. Permissions. 4 pp. Index. 12 pp.

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