Risen - State Of War (2006) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper XXXVI: September 24, 2006, 7:00 p.m. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006). A Note on Sources. “Many” sources “willing to discuss sensitive matters only on the condition of anonymity” ([xv]). [The book has no footnotes, no bibliography.] Prologue: The Secret History. George W. Bush hung up on George H.W. Bush in 2003, symbolizing the “radical departure” his administration has been (1-2). The National Security Council has been “weak and dysfunctional” under Bush II (3). The military and the CIA failed to resist much (4). The CIA’s failure can be attributed to its revealed “bankruptcy” and subsequent decline in the aftermath of the Cold War (4-7). Tenet was “not a great leader” (7-9). Bush has undertaken “an enormous gamble” by pushing democratic reform in the Middle East (9-10). This book is a contribution to the “secret history” of the CIA, marked by “domestic spying, abuse of power, and outrageous operations” (10). Ch. 1: “Who Authorized Putting Him on Pain Medication?” Bush decides to keep Tenet (11-18). Post-9/11 their relationship was “forged in fire” (18-20). Abu Zubaydah capture in Pakistan in March 2002, flown to a secret site in Thailand (20-22). Bush heard to ask Tenet who authorized putting him on pain medication (22-24). Bush never briefed on interrogation techniques to give him “plausible deniability” (24-27). Guantanamo chosen, and Bush gives CIA authority over prisoners (27-29). CIA sets up secret prisons (29-31). CIA tortures prisoners (31-33). Renditions (34-35). Operation Box Top planned assassinations (never executed) (35). Numbers in this secret system are unknown, but accountability is an issue

and future legal problems are possible (35-37). Ch. 2: The Program. Michael Hayden’s pre-9/11 career (39-43). Bush is using the National Security Agency to spy on communications, probably unconstitutionally (43-46). “The Program” is large-scale and “aggressive,” includes domestic communications, and uses key switches, many in the New York area; there is little oversight (47-55). No meaningful congressional oversight (55-58). Need for it not explained (58-59). Creation of Northern Command raises specter of military intelligence on U.S. soil (59). Hayden rewarded by Bush (59-60). Ch. 3: Casus Belli. Iraq created “war fever” in the national security bureaucracy (61). Tenet and Rice dominated by Rumsfeld and Cheney (6267). Pentagon ramps up Pentagon intel and creates covert action teams (67-71). Wolfowitz distrusted the CIA (71-73). The embrace of Chalabi was a rejection of CIA advice (73-76). Tenet never resisted the war on Iraq, despite senior CIA belief that it would hurt the battle against terrorism (76). Ways sought to use CIA’s Iraq Operations Group against Iraq (77-83). Ch. 4: The Hunt for WMD. CIA used Dr. Sawsan Alhaddad of Cleveland to contact her brother, Saad Tawfiq, in Iraq, identified as a key figure in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, to try to convince him to defect; Saad tells Sawsan there was no program, information which she passed along and which was ignored, along with similar testimony from thirty Iraqi weapons scientists (85-107). Ch. 5: Skeptics and Zealots. There were many skeptics on Iraqi WMD in the

CIA (109-12). But the view that the Bush administration was set on war took hold (112-13). Richard Dearlove and the Downing Street memo (113-15). Curveball (115-19). Extent of Bush’s knowledge of intelligence gaps is “unclear” (120-24). Ch. 6: Spinning War and Peace. The new CIA station in Baghdad failed to develop adequate intelligence in 2003, principally for lack of planning (124-42). The station chief who wrote an accurate aardwolf [country assessment] for Iraq was not returned to his post (142-47). Ch. 7: Losing Afghanistan. Colin Powell (149-51). Analysis that Afghanistan was becoming a “narcostate” ignored (151-63). U.S. allowed drug kingpin Haji Bashir Noorzai to get away (163-66). The hunt for bin Laden, who went to Pakistan (166-72). Ch. 8: In Denial: Oil, Terrorism, and Saudi Arabia. Failure to press Saudi Arabia on terrorism (173-91). Ch. 9: A Rogue Operation. In 2004, the U.S. accidentally sent to Iran “data [that] could be used to identify virtually every spy the CIA had inside Iran”; as a result, the U.S. “is now operating in the blind on Iran” (193-94). MERLIN: CIA had a Russian scientist give Iran nuclear bomb blueprints in Vienna in 2000, a “reckless” operation that “may not be over” (194-207). The goal: to stunt Iran’s program by sending it down the wrong technical path (206-12). Missed opportunities with Iran (212-18).

Afterword. By 2005 the CIA’s credibility had “vanished” (219-20). Rumsfeld destroyed the independence of the CIA from the military (221). The confounding neoconservative ascendancy “deeply divided the Republican elite” (222-23). Epilogue. Bush’s failure (225-26). Col. Larry Wilkerson’s criticism of administration as radical and inept (22627). Revival of American checks and balances, perhaps possible only because of the catastrophe in Iraq (227-31). Iran benefits (231). CIA now “even more irrelevant than ever before” (231). Battle over executive power is now the key issue (232). Acknowledgments. Research associates, editor, and “the many current and former government officials who cooperated for this book, sometimes at great personal risk” (233). Index. 14 pp. About the Author. “Covers national security for the New York Times” (249). One of a team that won Pulitzer Prize for 9/11 coverage. Co-authored two previous books. Wife, three sons. [CIA issued press release saying this book has serious error in every chapter (Wikipedia). The Dept. of Justice is investigating leaks in relation to this case, and the possibility of demanding that Risen identify sources has been raised. Risen was the author of a 1999 article on Wen Ho Lee that proved unfounded.]