Eco Science - Thirteen - Disarmament

ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT PAUL R. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ANNE H. EHRLICH STANFORD UNIVERSITY

JOHN P. HOLDREN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY San Francisco

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT /

In our view, the most serious risk associated with nuclear power is the attendant increase in the number of countries that have access to technology, materials, and facilities leading to a nuclear weapons capability. ... If widespread proliferation actually occurs, it will prove an extremely serious danger to U.S. security and to world peace and stability in general.86c The Ford group recommended that the U.S. defer the recycle of plutonium and the commercialization of the breeder reactor and that it seek "common supplier action to ban the export of such technology." It recommended also that the U.S. and other supplier nations provide assured supplies of slightly enriched uranium to other countries at favorable prices, a plan whose drawbacks we have already mentioned above. In April 1977, President Carter announced a nuclear policy for his administration essentially congruent with the Ford Study's recommendation. While we applaud the progress represented by the positions taken by the Flowers, Ranger, and Ford reports and by the Carter administration's position, our own preference is for a stronger stance. We believe there should be an absolute embargo on the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology by any nation.86d The United States should cajole and, if necessary, coerce its allies into compliance, using every incentive and/or peaceful sanction at its disposal. (The possibilities are considerable, not least of which is the fact that West Germany and France will be dependent on U.S. enriched uranium for their own nuclear power programs into the 1980s.) Since the Soviets are also intensely concerned about proliferation, there is a chance that they would cooperate. Countries that have power reactors but no enrichment or reprocessing capability could be supplied with low-enriched uranium by the sort of consortium mentioned above, but there is reason to question whether any additional power reactors should be exported by anyone. A universal embargo on reactor exports may seem a drastic measure—certainly drastic enough to require rewriting the NPT—but lowering the probability of a nuclear holocaust is a desperately important task. S61

'Spurgeon Kceny et al., Nuclear power issues and choices. See also the chapter on proliferation in A. Lovins, Soft energy paths: Toward a durable peace. 8
The sort of pussyfooting that characterized attempts to stem proliferation before 1977 was not merely a scandal but a threat to the survival of civilization. Chemical, biological, and environmental weapons. Even if humanity does manage to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it still must deal with the ever-increasing deadliness of conventional weapons and the prospective horrors of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and environmental warfare. Biological and chemical weapons, which could be nearly as destructive o£ lives as nuclear arms, seem to have some prospects of being eventually considered "conventional."87 Environmental warfare is newer and potentially perhaps even more threatening.88 Achieving disarmament.\ The third element of difficulty in changing the rules of international relations is uncertainty about the best way to achieve disarmament and security in a world where in the past security has_ usually been provided by brute force,, either threatened or overtly exercised. Unfortunately, the effort going into the study of peaceful means to world security has been infinitesimal compared with that going into military research, although almost no area needs greater immediate attention. The basic requirement is evident: once again it is a change in human attitudes so that the in-group against which aggression is forbidden expands to include all human beings. If this could be accomplished, jigf-iin'ty might he provided by an armed international organization, a global analogue of a police force. Many people have recognized this as a goal, but the way to reach it remains obscure seems, '— in a world where factionalism , ——•* if anything TO be increasing. The nrststep necessarily invn1'"'' Tganization.J?ut it seems probable that, as long as people fail to comprehend the magnitude of the danger,' that step will be impossible. At the very least, societies 87 J. P. Perry Robinson, The special case of chemical and biological weapons; see also Bo Holmberg, Biological aspects of chemical and biological weapons. 88 For example, see Chapter 11 and Frank Barnaby, The spread of the capability to do violence: An introduction to environmental warfare; Jozef Goldblat, The prohibition of environmental warfare; and Bhupendra M. Jasani, Environmental modification: New weapons of war?

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918 / THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT: FINDING A WAY OUT

must learn to weigh the risks inherent in attempting to achieve controlled disarmament against the risks of continuing the arms race. An(attemrjt at disarmament^ could lead to a war^W to the destruction or domination of the United States through Chinese or Soviet "cheating.", But, if disarmament were successfully carried out, and if an international police force were established, the reward^ would be a very much safer world in which resources would be freed for raising the standard of living for all people.89 No problem deserves more intensive study and international discussion. The dynamics of disarmament appear to be even more complex than those of arms races. Nevertheless, in 1970 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the only United States agency charged with planning in this area, had a budget of only a few million dollars (contrasted with $80 billion for "defense"). Representative John F. Seiberling of Ohio put it succinctly: "The, Pentagon has 3000 people working on arms sales to other countries while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has 12 people monitoring arms sales. That gives you an idea of where the executive branch priorities are.'""3 Moreover, the ACDA is heavily influenced by the Department of State bureaucracy, still a stronghold of cold-war thinking. It has been suggested that an important step toward^ disarmament could be taken hy the pgtahli^irpfnt of an international Disarmament control organization, which would serve as a clearinghouse forCinformtior) on the quantity and quality of weapons in various nations and would thus help to detect cheating on agreements.91 As a semi-independent UnifH N.arinnc_ agency, such an organization could play a vital role— butso far there has been no significant effort to establish one. (Diverting the military to peaceful purposes} Tfrp fourth element of difficulty involves economics and the "See, for example, Ronald Huisken, The consumption of raw materials for military purposes; and Ruth L. Sivard, Let them eat bullets! The military budgets of the United States and USSR in 1973 were greater than the combined annual income of more than 1 billion people in thirty-three of the poorest nations and almost 20 times the value of all foreign aid from all sources. '"Quoted in San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner, November 9, 1975. "Alva Myrdal, The international control of disarmament.

military establishment. Although this will be discussed in terms of the United States, there is every reason to believe that an analogous situation exists in the Soviet Union, the other military superpower. Civilians should realize that peace and freedom from tension are not viewed as an ideal situation by many members of the ._ military-industrial-government complex. By and large, professional military officers, especially field grade and higher, hope for an end to international tensions about as fervently as farmers hope for drought. When there is an atmosphere of national security, military budgets are usually small, military power minimal, and military promotions slow. The founders of the United States, recognized that the military services were unlikely to, work against their own interests, so they carefully established ultimate civilian control over the army and navy; It worked rather well for a long time. But times have changed. Wars are no longer fought with simple, understandable weapons like axes, swords, and cannon. Now a nation needs weapons systems with complex and often arcane components, such as acquisition radar, VTOL fighters, Doppler navigators, MIRVs, cruise missiles, and nuclear submarines. Such systems cannot be produced rapidly, on demand, by a few government contractors. Long-term planning is required, involving not only the military services but also a large number of industrial organizations that supply various components. Those organizations, not unnaturally, often hire rewed military officers to help them in their negotiations^ with the government; where decisions on appropriations for armaments are made. The necessary intimacy of the military and industry in development and procurement of weapons led Dwight D. Eisenhower to coin the (jmlitary-industnal complex!) The term militaryindustrial-labor-government complex sometimes seems more accurate. In his heavily documented 1970 book. Pentagon capitalism, industrial engineer Seymour Melman of Columbia University showed that even that term is inadequate to describe the Frankenstein's monster that has

This complex seems to have an aversion to peace, but it 92

See especially Melman's chapter 7.